Suchergebnisse

In autumn 2022, the electoral victory of the right-centre coalition led by Giorgia Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia (FdI, Brothers of Italy) and the subsequent establishment of her government caused scepticism and apprehension among international commentators. Concerns stemmed not only from it being the first administration in the history of post-war Italy whose majority partner, FdI, is rooted in the post-fascist tradition; more concretely, the inclusion within the coalition of parties such as Matteo Salvini's Lega (League) and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia (Come on Italy), which had entertained political and personal relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia prior to the invasion of Ukraine, raised doubts about Italy's continuing support for Kyiv and the Western coalition. In reality, unwavering Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine views were repeatedly voiced by Meloni during the election campaign already, and – apart from a few unfortunate remarks by single individuals – this stance has been unambiguously upheld by the new government since it took office, as sealed by the Prime Minister's visit to Kyiv in February and to Washington in July 2023.[1]
A more complex picture emerges regarding relations with the European Union and European partners. Historically, in the post-war period, European integration has been a crucial dimension of Italy's foreign policy, along with Atlanticism and strong support for multilateralism. Rome was one of the founders of the European communities, and European integration was long seen by ruling and opposition parties alike as key to Italy's economic, cultural and social modernisation. Since the 1990s, however, criticism of the European project began to emerge in Italy, especially among the new centre-right parties, which developed a so-called "Euro-realist" approach when in government, whereby Italy's national interest would not necessarily coincide with deeper European integration.[2] Outright Euroscepticism became more apparent since the Eurozone and migration "crises" of the 2010s, leading to the emergence of so-called "sovereigntist" narratives depicting the EU as an "antagonist", which found resonance especially among populist parties.[3] This narrative, however, lost momentum as a result of the unprecedented level of funding granted to Italy through the NextGenerationEU programme in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2022 election, managing relations with Europe was thus a crucial task for the newly elected Italian government.Meloni the Eurorealist
Against this backdrop, Meloni's approach to Europe was centred on the vindication of Italy's "national interests" but within the framework of European integration and with a self-declared ambition to play a protagonist role. In the run-up to the 2022 election, FdI's electoral programme jettisoned some populist tones of the past (especially regarding the euro). Instead, the emphasis was placed on the need for Italy to "return as a protagonist in Europe" and to "relaunch the system of European integration, for a Europe of homelands, founded on peoples' interests".[4] In a similar vein, in her inaugural address to the Chamber of Deputies, Meloni stressed the desire for Italy to stand "with head high" in Europe and the other international fora, "with a constructive spirit, but without subordination or inferiority complexes". The emphasis on the "national interest" was accompanied by the acknowledgement of "a common European and Western destiny" – as well as of the importance of a frank dialogue within the European institutions, taking a "pragmatic" approach.[5] As a matter of fact, Meloni's first mission abroad as Italy's prime minister was to Brussels.
In its first months of government, the Meloni administration adopted a Eurorealist stance in line with that of previous centre-rights governments from the early 2000s. While expressing a strong preference for an intergovernmental view of Europe, the Italian government acted within the framework of EU rules and governance. Meloni tried to bring forward, with mixed results, the Italian point of view on the main issues under discussion in European fora – from energy to migration. In terms of economic policy, despite a few contentious measures, the 2023 budget law on the whole met Brussels' expectations.[6] The management of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan funds and related reforms was instead more troubled, marked by sluggish implementation, delays and subsequent requests for revision by the Italian government.[7]Migration and the economy: Dark clouds ahead
One year after the establishment of Giorgia Meloni's government, dark clouds are gathering on the horizon of Italy–EU relations. In the realm of policy, Rome is faced with increasing challenges, although these have often been concealed, belittled or even denied in the past months. This is especially true for two key areas: migration and the economy.
