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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of trade and financial globalization on human development in 52 African countries using updated data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). Design/methodology/approach – The estimation technique used is a Two-Stage-Least Squares Instrumental Variable methodology. Instruments include: income-levels, legal-origins and religious-dominations. The first-step consists of justifying the choice of the estimation technique with a Hausman-test for endogeneity. In the second-step, we verify that the instrumental variables are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables (globalization dynamic channels) conditional on other covariates (control variables). In the third-step, the strength and validity of the instruments are assessed with the Cragg-Donald and Sargan overidentifying restrictions tests respectively. Robustness checks are ensured by: (1) use of alternative globalization indicators; (2) endogeneity based estimation; (3) adoption of two interchangeable sets of instruments; (4) estimation with a technique that controls for time-invariant unobservable shocks that affect openness and human development simultaneously. Findings – Findings broadly indicate that while trade globalization improves human development (consistent with the neoliberal theory), financial globalization has the opposite effect (in line with the hegemony thesis). The 'life expectancy' component of the HDI weighs most in the positive impact of trade globalization on human emancipation. Practical implications – Capital accounts should be opened in tandem with financial and institutional development. The investment atmosphere needs improvement to curtail capital flight (about 39%). Other policy implications include: adoption of openness options in a selective and gradual manner, development of some industrial backbone for an import-substitution or export-led industry, emphasis on regional trade and building capacity, development of the agricultural sector with continuous government assistance, building of rural infrastructure, increasing adult literacy rate and developing human resources, fighting corruption and mitigating wastages in government expenditure. Originality/value – These findings are based on very recent data. Usage of the inequality adjusted human development index first published in 2010, corrects past works of the bulk of criticisms inherent in the first index.

In this paper the author compared 13stock exchange indexes of American, British and German markets and determined their impact on Polish Wig and WIG20 indexes. The analysis proved that the British FTSE100 and FTSE250 as well as the German DAX had the biggest influence on the Warsaw indexes. The relations among all these indexes were also heavily influenced by the Russian and American economic crisis and Poland's access to the European Union.

Im November dieses Jahres sollen auf dem G-20-Gipfel in Cannes Vorschläge zur Reform des internationalen Währungssystems vorgelegt werden. Wie sollte ein zukünftiges globales Wechselkursregime gestaltet werden? Jörg Asmussen, Staatssekretär im Bundesministerium der Finanzen, unterstreicht, dass aus Sicht des Bundesfinanzministeriums ein System fester Wechselkurse oder von Wechselkurszielzonen abzulehnen ist. Europa habe mit den Wechselkurszielzonen des Europäischen Wechselkurssystems in der Vergangenheit ausreichend Erfahrungen gesammelt. Stattdessen könnten Reformmaßnahmen, z.B. eine Stärkung der IWF-Überwachungsmechanismen, eine verbesserte Kooperation bei der Steuerung globaler Kapitalflüsse sowie ein Fahrplan zur Integration weiterer Währungen wie des chinesischen Renminbis in den SZR-Währungskorb helfen, in einem flexibleren weltweiten Wechselkursregime die Volatilität zu verringern, und dazu beitragen, dass Wechselkurse stärker die Fundamentaldaten der Volkswirtschaften widerspiegeln. Dies würde auch einen Beitrag zu einem geordneten Abbau der globalen Ungleichgewichte leisten. Nach Ansicht von Gunther Schnabl, Universität Leipzig, sollte der Kern der Reformen zunächst nicht bei den optimalen Wechselkursstrategien der Peripherieländer liegen, sondern bei der Frage, wie der geldpolitische Kurs der USA im Interesse der ganzen Welt diszipliniert werden kann. Die Antwort könnte in einer Neuausrichtung der Wechselkurse Ostasiens am Euro liegen. Eine informelle Bindung aller ostasiatischer Währungen an den Euro wäre vielversprechend, weil ein externer Anker sowohl für Japan als auch für China politisch akzeptabel sei. Und auch für Europa wäre die »informelle Fernosterweiterung« der Eurozone attraktiv. Unter anderem wäre der Zwang, dem geldpolitischen Kurs der US-Fed zu folgen, im erweiterten informellen Euroraum deutlich gemindert.

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), government-owned investment funds, are of growing importance in international finance. They are a vehicle to manage foreign exchange reserves and wealth which have been accumulating in the emerging world, particularly in the BRICs. However, while China and Russia set up SWFs over the last decade, India and Brazil still lack such funds. In analysing thoroughly the Indian case, this paper seeks to contribute to recent literature on the determinants of SWFs with two main findings: First, it confirms conventional economic theory which shows the requirement of excessive foreign reserves for the set-up of SWFs. Second, it suggests that political systems matter, as demonstrated by the lively debate in India on whether that country should have such a fund. In this way, influential societal actors, in particular the central bank and regulating agencies as well as business associations, have dominated the public discourse and successfully lobbied the government to waive initial plans in support of an alternative wealth management scheme.

