Suchergebnisse

"This report examines the role that land-based, multi-domain anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) forces can play in deterring or defeating aggression. The focus is primarily on aggression by China, but the report also examines the use of such forces against Russia and, briefly, against Iran. A discussion of the strategic context in the Asia-Pacific region (centered on China) and the Baltic Sea (centered on Russia) highlights growing Chinese and Russian A2/AD capabilities, as well as potential scenarios for conflict. With that context, the report argues that the United States and its allies can take two approaches to counter an adversary's A2 capabilities. The first is to defeat enemy forces, including their A2/AD capabilities, such as long-range and increasingly precise ballistic and cruise missiles. The second is to impose A2/AD challenges on enemies to raise the costs for aggression. Allies and partners could field a mix of anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and surface-to-surface fires when they feel sufficiently threatened to employ force in their own defense, while the United States could provide support and, potentially, reinforcements. The report focuses on the second of these approaches helping allies and partners develop A2/AD defenses. RAND estimates the costs of several options for land-based missile systems; provides some near-term force structure options for ground-based, multi-domain fires; and offers recommendations for the U.S. Army as part of a joint ground-based, multi-domain A2/AD force."--Publisher's description

Washington has become increasingly concerned that Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) capabilities will put at risk US military assets and forward forces operating in the Western Pacific region, enabling China to deter, delay and deny US intervention in future regional conflict and crisis. US defence analysts in their assessments have frequently, and often erroneously, conflated a Chinese operational capability with an underlying strategic intention that conceptualises the United States as its primary (if not sole) target. The central argument this article proffers is that US perceptions of A2-AD have been framed by specific analytical baselines that have overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational and doctrinal preferences, and over-reliant upon military material-based assessments to determine Beijing's strategic intentions, and formulate US military countervails. The article concludes that the strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with Chinese A2-AD capabilities and its 'active defence' concept reinforced Washington's reliance upon capacity-based assessments that in turn, exacerbated misperceptions confounded by cognitive bias of Chinese strategic intentions. The critical framing assumptions of this article draw heavily upon the ideas and rationale associated with the international relations 'Security Dilemma' concept.

A continued deficit in NATO's ability to provide permanent security wherever and whenever the allied states' political interests demand may result in the Alliance failing to maintain internal cohesion and to deter potential geopolitical adversaries. This aspect, constantly hoped for and speculated by the Russian Federation, starting with the resumption of the offensive at the beginning of the 21st century, especially after the annexation of Crimea, has led to a proper dosage of the ingredients that laid the foundation of the A2/AD concept. Understanding the role A2/AD plays in Russia's doctrinal thinking is as critical as allocating the resources to counter it. A full change in Russia's strategy in this regard for the Black Sea region is very unlikely, especially after the interdiction capabilities have reached a satisfactory level of operationalization and remain the only ones that guarantee optimal control of the maritime area, thus making it possible to continue ground operations in Ukraine.

Bibliographical footnotes. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; UM copy 1: With this are bound Research monographs no. 2-8: Some problems in the strategic analysis of international politics / M.A. Kaplan. The rationale of catalytic war / A.L. Burns. Adam Smith and Karl Marx on occupational change / A.S. Feldman. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia / M.A. Kaplan. Military elite and social change, Egypt since Napoleon / M. Berger. American capability in basic science and technological invention / A.S. Feldman and K. Knorr. Church and state in Franco Spain / W. Ebenstein.

This article presents an analysis of the development of the Russian Anti Access/Anti Denial concept – A2/AD. The considerations contained in this article focus on identifying the threats that the Russian A2/AD concept creates for NATO and Poland. This article compiles empirical data from scientific publications, formal strategic and doctrinal documents, which allowed to define the A2/AD category, specify its essence and characterize it through the prism of military and non-military forces and resources engaged by Russia in several important operational regions: the Kaliningrad Oblast, Crimea, Syria and the Arctic.The aim of this article is to evaluate the Russian Anti-Access/Anti Denial concept from the perspective of the threats it creates for NATO and Poland.The obtained research results allow us to make the conclusion that when assessing the current external conditions, effective opposition to the Russian A2/AD by NATO will be very difficult to implement. Increasing the capabilities in this area will probably require the individual member states to increase their defense spending, mainly on the modernization and development of their armed forces. In addition to increasing the financial expenditures, increasing the ability to counteract the Russian A2/AD will require proper coordination and integration of the activities of the entire NATO structure around one coherent operational concept. This applies not only to counteracting the Russian A2/AD in Europe but also in other regions of the world, which in the near future may become the theatre of military operations, both classic, asymmetric or hybrid.

This article presents an analysis of the development of the Russian Anti Access/Anti Denial concept – A2/AD. The considerations contained in this article focus on identifying the threats that the Russian A2/AD concept creates for NATO and Poland. This article compiles empirical data from scientific publications, formal strategic and doctrinal documents, which allowed to define the A2/AD category, specify its essence and characterize it through the prism of military and non-military forces and resources engaged by Russia in several important operational regions: the Kaliningrad Oblast, Crimea, Syria and the Arctic.The aim of this article is to evaluate the Russian Anti-Access/Anti Denial concept from the perspective of the threats it creates for NATO and Poland.The obtained research results allow us to make the conclusion that when assessing the current external conditions, effective opposition to the Russian A2/AD by NATO will be very difficult to implement. Increasing the capabilities in this area will probably require the individual member states to increase their defense spending, mainly on the modernization and development of their armed forces. In addition to increasing the financial expenditures, increasing the ability to counteract the Russian A2/AD will require proper coordination and integration of the activities of the entire NATO structure around one coherent operational concept. This applies not only to counteracting the Russian A2/AD in Europe but also in other regions of the world, which in the near future may become the theatre of military operations, both classic, asymmetric or hybrid.

Washington has become increasingly concerned that Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) capabilities will put at risk US military assets and forward forces operating in the Western Pacific region, enabling China to deter, delay and deny US intervention in future regional conflict and crisis. US defence analysts in their assessments have frequently, and often erroneously, conflated a Chinese operational capability with an underlying strategic intention that conceptualises the United States as its primary (if not sole) target. The central argument this article proffers is that US perceptions of A2-AD have been framed by specific analytical baselines that have overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational and doctrinal preferences, and over-reliant upon military material-based assessments to determine Beijing's strategic intentions, and formulate US military countervails. The article concludes that the strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with Chinese A2-AD capabilities and its 'active defence' concept reinforced Washington's reliance upon capacity-based assessments that in turn, exacerbated misperceptions confounded by cognitive bias of Chinese strategic intentions. The critical framing assumptions of this article draw heavily upon the ideas and rationale associated with the international relations 'Security Dilemma' concept. (Pac Rev/GIGA)