On migration, while unauthorised arrivals to Italy through the Central Mediterranean route were soaring, in June, Meloni tried to put on a good face by declaring that Europe was eventually addressing the external dimension of migration, which according to her had previously been "unthinkable".[8] However, as the agreement reached between the EU and Turkey in 2016 at the height of the "migration crisis" shows,[9] there is actually nothing new in this approach. For many years now, the Union has systematically failed to address the migration issue in a holistic way – that is, considering the internal, external and border management dimensions together – and has instead tried to shift the responsibility onto countries of origin and transit through a transactional approach – with the latter being called upon to keep, readmit or repatriate migrants in exchange for economic support.[10] Agreements reached on paper, however, amount to very little when the counterparts do not duly implement them. The memorandum of understanding between the EU and Tunisia signed amid great optimism on 16 July seems to be a case in point: arrivals from the North African country to Italy increased by almost 60 per cent in the eight weeks after the agreement, while a group of members of European Parliament who wanted to monitor the situation in the country was recently refused entry.[11] The reality is that Meloni is focusing on the external dimension of EU migration policies because, while migration flows are on the rise under her government, Italy has so far failed to achieve anything on the internal dimension. This is true even for the bland agreement on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum reached at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in early June, which – in spite of Meloni's failed mediation efforts – has been strongly opposed by her supposed allies in Poland and Hungary.[12]
If the Italian government has already failed in migration policy, the key area of economic policy looks increasingly troubled too. Having very little fiscal room for manoeuvre, Italy is unable to benefit from any relaxation of state aid rules; hence, Rome supported the establishment of a new European sovereignty fund as the backbone for an EU-wide industrial policy.[13] Many member states are sceptical,[14] though, and Italy's apparent troubles in spending existing NextGenerationEU funds provides a very good argument against it. Indeed, for the time being, ambitions for a new fund have been scaled back drastically, with a "platform" on strategic technologies being established instead. Added to this are the dilemmas in the negotiation of the new Stability and Growth Pact. Germany, in particular, is stonewalling on the European Commission's proposal, which would significantly benefit Italy by bringing greater flexibility to the old rules. Indeed, Italy's priority should be the creation of a common front along the lines of the Commission's proposal, which may well include member states such as Spain and France. But some postures of the Italian government are instead weakening Italy's credibility and negotiating strength: so far, it has been unable to compose an internal quarrel over the ratification of the European Stability Mechanism (already ratified by all other Eurozone states), while its campaign for excluding certain types of public investment from EU deficit targets is unlikely to be successful. There is a real risk that, in the end, the new Pact will be well below Italian expectations and needs.[15]Italy's true national interest: A stronger Europe
The coming months will most likely see Meloni intensify her efforts to prepare the ground for a change of majority at the European level after the June 2024 election, working towards a coalition inclusive of conservative and nationalist forces. However, the political cohesion of a supranational alliance between movements, leaders and governments whose watchword is the vindication of their respective national interests "first and foremost" would be likely put to the test over and over again. Even domestically, in the run up to next year's European Parliament elections, Meloni now faces increasing opposition from within her own government, pushed to run a populist-nationalist race against Matteo Salvini. Whatever affinities European conservatives and nationalists may find in the realm of values, the extent to which they would be able to find common ground on issues pertaining, among others, to migration – as has already been evidenced in the past months – or economic governance seems uncertain, to say the least.
There's the rub: an international context riven by multiple crises and increased competition, even assuming that one follows the logic of merely protecting the national interest, for a country like Italy – with the second-highest government debt-to-GDP ratio in the European Union and the highest old-age dependency ratio of all EU member states[16] – the priority should be further promoting European integration, advancing Italian demands in a frank and constructive manner within strengthened EU fora and institutions. National ambitions must always confront international realities. An overestimation of one's own means, any attempts to water down the system of supranational governance, or a resurfacing confrontational attitude would damage not only the European project, but Italy first and foremost.Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Honorary Professor at the University of Tübingen. Leo Goretti is Head of the Italian Foreign Policy programme at IAI.[1] Nona Mikhelidze, "Italy's Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|06 (February 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/16643.[2] Lucia Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union: Between Continuity and Change", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 2 (August 2007), p. 133-148, DOI 10.1080/14613190701414426.[3] Fabrizio Coticchia, "A Sovereignist Revolution? Italy's Foreign Policy under the 'Yellow–Green' Government", in Comparative European Politics, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 2021), p. 739-759, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00259-0.[4] Fratelli d'Italia, Il programma. Pronti a risollevare l'Italia. Elezioni politiche 25 settembre 2022, August 2022, point 25, https://www.fratelli-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Brochure_programma_FdI_qr_def.pdf.[5] Italian Government, President of the Council of Ministers Giorgia Meloni's Parliamentary Address on the Government Programme, 25 October 2022, https://www.governo.it/en/node/21000.[6] Nicoletta Pirozzi, "I rapporti Italia-Ue", in Ferdinando Nelli Feroci and Leo Goretti (eds), L'Italia dal governo Draghi al governo Meloni. Rapporto sulla politica estera italiana. Edizione 2022, Roma, IAI, January 2023, p. 25-31, https://www.iai.it/en/node/16471.[7] Giuseppe Fonte, "Italy Struggling to Meet Reform Policy Targets Agreed for EU for Post-COVID Funds", in Reuters, 8 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-struggling-meet-reform-policy-targets-agreed-eu-post-covid-funds-2023-06-08.[8] Italian Government, President Meloni's Doorstep Following the European Council Meeting of 29-30 June, 30 June 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/23062.[9] European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, http://europa.eu/!Uv88TM.[10] Luca Barana and Asly Okyay, "Shaking Hands with Saied's Tunisia: The Paradoxes and Trade-offs Facing the EU", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|40 (August 2023), node/17362.[11] Alessandra Ziniti, "L'intesa flop con la Tunisia, sbarchi aumentati del 60%. Salvini: è un atto di guerra", in Repubblica, 14 September 2023; Lisa O'Carroll, "MEPs Refused Entry to Tunisia Two Months after Signing of Migration Deal", in The Guardian, 14 September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/zq9me.[12] "Meloni 'Not Disappointed' with Poland, Hungary over Migrant Deadlock", in Ansa, 30 June 2023, https://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2023/06/30/migrants-meloni-not-disappointed-with-poland-hungary_ec2352bb-02d2-4860-97bc-04780f6d58ba.html.[13] Italian Government, President Meloni's Introduction at Her Press Conference following the Special European Council Meeting, 10 February 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/21805.[14] Jan Strupczewski, "Seven EU Countries Oppose New EU Funding as Response to U.S. Subsidy Plan – Letter", in Reuters, 27 January 2023, http://reut.rs/3Jgftt6.[15] Ferdinando Nelli Feroci, "L'incrocio pericoloso fra legge di bilancio e riforma del Patto di Stabilità", in AffarInternazionali, 29 August 2023, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=104942.[16] Eurostat, "Government Debt Down to 91.2% of GDP in Euro Area", in Euro Indicators, No. 83/2023 (21 July 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21072023-ap; Eurostat, Half of EU's Population Older than 44.4 Years in 2022, 22 February 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230222-1.

