Bodenerosion durch Wasser ist ein ubiquitäres Problem, dass sowohl die landwirtschaftliche Produktivität vermindert, Bodenfunktionen einschränkt und auch in anderen Umweltkompartimenten schädliche Auswirkungen haben kann. Oberflächengewässer sind durch die mit Bodenerosion einhergehende Belastung durch Sediment, sedimentgebundenen und gelösten Nährstoffen sowie anderen Schadstoffen besonders betroffen. Das Wissen über Erosionsprozesse und Sedimentfrachten hat daher große Bedeutung für den Schutz der Güter Boden und Wasser und darüber hinaus eine ökonomische Bedeutung. Generell kann innerhalb eines Hanges oder Einzugsgebietes von einer Zone der Erosion, des Transports und der Sedimentation ausgegangen werden. Jedoch führen Abflussbildungsprozesse und rauhigkeits- bzw. topographiebeeinflusste Abflusskonzentration zu einer individuellen Differenzierung. Räumliche und zeitliche Prozessdiskontinuitäten oder Konnektivitäten und Schwellenwerte modifizieren die Erosions- und Sedimentaustragssituation in einem Einzugsgebiet darüber hinaus. Die Landschaftstrukturelemente Relief und Boden kontrollieren demnach über die Bodenfeuchtedifferenzierung im entscheidenden Maße die Abflussbildung und Sedimentfracht in einem Einzugsgebiet. Obwohl in den gemäßigten und kühlen Klimaregionen ein großer Teil der Abflussbildung im Winter stattfindet und von Bodenfrost sowie Schneeschmelzen geprägt sein kann, ist über die Prozesse und die Größe der Sediment- und Nährstoffausträge bei solchen winterlichen Randbedingungen nur wenig bekannt. Systematische Untersuchungen existieren vor allem für Norwegen und Russland. Dieses Defizit spiegelt sich auch in den vorhandenen Modellansätzen zur Abbildung der Bodenerosion und der Abschätzung von Sedimentausträgen aus Einzugsgebieten wider. Zum einen werden in der Regel weder Schneedeckenaufbau bzw. -schmelze noch die Veränderungen des Bodenwasserflusses bei Bodenfrost berücksichtigt. Zum anderen werden die Erosivität des Schneeschmelzabflusses und die Beeinflussungen der Bodenerodibilität, z.B. durch Frost-Tau Zyklen, nicht hinreichend wiedergegeben. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, auf der Analyse von Daten aus einem deutschen und einem russischen Untersuchungseinzugsgebiet aufbauend, die wichtigsten Prozesse und Größen der Abflussbildung und Stoffausträge bei winterlichen Rahmenbedingungen zu charakterisieren und in einem Modellsystem umzusetzen. Die weitergehende Anwendung dieses Modellsystems dient der Interpretation räumlicher Heterogenitäten und zeitlicher Variabilitäten sowie der Auswirkungen von klimatischen- und Landnutzungsänderungen auf den Sedimentaustrag der beiden Untersuchungseinzugsgebiete. Das 1.44 km² große Einzugsgebiet Schäfertal liegt im östlichen Unterharz. Über den Grauwacken und Tonschiefern haben sich aus einem periglazialen Decklagenkomplex Braun- und Parabraunerden entwickelt, die ackerbaulich mit einer Wintergetreide-Raps Fruchtfolge genutzt werden. In der Tiefenlinie dominieren hydromorph überprägte Böden mit Wiesennutzung. Das Klima weist bei einer Jahresmitteltemperatur von 6.8°C und 680 mm Jahresniederschlagssumme eine geringe kontinentale Überprägung auf. Neben langjährigen umfangreichen hydro-meteorologischen Messungen finden seit mehreren Jahren Untersuchungen zum Sediment- und Nährstoffautrag statt. Eine regelmäßige zweiwöchentliche Beprobung des Abflusses am Gebietsauslass wird durch eine automatisierte Hochwasserprobenahme vor allem bei Schneeschmelzen ergänzt. Neben der Sedimentkonzentration werden unter anderem Phosphor und gelöster organischer Kohlenstoff nach Standardmethoden bestimmt. Auch im russischen Zielgebiet Lubazhinkha liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf der Charakterisierung der Abflussbildung und der Stoffausträge bei den jährlich auftretenden Schneeschmelzen. Das Einzugsgebiet liegt ungefähr 100 km südlich von Moskau im Übergangsbereich der südlichen Taiga zur Waldsteppe. Die insgesamt 18.8 km² werden zur Hälfte landwirtschaftlich und zu einem Drittel forstwirtschaftlich genutzt. Die aktuelle räumliche Differenzierung der Nutzung in diesem Gebiet wird durch die reliefbedingte Kappung und hydromorphe Überprägung der vorherrschenden grauen Waldböden bestimmt. Das Klima und die Hydrologie sind durch Schneedeckenaufbau und –schmelze, bei einer Jahresdurchschnittstemperatur von 4.4°C und einer Jahresniederschlagsmenge von 560 mm, geprägt. Zur Erfassung des Stoffaustrags werden Hochwasserprobenahmen am Gebietsauslass sowie an den beiden wichtigsten Zuflüssen genommen und neben Sediment- und Nährstoffkonzentrationen weitere physikalische und chemische Parameter bestimmt. Die Auswertung der Daten des Schäfertals zeigen für den Untersuchungszeitraum eine deutliche Dominanz der Hochwasserereignisse, die durch Schneeschmelzen hervorgerufen werden. Einzugsgebietsbedingungen mit gefrorenem Boden führen zu einer Modifizierung der Abflussentwicklung vor allem im ansteigenden Teil des gemessenen Hydrographen durch Auftreten von schnellen oberflächen- oder oberflächennahen Abflüssen. Der Spitzenabfluss bei den acht zur Interpretation herangezogenen Hochwasserereignissen variiert zwischen 30 und 270 l s-1, bei Abflussmengen von 1-50 mm. Die am Gebietsauslass ermittelten maximalen Sedimentkonzentrationen liegen für die beiden Ereignisse ohne gefrorenen Boden bei unter 650 mg l-1 und damit deutlich unter den bis zu 6000 mg l-1 bei teilweise oder ganz gefrorenen Böden im Schäfertal. Lediglich bei einem Ereignis mit Niederschlag und ungefrorenem Boden treten hohe Sedimentkonzentrationen auf, die auf Gerinnepflegemaßnahmen und dadurch leichte Mobilisierbarkeit von Material zurückzuführen sind. Dementsprechend schwanken die Sedimentfrachten der Einzelereignisse und erreichen bis zu 17 t. Die wichtigste Steuergröße ist dabei die Ausbildung erosiven Abflusses auf den Hängen durch eine Verminderung der hydraulischen Leitfähigkeit bei gefrorenen Böden. Der Vergleich der Sedimentkonzentrationen der Hochwasserereignisse mit der zweiwöchentlichen Grundbeprobung verdeutlicht, ebenso wie Hysteresekurven der Einzelereignisse, die unterschiedlichen Dynamiken der Austragssituationen. Während die durch Bodenfrost geprägten Ereignisse ein gegen den Uhrzeigersinn verlaufendes Abfluss-Sedimentkonzentrationsverhältnis aufweisen, das auf eine Sedimentquelle auf den Hängen hinweist, sind die Hysteresekurven bei nicht gefrorenen Böden im Uhrzeigersinn orientiert. Eine Sedimentherkunft in Gerinnenähe oder den Gerinneböschungen selbst ist daher wahrscheinlich. Diese Annahmen werden auch durch eine differenzierte Phosphoranreicherungsrate im ausgetragenen Sediment bestätigt. Darüber hinaus kann teilweise eine ereignisinterne Dynamik beobachtet werden, die auf zeitliche Variabilität in der Abflussbildung und damit zusammenhängend, eine räumliche Heterogenität der Sedimentquellen belegt. Während im Untersuchungsgebiet Schäfertal ein mehrmaliges Auftreten von Schneeschmelzen innerhalb eines Winters möglich ist, kommt es im russischen Einzugsgebiet zu einem regelmäßigen Schneedeckenaufbau über den Winter hinweg und einer Schneeschmelze in der Regel im März oder in der ersten Aprilhälfte. Die Auswertung mehrjähriger Datenreihen belegt die Bedeutung der Schneeschmelze für die Abflussbildung und den Sedimentaustrag aus dem Untersuchungsgebiet Lubazhinkha. Für die drei zur Interpretation herangezogenen Schneeschmelzen liegt die Sedimentfracht zwischen 50 und 630 t bei deutlichen Unterschieden in den hydrologischen Rahmenbedingungen. Die ereignisbezogene Sedimentfracht von mindestens 0.3 t ha-1 liegt zwar über der für das Schäfertal ermittelten, befindet sich aber im Bereich der Werte, die in anderen Studien bei vergleichbaren Böden und Nutzungsformen bestimmt wurden. Eine detaillierte Analyse der Messwerte der Schneeschmelze im Jahr 2003 belegt eine Dynamik innerhalb dieses Einzelereignisses. Bei Sedimentkonzentrationen im Abfluss am Gebietsauslass von 6 bis 540 mg l-1 kommt es zu einer Sedimentfracht von ungefähr 190 t. Während die maximalen Konzentrationen von Sediment und Phosphor mit der Spitze des Abflusses einhergehen, liegt für DOC eine Verzögerung vor, die durch eine langsamere Schneeschmelze und Mobilisierung von DOC aus dem humusreichen Oberboden der Waldflächen ausgelöst wird. Eine Differenzierung der Abflusskomponenten ermöglicht eine weitergehende Interpretation der ereignisinternen Dynamik der Stoffquellen und Eintragspfade. Bei geringen Abflussmengen (< 2,5 mm d-1) findet ein Stoffeintrag überwiegend in gelöster Form über die Bodenwasserpassage und langsame Abflusskomponenten in den Vorfluter statt. Bei höheren Abflussmengen dominieren schnelle Abflusskomponenten bzw. Oberflächenabfluss, der zeitlich dynamisch unterschiedliche Stoffquellen mobilisiert. Neben diesen ereignisinternen treten interanuelle Variabilitäten auf, die durch witterungsbedingte Faktoren bestimmt werden. Wie im Schäfertal spielt auch im Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet die Ausbildung von Bodenfrost und damit verbundene Veränderung der Infiltrationseigenschaften der Böden eine große Rolle. Das Schneewasseräquivalent, die Schneeschmelzdynamik und Bodenfrosteigenschaften, z.B. Eindringtiefe, sind die wichtigsten Steuergrößen. Die Variabilität dieser Randbedingungen führt zu einer hohen interannuellen Differenzierung der Abflussbildung und der Sedimentausträge. Für die Schneeschmelze 2004 kann so bei überdurchschnittlich hohen Wintertemperaturen und nur teilweise gefrorenen Böden sowie geringem Schneewasseräquivalent eine geringe Sedimentfracht ermittelt werden. Darüber hinaus verdeutlichen die Hysteresekurven der Sedimentkonzentrationen Unterschiede in der Sedimentquelle für die Einzeljahre, die von den oben genannten Rahmenbedingungen abhängen. Auf der Basis des Monitoring lassen sich für beide Einzugsgebiete die wichtigen abflussbildenden Prozesse charakterisieren und Einflussgrößen erfassen. Dem Bodenfrost und der Schneeschmelzdynamik kommen dabei übergeordnete Bedeutung zu. In beiden Gebieten werden bei winterlichen Rahmenbedingungen erhebliche Mengen an Sediment und Nährstoffen ausgetragen. Die Interpretation physikalischer bzw. chemischer Parameter des Abflusses ermöglicht darüber hinaus auch Aussagen über die zeitliche Variabilität und räumliche Heterogenität der Sedimentherkunftsräume. Aus den Erkenntnissen der Einzugsgebietsbeobachtung ergeben sich für einen Modellansatz verschiedenen Anforderungen, die vor allem die räumlich differenzierte Darstellung des Einflusses von Bodenfrost auf den Bodenwasserhaushalt sowie die Bodenerosion durch oberflächlich abfließendes Schneeschmelzwasser betreffen. Die Grundlage für das Modellsystem "IWAN" (Integrated Winter erosion And Nutrient load model) stellt das hydrologische Modell WASIM ETH Ver. 2 und das Stoffhaushaltsmodell AGNPS 5.0 dar. Die Verknüpfung dieser beiden auf Rasterzellen aufbauenden Modelle ermöglicht die Nutzung von kontinuierlichen, räumlich differenzierten Informationen zum Oberflächenabfluss für die Abschätzung der Bodenerosion. Durch diese Schnittstelle wird die sehr hohe Parametersensitivität des SCS-CN Verfahrens in AGNPS durch geringere Einzelsensitivitäten verschiedener Parameter des Bodenwasserhaushaltes in WASIM ersetzt und gleichzeitig eine plausible, prozessbasierte räumliche Abflussbildung berechnet. Durch die Implementierung eines Moduls zur Abschätzung der Bodentemperatur in WASIM ist zusätzlich die Grundlage für eine weitergehende Verbesserung der Abflussbildung bei winterlichen Randbedingungen gelegt. Durch das Modul wird die Oberbodentemperatur aus Werten der Lufttemperatur unter Einbeziehung der Exposition und der Landnutzung auf der Basis einer Polynomanpassung abgeschätzt. Bei einer modellierten Schneedecke von mehr als 5 mm Schneewasseräquivalent wird die berechnete Bodentemperatur des Vortages übernommen. Bei Bodentemperaturen unter dem Gefrierpunkt wird darüber hinaus die gesättigte hydraulische Leitfähigkeit des Bodens auf Null herabgesetzt, so dass im Zuge der Schneeschmelze zunächst das noch freie Porenvolumen aufgefüllt wird und danach Oberflächenabflussbildung beginnt. Für das Schäfertal liegt die Güte der Anpassung der Bodentemperatur bei Korrelationskoeffizienten von 0.62 bis 0.81 und für das Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet bei Werten von 0.82 bis 0.91. Die räumlich und zeitlich differenzierte Oberflächenabflussinformation dient als Grundlage einer neu entwickelten Berechnung der Rillenerosion bei Schneeschmelzen, die den dafür nicht geeigneten empirischen Ansatz in AGNPS ersetzt. Basierend auf der Grundannahme eines dreieckigen, nicht durch Frost in der Eintiefung beeinträchtigten Rillenprofils und, da wassergesättigt, nichtkohesiver Bodeneigenschaften wird für jede Rasterzelle eine Rille simuliert. Die Erodibilität des Bodens wird als Funktion von Wurzelparametern und des Durchmessers der wasserstabilen Aggregate erfasst. Die Scherkraft des Schneeschmelzeabflusses in der Rille wird in Abhängigkeit von der Oberflächenrauhigkeit und dem Aggregatdurchmesser betrachtet und darauf aufbauend in einem Impulsstromansatz die erodierte Bodenmenge berechnet. In Verbindung mit dem durch das modifizierte WASIM berechneten und gerouteten Oberflächenabfluss ergibt sich so ein räumlich differenziertes Bild der Bodenerosion. Das Modellsystem IWAN beinhaltet neben der Erosionsberechnung ein eingabefenstergesteuertes Menü zur Datenkonvertierung und zum Prä- sowie Postprozessing. Die Ergebnisse der Anwendung des Modellsystems für die beiden Einzugsgebiete belegen, dass sowohl die entscheidenden Prozesse der Abflussbildung als auch des Sedimentaustrags wiedergegeben werden. Für das Schäfertal wurde für die Kalibrierungsjahre 1994 bis 1995 eine Modellierungsgüte von R2 0.94 bzw. 0.91 erzielt. Mit Ausnahmen der Schneeschmelze im Jahr 1996 werden die Episoden hohen Abflusses in den Jahren 1996 bis 2003 mit dem kalibrierten Parametersatz gut wiedergegeben und das witterungsbedingte Trockenfallen im Sommer zufriedenstellend dargestellt. Auf dieser Basis wird für die experimentell erfassten und diskutierten Schneeschmelzereignisse das Gesamtabflussvolumen dieser Ereignisse mit hoher Güte abgebildet. Die räumlich differenziert berechnete Bodenfeuchte und Bodenfrostvorkommen bedingen einen variablen Anteil des Oberflächenabflusses am Gesamtabfluss. Für das Schneeschmelzerosionsmodul hat das Abflussvolumen ebenso wie die Hangneigung und Abflusslänge eine positive Sensitivität. Aufgrund von Parameterkombinationen und nichtlineare Algorithmen kann es jedoch vor allem für die Wurzelparameter und den Manning Koeffizienten zu differenzierten Sensitivitätsentwicklungen kommen. Für die Simulation der Erosion im Schäfertal wurde daher zunächst auf einen Parametersatz zurückgegriffen, der auf der Basis von Erosionsparzellenversuchen kalibriert wurde. Die Mittelwerte der berechneten Erosion liegen zwischen 0.0006 und 0.96 t ha-1 für die sechs gemessenen Einzelereignisse im Schäfertal. Die Medianwerte und hohen Standardabweichungen belegen jedoch, dass insgesamt Zellen mit geringen Erosionswerten überwiegen. Die Ereignisse mit gefrorenen Böden weisen eine signifikant höhere Erosion auf. Unterschiede in der Erosion treten bei gleichen Gesamtabflussvolumen wie z.B. bei den Ereignissen vom 20.01.2001 und 26.02.2002 durch differenzierte Abflusskonzentration auf dem nord- bzw. südexponierten Hang auf. Neben einer Überprüfung der Plausibilität der berechneten Werte, werden die räumlichen Verteilungsmuster durch Geländeaufnahmen bestätigt. Die Anpassung der berechneten Sedimentfracht an die gemessenen Werte erfolgte durch die Kalibrierung des Manning Koeffizienten für ein Ereignis. Die simulierte Sedimentfracht ist in einigen Hangfußbereichen aufgrund der Abflussakkumulation besonders hoch und erreicht für den Gebietsauslass Werte zwischen 0.0 und 13.84 t. Mit der Ausnahme des Ereignisses vom 26.02.2002 ist die Sedimentfracht leicht unterschätzt, so dass sich in der Summe für die drei Winterhalbjahre 2001 bis 2003 ein Gesamtfehler von 11 t ergibt. Die Differenz zwischen der simulierten und beobachteten Sedimentfracht ist für den 26.12.2002 am größten. Als mögliche Ursache für die Abweichungen der berechneten zu den gemessenen Werten, wird die zeitliche Variabilität und räumliche Heterogenität der Oberflächenrauhigkeit, vor allem in Hinblick auf Bodenbearbeitung und Bodenfrosteinflüssen, diskutiert. Die generelle Verteilung der Sedimentquellen, Transportwege und Übertrittstellen vom Hang ins Gewässer stimmt mit Geländebeobachtungen überein. Eine quantitative Überprüfung der räumlichen Ergebnisse auf der Einzelereignisebene ist für das Schäfertal jedoch nicht möglich. Für das Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet können zwei Parametersätze für das Kalibrierungsjahr 2004 identifiziert werde, die eine zufriedenstellende Modellierungsgüte für das hydrologische Modell erreichen. Obwohl einer dieser Parametersätze die Schneeschmelzsituationen und Maximalabflüsse gut darstellt, sind die Areale mit Oberflächenabflussbildung innerhalb des Einzugsgebietes nicht plausibel verteilt. Im Gegensatz dazu werden die lateralen Wasserflüsse und damit die prozessbestimmende Bodenfeuchteverteilung durch den anderen Parametersatz besser abgebildet. Es kommt jedoch zu einer Überschätzung der Spitzenabflüsse der Schneeschmelzhochwasser für die Validierungsjahre 2003 und 2005. Die auf der Basis der Messwerte erkannten Unterschiede zwischen den Einzeljahren werden ebenso dargestellt wie die differenzierte Abflussbildung innerhalb einer Schneeschmelzsituation. Neben Oberflächenabflussbildung auf den flachen Kuppenbereichen und auf Sättigungsflächen in den Talböden, wird auch die beobachtete verzögerte Abflussbildung unter Wald durch das Modell berücksichtigt. Bei zehn Tagen mit Oberflächenabfluss innerhalb der drei Schneeschmelzen 2003 bis 2005 mit Oberflächenabflussvolumen von 0.3 bis 24.1 mm d-1 werden durch das Modellsystem IWAN Erosionssummen von 10 bis 280 t d-1 simuliert. Bei einem variablen Flächenanteil von ca. 5 bis 46 % des Gesamtgebietes, auf dem Erosion stattfindet, bewegen sich die Werte der effektiven Erosion bei 0.1 bis 0.32 t ha-1 für die Einzeltage und 0.44 bis 0.92 t ha-1 für die mehrtägigen Schneeschmelzen. Die am Gebietsauslass simulierte Sedimentfracht liegt zwischen 6.7 und 365.8 t pro Tag und summiert sich auf 246.2 t für die Schneeschmelze 2003. Im Jahr 2004 werden 99.9 t und im Jahr 2005 sogar 757.9 t Austrag simuliert. Für das Kalibrierungsjahr 2004 kommt es zu einer Überschätzung der Sedimentfracht im Vergleich zur gemessenen von lediglich 10 t bzw. 12%. Für die Schneeschmelze im Jahr 2003 liegt die Abweichung mit diesem Parametersatz bei -9 %. Für das Jahr 2005 fällt die Berechnung mit einem Fehler von 33 % nicht so gut aus. Insgesamt führen Schneeschmelztage mit geringer simulierter Erosionsmenge zu einer zusätzlichen Mobilisierung von Sediment aus dem Gerinne und umgekehrt, hohe Erosionsmengen zu einer Deposition von Material auf den Wald- und Grünlandflächen und im Gerinne selbst. Hohe Sedimentfrachten werden daher vor allem für die Talflanken und die kerbtalähnlichen Talanfänge berechnet. Durch die räumliche Differenzierung der Abfluss- und Erosionsprozesse kommt es zu signifikanten Unterschieden bei der berechneten Sedimentfracht für die beiden Teileinzugsgebiete. Bei Schneeschmelztagen mit Abflussbildung unter Wald wird aufgrund des höheren Waldanteils im Lubazhinkhateilgebiet eine höhere Sedimentmenge ausgetragen. Die Unterschiede im Gerinneverhalten und zwischen den Teileinzugsgebieten verdeutlichen die insgesamt hohe Prozessrepräsentanz der Modellergebnisse. Das Modellsystem IWAN bildet für beide Einzugsgebiete mit hoher Plausibilität die räumliche und zeitliche Dynamik der Oberflächenabflussbildung während der Schneeschmelze und die damit verbundenen Erosionsprozesse ab. Der Modellansatz stellt somit eine Möglichkeit zwischen Modellergebnisaggregierung für den Gebietsauslass und aufwendiger Geländebeobachtung bzw. –messungen dar. Die prozessbeschreibende Modellierung mit zufriedenstellender Güte sowohl für das Schäfertal als auch für das Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet stellt die Grundlage für die Berechnung von Klima- oder Landnutzungsszenarien dar. Eine Auswertung der bestehenden langjährigen Datenreihe aus dem Schäfertal bestätigt zunächst den allgemeinen Trend zur Erwärmung vor allem im Winterhalbjahr. Demgegenüber lässt der instrumentenbedingte Fehler bei der Niederschlagmessung keine Ableitung eines Trends aus den vorhandenen Daten zu. Aus der meteorologischen Datenreihe des Schäfertals wurden insgesamt 13 Jahre mit definierter Abweichung von +2.5 bis -2.5 °C und fünfmal +0.5 °C von der durchschnittlichen Winterlufttemperatur (Jd 330-90) gegenüber dem langjährigen Wintermittel ausgewählt. Im Gegensatz zu Wettergeneratoren werden dadurch eine Kombinationen aus Lufttemperatur und Niederschlag erfasst, die typischen Witterungssituationen entsprechen. Die Niederschlagssummen für den Winterzeitraum dieser Szenariojahre liegen zwischen -45 % und + 75 % gegenüber den langjährigen Mittelwerten. Die Modellergebnisse belegen die große Bedeutung der Witterungssituationen für die Abflussbildung in der Art, dass eine erhöhte Niederschlagsumme nicht zwingend auch eine überdurchschnittliche Abflussmenge hervorruft. Schneedeckendynamik und Bodenfrost sind die prägenden Elemente. Die Anzahl der Schneetage und die Dauer einer Schneeperiode liegt bei negativen Temperaturabweichungen deutlich über den Szenarien mit positiver Abweichung. Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse der hydrologischen Simulation für die Szenarien, dass sowohl eine starke Abweichung nach oben oder unten vom bisherigen Durchschnitt vermehrt zu Oberflächenabflussbildung führt. Die Erosionssummen der Szenariotage mit Oberflächenabfluss variieren zwischen 4 und 141 t d-1 und stehen aufgrund des nicht veränderten Parametersatzes in direkter Abhängigkeit zum Abflussvolumen. Die berechneten Erosionssummen für Situationen ohne Bodenfrost fallen generell geringer aus, befinden sich aber wie auch die Ereignisse mit Bodenfrost im Wertebereich der Referenzereignisse. Im Bereich der Referenzereignisse liegen auch die Sedimentfrachten mit 0.03 bis 13.15 t d-1. Eine erhöhte Variabilität ist zu erwarten, wenn die Veränderungen der Vegetationsperioden und der Fruchtfolgen in den Modellansatz aufgenommen würden. Eine Betrachtung der Erosionsummen und Sedimentfrachten nicht auf Basis von Tageswerten sondern von Schneeschmelzereignissen zeigt deutlich, dass die Klimaszenarien mit hohen Abweichungen von den Normwerten auch erhöhte Gesamtstoffausträge verursachen. Im russischen Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet führen die Transformationsprozesse im Landwirtschaftssektor zu tiefgreifenden Änderungen der Landnutzung. Auf einer Analyse der Entwicklung in den letzten 15 Jahren aufbauend, kann für das Gebiet von einer deutlichen Modifikation im Verhältnis Grünland, Acker und Wald ausgegangen werden. Diese Dynamik spiegelt sich in den fünf Szenarien wider, die flächenspezifische Änderungen vorsehen. Die Variationen reichen von einem Szenario, in dem ein ausländischer Investor die landwirtschaftliche Nutzfläche auf alle geeigneten Böden ausdehnt, über eine Ausdehnung der Waldflächen in einem laufenden staatlichen Waldschutzprogramm bis hin zum Aufbau kleinbäuerlicher Strukturen und lokale Vermarktung der Produkte durch sich entwickelnden Tourismus. Die Gesamtabflussmenge der Szenarien liegt zwischen 276.4 und 293.3 mm für die Simulationsperiode 2003 bis 2005. In Abhängigkeit vom Waldflächenanteil und der damit verbundenen Evapotranspiration treten im Vergleich zum Ist-Zustands des Referenzszenarios nur geringe positive oder negative Abweichungen auf. Im Unterschied dazu treten bei der Betrachtung der Oberflächabflussentwicklung für die drei Schneeschmelzperioden relativ große Abweichungen bis zu über 20 mm auf. Diese Unterschiede sind am deutlichsten in den durch Bodenfrost und hohes Schneewasseräquivalent ausgezeichneten Jahre 2003 und 2005 für das Szenario mit dem größten Waldflächen- und Grünlandanteil. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen führen die Szenarien zu einer Erhöhung der simulierten Sedimentfracht am Gebietsauslass. Die Ergebnisse belegen darüber hinaus, dass eine Verminderung der Erosion auf den Hängen allein nicht zu einer Frachtreduzierung führen muss, da bei geringer Sedimentbelastung im Gerinne Material aufgenommen werden kann. Ein flächenspezifischer Vergleich zweier Szenarien belegt die Bedeutung der Verortung der Nutzungsänderungen innerhalb des Einzugsgebietes und der damit einhergehenden Konnektivität von abflussbildenden Arealen und Erosionsflächen zum Gerinne hin. Die Szenarioergebnisse weisen auf die steigende Bedeutung von Extremereignissen hin, die im Zuge des Klimawandels zu erwarten sind. Ebenso wird die Verknüpfung von Hang- und Gerinneprozessen als Attribut eines Einzugsgebietes unterstrichen, das bei Managementmaßnahmen beachtet werden muss. Insgesamt belegen die Ergebnisse für beide Untersuchungsgebiete, dass das Modellsystem IWAN nach einer Kabibrierung erfolgreich zur Abschätzung von möglichen zukünftigen Sedimentquellen und Sedimentausträgen eingesetzt werden kann. Weitergehender Forschungsbedarf besteht in der Frage der Übertragbarkeit des Monitoringansatzes in Naturräume mit anderen, zum Teil komplexeren hydrologischen Einzugsgebietsreaktionen und darauf aufbauenden Stoffausträgen und Austragspfaden. Darüber hinaus kann im Modellsystem IWAN eine Verbesserung durch eine Berechnung der Rillenausbildung auf dem Hang sowie eine Modifikation der Sedimenttransportberechnung erzielt werden. Bei einer Übertragung auf andere Einzugsgebiete sollte eine umfassende Sensitivitätsanalyse und Ergebnisunsicherheitsbetrachtung vor allem in Hinblick auf die Kopplung von Teilmodellen innerhalb des Modellsystems erfolgen.:Gliederung Gliederung V Liste der Abbildungen VII Liste der Tabellen XII 1 Einleitung und Fragestellung 3 1.1 Bodenerosion und Sedimentfracht in Einzugsgebieten 3 1.1.1 Abflussbildung, Bodenerosion und Sedimentaustrag 3 1.1.2 Winterliche Situationen 5 1.2 Modellierungsansätze 13 1.2.1 Modelle und Modellkopplungen 13 1.2.2 Probleme der Modellanwendung 17 1.3 Wissensdefizite und Zielstellung 23 2 Untersuchungsgebiete und Methoden 25 2.1 Schäfertal 25 2.1.1 Naturraum 25 2.1.2 Methoden 28 2.2 Lubazhinkha 31 2.2.1 Naturraum 31 2.2.2 Methoden 36 2.3 Datenverarbeitung 38 3 Ergebnisse und Diskussion des Monitorings in den Einzugsgebieten 41 3.1 Schäfertal 41 3.1.1 Abflussbildung 41 3.1.2 Stoffausträge bei Hochwasserereignissen 45 3.2 Lubazhinkha 54 3.2.1 Bedeutung der Schneeschmelze für den Stoffaustrag 54 3.2.2 Stoffdynamik während der Schneeschmelze 57 4 Modellentwicklung 69 4.1 Zielstellungen der Modellmodifikation und -entwicklung 69 4.2 WASIM-AGNPS 70 4.2.1 Wasserhaushaltsmodell WASIM 70 4.2.2 Stofftransportmodell AGNPS 72 4.2.3 Schnittstelle WASIM-AGNPS 74 4.3 Modifikation von WASIM für winterliche Abflussbildung 76 4.3.1 Grundlagen 76 4.3.2 Datenerhebung 77 4.3.3 Sensorauswahl 77 4.3.4 Ergebnisse 79 4.3.5 Empirisches Modell 82 4.3.6 Bodentemperaturteilmodul 83 4.3.7 Anpassung mit Daten aus dem Einzugsgebiet Lubazhinkha 85 4.4 Schneeschmelzerosionsmodell (SMEM) 87 4.4.1 Rillenprofil 87 4.4.2 Bodenerosion 90 4.4.3 Technische Umsetzung 96 4.5 Modellsystem IWAN 97 4.5.1 Schnittstelle SMEM-AGNPS 97 4.5.2 Graphische Benutzeroberfläche 99 5 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 105 5.1 Schäfertal 105 5.1.1 Bodentemperatur 105 5.1.2 Hydrologie 108 5.1.3 Schneeschmelzerosion 113 5.1.4 Sedimentfracht 120 5.2 Lubazhinkha 126 5.2.1 Hydrologie 126 5.2.2 Schneeschmelzerosion 133 5.2.3 Sedimentfracht 137 6 Szenariorechnungen 143 6.1 Klimaszenarien Schäfertal 143 6.1.1 Szenarienauswahl 143 6.1.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 148 6.2 Landnutzungsszenarien Lubazhinkha 158 6.2.1 Szenarienauswahl 158 6.2.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 163 7 Schlussfolgerungen 169 7.1 Einzugsgebiete 169 7.2 Modellsystem IWAN 172 7.3 Szenarien 176 7.4 Forschungsbedarf 178 8 Zusammenfassung 179 9 Summary 189 10 Literatur 199 Appendix 207 Abkürzungen Modellübersicht Quellcode (VBA) ; Soil erosion by water is a ubiquitous problem that impairs the agricultural productivity, diminishes soil functionality and may harmfully affect neighbouring environmental compartments. Surface waters are especially affected by the sediment, sediment bounded and soluble nutrients as well as pollutants mobilised by soil erosion. The knowledge about erosion processes and sediment loads is of high relevance for the protection of the soil and water and has moreover an economic dimension. Generally, a slope or catchment can be divided into three zones: erosion, transport and sedimentation. However, runoff generating processes and roughness or topography triggered runoff concentration lead to an individual differentiation. Furthermore, spatial and temporal discontinuities of processes or connectivities and thresholds modify the erosion and sediment characteristics. Relief and soil as structural elements of a catchment control accordingly the soil moisture differentiation and in an essential way the runoff generation and sediment load. In temperate and cold climates an important portion of runoff is generated in winter and can be affected by soil frost and snowmelt. However, only little knowledge exists about the processes and dimension of sediment and nutrient emissions under these wintry conditions. Systematic research exists particularly in Russia and Norway. The related deficits are also reflected in existing model approaches to estimate soil erosion and sediment fields from catchments. On the one hand neither the snow development or snow melt nor the modification of the soil water flow in case of frozen soil is considered. On the other hand the erosivity of the snow melt runoff and the modification of the soil erodibility through, for example frost-thaw cycles, is adequately reflected. It is the main focus of the presented work to identify, by analysing data from a German and a Russian catchment, the dominant processes and triggers of runoff generation and diffuse pollution under winter conditions. The results are implemented into a model system which is utilised to analyse spatial heterogeneity and temporal variability of processes and to estimate the effects of climate and land use change on sediment loads in the two target areas. The 1.44 km² catchment Schaefertal is located in the eastern lower Harz Mountains approx. 