Suchergebnisse

Purpose – This study aims to examine the effect of financial innovation, financial ratios, cost efficiency and good corporate governance on the financial performance of banks in Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach – The data in this study are in the form of annual financial statements of conventional banks in Indonesia. The effect of cost efficiency, innovation and financial performance of banks in Indonesia is expected to be evident in 2009–2018. The research method used is the panel regression method. Findings – The results show that financial innovation affects the financial performance of banks. Cost efficiency has a negative effect on the financial performance of banks. Financial ratio, which is proxied by the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and loan to deposit ratio, has a positive effect on return on asset and net interest margin. Financial ratio, which is proxied by nonperforming loan and equity to total assets, has a negative effect on return on asset and return on equity. Good corporate governance (GCG), which is proxied by the proportion of managerial ownership (PMO), does not affect the financial performance of banks, whereas GCG, which is proxied by the proportion of independent board of directors, has a negative and significant effect on the financial performance of banks in Indonesia. Practical implications – These results are a warning to bankers and the government to be cautious when formulating a strategy for the financial performance of banking. Originality/value – Cost efficiency and financial innovation are important for the financial performance of banking. However, the possible impact of cost efficiency and financial innovation in Indonesia does not have a significant impact. The study uses static panel estimation techniques to analyze the data.

ABSTRACTThe paper develops a cost frontier model of electricity distribution and estimates it on data for the 12 regional electricity companies of England and Wales. It is found that some significant cost drivers in cross‐section estimation are insignificant when the model is estimated on panel data, highlighting the well‐known drawbacks of cross‐section estimation. Panel data estimation suggests that the main determinants of distribution operating costs are the number of customers in the area and simultaneous maximum demand. These results and the efficiency rankings of the companies are not sensitive to changes in error distribution assumptions and sample size. There is also significant evidence of economies of scale. There is a small but significant effect on cost efficiency from privatization, but this is as likely to be due to the changes in accounting policies at the time of privatization as any real effect.

This study explored the cost-efficiency of all 231,204 supported employees funded by vocational rehabilitation throughout the entire United States from 2002 to 2007. Results found that supported employees returned an average monthly net benefit to taxpayers of $251.34 (i.e., an annual net benefit of $3,016.08 per supported employee) and generated a benefit–cost ratio of 1.46. Further, economic returns of supported employees were investigated across nine disabling conditions. Even individuals with the least cost-efficient disability (i.e., traumatic brain injuries) returned to taxpayers a monthly net benefit of $111.62. Finally, this study determined that supported employees with multiple conditions were as cost-efficient as individuals with only one disability (i.e., benefit–cost ratios of 1.49 versus 1.46, respectively).

PurposeIn this study, we test the so-called "Quiet Life Hypothesis" (QLH), which postulates that banks with market power are less efficient.Design/methodology/approachWe employ instrumental variable Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects, Tobit and Logistic regressions. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 2001–2011. There is a two-step analytical procedure. First, we estimate Lerner indices and cost efficiency scores. Then, we regress cost efficiency scores on Lerner indices contingent on bank characteristics, market features and the unobserved heterogeneity.FindingsThe empirical evidence does not support the QLH because market power is positively associated with cost efficiency.Originality/valueOwing to data availability constraints, this is one of the few studies to test the QLH in African banking.