JEL Classification: G21, G34, M14, O16 ; As a natural consequence of the creation of the euro, the European Commission, the Eurosystem and the Banking Industry in Europe decided to build one single payments area (SEPA - Single Euro Payments Area) in 1999 (publication of Eurosystem objectives). This study intends to add to the literature on Stakeholder Theory and its application to the European Banking Industry, deploying an analysis on the impact of the creation and progress of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), before and during the recent global economic and financial crises. SEPA involves more than 508 million consumers, 25 million companies, as well as 9,000 banks, public corporations, clearing houses and software suppliers, yielding more than 73,000 million transactions per year (European Payments Council, 2013). SEPA currently consists of the 28 European Union (EU) Member States plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Monaco. SEPA features the largest project ever carried out in the payments area and encompasses a wide range of active stakeholders in the governance process. That is why SEPA provides a fertile and momentous ground for analysis through the lens of stakeholder theory. This dissertation is rooted in the social sciences and uses a case study approach as its main method of analysis. Expert interviews and document analysis are used as data-gathering techniques. The first point is that the governance under the creation of the SEPA project can be best explained by the Stakeholder Theory, since SEPA governance is the direct result of the stakeholders call for more extensive involvement. Secondly, Stakeholder Theory is the only theory capable of explaining the driving forces hailing from the diversity of stakeholders involved in the project. Thirdly, the creation of various SEPA governance bodies is rooted in a community vision of a single payments area, and the embedded socio-political dimension is thus unavoidable. Unlike extant studies that do not go beyond the analysis of a corporation, the main contribution of this thesis is to analyse one on-going, major, supranational and topical project, through the lens of stakeholder theory, paving the way for a follow-up of forthcoming SEPA achievements and the development of the theoretical underpinnings. ; Como consequência natural da criação da moeda única, a Comissão Europeia, o Eurosistema e o Sector Bancário na Europa, decidiram construir um espaço único de pagamentos, em euros (SEPA - Single Euro Payments Area), em 1999 (publicação dos objectivos do Eurosistema). Este estudo visa contribuir para o conhecimento sobre a Teoria dos Stakeholders e a sua aplicação à Indústria Bancária Europeia, ao analisar o impacto da criação e desenvolvimento da Área Única de Pagamentos em Euros (SEPA), antes e durante as crises económicas e financeiras globais recentes. A SEPA envolve mais de 508 milhões de consumidores, 25 milhões de empresas, bem como 9.000 bancos, empresas públicas, câmaras de compensação e fornecedores de software, gerando mais de 73 mil milhões de transações por ano (European Payments Council, 2013). A SEPA é constituída actualmente por 28 Estados-Membros da União Europeia (UE) e ainda Islândia, Noruega, Liechtenstein, Suíça e Mónaco. A SEPA representa o maior projecto já realizado em termos de pagamentos e abrange uma ampla gama de stakeholders activamente interessados no processo de governance. É por isso que a SEPA constitui um terreno de análise tão fértil e importante, com base na Teoria dos Stakeholders. A presente dissertação radica nas ciências sociais e usa uma abordagem de estudo de caso, como seu principal método de análise. Entrevistas com especialistas e análise de documentos são técnicas que foram utilizadas para recolha de dados. Em primeiro lugar, importa referir que a governance, no âmbito da criação do projecto SEPA, é suportada pela Teoria dos Stakeholders, dado que a governance da SEPA é o resultado direto da intervenção dos próprios stakeholders no sentido de uma participação activa do projecto. Em segundo lugar, a Teoria dos Stakeholders é a única teoria capaz de explicar todos os factores e forças em jogo, que resultam da diversidade de stakeholders, envolvidos no projecto. Em terceiro lugar, a criação de vários órgãos de governance da SEPA, assenta numa visão comunitária da conceção de uma área única de pagamentos e outrossim na dimensão sociopolítica que lhe está adstrita e que é, portanto, um factor incontornável. Ao contrário dos estudos já realizados, fundamentados na Teoria dos Stakeholders, que tanto quanto conhecemos não vão para além da análise de uma empresa, o principal contributo desta tese é analisar um relevante e estimulante projecto supranacional, em curso e de grande actualidade e impacto, através da perspetiva da Teoria dos Stakeholders, dando o mote quer para outros estudos de acompanhamento dos próximos sucessos da SEPA, quer para o desenvolvimento dos fundamentos teóricos.