150 km SW of Berlin, Germany. Cambisols and Luvisolos have developed from periglacial slope deposits on greywacke and argillaceous shale. These slopes are utilised agriculturally with a crop rotation of mainly winter grain and canola. The thalweg is dominated by hydromorphic soils and pasture. The climate is slightly continental with an annual average temperature of 6.8°C and 680 mm total annual precipitation. In addition to long-time hydro-meteorological measurements, since several years research into sediment and nutrient emissions is conducted. A routine biweekly sampling of the runoff at the catchment outlet is supplemented by automatic high flow sampling especially during snow melt flows. Besides suspended sediment concentration, phosphorus species and dissolved organic carbon are sampled and analysed following standard methods. Also in the Russian catchment Lubazhinkha the main focus is the characterisation of runoff generation and sediment/nutrient transport during snowmelt events. The catchment is located about 100 km south of Moscow, Russia in the transition zone from southern Taiga to forest steppe. The area of 18.8 km² is utilised half by agriculture and one third by forestry. The recent spatial differentiation of this land use is triggered by the relief determined erosive shortening and hydromorphic characteristics of the dominant grey forest soils. Climate and hydrology are dominated by snow cover accumulation and snow melt; annual average temperature is 4.4°C and the annual precipitation sum is 560 mm. High flow samples are taken at the catchment outlet behind a small dam and at the two most important tributaries to characterise mobilisation processes and the sediment and nutrient concentrations. The interpretation of data from the Schaefertal demonstrate for the period of investigation the importance of high flow situations that are caused by snow melt. Catchment conditions characterised by frozen soils lead to a modification of the measured hydrograph, especially through the occurrence of fast surface or near-surface components. The peak flow of the eight high flow events which are employed for interpretation vary between 30 and 270 l s-1, with total runoff volumes in a range from 1 to 50 mm. The sediment concentrations that are observed at the catchment outlet are below 650 mg l-1 for the two events without frozen soil and therewith distinct below the maximum of around 6000 mg l-1 for events with frozen or partly frozen soil conditions. Solely, one event with rainfall on unfrozen soil is characterised by high sediment concentration which is caused by channel maintenances and easy mobilisation of material from the channel banks. According to this, the sediment yields vary for the single events and achieve up to 17 t. The most important trigger is the generation of erosive surface runoff on the slopes by reduction of the hydraulic conductivity of the frozen soils. The comparison of the sediment concentrations of high flow events and the biweekly sampling as well as hysteresis curves of the single events clarify the differing dynamics of sediment export situations. The soil frost affected events show an anti-clockwise direction of the discharge-sediment relationship which points to a sediment source on the slope, whereas the hysteresis curves of unfrozen soil conditions are oriented clockwise. For these events a sediment source near the channel or the channel bank is probable. These assumptions are also supported by a differentiated phosphorus enrichment ratio in the exported sediment. Furthermore, a dynamic in the progress of the single events can be observed which is caused by the temporal variability of the runoff generation and confirms the related spatial heterogeneity of sediment sources. Contrary to the Schaefertal with several snow melt events per year, in the Russian catchment the snow cover is accumulated over the entire winter and one snow melt flood occurs in March or during the first half of April. The interpretation of multiannual data document the importance of the spring snow melts for the runoff generation and sediment export from the catchment Lubazhinkha. The sediment yield of three observed snow melt events varies between 50 and 630 t in dependency on the hydrological conditions. The event related sediment load of at least 0.3 t ha-1 is above the values that were measured in the Schaefertal but in the range of other studies with comparable soils and land use. Detailed analyses of the measurements of the snow melt in spring 2003 document the dynamic within one event. A sediment concentration at the catchment outlet from 6 to 540 mg l-1 led to a total event sediment yield of 190 t. The maximum concentrations of sediment and phosphorus peak with the discharge. In contrast, the concentration of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) is delayed compared to the runoff peak due to the slow snow melt development under forest stands and mobilisation of DOC from the organic rich topsoil of these forest areas. A differentiation of runoff components allows a further interpretation of event specific dynamic of sediment sources and transport pathways. In case of low discharge (< 2.5 mm d-1) the material transfer is dominated by dissolved forms and enters the channel passing the soil as slow runoff. Fast runoff components or surface runoff dominate situations with higher amounts of discharge in which sediment and nutrient sources are mobilised with temporal dynamic. Besides this event internal dynamic inter-annual variability exists that is a result of weather conditions in the specific winter. Similar to the Schaefertal, the development of frozen soils and the related modification of infiltration characteristics of the soils play an important role in the Lubazhinkha catchment. Other important triggers are snow water equivalent, snow melt dynamic and specific soil frost characteristics, i.e. depth of penetration. The variability of these boundary conditions led to a high inter-annual differentiation of runoff generation and sediment loads. Thus, for the snowmelt 2004 with above average winter air temperatures and only partly frozen soils, as well as low snow water equivalent, a comparable low sediment load was observed. In addition, the hysteresis curves of the discharge-sediment concentration relationship indicate differences in the sediment sources for the single snow melt events which are in dependency of the abovementioned factors. For both catchments the established monitoring system and selected parameters provide an insight into runoff generating processes and relevant triggers. Occurrences of soil frost and snow melt dynamics are most important factors. Wintry conditions led to high sediment and nutrient yields in both catchments. The interpretation of physical and chemical parameters of discharge allows the identification of spatial heterogeneity and temporal variability of sediment source areas. Several demands for a model approach arise from these findings of catchment monitoring which are especially related to the spatial differentiated estimation of surface runoff generating areas and soil erosion through snow melt water. The basis for the model system "IWAN" (Integrated Winter erosion And Nutrient load model) is the hydrological model WASIM ETH Ver.2 and the nutrient load model AGNPS 5.0. The linking of these two raster-based models facilitates the utilisation of continuous, spatial differentiated information for surface runoff to estimate soil erosion. By this, the high parameter sensitivity of the SCS-CN approach in AGNPS is replaced with sensitivities distributed among different parameters of the soil water calculation in WASIM and the concurrent calculation of a plausible process based spatial differentiated runoff generation. The implementation of a module to estimate the soil temperature forms the basis for an improved calculation of soil water flows and runoff generation under winter conditions. This module calculates the topsoil temperature based on values of air temperature and considers exposition and land use. The calculated soil temperature of the previous day is assumed in case of a snow cover of more than 5 mm water equivalent. The saturated hydraulic conductivity of the soil is set to zero if the calculated soil temperature drops below freezing and surface runoff begins after the water free soil pore volume is filled up. The goodness of fit for the Schaefertal shows a correlation coefficient of 0.62 to 0.81 and for the Lubazhinkha catchment values in a range between 0.82 and 0.91. The spatial and temporal differentiated information of surface runoff is fundamental to a new developed calculation of rill erosion during snow melt situations which replaces the empirical erosion estimation of AGNPS. One rill for each raster cell is simulated on the assumption of a non-cohesive soil through water saturation and that soil frost does not hinder the deepening of the triangular rill profile. The soil erodibilty is a function of root parameters and diameter of water stable aggregates. The erosivity of the snow melt runoff in the rill is calculated in dependency of surface roughness and soil aggregate diameter. A spatial differentiated estimation of soil erosion is possible in combination with the routed surface runoff from the modified WASIM. In addition to the erosion estimation, the model system IWAN comprises a user interface for data conversion as well as pre- and post-processing options. The results of the model system application for both catchments demonstrate that the dominant processes of runoff generation as well as sediment loss are matched. For the Schaefertal a modelling agreement of r² equalling 0.94 and 0.91 is realised for the year of calibration 1994 and the year of validation 1995, respectively. With the exception of 1996 all periods of high flow and the falling dry of the channel in summer from 1996 until 2003 are represented satisfactorily with the calibrated set of parameters. On this basis, the total runoff volume of the observed and above discussed snow melt events has been modelled with a high degree of accuracy. The spatially differentiated calculation of soil moisture and soil frost occurrence results in a variable fraction of surface runoff on the total runoff for these events. Runoff volume, slope and flow length show positive sensitivities in the new snow melt erosion module. However, parameter combinations and non-linear algorithms, especially for root parameters and the Manning coefficient, may lead to more complex sensitivity properties. Thus, the simulation of soil erosion in the Schaefertal was first conducted with a set of parameters that was calibrated with results of erosion plot experiments. The average values of calculated erosion vary between 0.0006 and 0.96 t ha-1 for the six events from the Schaefertal. However, the median values and high standard deviations prove that most of the cells have low erosion values. The results for events with frozen soils are characterised by significant higher values of erosion. Despite similar total runoff volume i.e. of the events from 20.01.2001 and 26.02.2002 differences occur because of distinctions in runoff concentration on the north and south exposed slope. The spatial results are positively compared to field mapping in addition to a plausibility control of the calculated values. The adjustment of the calculated values for sediment load against the observations is done with calibration of the Manning coefficient for one randomly selected event. The sediment load in some footslope areas caused by runoff concentration is especially high and in the range of 0.0 to 13.84 t for single events. The event sediment yield is generally underestimated with the exception of the event on 26.02.2002. The total absolute error for the three winter seasons is 11 t. The difference between simulated and observed sediment load is highest for the 26.12.2002. This distinction may originate in the temporal variability and spatial heterogeneity of surface roughness against the background of soil frost influences and tillage operations. The general distribution of modelled sediment sources, transport pathways and connecting points to the channel are confirmed by field observations. However, a quantification of the spatial model results on the basis of the observed single events is not possible. For the Lubazhinkha catchment two sets of hydrological parameters are identified for the year of calibration 2004 which achieve satisfying results in comparison to the observed discharge. Although one of these set of parameters performed better in reproducing the peak flows of the snow melt situations, the spatial distribution of surface runoff generating areas was not plausible. Contrary, the second set of parameters characterises the lateral water flows and thus the important spatial soil moisture distribution in a more realistic way. However, the snow melt peak flows for the years of validation 2003 and 2005 are overestimated. The difference between the years, which was identified on the basis of the interpretation of the observations, is matched as well as the dynamic of runoff generation. Surface runoff generation on the flat interfluves areas and saturated areas in valley bottoms are modelled satisfactorily as well as the delayed runoff generation under forest stands. The model system simulates erosion sums of 10 to 280 t d-1 for a total of ten days with surface runoff in a range of 0.3 to 24.1 mm d-1 in the entire modelling period of three years. Considering the variable area of 5 to 46 % on which erosion takes place, the values of effective erosion vary between 0.1 and 0.32 t ha-1 for single days and between 0.44 to 0.92 t ha-1 for multi-day snow melts. The simulated sediment load at the catchment outlet range from 6.7 to 365.8 t per day and sums up to 246.2 t for the snow melt 2003. For the year 2004 99.9 t and for 2005 757.9 t are calculated. In comparison to the observations for the calibration year 2004, the sediment load is overestimated by 10 t or 12 %. The deviation for 2003 is -9 %, with the same set of parameters. The result for 2005 is with an error of 33 % not as good as in the two other years. Overall, the days of snow melt with a low amount of erosion cause additional mobilisation of sediment from the channel banks and contrary, high amount of erosion on the slopes result in deposition processes on the forest and pasture areas near in the valley bottom and in the channel itself. Thus, high sediment loads are estimated for the bottom slopes and the small V-shaped first order valleys. The sediment loads for the two sub-catchments differ significantly because of the spatially differentiated processes of runoff generation and soil erosion. For the days with runoff generation in forest areas higher sediment yields are calculated for the Lubazhinkha-subcatchment which is characterised by a higher degree of forested areas. Differences in slope-channel interaction and variations between the two subcatchments illustrated the overall high process relevance of the model results. The model system IWAN estimates for the Schaefertal and the Lubazhinkha catchment the spatial and temporal dynamics of surface runoff generation and the related erosion processes during snow melt episodes with high plausibility. The model approach demonstrates an option between model result aggregation at the catchment outlet and intensive spatial field observation and measurement within a catchment. The satisfactory modelling of processes for the Schaefertal, as well as for the Lubazhinkha catchment, forms the basis for the calculation of climate and land use scenarios. An analysis of the existing long-term dataset from the Schaefertal approves the general trend of warming, especially in the winter half year. Contrary, the instrument error for rainfall measurements disallows an identification of a trend in the present data. A total of 13 years with defined deviation of +2.5 to -2.5 °C and five years with a deviation of +0.5 °C from the average air temperature in winter (Jd 330-90) were selected from the data set. In contrast to the utilisation of weather generators, this selection provides a dataset with a combination of air temperature and rainfall/snow that is in accordance with typical atmospheric situations. The amount of rainfall for the winter period of the scenario years deviates -45 % to +75 % from the long term average of winter. The model results substantiate the role of weather situations such that an increased amount of rainfall does not automatically result in above-average runoff. Snow cover dynamics and soil frost occurrence are the controlling factors. The number of days with snow and the duration of each snow period are significant higher for scenarios with negative temperature deviation compared to the scenarios with positive deviation. Overall the results of the hydrological calculation of the scenarios show that extreme positive and negative deviations lead to increased surface runoff probability. The sums of erosion for single days with surface runoff varies between 4 to 141 t d-1 and are in direct relation to runoff volume due to the unchanged set of parameters. Generally the calculated sums of erosion for situations without soil frost are lower than with soil frost, but both types are in the range of values of the measured and modelled reference events. Also the calculated sediment yields from 0.03 to 13.15 t d-1 for the scenario days are in the range of the measurements. A higher variability could be expected when considering modifications to vegetation period or crop rotations. An interpretation of erosion and sediment yield on the basis of snow melt periods clarifies those scenarios with extreme deviations also tend to higher sediment export from the catchment. Transformation processes in the agricultural sector of Russia trigger fundamental changes in land use. Based on an analysis of the development of the past 15 years for the Lubazhinkha catchment a significant modification of the pasture, arable land and forest areas is probable in the future. This dynamic is reflected in five scenarios with area-specific changes in land use distribution. The variations range from scenarios with a foreign investor who extends the arable land to all suitable soils in the catchment, an expansion of forest areas in the frame of a governmental forest protection program to the development of small family farms with local market structures because of tourism. The calculated total runoff for the scenarios varies between 276.4 and 293.3 mm for the entire simulation period 2003 to 2005. Small positive or negative deviations occur compared to the as-is state in relation to the variable forest area and combined evapotranspiration. Contrary, the surface runoff shows large deviations of more than 20 mm for the three snow melt periods. These differences are pronounced for the scenario with highest portion of forest and pasture area in the years 2003 and 2005 that are characterised by soil frost and high water equivalent in snow. With only few exceptions the scenarios lead to an increase in simulated sediment yield at the catchment outlet. Moreover, the results document that a decrease of erosion on the slopes does not consequently result in a yield reduction. In the case of low sediment input from the slopes additional material from the channel bed and banks may attribute significantly to the sediment loading. An area specific comparison of two scenarios clarifies the importance of localisation of land use changes and the according connectivity of surface runoff areas and erosion areas to the channel. The scenarios document the increasing importance of extreme events that can be expected due to climate change. Additionally, the link of slope and channel processes, as attribute of a catchment, has to be considered in planning of management measures. The results prove for both catchments that the model system IWAN can be applied for estimating future potential sediment sources and sediment yield after successful calibration. Further research is needed in the question of transferability of the monitoring approach to other environments with a different, more complex hydrological catchment reaction and linked sediment sources and transport mechanisms. The model system IWAN can be improved by a dynamic calculation of rill network generation on the slope and a modification of the sediment transport algorithms. The transfer of the model system to other catchments has to be accompanied by a comprehensive sensitivity and uncertainty analysis especially respecting the model chain within IWAN.:Gliederung Gliederung V Liste der Abbildungen VII Liste der Tabellen XII 1 Einleitung und Fragestellung 3 1.1 Bodenerosion und Sedimentfracht in Einzugsgebieten 3 1.1.1 Abflussbildung, Bodenerosion und Sedimentaustrag 3 1.1.2 Winterliche Situationen 5 1.2 Modellierungsansätze 13 1.2.1 Modelle und Modellkopplungen 13 1.2.2 Probleme der Modellanwendung 17 1.3 Wissensdefizite und Zielstellung 23 2 Untersuchungsgebiete und Methoden 25 2.1 Schäfertal 25 2.1.1 Naturraum 25 2.1.2 Methoden 28 2.2 Lubazhinkha 31 2.2.1 Naturraum 31 2.2.2 Methoden 36 2.3 Datenverarbeitung 38 3 Ergebnisse und Diskussion des Monitorings in den Einzugsgebieten 41 3.1 Schäfertal 41 3.1.1 Abflussbildung 41 3.1.2 Stoffausträge bei Hochwasserereignissen 45 3.2 Lubazhinkha 54 3.2.1 Bedeutung der Schneeschmelze für den Stoffaustrag 54 3.2.2 Stoffdynamik während der Schneeschmelze 57 4 Modellentwicklung 69 4.1 Zielstellungen der Modellmodifikation und -entwicklung 69 4.2 WASIM-AGNPS 70 4.2.1 Wasserhaushaltsmodell WASIM 70 4.2.2 Stofftransportmodell AGNPS 72 4.2.3 Schnittstelle WASIM-AGNPS 74 4.3 Modifikation von WASIM für winterliche Abflussbildung 76 4.3.1 Grundlagen 76 4.3.2 Datenerhebung 77 4.3.3 Sensorauswahl 77 4.3.4 Ergebnisse 79 4.3.5 Empirisches Modell 82 4.3.6 Bodentemperaturteilmodul 83 4.3.7 Anpassung mit Daten aus dem Einzugsgebiet Lubazhinkha 85 4.4 Schneeschmelzerosionsmodell (SMEM) 87 4.4.1 Rillenprofil 87 4.4.2 Bodenerosion 90 4.4.3 Technische Umsetzung 96 4.5 Modellsystem IWAN 97 4.5.1 Schnittstelle SMEM-AGNPS 97 4.5.2 Graphische Benutzeroberfläche 99 5 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 105 5.1 Schäfertal 105 5.1.1 Bodentemperatur 105 5.1.2 Hydrologie 108 5.1.3 Schneeschmelzerosion 113 5.1.4 Sedimentfracht 120 5.2 Lubazhinkha 126 5.2.1 Hydrologie 126 5.2.2 Schneeschmelzerosion 133 5.2.3 Sedimentfracht 137 6 Szenariorechnungen 143 6.1 Klimaszenarien Schäfertal 143 6.1.1 Szenarienauswahl 143 6.1.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 148 6.2 Landnutzungsszenarien Lubazhinkha 158 6.2.1 Szenarienauswahl 158 6.2.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 163 7 Schlussfolgerungen 169 7.1 Einzugsgebiete 169 7.2 Modellsystem IWAN 172 7.3 Szenarien 176 7.4 Forschungsbedarf 178 8 Zusammenfassung 179 9 Summary 189 10 Literatur 199 Appendix 207 Abkürzungen Modellübersicht Quellcode (VBA)
Scopo di questo lavoro è proporre una comparazione a livello tematico tra l'Odissea e il poema I Lusiadi, cui dà vita, nel 1572, Luìs Vaz de Camões, il maggiore scrittore di lingua portoghese. Dopo questo primo capitolo introduttivo, l'esposizione si focalizzerà sulla relazione che sussiste tra la cultura portoghese e quella classica. Nel secondo capitolo verrà introdotta l'episteme storica e culturale entro cui si situa il secolo de I Lusiadi: il secolo delle scoperte, delle Gesta Dei por Lusos, che vede assurgere ad eroe primario un Ulisse nuovo, dantesco, che con il suo "fatti non foste a viver come bruti" spinge a seguire nuove rotte e diviene - diremmo oggi, idolo, di naviganti e navigatori. Poi verrà introdotta, nel quarto capitolo, una sinossi del poema di Camões, funzionale all'indagine comparatistica. Dopo aver individuato riprese, riformulazioni e novità prenderà avvio lo sviluppo delle correlazioni individuate: nel quinto capitolo verrà analizzato il transito marittimo ed il suo fine, nel sesto capitolo il ruolo degli dei, nel settimo la struttura delle narrazioni e degli espedienti tecnici messi in opera per strutturarle (mise en abyme, flashback e flashforward). A seguire vengono dunque presentate, nel paragrafo 1.2, le peculiarità che fanno de Lusiadi un poema epico. In 1.3.1, la presentazione del cronotopo de I Lusiadi permette di avvalorare queste affermazioni. Nel paragrafo 1.4, infine, viene presentata la componente più innovativa del poema camoniano. 1.2 L'epica de "I Lusiadi" Nell'introdurre lo statuto epico del poema camoniano, vanno considerate non solo le radici profonde che legano quest'opera cinquecentesca all'epica classica, ma anche le variazioni sul tema che permettono al poema di rispecchiare in pieno la propria epoca. Camões canta il viaggio di Gama considerandolo molto più di un avvenimento concluso: quel viaggio rappresenta il culmine non solo delle esplorazioni della costa africana occidentale, iniziate con il vigoroso impulso dell'Infante Dom Henrique, ma della storia stessa del Portogallo che con tali esplorazioni si identifica a partire dal 1415. L'essenza ultima del poema non è però solo questa. Si è discusso a lungo, infatti, sulla natura simbolica del viaggio che viene rappresentato nei poemi epici. Questo schema definisce i tre momenti fondamentali della chiamata, del viaggio propriamente detto e del ritorno. Di contro, dal punto di vista della comunità, il ritorno dell'eroe costituisce l'obiettivo e l'unica giustificazione della sua lunga assenza. 1.3 Il cronotopo dell'epica Nel riflettere sulla capacità di autoanalisi di una comunità, è interessante notare come l'epica letteraria, a giudicare dalle sue migliori produzioni, non sbocci mai nei tempi d'oro di una nazione, ma nel momento del suo declino. Se ciò accadesse solo in un caso, potremmo ascriverlo al temperamento del poeta e considerarlo nei termini di tale specifica occorrenza. 1.3.1 Il cronotopo de "I Lusiadi" Camões vive alla fine di grandi avventure e all'alba di grandi cambiamenti. Così decide di cantare la grandezza della sua nazione e di coloro che l'hanno costruita. 2. Dalla follia di Ulisse alle gesta Dei por Lusos: esegesi di una rivoluzione mentale 2.1 Il Portogallo Rinascimentale Non è semplice riuscire a comprendere pienamente l'ascesa e il declino dell'Impero coloniale portoghese rinascimentale. Il Portogallo detiene una posizione di preminenza nella storia delle scoperte geografiche grazie a tre grandi imprese: l'apertura delle rotte oceaniche verso Oriente, la colonizzazione del Brasile e la diffusione della cristianità in terre lontane, soprattutto ad opera dei Gesuiti. I portoghesi del Rinascimento non erano tutti grandi pensatori; molti di loro, come Álvaro Velho e Pero Vaz de Caminha, erano uomini semplici, non colti, che presero parte con modestia alle scoperte e che, senza dubbio, sapevano come resistere alle difficoltà marittime. Intelligenze acute, come il vate Camões, combinarono una innata capacità di resistere alle avversità della vita con una disincantata, realistica visione del mondo, degli uomini, del Portogallo, che sottende l'apparente ottimismo patriottico dei Lusiadi. Forse queste qualità possono aiutarci a capire come tali uomini siano riusciti a raggiungere quasi tutti i lidi del mondo perseverando nel sacrificio. Molti della ciurma erano in realtà veterani dei viaggi di Dias. È probabile che questo resoconto di viaggio sia il diario di bordo di uno dei quattro vascelli – il São Rafael – che salparono dal Restelo, il porto di Lisbona, alla volta delle Indie. Eccone l'incipit: Nel nome di Dio. Uno degli scopi dei viaggi portoghesi era quello di scoprire se e che tipi di evidenze cristiane vi fossero in India. L'ideale sarebbe stato trovare qualche monarca cristiano e stringere alleanze politiche e religiose con lui, per quella convinzione secondo cui le navigazioni intraprese sotto l'egida della diffusione del Cristianesimo potevano avere buon fine e portare prestigio alla madrepatria. 