Illegal logging is a significant problem of major international community concern because it has a devastating impact on some of the world's most valuable remaining forests and contributes to tropical deforestation and forest degradation. Furthermore, it threatens biodiversity and undermines sustainable forest management, having a negative impact on poverty reduction, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development. The article presents instruments adopted by the EU in order to combat illegal timber logging. The author describes their material scope and legal character, dividing them into two groups: internal and international legally binding instruments and soft law instruments, in order to answer the question about their legal character and position in the EU legal order and in national orders of the Member States.
Illegal logging is widely recognized as a major economic problem and one of the causes of environmental degradation. Increasing awareness of its negative effects has fostered a wide range of proposals to combat it by major international conservation groups and political organizations. Following the 2008 US legislation which prohibits the import of illegally harvested wood and wood products, the European Union (EU) is now discussing a legislation proposal which would ban illegal timber from the EU market. In this study we use the ICES computable general equilibrium model to estimate the reallocation of global demand and timber imports following the pending EU legislation. With this exercise our final objective is to assess the economic impacts and measure the potential emission reduction resulting from the introduction of this type of policy. Results show that while the EU ban does not seem particularly effective in reducing illegal logging activities, its main effect will be the removal of illegal logs from the international markets. In addition, the unilateral EU ban on illegal logs increases secondary wood production in illegal logging countries as their exports become relatively more competitive. Through this mechanism, part of the banned, illegal timber will re-enter the international trade flows, but it will be 'hidden' as processed wood. This effect is, however, limited. Finally, given the limited effect on overall economic activity, effects on GHG emissions are also limited. Direct carbon emissions from logging activities can decrease from 2.5 to 0.6 million tons per year.
Illegal logging is widely recognized as a major economic problem and one of the causes of environmental degradation. Increasing awareness of its negative effects has fostered a wide range of proposals to combat it by major international conservation groups and political organizations. Following the 2008 US legislation which prohibits the import of illegally harvested wood and wood products, the European Union (EU) is now discussing a legislation proposal which would ban illegal timber from the EU market. In this study we use the ICES computable general equilibrium model to estimate the reallocation of global demand and timber imports following the pending EU legislation. With this exercise our final objective is to assess the economic impacts and measure the potential emission reduction resulting from the introduction of this type of policy. Results show that while the EU ban does not seem particularly effective in reducing illegal logging activities, its main effect will be the removal of illegal logs from the international markets. In addition, the unilateral EU ban on illegal logs increases secondary wood production in illegal logging countries as their exports become relatively more competitive. Through this mechanism, part of the banned, illegal timber will re-enter the international trade flows, but it will be "hidden" as processed wood. This effect is, however, limited. Finally, given the limited effect on overall economic activity, effects on GHG emissions are also limited. Direct carbon emissions from logging activities can decrease from 2.5 to 0.6 million tons per year
The objective of the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR), enforced since March 2013, is for importers and exporters to commit to reducing the risk of trading timber products from illegal sources in the EU. EUROSTAT time series on monthly trade with wood products from January 1988 to August 2016 were used to monitor the law's impact. The time series, subdivided into sections before and after the implementation of EUTR, were investigated in time and frequency domains. The analyses in the time domain indicated the adequateness of the AR (1) and ARMA (1, 1) models. As the confidence intervals for their estimates before and after EUTR do not overlap, the respective time series are considered as different and the influence of EUTR legislation probable (also confirmed by the significant models with EUTR as intervening event). Long term variation of the monthly time series (March 2013 to August 2016) show an increasing linear trend for all wood products and for wood products with tropical woods excluded. Since EU imports of tropical wood were falling before EUTR, the stagnant imports thereafter are judged as uncertainty and time the markets need to adapt to a new legislative situation. The analyses in frequency domain based on inference from periodogram revealed cycles of 3, 4, 6 and 12 months, except for time series of tropical wood imports after EUTR. If cycles are thought of as inherent to import time series, this lack in tropical wood imports can be an indication of a 'wait-and-see' attitude of importers as a consequence of EUTR. ; Die Europäische Holzhandelsverordnung (EUTR) trat im März 2013 in Kraft. Diese Verordnung zielt darauf