Suchergebnisse

This report describes the Navy's role in carrying out a variety of activities related to what the Administration refers to as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Navy's role in the GWOT raises several potential oversight issues for Congress.

When the war on terrorism became the top U.S. priority, how did this affect the Army's other longstanding commitments?How should the Army adjust to the altered landscape? The author here summarizes the thoughts of a group of RAND Arroyo Center researchers who found five main demands that the Army must be able to meet: increased deployments, a broader range of capabilities, greater use of the transformation process to meet these goals, high demand for scarce skills, and a more flexible overseas basing structure

"Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 was the first test to rapidly mobilize Army National Guard combat power for a contingency operation, and included combat brigades. The Army approached the DESERT STORM mobilizations through the affiliation program, namely the Roundout Program. While DESERT STORM was a resounding success by expelling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait in February 1991 and vindicating the Total Force policy, it revealed serious issues with the expeditious mobilization of Guard combat power. Operation DESERT STORM foreshadowed many mobilization issues the Army National Guard faced in subsequent decades, involving manning, unit equipment, health readiness, and training"--