The literature has identified three main approaches to account for the way exchange rate regimes are chosen: i) the optimal currency area theory; ii) the financial view, which highlights the consequences of international financial integration; and iii) the political view, which stresses the use of exchange rate anchors as credibility enhancers in politically challenged economies. Using de facto and de jure regime classifications, we test the empirical relevance of these approaches separately and jointly. We find overall empirical support for all of them, although the incidence of financial and political aspects varies substantially between industrial and non-industrial economies. Furthermore, we find that the link between de facto regimes and their underlying fundamentals has been surprisingly stable over the years, suggesting that the global trends often highlighted in the literature can be traced back to the evolution of their natural determinants, and that actual policies have been little influenced by the frequent twist and turns in the exchange rate regime debate.

This paper, using a microfounded macroeconomic model that embeds the key features of the Greek economy, studies the efficacy of the various policy measures taken, at national and EU level, to cushion the economic effects of the pandemic shock. The paper attempts to give quantitative answers to questions like: What are the effects of these policies and, especially, what are the implications of the fiscal transfers and grants from the Recovery Fund and the quantitative policies of the ECB, like the PEPP, for the Greek economy? Do they help the real economy and, if yes, by how much? What would have happened had these measures not taken? How costly will be the re-emergence of the fear of debt default and risk premia?

By merging transaction-level trade data from China Customs and loan data from the China Development Bank (CDB), we analyze the effects of government credit on trade activities. We find that CDB credit mainly flows to SOEs in strategic industries at the top of the supply chain. These up-stream loans lead to the lower price and higher amount of export goods of private firms in down-stream industries, which leads to decreases in employment and performance of the US firms in the same industry. In contrast, the US firms in downstream industries use cheaper intermediate goods imported from China and perform better subsequently.

The Central and Eastern European (CEE) capital markets (of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine and, to a limited extent, Belarus) are gradually evolving towards increased breadth (diversity) and depth (liquidity), however, they are still exposed to considerable cross-country volatility and interdependence spill-overs – especially in times of capital flight to more established asset classes ("safe havens"). Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have widely been censured for their undesirable political interference and chronic operational opacity. This paper demonstrates that in CEE, contrary to widespread perceptions attributable to developed markets, SWFs can act as natural and powerful risk mitigators (contributing to a more stable capital base and reduced systemic volatility). Such a proposition is premised on several factors specific to SWFs oriented to CEE. They comprise: strategic long-termism and patience in overcoming interim pricing deficiencies, commitments to elements of a broadly interpreted infrastructure, and absence of overt conflicts of interest with the CEE host economies. The paper, besides reviewing the utilitarianism of SWFs in the CEE's risk mitigation context, highlights regulatory and technical barriers to more SWF funding for CEE. It also recommends policy measures to the CEE economies aimed at luring more host-friendly SWF investment into the region.

This paper investigates how financial, trade, institutional and political liberalization policies have affected financial efficiency in Africa. It uses updated data to appraise second generation reforms in order to gather fresh evidence and derive more updated policy implications. The 'freedom to trade' and 'economic freedom' indices are also employed. The following findings are established. (1) Financial liberalization mitigates financial allocation efficiency, with the magnitude of the de jure indicator (KAOPEN) higher than that of the de facto measurement (FDI). (2) Exports significantly improve financial efficiency. (3) Institutional liberalization has a positive effect on the efficiency of allocation while the effect of political liberalization is not significant. (4) Freedom of trade decreases (improves) financial (banking) system efficiency. (5) Economic freedom facilitates the transformation of mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators. Justifications for these nexuses are provided.

In this work, we trace and analyze the emergence of the crisis in the Bulgarian banking system as well as the behavior of the central bank and other macroeconomic institutions. The average annual rate of growth in the net profits of the commercial banks for the period 2002-2008 amounted to 31.6%, which encouraged and accounted for the increase in credits. After 2008, the pendulum began to swing back as the difficulties in collecting loan repayments increased, the strain in financial balances tightened and assistance and support from the regulators were requested. The level of the financial and operating income was maintained primarily because of the high interest rates on the loans, but the structure of their distribution shifted substantially. Administrative costs and depreciation were nearly frozen up, and impairment and provisions grew at the expense of profit. This work shows that macroeconomic policies allowed the expansion of the lending boom and encouraged its irrational development. Poor operation and poor quality of the institutions not only allowed but also enabled direction of investments to financing of inefficient production structures. Underestimating the negative consequences shoring up a dysfunctional institutional environment is deemed a form of irrationality; however, not one of the immediate economic players acted to override the economic and political environment. The financial and economic crisis currently affecting the country has its roots in the deficiencies of the domestic macroeconomic policies, and therefore, the efforts toward overcoming these failures should be directed at improved domestic macroeconomic management.