ab, die Verpflichtung der Marktteilnehmer in der EU zur Vermeidung des Holzhandels aus illegalen Quellen zu stärken. Um die Auswirkungen von EUTR auf Holzhandel zwischen Europa und nichteuropäischen Ländern bewerten zu können, wurden, auf EUROSTAT Daten basierend, umfangreiche Zeitreihenanalysen für den Zeitraum vom Januar 1988 bis August 2016 durchgeführt. Die Zeitreihen wurden sowohl im Zeit- als auch im Frequenzbereich untersucht. Dabei zeigte sich, dass zur mathematisch-statistischen Modellierung der monatlichen Handelsmengen mit Holzprodukten autoregressive AR(1) bzw. Autoregressiv-Moving-Average Modelle ARMA(1, 1) adäquat sind. Die Analyse der partitionierten Abschnitte der Zeitreihen vor und nach Inkrafttreten der EUTR ergab statistisch signifikante Unterschiede, so dass der Einfluss der Holzhandelsverordnung als Interventionseffekt im Holzhandel als wahrscheinlich erachtet wird. Wichtig ist allerdings, dass der Holzhandel wegen EUTR keine quantitativen Einbrüche verzeichnet: der Handel mit allen Holzprodukten weist sogar einen positiven, linearen Trend ab März 2013. Da die Importe der tropischen Holzprodukte vor dem Inkrafttreten der EUTR rückläufig waren, kann die Stagnation des Holzhandels mit den tropischen Holzprodukten nach EUTR auf eine Unsicherheit der Marktteilnehmer und eine Art von 'wait-and-see' Verhalten hindeuten. Festgestellt wurde auch eine auffällige Veränderung der Zeitreihen im Frequenzbereich: die vor EUTR deutliche 3, 4, 6 und 12 monatliche Zyklen bei Importmengen aus den tropischen Ländern konnten in den Zeitreihen nach Inkrafttreten der EUTR nicht mehr nachgewiesen werden.
Societal Impact Statement A wide variety of plant species are threatened by illegal wildlife trade (IWT), and yet plants receive scant attention in IWT policy and research, a matter of pressing global concern. This review examines how "plant blindness" manifests within policy and research on IWT, with serious and detrimental effects for biodiversity conservation. We suggest several key points: (a) perhaps with the exception of the illegal timber market, plants are overlooked in IWT policy and research; (b) there is insufficient attention from funding agencies to the presence and persistence of illegal trade in plants; and (c) these absences are at least in part resultant from plant blindness as codified in governmental laws defining the meaning of "wildlife." Summary This review investigates the ways in which "plant blindness," first described by Wandersee and Schussler (1999, p. 82) as "the misguided anthropocentric ranking of plants as inferior to animals," intersects with the contemporary boom in research and policy on illegal wildlife trade (IWT). We argue that plants have been largely ignored within this emerging conservation arena, with serious and detrimental effects for biodiversity conservation. With the exception of the illegal trade in timber, we show that plants are absent from much emerging scholarship, and receive scant attention by US and UK funding agencies often driving global efforts to address illegal wildlife trade, despite the high levels of threat many plants face. Our article concludes by discussing current challenges posed by plant blindness in IWT policy and research, but also suggests reasons for cautious optimism in addressing this critical issue for plant conservation.
Illegal activities are one of the most pressing problems facing the Indonesian forest sector today. The debate on illegal forest activities has focused primarily on legal and governance issues. Economic forces, however, are increasingly recognized as fundamental drivers of illegal forest activities. We ask the question whether the legalization of small logging concessions and their development can teach us anything about how to address the illegal logging problem. We find that legalization alone-when a legal timber concession is granted to a previously illegal operator-does not necessarily result in a significant reduction in illegal activities. When illegal activities are profitable, they can be expected to continue. Changing the regulatory framework to increase monitoring and enforcement can affect the profitability of these illegal activities. By changing the underlying economic incentives for logging, such interventions hold greater promise of success. In the medium to long term, however, legalization may help reduce illegal logging when it entrusts local people with ownership and control of forest resources and maintains a monitoring role for government agencies.
Illegal activities are one of the most pressing problems facing the Indonesian forest sector today. The debate on illegal forest activities has focused primarily on legal and governance issues. Economic forces, however, are increasingly recognized as fundamental drivers of illegal forest activities. We ask the question whether the legalization of small logging concessions and their development can teach us anything about how to address the illegal logging problem. We find that legalization alone-when a legal timber concession is granted to a previously illegal operator-does not necessarily result in a significant reduction in illegal activities. When illegal activities are profitable, they can be expected to continue. Changing the regulatory framework to increase monitoring and enforcement can affect the profitability of these illegal activities. By changing the underlying economic incentives for logging, such interventions hold greater promise of success. In the medium to long term, however, legalization may help reduce illegal logging when it entrusts local people with ownership and control of forest resources and maintains a monitoring role for government agencies.
