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The power of economic elites, as measured by studies of interlocking corporate directorates, is one of the major issues in social science. Interlocks are identified for the 200 largest nonfinancial & the 50 largest financial corporations in both 1935 & 1970, using direct factor analysis as a means of clique identification. Rotation identifies 10 principal interlock groups for 1935 & 10 principal interlock groups for 1970. The 1970 interlock groups include smaller numbers of corporations & are less cohesive than in 1935, & financial & investment ties have become less important within groups. These results do not entirely conform or contradict any of the major theories of economic elites. 2 Tables. W. H. Stoddard

AbstractManuscript TypeReviewResearch Question/IssueThis article addresses the diverse and fragmented literature about the corporate governance of business groups. We collected scholarly work on the subject, proposed a conceptualization of the main research questions they addressed, classified them according to their research themes, and identified future research directions.Research Findings/InsightsAcademic research on corporate governance in business groups has been increasing but is still a developing field. Available analyses make use of the main theoretical frameworks in general in corporate governance research. However, there are several areas of analysis that still need stronger conceptualization and empirical work, leaving many opportunities for future studies and a pressing need to substantiate and extend the findings of previous studies.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur study identifies four avenues for future research on corporate governance in business groups. This includes the examination of the complex relationships and co‐evolutionary processes among corporate governance attributes and organizational and performance outcomes of business groups; the effects of ownership goals on groups' performance outcomes; the role and the actual functioning of boards inside business groups; and the analyses of cross‐national comparison and long‐term development of the governance of business groups.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis research allows practitioners and policymakers to get a better understanding of the crucial areas regarding business groups and their governance, and offers pathways to examine inside the "black‐box" of business groups.

After the pioneering German "Aktiengesetz" of 1965 and the Brazilian "Lei das Sociedades Anónimas" of 1976, Portugal has become the third country in the world to enact a specific regulation on groups of companies. The Code of Commercial Companies ("Código das Sociedades Comerciais", abbreviately hereinafter CSC), enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules regulating the relationships between companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC). With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: "Company lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies". This trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also true for small markets such as Portugal. Although Portuguese economy is still dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the seven largest groups of companies owned about 50% of the equity capital of all domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. Such a trend has continued and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand controlled companies has been created ("IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado"); and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, "BCP – Banco Comercial Português", in the industrial area, "SONAE", and in the media and communication area, "Portugal-Telecom").

There are both theoretical and practical tax policy considerations that favour a broad recognition for the value of corporate income tax losses-- including for businesses operated within corporate groups. Ideally, an equitable and economically efficient tax system could obviate the need for loss netting against income by providing for the tax value of losses from business to be refundable by tax authorities in cash to owners. This approach, however, involves many serious difficulties, including revenue cost to governments and potential for abuse by both domestic and foreign businesses. Accordingly, loss refundability tends to be provided for only sparingly, if at all; while many corporate income tax systems—such as in the U.S. the U.K., Japan and many other OECD countries--deal with loss netting within corporate groups through a formal system of tax loss transfer or tax consolidation.While Canadian policymakers have considered introduction of such a system over a long period of time, they have yet to come up with a satisfactory formal system for Canada. So, corporate groups in Canada have been left to make do with an informal self-help loss trading system that presents a number of problems compared to formal systems.As a federal country with substantial corporate taxation levied at the provincial level, Canada appears unusually constrained in what it can do to bring greater equity and efficiency to corporate group tax loss utilization. Moreover, the inefficiencies in the current system are small in aggregate terms, and the informal self-help system has a relatively generous threshold for access. Accordingly, while Canada's current informal self-help corporate group loss system is far from ideal, it appears to remain as a workable approach. Alternatives to the status quo should be considered cautiously, as they have the potential to do more harm than good.

There are both theoretical and practical tax policy considerations that favour a broad recognition for the value of corporate income tax losses-- including for businesses operated within corporate groups. Ideally, an equitable and economically efficient tax system could obviate the need for loss netting against income by providing for the tax value of losses from business to be refundable by tax authorities in cash to owners. This approach, however, involves many serious difficulties, including revenue cost to governments and potential for abuse by both domestic and foreign businesses. Accordingly, loss refundability tends to be provided for only sparingly, if at all; while many corporate income tax systems—such as in the U.S. the U.K., Japan and many other OECD countries--deal with loss netting within corporate groups through a formal system of tax loss transfer or tax consolidation.While Canadian policymakers have considered introduction of such a system over a long period of time, they have yet to come up with a satisfactory formal system for Canada. So, corporate groups in Canada have been left to make do with an informal self-help loss trading system that presents a number of problems compared to formal systems.As a federal country with substantial corporate taxation levied at the provincial level, Canada appears unusually constrained in what it can do to bring greater equity and efficiency to corporate group tax loss utilization. Moreover, the inefficiencies in the current system are small in aggregate terms, and the informal self-help system has a relatively generous threshold for access. Accordingly, while Canada's current informal self-help corporate group loss system is far from ideal, it appears to remain as a workable approach. Alternatives to the status quo should be considered cautiously, as they have the potential to do more harm than good.