Suchergebnisse

A theoretical framework combining the two branches of TCE, i.e., the governance branch (Williamson, 2005) and the measurement branch (Barzel, 2005) may explain the choice of the governance structure for private environmental transactions. Four case studies, i.e., the market for pure air in polluted cities, the contractual arrangement between La Esperanza and the Monteverde Conservation League, the case of the French mineral water bottler Vittel and the case of land ownership by land trusts are briefly developed in order to support the theoretical framework. Special attention is devoted to the presence (or not) of a 3-D (defined, defended and divestible) property rights system and its influence on the way environmental property rights are likely (or not) to be re-arranged. Lessons and policy implications are drawn in order to foster research on these challenging issues.

The transaction specificity of assets yields dependence, and hence transaction costs in case of opportunism and bounded rationality. However, this dependence need not be symmetric between buyer and supplier, and there may be dependence without transaction specific assets. There are many forms of speci ficity, yielding different patterns of more or less symmetric dependence. These different forms of specificity are analyzed in terms of a formal, generalized rela tion of specificity. The implications for dependence are discussed.

We examine the empirical research on interfirm contracts that has been inspired by Oliver Williamson's work on transaction costs. We eschew the vast and supportive empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision, covered elsewhere, focusing instead on vertical market restrictions. We organize our discussion around specific restrictions, emphasizing the evidence concerning restrictions, such as contract duration and adjustment clauses, that have been studied most through transaction cost lenses, but also the findings from studies of vertical restraints, namely those restrictions that have been the focus of antitrust policy. We conclude with some general thoughts about how what one can learn from these studies can inform antitrust policy regarding vertical market restrictions.

We examine the empirical research on interfirm contracts that has been inspired by Oliver Williamson's work on transaction costs. We eschew the vast and supportive empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision, covered elsewhere, focusing instead on vertical market restrictions. We organize our discussion around specific restrictions, emphasizing the evidence concerning restrictions, such as contract duration and adjustment clauses, that have been studied most through transaction cost lenses, but also the findings from studies of vertical restraints, namely those restrictions that have been the focus of antitrust policy. We conclude with some general thoughts about how what one can learn from these studies can inform antitrust policy regarding vertical market restrictions.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we offer a methodological reflection on how the explanatory virtues of economic theories can be assessed in a systematic way. Second, we use that theoretical apparatus to study the explanatory virtues of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE, henceforth). Precisely, we are primarily interested in assessing the progress within TCE with respect to its explanatory power rather than directly comparing TCE's explanatory virtues to alternative theories. The paper offers also some general insights into the way we compare economic theories.

This study focuses on changes in transaction costs over time in nonmarket settings. Traditional Williamsonian transaction cost economics theory shows little concern with time. However, this study reveals that time is a crucial factor in the fluctuation of transaction costs in nonmarket settings: Transaction costs increase in the initial and middle phases of a transaction. But in the long term, they may increase or decrease and are affected considerably by whether the rules, procedures, and protocols governing the transaction are effective ("green tape") or ineffective ("red tape"). In contrast, traditional transaction cost economics assumes a gradual decrease in transaction costs over time. The passage of time and the "red tape" or "green tape" governing the transaction influence stakeholders' transaction behavior in nonmarket settings.

This book examines transaction cost economics, the influential theoretical perspective on organizations and industry that was the subject of Oliver Williamson's seminal book,Markets and Hierarchies (1975). Written by leading economists, sociologists, and political scientists, the essays collected here reflect the fruitful intellectual exchange that is occurring across the major social science disciplines. They examine transaction cost economics' general conceptual orientation, its specific theoretical propositions, its applications to policy, and its use in systematic empirical research. The chapters include classic texts, broad review essays, reflective commentaries, and several new contributions to a wide range of topics, including organizations, regulations and law, institutions, strategic management, game theory, entrepreneurship, innovation, finance, and technical information. The book begins with an overview of theory and research on transaction cost economics, highlighting the specific accomplishments of scholars working within the perspective and emphasizing the enormous influence that transaction cost reasoning exerts on the social sciences. The following section covers conceptual uses for the transaction cost framework and major theoretical or methodological elements within it, such as bounded rationality. While advancing some interesting theoretical propositions, these chapters are in fact more ambitious: each examines a specific field, area, or research program and attempts to fashion a new way of thinking about research questions. In the section on industrial applications, contributors study the application of transaction cost theory to a range of problems in utilities, telecommunications, laser printing, and early international trade. The book closes with four microanalytical chapters that delve into the structures and behaviors of

Proceedings Paper (for Acquisition Research Program) ; This study examines defense acquisition through the new lens of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). TCE is an emergent field in economics that has multiple applications to defense acquisition practices. TCE''s original focus was to guide ''make-or-buy?'' decisions that define the boundaries of a firm. This study reviews insights afforded by TCE that impact government outsourcing (''buy'' decisions), paying special attention to defense procurement. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.