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This thesis deals with selected topics in fiscal policy. The first part examines the relationship between fiscal decentralization and certain outcomes, one being the amount of trust citizens have in their government, the other being economic efficiency. The second part looks into the challenge of governments to develop fiscal systems, or policy reforms, that generate sufficient revenues to deal with long-run government budget challenges and promote economic growth at the same time.

This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s. We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.

The role of fiscal policy in short-run macroeconomic stabilization is, by now, well known in the academic literature and in policy circles. However, this focus on the short-run, especially in a democracy, means that much less attention has been paid to the other consequences of the use of fiscal policy. By studying the intergenerational-welfare aspects of fiscal policy, this book deals with some fundamental issues of fiscal policy. Why does public debt tend to rise over time in democracies? Why is there a tendency for government spending on consumption and on social security to grow? Why do governments fail to invest in public capital adequately? Should a dollar transferred from the young be treated as a dollar transferred to the old? By studying the international aspects of fiscal policy, the book establishes international differences in fiscal policy as determinants of persistent trade imbalances and international indebtedness. It also considers some basic questions on international transfers and austerity in open economies. What criteria should be used to define a successful foreign-aid programme? Why is foreign aid likely to fail in a world of global wealth disparity? Can reliance be placed on the international coordination of austerity to improve welfare in the long run? Is austerity accompanied by international transfers superior to austerity unaccompanied by international transfers? This book based on the OLG model fills a gap on fiscal-policy issues in the recent spate of books on overlapping generations.

In the past twelve months the government budget situation in Germany has improved markedly, and the budget deficit has moved from 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 1.7 per cent in 2006, with further improvements in prospect. Over the same period in France, the budget deficit moved marginally from 3 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2006. The prospects for further improvement appear limited as the new government plans to cut taxes to stimulate the economy. Projections for budget deficits are very uncertain, as they are the difference between two large numbers (receipts and spending) that are difficult to predict accurately. Figures 1 and 2 plot the errors around our budget projections for France and Germany based on stochastic simulations on NiGEM. The 95 per cent confidence limit for our forecast one year ahead is around 1 per cent of GDP around our central forecast, and uncertainty increases into the future. As we can see from figures 3 and 4, our forecast errors for France and Germany have been well within the 95 per cent bands in the past three years, except for our one year ahead forecast for Germany for 2006. The budget improved by 1.5 per cent of GDP more than we had anticipated, and this appears to have been due to unexpectedly high tax receipts, rather than to changed policy.