Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Criteria for policy evaluation -- List of policy evaluation criteria -- Use of policy evaluation criteria -- Overview of policy options -- Regulations -- Voluntary agreements -- Financial incentives and disincentives -- Investments in infrastructure -- Improvement of government operations -- Indirect GHG reduction policies -- Investments in technology development -- Investments in public awareness -- Targets -- Conditional transfers -- Canadian policy experience -- Jurisdiction -- Canada's main sources of GHG emissions -- Canadian climate policy implementation to date -- Policy assessment and combination: general -- Policy assessment and combination: Canada -- Carbon pricing -- Revenue recycling -- International competitiveness concerns -- Areas for further research -- Appendix A: Straw dog policy combination -- Appendix B: Review of experience of and research on greenhouse gas reduction policies in Canada and internationally.

Greenhouse gas emissions have serious impacts on the natural environment. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on carbon emission force enterprises to take carbon emission into consideration when making production decisions. In this paper, in the context of allowing emission trading and investment of emission reduction technology, models were presented for a two-stage supply chain to analyze the optimal investment and pricing decisions. The results indicate that manufacturer's endurance capacity of reduction difficulty is higher in the cooperation model than in the Stackelberg game model, and that perfect coordination of supply chains can be realized by a revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of a consumer, low-carbon products mean higher price, so that subsidies or tax exemptions should be provided to keep low prices. Meanwhile, the government can promote investment in emission-reduction technologies and achieve its emission reduction targets by controlling emission trading price, strengthening emission reduction publicity and providing technology investment subsidies.

ABSTRACTThis paper, based on a computable general equilibrium model of the Indian economy, shows that a domestic carbon tax policy that recycles carbon tax revenues to households imposes heavy costs in terms of lower economic growth and higher poverty. However, the decline in economic growth and rise in poverty can be minimized if the emissions restriction target is modest, and carbon tax revenues are transferred exclusively to the poor. India's participation in an internationally tradable emission permits regime with grandfathered emissions allocation is preferable to any domestic carbon tax option, provided the world market price of emission permits remains low. Even better would be if India participated in a global system of tradable emission permits with equal per capita emission entitlements. India would then be able to use the revenues garnered from the sale of surplus permits to speed up its economic growth and poverty reduction and yet keep its per capita emissions below the 1990 per capita global emissions level.

Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to voluntary environmentally responsible behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. The paper shows that the introduction of environmental policy may lead to a reduction of voluntary abatement and sometimes may increase emissions and environmental damage. The explanation is that voluntary abatement is socially rewarded and the reward depends on the general attitude of society towards voluntary abatement. So, if the government tightens environmental standards, the voluntary component of abatement is reduced and the social reward is negatively affected. Some considerations concerning optimal environmental policies are discussed towards the end of the paper.

Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to voluntary environmentally responsible behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. The paper shows that the introduction of environmental policy may lead to a reduction of voluntary abatement and sometimes may increase emissions and environmental damage. The explanation is that voluntary abatement is socially rewarded and the reward depends on the general attitude of society towards voluntary abatement. So, if the government tightens environmental standards, the voluntary component of abatement is reduced and the social reward is negatively affected. Some considerations concerning optimal environmental policies are discussed towards the end of the paper.