Este trabajo se remonta a 2014, el último curso del grado de Antropología Social, cuando se me otorga una beca de investigación (beca de colaboración), financiada por el Ministerio de Ecuación. La finalidad era participar en una investigación en proceso. Este proyecto I+D+i denominado: "Construyendo diferencias en la escuela. Estudios de la trayectoria de las ATAL en Andalucía, de su profesorado y de su alumnado" se estaba llevando a cabo desde el Instituto de Migraciones de la Universidad de Granada junto a otras universidades andaluzas. ; La presente tesis doctoral tiene como finalidad construir conocimiento sobre la gestión de la diversidad cultural y la construcción de la diferencia en el sistema educativo. Para ello, ha sido necesario analizar y contrastar los ámbitos que conforman el contexto escolar: el ámbito normativo, el ámbito político y el terreno escolar. En este trabajo se parte de la construcción social de diversidad en relación a los procesos de diferenciación, alteridad e identificación. Se defiende que la diversidad está instaurada en la sociedad (Carrithers, 2010), es construida según lo considerado en la norma (Calderón, 2012; Feito, 2009; Foulcault, 2014) y las relaciones de poder (Hall, 2003). Sin embargo, a partir de la construcción social del concepto de diversidad se llevan a cabo procesos de otredad (Dumbar, 1998; Izaola, 2017). Todo aquel grupo que se salga de la norma establecida será construido como un diferente; influyendo en la identificación de cada uno de los sujetos (Brubaker y Cooper, 2001; Bauman, 2005; Besalú, 2011). Esta situación queda representada a partir del imaginario que rodea a: emigrante, inmigrante, extranjero, refugiado y "MENA". Estas categorías sociales se han estudiado en los diferentes ámbitos con el objetivo de analizar la influencia y la relación entre ellos. El contexto actual ha permitido replantear estas cuestiones y arrojar nuevas líneas de investigación. En las dos últimas décadas ha predominado un aumento de la inmigración dentro del contexto español y europeo; al igual que se ha caracterizado por un cambio constante en el panorama político. Esta situación ha dado lugar a una mayor presencia de alumnado de nacionalidad extranjera dentro del contexto educativo y a la creación de nuevas medidas para gestionar la diversidad cultural que se le asocia a este alumnado. Sin embargo, independientemente del partido político instaurado en el poder, las lógicas escolares se han ido manteniendo, así como la construcción de la diferencia hacia el alumnado considerado "inmigrante". Este panorama ha permitido comprender la realidad social que nos encontramos, cuestionando la relación e influencia de los diferentes contextos y planteando el objetivo general de esta investigación: identificar y analizar los elementos de alterización que se llevan a cabo en el sistema educativo en torno a la diversidad cultural. Para abarcar dicho objetivo se ha utilizado una metodología cualitativa, caracterizada por el método etnográfico, el análisis crítico del discurso y por otorgarle voz a los agentes partícipes de este contexto. Los resultados producidos han sido presentados a partir de siete publicaciones en revistas y editoriales de impacto, que han sido estructuradas en función de las temáticas abordadas. Se parte del análisis de la gestión de la diversidad cultural en el ámbito europeo con el objetivo de contextualizar la investigación. A continuación, se ha desarrollado cómo se gestiona la diversidad cultural en el ámbito educativo y, por último, la influencia que dicha gestión ejerce en el imaginario social y en la identificación de cada uno de los sujetos. Se ha observado que en los diferentes ámbitos predomina un discurso alarmista que está unido a políticas restrictivas que contribuyen al desconocimiento del alumnado y que influye en la identificación de cada uno de ellos. Por ello, es necesario tener presente el poder que tienen los discursos, las normativas y las políticas dirigidas hacia estos jóvenes. A partir de este trabajo se defiende la reivindicación del diálogo (Pinillo Díaz, 1997), estableciendo medidas que permitan la unión y el conocimiento real de todos los individuos. ; The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to build knowledge about the management of cultural diversity and the construction of difference in the educational system. For that, it has been necessary to analyze and contrast the areas that compose the school context: normative area, political area and the school field. In this research, the social construction of diversity is understood in relation to the processes of differentiation, otherness and identification. It is argued that diversity is established in society (Carrithers, 2010), it is constructed according to what is considered the norm (Calderón, 2012; Feito, 2009; Foulcault, 2014) and power relations (Hall, 2003). However, from the social construction