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its case-law formulated a thesis telling that the rule of law requires the state to provide the legislator with both a right and an obligation to prohibit acts which result in injuring or endangering the interests of persons, society or the state. The international agreements ratified by the Seimas, the membership in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well create legal obligations relating liability for corruption in private sector for our country. Thus, appropriate legal liability (including liability for corruption in private sector) might be only conditionally regarded as the issue of discretion of the Seimas. In case the acts in question are sufficiently harmful and (or) the criminalisation thereof is connected with the implementation of the obligations of Lithuania, their inclusion into the Criminal Code of the Republic in Lithuania and active prosecution in respect of them is the duty of the Republic of Lithuania. The research paper aims to evaluate the regulation of liability for corruption in private sector in Lithuanian legal system. It must be noted that it examines not only the issues of criminal liability for corruption in private sector. Taking into account the fact that the standards for the application of criminal liability are particularly high (including inter alia the presumption of innocence), the research question was set on whether the existing legal regulation (labour law) provides possibilities to protect from employees displaying unacceptable standards of behaviour. Legal requirements relating the legal liability for corruption in private sector are provided for in a few international and supranational legal acts, i.e. (a) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector; (b) United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2005 (c) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999; (d) Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003; (e) Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions of 18 September 2014 (this Convention has not entered into force yet). Regrettably, these few international instruments are as well rather limited: for example, the Framework Decision requires criminalisation of only active and passive bribery in private sector, and the scope of application thereof fails to include not only any unilateral acts of corruption, but as well the corruption acts related to the aspiration to receive other benefit rather than remuneration, whereas the only one universal instrument of international law, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, requires the contracting states only to consider the criminalisation of corruption in private sector rather than the criminalisation itself. All three documents mentioning active and passive bribery in private sector (including Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption besides the two already referred) are applied in restricted scope, i.e. only in cases when a bribe is given for acts or refraining from acting, in breach of the duties. This means that criminal liability is not applied in case the bribe is taken or even forced to give for proper performance of duties. However, Lithuania fails to proper implement event the limited duties formulated in the mentioned documents. Although in accordance with these three mentioned documents the subject of corruption in private sector is considered to be any employee in the private sector, Article 230(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that criminal liability for active and passive bribery may arise only in cases when an employee holds administrative powers or is entitled to act on behalf of the legal person or other organisation, or provides public services. As according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania most of employees in private companies are not held "persons to be treated as public servants", therefore, they might be held liable only for a restricted number of criminal activities – fraud, commercial espionage or disclosure of a commercial secret. Even upon the evidence of existence of dangerous acts, they may not be held liable for active and passive bribery or embezzlement. Due to the settled case-law which links the status of the "persons to be treated as public servants" with the exceptional importance of the company where they work for the public interest, even the majority of directors of companies and other persons acting on behalf of them may not be prosecuted for the mentioned acts. A part of corruption activities of the companies connected to their relations with clients, users and partners are standard ones, another part of corruption activities differ according to the field of activities of companies. Most of corruption activities of private companies occur either in the field of supply chain (production, distribution, marketing), or the purchasing field. These usually include active and private bribery, fraud, unfair commercial activities, misleading advertising or similar activities, subject to criminal or economic sanctions. Meanwhile, in the field of provision of legal services, pharmacy, healthcare, education, etc. possible corruption activities are of specific nature, and the prevention is provided for in special laws and codes of behaviour. Neither international, nor European Union legal acts regulate liability for corruption in labour relations, therefore, this issue is regulated only in national legislation. The main sanctions in labour law applicable in respect of an employee for corruption activities are the suspension of the performance of the labour agreement (a provisional measure) and termination of labour contract on the initiative of the employer upon the fault of the employee (Article 58 of the Labour Code). Besides, in respect of employees who act as directors a measure of revocation may be applied, and indeed, this measure is an important one for the protection of the company from a corrupted director. As well, particular sanctions for failure to execute the duties or improper execution thereof might be established in the internal documents of a company. These may include a warning, termination of additional payments or bonuses, etc. Due to the open list of measures applicable in labour relations, the liability for corruption activities in labour relations is broader in scope than criminal liability. On the other hand, rather short time-limits for the termination of the labour agreement on the initiative of the employer in case of fault of an employee and its weak deterrence weakens the effectiveness of this sanction. The problem of application of short time limits is not acute when the revocation of an employee is applied; however, the latter instrument is possible only in respect of heads of a legal person.