Tese de doutoramento em Governação, Conhecimento e Inovação, apresentada à Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra ; O comércio de carbono, enquanto uma política climática de mercado que permite aos poluidores cumprir com compromissos de redução de emissões recorrendo a direitos de poluição transacionáveis, é apresentado pelos seus proponentes como a alternativa mais eficiente para a mitigação das alterações climáticas, enquanto oponentes contrapõem que o argumento baseado na custo-eficiência negligencia os prejuízos que resultam da mercantilização do carbono. Esta tese contribui para este debate, que é fundamental para o futuro das políticas ambientais, expondo os custos sociais do comércio de carbono e posicionando-se contra a inclusão do comércio de carbono no leque de políticas climáticas. A argumentação aqui desenvolvida é baseada nas contribuições teóricas sobre os custos sociais de atividades privadas e conflitos de valores, assim como perspetivas críticas sobre a neoliberalização da natureza e os limites do mercado. O comércio de emissões foi primeiramente proposto como uma alternativa às taxas ambientais pigouvianas maximizadoras da eficiência. Baseado na perspetiva sobre custos sociais assente em direitos de propriedade, o comércio de emissões permitiria ao regulador escapar à impossível tarefa de calcular um nível ótimo de poluição e providenciaria em alternativa uma forma custo-eficiente de atingir um nível de poluição determinado exogenamente. Esta transição teórica permitiria à Economia centrar-se na discussão dos melhores meios par atingir fins dados e esquivar-se à discussão dos fins. A dicotomia fins-meios, no entanto, não se aplica fora da teoria económica, tal como a descrição do comércio de emissões como uma alternativa simples e eficiente à regulação direta. Como a experiência dos EUA com o comércio de emissões demonstra, criar mercados para direitos de poluição transacionáveis requer investimento governamental num aparato regulatório que não é menos complexo do que é requerido pela regulação direta ou pela taxação. Esta experiência também ilustra o quanto a alegada eficiência dos mercados de emissões é resultado do seu fraco desempenho ambiental e da sua desconsideração pela justiça social e pela participação democrática. Os mercados de carbono criados ao abrigo do Protocolo de Quioto suscitam problemas adicionais. Comparados com os esquemas de "limitação e comércio" baseados num único poluente e um número restrito de fontes, esquemas como o Sistema Europeu de Comércio de Licenças de Emissão são mais complexos e requerem maior intervenção governamental. Para mais, instrumentos flexíveis como o Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo permitem aos países industrializados poluir além dos seus compromissos de emissões e suscitam preocupações com a integridade disputável de metodologias que contabilizam reduções de emissões de projetos de compensação em relação a um cenário de referência arbitrário. O fraco desempenho ambiental destes esquemas é ilustrado pela sua incapacidade de incentivar a descarbonização, enquanto distribuem rendas aos poluidores e criam novas fontes de corrupção. Estas questões não são redutíveis a discussões sobre procedimentos contabilísticos e outras tecnicalidades. Abrindo a "caixa negra" da quantificação e comensuração do carbono, é revelado que os seus cálculos marginalizam incertezas relevantes e assumem um grau de precisão que o conhecimento científico e a tecnologia não podem providenciar no presente. No entanto, dado que contabilizar aumentos e reduções de emissões requer decisões políticas sobre o que deve ser contabilizado, qual a métrica relevante e o que é um grau de incerteza aceitável, avanços científicos e tecnológicos não são condição suficiente para que seja possível produzir os números inequívocos que o comércio de carbono requer. Indo mais longe na discussão sobre as implicações da comensuração e abstração de carbono, esta tese apresenta um argumento contra a inclusão do comércio de carbono no leque de políticas climáticas, baseado em quatro críticas normativas. Com o apoio da literatura crítica, é defendido que o comércio de carbono é ineficaz, antidemocrático, injusto e antiético e que, por estas razões, só pode ser considerado como uma política custo-eficiente quando os seus custos sociais são ignorados. Um argumento contra o reformismo do comércio de carbono é então apresentado mostrando como tentar contrariar os efeitos negativos dos mercados de carbono através de restrições ao comércio conduz à erosão destes mercados. Uma melhor alternativa é o apoio a políticas climáticas que fomentam uma pluralidade de valores e providenciam benefícios sociais. A tese conclui defendendo uma mudança no debate sobre política climática no sentido da discussão dos valores que são fomentados ou prejudicados por cada política. Um enquadramento geral é proposto que respeita o pluralismo de valores e reconhece conflitos entre valores incomensuráveis, o que não é compatível com políticas de mercado. ; Carbon trading, as a market-based climate policy that allows polluters to comply with emissions reductions commitments with tradable pollution rights, is presented by its proponents as the most cost-efficient alternative for climate change mitigation, while critics counter that the cost-efficiency argument ignores the harms that result from commodifying carbon. This thesis contributes to this debate, which is fundamental for the future of environmental policies, by exposing the social costs of carbon trading and making the case against its inclusion in the climate policy-mix. The argument developed here draws from theoretical contributions on the social costs of private activities and on value conflicts, as well as critical perspectives on the neoliberalization of nature and the limits of the market. Emissions trading was firstly proposed as an alternative to efficiency-maximizing or pigouvian environmental taxation. Based on the property rights approach to social costs, emissions trading would allow regulators to escape the impossible task of calculating the optimal level of pollution and offer instead a cost-efficient way to achieve an exogenously determined level of pollution. This theoretical shift would allow economics to be centred on discussing the best means to achieve given ends and relived it of discussing ends. The ends-means dichotomy, however, does not hold outside textbook economics, as well as the description of emissions trading as a simple and efficient alternative to direct regulation. As the US experience with emissions trading shows, creating markets for tradable pollution rights requires government investment in a regulatory apparatus that is no less complex than what is required for direct regulation or taxation. This experience also illustrates how the purported efficiency of emissions trading systems is a flip side of their weak environmental performance and their disregard for social justice and democratic participation. Carbon trading schemes created under the Kyoto Protocol raise additional problems. Compared to "cap and trade" schemes based on a single pollutant and a restricted number of sources, schemes like the EU Emissions Trading System are more complex and require further government intervention. Furthermore, flexibility instruments like the Clean Development Mechanism allow industrialized countries to pollute beyond their emissions commitments and raise issues with the disputable integrity of methodologies that account for emissions reductions from offset projects relative to an arbitrary baseline. The dismal performance of these schemes is illustrated by their inability to provide an incentive to decarbonization, while distributing rents to polluters and creating new sources of corruption. These issues are not reducible to discussions on accounting procedures and other technicalities. Opening the "black box" of carbon quantification and commensuration reveals that its calculations sideline relevant uncertainties and assume a degree of accuracy that scientific knowledge and technology cannot deliver in the present. Yet, since accounting for emissions increases or reductions requires political decisions on what is to be accounted for, what is the relevant metric and what is an acceptable degree of uncertainty, further scientific and technological developments are not enough to make it possible to produce the unambiguous numbers that carbon trading requires. Going further on the discussion of the implications of carbon commensuration and abstraction, this thesis presents an argument against the inclusion of carbon trading in the climate policy-mix based on four normative critiques. With the support of critical literature, it is argued that carbon trading is ineffective, undemocratic, unjust and unethical and that, for these reasons, it can only be considered as a cost-effective policy when its social costs are ignored. An argument against carbon trading reformism is then presented by illustrating how trying to mitigate the negative effects of carbon markets by imposing restrictions on trading leads to the erosion of these markets. A better alternative is claimed to be supporting climate policies that foster a plurality of values and deliver social benefits. The thesis concludes by advocating a shift in the climate policy debate to a discussion on the values that are fostered or hindered by each policy. A general framework is proposed that respects value pluralism and acknowledges conflicts between incommensurable values, which is not compatible with market-based policies. ; FCT - "Projeto BECOM" - FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-009234