of the concept of diversity, otherness processes are carried out (Dumbar, 1998; Izaola, 2017). The group that deviates from the established norm will be constructed as a different one; influencing the identification of each of the subjects (Brubaker and Cooper, 2001; Bauman, 2005; Besalú, 2011). This situation is represented from the imaginary that surrounds emigrant, immigrant, foreigner, refugee, and "MENA". These social categories have been studied in different context, with the aim of analyzing the influence and the relationship between them. The current context has allowed to rethink these questions and open up new opportunities of research. In the last two decades an increase in immigration has prevailed within the Spanish and European context; just as it has been characterized by a constant change in the political landscape. This situation has led to a greater presence of students of foreign nationality within the educational context and the creation of new measures to manage the cultural diversity associated with these students. However, regardless of the political party in power, the school logic has been maintained, as well as the construction of the difference for immigrant students. This panorama has allowed us to understand the social reality that we find ourselves, to question the relationship and influence of the different contexts and to rethink the general objective of this research: to identify and analyze the elements of otherness that are carried out in the educational system around the cultural diversity. To encompass this objective, a qualitative methodology has been used, it has been characterized by the ethnographic method, the critical analysis of the discourse and by giving voice to the agents participating in this context. The results produced have been presented from seven publications in high-impact magazines and editorials, which have been structured according to the topics discussed. It starts from the analysis of the management of cultural diversity in Europe with the aim of contextualizing the research. Then, it has been developed how cultural diversity is managed in the educational field and, finally, the influence that such management exerts on the social imaginary and on the identification of each of the subjects. In this research it has been observed that in the different areas an alarmist discourse prevails that is linked to restrictive policies that contribute to the ignorance of the students and that influences the identification of each one of them. Therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind the power of discourses, regulations and policies directed towards these young people. From this study the vindication of dialogue is defended (Pinillo Díaz, 1997), establishing measures that allow the union and real knowledge of all individuals. ; Tesis Univ. Granada. ; Ministerio de Ecuación "Construyendo diferencias en la escuela. Estudios de la trayectoria de las ATAL en Andalucía, de su profesorado y de su alumnado"
The paper compares the introduction and stabilization of national currency in the First and Second Republics of Lithuania (LR I and LR II) during the years 1918–1922 and 1990–1993, respectively. These diachronic comparisons are supplemented by the synchronic ones where LR I is compared with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland and LR II with Estonia and Latvia. Jointly with Lithuania, all these countries faced the challenge of nation state building simultaneously with the macroeconomic stabilization. Both times, Lithuania was the last to introduce the national currency. The analysis starts with a discussion of the similarities and differences in the economic situations of the LR I and LR II during the first years of independence. In this discussion, the author argues that the prototype of the Soviet command administrative economy was the administrative war economy of Kaiser Germany during WWI, with occupied Lithuania suffering under extreme forms of the administrative control of economic activities by the Oberost authorities. The restoration of the capitalist free market economy and macroeconomic equilibrium was complicated by the extraordinary spending to finance the independence wars in 1918–1920 when national states-in-making lacked administrative capacities to collect taxes in the ordinary ways. Therefore, all Lithuanian neighbours did finance their independence wars by inflation tax, introducing national currencies almost immediately after proclaiming independence and collecting up to 2/3 of the total state revenue from the seigniorage. Among all countries fighting indepenendence wars in the modern times, Lithuania was probably unique in its persistent effort to pay the war cost without the inflation tax. As Lithuania maintained a monetary union with Germany up to 1922, it donated to this country the seigniorage income and was not able to draft all its