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its case-law formulated a thesis telling that the rule of law requires the state to provide the legislator with both a right and an obligation to prohibit acts which result in injuring or endangering the interests of persons, society or the state. The international agreements ratified by the Seimas, the membership in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well create legal obligations relating liability for corruption in private sector for our country. Thus, appropriate legal liability (including liability for corruption in private sector) might be only conditionally regarded as the issue of discretion of the Seimas. In case the acts in question are sufficiently harmful and (or) the criminalisation thereof is connected with the implementation of the obligations of Lithuania, their inclusion into the Criminal Code of the Republic in Lithuania and active prosecution in respect of them is the duty of the Republic of Lithuania. The research paper aims to evaluate the regulation of liability for corruption in private sector in Lithuanian legal system. It must be noted that it examines not only the issues of criminal liability for corruption in private sector. Taking into account the fact that the standards for the application of criminal liability are particularly high (including inter alia the presumption of innocence), the research question was set on whether the existing legal regulation (labour law) provides possibilities to protect from employees displaying unacceptable standards of behaviour. Legal requirements relating the legal liability for corruption in private sector are provided for in a few international and supranational legal acts, i.e. (a) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector; (b) United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2005 (c) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999; (d) Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003; (e) Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions of 18 September 2014 (this Convention has not entered into force yet). Regrettably, these few international instruments are as well rather limited: for example, the Framework Decision requires criminalisation of only active and passive bribery in private sector, and the scope of application thereof fails to include not only any unilateral acts of corruption, but as well the corruption acts related to the aspiration to receive other benefit rather than remuneration, whereas the only one universal instrument of international law, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, requires the contracting states only to consider the criminalisation of corruption in private sector rather than the criminalisation itself. All three documents mentioning active and passive bribery in private sector (including Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption besides the two already referred) are applied in restricted scope, i.e. only in cases when a bribe is given for acts or refraining from acting, in breach of the duties. This means that criminal liability is not applied in case the bribe is taken or even forced to give for proper performance of duties. However, Lithuania fails to proper implement event the limited duties formulated in the mentioned documents. Although in accordance with these three mentioned documents the subject of corruption in private sector is considered to be any employee in the private sector, Article 230(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that criminal liability for active and passive bribery may arise only in cases when an employee holds administrative powers or is entitled to act on behalf of the legal person or other organisation, or provides public services. As according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania most of employees in private companies are not held "persons to be treated as public servants", therefore, they might be held liable only for a restricted number of criminal activities – fraud, commercial espionage or disclosure of a commercial secret. Even upon the evidence of existence of dangerous acts, they may not be held liable for active and passive bribery or embezzlement. Due to the settled case-law which links the status of the "persons to be treated as public servants" with the exceptional importance of the company where they work for the public interest, even the majority of directors of companies and other persons acting on behalf of them may not be prosecuted for the mentioned acts. A part of corruption activities of the companies connected to their relations with clients, users and partners are standard ones, another part of corruption activities differ according to the field of activities of companies. Most of corruption activities of private companies occur either in the field of supply chain (production, distribution, marketing), or the purchasing field. These usually include active and private bribery, fraud, unfair commercial activities, misleading advertising or similar activities, subject to criminal or economic sanctions. Meanwhile, in the field of provision of legal services, pharmacy, healthcare, education, etc. possible corruption activities are of specific nature, and the prevention is provided for in special laws and codes of behaviour. Neither international, nor European Union legal acts regulate liability for corruption in labour relations, therefore, this issue is regulated only in national legislation. The main sanctions in labour law applicable in respect of an employee for corruption activities are the suspension of the performance of the labour agreement (a provisional measure) and termination of labour contract on the initiative of the employer upon the fault of the employee (Article 58 of the Labour Code). Besides, in respect of employees who act as directors a measure of revocation may be applied, and indeed, this measure is an important one for the protection of the company from a corrupted director. As well, particular sanctions for failure to execute the duties or improper execution thereof might be established in the internal documents of a company. These may include a warning, termination of additional payments or bonuses, etc. Due to the open list of measures applicable in labour relations, the liability for corruption activities in labour relations is broader in scope than criminal liability. On the other hand, rather short time-limits for the termination of the labour agreement on the initiative of the employer in case of fault of an employee and its weak deterrence weakens the effectiveness of this sanction. The problem of application of short time limits is not acute when the revocation of an employee is applied; however, the latter instrument is possible only in respect of heads of a legal person.