2.2 Un caso tardomedievale: l'impresa dei Vivaldi In epoche anteriori al Rinascimento, comunque, si rendeva già manifesto un cambiamento culturale che, considerando superata l'idea del non più oltre, tentava la via del mare alla ricerca di nuove rotte. Vi furono già nel Medioevo alcuni che, salpati alla volta dell'Atlantico suscitando la meraviglia di chi li vide partire, non fecero più ritorno. Come sostiene Nardi, non è inverosimile che Dante abbia avuto notizia dell'accaduto e, ispirandosi a questa storia, sia riuscito ad animare della stessa intraprendenza la figura del suo Ulisse. Se l'Ulisse di Omero, al sicuro nella propria reggia, può lì attendervi una decorosa vecchiaia, tale sorte non si addice all'eroe dantesco, che personifica la ragione umana insofferente ai limiti e ribelle al decreto divino che interdice il trapassar del segno . L'Ulisse di Dante non nasce dallo sforzo erudito di un tardo umanista, abilissimo nel riprodurre fedelmente modelli; quanto poi il dantesco sia lontano dall'omerico è visibile al primo sguardo. Forse spira veramente, nel pathos con cui Dante dà ali al discorso del suo Ulisse, il futuro spirito dei viaggi intorno al mondo. L'oceano era la parte del globo terracqueo negata ai viventi, dove l'unica terra emersa era la montagna del Paradiso Terrestre; nessun mortale l'aveva impunemente violata. Dante sceglie di seguire un cammino differente da quello del suo Ulisse, una strada luminosa, non folle, ma sublimata da una visione cristiana delle cose e del mondo. L'Ulisse trecentesco incarna la nascita del mondo moderno e lo fa grazie ad una poesia di altissimo valore che sgorga dalla realtà dei fatti, da un evento tanto impensabile allora quanto la grandezza dei sogni e delle speranze umane. 2.4 Colombo e Vespucci: dall'arte alla vita. La realtà del Nuovo Mondo affonda l'incubo dantesco: la poesia si inoltra nel mare, seguendo stavolta Ulisse senza biasimarlo, diventa vita, vissuta e vera. Le gesta dei Portoghesi ricevono così il sigillo di Dio. 3. Ulisse e Lisbona: un legame da sempre 3.1 Le radici leggendarie Al fine di introdurre l'eziologia della città di Lisbona pare opportuno riportare l'episodio mitologico seguente che narra della fondazione della città . Nel frattempo, il nemico sconosciuto e occulto era in cerca di Ulisse. Si avvicinò alla donna che gli parlava. La regina, consapevole del proprio trionfo, continuava a incantarlo nel suo sguardo enigmatico. Aveva nostalgia del mare e sete di nuove battaglie. La presenza femminea, in primo luogo, rimanda all'archetipo del matriarcato, tipico delle civiltà mediterranee arcaiche. In seconda istanza, la presenza dei serpenti. Il serpente, nelle società matriarcali africane, viene considerato signore delle donne e della fecondità. Lorenzo Valla, tra il 1445 ed il 1446 al servizio del re di Aragona, afferma che in Portogallo si usa una forma del nome di Lisbona a pretesto di una derivazione etimologica da Ulisse, e sostiene che la referenza greca può notarsi al massimo in un ipotetico, sebbene infondato, elemento finale della parola, ossia in –hìppoi , in cui mito e realtà si incontrano . / Ulisse è quel ch' alza la sacra casa / alla dea che gli diè lingua faconda. / Dopo aver Ilio in Asia al suolo rasa / su terreno europeo Lisbona fonda) . In questo passo Paolo da Gama illustra al catual di Calicut gli stendardi di seta che svettano sulle navi portoghesi, su cui è dipinta la storia del Portogallo. Rodrigues parte da un'osservazione sul titolo del poema camoniano, sostenendo che Resende fu uno degli innovatori della parola Lusiadae, impiegandola per la prima volta – in vece della forma Lysiadae, molto usata dai latinisti rinascimentali – proprio nel seguente passaggio del Vincentius: …urbemque [ Olysses] suo de nomine primum Finxit Odysseiam, quae nunc carissima toto Cognita in orbe, ducem fama super astra Pelasgum Tollit. 3.3 Una Laudatio Urbis: letteratura apologetica a sostegno del mito. La laudatio si articola in maniera peculiare: si esaltano la strategica posizione della città, l'opulenza del porto, la salubrità del clima. 3.4 L'Ulisseia: Lisbona mulher à espera Se si guarda al secolo XVII, infine, Gabriel Pereira de Castro, autore nel 1636 dell'Ulisseia, altro poema epico con l'intento di narrare le avventure che portarono Ulisse alle sponde lusitane, ricorre all'Odissea come modello. L'evolversi di questa programmaticità è ben visibile fin dall'apertura, con l'invocazione alla musa, la dedica al re e l'inizio della narrazione in medias res, passando attraverso l'utilizzo della mitologia, il ricorso alla profezia ed una certa varietà stilistica che stempera il tono epico talvolta con episodi lirici, talaltra con inserti bucolici. Questa aspirazione letteraria incontra, nel Portogallo del secolo XVI, fatti grandiosi appena occorsi. Fin dall'esordio del poema è enunciata la poetica della verità e realtà dell'epos narrato. La varietà di inserimento della materia è strutturata in maniera armoniosa: è possibile notare infatti una lunga analessi costituita dalla narrazione di Vasco de Gama ai canti II – IV; seguono l'ekphrasis delle scene rappresentate sugli stendardi portoghesi al canto VIII e la profezia al canto X. Questi tre blocchi narrativi sulla storia portoghese sono assai istruttivi perché mostrano il procedere del poeta. Oggetto della narrazione è il passato portoghese, fino ad anni prossimi alla composizione del poema; l'ottica che caratterizza questo incedere muta di continuo: nel primo blocco dona una visione travagliata della monarchia portoghese, nel secondo è colma d'ammirazione verso i più fulgidi esempi di eroismo dei suoi servitori, nel terzo guarda alla colonizzazione futura. Il passato portoghese appare segnato dalla fragilità umana; non va mai dimenticata la situazione psicologica in cui de Gama è narratore. Canto I – il poeta dichiara la sua intenzione di cantare le gloriose imprese d'Asia e Africa dei portoghesi. Invoca per questo le ninfe del Tago e dedica il suo poema al giovane don Sebastiano. Bacco, dal cielo, non tollera la buona sorte dei portoghesi. Canto II – all'arrivo a Mombasa, un messo del re locale invita de Gama a sbarcare; i due degredados che de Gama manda in perlustrazione a terra sono ingannati dagli abitanti e da Bacco. Gli infedeli lasciano le navi insieme al pilota mozambicano che teme sia stato scoperto il suo inganno. Vasco de Gama invoca la Divina Provvidenza e Venere, per soccorrerlo, si reca da Giove chiedendo al padre di confermare l'aiuto ai portoghesi. Qui il re accoglie favorevolmente i portoghesi, e chiede di essere informato sulla storia del popolo lusitano e sulle traversie affrontate dai naviganti per giungere fino alla sua città. Canto III – Vasco de Gama dà avvio alla sua lunga risposta al re di Malindi. Inizia descrivendo la collocazione geografica del Portogallo e, dopo un cenno alle antichità portoghesi, tra mito e storia, ricostruisce la nascita del regno a partire da Enrico di Borgogna e dal figlio di lui, Afonso I, le cui vicende sono descritte in dettaglio. Il pianto del gigante, sotto forma di tempesta, segna la fine dell'angoscioso incontro. La narrazione al re termina con l'esaltazione della veridicità delle scoperte dei portoghesi. Camões canta infine a sua volta la grandezza delle opere portoghesi, esaltando il valore della poesia che le celebra. All'alba viene avvistata Calicut, meta tanto sospirata; de Gama, in ginocchio, rende grazie a Dio. Il poeta conclude il canto esaltando l'onore raggiunto grazie al valore individuale e al rischio della vita, non tra le mollezze e fondandosi sulla nobiltà dei propri predecessori. Canto VII – Camões celebra con ardore il valore dei portoghesi, introducendo poi una descrizione sintetica dell'India e dei suoi abitanti. Monçaide riferisce le principali vicende del regno del Malabar, a partire dalla conversione all'Islam del re Perimal, illustrando anche gli usi sociali e religiosi degli Indù. De Gama viene accompagnato fino alla reggia da un catual mandato dal re e, nella sala del trono, propone allo zamorino l'alleanza con i portoghesi; l'indiano rimanda la decisione all'incontro con il suo consiglio, facendo ospitare i portoghesi negli appartamenti del catual. Il poeta interrompe allora la descrizione per rivolgere alle ninfe del Tago e del Mondego una nuova invocazione in cui ricorda l'impegno profuso per la poesia e la scelta di cantare gli eroi che misero a repentaglio la vita per Dio e per il re. L'animo del re è mal disposto verso i portoghesi sia per i responsi degli auspici, che ne predicono il dominio, sia perché Bacco, assunti i panni di Maometto, appare in sogno ad un sacerdote musulmano esortandolo a contrapporsi ai cristiani, provocando così i maneggi dei musulmani e dei catuali. Venere, mentre i portoghesi sono sulla via del ritorno, appronta per loro il meritato riposo: una splendida isola oceanica in cui i naviganti possano provare le gioie dell'amore con le ninfe del mare. Canto X - Un sontuoso banchetto è pronto nel palazzo di Teti, che canta le future glorie dei lusitani, ricordandone le più brillanti figure: tra gli altri, Duarte Pacheco e Francisco de Almeida, Afonso de Abuquerque e João de Castro. Infine Teti conduce de Gama – privilegio straordinariamente concesso ad un mortale – a contemplare la macchina del mondo, illustrata secondo il modello geocentrico tolemaico, retta dalla Provvidenza Divina, mentre gli dei sono, dice Teti, solo bei nomi di cui Dio si serve per le cause seconde. Il poema si conclude con la dura invettiva contro l'insensibilità nazionale nei confronti della poesia e con l'invito al re a ricompensare i suoi fedeli servitori che rischiano la vita per lui; la poesia del poeta non cesserà di celebrarlo. La tematica dell'attraversamento, del transito, del viaggio che si compie in un moto dalle più disparate sfaccettature è stata numerose volte oggetto d'indagine e di riflessioni. Ad esempio, finita la narrazione al banchetto di Alcinoo, così possiamo leggere tra i primi versi del libro tredicesimo: [….] Ricordo e ritorno costituiscono un'endiade in cui i due termini sono inscindibile rinvio dell'uno all'altro: dimenticare il ritorno equivale alla perdita della propria identità, della propria destinazione, equivale alla condanna allo smarrimento errante senza un fine. Nel libro dodicesimo, ai versi riportati nel paragrafo precedente, riguardanti l'episodio della terra dei lotofagi, l'oblio è una terrificante evenienza che viene oggettivata da Omero nel loto. Tale meccanismo rimanda inferenzialmente ad un'altra oggettivazione presente in un altro mito: la mela offerta ad Eva nel giardino dell'Eden oggettivizza in sé la possibilità della conoscenza del bene e del male. In corrispondenza ossimorica con questa oggettivazione troviamo appunto il loto: se la tentazione propugnata ad Eva conduce alla conoscenza del bene e del male, quella offerta dai lotofagi porta all'oblio. ( Odissea, IX, 224 – 225 / 228 – 230 ) Possiamo vedere come contenga il germe del mito dantesco di Ulisse: "O frati", dissi, "che per cento milia perigli siete giunti a l'occidente, a questa tanto picciola vigilia d'i nostri sensi ch'è del rimanente non vogliate negar l'esperïenza, di retro al sol, del mondo sanza gente. La continua ridefinizione e rielaborazione di se stessi attraverso l'acquisizione dell'ignoto permette di prendere coscienza della propria finitezza, di avvertire l'urgenza della conoscenza, di spostare i baricentri epistemologici dagli infiniti celesti alla limitatezza mortale, che però racchiude in sé l'infinito della mente umana. 6.Il ruolo degli déi In questo capitolo verrà esposta in maniera sistematica la funzione degli dei all'interno dei due poemi presi in esame. 6.4.1 Atena. Per sollecitare la capacità decisionale del padre, Atena sottilmente agisce suscitando la commozione di Zeus. La dea, nel perorare la causa del proprio protetto, nel primo libro dell'Odissea dispiega in toto la propria capacità intellettuale e, appunto in sede di concilio, la vediamo fare leva in maniera incalzante proponendo il suo argomento preponderante: Ma il mio cuore si spezza per Odisseo cuore ardente, misero!, che lunghi dolori sopporta lontano dai suoi, nell'isola in mezzo alle onde, dov'è l'ombelico del mare: [………………………………….]Se però tale attributo avvicina ad una dimensione umana il dio, eccolo nel V libro riportare l'adorata figlia glaucopide alla lungimiranza divina, con una risposta che riguarda la punizione che attende i pretendenti. Infatti ai vv. 21 – 27 ricorda alla figlia che proprio a lei è affidato il compito di punire le malefatte degli usurpatori della casa di Odisseo. È ciò che Ermes, su comando del Cronide, riferisce a Calipso nel V libro, quando il messaggero degli dei viene inviato dalla ninfa per comunicarle la decisione del concilio riguardo all'eroe itacese: Ma certo il volere di Zeus egìoco non può Un altro dio trascurare o far vano. Quando infatti il Sole, nel XII libro, si lamenta del sacrilegio compiuto ai suoi danni ad opera dei compagni di Odisseo, ossia l'aver osato cibarsi delle vacche sacre a lui, protesta in maniera clamorosa ed estremistica: abbandonerà la terra per trasferirsi negli Inferi qualora i Greci non venissero puniti. (XII, 385 - 388) Oltre che le lagnanze del Sole, Zeus riceve anche le rimostranze di Poseidone, che, progenitore dei Feaci, si sente tradito da loro perché hanno reso troppo facile il ritorno di Odisseo, che pure il dio del mare sa di non potere impedire, in quanto assicuratogli dal destino e quindi dallo stesso Zeus che ne è garante. Che pietrifichi una nave al suo ritorno in patria, quando è già visibile dalla città, e copra la città stessa con un gran monte. Nel libro XX troviamo Odisseo in ascolto del pianto di Penelope, finalmente ritrovata e accanto a lui; crede sia una fantasia, e chiede a Zeus conferma del lieto presagio; vuole un segno divino ed uno umano che lo rassicurino sulla contingenza dell'evento che sta vivendo. (XX, 102 – 105 / 111 - 119) L'epifania gratuita garantisce la validità del segno, e risulta gratuita in quanto proveniente, nella sua manifestazione umana, da persona estranea al conflitto. Tale evenienza svolge una funzione maieutica nel procedere degli eventi; Odisseo comprende che è l'ora di agire, che il fato e gli dei lo accompagnano. L'ultima performance del padre degli dei ha luogo nel libro ventunesimo, e decreta la fine dei pretendenti dando il via alla gara con l'arco: […………….] 6.1.3 Poseidone Il ruolo di Poseidone può essere considerato quello dell'antagonista primario, portatore di distruzione, ma sopra ogni cosa figurazione del caos, della furia devastatrice che, nella propria ira, diviene causa primaria del lungo peregrinare. All'inizio, nel libro I, durante il concilio degli dei, il dio non è in sede: sta smaltendo i bollori nel paese degli Etiopi, dove gli vengono tributati lauti sacrifici. Così Camões, affidandosi al proprio amore per l'antichità, sceglie di reintrodurli, e di dare loro una posizione preminente nel proprio schema principale. Gli dei sono comunque reali, nel senso che incarnano forze potenti nel cuore umano e nello scorrere della vita. Nel Rinascimento questi due mondi potevano convivere fianco a fianco. Non è il dio del vino e dell'estasi dionisiaca, ma lo spirito orientale nella propria vanità, astuzia e disordine. A Giove - come a Zeus nell'Odissea - spetta la decisione finale, ma egli è al di fuori della battaglia. A Mozambico diffonde cupe voci, ma viene frustrato nel suo intento dall'accortezza di Gama. Camões si concede una fantasia bizzarra nel rappresentare Bacco rogante all'altare. Tutto ciò non è mera fantasia; ha delle basi nella storia. Determinato nell'impedire che la flotta raggiunga l'India, Bacco invoca i poteri del mare affinché scatenino una tempesta. Avendo sofferto a causa della malignità degli uomini, adesso soffrono per la malignità degli elementi. Una volta ancora Venere e Bacco fanno le veci dei poteri sovrumani che aiutano o ostacolano i portoghesi. Le benefiche forze del mondo che nascono dalla civiltà non vengono spesso mostrate in natura; le forze del male, che riempiono il cuore dell'uomo di nefandezze e menzogne sono simili alla violenza dei poteri naturali che gli esploratori devono affrontare. In Venere e Bacco Camões mostra una dicotomia fondamentale del mondo, una lotta tra gli opposti nella quale uno dei due deve necessariamente cedere il passo all'altro. Alla fine Venere vince. Nella propria mitologia pagana Camões crea nuovi simboli per mostrare la reale situazione che intravede come sostrato del viaggio di Gama. Dall'apertura del concilio degli dei nel canto I alle ultime parole di Venere nel X non smette di prendere il massimo da ogni opportunità che gli si presenta. La prima riunione degli dei avviene in un immenso aere olimpico. ( I, 20, 5 – 6 ) Qui, Giove, assiso sul trono; e quando gli dei si dispongono secondo l'ordine previsto si rivolge loro con un linguaggio che si addice alla loro olimpica posizione: O Eterni Abitatori del lucente Polo e del vasto chiaro Firmamento. I poteri che lavorano nell'universo hanno la gloria e la maestà che l'entusiasmo dei giovani conferisce all'oggetto della propria devozione. In questi esseri, al di sopra del tempo e delle altre limitazioni proprie della finitudine mortale, Camões trova l'antitesi delle proprie tribolazioni e il fulcro dei suoi desideri. La protettrice del Portogallo è ancora la dea dell'amore e della bellezza, ed il poeta è fiero del fatto che il suo Paese sia favorito da lei. Gli uomini hanno la loro gloria, ma la gloria degli dei è al di sopra delle possibilità umane. Libero dalle inibizioni teologiche del Medioevo e duramente colpito dalla controriforma, egli lavora in maniera certosina al fine di inserirli nel proprio poema. L'accanita lotta degli esploratori portoghesi è una parte del racconto; l'altra parte contiene tutto ciò che gli dei rappresentano: la gioia e la gloria che portano con sé, l'ordine che istaurano. Aderendo a questa convenzione della poesia epica Camões ottiene un successo trionfale. Come Correggio e Raffaello, Camões comprende gli antichi numi e adatta il loro significato al proprio tempo. 6.4 Che posto per gli Dèi? Il Vate tuttavia non è pagano ma cattolico, suddito di un re cristiano, ed il suo Portogallo doveva gran parte della propria dignità al baluardo della causa cristiana contro gli idolatri, mori ed orientali. Ad ogni modo la spiegazione viene resa inconsistente con ciò che Camões sostiene in un altro momento del poema, parole che non possono ricevere lo stesso trattamento riservato alle sue ultime. Nel canto X l'idea è elaborata. Che questa sia la concezione di Camões è provato dal modo in cui cesella le sue divinità all'interno del poema. Quando Venere o Mercurio intervengono ad aiutare de Gama, non è a loro che egli rivolge le proprie preghiere e le lodi, ma al Dio dei suoi padri. ( II, 65, 3 – 4 ) Quando Venere salva la flotta, de Gama attribuisce l'impresa alla provvidenza e termina con una solenne preghiera al suo Dio: Tu solamente puoi, Guardia Celeste Salvarci dall'insidia che c'investe. ( II, 31, 7 – 8 ) Ancora più impressionante è la grande preghiera di de Gama durante la tempesta nel VI canto. ( VI, 85, 1 – 4 ) Quindi segue l'intervento della dea ed il mare si placa. Poseidone è irato a causa dell'inganno perpetrato da Odisseo nei confronti del figlio Polifemo, Bacco teme che il proprio regno, l'Oriente, in cui ha istaurato il regime del caos, venga paradossalmente scosso da eventuali contaminazioni dell'ordine occidentale. Risulta però interessante notare come gli schemi narratologici che sottendono l'agire delle forze del bene siano sempre diversi tra loro: nel loro intreccio, nel loro svolgersi, nelle dinamiche che li attraversano. L'agire del male, invece, è sempre caratterizzato dalle stesse dinamiche, dallo stesso svolgersi dei fatti, come una iterazione che si ripete in un continuum e che è destinata a non centrare i propri obiettivi. Se le variatio che marcano l'agire del bene possono essere ritenute meno capaci di suscitare l'attenzione del lettore a causa della difficoltà di acquisirle, allo stesso modo le si può ritenere specchio delle infinite risoluzioni di stasis che la vita reale paventa. 7. Struttura delle narrazioni In questo capitolo verranno prese in esame le narrazioni di Odisseo e Vasco de Gama. 7.1 Odisseo narratore Risulta molto utile ai fini di questa comparazione esaminare la funzione assolta, nella costruzione dell'Odissea, dalla figura di Odisseo narratore alla corte dei Feaci, nel libro XI. Dal punto di vista della conoscenza dell'oggetto del canto, l'eroe è nelle condizioni ideali: il lungo racconto dei suoi "errores" è narrazione di una esperienza personale. Odisseo non è visto solo come narratore della propria personale vicenda: all'interno del suo stesso racconto ad Alcinoo lo si vede esporre κατά μοιραν quanto gli viene richiesto, (Ilio e le navi degli Argivi, e il ritorno degli Achei). Quando, nella cortese replica, il re itacese acconsente alla ripresa del racconto, la lega al desiderio degli ascoltatori e accenna, secondo consuetudine, al tema iniziale prima di riprendere il racconto nel punto interrotto. Le mitiche creature posseggono il dono del canto che consente di partire conoscendo più cose: l'oggetto della scienza delle sirene è precisato, non si tratta soltanto del racconto tradizionale delle gesta degli Argivi e dei Teucri, le Sirene conoscono tutto quanto avviene sulla terra. L'eroe canta κατά μοιραν perché ben noto gli è l'oggetto del canto, note gli sono le imprese degli Achei sotto Troia la cui narrazione di Demodoco l'ha mosso al pianto. 7.2 Vasco narratore. L'eroe inizia così la sua narrazione al Re di Malindi, nel III canto: Stavano tutti attenti per udire Quello che Gama avrebbe raccontato. L'eroe afferma di non riuscire a dire tutta l'eccellenza della propria terra, in una ripresa del topos della falsa modestia, qui utilizzato in rapporto alle straordinarie imprese del popolo portoghese e dei suoi re. Più volte, nel quinto canto, con anafora al primo verso delle ottave 16, 17 e 18 questo concetto viene ribadito: vidi i casi che i rudi marinai (….); 7.3. Strategie della metanarrazione. Il procedimento della mise en abyme accomuna infatti anche i due testi presi in esame: la narrazione delle proprie vicende da parte di Odisseo ai Feaci, e quella della propria storia compiuta da Vasco de Gama al Re di Malindi, si configurano come una vera e propria mise en abyme, una narrazione omodiegetica che si inserisce all'interno della più ampia narrazione che è lo stesso poema. Situazione similare si verifica alla corte del Re di Malindi ne I Lusiadi. 8.1. Polifemo Nell'avventura nel paese dei Ciclopi ( libro IX ) si fondono la violenza sanguinaria e l'alterità straniante; può essere davvero considerata il vertice del terrore di tutto il poema. La prima avvisaglia è data dalla definizione dei loro usi che Odisseo dà con l'occhio di poi, descritti come " ingiusti e violenti"; visione che appartiene cioè al narratore Odisseo e non al personaggio che vive la vicenda. La funzione strutturale di quest'isola nella vicenda è quella di permettere ad Odisseo di rischiare una sola nave nell'esplorazione della terra dei Ciclopi. Si trovano ben presto davanti alla grotta di Polifemo, la cui paurosa descrizione è ricavata da dati acquisiti successivamente da Odisseo – personaggio: Polifemo porta alle estreme conseguenze l'isolamento dei Ciclopi, non ha una famiglia, e alto com'è quanto una montagna, appare come un massiccio isolato dagli altri. La prima è il rumore di un immenso fascio di legna, che determina l'arretrare di Odisseo e dei compagni nel fondo della caverna – un movimento che assomma all'angoscia l'automatismo del riflesso. La richiesta di sopravvivenza intrinseca alla supplica è appesa al filo dell'onnipotenza del capriccio del Ciclope. Di fatto, la risposta alle suppliche sta nel gesto violento con cui il mostro afferra due uomini e si ciba di loro. Ai portoghesi in viaggio verso le Indie appare la mostruosa figura di Adamastor, il Capo delle Tempeste, che racconta la sua storia. Esattamente a metà del poema, l'incontro di Gama con Adamastor marca, geograficamente, il passaggio dall'Occidente all'Oriente, dall'Atlantico all'oceano Indiano, ossia dalla fine del mondo conosciuto all'inizio del mondo sconosciuto. L'eroe entra nella regione delle forze indomate. Con riso onesto Rispose Teti: "Quale dea può tale Gigante ricambiar con forza eguale? ( V, 53) Imprigionato nella roccia in cui si trasforma nel tentativo di violarla, Adamastor rimane eternamente carceriero della propria prigione, guardia dei segreti nascosti in cui si è intrappolato. Dunque, il colosso orrendo gli permette l'accesso alla conoscenza delle cose segrete del mare. Dubbio al quale sorgerà Adamastor come risposta, provocando la seconda domanda: [……………….]"Chi sei tu, così tremendo - dissi – all'immensa mole ed all'aspetto?" ( V, 49, 3 – 4 ) Di contro al lungo discorso del gigante, questa breve domanda racchiude, nel suo laconismo, un intenso potere significativo. Lungi dal tradire tremore, la voce del capitano manifesta stupore ed esprime, proprio per queste ragioni, la vittoria del coraggio sulla forza e sulla paura. Non vi è un tentativo di attacco in difesa del bene che gli appartiene, ma il riconoscimento del valore di quella gente che merita non solo di vincere, ma anche di essere testimone del suo dolore e delle sue lacrime. (IX, 317–318; 326; 331–333; 345–347; 361; 366; 372; 382-383) Il primo proposito di Odisseo di fronte alla brutalità del Ciclope è ispirato allo statuto della violenza eroica: pensa di trafiggere il Ciclope con la spada, ma questo proposito non viene realizzato, perché lucidamente l'eroe si rende conto che assieme a Polifemo condannerebbe a morte sé e i suoi compagni, non essendo in grado di rimuovere il masso dalla porta della caverna. L'offerta del vino al Ciclope, e l'accettazione da parte di Polifemo di questo dono, marca fortemente il primo passaggio in cui notiamo il mostro avere un ruolo attivo nel compiersi dell'inganno ai suoi danni. (V, 54, 5–6; 55, 1 – 6; 56.) La similarità sostanziale, sta, credo, nell'identico abbandono da parte dei due giganti ai piaceri sensoriali. Questo abbassamento della soglia di lucidità permette l'interpretazione di un ruolo "attivo", Polifemo e Adamastor divengono coadiutori del loro inganno. Vengono ingannati da Odisseo e da Teti, ma si prestano alla loro parte, partecipano attivamente. .l'agire convulso del Ciclope, il suo scagliare massi contro le navi, l'impossibilità di requie denotano una follia che, lungi dall'essere sterile, produrrà l'ira funesta del padre Poseidone, persecutore senza sosta dell'astuto Odisseo La cifra stilistica di Adamastor diviene invece l'irreversibilità statica della sua nuova condizione,. 8.4. Tracce di un'evoluzione La riformulazione di contenuti della tradizione epica con una feconda capacità stilistica è uno dei tratti più suggestivi dell'opera di Camões. Le dinamiche di attuazione dell'evento sono simili, nel primo caso avvengono realmente, nel secondo si tratta di una proiezione nel futuro: e proprio in quel punto Scilla ghermì dalla concava nave sei compagni, i più vigorosi per la forza del braccio. Come osservato nei precedenti paragrafi, molte sono le caratteristiche che accomunano il Ciclope ed Adamastor, ma la collocazione topografica e l'atrocità dell'agire nei confronti dei naviganti rendono possibile un accostamento del Capo Tormentorio al mostro che abita lo stretto. se nell'Odissea questo percorso viene compiuto dall'eroe in persona ( XI libro ), ne I Lusiadi è l'antagonista, Bacco, a raggiungere un altro posto, il fondo del mare, regno di Nettuno, per chiedere al dio del mare di aiutarlo nella sua lotta contro le navi portoghesi ( VI, 6 – 34 ). Odisseo necessita della sapienza di Tiresia, e tutto ciò che è in suo potere per riuscire ad accedervi egli lo compie senza esitare, esegue alla lettera le disposizioni di Circe ( X, 504 – 540). 9.1. Odisseo: discesa e profezia di Tiresia Odisseo raggiunge i confini della terra, dei Cimmerii che è "avvolta nella nebbia e nelle nubi" (XI, 15 ) e presso il fiume Oceano, al limite dell'esperienza degli uomini, scava una fossa in cui versa – dopo riti di libagione propiziatoria con latte, miele, vino, acqua e un'offerta di farina d'orzo – il sangue delle vittime che Circe gli ha indicato. Merita fermarsi un attimo per far notare il molteplice registro dei simboli. Il sangue, elemento liquido della vitalità, permetterà alle ombre dei morti una effimera ripresa di contatto con il mondo dei vivi. È un contatto limitato alla comunicazione: il morto non può prescindere dalla propria incorporeità. Ciascuno vuol sapere quello che non sa, ciascuno ritaglia una porzione di conoscenza contornata dalla dimensione del proprio universo affettivo. Le pene in casa consistono nella presenza arrogante e dissipatrice dei pretendenti, di cui il lettore già sa, ma Odisseo non ancora. Lo sguardo del profeta si estende poi ad un futuro ancora più lontano, in cui Odisseo si riconcilierà con Poseidone a mezzo di un sacrificio; per un bizzarro contrappasso, l'uomo che ha sconfitto il mare deve rendere omaggio al dio del mare in luogo che gli sia radicalmente estraneo, dopo una lunga peregrinazione alla ricerca di una terra che ignori tutto della civiltà marinara. Nella morte che viene dal mare è forse possibile leggere una allusione alla leggenda della morte di Odisseo per mano del figlio avuto da Circe, Telegono che, sbarcato a Itaca, uccise il padre. È accreditata tuttavia un'interpretazione diversa del passo nel senso che la morte sopravverrebbe a Odisseo "lontano dal mare". (………………………………………………) Scende d'Olimpo infine disperato Per liberarsi della grave soma, e va spedito alla divina corte di chi dei mar l'imperio ha avuto in sorte. ( VI, 6, 5–8; 7, 5–8; 28, 1–4;35, 5–8) La discesa di Bacco negli abissi marini è per il dio, così come è la catabasi per Odisseo, necessaria alla realizzazione del proprio fine. Il dio è disperato poiché vede gli dei del cielo, suoi pari, essere tutti favorevoli alla riuscita dell'esplorazione portoghese che mina il suo reame. Dopo l'introduzione della decisione, vi è nel poema una lunga digressione che descrive il regno di Nettuno, oltre ad una raffigurazione del dio stesso. Vi è un raddoppiamento dei concili divini ne I Lusiadi: il primo, nel I canto, riunito in cielo; il secondo, in fondo al mare. Altro motivo simmetrico è che nel primo il discorso diretto, pronunciato da Venere, era riservato a fiancheggiare i portoghesi; qui, al contrario, Bacco manifesta direttamente le sue recriminazioni contro l'incedere della flotta lusitana. Le invettive del dio fomentano rabbia nel concilio marino, tanto è vero che risulta impossibile prendere una decisione frutto di saggi avvisi: l'intemperanza del momento porta Nettuno ad agire d'impulso. Come considerare a livello strutturale questa evenienza? La profezia fondamentale del poema verrà proferita da Teti nell'isola degli Amori. Il viaggio di Da Gama e dei suoi eroi si conclude, nei canti IX e X, nella migliore maniera possibile, con tutta la gloria che è dato agli uomini di acquisire e con una rinnovata e maggiore esperienza di se stessi, degli altri e del mondo. L'Ilha dos Amores è un'isola divina, sorta in mezzo alle acque come la stessa Venere. È un prodotto dell'Essere primordiale, un locus amoenus la cui descrizione scorre lungo tutto il canto IX, intrecciandosi al rincorrersi dei marinai e delle ninfe e alle loro schermaglie amorose. La chiusa degli amori con un matrimonio collettivo dà l'abbrivio all'incontro tra Gama e Teti, che porta alla visione grandiosa del canto X. L'isola è simbolicamente un punto d'arrivo. Coronati dalle "spose eterne", i naviganti ritornano alla patria. Non si separeranno più da quel sapere acquisito che le ninfe rappresentano; loro, e soprattutto Teti, la loro regina, sono forme di presenza divina, finalmente manifesta a Vasco, ai suoi compagni e, per bocca del poeta, ai portoghesi e al mondo. La differenza di livello è simbolicamente rappresentata dal monte su cui Gama e la dea salgono, da una catabasi che segnala una variatio rispetto al procedere tradizionale della narrazione in caso di rivelazioni. Se infatti, nel caso di Odisseo, è la catabasi a marcare il momento della rivelazione, Camões compie una innovazione facendo sì che de Gama salga sul monte per ricevere la rivelazione della dea. L'atmosfera di elevata aulicità del palazzo di Teti ben introduce alla rivelazione della dea a de Gama, scandita nei modi della profezia in una prima parte, e nell'esposizione descrittiva della macchina del mondo nella seconda. La profezia funzionale allo svolgimento dell'azione, alle vicende dell'eroe – come lo è stata quella di Tiresia – si sviluppa, diviene altro; la conoscenza attraverso l'aiuto della dea sopravviene dopo due altri elementi: la giustizia e l'amore. Una eccezione strutturale dunque, che marca ancora di più la particolarità dell'opera camoniana Una possibile lettura di questa variazione può essere svolta considerando quanto Camões sapesse bene che l'apice della propria storia passata può dalla sua vetta guardare ai posteri, al tempo del vate dunque, carico di aspettative verso un continuum nella stessa direzione. Speranza disattesa, disillusa; al suo tempo il poeta non risparmia le proprie tirate veementi. Eppure conclude con la speranza che la sua Musa ispiratrice, cantando le glorie del suo re, riceva l'accettazione che merita. Questa connotazione contraddistingue Vasco de Gama, l'ansia di seguire la propria curiositas, mediata dall'Ulisse dantesco, si trasforma nel Rinascimento in quello che sarà il pungolo che spinge alle scoperte geografiche, al nuovo mondo, e, ovviamente, a un nuovo uomo. È un umanista anche nelle sue contraddizioni, nell'associare la mitologia pagana ad una visione cristiana del mondo, nei suoi sentimenti conflittuali verso la guerra e l'Impero, nel suo amore per la patria e nel suo desiderio di avventure, nel suo apprezzare il piacere estetico e nella richiesta di uno statuto eroico che fa ai suoi personaggi. Ma è soprattutto un Umanista nella sua devozione agli ideali classici, e nel suo considerarli la forza vitale dell'immaginario europeo del suo tempo. Racconta il suo Portogallo servendosi sia della cristianità che della tradizione classica. Sebbene Camões abbia molto della magnificenza rinascimentale nel suo incedere narrativo, la stempera con una sensibilità che sa sempre quando fermarsi, senza sfociare in pericolosi funambolismi estetici.