available manpower because of monetary restrictions. At the same time, the early LR I provides for the posteriority an example of the frugal management of state finance policies even under extraordinary circumstances. This example still lacks the due appreciation by neoliberal monetarist apologists of the sound monetary and fiscal policies. During its early time of restored independence, LR II procrastinated to end the monetary union with its former imperial suzerain (Russia) too for quite a different reason: the choice of the Gediminas Vagnorius' government to participate in the "inflation race" in the rouble zone after September 1991 when the restoration of independent Lithuania was internationally recognized. The winners in this race were the former republics of the USSR that were the leaders in rising prices and wages. Therefore, while Lithuania in 1918–1922 suffered only from imported (from Germany) inflation, in 1991–1992 this country both imported and exported inflation. While permissive policies of the Vagnorius government helped to void the efforts of the Moscow to undermine Lithuanian independence in January–August 1991 by the economic blockade, their continuation after the dissolution of the USSR delayed the onset of macroeconomic stabilization until the early summer 1993. Even after October 1st, 1992 when the national provisional currency talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania, its govermnent continued collecting the inflation tax, which was immoral given the absence of the war or other extraordinary circumstances. Because of the delayed macroeconomic stabilization, market reforms in Lithuania were conducted in the wrong sequence, with a large-scale privatization enacted under conditions, near to hyperinflation, which favoured prolonged rent-seeking by the early winners. The correct sequence of market reforms in Estonia, due to its early monetary stabilization (since June 1992), jointly with more favourable initial conditions, helped this country to become the leader in the "Baltic race". The policy of Gediminas Vagnorius to chase after short-time advantages of the leadership in the inflation race among the former Soviet republics was punished by Lithuania losing the long-time advantages of the leadership in the transformation race among them Baltic countries. According to another concluding causal argument, the governments of LR I committed a strategic blunder by declining to use the inflation tax for the extraordinary spending to finance the independence war in 1918–1920. Despite their smaller populations and a greater WWI damage (in Latvia's case), both Estonia and Latvia raised more than 70 000 manpower each, financing their war efforts by the inflation tax. Because of its responsible and frugal financial policies, which were wrong given the extraordinary circumstances of a war, the peasantly penny-pinching Lithuania had only some 30 000 manpower at the time of critical battles for its historical capital Vilnius in the autumn 1920. Such military power was too small and weak to hold the city against only one allegedly rebellious division under general Lucjan Żeligowski from landlordly lavish Poland which, like other Lithuania's neighbours, financed its war effort in 1918–1920 by the inflation tax. So Lithuania lost Vilnius in 1920, because it was not ready to pay its (monetary) price. Credits to Prof. Dr. Arnd Bauerkämper from Freie Universität Berlin who hosted the research visit of the author to Berlin to collect and research part of the sources (about post-WWI inflation in Germany and Eastern Europe) used in the paper. ; Straipsnyje lyginamas nacionalinių pinigų įvedimas ir stabilizacija Pirmojoje ir Antrojoje Lietuvos Respublikose (LR I ir LR II). Šie diachroniniai palyginimai papildomi sinchroniniais – LR I lyginama su Estija, Latvija ir Lenkija, o LR II – su Estija ir Latvija, gretimomis šalimis, kurios vienu metu sprendė nacionalinės valstybės kūrimo ir makroekonominės stabilizacijos problemas. Ir vienoje, ir kitoje epochoje LR paskutinė įsivedė nacionalinius pinigus, nors tarpukariu tik Latvija aplenkė Lietuvą tuos pinigus galutinai stabilizuodama. Palyginimų tikslas yra išaiškinti LR vėlavimo priežastis ir jo padarinius. Pirmiausia išryškinami LR I ir LR II ekonominės situacijos pirmaisiais nepriklausomybės metais panašumai ir skirtumai. Išryškinant panašumus, parodoma, kad sovietinio komandinio-administracinio ūkio prototipas buvo Pirmojo pasaulinio karo laikų kaizerinės Vokietijos karinė administracinė ekonomika, kurios poligonu tapo Oberosto kraštas (apėmęs ir šiuolaikinės Lietuvos teritoriją), kur administracinė ūkinės veiklos kontrolė įgijo griežčiausias formas. Grįžimą prie kapitalistinės laisvosios rinkos ekonomikos ir makroekonominės pusiausvyros atkūrimą ankstyvuoju tarpukariu sukomplikavo nepaprastosios išlaidos nepriklausomybės karams, dar tik besikuriančioms nacionalinėms valstybėms