Europa - und in geringem Maße auch Nordamerika - steht, wie allgemein bekannt, einer "asiatischen Herausforderung" gegenüber. Dieser Umstand lädt zu Vergleichen ein: Was ist es, das Asien bzw. große Teile davon , so schnell vorankommen läßt, während Europa zurückfällt? Auch besteht, mit Blick auf die Tatsache, daß die Erfolge in Asien mit anderen Mitteln erreicht worden sind, weiterhin der Eindruck, daß das Beispiel, das die (west-) europäische Integration nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg gegeben hat (also das "Modell Europa"), in Asien gescheitert ist. Geopolitisch zwischen Europa und Asien haben die Vereinigten Staaten ihren Platz gefunden. (Aussenpolitik / DGAP)

It is a well-established that the promotion of regional development always results in a higher degree of socioeconomic development, for every country or region, whether they are developed, developing or least-developed economies. African economies are no exception to this rule. This idea is even more valid and more relevant for the ongoing economic and social development (two faces of the same coin) of African economies, where there is greater room for accelerating the pace of growth and development.
The role of Africa in the global economy and its contribution has been growing year after year. According to calculations by the African Development Bank (ADB), the growth rate of the aggregate real GDP of African economies was predicted to reach 4.0 per cent in 2019 and 4.1 per cent in 2020. Although these growth rates are still lower than those witnessed by emerging economies, namely China and India, it is believed that African economies will nevertheless exceed the average growth rate in other developing countries and emerging economies.1
To reach their objectives of attaining quantitative development (higher GDP) and qualitative development (improvement in standard of living and quality of life), African states will have to take integrated and systematic measures aimed at solving the persistent and alarming problems of the continent, such as accelerating the pace of development of the economy, trade and the social sector. Major challenges are still faced by African nations, namely poverty, hunger, disease, lack of education, underdeveloped infrastructures (hard and soft), increasing dependence on resource exports, and the influence of foreign monopolies.
The emerging economies, especially the non-African BRICS countries (including Brazil, Russia, India, and China), in their turn, have been showing increasing interest in the African region in recent years. At the 2022 BRICS Summit, these nations emphasised the need for and significance of achieving progress through collaboration between developing countries, especially global South cooperation, in terms of trade and investment flow, which is the sine qua non for the acceleration of the pace of growth and development. Two emerging economies—China and India—must play the role of promoters, not rivals.
When working for economic and social development for the continent, developed and developing countries must establish backward and forward linkages with African countries. The developed countries of the global North must keep in mind the newly emerging trends of African development, which include the delegation of authority to supranational organisations (the African Union and other regional institutions), ecologically sustainable development of human capital and the infrastructure, formation of the ICT market, development of Big Data and AI, and other equally important processes.
Why a Special Issue?
The general rule on development highlighted above was recently interrupted by the Covid-19 crisis, a crisis that has had far-reaching and direct impact and implications for African economies, not least because it drastically affected the movement of goods and services, resulting in an unbearable consequences on African businesses and SMEs. To what extent has this affected Africa's role in the global economy?
Keeping in mind the persisting challenges arising out of Covid-19, there was an urgent need to discuss the different issues relating to this pandemic at length. This formed the justification for this issue of Africa Development in which we undertake to examine critical issues that are directly and indirectly related to the impact and implications of Covid-19 on African economies.
In all, eleven papers were received. Out of these, seven were selected for inclusion in this special issue. The papers were vigorously peer reviewed by two reviewers to ensure high scientific quality. These seven papers touch on different issues of Covid-19 and African development. But as it has become a tradition in CODESRIA, we also use the pages of this journal to publish the Thandika Mkandawire Annual Memorial Lecture which was prepared separately by Fiona Tregenna and delivered in 2022.
The Structure of the Papers
The first paper by Felix Fofana N'Zue and Adjoua Math Komenan aims to provide a better understanding of the possible link or interaction between the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic in West Africa, as proxied by the
rate of infection, and the state of governance in the ECOWAS countries. The article finds that governance did not significantly impact the Covid-19 infection rate in the ECOWAS region, but tourism and external debt did. The authors then urge development partners to pay close attention to the reliability of Covid-19 confirmed cases to ensure that the data collected is not manipulated for any reasons whatsoever.
The second paper, authored by Tope Akinyetun, examines the regional impact of the pandemic on the security and development in the Sahel. The author finds that Covid-19 exacerbated the threat of insecurity in the region due to pre-existing weak governance, poor state capacity, and climate change, which were already worsening and causing more risks and increasing the severity of violent conflicts. The result of this has been further fragility, loss of income, food insecurity, displacement, loss of livelihood, increased poverty, unemployment, hunger, humanitarian crises and contracting economies.
