Suchergebnisse

This entry has been realised in the framework of the H2020-MSCA-RISE-2018 project "LoGov - Local Government and the Changing Urban-Rural Interplay". LoGov aims to provide solutions for local governments that address the fundamental challenges resulting from urbanisation. To address this complex issue, 18 partners from 17 countries and six continents share their expertise and knowledge in the realms of public law, political science, and public administration. LoGov identifies, evaluates, compares, and shares innovative practices that cope with the impact of changing urban-rural relations in five major local government areas: (1) local responsibilities and public services, (2) local financial arrangements, (3) structure of local government, (4) intergovernmental relations of local governments, and (5) people's participation in local decision-making. The present entry addresses the structure of local government in India. The entry forms part of the LoGov Report on India. To access the full version of the report on India, other practices regarding the structure of local government and to receive more information about the project, please visit: https://www.logov-rise.eu/. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 823961.

This study examines the role of politics on decentralization and service delivery in South Africa, with a specific focus on Johannesburg and Cape Town. The research delineates how national decentralization has affected service delivery responsibilities and resources, determines whether service delivery is affected by whether or not a city is governed by an opposition party, and considers what the nature of inter-governmental relations implies for donors operating in South Africa's urban sector. The study finds that service delivery does not appear to be worse off in Cape Town than in Johannesburg, even though the former is controlled by the opposition Democratic Alliance while the latter is in the hands of the ruling African National Congress. While there have been political attempts to undermine opposition-controlled Cape Town, the fiscal elements are protected by a relatively strong and well-managed department of finance. Moreover, both donors and the national government steer money towards Cape Town because they know it can deliver on its obligations.

Since 2000 in New Delhi, urban decentralization has mainly come in the form of the highly visible Bhagidari or partnership scheme, inviting city residents to participate in a 'process of dialogue and the discovery of joint-solutions.' This paper critically examines this program between 2000-2012, through the experiences of primarily middle class neighbourhood organizations (called Resident Welfare Associations, or RWAs) that were included in the scheme. The paper argues that rather than constitutional decentralization, Bhagidari as an initiative must be read in terms of a larger shift to Decentralized Delhi - Mehra - image2entrepreneurial governance. Bhagidari's success has been in delegating management to voluntary middle class neighbourhood associations called RWAs, at little cost to city government, while seemingly opening up a 'participatory' space for middle class urban residents in civic affairs. However, the article argues that Bhagidari's impact has come to represent an attempt at harnessing and managing the new middle class aspiration to engage with urban government for administrative and political ends. In this context, Bhagidari has also been seen as an important means of cultivating middle class consent and a constituency through courting RWAs for an ambitious chief executive. Over time, this has become a common strategy for building political and civic visibility for a range of actors, and thus the number of RWAs has proliferated. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

The article analyzes decentralization and commercialization reforms in the Yemeni urban water and sanitation sector. The case study shows that sector reforms to increase the performance and independence of water utilities in developing countries can become entangled in conflicting political agendas, leading to the derailing of reforms. The reform process in the Yemeni case is presented as part of sector-wide policy change due to increasing scarcity, supply crises, and pressure from donors. A measurement framework for the level of decentralization and commercialization of water utilities is developed and applied. The future reform pathways are outlined, giving consideration to the current political reality in Yemen. Points for practitioners Water decentralization reforms need to follow technical considerations regarding the capacity and independence of utilities in order to enhance any positive impacts of decentralization. Institutional conflicts are difficult to tackle during an ongoing reform process, particularly in a context of corruption, politicization, and state fragility. There is a need for more context-specific reform agendas and better strategies to deal with conflicts and shield utilities from political interference. Further, effective commercialization requires a level of accountability at the local level and improved capacities of staff. Such capacities can be enhanced through trainings ahead of reforms.