neturint administracinių gebėjimų surinkti tradicinio tipo mokesčius. Visos Lietuvos kaimynės nepriklausomybės karus finansavo infliaciniu mokesčiu, pačioje nepriklausomybės pradžioje įsivedusios nacionalinius pinigus ir iki 2/3 visų valstybės pajamų gaudamos iš senjoražo. Vos ne tarp visų nepriklausomybės karus moderniaisiais laikais kariavusių šalių LR I unikali savo monetarine "neoliberalia iki neoliberalizmo" finansų politika, išsivertusi be senjoražo pajamų, padovanotų Vokietijai, su kuria Lietuva iki pat 1922 m. išlaikė pinigų sąjungą. Nepriklausomybės atkūrimo laikais delsimą nutraukti pinigų sąjungą su buvusiu imperiniu siuzerenu (Rusija) lėmė Gedimino Vagnoriaus vyriausybės pasirinkimas ir po tarptautinio LR II nepriklausomybės pripažinimo 1991 m. rudenį tęsti pirmoje tų metų pusėje pasiteisinusias infliacijos lenktynes, kuriose išlošdavo sparčiausiai atlyginimus ir kainas keliančios rublio zonos narės. Taigi dėl taupios LR I finansų politikos ankstyvojo tarpukario Lietuva kentėjo tik dėl importuojamos iš Vokietijos infliacijos, atsikovojusi nepriklausomybę ir toliau išlaidavusi Lietuva infliaciją iš Rusijos ir importavo, ir eksportavo. 1992 m. rudenį talonui tapus vienintele teisėta mokėjimo priemone, LR II vyriausybė dar aštuonis mėnesius savo išlaidoms dengti naudojo infliacinį mokestį, vykdydama moraliai nepateisinamą taikos sąlygomis finansų politiką, kuri dėl masinės privatizacijos vykdymo artimomis hiperinfliacijai sąlygomis turėjo pragaištingų ilgalaikių padarinių Lietuvos ekonominei raidai – nulėmė jos didėjantį atsilikimą nuo Estijos. O tarpukario nepriklausomybės pradžios LR I vyriausybės padarė strateginę klaidą, atsisakydamos infliacinio mokesčio nepaprastosioms nepriklausomybės karo išlaidoms finansuoti. Jis mažiau gyventojų turinčioms ir ne mažiau už Lietuvą nuo Pirmojo pasaulinio karo veiksmų nukentėjusioms Estijai ir Latvijai davė išteklių mobilizuoti apie 70 000 vyrų kariuomenes. Vykdydama neadekvačią karo sąlygoms taupią ir atsakingą finansų politiką, valstietiškai šykšti Lietuva 1920 m. rudenį turėjo tik apie 30 000 vyrų kariuomenę, kuri buvo per maža ir silpna apginti Vilnių nuo vienos dvarponiškai išlaidžios Lenkijos (kuri kaip ir kitos Lietuvos kaimynės savo 1918–1920 m. karus finansavo iš infliacinio mokesčio pajamų) tariamai sukilusios divizijos.
Foreword The Max Weber post-doctoral Programme is a unique programme. In 2007– 2008, there were forty Fellows on the Programme, covering a wide range of research interests within the Social Sciences and Humanities, and representing twenty-three nationalities. Among the different activities of the academic year, the conference on "European integration without membership: models, experiences, perspectives" is a good example of Fellows' initiative and their concern for relevant issues. Encouraged by Professor Marise Cremona of the Law Department of the EUI, three Max Weber Fellows, Francesco Maiani, Roman Petrov and Ekaterina Mouliarova, took the initiative to organize the conference, invite the participants, actively participate in its development and, finally, act as editors of the proceedings which follow. The Max Weber Programme, in collaboration with the Law Department, fully supported their initiative, but the credit is theirs and that of the participants who contributed to the conference. Since its foundation more than thirty years ago, "European Integration" has been a recurrent theme in the research agenda of the European University Institute – specially within the Law Department. The conference built on this long tradition, but also took from the new perspectives that young postdoctoral Fellows, with different national experiences, can bring to the discussion, a discussion that brings forward new issues, when the EU27 must reassess its relationships with neighbouring countries that form part of the broader European area without aiming at becoming EU members in the years to come. A fruitful discussion on this relevant issue needs academic reflection, as well as practical legal and political experience, it needs understanding of the EU perspective, as well as that of neighbouring countries. It is again to the credit of the organizers that in the panels of the conference all these perspectives were present in open discussion. The proceedings that follow bring together the papers presented in this conference that took place at our beloved Villa La Fonte on May 23-24, 2008. Ramon Marimon Director of the Max Weber Programme ; At the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of "European integration" could still be said to be fairly unambiguous. Nowadays, it has become plural and complex almost to the point of unintelligibility. This is due, of course, to the internal differentiation of EU membership, with several Member States pulling out of key integrative projects such as establishing an area without frontiers, the "Schengen" area, and a common currency. But