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The Ukrainian legal thought has traditionally regarded the right of access to justice as a right of accessto the State court, or to State managed or controlled procedures for dispute settlement. One of the mainreasons for that was that the non-state, or uncontrolled by the State dispute settlement was not formallypermitted, prohibition being imposed by the Soviet system and even to a certain extent during the periodof domination on parts of the territory of the modern Ukraine, of the various externally imposedrequirements of various legal systems in force at the material time. Non-state dispute settlement in itstraditional forms, mainly based on the custom, was also left outside the attention in the pre-Soviet timesand could not find its dignified place between accessible schemes and instruments for dispute settlement.Moreover, the understanding that justice delivery for the parties to the dispute should remain within Statemonopoly, became commonly accepted as from 1996. The adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine to acertain extent perverted approach to settlement of conflicts, focusing on the main role for the State courts,to these ends. In particular, the courts are having "direct jurisdiction" over any dispute, this led toperception of pre-trial settlements as unnecessary, even as regards those that remained in force, notably,the commissions on labour disputes that were recognized in the case-law of the European Court as equatingin legal force to binding and enforceable legal instruments. Thus, the traditional historical approach toseeing judicial examination of disputes as an exceptional step in dispute settlement, in the absence ofagreement or settlement by the parties, notably through mediation, arbitration or conciliation, variousforms of third party involvement, steadily disappeared. However, alternative examination of disputes isreturning back to its original standing. It is gaining its place in the discussions on the judicial reform andreform of the system for settlement of disputes. This reform is far from being finalised and possibly has noteven started in practice. The new approach to settlement of disputes, aimed at breaking the principle ofState monopoly on examination of disputes and seeing State dispute settlement by court as an exception,is still not firmly entrenched into the mentality of lawyers, public servants, judges, law enforcementemployees and politicians in Ukraine. Thus, the article suggests and points out to importance of takinginto account with these changes of a wider European perspective. Such a perspective should relate notonly to theoretical and practical advantages of the non-state dispute settlement, but also provides that theprivatisation of the dispute settlement procedures and breaking the state monopoly on it, is a part of widerinternational obligations, also being a part of the supranational legal order of the European Union. Thisobligation of Ukraine is also seen as part of the requirements stemming from the Council of Europe law.Both the EU law and the Council of Europe provide for extensive soft law recommendations, legalprinciples, which are formed by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Such an approachprovides that alternative means of dispute settlement, including arbitration, do not run contrary to theprinciples of human rights with regard to fair judicial proceedings. On the contrary, they could be seen asa highly relevant actual means of dispute settlement for any modern European society, built on theprinciples of respect to rule of law and human rights. ; В українській правовій думці право доступу до правосуддя традиційно розумілося лише якправо доступу до державного суду або ж до державних чи контрольованих державою процедурурегулювання спорів. Однією з причин такого розуміння є те, що недержавне або ж неконтрольоване державою врегулювання спору не дозволялося в радянські часи. Недержавне врегулюванняспорів у його традиційних формах також залишалося поза увагою в дорадянські часи і не знаходило свого місця серед доступних схем та інструментів урегулювання спорів. Більше того, розуміннятого, що правосуддя для сторін спору має залишатися тільки в державній монополії, набуло поширення з 1996 року. Прийняття Конституції України дещо викривило підхід до врегулювання конфліктів, відводячи головну роль державним судам. Зокрема, суди мають безпосередню юрисдикцію над будь-яким спором, а процедури досудового врегулювання спору стали непотрібними,навіть ті, які залишалися чинними, наприклад, комісії по трудових спорах. Таким чином, традиційний історичний підхід до подання спорів на розгляд судді у винятковому випадку, коли їх неможливо було вирішити за допомогою альтернативних способів, у тому числі засобами медіації, арбітражу чи із залученням третіх осіб, поступово зник. Однак альтернативне вирішення спорівчастково повертається нині в межах судової реформи та реформування системи врегулюванняспорів. Ця реформа ще далека від завершення, а може, ще навіть і не почалася. Новий підхід доврегулювання спорів, спрямований на відхід від принципу державної монополії на вирішення спорів, поки що не закріпився у свідомості правників, державних службовців, суддів, працівниківправоохоронних органів чи політиків в Україні. У статті наголошується на важливості врахуванняпід час змін ширшої європейської перспективи. Така перспектива стосується не лише теоретичнихі практичних переваг недержавного врегулювання спорів, але й передбачає, що система недержавного та альтернативного вирішення спорів – це міжнародне зобов'язання в наднаціональномуправовому порядку Європейського Союзу. Таке зобов'язання посідає чільне місце і в системі праваРади Європи. Обидві системи мають широкий набір підходів, побудованих на рекомендаційнихнормах м'якого права, на принципах права, які формуються судовою практикою Європейськогосуду з прав людини. Цей підхід передбачає, що альтернативні способи вирішення спорів, зокремаарбітраж, не суперечать принципам прав людини щодо справедливого судочинства. Навіть навпаки, вони стануть кориcним інструментом вирішення конфліктів для будь-якого сучасного європейського суспільства, побудованого на принципах поваги до верховенства права.

