Prepared as an appendix to the Report and recommendations of the Seminar on financial aspects of trade expansion, issued by the U.N. commission for Asia and the Far East.
Some states have recently moved away from the traditional winner‐loser model of child custody to one focused on coparenting. Under the old approach, divorce decrees typically "awarded" custody to one parent while relegating the other to a "visitor" with poorly defined status. The new system is premised on the child's need for a continuing relationship with both parents and promotes this goal by upgrading the noncustodial parent's status and time‐share, assigning substantive rights and responsibilities to both parents. To give effect to the shared parenting idea, Texas adopted joint custody and statutory visitation guidelines legislatively. The policy covers all major aspects of parental rights and duties with great specificity (not just child support, for which all states must have guidelines). It applies equally to divorce and paternity cases. Judges are authorized to deviate from standard visitation guidelines but must state a rationale for doing so on request. Parties may also negotiate and agree to arrangements at variance with the guidelines, subject to approval by the court. This article describes the statutory regime in Texas and its implementation in the family court system. Based on a sample of divorce and paternity cases in the state's largest jurisdiction, it documents innovative court interventions and a wide array of coparenting and support arrangements.
International audience ; It is widely acknowledged that the ratios of public debt over GDP reached historically high levels in the Euro area during the recent sovereign debt crisis. More unnoticed however is the simultaneous increase in the share of government debt held by residents that has started in late 2008 in most fragile economies of the area. This paper develops a simple theoretical framework, in which multiple equilibria arise, to explain why exogenous increases in the debt level may cause this share to increase, due to distinct expected returns on domestic sovereign debt for domestic and foreign creditors in times of turmoil.
International audience ; It is widely acknowledged that the ratios of public debt over GDP reached historically high levels in the Euro area during the recent sovereign debt crisis. More unnoticed however is the simultaneous increase in the share of government debt held by residents that has started in late 2008 in most fragile economies of the area. This paper develops a simple theoretical framework, in which multiple equilibria arise, to explain why exogenous increases in the debt level may cause this share to increase, due to distinct expected returns on domestic sovereign debt for domestic and foreign creditors in times of turmoil.
International audience ; It is widely acknowledged that the ratios of public debt over GDP reached historically high levels in the Euro area during the recent sovereign debt crisis. More unnoticed however is the simultaneous increase in the share of government debt held by residents that has started in late 2008 in most fragile economies of the area. This paper develops a simple theoretical framework, in which multiple equilibria arise, to explain why exogenous increases in the debt level may cause this share to increase, due to distinct expected returns on domestic sovereign debt for domestic and foreign creditors in times of turmoil.
International audience ; It is widely acknowledged that the ratios of public debt over GDP reached historically high levels in the Euro area during the recent sovereign debt crisis. More unnoticed however is the simultaneous increase in the share of government debt held by residents that has started in late 2008 in most fragile economies of the area. This paper develops a simple theoretical framework, in which multiple equilibria arise, to explain why exogenous increases in the debt level may cause this share to increase, due to distinct expected returns on domestic sovereign debt for domestic and foreign creditors in times of turmoil.