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Abstract
The study presents the results regarding the attitudes of students from humanities and technical specializations in Timișoara towards the emergence and development of artificial intelligence (AI). The emphasis was on the most likely consequences of the development of artificial intelligence in the future, especially the negative consequences that its development would entail. The method used for data collection was the sociological survey and the information gathering tool was the questionnaire. It was applied to a total of 929 people, ensuring a sample representativity margin of ± 3%. The analysis reveals that the participants in the study predict that due to the emergence and development of AI, in the future, interpersonal relationships will be negatively affected, there will be fewer jobs, economic crises will emerge, it will be used to make intelligent weapons, to increase military conflicts, to take control of humanity and, last but not least, to destroy mankind. The results revealed differences in responses depending on the type of specialization (humanities or technical) and the gender of the respondents.

Carl von Clausewitz bestimmt den Krieg als Zweikampf. Bernd Hüppaufs Grundlegung einer Kulturgeschichte des Kriegs widerspricht: Es gibt keinen Krieg ohne Diskurs. Der Blick auf den Kriegsdiskurs von seinen Anfängen in Mesopotamien bis zu den intelligenten Waffen in Cyberwar und Drohnenkrieg zeigt, dass Krieg aus militärischem Kampf und kulturellem Diskurs besteht. Militärgeschichte fetischisiert die Fakten, die Kulturgeschichte des Kriegs dagegen baut sie in ein Netz aus Bedeutungen ein. Erst so geraten Begeisterung, Angst, Grausamkeit und Grauen als Elemente des Kriegs in den Blick. Und erst so wird das Netz aus Symbolen, Handlungen und Bedeutungen beschreibbar, aus denen jede Erinnerung die Wirklichkeit des Kriegs konstruiert. Es ist der Blick auf Erlebnis, Ethik, Subjektivität und Identität, der die Kontinuität von Krieg über 3000 Jahre Kriegsgeschichte bis in die Gegenwart erweist. Daraus ergibt sich nicht weniger als das Erfordernis einer zu schreibenden Gefühlsmoral um die Frage: Dürfen Soldaten überhaupt töten? Carl von Clausewitz defines war as a fight. Bernd Hüppauf's foundation of a cultural history of war objects: There is no war without discourse. Looking at war discourse from its beginnings in Mesopotamia to the intelligent weapons of cyber and drone warfare shows that war consists of military fighting and cultural discourse. Military history fetishizes facts, while a cultural history of war integrates them into a web of meanings. Only this brings enthusiasm, fear, cruelty, and horror into view as elements of war. And only this makes it possible to describe the web of symbols, actions, and meanings from which every memory construes the reality of war. Looking at experience, ethics, subjectivity, and identity is what reveals the continuity of war through 3000 years of war history to the present day. This results in nothing less

Zur Vermeidung von Kollateralschäden im urbanen Umfeld ist es besonders wichtig, über präzise Wirkmittel zu verfügen und darüber hinaus die Wirkung dem Einsatzumfeld anpassen zu können. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)

This article focuses on the problem of regulation of the application of the autonomous weapons systems from the perspective of the norms and principles of international humanitarian law. The article discusses the question of what restrictions are imposed on the application of such weapons in the international humanitarian law. The article presents a number of principles that must be met by both the weapons and their method of their application: distinction between civilians and combatants, military necessity, proportionality, prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering, and humanity.

The author concludes that from the perspective of the principles of the international humanitarian law, it is doubtful if autonomous systems would be able to comply with these principles. Weapons that hit targets without human intervention have been applied for a long time, but they have never had the independence that they have now. The issue of compliance of autonomous weapons systems with the international humanitarian law can be considered if sufficient experience of application of such weapons in real conditions is accumulated.

This study demonstrates that it is impossible to say that autonomous weapons systems do not comply with the principles of humanitarian law in general. The paper provides policy recommendations and assessments for each of the principles under consideration. The author also concludes that it would be necessary not to prohibit autonomous weapons, because they do not comply with the principles of international humanitarian law, but to develop rules for their application and for human participation in their functioning. A significant challenge to the development of such rules is the opacity of these autonomous weapons systems, if we look at them as at the complex intelligent computer systems.