The object of research is the processes of formation and implementation of mechanisms for innovative development of the energy sector of the national economy in the context of the fourth industrial revolution. It was determined that at the global level, mechanisms for innovative development of industry and energy are formed in the New Industrial Strategy of the European Union (EU), the Paris Climate Agreement, and the fourth energy package of the EU. The challenges of Industry 4.0 necessitate the formation and adaptation of these mechanisms in individual countries to ensure the innovative development of the energy sector in different countries. In the course of the study, the scientific and applied foundations of ensuring the development of the energy sector at the state level have been analyzed. They also used a system-functional approach, methods of structural and functional analysis and functional synthesis, critical analysis of regulatory framework, goals and objectives in the energy sector of the national economy. As a result, a comprehensive mechanism for the implementation of the national innovation policy in the energy sector of the national economy at various levels of the social hierarchy has been proposed. In particular, 5 functional components of the innovative development of the energy sector of the national economy have been identified: 1) productivity of innovation; 2) effectiveness of innovation policy; 3) effectiveness of energy innovation; 4) investment support for innovative development of the energy sector; 5) development of human capital in terms of decarbonization of the economy. On the basis of these components, the main mechanisms have been formed, which make up a comprehensive mechanism for implementing the state policy of innovative development of the energy sector of the national economy, and each of these mechanisms has its own set of implementation tools: economic; motivational; organizational-technological and political-legal. This forms the basis for the implementation of its interfunctionality and ensures its functioning, based on the principle of multilevel (elements relate to the supranational, interstate, national, regional, local and sectoral levels) and is intended to enhance the socio-economic effects of Industry 4.0. ; Объектом исследования являются процессы формирования и реализации механизмов инновационного развития энергетической сферы национальной экономики в контексте Четвертой промышленной революции. Определено, что на глобальном уровне механизмы инновационного развития промышленности и энергетики сформированы в Новой промышленной стратегии Европейского Союза (ЕС), Парижском климатическом соглашении, четвертом энергетическом пакете ЕС. Вызовы Индустрии 4.0 обуславливают потребность в формировании и адаптации этих механизмов в отдельных странах для обеспечения инновационного развития энергетической сферы экономики разных стран. В процессе исследования анализировали научно-прикладные основы обеспечения развития энергетической сферы на государственном уровне. А также использовали системно-функциональный подход, методы структурно-функционального анализа и функционального синтеза, критического анализа нормативно-правового обеспечения, целей и задач в энергетической сфере национальной экономики. В результате предложен комплексный механизм реализации национальной инновационной политики в энергетической сфере национальной экономики на различных уровнях общественной иерархии. В частности, определено 5 функциональных составляющих инновационного развития энергетической сферы национальной экономики: 1)производительность инновационной деятельности; 2)результативность инновационной политики; 3)эффективность энергетических инноваций; 4)инвестиционное обеспечение инновационного развития сферы энергетики; 5)развитие человеческого капитала в части декарбонизации экономики. На основе этих составляющих сформированы основные механизмы, из которых состоит комплексный механизм реализации государственной политики инновационного развития энергетической сферы национальной экономики и каждый из этих механизмов имеет свой набор инструментов реализации: экономический; мотивационный; организационно-технологический и политически-правовой. Это составляет основу для реализации его интерфункциональности и обеспечивеют его функционирование, основывающиеся на принципе многоуровневости (элементы касаются надгосударственного, межгосударственного, национального, регионального, местного и отраслевого уровней) и призван усилить социально-экономические эффекты Индустрии 4.0. ; Об'єктом дослідження є процеси формування та реалізації механізмів інноваційного розвитку енергетичної сфери національної економіки в контексті Четвертої промислової революції. Визначено, що на глобальному рівні механізми інноваційного розвитку промисловості та енергетики сформовані в Новій промисловій стратегії Європейського Союзу (ЄС), Паризькій кліматичній угоді, четвертому енергетичному пакеті ЄС. Виклики Індустрії4.0 обумовлюють потребу у формуванні та адаптації цих механізмів в окремих країнах для забезпечення інноваційного розвитку енергетичної сфери в різних країнах. В процесі досліджування аналізували науково-прикладні засади забезпечення розвитку енергетичної сфери на державному рівні. А також використовували системно-функціональний підхід, методи структурно-функціонального аналізу та функціонального синтезу, критичного аналізу нормативно-правового забезпечення, цілей та завдань в енергетичній сфері національної економіки. В результаті запропоновано комплексний механізм реалізації національної інноваційної політики в енергетичній сфері національної економіки на різних рівнях суспільної ієрархії. Зокрема, визначено 5 функціональних складників інноваційного розвитку енергетичної сфери національної економіки: 1)продуктивність інноваційної діяльності; 2)результативність інноваційної політики; 3)ефективність енергетичних інновацій; 4)інвестиційне забезпечення інноваційного розвитку сфери енергетики; 5)розвиток людського капіталу в частині декарбонізації економіки. На основі цих складників сформовано основні механізми, з яких складається комплексний механізм реалізації державної політики інноваційного розвитку енергетичної сфери національної економіки та кожен з цих механізмів має свій набір інструментів реалізації: економічний; мотиваційний; організаційно-технологічний та політично-правовий. Це становить основу для реалізації його інтерфункціональності та забезпечує його функціонування, що базується на принципі багаторівневості (елементи стосуються наддержавного, міждержавного, національного, регіонального, місцевого та галузевого рівнів) і покликаний посилити соціально-економічні ефекти Індустрії4.0.