1. IntroductionOver the last decade, increased attention has been paid to terrorism, particularly to the new wave of terrorist groups, fundamentalist movements, and extremist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda. September 11 marked the beginning of a turbulent phase in which states face a new kind of threat made up of a complex network of insidious revolutionary and nationalist forces. Such transformations have given rise to an unprecedented number of publications. However, both political violence and terrorism remain sources of endless disputes and controversies because of their political implications. At the same time, in the scientific community, terrorism studies lack conceptual and methodological uniformity. In his article, Domenico Tosini synthesises and discusses some major findings from this research. Courses using such a review will be confronted with the four major topics that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of the consequences of counterterrorism policies.2. Literature recommendations Bjørgo, Tore (ed.) 2005. Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, based on the analysis of numerous case studies (e.g. Palestinian armed groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, right‐wing extremists, state terrorism and state‐sponsored terrorism), experts in political violence examine the preconditions for the emergence of different types of terrorist organisations and the main factors that sustain terrorist campaigns. Cole, David 2003. Enemy Aliens: Double Standard and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York, NY: The New Press.Thanks to its analysis and evaluation of the consequences of counter‐terrorism measures, David Cole's Enemy Aliens is one of the most rigorous discussions of how states (like the United States since 2001) often combat terrorism by adopting emergency powers (such as the special detention at Guantanamo Bay), which, in turn, risk undermining civil liberties. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Based on empirical research that compares the origins and development of left‐wing terrorism in Italy and Germany between the 1960s and the 1990s, della Porta offers a middle‐range theory of political violence that combines an analysis of the political opportunities and ideological frames exploited by armed groups, a profile of their organisational structures, and an investigation of the typical patterns underlying their recruitment processes. Gambetta, Diego (ed.) 2006. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.In this book, a number of distinguished social scientists, while examining the use of suicide missions by political and religious groups (such as the Japanese Kamikaze, the Tamil Tigers, Palestinian organisations, and Al‐Qaeda), specify and discuss the most important methodological questions associated with definitions, data collection, and explanations concerning this form of political struggle. Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Colombia University Press.The book introduces the most important issues of terrorism studies: the controversial problem of the definition of terrorism; a history of terrorism, from anti‐colonial struggles to international terrorism; an examination and explanation of the most recent waves of religious extremists and suicide terrorism; an analysis of the ways terrorist groups exploit old and new media such as the Internet; and, finally, an overview of the strategies, tactics, and organisational aspects of modern and contemporary terrorism. Horgan, John 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge.Horgan presents a critical analysis of our understanding of terrorist psychology; many shortcomings emerge, particularly the limitations of personality theories in attempting to explain militancy. Based on interviews with terrorists, the book considers the most relevant psychological and social factors underlying involvement and engagement in political violence, and the process of leaving terrorist organisations. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Scholars generally distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence against civilians – tactics of guerrilla warfare or insurgency in civil wars, for example. However, this work makes a relevant contribution to terrorism studies. Kalyvas clarifies the rationality and micro‐processes of interactions during armed conflicts that account for indiscriminate and selective uses of violence against civilian populations by political actors. Kushner, Harvey W. 2003. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. London, UK: Sage.One of the most accurate and exhaustive dictionaries focusing on terrorism, with more than 300 entries concerning terrorist groups, key events, people, terms, and statistics, as well as biographical, historical, and geographical information. Free access is available at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/eBooks.asp). Laqueur, Walter 2002. A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers.Along with Laqueur's Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), this constitutes a pioneering history of armed organisations, from nineteenth century Europe, to the anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s, to the left‐wing clashes during the 20th century, and up to the most recent terrorist groups. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House.Over the last decade, suicide terrorism has become an alarming political threat and a crucial challenge for social scientists. In his work, which compares a number of organisations responsible for suicide attacks, Pape rejects the explanation of suicide terrorism based on religious fundamentalism. He argues for a correlation between the use of this tactic and specific kinds of groups engaged in separatist campaigns or in struggles for liberation from foreign occupiers. Ranstorp, Magnus (ed.) 2007. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, distinguished scholars of terrorism studies discuss state‐of‐the‐art field research. In exploring new trends in this area – the most important questions about the explanation of recent terrorist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda, and about counterterrorism – these essays shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of our current knowledge of political violence. Reich, Walter (ed.) 1998. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.This is another seminal work on terrorism, bringing together some of the most well known experts in political violence. The variety of approaches used in the explanations of terrorist organisations and in the analysis of counterterrorism paves the way for a real interdisciplinary setting, which is absolutely crucial once the multi‐faceted nature of terrorism is clear. Sageman, Marc 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.Based on the analysis of biographical data for nearly 200 members of global Islamist extremism (of which Al‐Qaeda is a part), Sageman accounts for the origins and developments of this movement and specifies the crucial role played by social networks in the recruitment of individuals as Islamist militants. Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.Wilkinson examines major trends in international terrorism and liberal democratic responses. On the one hand, the book introduces the specificity of terrorism and offers a classification and explanation of the most important types of armed groups. On the other, in approaching how states deal with terrorist threats, this work discusses forms of counterterrorism, by taking into account their impact on the rule of law and on the protection of civil liberties.3. Online materials Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) (Agency for Internal Information and Security)(http://www.aisi.gov.it)The Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) is the branch of Italian Intelligence tasked with collecting and analysing information about any criminal and terrorist threat to security. Among other activities, the AISI distributes its own periodical, Gnosis, online, where a chronology of international as well as domestic terrorist attacks since 2004 (currently updated through 2007) is available. Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org)The Counterterrorism Blog is a multi‐expert blog devoted to providing a one‐stop gateway to the counterterrorism community. It offers, among other things, overnight and breaking news, with real time commentary by experts; reports on terrorist organisations; discussions of long‐term trends in counterterrorism; and summaries of and discussions about US and international law. Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) (http://ccrjustice.org)Founded in 1966 by attorneys who represented civil rights organisations, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) is a non‐profit legal and educational organisation dedicated to protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also offers information about important issues related to counterterrorism (e.g., the prolonged battle in defence of civil liberties associated with the special detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Global Terrorism Database (GTD)(http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd)The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open‐source database on terrorist incidents around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). It includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist attacks. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the attack, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and (when possible) the identity of the perpetrator. Another important database, the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.mipt.org/TKB.asp), has recently ceased operations and elements of the system have been merged with the GTD. Information on terrorist groups is now available at the Terrorist Organization Profiles (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops). Human Security Report Project
(HSRP) (http://www.hsrgroup.org)The HSRP conducts research on global and regional trends in political violence, exploring their causes and consequences, and then making this research accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators, and the interested public. The HSRP's publications include the Human Security Report, the Human Security Brief series, and the Human Security Gateway. The recent Human Security Brief 2007, online, makes a relevant contribution in discussing the methodological issues associated with collecting data on terrorism and offers a comprehensive overview of terrorist incidents in the last decade. Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI) (http://www.memri.org)The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region's media with respect to a variety of topics including terrorism. MEMRI provides translations of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish media, as well as analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious tendencies in the Middle East. A new section, the MEMRI's Islamist Websites Monitor Project, was launched in 2006 as part of the Jihad & Terrorism Studies project. Its aim is to keep Western audiences informed about the phenomenon of jihadist sites on the Internet, which are used by terrorist groups and their sympathisers to spread their extremist messages, to raise funds, and to recruit activists. Uppsala Conflict Data Project
(UCDP) (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP)The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) collects data on armed conflicts around the world. A global conflict database is now available online. Data are useful for systematic studies of conflict origins, dynamics, and resolution. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)(http://wits.nctc.gov)The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. NCTC serves as the primary organisation in the United States government for integrating and analysing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and, at the same time, as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information. Based on WITS, the NCTC provides an annual report and statistical information about terrorist incidents. Additional Online Resources Scores of additional organisations and centres (too many to list) conduct and disseminate research on issues related to armed conflicts, terrorism, terrorist groups, security, and counterterrorism. What follows is a list of some other key organisations and centres, with links to their websites:Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)(http://www.aspi.org.au)Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)(http://www.fhs.se/en/Research/Centers‐and‐Research‐Programmes/CATS)Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)(http://www.csis.org)Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)(http://www.st‐andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv)IntelCenter(http://intelcenter.com)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)(http://www.pvtr.org)International Crisis Group (ICG)(http://www.crisisgroup.org)International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(http://www.iiss.org)International Policy Institute for Counter‐Terrorism (ICT)(http://www.ict.org.il)Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)(http://www.mipt.org)Saban Center at the Brookings Institution(http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx)Senlis Council(http://www.senliscouncil.net)Southern Poverty Law Center(http://www.splcenter.org)Terrorism and Homeland Security at RAND Corporation(http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism)Terrorism Research Center (TRC)(http://www.terrorism.org)Transnational Radical Islamism Project at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment(http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis_Division/_TERRA)United States Institute of Peace(http://www.usip.org/index.html)4. Sample syllabus Course Title: A Sociological Analysis of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Course Description In this course, we will explore the most relevant issues around terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Although we will largely approach this topic from a sociological perspective, this study is quite interdisciplinary. Consequently, we will be reading works from other academic disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, and economics. There are four major areas that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of consequences related to counterterrorism. After an introduction to terrorism research (part 1), we will discuss the controversies related to the definition of terrorism (part 2) and to data collection (part 3), both necessary for an understanding of tendencies concerning terrorist incidents. A historical overview (part 4) will give us some preliminary information about the variety of terrorist campaigns – information that prepares us for the next exercise (part 5): grouping terrorist organisations by different types. Looking in more depth at the evolution of terrorism in the last decade, we will examine the case of Al‐Qaeda (part 6), and how this and other organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet (part 7). The next chapter will be the explanation of terrorism, that is, the specification of the main psychological, political, cultural, and religious factors underlying the emergence of a terrorist organisation and the unfolding of a terrorist campaign. Suicide terrorism will be used as a case study. More specifically, we will approach terrorism by examining the motivations and rationality of terrorist organisations (part 8), of the communities that support them (part 9), and of those who join them (part 10). We end the course by focusing on both the legal (part 11) and strategic (part 12) implications of counterterrorism measures adopted since 2001. Course outline and reading assignments Part 1. Terrorism Research An overview of the most important approaches to the study of terrorism and of the strengths and weaknesses of available analyses. Bjørgo, Tore 2005. 'Introduction' (pp. 1–15) and 'Conclusions' (pp. 256–264) in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Crenshaw, Martha 2000. 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.'Political Psychology 21 (2): 405–420 (Doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00195). Ranstorp, Magnus 2007. 'Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research – Challenges and Priorities.' Pp. 1–28 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Silke, Andrew 2004. 'An Introduction to Terrorism Research.' Pp. 1–29 in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, edited by Andrew Silke. London, UK: Frank Cass. Sinai, Joshua 2007. 'New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses.' Pp. 31–50 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Turk, Austin T. 2004. 'Sociology of Terrorism.'Annual Review of Sociology 30: 271–286 (Doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110510). Wilkinson, Paul 2007. 'Research into Terrorism Studies: Achievements and Failures.' Pp. 316–328 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Part 2. What is Terrorism? A discussion of one of the most controversial issues, the definition of terrorism, focusing on its political and methodological implications. Aly, Waleed 2008. 'The Axiom of Evil.'The Guardian, 8 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/08/nelsonmandela.terrorism (last accessed: 8 July 2008). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–42). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. della Porta, Donatella 2004. 'Terror Against the State.' Pp. 208–16 in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Schmid, Alexander P. 2004. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.'Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2): 197–221 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550490483134). Tilly, Charles 2004. 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist.'Sociological Theory 22 (1): 5–16 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00200.x). Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–19). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 3. Collecting Data on Terrorism Incidents An introduction to the challenges and solutions to the collection of terrorism data, a preliminary and crucial aspect of any scientific analysis. Buchalter, Alice R. and Glenn E. Curtis 2003. Inventory and Assessment of Databases Relevant for Social Science Research on Terrorism. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/frd (last accessed 10 June 2008). Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler 2006. Chapter 3 (pp. 52–83). The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lafree, Gary 2007. 'Introducing the Global Terrorism Database.'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2): 181–204 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701246817). HSP 2008. Human Security Brief 2007. Dying to Lose: Explaining the Decline in Global Terrorism. Simon Fraser University, Canada: Human Security Report Project, http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf (last accessed 15 June 2008). Part 4. Waves of Terror: The Evolution of Terrorism A look at terrorism from a historical perspective in an attempt to identify continuities and discontinuities in the use of political violence. Abrahms, Max 2006. 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work.'International Security 31 (2): 42–78 (Doi: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.42). Duyvesteyn, Isabelle 2004. 'How New Is the New Terrorism?'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (5): 439–454 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100490483750). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 2–4 (pp. 43–130). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, Brian 1975. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. Research Paper n. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Kaplan, Jeffrey 2007. 'The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (4): 545–570 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701606564). Laqueur, Walter 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 3–78). A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Münkler, Herfried 2005. Chapter 5 (pp. 99–116). The New Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Rapoport, David C. 2004. 'Modern Terror: The Four Waves.' Pp. 46–73 in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Great Strategy, edited by Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Reed, Donald J. 2008. 'Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (8): 684–722 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100802206533). Part 5. Typologies of Terrorist Movements An overview of the complex task of classifying terrorist organisations on the basis of characteristics such as political objectives, ideological frames, and the cleavages between them and their enemies. Goodwin, Jeff 2006. 'A Theory of the Categorical Terrorism.'Social Forces 84 (4): 2027–2046. Gunaratna, Rohan and Graeme C. S. Steven 2004. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–98). Counterterrorism. Santa Barbara, CA: Abc Clio. Schmid, Alexander P. and Albert J. Jongman 1988. Chapter 2 (in collaboration with M. Stohl and P. A. Fleming, pp. 39–60). Political Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat.'Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 20–38). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 6. Al‐Qaeda and its Affiliates: Ideologies, Strategies, Structures A sociological look at the ideological, strategic, and organisational aspects of Al‐Qaeda's terrorism from the 1980s to its most recent campaign in Iraq. Al‐Zayyat, Montasser 2004. The Road to Al‐Qaeda. London, UK: Pluto Press. Gunaratna, Rohan 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 21–126). Inside Al‐Qaeda. New York, NY: Berkley Books. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 7 (pp. 102–125). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 1‐2 (pp. 1‐60). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hafez, Mohammed M. 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 35–162). Suicide Bombers in Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 7. Terrorism and the Media An exploration of the ways that terrorist organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet, as communicative channels (for staging their attacks, threats, demands, and propaganda) and as instrumental tools (for fund raising, coordination, and recruitment). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 173–228). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ICG 2006. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No 50, 15 February, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1 (last accessed 5 February 2008). Rogan, Hanna 2006. Jihadism Online: A Study of How Al‐Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups Use Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: FFI/RAPPORT‐2006/00915, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2008). Sageman, Marc 2008. Chapter 6 (pp. 109–123). Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Weimann, Gabriel 2006. Chapters 3–4 (pp. 49–145). Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 8. Terrorist Organisations and Their Logic An examination of the political objectives and ideologies of terrorist organisations and an overview of the rationality and strategies underlying their decision‐making in relation to the political opportunities and military events shaping their environment. Boyns, David and James David Ballard 2004. 'Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical Understanding of Terrorism.'American Sociologist 35 (2): 5–26 (Doi: 10.1007/BF02692394). Crenshaw, Martha 1998. 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice.' Pp. 7–24 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Gambetta, Diego 2006. 'Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?' Pp. 259–299 in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hafez, Mohammed and Quintan Wiktorowicz 2004. 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement.' Pp. 61–88 in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited Quintan Wiktorowicz. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 147–208). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kramer, Martin 1998. 'The Moral Logic of Hezbollah.' Pp. 131–157 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 3–5 (pp. 27–60). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Tosini, Domenico 2009. 'A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks.'Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). Part 9. Mechanisms of Social Support A discussion of the economic, cultural, and political conditions which make possible the support for, and collaboration with, terrorist organisations by members of certain communities. Cook, David and Olivia Allison 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 1–85). Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Chernick, Marc 2007. 'FARC‐EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post‐Cold War Insurgency.' Pp. 51–120 in Terror, Insurgency, and the State, edited by Marianne Heiberg et al. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 59–124). Insurgency and Counter‐Insurgency in Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapter 4 (pp. 87–110). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Merari, Ariel 2005. 'Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism.' Pp. 70–86 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 6–8 (pp. 79–167). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Part 10. Social Networks and Recruitment An analysis of the motivations behind the process of joining terrorist organisations and of the role played by group dynamics and social networks. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Chapter 7 (pp. 165–186). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 4–5 (pp. 99–173). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Horgan, John 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 47–79). The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge. Khosrokhavar, Fahad 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 149–224). Suicide Bombers. London, UK: Pluto Press. Pedahzur, Ami 2005. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 118–181). Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Stern, Jessica 2003. Chapter 9 (pp. 237–280). Terror in the Name of God. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher. Wintrobe, Ronald 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 108–157). Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Part 11. Counterterrorism I: Legal Implications An overview of the emergency powers of antiterrorism legislations and 'special measures', and an analysis of their legal impact on the protection of human rights. Cole, David 2003. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 17–82). Enemy Aliens. New York, NY: The Free Press. Haubrich, Dirk 2003. 'September 11, Anti‐Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared.'Government and Opposition 38 (1): 3–29 (Doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.00002). Parker, Tom 2005. 'Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom.' Pp. 119–148 in Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror, edited by Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Part 12. Counterterrorism II: Strategic Limitations An examination of the most important counterterrorism policies adopted since 2001, with special reference to the occupation of Iraq, and an assessment of their advantages and risks for combating and preventing terrorism. Nesser, Peter 2006. 'Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (4): 323–342 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100600641899). Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 12 (pp. 237–250). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Silke, Andrew 2005. 'Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to Be Done.' Pp. 241–255 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Smelser, Neil J. 2007. Chapter 6 (pp. 160–199). The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 61–102). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.5. Films and videos Al‐Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/1186.htm)Excerpts from a message from 2005 London bomber Shehzad Tanweer and statements by Al‐Qaeda leaders Ayman Al‐Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, posted on http://www.tajdeed.net.tc on 8 July 2006. A typical example of the communicative use of the Internet by Islamists in their attempt to frame terrorist attacks as legitimate acts of martyrdom, committed by courageous Muslims in defence of their brothers and sisters in occupied Muslim lands (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine). Al‐Qaeda Leader in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi's First Televised Interview. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/344/1118.htm)A video posted by the Islamist web forum http://www.alsaha.com on 25 April 2006, in which the Al‐Qaeda commander in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi (killed by an airstrike on 7 June 2006) outlines all the typical condemnations (by Islamist extremists) of the Iraq occupation by the US‐led coalition, and calls for a jihad against its forces and allies. Propagandising the military capabilities of Al‐Qaeda, the video culminates in footage of Al‐Zarqawi with masked fighters, firing an automatic weapon, and 'new missiles' developed by 'the brothers'. Al‐Arabiya TV Special on the Culture of Martyrdom and Suicide Bombers. 2005 (7 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/807.htm)Excerpts from a show about the culture of martyrdom, aired on Al‐Arabiya TV on 22 July 2005. The documentary investigates some of the most relevant religious and political justifications and symbolic representations among Islamist extremists in favour of suicide attacks. In particular, it looks at the Palestinian organisations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and at the Lebanese Hezbollah. The film includes an interview with Maha Ghandour, the wife of Salah Ghandour, who was responsible for a suicide attack carried out in 1995 on behalf of Hezbollah against an Israeli military convoy. Battle For Haditha. 2007 (93 min)(http://www.nickbroomfield.com/haditha.html)In this film, the director Nick Broomfield looks at the dramatic events surrounding an incident that occurred in Haditha, Iraq, when 24 Iraqis were allegedly massacred by US Marines, following the death of a Marine in a bombing perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents. The harsh reality of the war is viewed from three perspectives: that of the US troops, the insurgents who committed the attacks, and a civilian Iraqi family. Iranian Animated Film for Children Promotes Suicide Bombings. 2005 (10 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/906.htm)Including excerpts from an Iranian animated movie for children, aired on IRIB 3 TV on 28 October 2005, this film is an example of the mechanisms of de‐humanization of the enemy (the Israelis), based on a tale of the ferocious murder of innocent people by Israeli soldiers. This incident is followed by a bomb attack framed as an act of martyrdom by young militants in revenge of the previous assassination. Paradise Now. 2005 (91 min)In his film, the director Hany Abu‐Assad focuses on the final days of two Palestinian militants as they prepare to carry out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. Once childhood friends Said (Kais Nashef) and Khaled (Ali Suliman) are offered such an attack, they feel a sense of purpose in serving their people's cause, whereas a young Palestinian woman, after learning of their plan, tries to dissuade them from carrying out their missions. Paradise Now has been viewed as a controversial attempt to examine the motivations of suicide bombers. The Reach of War: Sectarian War in Iraq. 2006 (7 min)(http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/12/28/world/20061228_SECTARIAN_FEATURE.html)The New York Times journalist Marc Santora reports on some of the most violent and bloody effects of the sectarian violence perpetrated in Iraq during the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which has followed the occupation by the US‐led coalition. The Road to Guantanamo. 2006 (92 min)(http://www.roadtoguantanamomovie.com)Directed by Michael Winterbottom, the film tells the story of four friends beginning a holiday in Pakistan. Through a series of interviews and news footage, the film shows how they end up in Afghanistan, where are then captured by American forces and kept in harsh conditions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over 2 years. The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Iraqi Jihad. 2006 (9 min)(http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia‐original.html)In this video, NEFA Foundation expert Evan Kohlmann documents the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Iraq and their role within the Sunni insurgency. The video includes footage of senior figures from Abu Musab al‐Zarqawi's terrorist group (including Lebanese, Saudi, and Kuwaiti nationals) and scenes from Al‐Qaida training camps in Iraq. The Suicide Bomber. 2005 (12 min)(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july‐dec05/bombers_11‐14.html)In this debate aired on PBS on 14 November 2005, three experts (Mia Bloom, Mohammed M. Hafez, and Robert A. Pape) discuss what motivates suicide bombers and their terrorist organisations, with special reference to the 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, where a female militant joining these attacks was found alive after her bomb failed to detonate. The Terrorist Propaganda (three videos): Indexing Al‐Qaeda Online. 2005 (6 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/custom/2005/08/05/CU2005080501141.html?whichDay=1) Without the Video, It's Just an Attack. 2007 (5 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/video/2007/09/28/VI2007092800608.html) Al‐Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive. 2008 (14 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/23/AR2008062302135.html)Over the last decade, terrorist propaganda on the Internet has increased dramatically. In these videos, experts discuss how insurgent groups, in particular Islamist extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, are using new media to spread their messages worldwide, to chronicle their operations (including the assembly and emplacement of roadside bombs targeting US forces), to recruit, and to raise money.6. Focus questions
What challenges do researchers interested in terrorism studies face and why? What are the most important theoretical and methodological weaknesses in current terrorism research? How can we define terrorism? What political controversies affect the definition of terrorism? When comparing different terrorism data sets, what kinds of diagnoses can we make on the tendencies of terrorist incidents in the last decade? How has terrorism changed in history? Based on the literature concerning Al‐Qaeda's ideology, strategies, and structures, what continuities and discontinuities can we identify with respect to previous forms of terrorism? When dealing with the explanation of terrorism, what are the most significant factors to be taken into account? How can we learn from the current literature on suicide terrorism in order to build a comprehensive model for its explanation? Given the legislative and military responses to September 11 and subsequent attacks (e.g. the 2005 London bombings), what have been the legal consequences affecting our societies and the strategic implications for combating and preventing terrorist violence?
7. SeminarsParticipants will be divided into small groups of about three persons. Each group will be asked to make a contribution to a sociological analysis (either written or presented) of a specific armed organisation, such as:Al‐Gama'a Al‐IslamiyyaAl‐QaedaAl‐Qaeda in IraqAl‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)Ansar Al‐SunnahAnsar Al‐IslamArmed Islamic Groups (GIA)Army of GodAum ShinrikyoChechen separatistsEgyptian Islamic JihadEuskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)HamasHezbollahIrgun Zvai LeumiIrish Republican Army (IRA)Islamic Movement of UzbekistanJemaah IslamiyahKashmiri separatistsKu Klux Klan (KKK)Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar‐e‐JhangviLibyan Islamic Fighting GroupPalestinian Islamic JihadPalestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)Red Army Faction (RAF)Red Brigades (BR)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Taliban.For each armed organisation, each group will examine the following aspects:
data on its attacks – including information that justifies the label of 'terrorist organisation'; a historical account of its origins and developments; an analysis of the strategy underlying its terrorist campaigns; a clarification of its social support and collaboration (if any); a profile of its militants and patterns of recruitment; a discussion of the counterterrorism policies adopted by states and their impact on the terrorist organisation.
Note * Correspondence address: Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Research, Piazza Venezia 41 – 38100 Trento, Italy, +39 0461 881324; +39 0461 881348 (fax); +39 347 2329219 (mobile); Email: domenico.tosini@soc.unitn.it http://portale.unitn.it/dpt/dsrs/docenti/tosini.htm
Part one of an interview with Maria Mendoza of Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Topics include: Maria Mendoza's parents were born in Portugal, but she was born in Bedford, MA. How she and her husband moved to Fitchburg, MA because of his work in the cotton industry. Her first impressions of Fitchburg and what the city was like when she first moved there. Her work as a stitcher. Her education. Her feelings about politics and government in the U.S. Her feelings about Fitchburg today. How she spends her leisure time. ; 1 WAYNE LUCIER: December 1st, 1973, interview conducted by Wayne Lucier. Place of interview, Mrs. Mendoza's home. Your name, please. MARY MENDOZA: Mary Mendoza. WAYNE LUCIER: And your nationality. MARY MENDOZA: Portuguese descent. WAYNE LUCIER: And your age. MARY MENDOZA: 62. WAYNE LUCIER: Date of birth. MARY MENDOZA: June 15, 1911. WAYNE LUCIER: And what generation are you? Were you born in the United States? MARY MENDOZA: Yes, that would be the second generation now. WAYNE LUCIER: And your present address. MARY MENDOZA: 9 Exeter Street, Fitchburg, Mass. WAYNE LUCIER: And your phone number. MARY MENDOZA: 2-2286. WAYNE LUCIER: And what city were you born? MARY MENDOZA: New Bedford, Mass. WAYNE LUCIER: Okay. And when did you come to Fitchburg? MARY MENDOZA: Hmm, 1941. WAYNE LUCIER: And like from, from New Bedford, when-when you were born, where else did you go? MARY MENDOZA: Springfield. Oh, what, I didn't [go to] Springfield now, don't I, because I lived in Springfield anyway. WAYNE LUCIER: You went from New Bedford directly to Springfield? MARY MENDOZA: Well, we went, uh, Chicopee before, but then I didn't like the place where we lived in and we moved to Springfield. WAYNE LUCIER: And why did you, why did you move to these places? MARY MENDOZA: Because his work, yeah. He has to go and work in there, in Springfield, so there's too much driving. WAYNE LUCIER: Why did you come into Fitchburg? MARY MENDOZA: Mm, the cotton industry. We went in after my husband had to come for the [mildew] and shot at [your health] there. In that, he was attorney to handle some, manage some people in the night shift. 2 WAYNE LUCIER: Before you came here, what kind of jobs did you hold? MARY MENDOZA: Myself was stitching. WAYNE LUCIER: Throughout the whole time? MARY MENDOZA: No. I was a supervisor, because I went up. I went in, I cut the work… well, stitched part of that time, too. WAYNE LUCIER: Before you came here, what did you know about Fitchburg? MARY MENDOZA: Nothing, just my husband, the boss, the superintendent of the cotton industry brought him here. WAYNE LUCIER: What did you think about it after you got here? MARY MENDOZA: Well, I thought it was a nice, old city, small, but peaceful. My thoughts and my mind was always in New Bedford, but after a while, my son was born here and I kind of, you know, learned to like Fitchburg. The only thing that bothers me is what the politicians are doing to it. WAYNE LUCIER: Even then? The politicians were… MARY MENDOZA: No, they were peaceful. We had enough. We had everything we needed if we wanted to work for it. Now, they give us this, give us that, then they turn around and take all we, all the dollars we have, together, put together all those years. And they call it "to help the people." Let the people help themselves, and they're fine. Unless they're sick, they shouldn't be so much helpless. They call it "help." WAYNE LUCIER: Where did you live in Fitchburg when you came? MARY MENDOZA: When we came over here, we went to Marine- WAYNE LUCIER: Maryland. MARY MENDOZA: Maryland, yeah, Maryland. WAYNE LUCIER: And then from there you came… MARY MENDOZA: And then we went to Edwards Street. They sold the house where I was, so I went to Edwards Street. And then we bought this house. WAYNE LUCIER: And all these homes, did you own these homes or…? MARY MENDOZA: No, just this one. WAYNE LUCIER: Were they… MARY MENDOZA: They were rented.3 WAYNE LUCIER: And were there a lot of people living there? You know what I mean, where… MARY MENDOZA: No, one was a cottage, and the other one was a two-family apartment. WAYNE LUCIER: And in this district, were the people… MARY MENDOZA: Oh, those days, they had about 10 children, I guess, [from us]. WAYNE LUCIER: Were they Portuguese people or they were just… MARY MENDOZA: They were French people. But to me, they were people and they were nice people, poor people. But that's why I compare now – things now and then. Then they were so poor, they used to put beans, green beans in a bowl with milk and they call it a feast. Now we have so much. I used to say, you know, once in a while, I used to give things to them because – and they were so pleased with life. They were a paper girl and a paper boy, and they help the father. The name, the middle name was LeBlanc, but the dad name's [nothing]. And yet, they seem to have certain happiness. Now that they have so much in name, yet it isn't enough. My gosh! I never had no trouble, because my heart was here, the day my mother put me in school, you know, to know your language and all that, but she had a summer house there, so that made it… she left me there, and of course, I didn't want it. We come back after my father died and we struggled. She had no social securities, no nothing. Ten children and we get together, and we get along all right. But those times, there was no help of any kind. I remember when they used to – Mr. Simmons, you give him $3 a week, warfare, and he was so grateful. They paid his rent, which in those days was about $2.50 for a three-room apartment. And he was so grateful. Now, they're getting $20 a head and more, but still they holler because they don't go to work, you know. That's why when I get to politicians, you get my blood way up in the air. But the country that I loved to be, it's just like before, not the way in the depression time. That was a bad time. Still, we could depend, we could trust people. Now, we have more than what we need—not everybody, but the biggest part of it—and we can enjoy nothing 4 because we have no faith, no leader, no… That's what's bothering me about the country and about my son and his children. For us, you know, we're almost there. WAYNE LUCIER: Almost there where? MARY MENDOZA: In heaven, I hope. WAYNE LUCIER: [Laughs] MARY MENDOZA: Close to it. WAYNE LUCIER: One foot in the door, huh. MARY MENDOZA: Yeah. Well, before, I never even bothered with politicians, and now with peace, now that I decided for… but going on two years now, I decided to think if there was anything that I could do or help, you know, on my [own], because if everybody does a little something, then the little in every home or in every family would help the country finally. But I told you, I'm sorry, I did, because it gets my blood boiling. I can see it, but all I have is grammar and people that go to colleges and have they call it an education and yet they can't, they do nothing about it. I don't know. So you see, when there's not much that I can say, even the prices are so high that you can't touch this, you can't touch that. Even that, I wouldn't mind it if we had a good leader and if we had some kind of a love in our country, but they bring so many people from all over the world, they each get their different ideas, and mixing them together, of course something's going to blow up. But I shouldn't tell you this, because you know more than I do anyway. But you asked me how I feel. It's a terrible feeling that you can't explain it. And even prayer kind of gets mixed up. Your mind is wondering what's going to be the next minute. WAYNE LUCIER: When you were younger, what type of jobs did you hold? MARY MENDOZA: Well, I've been a stitcher all the way; most of it is stitch. WAYNE LUCIER: How did you learn this? Is this something your mother taught you or you just learned to pick it up? MARY MENDOZA: No. I went to the shop and I guess I asked Mr. Silverman for a job. And he asked me what did I know about the job. I told him nothing. We had a sewing machine, you know, not a [farm]5 machine, a sewing machine. I used to make an apron or… it wasn't me already to cut this, cut that. He says, "Would you bring, come tomorrow and bring some of the things that you did?" And I went home and I couldn't think of anything that I thought was good to show them. So I took myself a dress and an apron that I had bought all a bunch of cloth for $1.00 and took it to him. "Did you did that?" I had made a dress for a doll, but when I was small, I never had a doll. Then somebody, you know, I get a price, a dollar, and I was made a dress. So he says, "Why don't you go in that machine and you play with these pieces of cloth? Do anything you want." And so I made a dress for my doll. And from thereon, you know, I was – he says, "I'm going to give you a job. There was the floor walking. I want you to help me. When some work is wrong, you tell them that; show them what they did wrong. We take it out of the block." I said, "I don't have enough education for that." She says, "Well, just mark one dress out." And from thereon, you know, when I get away, [unintelligible - 00:09:33] I could hand in my papers and mark with kind of cloth, how many yards, what I did and all that. So that's how I learned it, at work. WAYNE LUCIER: Where was this first place? It was in -- MARY MENDOZA: Silverman and Sons, New Bedford, Mass. I worked there nine years. It's a dress shop. And from then on, I get out of there was, well, I don't like to get myself fancy [battle], but it doesn't work with me. But I used to be an assistant to the floor walk. She put me like, you know, there's [above] a hundred bills' work and there 400 bills is a lot of work and we checked the work. And anything that we think that wasn't going to pass, we put it in a box and I sit in a machine next to the office and fix it in some way, surely it can be done. She said, "Use your imagination. Whatever you do, it's done." Those days we're making, I think it was $14 a week. And boy, that was a big pay for me. It was big, because the other girls were making five or six dollars. And I thought, see, the language didn't do… I pay attention to what she said, because I could scribble like any human being that comes from Europe and he 6 takes that paper with their parents with somebody there that they know from [unintelligible - 00:10:49], they can do it. In three months' time, I could write a letter. Not like you do, or you know, the people who go to school, but I could write it. If I could do it those days, then everything goes so slow. The kids today are so smart. They want me to tell me that they need all this spending money and that they do it or not. Oh, I wish I had the chance to talk to that [girl]. He's trying now, but I think it's a bit late. Well, never too late, I guess, they say. So that's the way it is. And, you know, the two of us together, we bought our home. We always had our car. I don't call my house luxury because everything is going to be 40 years that I'm married next April. So everything is old but that. The rest is all furnished. They rented things that is in there. It's not all new, but it's not the one, the furnishing I had. And still, you know, we're happy, until this crooked stuff come up. That's the only complaint I got about it. Not the country, but the politicians. I love the country. WAYNE LUCIER: Do you belong in any clubs? MARY MENDOZA: No. I belong to the guild in the church but I quit, because in some of them, we go to the cottage so I never – I mean no meats or nothing, so I told the priest, I can't belong to anything which we enjoy very much when we go down there. It's just a little weekend near the water. WAYNE LUCIER: Where's this? MARY MENDOZA: In the Buzzards Bay. Fairhaven is the town. We pay the tax. And now you can't even go there. That's not funny when you work so hard and we had so much. The country have plenty and look what… Oh, gosh, going… I don't know. No matter what I say, it ends up on the… And I was so happy that I was going to retire this year. And, you know, going here, not going too much in it anyway. Just going a bit, that's enough good time for me. And I don't do any more than I would do at home, but just go and wipe my feet, go in the water, that I enjoy very much and the air. That's the way things are now. You stay home and get old to the point 7 that there's no faith of any kind all because of the… oh, gosh, no, it's really terrible. And the young people, they have so much power. There's so much – not understanding, they don't have any, but so much knowledge, and yet they don't put it to good use. They put it to steal. That people can't keep their doors, they can't go out in peace and say, "When I want to go home, would I have the junks that I left home?" It's not a – I don't know, you can't put into words. WAYNE LUCIER: Things have to get better anyway. MARY MENDOZA: Oh, they have to because if this is it, the good Lord will punish all of us, because, you know, it's really too much. They go stealing. Murderers walk free. That's really… Only they think they're doing some good to themselves, and how wrong they are. There going to be a time where they don't have no body and no soul to go with it. WAYNE LUCIER: What type of education did you have? MARY MENDOZA: Fifth grade? WAYNE LUCIER: What city was it? MARY MENDOZA: Oh, it was in New Bedford, A. Lincoln School, Abraham Lincoln Elementary School that I went to. And there was sitting among us, there's love for the Abraham Lincoln story that I could learn most anything. And I was 17 years old already. WAYNE LUCIER: Do they mix boys and girls in classes? MARY MENDOZA: Yeah. Then it's always the funny ones that don't want to learn. They're cracking jokes, and there's a couple of serious ones. I don't know, she says, "Well, you don't belong with these. Where did you go to school?" I said, "I didn't." I went to school, you know, in Europe, in school which [unintelligible - 00:14:48] high school I finished there. But that was it. Over there, they call it high school the way I -- it's different, the grades from here. WAYNE LUCIER: You went to school in Europe? MARY MENDOZA: Yes, I finished the school. WAYNE LUCIER: What type of school?8 MARY MENDOZA: Regular school, but I finished almost the secondary of high school in Portuguese. WAYNE LUCIER: Was it harder over there? Is the school harder? MARY MENDOZA: Well, we don't have no fun. We go to all the school at 8:00 and we get out at 4:00. And now, we have after that, it's one hour for dinner. WAYNE LUCIER: So you learn the same things, too? MARY MENDOZA: You learn, you read, you write, you learn about the histories, about… well, most of it is reading and writing, see what other countries are doing. You get into a history which I was beginning to get into it other than… well, let's put it that way. I only have what would you call junior high, huh. WAYNE LUCIER: Yeah. MARY MENDOZA: Yeah. And we don't learn no stitching, no cooking, no nothing. That's up to our mothers to teach us that. That's the difference of our country, make the people work and learn and love it at the same time. And when you get home, you do what your mother tells you. You do wash clothes, you iron clothes, you wash dishes, and you help, you know, when they bake bread. It's really an interesting life, though. We do a lot more. Here, everything is bought. When they get the rough going, they can't take it. I remember these things; we get our potatoes, our beans and all that. I was fortunate that I never had to do anything like that. Because it – that St. Michael resources, the woman don't work. The men work like the devil, but they don't do any wives' work either. It's men's work and men's work, and the woman does its washing, cleaning, and that's it, and cooking, of course, and trying to mend the clothes and make their own clothes. Now I guess, I understand everything is different. It's 40 years. I haven't been there now. I was too young to… but what I remember, I remember vividly, though. And that's the way I learned to… you learn to read, you learn some manners. The girls stay in the middle of school and the boys stays on one row in the sides, you know, facing the windows and the girls facing the teachers. And you then, when it's the 9 border, boys will sit like that and watch them. They were writing, they want us to figure that. That at school, that's what we had. That's why a kid there for with the second grade knows more than one over here at fifth grade. Because we have nothing, we have no basketball, no pitches, no nothing – just work, books, and they make you writing and they make you try to explain what you read, you know, how that means. That's the way they learn there which is the same thing over here. They give you a book and you read it and you have to explain that in your own words. But see, there's a difference. It's funny, though, only one hour a day that we had. So when you get to 12 years old, you have to pay for the school because that… WAYNE LUCIER: Who pays for the school? MARY MENDOZA: The parents, and if you don't have it, you stay out. WAYNE LUCIER: Really? MARY MENDOZA: My mother paid for my brothers, and they don't care. They were satisfied. Jimmy was the only one, but he's smart, though. But he likes his tea, strong tea. But he is a pretty, smart kid, and he writes like a professor, actually. And you know, that's the