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The subject of deterrence fell away from the forefront of American strategic thinking during the three decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. Our ability to deter much weaker states by denying them the ability to achieve their aims was long assumed. But today there is a new global security situation that makes it imperative for American military officers and security specialists to begin to relearn the fundamental tenets of this aspect of national security. The purpose of this volume is to contribute to that campaign of learning by drawing on some of the excellent scholarship published in the Naval War College Review during the Cold War and the decades since. Some of the articles included here lay out a few of the fundamentals of the theories of deterrence. ; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1045/thumbnail.jpg

Recommendations for reducing US nuclear arms require assessment of nuclear force requirements & arms control positions. Complex technical, political, & operational factors fluctuate due to rapidly changing strategic conditions. The 1994 Dept of Defense Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recognized the need to lead the world toward reduction in nuclear arms, but to hedge if security threats reemerged. Factors that must be considered embody a range of strategic issues. Since policymakers cannot predict the future needs for nuclear arms, the US should avoid the legal rigidity & formality of Cold War agreements. Strategy for the future should focus on close consultation, coordination, & transparency. Structuring arms control away from mutual assured destruction, combined with initiatives to improve political relations, could allow the US & Russia to coordinate nuclear force reduction. L. A. Hoffman