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The objective of the mission was to assess the debt management strengths and areas in need of reform through the application of the Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) methodology. The DeMPA mission delivered an evaluation of the legal, institutional and regulatory framework in government debt management.Compared to the previous DeMPA assessment undertaken in 2008, impressive progress is observed in a number of areas. These include the quality and annual update of a medium-term debt management strategy and borrowing plans and procedures for external borrowing. Areas that have digressed or not improved include coordination with fiscal policy and debt sustainability analysis, and cash flow forecasting and cash management.

The paper introduces government debt and monetary strategy (Inflation Targeting - IT) into the empirical literature about the relationship between Central Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation. According to Martin's (2014) model, CBI is not sufficient to maintain price stability in the long run and requires the adoption of IT as a monetary strategy. Using annual data from the period 1998 to 2010 we consider 87 countries (18 considered as developed and 69 as emerging). By using a panel VAR model we explicitly test a possible reciprocal influence between inflation and government debt. At a global level results show an indirect negative effect of Inflation Targeting and CBI on inflation through the government debt channel. A high level of CBI or the choice of IT as a monetary strategy has a significant negative effect on government debt and on inflation.

Übersicht über die Entwicklung der Verschuldung Zentralamerikas in den 70er Jahren und die Umstellung der externen Finanzierung. Bilanz der auswärtigen Verbindlichkeiten im Jahr 1986 und Bericht über den Stand der Umschuldungsverhandlungen

Do governments strategically choose debt maturity to fill supply gaps across maturities? Building on a new panel data set of more than 9,000 individual Eurozone government debt issues between 1999 and 2015, I find that governments increase long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone long-term debt issuance, and vice versa. This gap-filling behavior is more pronounced for (1) less financially constrained and (2) higher rated governments. Using the ECB's three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 as an event study, I find that core governments filled the supply gap of longer maturity debt, which resulted from peripheral governments accommodating banks' short-term debt demand for "carry trades". This gap-filling implies that governments act as macro-liquidity providers across maturities, thereby adding significant risk absorption capacity to government bond markets.