way we were. My brother's used to go, you know, in the farm, like a farm over here. It was about 100 acres of land and when she had it, it was enough to take care of all the children. And when nobody… then she could not – she signed her name, my grandma, but that's all she was interested into it, because she went to school a couple of years, and she says that don't give me no share at all of bread to eat. She quit it. And now, you know, but she worked hard. She didn't have to have no help, no. It's a farm. Of course, she worked there. She got up from 6:00 to 6:00 in those days. I don't remember my mother when I was little. She leave, I was asleep. She would come home, I was asleep. So finally, my grandmother says, "Leave her here." WAYNE LUCIER: She was working where? She wasn't working over there, right? MARY MENDOZA: In New Bedford. WAYNE LUCIER: New Bedford.10 MARY MENDOZA: She was 25 years in New Bedford thing, too hard, only he except two. Not three year, she used to go there every two or three years. She used to go spend the summer there. My father was there. They're rich here. A couple of rich people, my father, very rich, too. But his mother don't want him to marry my mother. And that was it, he was out. And they used to work there every three years, because he was a steam engineer, my father. And he used to – then, he used to make better than average, but he spent it, too. Every three years, he goes to Europe for six months; that's a pretty good life. But he was used to that. You couldn't take him out of it. All my father's people didn't got a home. They claim I have some relations here and I have seen that. I don't know them when I was little. Now, it doesn't feel that. That was an awful thing to do to your children. I've thought about it, they go look far, but on my father side, the lowest one, she's the head of a hospital in Sacramento, California. WAYNE LUCIER: What, your father's what? MARY MENDOZA: Sister. And the other one's, well, they come into paper not too long ago. They'll send it to me. There's your uncle's boy, got injured in [Madeira]. I just go, "Good for him." You know, it doesn't do me anything because we never saw – I only saw one cousin. He was a lawyer. And he was so bad. My mother didn't know what to do with himself. And she said – WAYNE LUCIER: Are you a citizen? MARY MENDOZA: I was born in this country so I consider myself as a citizen. WAYNE LUCIER: Okay. Are you a Republican or a Democrat? MARY MENDOZA: A Democrat. WAYNE LUCIER: A faithful Democrat? MARY MENDOZA: Well, when it comes to good men, I never [unintelligible - 00:21:06], see I belong to this team, and I'm going to fight for it with all my heart if a good man is a good man, and an American is an American. That's all it means to me. But when Roosevelt came in, that was the first time that I voted. So that's when it went, not because I had any special feelings for any… And now, I still say, a 11 good man is a good man. If a Democrat is rotten, we don't root for him. WAYNE LUCIER: Have you ever become involved in a political party, working for a candidate? MARY MENDOZA: No, I never did. WAYNE LUCIER: And what are your feelings about the state government? Is it a useful tool? How was it? MARY MENDOZA: About what the state does? WAYNE LUCIER: The state, yeah. MARY MENDOZA: I don't know. I don't think I'm going to get to those answers because that gets me mad. Oh, no, the state did to me, I think more the city, what the city does than the state. WAYNE LUCIER: What does the city do, then? Is it better than the state? MARY MENDOZA: No, they're copying the state; that's why they call Fitchburg "the Little Watergate." Yeah, and that's… I don't know much about it. So just now, I have no special feeling for the government and even scared of anybody that works for them, because they all – not all, thank God for that. There's a dozen of good ones there somewhere. I don't think they're doing their job. That's – is that a good enough answer? WAYNE LUCIER: That's good. Have you ever experienced any language barriers or problems, you know, when you first, you know, say in your education or today or…? MARY MENDOZA: No, seeing that I'm not much of a social… I really don't… Never bothered me not knowing, I never go any places that I have to be put on. I fall asleep pretty soon. WAYNE LUCIER: How about, have you ever experienced any discrimination in your job due to your language or to your background? MARY MENDOZA: No, that's another left wing. They call this… they're "Oh, we don't like this guy and their people." I never even thought about it. Where I worked, there was a Jewish girl next to me. On the Friday, we eat meat and she eat… we eat fish and she'd eat meat. I ask her, "Why do you do that?" She said, "Well, our religion doesn't call… we don't eat this, we don't eat that." I thought, 12 "Well, it's her own way. Let her do the way she wants." To me, you know, she was – then there's a colored girl then, in [unintelligible - 00:23:34], I didn't understand half of the things she says, the way she talked. But still to me, "She was one of the workers," I said. I don't think there's no discrimination. That's the politicians just make that. And the Black people, they holler that they're getting hurt. They don't think of the White ones, they're getting the same thing. It's the workers that… I can't explain it. The states got the power to come in our pay envelopes and take in the government, to take out [unintelligible - 00:24:05] and we can't say nothing about it. They would have the power to say, "You do wrong, you pay." And we take just so much. And we can't do that, you know. We're not going to do it. You know, I have a son, they need schools. They close the schools. And in Route 12, they got a nice-looking school. It's a small school, but it's all boarded up. And yet we have no own, and then they keep sending for the kids, when they let their kids to come from all over the place. Immigration should be, come down to nothing now, until we get these things straight. Then when they open the immigration ports, they should be slow. Not the way they are, because they – among those immigrants, there's a lot of troublemakers. And that's why our country is rotten and the president is… I don't want to get to talk about him because of his… This is a weekend. WAYNE LUCIER: How about when you went looking for a house? Did you ever have any trouble finding a house, you know? MARY MENDOZA: No, never trouble of that. I always was lucky to find a nice home. Even when I come to Fitchburg, you know, I thought that was really, oh, it's a French town, and I had no trouble of any kind. I moved over here. They say, "You don't only stay here a couple of years." I saw the French. I said, "Well, what's the difference? They're people." WAYNE LUCIER: Who said that?13 MARY MENDOZA: Some of my neighbors. This one is German. She's says, "Oh, you won't like it." I never liked her. I said, "Look, that's their house. This is my house. We all belong to the same…" I never had no trouble. Honestly, I never did. WAYNE LUCIER: Okay. Do you think Fitchburg has decent job opportunities? Let's say, when you came here. Did they have enough jobs when you first came to Fitchburg? MARY MENDOZA: It's better than the average city, though. They get… well, like not every city has [AEG] and they're the ones that complain that they not making enough. But they have the paper mills which you always pay better than the shops. I think Fitchburg has more opportunities than some big cities. WAYNE LUCIER: Even today? MARY MENDOZA: Even today, if people want to work. And the government was fair, and they say, "Look, somebody is sick." Does this sound good? If somebody is… well, like my grandma, she was really an invalid that could do no more. She could not take care of herself. I could pick her up. You know, you need help, that's fine. I'll be glad that they give them people, whatever they need. But when these people, they got to go to the hairdresser every month. I haven't been to hairdresser for two years. I get by, passing, I'm no beauty, but I never try to please the outside world, just my own family. And I don't understand it when they… if they do that, they give so much. And yeah, they get people to have the feeling of doing something for themselves. Like now, you're a young boy, but you're taking care of your home. You used to come here, "See, I did this myself." You learn to love that house. But there's a lot of people, my daughter in law told me the other day, she says, "I'm going to change this living room." I said, "Why?" She says, "It's because it's my work. And I love this house." I could see what she – she was wanting to work. Some of these people, they just don't want to work; that's why the city of Fitchburg has a lot of jobs and still pretty good. The only thing that was wrong with that 14 baby [feast], that's why, you know, we hire… young men's going to have a hard time to get in. WAYNE LUCIER: Who? MARY MENDOZA: Some men. WAYNE LUCIER: Oh, yeah. MARY MENDOZA: When the rough, when things get rough, you walk out. And he's good, he's good nothing. This, you know, maybe this don't mean anything to the reevaluation. This is an awful thing they did to Fitchburg that destroyed their faith, the city, and made people swearing and got… well, they got to go to office. Because the reevaluation, I'm paying the rent in this house. That's what's wrong, very wrong. And yet, they mean to tell me they can't do anything about it, the mayor. WAYNE LUCIER: There's a new one coming, anyway. MARY MENDOZA: Well, I'm going to tell you something. He's not much when it comes to speeches and to looks and all that. He's an old man. But I'm sure he's not going to make it worse. If the councils work with him, he's going to be better than the lawyer. Lawyers always have riches and all that. I think that's why Black Walden stay in, not because he was a bad man, because he's a lawyer. People get so scared, that Watergate, that… You know, it's true. That's why I hope and I hope the council works with him. But he was against the reevaluation. But no, they'll be faced with evaluation. It's bad if some don't pay, some don't own… Do you think it's fair in your own mind that I pay about $18 a week for taxes in this house, between $17 and $18 just for taxes? WAYNE LUCIER: Well, you wouldn't mind paying them if you saw it – I don't mind paying as long as I see something for it, I mean, the money helping somebody, you know, that deserves it. You know what I mean? MARY MENDOZA: Oh, there's a lot of people that deserve, you know, I like to put it, deserve help, that they have no way of going to work. But there's also these people… You know, in Europe, a girl has a baby, she's not married, she's got to struggle. And the second time she has one, they put her away. That's why they have people over there, 15 they think they're straight. They're not. The government is straight. They don't go and help all kinds, you know, induce them to have it, so the others can support it. That's the wrong thing, too. But a girl falls into a misfortune the first time, sure, I give her the help that she needs. But you hear them telling you, "Oh, I'm not going to work. If I go to work, I get less than what I get from the welfare." I don't know. Then they pay babysitters, they have to have a day where… I don't know. I don't understand it anymore. I know that's not the way I do things, the way they do it. The taxes are too high, and there's still people that didn't get no reevaluation at all. They say every five houses, they skip one. Well, I wasn't the lucky one. But one of their men came over here and see the house, if you only know what I felt like doing. So the government is turning the people into killers and to… Oh, boy, if I had a gun, I think I'd shoot him. Yeah, I wouldn't shoot him to kill him, but I'd say, "I want you to get out." But who is making the fuss? Just me, not because I take it to see how we don't know… we're not stupid. Now, one of these days, they're going to get it. People are going to revolt. Boy, and it's not going to be fun and God have mercy on all of us. So it's good that we go out and try to bring peace with them. It takes a lot of it. So that's the way I think of our government and I hope somebody feels better than I do. WAYNE LUCIER: How is your leisure time spent now away from work? MARY MENDOZA: That's it. We go to the summer cottage in summer. In winter, we save, save so we can go in the summer. And we go and every other week, we stay there a week, three days. Now that, I figured, maybe I could stay there and all, biggest part of the week then come back. I'd never liked to stay there, let's say all summer, no. My son and my grandchildren are here. So my heart stays in Fitchburg, too. I'm divided. But that was enough fun for me. Got my family and my husband's family, they're all from there. They come and stay with us. I call that a lot of fun. They don't live there. They live around there. They come and spend the day with us and we go in the water. We talk to our neighbors. That kind of, you know, it 16 was just some things that I never had a chance to do when I'm working. That's my pastime. I don't like big crowds. I like little gatherings, but I don't like big crowds. I don't like going for dances and –/AT/jf/cp/ee
The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting
Issue 4.3 of the Review for Religious, 1945. ; MAy !'5, 1945"' ' ",, ris in rl÷|ncjs~ ampere " ~ ~v~ ~ '~ f~ -";~ ,~ ¯ 7ESUS CHEST IN ~THE WRITINGS OF R~MI~RE--.~" ~,7- '-~ "~ Dominic U~ger,.6.F.M~Cap: . ~. sMEDITATION, . BOOK~ , FOR MINOR~. ~S~MINAKIES Vo1. IV, No~ .3~ ~'/Publish~d 3~onthl¢; Jan~arg, Mar~h,'Mag July'September~and No~ember a~ ~h~ Cdlieg~iPres~ 606 H~ms~n Street, T~peka K~ns~s ~b~ St. Mar7 s College St. M~gs w~th ecclesiastical approbatton. Entered as~second class matter-Januar~ 15 1942 . at thvPost O~ce Topeka Kansas underthe act of ~arch 3+ 1879~' ~'~ *~ . ?"Edit0rih1.Board: Adam C. Ellis, S.J., G. Au~usfifie Ellaid,. S.J., Getaid"Kelly, S J.~: Editorial-Secretary. Alfred F. Scfine~der S J ~ . : Coplright 19~ b7 Adam,C. Ellis: permission is hereb7 grantld for quotations 3"~" of reasonableTl¢ngth,, provided due credit, ,be given this review" and the' author. -("Subscription price: 2 'dollars a,year . ,? . . ~ " ~ ~rmte~ m.U.S;t~; .- ~ . . J' / 89)~.~, ~' Our deification is as certain ds the dogma of the divinity ~;, . bf Christ/of which it is the complement. oit is novmereiy "for itself-that ~l~e:'holy Hiamanity of Jesu.s" has ~e~ei~;ed, tfie ,,_ ~f-ul:nessof the di~Jinity through the personal union with the °~.~ -Wbrd,, bu~ als0.to make all humanity divine b~ granting'a :ihareiof Hii plenitude to all whowish to receige, His ~' ~ 'muni~tion. ~ Wh.en God ~redestined His own Son to be the :i'~7 ._ ¯ S0~a 0[ l~a~ry, "He p~e ~destined us t,o become His ~ad0pfed:sons ,b~y' union~with His onb/-begotten Son. (Ephes!gns~l:5). In becoming incarnate the" W;~d "of Gbd communk~(ed ¯ ~H.is di~iinity inca very personal manner to one soul and one ~ ,body in Christ. But his limitless love, embracing th~ whol~ _ world, mad~ it poss!ble for all,o .men toshare in-tha.tpartici- , . patton of the divine¯life. "His (Christ's) InCarnation ~a~ , -- no other end or aim, than to c6mmunicate His divine" life. ~ - to us: , ,~ . - But if-the'fulness 6f the diyinity!belongs.~shbstantially to.Jesus .- ~ Christ gl0ne (C01. 2:9), all who are united to Him by holy ba'ptis~rri .~'becoNe parta~kers in this fulness each according to his measure (John- ~ ~1:16),.: .-.,Ali o~iaer individual -natures belonging, to o~hd ia~e ~.~ Adaha shall be called, to unite themselve~ to-tBi~ privilqged nature, and to recei~'e by t'his union a very real communication,of its divine~iife. ¯ There shall be but one only, Go~d-Man: but" all men who. shal1~ be ~DOMINIC- UNGER~ Son of the~Heayenly :~E~th~r; but~all those.,who shall be willing-t~ receive~ thii~only Son shall becomethereby thd adopted sons of His Ffither add shall adqfiire - ,g s~rjct, right to share in H)s heavenly inhe/i(affce. "-(Tbe" Ap6stlesbip oLPr~g~r,,~p. 138: and The Laws o~ Prodidence, p. 90.)- ~ . ,"L It is possible for Christ to b~ the Head ~f all men and to i m~ke'~hem divine becahse.He is personally' unit~d"with Go~ ahd because He possesses the fulness of divine life. which He " fofcef~!y stated b~.Father Ram~{rd:- ~ . ~ Jesfis Christ is, therefore,.3n a ver~ real sense, the Head of huma~ ity ~nd of tile w~ole spiritual creation: .for from Him alone~do~s thd 'divine li~e ~our itself forth on angels and men, as really as animal lif~? ~s~reags' fr6m'the h~ad into every ~a[t pf our body." From Himhnd ~'flom Him alon~ proceed all supernatural acts which are d~ne 'io-heaven arid earth. We capnot acquire the least ;merit, do the least ~c~i'on,.conceive the least" thought,pronounce the least w~rd. in the supernatural order, if these different ~mov¢ments are not in-~ur hearts. *~througb~ an ~mpul~e'of His Divine~ Heart. This adorable ~art is 'for: all h~manity, in the order of grace, what ~he sun,.in ~fie physical okder, is for the earth and th~ 6ther planets which'gravitate~around it. - ~- The fact that Christ h~s, made it possibld --;_re~el~eHls o~n Bo'dyafid Blood in~the Eucfiari~t is ~an?- argument that He ifitend~d usto be divine. This union of -man~ith
Para el desarrollo de este trabajo de investigación, partimos de una idea originaria para el proceso de investigación sobre la problematicidad entre el Derecho internacional y el sistema jurídico mexicano, que hila nuestra empresa cognitiva: el ordenamiento jurídico internacional y los ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales mantienen una ínsita, simbiótica e inextricable conexión. En ésta interrelación el Derecho internacional determina al Derecho nacional en tanto que para que aquel sea eficaz en cada Estado se requiere que éstos lo implementen y reciban en sus propios sistemas jurídicos; por otro lado, esta recepción e implementación impacta efectivamente en la aplicación del Derecho internacional, lo cual termina favoreciendo la eficacia del Derecho internacional. Además, esta interrelación se encuentra mediada por el Estado, si bien ya no como actor exclusivo, sí como actor principal y primigenio, lo cual condiciona de plano esta relación, la cual está regida por el principio de soberanía estatal, lo que implica, como necesaria consecuencia, que el consentimiento del Estado es cardinal en la creación, aplicación, desarrollo progresivo, codificación y adjudicación de las normas jurídicas internacionales. En el caso concreto que nos ocupa, la problematicidad relacional entre el Derecho internacional y el sistema jurídico mexicano, a través de cuanto hemos expuesto y analizado, podemos plantear que ha quedado demostrada, en la medida de lo posible, esta idea conductora. Lamentablemente, no tuvimos el espacio como para ocuparnos del estudio de la totalidad de las áreas y regímenes en que esta relación entre el Derecho internacional (DI) y el sistema jurídico mexicano se manifiesta, no obstante, consideramos que cuanto pudimos abarcar, cabe considerarlo como una muestra representativa suficientemente plausible. Con base en todo el trabajo de investigación que presentamos, pudimos arribar al siguiente conocimiento. Luego de dar un recorrido por áreas teoréticas ampliamente exploradas de la doctrina iusinternacionalista sobre el tema de la interrelación entre el DI y los sistemas jurídicos estatales (capítulo I), llegamos al convencimiento de que el planteamiento tradicional monismo-dualismo no da cuenta del fenómeno en su conjunto. No obstante, las tendencias moderadas tampoco se encuentran libres de vacilación y yerro. Al menos en el caso mexicano luego de la reforma de derechos humanos de junio de 2011, es insostenible la idea de que en el orden interno el que tiene primacía es el Derecho interno, mientras que en el orden internacional la tiene el DI, como parece sostenerse desde algunos ejes de la doctrina. Toda vez que esta reforma vino a incorporar el principio propersona. Además, damos por suficientemente demostrado que el sistema jurídico mexicano, a partir de la reforma constitucional de 10 de junio de 2011 en materia de derechos humanos, tiene un nuevo mecanismo para implementar las normas jurídicas internacionales referentes a derechos humanos, pues establece un principio dinámico con el cual este tipo de normas jurídicas habrán de entrar en juego con las normas jurídicas internas, y en su momento se este principio ayudará a determinar cuál de ellas ¿norma de derechos humanos de fuente internacional o interna¿ ha de ser adjudicada en un caso concreto. Este nuevo elemento incorporado al diseño constitucional mexicano es el principio propersona. Con esto, podríamos conjeturar que el sistema jurídico mexicano deja de lado el debate sobre cuál ordenamiento prima sobre el otro pues, en materia de derechos humanos, primará aquel que otorgue mayor protección a las personas que se encuentren bajo el influjo del Estado mexicano. En todo caso, creemos haber puesto los cimientos para la demostración de que el DI y los sistemas jurídicos nacionales, corroborado por el caso mexicano, presentan una interrelación simbiótica que logra reconfigurar de forma el carácter y alcance de ambos ordenamientos, el DI se ve impactado en su eficacia, mientras que el Derecho nacional sufre necesarias modificaciones como parte de la implementación de normas jurídicas internacionales que los Estados emprenden; y lo hicimos en la medida en que, tomando la relación existente entre el sistema jurídico mexicano y el DI como una muestra representativa suficiente, pudimos mostrar que el DI determina al sistema jurídico mexicano, recordemos la reforma constitucional de junio de 2011, que no hace sino cristalizar los resultados del diálogo jurisprudencial entablado entre la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) y la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN), y el sistema jurídico mexicano a su vez fortalece al DI, en la medida en que el diseño constitucional y legal se van haciendo más sinérgicos con las normas jurídicas internacionales, lo que sin duda alguna termina por impactar en la eficacia del ordenamiento jurídico internacional, muy especialmente en lo referente a los derechos humanos. Toda vez que tanto el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, como el universal, son mucho más eficaces, pues cuenta para ello ¿claro está en el ámbito mexicano¿ con una serie de principios y mecanismos de control y de protección previstos en la Constitución que están diseñados para facilitar la aplicación directa de las normas jurídicas internacionales en materia de derechos humanos, y que antes de la reforma de 2011 no se contaba con ellos. De otra parte, pudimos confirmar que el sistema mexicano de incorporación de normas jurídicas internacionales, responde a una tradición constitucional mexicana, la cual está condicionada por el desarrollo social, político, económico y jurídico del pueblo mexicano, su herencia hispánica, su pasado colonial, sus luchas internas, la pérdida de la mitad de su territorio a mediados de siglo XIX, las invasiones, así como la incidencia de ¿la configuración externa de los Estados¿ (capítulo II). Lo que llevó a la incipiente élite estadista mexicana de la primera mitad del siglo XIX, a conceptualizar al DI como un medio jurídico de defensa de la nueva nación, esto es, como un ordenamiento no solo articulador de las relaciones soberanas que facilita relaciones de cooperación y coordinación, sino como un ordenamiento que, desligado de concepciones religiosas y naturalistas, impone deberes y confiere derechos a las naciones; y es este ordenamiento concreto les proveyó de un estatus de igualdad, especialmente frente a las naciones europeas, confiriéndole al Estado mexicano un halo de protección. Pues bien, todo ello, terminó por impactar en la estructura, diseño y desarrollo constitucional del Estado mexicano, especialmente en lo referente a su sistema de incorporación de las normas jurídicas internacionales y en el régimen de aplicación del Derecho internacional en México. Pero estas realidades históricas no solo inciden en la configuración constitucional de México, sino que lleva a los Estados americanos a desarrollar la conciencia de que el Derecho internacional de la época no respondía enteramente a sus intereses, lo cual contribuyo finalmente a la necesidad de ir configurando un Derecho internacional americano. Abordar y analizar las cuestiones referentes a las diferentes teorías sobre la relación entre los ordenamientos internacional y nacionales, nos permitió tener en claro cuáles son los fundamentos teoréticos para dilucidar qué tipo de sistema de incorporación de normas jurídicas internacionales tiene diseñado el sistema jurídico mexicano, y cómo opera en realidad, y qué tan eficaz puede llegar a ser en la práctica. Así pues, hemos de concluir que dicho sistema de incorporación diseñado por el ordenamiento jurídico mexicano, bien puede ser calificado como un sistema monista de incorporación (o automático). Consideramos demostrado que dicho sistema de incorporación de normas jurídicas internacionales, es deficiente y atomizado, en el sentido de que las normas constitucionales que lo articulan no contemplan la totalidad de normas jurídicas internacionales, como las consuetudinarias y las resoluciones de tribunales internacionales, además estas normas constitucionales se encuentran diseminadas en una serie de artículos a lo largo del texto constitucional, lo cual ¿tal como pudimos ver¿ termina incidiendo en la funcionalidad del sistema mismo. En consecuencia, tenemos que el sistema mexicano de incorporación de normas jurídicas internacionales referentes a derechos humanos ¿aun cuando ha sido reformado en junio de 2011¿ todavía presenta deficiencias y es atomizado. Actualmente el sistema mexicano de incorporación de normas jurídicas internacionales se encuentra articulado por el juego de los artículos 1º y 133 constitucionales, y ninguno de ellos prevé la incorporación o cumplimiento de resoluciones de tribunales internacionales, ni de recomendaciones de otros órganos internacionales de control. Por tal razón, el desarrollo jurisprudencia en la materia es de vital relevancia. Muestra de ello, es la resolución del expediente varios 912/2010, en donde la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación no hace sino dar cumplimiento a la sentencia del caso Radilla vs. Estados Unidos Mexicanos de la CIDH. Así mismo, hemos de derivar que los principios rectores del sistema jurídico mexicano, tanto sustantivos como procesales, que rigen su interacción con el DI de los que destacan los siguientes: a) La facultad de celebración de tratados por parte del Estado mexicano es competencialmente ilimitada. Dicha facultad no tiene ninguna limitación competencial, con respecto a la estructura federal del Estado mexicano, así ello, la facultad de celebrar tratados internacionales es exclusiva para los funcionarios federales, que atendiendo al 133, son: el Presidente y el Senado. b) Supremacía normativa: las normas jurídicas internacionales que gozan de supremacía constitucional son: Las relativas a los derechos humanos; las normas jurídicas internacionales que fijen la extensión y términos del espacio situado sobre el territorio nacional, así como las aguas de los mares territoriales. El resto de las normas jurídicas internacionales tienen una jerarquía normativa inmediatamente por debajo de la Constitución, pero superior a las leyes federales, además se consideran ley suprema de toda la Unión. c) Limitaciones y prohibiciones sustantivas en materia de celebración de tratados. Ejemplo de ellas son: imposibilidad de modificación de alteración de los derechos humanos contenidos en tratados internacionales, mediante la celebración de tratados posteriores; prohibición de celebrar tratados para extradición de reos políticos, ni para la de aquellos delincuentes del orden común que hayan tenido en el país donde cometieron el delito, la condición de esclavos y, por último, prohibición a los Estados federados de celebrar tratados internacionales. d) Principios democráticos y legitimadores. i. Control jurisdiccional de regularidad constitucional en la aplicación de las normas jurídicas internacionales. ii. Principio de división de poderes en la configuración del consentimiento en la creación de obligaciones internacionales convencionales. iii. Formas concretas y tasadas de manifestación del consentimiento del Estado mexicano. iv. Principio de publicidad. Apoyándonos tanto en el diseño constitucional y legal mexicano en lo referente al tema de los llamados acuerdos interinstitucionales, así como en el DI general y convencional relativo a los tratados internacionales, pudimos demostrar suficientemente que dichos materiales nacionales no tienen el carácter y alcance jurídico de tratados internacionales. Al margen de que pudieran ser considerados como meros hechos atribuibles al Estado mexicano y que eventualmente pudieran comprometer su responsabilidad internacional. Lo cual nos llevó a su vez, al problema de dilucidar el carácter jurídico interno (nacional) de estos materiales en comento, y pudimos establecer que los acuerdos interinstitucionales no pueden ser considerados como ¿Ley suprema de toda la Unión¿, al no contar con el carácter de tratado internacional, y esto nos puso frente a una consecuencia concreta ¿aunque no incontrovertida¿, a estos materiales no se les puede atribuir valor normativo jurídico alguno, ni como tratados internacionales, ni leyes, ni reglamentos, etcétera. A lo sumo, podrá atribuírseles un valor programático, propio