This article traces some of the history of and logic behind the automation of weapons systems in relation to their planned deployment as an integral element of 'homeland security' in the US after the September 11th attacks. We focus primarily on unmanned combat air vehicles that have long been part of the Air Force's R&D plans, but have now apparently found an event that justifies their production and deployment. What, we wonder, will be the effects on the urban landscape by using unmanned vehicles capable of 'intelligently' selecting a target and firing upon it, especially when the technology that allows these weapons systems to find the target as satellite coordinates relies on the same information technology that provides the infrastructure for 'smart' communities, and are already deployed in virtually all urban settings. By exploring the logic of speed and surprise that has driven the increased move toward and reliance on automated and intelligent weapons systems, we reveal how the arguments used in favor of developing and deploying such weapons systems also work as arguments against them. The technology that makes a weapons system intelligent, for example, also means that it has to be capable of choosing the wrong target, hence its 'intelligence'. Similarly, the need to control the element of surprise has its logical end in the pursuit of the ultimate hidden vantage point, exemplified by the dark side of the moon. The technology and logic of the current 'War on Terror' fits neatly into already extant long–range military strategic planning, and could have a massive impact on the shape of urban environments in the immediate and distant futures.Cet article reprend en partie l'historique et la logique qui sous–tendent l'automatisation des systèmes d'armes dans le cadre de leur déploiement en tant qu'élément constitutif de la 'séécurité de la patrie' aux Etats–Unis après les attaques du 11 septembre. Il se consacre surtout aux aéronefs de combat sans pilote qui font partie des stratégies de R&D de l'Air Force depuis longtemps même si, apparemment, ils ont dorénavant trouvé un événement justifiant leur production et leur déploiement. Quels seraient les effets sur le paysage urbain d'un recours à ces véhicules sans pilote capables de choisir 'intelligemment' une cible et de la viser? Et ce, en particulier si la technologie qui leur permet de trouver la cible sous forme de coordonnées par satellite s'appuie sur cette même informatique qui fournit l'infrastructure aux communautés 'intelligentes', celle–ci étant déjà installée sur quasiment toutes les scènes urbaines. En s'intéressant à la logique de rapidité et surprise qui a motivé la tendance croissante et la dépendance à légard des systèmes d'armes automatisés intelligents, l'article révèle comment les arguments favorables au développement et au déploiement de ces systèmes fonctionnent aussi comme arguments contraires. La technologie qui rend intelligent un tel système signifie, par exemple, qu'il doit être capable de choisir la mauvaise cible, donc son 'intelligence'. De même, le besoin de maîtriser l'élément de surprise trouve sa fin logique dans la recherche de la position cachée optimale, caractérisée par la face cachée de la lune. Technologie et logique de la 'guerre' actuelle contre la terreur s'adaptent parfaitement aux plans stratégiques militaires de grande envergure déjà en place et pourraient avoir une incidence énorme sur la conformation des environnements urbains dans un avenir à la fois immédiat et lointain.

The problem being addressed is how to best find and engage an unknown number of targets in unknown locations using multiple autonomous wide area search munitions. In this research cooperative behavior is being investigated to improve the overall mission effectiveness. A simulation was used to emulate the behavior of autonomous wide area search munitions and measure their overall expected performance. This code was modified to incorporate the capability for cooperative engagement based on a parameterized decision rule. Using Design of Experiments and Response Surface Methodologies, the simulation was run to achieve optimal decision rule parameters for given scenarios and to determine the sensitivities of those parameters to the precision of the Autonomous Target Recognition algorithm, lethality of the warhead, and the characteristics of the battlefield. Results show that the form of cooperative engagement used in this study is most useful in overcoming the limitations on warhead lethality and, to a lesser degree, probability of target report. However, cooperative engagement alone is not able to compensate for higher false target attack rates. Also, the selection of the optimal weights in the decision algorithm are very sensitive to all battlefield characteristics.

With Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems being deeply rooted in the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure, it is necessary for combat models to capture C4ISR effects in order to properly assess military worth. Unlike many DoD legacy combat models, the agent based model System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation (SEAS) is identified as having C4ISR analysis capabilities. In lieu of requirements for all new DoD C4ISR weapon systems to be placed within a DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF), investigation of means to export data from the Framework to the combat model SEAS began. Through operational, system, and technical views, the DoDAF provides a consistent format for new weapon systems to be compared and evaluated. Little research has been conducted to show how to create an executable model of an actual DoD weapon system described by the DoDAF. In collaboration with Systems Engineering masters student Captain Andrew Zinn, this research identified the Aerospace Operation Center (AOC) weapon system architecture, provided by the MITRE Corp., as suitable for translation into SEAS. The collaborative efforts lead to the identification and translation of architectural data products to represent the Time Critical Targeting (TCT) activities of the AOC. A comparison of the AOC weapon system employing these TCT activities with an AOC without TCT capabilities is accomplished within a Kosovo-like engagement (provided by Space and Missile Center Transformations Directorate). Results show statistically significant differences in measures of effectiveness (MOEs) chosen to compare the systems. The comparison also identified the importance of data products not available in this incomplete architecture and makes recommendations for SEAS to be more receptive to DoDAF data products.

Die NSM (Naval Strike Missile) ist ein von Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace AS entwickelter Seezielflugkörper der neuesten Generation, dessen besondere Merkmale neben dem Stealth Design seine extreme Manövrierfähigkeit und seine autonome Zielerkennung mittels eines Dual Band Intelligent lmaging IRSuchkopfs (PR) darstellen. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)

The history of mankind as a species and the history of intelligent man is largely related to pathogenic biological agents that have been the cause of pandemics or used as weapons since prehistoric times. The development and improvement of any weapon is closely linked to the development of new technologies. The treatment of patients with infectious diseases and the protection of people during pandemics are also closely linked to new technologies. The twenty-first century is characterized by the rapid development of biotechnology and genetic engineering, which can be crucial in the treatment of many diseases and provide a dangerous impetus to the development of new biological weapons. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the enormous impact that a single biological pathogen can have on society, the natural origin of which experts have not given a definitive answer. The danger of developing new types of biological weapons and using them for war, sabotage, terror, blackmail, profiting or criminal activity increases with the development of biotechnology. Knowledge of possible ways to develop biological weapons allows you to build a system of biosafety and biosecurity in each country in particular and on the planet as a whole. The post-industrial era poses a threat of new viruses or diseases, the emergence of which may be triggered by agricultural or industrial development of new territories. And global communication systems contribute to the almost instantaneous spread of dangerous infections. Recent advances in biochemistry, genetics and molecular biology have made it possible to create living organisms. Although these developments offer effective tools to treat disease, increase food production and improve the quality of life of many people, they can also be used by government and non-government agencies to develop new biological weapons. The availability of basic biological science, information on genetic engineering and biotechnology, the modular principle of research, the basis of ready-made solutions, the availability of materials reduce the level of skills required for uncontrolled research of biological pathogens or biological weapons development. The paper analyzes the threats associated with the possibility of using genetic engineering and modern bioengineering technologies for the development of genetically modified biological pathogens, binary and other new types of biological weapons. Key words: biological pathogens, emergent and re-emergent infections, biological weapons, binary biological weapons, biosafety, biosecurity. ; Історія людства як біологічного виду та історія людини розумної в значній мірі пов'язана з патогенними біологічними агентами, які з доісторичних часів були причиною пандемій чи використовувались як зброя. Розвиток і удосконалення будь якої зброї тісно пов'язаний з розробкою нових технологій. Лікування пацієнтів з інфекційними захворюваннями, захист людей під час пандемій також тісно пов'язані з новими технологіями. Двадцять перше століття характерне бурхливим розвитком біотехнологій та генної інженерії, які можуть мати вирішальне значення у лікуванні багатьох хвороб та надати небезпечний поштовх розвитку нових видів біологічної зброї. Пандемія COVID-19 продемонструвала величезний вплив, який може мати на суспільство один біологічний патогенний агент, щодо природного походження якого експерти не дали остаточної однозначної відповіді. Небезпека розробки нових видів біологічної зброї та застосування її для війни, диверсій, терору, шантажу, отримання надприбутків чи в кримінальних злочинах зростає з розвитком біотехнологій. Знання про можливі шляхи розвитку біологічної зброї дозволяє вибудовувати систему біобезпеки та біозахисту в кожній країні зокрема та на планеті в цілому. Постіндустріальна епоха створює загрозу нових вірусів або хвороб, поява яких може бути спровокована сільськогосподарським чи промисловим освоєнням нових територій. А глобальні системи комунікації сприяють майже миттєвому поширенню небезпечних інфекцій. Останні досягнення в галузі біохімії, генетики та молекулярної біології зробили можливим створення живих організмів. Хоча ці розробки пропонують ефективні засоби для лікування хвороб, збільшення виробництва їжі та покращення якості життя багатьох людей, вони також можуть використовуватися державними та недержавними структурами для розробки нових видів біологічної зброї. Доступність фундаментальної біологічної науки, інформації про генну інженерію та біотехнології, модульний принцип досліджень, бази готових рішень, доступність матеріалів знижують рівень навичок, необхідний для проведення неконтрольованих досліджень біологічних патогенних агентів чи розробки біологічної зброї. В роботі проаналізовані загрози, пов'язані з можливістю застосування генної інженерії та сучасних біоінженерних технологій для розробки генетично модифікованих біологічних патогенних агентів, бінарної та інших нових видів біологічної зброї. Ключові слова: біологічні патогенні агенти, емерджентні та ре-емерджентні інфекції, біологічна зброя, бінарна біологічна зброя, біобезпека, біозахист