Purpose – Is globalization instrumental in fighting corruption? Do wealth effects matter in this fight? Are findings valid when linearity assumptions are dropped? This paper assesses the Lalountas et al. (2011) hypotheses (conclusions) in the African context. Design/methodology/approach – Though not in form, yet in substance the intuition and motivation are compatible with those of Lalountas et al. (2011). Four hypotheses are tested from different methodological and contextual standpoints. In the analysis, while the economic and social dimensions of globalization are reflected in the HDI, the political dimension is captured by good governance indicators. A TSLS-IV estimation technique is applied where-in globalization instruments of trade and financial liberalization are instrumented on human-development and government-quality to account for corruption (corruption-control) effects. Thus the intuition is assessing how globalization is instrumental in the fight against corruption through human development (economic and social dimensions) and government quality (political dimension). Findings – Hypothesis 1: Globalization is a powerful tool in fighting corruption (True). Hypothesis 2: Globalization is an important tool in fighting corruption only in Middle and High income countries (Partially True). Hypothesis 3: For Low income countries globalization has no significant impact on corruption (True). Hypothesis 4: Hypotheses 1 and 2 are valid only under linearity (False). Social Implications – In countries with high levels of per capita, emphasis is placed on the political and social dimensions of globalization and as a result the effects of this phenomenon on corruption-control are significant. Conversely, in nations with low levels of per capita income, emphasis is given to the economic dimension of international integration and as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited. As a policy implication, persistent globalization as an effective means to reduce corruption in developing countries might lead to inappropriate policies in low income countries. Originality/value – This paper has tested the Lalountas et al. (2011) hypotheses in the continent where concerns of globalization, human development and corruption are most acute.

The recent waves of political crises in Africa and the Middle East have inspired the debate over how political instability could pose a risk of financial contagion to emerging countries. With retrospect to the Kenyan political crisis, our findings suggest stock markets in Lebanon, Mauritius were contaminated while Nigeria experienced a positive spillover. Our results have two major implications. Firstly, we have confirmed existing consensus that African financial markets are increasingly integrated. Secondly, we have also shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial crisis; political crises effects should not be undermined.

Rainer Brüderle, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft und Technologie, sieht für eine weitergehende Zentralisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik keinen Grund. Die für die jeweilige Situation eines Mitgliedstaats bestmögliche Ausgestaltung von Strukturreformen gelinge am ehesten in nationaler Verantwortung und entsprechend den nationalen Gegebenheiten. Georg Fahrenschon, Bayerischer Staatsminister der Finanzen, warnt vor einer europäischen Wirtschaftsregierung einschließlich nivellierender Steuerungsfunktion. Ihre Befürworter seien bislang den Beweis schuldig geblieben, dass der Ansatz Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit stärken und nicht schwächen wird. Auch Carsten Hefeker, Universität Siegen, spricht sich gegen eine gemeinsame Wirtschaftsregierung aus. Man müsse sich die Frage stellen, wo Externalitäten bestehen und Mechanismen zum Eindämmen dieser Externalitäten nötig seien. Und man müsse sich auf die konsequente Durchsetzung von beschlossenen Regeln einigen. Rainer Schweickert, Universität Siegen, argumentiert in seinem Beitrag, dass man Regierungsversagen nicht mit mehr Kompetenzen für die Regierungen bekämpfen sollte. Eine europäische Wirtschaftsregierung könne nicht dazu beitragen, die gegenwärtige Krise besser zu bewältigen bzw. zukünftige Krisen zu vermeiden. Es gelte, die Spielregeln zu verbessern und damit sowohl Markt- als auch Regierungsversagen zu verhindern. Für Konrad Lammers, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, stellt eine europäische Wirtschaftsregierung keine brauchbare Alternative dar. Aus seiner Sicht fehlen in der Währungsunion Anreiz- und Sanktionsmechanismen, die die wirtschaftspolitischen Akteure zu einem verantwortungsvollen Verhalten sowohl auf der nationalen wie auch auf der europäischen Ebene anhalten.

ABSTRACT
We examine changes in stock price informativeness following the European Union's Transparency Directive (TPD). The TPD, implemented by country between 2007 and 2009, enhanced corporate transparency through mandating regular firm financial disclosures and facilitating the dissemination of financial reports. Using stock return synchronicity as a proxy for stock price informativeness, we find that price informativeness improved following implementation of the TPD. This improvement was more pronounced in countries with strong regulatory environments than those with weak regulatory environments. We additionally examine a later amendment to the TPD that eliminated the requirement of quarterly financial disclosures and document an increase in stock return synchronicity following the amendment. Our findings support prior research suggesting that transparency regulations improve financial information.
JEL Classifications: F30; G15; G30; M4.
Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.