de un acuerdo político. Todo ello nos pone frente a una conclusión ineludible: el sistema jurídico mexicano, si bien ha sufrido importantes cambios en materia de armonización con el DI en materia de derechos humanos, lo que arroja trascendentes consecuencias, según pudimos apreciar, cuenta aún con amplias y significativas áreas de oportunidad en materia de implementación de normas jurídicas internacionales. Y el régimen de los llamados acuerdos interinstitucionales es una muestra de ello. Por otra parte, el sistema jurídico mexicano no contempla el control de constitucionalidad previo de tratados, lo que ha llevado al Poder Judicial de la Federación a plantear la idea de la presunción de constitucionalidad de los tratados internacionales. Empero, esta presunción no resuelve el problema de fundo, pues en realidad no es un mecanismo idóneo para la armonización de ambos ordenamientos jurídicos, ni crea las condiciones para la sinergia necesaria en la implementación y cumplimiento de las normas jurídicas internacionales por parte del Estado mexicano. Además, el aparato jurisdiccional del Estado mexicano ha presentado una actitud vacilante y errática en la cuestión referente a la jerarquía normativa que las normas jurídicas internacionales han de ostentar dentro del sistema jurídico mexicano. Otra de las áreas en que el sistema jurídico mexicano muestra una deficiencia sistémica respecto de las normas jurídicas internacionales, es la referente a las normas consuetudinarias. En efecto, el sistema jurídico mexicano no contempla su régimen de incorporación, aplicación y cumplimiento. Lo que necesariamente nos lleva a la necesidad de proponer que el sistema jurídico mexicano debe ser reformado en este sentido, con la finalidad de fortalecerlo y fortalecen con ello al Derecho internacional en su conjunto. Es de lamentar que el Constituyente Permanente mexicano dejó pasar una oportunidad inconmensurable en junio del 2011, al no completar la reforma de nuestro diseño constitucional en materia de incorporación de las normas jurídicas internacionales, dejando fuera, incomprensiblemente, a las normas de Derecho internacional consuetudinario. Por último, con la finalidad de evidenciar y corroborar cuanto hallazgo arrojó nuestra investigación, nos abocamos al estudio concreto de tres casos test (capítulo III). Nos centramos en tres materia concretas para contrastar debidamente la interacción del DI y el sistema jurídico mexicano, a saber: el Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos; los crímenes contra el DI humanitario y otras formas de criminalidad internacional, y por último, la reforma constitucional ad hoc para la implementación del ER. Obviamente la interacción entre ambos ordenamientos jurídicos es mucho más amplia, pese a tener conciencia de ello, fue necesario realizar un corte al respecto con miras a establecer una muestra representativa suficiente y sustancial. Del análisis y contrastación de los casos test en comento, fue posible llegar al siguiente conocimiento. Con respecto al primer caso test que nos ocupamos, verificamos que la actitud del Estado mexicano respecto del Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos ¿que según vimos puede ser trazada en etapas¿ constituye una muestra en particular de cuanto ya hemos señalado antes: responde a una tradición constitucional mexicana, la cual está condicionada por el desarrollo social, político, económico y jurídico del pueblo mexicano, su herencia hispánica, su pasado colonial, sus luchas internas, la pérdida de la mitad de su territorio a mediados de siglo XIX, las invasiones, así como la incidencia de ¿la configuración externa de los Estados¿. Pues bien, una de las facetas en que se tornó la estrenada alternancia en el poder en México, que comienza en la década de 1990 y se cristaliza durante la del 2000, fue la ¿exterior¿ que se caracteriza por el auge de la firma de tratados internacionales en materia de derechos humanos, como una forma de demostrar el nuevo talente del Estado mexicano, tanto hacia el exterior como el interior. Sin embargo, entendemos también que muchos de esos esfuerzos fueron más mediáticos que de fondo, pues es difícil, en muchos casos, distinguir entre el afán de la cúpula del PAN y de la Presidencia de México por vender a la sociedad mexicana la imagen de un partido democrático y comprometido con la causa de los derechos humanos, y la agenda del Estado mexicano por mostrar al mundo una imagen concreta de país, uno aparentemente comprometido con la causa de los derechos humanos y con su eventual implementación en el interior; es decir, la agenda del Estado mexicano en una política exterior en la materia de Estado con intención, agenda y sistematicidad. Sin embargo, mantenemos que no es posible mantener la idea de que los cambios operados por el Estado mexicano en materia de derechos humanos, se deban a una génesis endógena. En cualquier caso, sustentamos que tanto los factores endógenos como exógenos tienen un peso específico dentro de la vida pública de las sociedades nacionales, y del comportamiento de los Estados en el ámbito internacional. Además, es necesario ir más allá del análisis centrado en el diseño de políticas públicas y de la agenda pública, para tratar de entender el punto en el que se encuentra el Estado mexicano al día de hoy en materia de protección y promoción de derechos fundamentales, debiendo poner en adecuada perspectiva el aporte de los tribunales internacionales de los que México es parte, y si indiscutible influencia favorecedora hacia el sistema jurídico mexicano. Por otra parte, al emprender el Estado mexicano su propio proceso de creciente internacionalización de su Constitución, cristalizado en la reforma de 10 de junio de 2011, obviamente se fortalece su sistema jurídico y expande su espectro de protección y promoción de los derechos humanos. Pero eso no es todo, consideramos que la trascendencia de la reforma referida es de mayores consecuencias pues, si el sistema jurídico mexicano se transforma considerablemente con esta reforma constitucional, el fortalecimiento, empoderamiento, proyección y eficacia del Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en particular, y con ello del Derecho internacional en general, es así mismo considerable y palmaria. Efectivamente, con esta reforma constitucional se verifica un importantísimo desarrollo al sistema jurídico mexicano en materia de protección de derechos humanos por vía de la expansión en distintos ámbitos, a saber: competencial y sustantivo. a) Competencial en el sentido de que el artículo 1º establece que todas las autoridades, en el ámbito de sus competencias se encuentran obligadas a cumplir con las normas de derechos humanos, ya sean de fuente constitucional o convencional. b) En el desarrollo sustantivo se encuentran las obligaciones a cargo del Estado mexicano respecto de los derechos humanos: promover, respetar, proteger y garantizar los derechos humanos y, en caso de su violación, el Estado se encuentra obligado a prevenir, investigar, sancionar y reparar (artículo 1º tercer párrafo). Además, el Estado mexicano se obliga a adjudicar y desarrollar los derechos humanos dentro de su sistema jurídico bajo una serie de principios hermenéuticos y evolutivos como son, por un lado, la interpretación conforme (control de constitucionalidad y de convencionalidad) y el principio propersona, y del otro, los principios de principios de universalidad, interdependencia, indivisibilidad y progresividad. Así pues, esta reforma no solo conforma una ampliación exponencial del catálogo de Derechos humanos, sino que implica que en México las normas de derechos humanos tienen dos fuentes, a saber: el texto constitucional y los distintos tratados internacionales, y que ambas fuentes de derechos humanos son equivalentes, lo que significa que las eventuales colisiones entre normas de sendas fuentes habrán de resolverse mediante el principio propersona. Desafortunadamente, la sinergia en la implementación de la reforma constitucional de junio de 2011 ¿sobre todo en el área jurisprudencial¿ no ha sido la adecuada. En efecto, la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación recién acaba de resolver que las restricciones constitucionales a los derechos humanos han de prevalecer sobre los derechos humanos de origen internacional, en su tesis 293/2011. Así, tal como vimos desde el capítulo II cuando hablamos de la evolución histórica de la jerarquía de las normas jurídicas internacionales convencionales en la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, demostramos que es posible identificar un talante concreto en toda esta evolución de los criterios respecto de los tratados internacionales en México: siempre se ha abordado desde una perspectiva de impronta normativista con tendencia a primar el orden jurídico de origen nacional. Una de las consecuencias que nosotros destacamos de ello es que, semejante talante de la SCJN ha entorpecido la construcción de un verdadero y fluido diálogo jurisprudencial constructivo entre los tribunales y demás organismos fiscalizadores en materia de derechos humanos (DH) y el Poder Judicial mexicano. Lo que queremos hacer notar es que, el nivel de diálogo entablado hasta hoy no constituye un sistema de vasos comunicantes, lo cual representa la idea de ¿diálogo jurisprudencial¿, tal como la doctrina jurídica lo concibe. La comunicación puesta en marcha por la SCJN hasta ahora, desafortunadamente, se encuentra articulada y limitada por dos principios, a saber: la soberanía nacional y la supremacía constitucional. Lo cual no deja de explicarse por el condicionamiento social, histórico, económico y político de la configuración interna y externa del Estado mexicano, tal como ya dejamos constancia. Además, esta resolución de la SCJN deja desarticulado el principio propersona, en defensa del principio jerárquico que siempre lleva a una solución a favor de las normas constitucionales, independientemente de que sean más favorables a la persona o no. Con esto, la SCJN ha despojado al orden jurídico mexicano de toda la riqueza que la reforma de junio de 2011 le había otorgado. Por todo ello, mantenemos que es un despropósito que la SCJN haya tratado de delimitar y dotar de contenido ¿vaciándola en realidad¿ a la reforma constitucional en comento, y encima con una perspectiva formalista y estatocéntrica, sin dar el tiempo necesario para que el Poder Judicial de la Federación en su conjunto, así como la comunidad académica, intelectual y a la ciudadanía en general reaccionaran y construyeran el contenido y alcance de la reforma constitucional en materia de derechos humanos. Así, lo que la SCJN realmente logra con esta resolución es vedar el diálogo jurisprudencial con la CIDH, y obstaculizar la eficacia de los derechos humanos ¿ya sean de fuente interna o internacional¿ en sede nacional, haciendo que todo asunto se convierta en carne de litigio en sede internacional, lo que termina incidiendo en la eficacia de tales derechos también en sede internacional. Esto necesariamente ha de entenderse como medidas estatales tendientes a entorpecer y limitar la implementación de las normas jurídicas internacionales en materia de derechos humanos. Lo que termina comprometiendo la responsabilidad internacional del Estado mexicano, pues resulta contrario a las obligaciones internacionales contraídas por el Estado mexicano. En cuanto al segundo caso test del que nos ocupamos, crímenes contra el Derecho internacional humanitario y otros crímenes en el sistema jurídico mexicano, tuvimos los siguientes hallazgos. En esta parte nos centramos en las obligaciones concretas que el Estado mexicano tiene en las materias que hemos señalado y en cómo, y en qué medida, ha dado cumplimiento a esas obligaciones. En este punto se exponen y analizan los instrumentos internacionales, en los cuales México es parte, que contienen disposiciones relativas a los crímenes internacionales y delitos de trascendencia internacional; así como la incorporación y desarrollo interno de las obligaciones a cargo del Estado mexicano. En el sistema jurídico mexicano se encuentran debidamente tipificados una serie de delitos de trascendencia internacional: terrorismo internacional, piratería, violación de inmunidades y de neutralidad y violaciones de los deberes de humanidad; así como el genocidio, que es un crimen internacional. Debiendo tener en cuenta además, de que México es parte de los cuatro Convenios de Ginebra de 1949, y en estos instrumentos internacionales sí se consigna la obligación de los Estados Parte de legislar en el ordenamiento interno sobre los crímenes contemplados en dichos convenios. El Estado mexicano ha optado por la opción de tipificar las violaciones al Derecho internacional humanitario (DIH) en su código penal y en el código penal militar. Y es revisando esta normativa como podemos advertir que México no ha cumplido a integridad, pues los delitos tipificados en el Título Tercero (Delitos contra la Humanidad) del Código Penal Federal (CPF) no cubren los crímenes contemplados en los Convenios de Ginebra. Y una situación análoga prevalece en lo dispuesto por el Código de Justicia Militar (CJM). Con respeto a los crímenes internacionales y de trascendencia internacional que el sistema jurídico mexicano tiene tipificados, observamos lo siguiente. En el caso del terrorismo internacional, se verifica que ha visto cierta evolución, ya que hasta no hace mucho tiempo en México el delito de terrorismo era considerado, como un delito con eventual trascendencia internacional, toda vez que, el código penal federal no tipificaba el terrorismo internacional expresamente. Solo recientemente, en el año 2007, México atendiendo a sus múltiples obligaciones internacionales contenidas tanto en una gama de instrumentos internacionales -como en algunas resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU- se ocupa de legislar en esta materia, buscando atajar integralmente este fenómeno delictivo. Además, El 14 de marzo de 2014, el Estado mexicano reforma nuevamente su tipo de terrorismo internacional, mejorando la redacción e incorporando importantes elementos, que en la reforma de 28 de junio de 2007 quedaron fuera, a saber: amplía los instrumentos y materiales que pueden ser utilizados en la comisión del delito; amplia los eventuales objetivos que pueden ser atacados y, además tipifica el encubrimiento del delito de financiamiento al terrorismo. De otro lado, la reforma referida adiciona y tipifica los delitos contra personas internacionalmente protegidas. Algo a lo que México estaba internacionalmente obligado a hacer desde hace más de tres décadas, en virtud de lo estipulado en la Convención sobre la Prevención y el Castigo de Delitos contra Personas Internacionalmente Protegidas, inclusive los Agentes Diplomáticos (la Convención), de 14 de diciembre de 1973. Sin embargo, consideramos que tal vez hubiese sido mejor dar un tratamiento por separado a ambos delitos, el de terrorismo internacional y los delitos contra las personas internacionalmente protegidas, toda vez, que este último al parecer se equipara al primero, o se entiende como una conducta subyacente, en todo caso. En todo caso, debemos destacar que el Estado mexicano ¿y en nuestra opinión esto es un acierto¿ opta por la jurisdicción ordinaria o civil en lugar de la militar para procesar a los imputados del delito de terrorismo internacional, y esta decisión tiene gran impacto, no solo en la efectividad de la lucha que el Estado mexicano asuma del terrorismo internacional sino, y sobre todo, en el respeto, promoción y protección de los Derechos humanos, logrando con ello un nivel más alto de legitimidad, en términos democráticos, de estado de derecho y constitucionales. De todo lo anterior, se desprende que el Estado mexicano ha tratado de armonizar su sistema jurídico nacional ¿con las limitaciones y particularidades que ya hemos apuntado, y tomando en cuenta que existen áreas de oportunidad aún¿ con las disposiciones tanto de instrumentos internacionales, así como con las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad en materia de terrorismo internacional. Esto lo podemos apreciar en la medida en que las acciones y medidas legislativas, que es el área en dónde nosotros situamos nuestro estudio, que México ha adoptado, parecen estar en sintonía con las grandes áreas de interés y acción marcadas por el Comité contra el Terrorismo. En lo tocante a la piratería internacional, se corrobora que la tipificación que de la piratería hace el Estado mexicano resulta deficiente por muchas razones que a continuación apuntamos. En primer lugar, el tipo penal rompe con una larga tradición de considerar que el escenario de un acto de piratería internacional es alta mar. En efecto, el Código Penal Federal no hace ninguna referencia a la alta mar ni, en su defecto, utiliza alguna fórmula que haga referencia a que el lugar en donde se cometa el acto de piratería se encuentre fuera de jurisdicción estatal alguna. Debemos recordar que la referencia a alta mar es vital, pues esto constituye la base de la jurisdicción universal sobre el crimen de piratería bajo el DI. Al margen de ello, se pudo comprobar que México no tiene regulada la cuestión de la jurisdicción universal, lo que nos lleva a plantear que, si el delito de piratería internacional es un delito de trascendencia internacional, sobre el cual el Derecho internacional autoriza a los Estados a ejercer su jurisdicción, mediante la figura de la jurisdicción universal, entonces, el Estado mexicano debiera de regular primeramente dicha figura en su ordenamiento jurídico nacional, para estar en condiciones de cumplir con sus obligaciones internacionales; siguiendo en este caso, el ejemplo de España. Sin embargo, esto no es todo, el tipo penal de piratería internacional que estatuye el Estado mexicano adolece de otra importante cuestión, a saber: la mala técnica legislativa en lo relativo a las aeronaves, pues hace una referencia a este tipo de naves en forma residual, y no queda suficientemente claro, si las disposiciones a que se refiere la última parte de la fracción III del artículo 146, se aplican solo a la fracción III o al artículo en su conjunto. Además, hace una referencia al corso y los corsarios que no tiene ya ningún sentido, en primer lugar porque en México esa institución se abandonó hace ya mucho tiempo, y la regulación que del corso hacia la Constitución fue derogada. A parte de ello, el Estado mexicano es Parte desde 1909 de la Declaración que Reglamenta Diversos Puntos de Derecho Marítimo de 1856 firmada en París, en donde se decreta que ¿Queda abolido para siempre el corso¿¿ Por otro lado, con motivo de la preocupante situación en la aguas territoriales y de alta mar frente a las costas de Somalia, el Consejo de Seguridad ha establecido la diferencia entre actos de ¿piratería¿ y los actos de ¿robo a mano armada¿, y según se desprende de las resoluciones adoptadas por el Consejo de Seguridad, sendos actos se distinguirían en función de un criterio espacial, es decir, en función del escenario de la realización del acto, ya sea en alta mar o en aguas territoriales. Esta novedad introducida por la práctica del Consejo de Seguridad viene a evidenciar la precaria y eventual pertinencia del tipo penal de nuestro Código Penal Federal en la eventual cooperación en materia de represión de la piratería internacional. Para terminar, entendemos que es necesario que el Estado mexicano tipifique el delito de piratería internacional en los términos establecidos por la CNUDM, y atender a los desarrollos normativos que en su caso suponen las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad, en las cuales, por cierto, se exhorta a los miembros de Naciones Unidas a legislar en la materia. Así como que también se requiere, si México así lo considera, que se tipifique de forma separada el delito de piratería (interna) o robo a mano armada en aguas territoriales sujetas a la jurisdicción mexicana. Con respecto a las violaciones de los deberes de humanidad, que se encuentra tipificado en el artículo 149 del Código Penal Federal (CPF), cabe mencionar que es el resultado de una deplorable praxis legislativa pues, no consigna ni siquiera alguna de las acciones típicas subyacentes de los crímenes de guerra establecidos en los convenios de Ginebra. Además, no se define lo que debe entenderse por ¿violaciones a los deberes de humanidad¿. Habla también de ¿rehenes de guerra¿, siendo que esa frase no significa nada en Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH), ya que los Convenios de Ginebra lo que hacen es prohibir la toma de rehenes, pero ¿rehenes de guerra¿ no constituye una categoría jurídica del DIH. Por otro lado, el delito de genocidio, que se encuentra tipificado en Capítulo Segundo, Título Tercero, del Libro Segundo del CPF, artículo 149 bis, y consagra al menos tres tipos legales y tres clases de sanción correspondientes a ellos. El primer tipo legal consagrado, en rigor de la técnica, se llama genocidio; y la acción típica punible se despliega a través de una serie de acciones (actus reus) consistentes en atentar contra la vida de las personas jurídicamente protegidas y la reproducción del grupo como tal. El artículo en posteriores párrafos estatuye diversos tipos legales innominados y ¿asimilados¿ al genocidio, ya que tienen identidad teleológica e identidad de sujeto pasivo; pero que no alcanzan, dada su naturaleza, una sanción tan grave como el tipo legal estructural o principal. Así, el artículo en su tercer párrafo consagra el primero de los delitos asimilados; y establece una acción típica positiva que radica en realizar ataques a la integridad física o a la salud. La otra acción típica positiva consiste en realizar traslados forzados de niños menores de diez y seis años de sus grupos originarios a otros diversos. Por último, el párrafo cuarto del presente artículo establece ¿con identidad de propósito y de sujeto pasivo¿ otro tipo penal asimilado con una acción típica punible que, en este caso en concreto, puede ser positiva o negativa, es decir, de acción o de omisión, consistente en someter e infligir unas condiciones de vida que indefectiblemente conlleven a la destrucción física del grupo. Ahora bien, si comparamos el tipo penal de genocidio contenido en el CPF con la definición que del genocidio hace la Convención para prevención y la sanción del delito de genocidio (Convención del genocidio), nos daremos cuenta del desfase entre ambos materiales jurídicos. En efecto, el legislador mexicano lamentable e inexplicablemente mutila, en el tipo penal del CPF, la definición dada en la Convención del genocidio, toda vez que establece que las acciones típicas serán perpetrar, por cualquier medio, delitos contra la vida o imponer la esterilización masiva; dejando fuera del tipo penal de genocidio el resto de acciones típicas, como son: la lesión grave a la integridad física o mental de los miembros del grupo; el sometimiento intencional del grupo a condiciones de existencia que hayan de acarrear su destrucción física, total o parcial; traslado por fuerza de niños del grupo a otro grupo y, también, el resto de medidas destinadas a impedir los nacimientos en el seno del grupo, que desde luego, no se limitan a la imposición de la esterilización masiva, tal como consigna el CPF en su artículo 149 bis. Así mismo, escogimos dos casos concretos que constituyen una muestra representativa de la práctica jurisdiccional mexicana en lo referente al manejo y aplicación de normas jurídicas internacionales. Esos casos fueron, a saber: el caso Cavallo y el caso ¿extradición de vascos¿. Sendos casos muestran que los tribunales mexicanos no se encuentran debidamente preparados para lidiar con aquellos casos que requieran un especial conocimiento de las normas jurídicas internacionales. Por todo lo expuesto, creemos estar en condiciones de sustentar que el Estado mexicano ha tratado de cumplir con sus obligaciones internacionales adquiridas en materia de Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Derecho internacional de derechos humanos y de crímenes contra el Derecho de Gentes. Muestra de ello, son los crímenes internacionales tipificados en el orden interno nacional. Ahora bien, el Estado mexicano no ha dado cabal cumplimiento a sus obligaciones internacionales sobre la materia pues, consideramos que queda patente que el legislador no tiene la habilidad, así como la técnica jurídica y legislativa necesarias, para generar un sincretismo jurídico entre el orden internacional, al que el Estado mexicano está obligado, y el orden jurídico interno, lo cual definitivamente incide en la lucha contra la impunidad de los crímenes más relevantes para la comunidad internacional en su conjunto; y con ello, el Estado mexicano puede estar comprometiendo su responsabilidad internacional. Además de que México no solo ha tipificado mal, sino que en mayor parte no ha incorporado el Derecho internacional penal en su conjunto, ni el contenido en el Estatuto de Roma, ni el contenido en otros instrumentos y en el DI consuetudinario. Lo que genera que el Estado mexicano se encuentre en una situación de atrofia respecto de su sistema de aplicación indirecto de las normas de Derecho internacional penal. Sobre el tercer caso test, la reforma constitucional ad hoc para el Estatuto de Roma, hemos podido corroborar que el Estado mexicano no tiene armonizado su sistema jurídico nacional respecto del Derecho internacional en materia de Derecho internacional penal, ya sea el contenido en el Estatuto de Roma, o el que se encuentra contenido en otros instrumento internacionales y en el Derecho internacional consuetudinario. Y en virtud de ello, sostenemos que México se encuentra en una situación ¿no solo que compromete su eventual responsabilidad internacional¿ sino sobre todo, que entorpece la aplicación y desarrollo del Derecho internacional penal en su conjunto, puesto que en México no resultan operativos los sistemas de aplicación directo e indirecto de las normas jurídicas internacionales penales. No obstante, debemos de considerar el esfuerzo social, institucional, jurídico y político que para el Estado mexicano supuso la firma y posterior ratificación del Estatuto de Roma (capítulo III.3.1.). Ciertamente, el Estado mexicano, tal como pudimos analizar en la última parte del capítulo III, emprendió una reforma constitucional ¿que se entendió era necesaria a fin de armonizar el Estatuto de Roma con el sistema jurídico mexicano¿ para adicionar el artículo 21, párrafo 8º, la cual reza: El Ejecutivo Federal podrá, con la aprobación del Senado en cada caso, reconocer la jurisdicción de la Corte Penal Internacional. Con todo, consideramos que tal reforma no hace sino entorpecer el sistema diseñado en la Corte Penal Internacional, esto al margen de que atrofia el principio de complementariedad contenido en el Estatuto de Roma. La consecuencia directa de todo lo anterior es que, en el caso del Estado mexicano, la jurisdicción de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) resulta aplicable por defecto, en razón del incompleto orden normativo penal mexicano sobre la materia, ya que México no tiene tipificados en su orden interno los crímenes internacionales tipificados en el Estatuto de Roma, salvo el genocidio. Pero eso no es todo, el sistema de incorporación del derecho internacional diseñado por la Constitución de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos presenta una serie de vacíos normativos e institucionales que dificultan la implementación plena del Estatuto de Roma. Además, la problematicidad que se genera por la colisión de la entrada en juego relacional del subsistema jurídico creado por Estatuto de Roma y el sistema jurídico secundario mexicano, no tiene un referente normativo de solución. Es por esto que nosotros entendemos que el aspecto programático que el Estatuto de Roma tiene con respecto a la influencia que ha de ejercer en los distintos ordenamientos jurídicos estatales, ha quedado desmantelado en el caso mexicano. Por último, consideramos que México no se encuentra en condiciones de contribuir a operar el sistema de aplicación directo del Derecho internacional penal que el Estatuto de Roma supone ; Premio Extraordinario de Doctorado US
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Robert Wade on Zombie Ideas, Being inside the World Bank, and the Death of Ethics in Economics after the Marginal Revolution
The global economy is at the core of some of the main issues in contemporary International Relations. But how do we understand the global economy and what impact does that have on how we deal with the power politics around it? A fault line seems to have emerged between those who take economic theory seriously and those who denounce it for being part of the problem. Informed by his training as an anthropologist, Robert H. Wade—professor at the LSE—takes a different tack: he bases his engagement with the way in which Adam Smith has been appropriated to advocate for a dominant view of 'free markets' on real-world economics and in-depth accounts of insiders. In this Talk, Wade—among others—discusses experimentation in international economic regimes, why the International Financial Institutions don't fight economic crises, and the powers and perils of being inside the World Bank.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
If we'd reframe your question as being more broadly about global studies, I think that one of the really fundamental questions is how and why it is that the precepts of neoliberalism have penetrated into every nook and cranny of Western societies, and have penetrated to a very large extent many non-Western countries.
