The relevance of the topic is due to the fact that the latest judicial reform has provoked a considerable influence on procedural relations and caused a number of problems for legal practitioners. The development of the main theoretical provisions took place since the 70s of the last century. In these studies, considerable attention was always paid to the procedural possibilities of applying to the court of first instance. At the same time, since the restoration of Ukrainian statehood, scientists have researched the value, limits of powers and, in general, the status of the Supreme Court in Ukraine. Ukraine has gone through many judicial reforms, most of which related to the courts of first instance and appeals. The main novelty, of the latest judicial reform, to which attention is paid in the article, is the updated grounds for filing a cassation appeal. Ukraine has declared a European course and adds all efforts to become part of the European family. That is why the latest judicial reform, which introduced these novellas, was carried out in the context of the European course. At the same time, the legal regulation of the possibility of applying to the court of cassation, actually restrict the constitutional rights and freedoms of a citizen, does not meet the standards announced in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and in the European standards, which became the main problem. The purpose of the article is to study the working documents that accompanied the relevant bills on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine on justice, decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the Supreme Court, as well as decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter – the ECHR). The achievement of the outlined goal became possible due to the use of a set of methods of information analysis and synthesis. The article highlights and analyzes the working documents that accompanied the constitutional amendments on justice, the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Court, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, with the aim of identifying substantive disagreements and shortcomings. It is emphasized that the changes (at the constitutional and legislative level) actually restrict the content and scope of rights and freedoms, regarding the possibility of cassation appeal of court decisions, which were guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and do not meet the principle of legal certainty. Based on the results of the study, conclusions were formulated and recommendations were made on the implementation of the right to appeal to the court of cassation.
In: International organization, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 623-628
ISSN: 1531-5088
The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case: On June 26, 1952, the International Court of Justice fixed October 6, 1952 as the time-limit for the filing of the reply of the government of the United Kingdom and February 6, 1953 as the time-limit for the filing of the rejoinder of the French government in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case. However, at the request of the United Kingdom, and with the acceptance of the extension by France, the Court, on August 27, fixed November 6, 1952 and March 6, 1953 as the time-limits for the filing of the United Kingdom reply and the French rejoinder, respectively.
In: International organization, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 329-329
ISSN: 1531-5088
Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand): According to an order of December 5, 1959, the International Court of Justice in the case of the Temple of Preah Vihear fixed January 20, i960, as the time limit for filing the memorial of Cambodia, and May 23, 1960, for filing the counter-memorial of Thailand.
In: International organization, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 309-309
ISSN: 1531-5088
Right of Passage Through Indian Territory (Portugal v. India): In an order of March 13, 1956, the Court fixed June 15, 1956, as the time-limit for the filing of the memorial of the Republic of Portugal, and December 15, 1956, as the time-limit for the filing of the counter-memorial of the Indian government.
In: International organization, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 217-217
ISSN: 1531-5088
Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): In an order of July 6, 1961, the International Court of Justice fixed the time limits for the filing of pleadings in the case concerning the Northern Cameroons as follows: for the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun, November 1, 1961; and for the countermemorial of the United Kingdom, March 1, 1962. Subsequently, in an order of November 2, 1961, the Court, in accordance with a request from the agent of the government of the Republic of Cameroun, extended to January 3, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun and to May 2, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the countermemorial of the United Kingdom.
In: International organization, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 599-603
ISSN: 1531-5088
South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): By an order of February 5, 1963, the President of the International Court of Justice fixed September 30, 1963, as the time limit for the filing of the South African countermemorial in the South West Africa cases. At the request of the government of South Africa, the Court in its order of September 18, 1963, extended this time limit to January 10, 1964. By its order of January 20, 1964, the International Court noted that the South African countermemorial had been filed, and it fixed as time limits June 20, 1964, for the filing of the replies of Ethiopia and Liberia; and November 20, 1964, for the filing of the rejoinder by South Africa
In: International organization, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 453-459
ISSN: 1531-5088
Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain): Preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company were filed in the Registry by the government of Spain on May 21, 1960, that is, within the time-limit fixed for the filing of the Spanish counter-memorial. In consequence of the filing of the objections, proceedings on the merits of the case were suspended.
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From L.A. Superior Court Judge Frank Tavelman's order last Friday in Roe v. Smith: Plaintiffs have not adhered to the proper procedure for proceeding anonymously. Before a party can proceed anonymously, they must move the Court for permission to do so. This procedure is addressed in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court…
In: International organization, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 254-260
ISSN: 1531-5088
Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): By an order of November 27, 1962, the International Court of Justice extended to March 1, 1963, the time limit for the filing of the observations and submissions of Cameroun on the preliminary objection raised by the United Kingdom in the Northern Cameroons case. By an order of January 11, 1963, the President of the Court extended to July 1, 1963, the time limit for the filing by the government of Cameroun of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objection raised by the United Kingdom in the Northern Cameroons case. The extensions were at the request of the government of Cameroun with the agreement of the United Kingdom government.
Since 1963, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional right of entities and persons to pursue civil legal claims in American courts under the First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances. However, in a series of three cases decided by the Supreme Court in the early 1970's - Boddie v. Connecticut, United States v. Kras and Ortwein v. Schwab - the Court inexplicably declined to address the appellants' claims that they have a constitutional right to access the courts to seek resolution of their civil legal claims. In each of these three cases, the indigent appellants had been initially denied the right to pursue their civil legal claims because they could not afford to pay the applicable civil filing fees. As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in these three cases, some poor persons in America can constitutionally be denied access to American courts to pursue their civil legal claims if they cannot afford to pay the court filing fees. The author contends that all Americans, including the poor, have a constitutional right under the first Amendment right to petition government to seek redress of grievances, including the right to file civil legal claims in courts. Like the right to vote, the exercise of this First Amendment right should not be limited by a person's financial inability to pay a government fee. When this First Amendment right is made available to all Americans regardless of their ability to pay court filing fees, then the poor will be able to access the judicial branches of government to seek redress of their grievances.
The investigation reveals shortcomings in the arguments of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the recognition of article 366-1 of the Criminal Code as not being in conformity with the Constitution, in terms of:(a) the court's lack of authority to criminalize socially dangerous acts; (b) lack of argumentation on the absence of social harm in the non-submission of a declaration and in the presentation of inaccurate information; (c) positive foreign experience; (d) conformity of article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with the principle of the rule of law. The article employs a set of legal research methods, including terminological, systemic-structural, formal-logical, and comparative-legal. It is stressed that:(a) the criminalization of a socially harmful act is a matter for the legislator, not the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, to decide; (b) the decision does not present or refute any argument on the element of social harmfulness relating to the non-submission of a declaration and the declaration of inaccurate information. On the basis of the investigation, it has been concluded that the decision of the Constitutional Court on the recognition of article 366-1 of the Criminal Code does not comply with the Constitution and has not been sufficiently substantiated.