Tropical forests represent vast carbon stocks and continue to be key carbon sinks and buffer climate changes. The international policy constructed several mechanisms aiming at conservation and sustainable use of these forests. Illegal logging is an important threat of forests, especially in the tropics. Several laws and regulations have been set up to combat illegal timber trade. Despite significant enforcement efforts of these regulations, illegal logging continues to be a serious problem and impacts for the functioning of the forest ecosystem and global biodiversity in the tropics. Microscopic analysis of wood samples and the use of conventional plant DNA barcodes often do not allow to distinguish closely-related species. The use of novel molecular technologies could make an important contribution for the identification of tree species. In this study, we used high-throughput sequencing technologies and bioinformatics tools to obtain the complete de-novo chloroplast genome of 62 commercial African timber species using the genome skimming method. Then, we performed a comparative genomic analysis that revealed new candidate genetic regions for the discrimination of closely-related species. We concluded that genome skimming is a promising method for the development of plant genetic markers to combat illegal logging activities supporting CITES, FLEGT and the EU Timber Regulation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
Illegal activities are one of the most pressing problems facing the Indonesian forest sector today. The debate on illegal forest activities has focused primarily on legal and governance issues. Economic forces, however, are increasingly recognized as fundamental drivers of illegal forest activities. We ask the question whether the legalization of small logging concessions and their development can teach us anything about how to address the illegal logging problem. We find that legalization alone-when a legal timber concession is granted to a previously illegal operator-does not necessarily result in a significant reduction in illegal activities. When illegal activities are profitable, they can be expected to continue. Changing the regulatory framework to increase monitoring and enforcement can affect the profitability of these illegal activities. By changing the underlying economic incentives for logging, such interventions hold greater promise of success. In the medium to long term, however, legalization may help reduce illegal logging when it entrusts local people with ownership and control of forest resources and maintains a monitoring role for government agencies.
Raised public concern in the European Union (EU) about the legality of its timber imports has pushed the European Commission to raise its standards and legality demands for wood imports. Combining literature reviews, structured interviews and trade data analyses, this study assesses the potential influence from Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) (with its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPA) system and new legislation EU Timber Regulation (EUTR)), and third party verification schemes on the timber trade between tropical countries and Europe. These instruments have the potential to reduce the amount of illegally sourced timber being placed on the market, and they seem to have resulted in both increasing support of legality verification and certification uptake. However, there are signs of increased ambiguity in trade that could originate as a side effect of the transition towards a stricter regulation for tropical timber. Such ambiguity is explicitly taken into account here. Possible consequences from increased ambiguity are substitution of oak lumber for tropical hardwood lumber, and a diversion of exports of tropical timber to destinations with a less stringent regulatory framework than the EU. Evidence of these trade patterns in the literature reviews, interviews, and trade data analyses seems to confirm that ambiguity in international trade markets has actually increased since the introduction of these instruments.
Illegal logging is one of the main causes of worldwide deforestation and, by releasing green-house-relevant gasses, contributes to climate change. Moreover, trade with illegal timber and wood products creates market disadvantages for products from sustainable forestry. As a contribution to global forest protection international laws and timber regulations are enacted, such as the USA Lacey Act, the European Timber regulation (EUTR) and, the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act in Australia. All these regulations prohibit the import and trade of illegally logged wood and require that timber and timber products have to be produced in accordance with the respective national legislation. Controls are based on a due diligence system which requires the correct declaration of the wood genus/species (botanical name) and origin. The clear identification of internationally traded timber is also of prime importance in enforcing CITES policies regarding protected species, e.g., the entire Dalbergia species = Rosewood or Swietenia spp. = True Mahogany (Koch et al. 2011). In the context of these important requirements and new challenges wood anatomy provides the most valuable support for practical wood identification and is routinely applied in the daily control of wood and wood products. Using light microscopic techniques, up to 100 anatomical characters can be used following the internationally standardized IAWA lists of "Microscopic Features for Hardwood and Softwood Identification". Overall, the microscopic descriptions of about 8,700 taxa of hardwoods are currently available and documented in several computerized databases, e.g., InsideWood or Commercial timbers, macroHOLZdata and CITESwoodID (Delta-Intkey-System), and XyloTron (Richter et. al. 2003, Hermanson & Wiedenhoeft 2011, Wheeler 2011).