Intro -- NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES AND ACTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES -- NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES AND ACTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES -- CONTENTS -- PROLOGUE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENT -- INTRODUCTION -- Chapter I GENERAL OVERVIEW -- ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES -- PILLARS TO STOP THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS AND ARMS STOCKPILES -- Today's Global Treats -- World Military Trade -- Armed Conflicts -- The Control of Nuclear Weapons -- The Control of Chemical Weapons -- The Control of Biological Weapons -- The Control of Conventional Weapons -- The Control of Missile Technology -- Chapter II CURRENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION -- FIRST PHASE -- SECOND PHASE -- THIRD PHASE -- Chapter III NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION -- Nuclear Weapons -- A.United States of America35 -- B. Russia -- C.United Kingdom38 -- D.France -- E.China -- F.India and Pakistan -- G.Israel -- H.The Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK) -- The Destruction Power of a Nuclear Weapon -- Chemical Weapons -- Biological Weapons -- Conventional Weapons -- Small Arms and Light Weapons -- Intelligent Weapons61 -- Cluster Munitions -- Antipersonnel Land Mines -- Delivery Systems (Missiles) -- Chapter IV ADDITIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS -- DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL -- SECURITY -- DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY -- MILITARY STRATEGY -- MILITARY DOCTRINES -- STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES -- Chapter V THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES AND ITS MAIN COMPONENTS -- COMPONENTS OF THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME -- A. THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGIME AND THE NPT -- The IAEA Safeguards System and the Additional Protocol -- The NPT Review Process -- The First NPT Review Conference -- The Second NPT Review Conference.

This article examines the potential implications of the combinations of robotics, artificial intelligence, and deep learning systems on the character and nature of war. The author employs Carl von Clausewitz's trinity concept to discuss how autonomous weapons will impact the essential elements of war. The essay argues war's essence, as politically directed violence fraught with friction, will remain its most enduring aspect, even if more intelligent machines are involved at every level.