This has happened especially, but not only, through the agency of the IMF and the World bank, which have imbued these neoliberal principles; through the mechanism of graduate education: children of the elites in developing countries go out to American, British, other Western universities, and they learn that this is 'true' economics, or 'true' IPE, or 'true' Political Science, and then they come back and implement these same principles and make them a reality back home. But across the globe, this even holds for the Nordic countries. In Iceland and other Nordic countries, from the 1980s, networks of people sharing a belief in neo-liberal precepts, began to form and sort of place each other in key positions within the state, and in politics, and built a momentum in this direction. These precepts have become understood as just natural, as in Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative'.
I live in the UK, and the great bulk of the British public really does believe that the government is just like a household writ large, and the same rules of budgeting that apply to the household should apply to the state. That when times are tough the household has to tighten its belt, cut back on spending, and it is only fair that the government does the same, and if the government does not, if the government runs a deficit in hard times, then the government is being irresponsible. And this is a completely mistaken and pre-Keynesian idea, but it is a 'zombie idea'—that is, however much arguments and evidence may be mounted against it, it just keeps coming up and up and up, and governments come to power riding on this zombie idea and a flotilla of related ideas.
The persistence of this zombie idea is all the more amazing as we just had a global financial crisis in 2007/8, which would prompt a rethinking of these ideas. But these neoliberal precepts have been, if anything, more strongly reinforced. In previous hard times—and obviously the 1930s depression is the exemplary case—there has been a stronger move towards, what you could call, social democratic precepts. But not this time! Indeed, even after the crisis, the whole of the European Union with 500 million people is even more thoroughly structured on the basis of these ideas. I am thinking of what is popularly known as the Fiscal Compact signed by the EU Member States in 2012, which commits all governments to balance budgets all the time—that is, first, the structural deficit may not rise above 0.5 percent of GDP. Second, the public debt may not rise above 60 percent of GDP. Third, automatic financial sanctions are levied on governments that exceed these two thresholds. Fourth, the whole procedure is supervised by the European Commission, and this is presented as in the name of sound budgeting. This package is presented as justified by the proposition that government is a household writ large. The most elementary principles of Keynesian macroeconomics show why this is not simply mistaken, but a disaster, and will keep generating recessionary pressures. It is sold as a kind of excuse for avoiding to put in place the essential conditions for the monetary union, namely, a common budget and a sizable transfer mechanism to the regions just as exists in the United States. But they do not want to do that, but still they call this agreement 'cooperation', which is all about not cooperation, but about writing these dictates around this zombie idea written into the very basic architecture of the EU. Beyond EU politics, it materializes all the way down to, I don't know, the function of the privatization of the Post Office, it goes all the way down to the sort of capillaries of how universities are run, and the incentive systems that have placed upon academics, and there is very little pushback. The one reason, why I am almost completely delighted about Jeremy Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour party, is that this is one small case of where there seems to be some concerted pushback against these zombie ideas. The point being that the established Labour party basically bought into this whole set of neo-liberal ideas. It combined maintaining the overall structure of inequality in society with more emphasis on providing some help to the poor, but they had to be hardworking poor.
Yet, one knows that there can be dramatic changes in the prevailing zeitgeist of norms. One knows that there can be big changes in the space of a few decades and the question is can one imagine a scenario in which they might be a big change in norms back to a more kind of social-democratic direction. So where will this take place? Because of technological change in the labor market, there is a real big crisis of employment with many middle-class jobs cut out and polarization in the labor market. This might then induce a political movement to have a much bigger change in income distribution than anybody with power is now talking about. Talk of re-distribution these days is really almost entirely around redistribution through the state, but the point I would make is that if there is to be any significant reduction of inequality, especially inequality at the top, there has to be more attention to changes in market-income distribution.
Let me explain. The share of profits in national income has been going up and the share of labor income has been going down. So we should harness the shareholder structure of the market to affect a more equal income distribution by enabling a much wider section of the population to buy into the profit share. At the moment the profit share goes to senior executives and equity holders, but equity holders are highly concentrating at the top of the income and wealth distribution. If equity earners could be spread much more equally, then a much wider section of the population would get income, while they sleep so to speak. We could institute something like trusts, whose members could be the employees of a company, the customers, the neighbors of the company, and the trust would borrow on capital markets and take out insurance against the repayment of the lending of loan and then it would buy shares, it would use that borrowed money to buy shares in the company, and the company would pay out dividends on the shares and then that dividend income coming out of profits would be distributed to the members of the trust. That would be a way of getting the rising share of profits in national income distributed out to the population at large. I particularly like this metaphor of "earning income while you sleep", since at the moment it is only the rich people, who are earning income while they sleep. Somehow that facility of earning income while you sleep has to be made much more widely and available—by using the market against itself, so to speak.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
I suppose the starting point was really this; my father was a New Zealand diplomat, so we moved quite often. By that time I was twelve my parents were posted to Colombo, Ceylon as it was called then. After having lived just in Western countries, I suddenly encountered at this very formative age Colombo and Sri Lanka. I was just amazed by that experience; by the color, the taste, the exoticness, but I was also very struck by how the many boys at the same age as me, were walking around with no shoes. I particular remember this boy carrying a baby on his shoulder, the baby looked half-dead and covered in scabs, and I think it was then I got the idea of just how unequal the world was. Then at university I studied economics, but I also visited my parents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and I got another sense of that great disparity in wealth and living standards. At this time I had come across Adam Smith and the wealth of nations question and that helped to encapsulate or to crystalize my interests. So I wanted to go the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex and got enrolled for a PhD in economics, but en route I spent several weeks in India and during that time I began to dwell upon just how boring and how useless everything I studied under the name of microeconomics. I kept thinking of these dreadfully dry textbooks of marginal cost curves and marginal revenue curves and utility function and difference curves etc., which I had forced myself to sit exams in. By this time I had done a little bit of fieldwork, living on Pitcairn Island in the middle of the Pacific.
When I got back to Sussex after fieldwork I announced that I wished to not do a PhD in economics, but to do one in anthropology thinking all the time, that this would actually be more use for understanding why for example India, where I had been, was so very poor. So that's what I did: a PhD in anthropology… In some ways I regard that as having been a mistake, because the sort of mainstream of anthropology is very far away from the Adam Smith questions. Having done the degree in anthropology, pretty soon I began to change direction and pay much more attention to the state, to the state bureaucracy. I went to India and I studied the Irrigation Department and other related departments. I went to South Korea and I studied state irrigation agencies and I went to Taiwan and I studied the state more broadly. So I was kind of moving up from my Italian village, moving kind of up the scale in terms of state agencies and then the state as a whole.
Then I went to work for the World Bank in the 1980s and my main reason for doing that was not to do the research the World Bank wanted me to do, but rather to study the World Bank from the inside as fieldwork. If in some ways switching to anthropology was a mistake, in other ways it was not, because I approached those kind of Wealth-of-Nations-questions in a way very different from how economists approached them. For example when I went to Taiwan and studied the trade regime, the first thing I did was to go and talk to people who operated through the trade regime, whereas I noticed that the published works by economists celebrating Taiwan's free trade regime was based on what the rules said and what certain government officials told them was the case. They had never actually talked to people who traded through the trade regime. If they would have, they would have learned about all the covert controls that went on such that there was quite a distinction between the liberal face of the trade regime and the reality of the trade regime. The reality was that the government was managing trade in line with industrial policy, but the government absolutely did not want the world to know that. So all this was kept hidden and I was really regarded as rather unwelcome visitor—and in fact to this day my book Governing the Market (1990, read the introduction here) is not well received in Taiwan. It says the government of Taiwan did a good job of managing the market, but they want the world to believe that Taiwan is a free trade country. So that is the kind of intellectual trajectory that I have been on.
So I think that the value of the anthropology PhD was that it really taught me, in practical terms, the meaning of the anthropological maxim, which is 'soaking and poking'. To put it another way—I love this—anthropologists are social scientists, who believe that the plural of anecdote is evidence. And indeed I place a lot of weight on anecdotes, on gossip, on the stories people tell, whereas economists would be much happier reducing, let us say, South Korea's trade regime to one data point in a matrix, and then compare that data point with, let us say, Malaysia's data point to see how the trade regimes are correlated with growth, or something like that, and that is really not my interest.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
Despite what I've just said, I do think that a graduate training in economics is very useful, provided one does not believe it. And that is really difficult, because the socialization pressures are intense: if you do not say the right things—which are neoliberal type things on the whole—then you will likely not get a high grade. But I have noticed that economists tend to know how to think, how to make arguments, they tend to understand the idea of causality, and that may seem an astonishing thing to say on my part, because it implies that students coming from other disciplines are often weak in understanding the very basic ideas of causality, but that is my experience. I had many students coming from, who knows, IR or Political Science or Sociology or Anthropology, who clearly do not have much idea of causality; they can describe things, but they find thinking in terms of cause and effect, in terms of independent and dependent variables, in terms of left and right side, they just find it difficult. So I do think that there is a lot to be said for studying economics, and mastering the maths, provided that the critical facility is not lost. That is point number one.
Point number two is that I think that there is a huge premium on doing fieldwork, and the field work maybe in developing countries, but when I say field work, I don't just mean going out to villages, going out to see poor people 'over there'. I am talking of fieldwork inside bureaucracies: to try and understand the culture, the incentive systems that people are working under—fieldwork at home so to speak, in the countries one comes from. From the students' point of view, it is clearly much easier to sit in the LSE library to do the research. So in my marking I give quite a premium to a student actually doing fieldwork, going out and interviewing, and having the experience of writing up and interpreting the interviews and somehow fitting it back into a larger argument—but really few students actually do that, and I think that that is a real, real big mistake. Mind you, the same risk holds for fieldwork in economics as it does for studying economics: I encourage students to work for (do fieldwork in, experience) the World Bank; and several have—but to the best of my knowledge almost none of them has kept their critical perspective. They really come to buy into it.
The relations between states are settled either through diplomacy or warfare. Why would we have to focus on economics to understand IR?
Because economics—such as for example balances of payment, surpluses and deficits—set the constraints and incentives on countries in terms of their relationships with each other. A great deal of diplomacy is driven by economic pressures: diplomacy to get other countries to for example open their markets, or to cut deals with countries—'if you do this, we will do that'—deals that may relate to areas that are rather different, for instance if you buy more of these of our exports, we will help you fight such and such country, because the manufactures are in my constituency.
So, in a way, the way you framed the question is part of the reason why I react against the discipline of IR: because it tends to treat diplomacy, war, and so on, as somehow rather separate from economic pressures, and I see these economic pressures as very powerful drivers of both of the other two things. As another example, one of the drivers of the Syrian conflict was that there was an acute drought (like Weizman observed in Theory Talk #69, red), which meant that many people were rendered destitute; rural areas flooded into the cities, and the Assad regime just was—understandably—unable to cope; and large numbers of young men, concentrated in cities, rootless and with no jobs, just were recruiting fodder for the Wahhabi sect. I have always thought of economics—not so much as in the making choices in conditions of scarcity, that is sort of Lionel Robin's definition—in the sense of Alfred Marshal, about how people make a living, as a very fundamental driver of a lot of what happens in International Relations.
Pikkety recently published Capital in the 21st Century, causing quite the stir. But why would inequality between people matter for IR?
Let me comment by invoking a very contemporary exhibit—the migration crisis in Europe now. Maybe a decade ago I looked at the figures and if you took the average income of the EU-15 prior to latest extensions and then expressed the average income of countries outside of the EU—including sub-Sahara Africa—as a percentage, then there was a really dramatic falling away of income levels relative to the EU, in countries all around the EU and whether you took market exchange rates or purchasing power parity. If you went round to sub-Sahara Africa and took the average, it was more like two percent in market exchange rates and seven percent in purchasing power parity; and the 'problem' is that there is certainly here a rather thin slither of sea between Africa and the promised land of Europe and to the east there are these great open planes, where armies can go up and down to the speed of light, so to speak, but people can also move pretty quickly across these planes.
So all one has to do—and this might just be only a bit of an exaggeration—if one is on the poor end of this poverty pyramid is hop across the border and you have a chance at least of getting a very appreciable increase in living conditions and income, with which you can then get savings to remit back to home. So the migrations pressures are just huge. So that is one reason for linking inequality to issues in International Relations—really fundamental issues, and very very difficult to dissolve.
You've done anthropological fieldwork inside the World Bank—an institution drawing a lot of criticism from its detractors in IR. Can you shed some kind of light about what kind of 'animal' the World Bank is?
First of all, let me say that at the micro-level—the level of the people you know and the people I know inside the World Bank—I agree that there are people doing a lot of good work. But if you look at the organization more generally—the World Bank and also the IMF—they are clearly instruments mainly of US foreign policy—and any number of US senators, members of the House, have basically said that. When they are defending the International Financial Institutions (they often criticize them), they do so by saying they are important for US foreign policy. And you have to look at the governance structures to see how it is that the US in particular—but Western states more generally—have from the beginning, through the very Articles of Agreement, created a structure which locks in their power, and has made it very difficult for other countries (including Japan) to significantly increase their shareholdings. The US has kept the presidency of the Bank and the much less recognized Number Two position of the IMF, and has used these positions to have a very strong influence.
Just to illustrate what the Bank and the Fund do: at the time of the East-Asian crisis—specifically the Korean crisis in 1997-1998—the IMF mission was in Seoul. The negotiations were in a hotel there. David Lipton from the US Treasury (and a former student of Larry Summers who was by then Deputy Secretary) was just down the corridor of where the negotiations took place, and every so often the IMF people would walk out of the negotiations and consult with David Lipton, then come back in and—as Paul Blustein reports in his book called The Chastening—often said something rather different from what they had been saying before they consulted with David Lipton.
Just to take another example, the US being able to appoint the president of the Bank—to appoint a person known personally to the Treasury Secretary or to the Secretary of the State, or both—is really of great value: when there is a 'trustful relationship'—or a relationship of dependency, the president being dependent on those who appointed him in the Administration—it is possible for those people in the Administration, or people close to them, to just ring up the president of the Bank, and talk in a very informal, confidential, trustful way about what is happening in Latin America, or what is happening in the Middle East, and what the US thinks the Bank should or should not be doing in those places. Larry Summers appointed a protégé of his to one of the regional development banks, and this person—who is very senior in the bank—told me that Larry would frequently ring him, while he is being driven home in the evening from the Treasury, just to have a chat about how things were going in her region, and to pass on suggestions about what the Bank should be doing there, and to get intelligence from her about what was happening in the region, and so on. The point is that, making these personal connections is of immense value, but at the same time, the US Congress, in particular, is very much against having a big Bank against allowing a capital increase for the World Bank—so that the bank could, as it should be doing, increase its lending for infrastructure investment ten times. It is just a complete scandal how little the Bank has been lending for the past 20 years or more for infrastructure, for roads and power stations and so on. The US does not want the Bank providing socialistic competition with the private sector: it says these things are for the private sector to do, and the Bank has to take care of poverty, because the private sector is not interested in poverty.
So the US wants to keep the presidency of the Bank, it wants to keep, secondly, its unique veto right on the big decisions, such as decisions on whether to increase the capital base—but provided those two things are met it does not care that much about the Bank. In the case of the Fund, the US is also very powerful, but of course the Europeans have a bit more relative power. Right now I think the world is in an even more dangerous sort if financial condition than might appear, because the IMF is acutely short of secure or guaranteed lending resources, so if there is to be another round of crisis—as I think is entirely likely within the next five years—the Fund depends upon borrowing short-term from member countries, like on six months terms, but member countries can say 'no', and that means that the Fund's ability to fight crises is quite constrained. The Fund should implement what was agreed in 2010 by all the member countries represented on the board of the IMF: to roughly double the quote of the guaranteed lending resources, that is, resources the countries actually hand over to the Fund, over which they actually give up country control. All the relevant capitals ratified it with one exception—the US—because Congress refused because the individual barons, who are not under that much party discipline, each said to the Treasury: 'look, the question of the IMF is of zero significance to my electorate, so if you want my vote on the IMF, you have to give me things that I want like projects in my constituency and so on'. The Treasury added up the demands of the people, whose vote had to be won, and it considered those demands were just way, way, way over the top. As long as a Democrat is in the presidency, while the House is controlled by Republicans the world is sort of held hostage to this. Beyond this example, this actually entails a structural problem: the US blocking or producing a gridlock in international organizations, because the Congress is hostile to international organizations, because Congress sees it to imply a loss of US sovereignty. The only way to end this gridlock is to end the US veto in the Fund and the Bank, but the problem is that the US can veto any measures.
One response of the big developing countries is to create bypass organizations—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks, such as the new Development Bank, such as the Contingent Reserve arrangement the BRICs have established, and then a growing number of sort of regional development banks. And I think that that is a good thing, but it does raise questions about coordination, about who is looking after, if you will, the global interests, global issues such as climate change. In short, we need a genuine World Bank, rather than the American-Bank-in-the-World we have today.
You engage thoroughly with economics and economic theory. Now there seem to be two kinds of critical approaches to economics in IPE: one criticizes its rationality as flawed, and another buys into its rationality but attempts to point out where actual policy gets it wrong. Where do you stand in this?
If you take the example of how the EU attempted to impose fiscal rules on Greece, you see a notion of rationality which draws upon these very primitive notions that I referred to right at the beginning, where the government is just a household writ large, and the same set of rules that apply to the budgeting of the household must apply to the government as well. Here, the assumption is that any macroeconomic proposition must have microeconomic foundations, that it must be derivable from propositions about microeconomic agents acting in this sort of self-maximizing way, and if you cannot derive macroeconomic propositions from those micro foundations, then there is something unreliable, un-rigorous about your macroeconomics. So what are then the sources of these micro-economic assumptions?
This leads us to one fundamental and almost completely unaddressed weaknesses of economics can be traced back to the Marginal Revolution in the late 19th century. From that moment onwards, there has been an attempt to model economics on physics, and that was very explicit on the part of people like Pareto and Walras, and Jevons, early Marginalist thinkers. They even drew up tables with terms of physics, like velocity, on one side, and then corresponding terms in economics on the other. That had a huge benefit in terms of the 'science' of economics, because it cut economics loose from Adam Smith's and other classical economists' preoccupations with issues of morality and ethics. Adam Smith thought his most important book was not the Wealth of Nations but his Theory of Moral Sentiments, on which he was working, revising yet again, when he died. For Smith, economics and morals were never separate worlds, but intimately related. So for him, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations were just twins. The point about the marginalist revolution, and the embrace of physics as the model, was that it cut economics free of all that sort of subjective stuff about values. So economics after the marginalist revolution set off with the assumption that not production, but the movement of individuals in markets engaged in trading with each other became the center of gravity of economics. Making the study of exchange rather than the study of production central was analogous to, say, Boyle's Law in physics. Boyle's Law in physics explained the movement of molecules in gasses, as a function of the pressure applied to the gas. So why did they make that analogy?
The point of likening of individuals in microeconomic actions with molecules in gasses was the following. Everybody knows that we do not apply any consideration of ethics or moral sentiments to the movement of the molecules in gas, so neither should we apply any notions of ethics or moral sentiments to the movements of individuals in market exchanges. And that was the way that all considerations of ethics, of morality were just removed from economics. I for instance asked the question to well-known American growth theorist, as we were walking down the street in Providence at Brown University: 'is it moral for people to freeride?' And he said, 'yes of course, provided they do not break the law'. So ethics and questions of morality have been almost completely expunged from economics in a way that would horrify classical economists including Smith; and a particular idea of rationality has been an important part of cleansing economics from those moral considerations. George DeMartino, editor of the Oxford Handbook of Professional Economics Ethics which just appeared has a wonderful phrase to capture this—'econogenic harm': the harm built into the way that economics, professional economists work.
Haven't specific fields, like development economics—a field you engage with yourself—advanced to overcome these weaknesses in economic theory?
Let me root my answer again in observations about the linkages between theory and practice, for it is in practice that economic theory really does its work and its politics becomes visible. It always amazes me we have had a development industry in place for roughly the past 70 years with vast numbers of people, organizations, money all orchestrated underneath this umbrella of development; yet if you go back and read what the early writers about development and economic growth said—I am thinking of people like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal, Hirschman, Prebisch, but also Moses Abramovitz. If you go back and look at what they were saying, it seems to me that we have not advanced all that much. Sure, we have advanced a lot in terms of econometric techniques, but in terms of substance we have not. One conclusion I draw from that is that it is really important that international regimes—for example, World Bank and IMF loan conditions, but also WTO regimes—give room for experimentation, because it is really not the case that 'there is no alternative'. This Washington Consensus agenda has clearly not been effective in accelerating production, upgrading it, and production diversification, or export upgrading, or export diversification. So, there should be written into the regimes a lot of room for experimentation. But this isn't there because of the political origin of these regimes; because of what western countries want for the rest world, namely, to open the rest of the world to their markets.
In the 80s there were a lot of experts in industrial development in the World Bank and they did good work, promoting industrial growth and investment in productive infrastructure. But then Anne Krueger came in as chief economist, and brought in a whole lot of people with her—who, like here, were arch-neoliberals. The industrial growth people were invited to find employment elsewhere, or to rebrand themselves as experts in who knows what, environmental assessment, primary education, or good governance. There was no room for them. This also fitted well with some bad experiences the Bank had had with investing in infrastructure. It had gotten into a lot of trouble with large-scale infrastructural interventions such as roads and dams and the like from, especially, US NGOs mobilizing Congress—which then put pressure on the Treasury and so on. My lament throughout this whole conversation has been that we seem to have become just locked into this direction that was set in the 1980s, and it is very difficult to see what kind of economic catastrophe would be necessary to give a sufficient shock to reroute the global system of economic governance.
So after the 1980s, the Bank sort of backed off and began saying that development, economic development, was about poverty reduction—the slogan of the Bank became, 'our dream is a world free of poverty'. You can understand that shift partly in terms of pulling out of the concern with production to get into safe territory, but also because poverty reduction seemed to sort of take care of inequality, because you reduced inequality to poverty—to the poor 'over there', and we can feel good about helping them; but we do not want talk about inequality, which involves us, because then there is the question of justice of our income.
But then the most recent turn is that we're seeing a renewed push for infrastructure in the World Bank and western development agencies. I think that you can link this recent infrastructure push to uncertainty about the sources of economic growth. In the West there is a real question about sustaining economic growth without housing bubbles and stock market bubbles—in other words, without endogenously building financial instability. There may well be a similar sort of issue in terms of the growth of developing countries.
Last question. Adam Smith seems to be constantly present in your work as a critical interlocutor. How come?
I kind of engage in a critical debate with Adam Smith, but especially with people today, who believe his ideas. I often start to frame arguments in terms of his famous 40 word summary of the causes of the relative wealth of nations, which he actually wrote in 1755, which is to say long before the first edition of the Wealth of Nations. I will just tell you what these 40 words say, and then I will tell you the significance of them. He said:
'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism than peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.'
So I am struck by how today many economists say or imply that this is essentially right; you need some qualifications of course, but essentially that is the nub of it. You might have to translate peace, easy taxes, tolerable administration of justice into more modern terms, but that is the essence of it. For example, Gregory Mankiw—Professor of economics at Harvard, former chair of the National Council of Economic Advisers during the Bush administration, and author of a very popular textbook in economics—said in the Wall Street Journal in 2006: Adam Smith was right to say that – and then he gave the 40 word quote. The renowned economists Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson wrote Pillars of Prosperity, which also begins with Smith's 40 words, and they even see the book as a kind of elaboration, but in that same kind of spirit, of Smith's basic idea. So my point is that these ideas are still current; they are still the sort of front of a lot of neoliberal thinking. I am just astonished these ideas all these centuries later remain so powerful. I have had at the back of my mind the idea of organizing an international competition to provide a contemporary 40 word statement, which is sort of equivalent to Smith's, which would obviously have to be of a more global character, encompassing the globalized world economy.
Robert Hunter Wade worked at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1972-95, World Bank, 1984-88, Princeton Woodrow Wilson School 1989/90, MIT Sloan School 1992, Brown University 1996-2000. Fellow of Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1992/93, Russell Sage Foundation 1997/98, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin 2000/01. Fieldwork in Pitcairn Is., Italy, India, Korea, Taiwan. Research on World Bank 1995-continuing. Author of Irrigation and Politics in South Korea (1982), Village Republics: The Economic Conditions of Collective Action in India (1988, 1994), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia's Industrialization (1990, 2003). Latter won American Political Science Association's award of Best Book in Political Economy, 1992.
Related links
Faculty profile at LSE Read Wade's The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality (2014, real-world economics review) here (pdf) Read Wade's Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes (2013, Challenge) here (pdf) Read Wade's Rethinking Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries (2007 ADB Conference paper) here (pdf) Read Wade's Bringing the State Back In (2005, IPG) here (pdf) Read Wade's Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? (2004, World Development) here (pdf) Read Wade's Creating Capitalisms (Introduction to 2003 book 'Governing the Market') here (pdf)