AbstractThe warehouse problem with deterministic production cost, selling prices, and demand was introduced in the 1950s and there is a renewed interest recently due to its applications in energy storage and arbitrage. In this paper, we consider two extensions of the warehouse problem and develop efficient computational algorithms for finding their optimal solutions. First, we consider a model where the firm can invest in capacity expansion projects for the warehouse while simultaneously making production and sales decisions in each period. We show that this problem can be solved with a computational complexity that is linear in the product of the length of the planning horizon and the number of capacity expansion projects. We then consider a problem in which the firm can invest to improve production cost efficiency while simultaneously making production and sales decisions in each period. The resulting optimization problem is non‐convex with integer decision variables. We show that, under some mild conditions on the cost data, the problem can be solved in linear computational time. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 367–373, 2016

National Transit Data from 1993 through 2004 is analyzed to examine the effects of contracting out on the cost efficiency and resource allocation of motor bus and demand response services. For motor bus service, results indicate no difference in cost between in-house and fully contracted operations. Contracting has a weak curvilinear association to total cost, suggesting that the most cost-efficient agencies either fully contract or they provide full in-house service. In contrast, demand response contracting is associated with about 20% lower total costs. Competitive conditions or the choice by agencies to offer specialized services may explain this result Transit agencies that contract with multiple motor bus providers pay a cost premium, whereas multiple providers have no effect on demand response cost. Contracting does not affect the growth of cost for either service. An examination of expense subcategories reveals no reduction in administrative expenses when agencies contract services and only a partial reduction in non operational maintenance expenses. Overall, the results call into question the efficacy of competitive contracting models of transit service delivery and the use of fully allocated costing methods in make-versus-buy decisions. Adapted from the source document.