Die Europäische Holzhandelsverordnung (EUTR) trat im März 2013 in Kraft. Diese Verordnung zielt darauf ab, die Verpflichtung der Marktteilnehmer in der EU zur Vermeidung des Holzhandels aus illegalen Quellen zu stärken. Um die Auswirkungen von EUTR auf Holzhandel zwischen Europa und nichteuropäischen Ländern bewerten zu können, wurden, auf EUROSTAT Daten basierend, umfangreiche Zeitreihenanalysen für den Zeitraum vom Januar 1988 bis August 2016 durchgeführt. Die Zeitreihen wurden sowohl im Zeit- als auch im Frequenzbereich untersucht. Dabei zeigte sich, dass zur mathematisch-statistischen Modellierung der monatlichen Handelsmengen mit Holzprodukten autoregressive AR(1) bzw. Autoregressiv-Moving-Average Modelle ARMA(1, 1) adäquat sind. Die Analyse der partitionierten Abschnitte der Zeitreihen vor und nach Inkrafttreten der EUTR ergab statistisch signifikante Unterschiede, so dass der Einfluss der Holzhandelsverordnung als Interventionseffekt im Holzhandel als wahrscheinlich erachtet wird. Wichtig ist allerdings, dass der Holzhandel wegen EUTR keine quantitativen Einbrüche verzeichnet: der Handel mit allen Holzprodukten weist sogar einen positiven, linearen Trend ab März 2013. Da die Importe der tropischen Holzprodukte vor dem Inkrafttreten der EUTR rückläufig waren, kann die Stagnation des Holzhandels mit den tropischen Holzprodukten nach EUTR auf eine Unsicherheit der Marktteilnehmer und eine Art von 'wait-and-see' Verhalten hindeuten. Festgestellt wurde auch eine auffällige Veränderung der Zeitreihen im Frequenzbereich: die vor EUTR deutliche 3, 4, 6 und 12 monatliche Zyklen bei Importmengen aus den tropischen Ländern konnten in den Zeitreihen nach Inkrafttreten der EUTR nicht mehr nachgewiesen werden. ; The objective of the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR), enforced since March 2013, is for importers and exporters to commit to reducing the risk of trading timber products from illegal sources in the EU. EUROSTAT time series on monthly trade with wood products from January 1988 to August 2016 were used to monitor the law's impact. The time series, subdivided into sections before and after the implementation of EUTR, were investigated in time and frequency domains. The analyses in the time domain indicated the adequateness of the AR (1) and ARMA (1, 1) models. As the confidence intervals for their estimates before and after EUTR do not overlap, the respective time series are considered as different and the influence of EUTR legislation probable (also confirmed by the significant models with EUTR as intervening event). Long term variation of the monthly time series (March 2013 to August 2016) show an increasing linear trend for all wood products and for wood products with tropical woods excluded. Since EU imports of tropical wood were falling before EUTR, the stagnant imports thereafter are judged as uncertainty and time the markets need to adapt to a new legislative situation. The analyses in frequency domain based on inference from periodogram revealed cycles of 3, 4, 6 and 12 months, except for time series of tropical wood imports after EUTR. If cycles are thought of as inherent to import time series, this lack in tropical wood imports can be an indication of a 'wait-and-see' attitude of importers as a consequence of EUTR.
This article points to the importance of systems and praxis-oriented approach in understanding the problem of illegal logging in Indonesia. In recent years, there has been a tendency on the part of industry analysts and forestry sector observes to view the seemingly irremediable spread of illegal logging in the country in isolation, as a result of disassociated and pre mediated criminal acts. This paper proposes a different view of the problem. It suggests that illegal logging is not a simple criminal offense, but a complex system with multiple stakeholders at its base. It further argues that illegal logging is also a way for local people to get a share of the profits from logging, profits denied by the central government for the last thirty years. Recent developments, like the possibility for local government to grant small-scale concessions now enable illegal timber operators to conduct their business legally. As a result, local communities are courted by so-called investors who covet their forests. With the implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia, local politicians also find it their interests to support small concessions. Recent attempts by the central government to control this new rush on forest have failed. Local governments are no longer willing to comply with the injunctions of the central government. The only way for the Ministry of Forestry to regain control (or at least to minimize unsustainable logging practices) would be to acknowledge this new paradigm and find a place for it within the overall forest policy. Long term solutions to the problem will probably involve a combination of community-based logging and joint-venture arrangements with industrial concessionaires.
