INEFFECTIVENESS AND INEFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT
In: Public personnel management, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 90-94
ISSN: 0091-0260
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In: Public personnel management, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 90-94
ISSN: 0091-0260
In: Journal of political economy, Band 81, Heft 5, S. 1092-1109
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Paper - Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Purdue University no. 648
In: Public choice, Band 75, Heft 4, S. 371-378
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 76, Heft 1-2, S. 371
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Journal of post-Keynesian economics, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 549-565
ISSN: 1557-7821
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 266, Heft 1, S. 24-31
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: Journal of development economics, Band 84, Heft 1, S. 465-486
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Public personnel management, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 90-95
ISSN: 1945-7421
"In recent years the public has been reluctant to accept tax increases, the principle means of supporting government services. one reason is the public's belief that government is ineffective and inefficient."
In: The Economic Journal, Band 99, Heft 396, S. 491
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 200
ISSN: 1938-274X
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 300-323
ISSN: 1756-2171
We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm‐level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability‐related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner who is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, would choose.
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 48
ISSN: 1756-2171