this is also due to the differentiated extension of key integrative projects to European non-EU countries – Schengen is again a case in point. Such processes of "integration without membership", the focus of the present publication, are acquiring an ever-growing topicality both in the political arena and in academia. International relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries are crucial for both, and their development through new agreements features prominently on the continent's political agenda. Over and above this aspect, the dissemination of EU values and standards beyond the Union's borders raises a whole host of theoretical and methodological questions, unsettling in some cases traditional conceptions of the autonomy and separation of national legal orders. This publication brings together the papers presented at the Integration without EU Membership workshop held in May 2008 at the EUI (Max Weber Programme and Department of Law). It aims to compare different models and experiences of integration between the EU, on the one hand, and those European countries that do not currently have an accession perspective on the other hand. In delimiting the geographical scope of the inquiry, so as to scale it down to manageable proportions, the guiding principles have been to include both the "Eastern" and "Western" neighbours of the EU, and to examine both structured frameworks of cooperation, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European Economic Area, and bilateral relations developing on a more ad hoc basis. These principles are reflected in the arrangement of the papers, which consider in turn the positions of Ukraine, Russia, Norway, and Switzerland in European integration – current standing, perspectives for evolution, consequences in terms of the EU-ization of their respective legal orders1. These subjects are examined from several perspectives. We had the privilege of receiving contributions from leading practitioners and scholars from the countries concerned, from EU highranking officials, from prominent specialists in EU external relations law, and from young and talented researchers. We wish to thank them all here for their invaluable insights. We are moreover deeply indebted to Marise Cremona (EUI, Law Department, EUI) for her inspiring advice and encouragement, as well as to Ramon Marimon, Karin Tilmans, Lotte Holm, Alyson Price and Susan Garvin (Max Weber Programme, EUI) for their unflinching support throughout this project. A word is perhaps needed on the propriety and usefulness of the research concept embodied in this publication. Does it make sense to compare the integration models and experiences of countries as different as Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Ukraine? Needless to say, this list of four evokes a staggering diversity of political, social, cultural, and economic conditions, and at least as great a diversity of approaches to European integration. Still, we would argue that such diversity only makes comparisons more meaningful. Indeed, while the particularities and idiosyncratic elements of each "model" of integration are fully displayed in the present volume, common themes and preoccupations run through the pages of every contribution: the difficulty in conceptualizing the finalité and essence of integration, which is evident in the EU today but which is greatly amplified for non-EU countries; the asymmetries and tradeoffs between integration and autonomy that are inherent in any attempt to participate in European integration from outside; the alteration of deeply seated legal concepts, and concepts about the law, that are already observable in the most integrated of the non-EU countries concerned. These issues are not transient or coincidental: they are inextricably bound up with the integration of non-EU countries in the EU project. By publishing this collection, we make no claim to have dealt with them in an exhaustive, still less in a definitive manner. Our ambition is more modest: to highlight the relevance of these themes, to place them more firmly on the scientific agenda, and to provide a stimulating basis for future research and reflection. ; Foreword Ramon Marimon 1 Introduction Francesco Maiani, Roman Petrov and Ekaterina Mouliarova 3 I. The European Neighbourhood Policy and Ukraine's European Ambitions Marise Cremona: The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Framework for Modernization 5 Bart Van Vooren: The Hybrid Legal Nature of the European Neighbourhood Policy 17 Viktor Muraviov: The Impact of the EU Acquis and Values on the Internal Legal Order of Ukraine 29 Roman Petrov: The New EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement versus the EUUkraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: Transitional Path or Final Destination? 39 II. The EU-Russia "Strategic Partnership" Olga Potemkina and Nikolay Kaveshnikov: EU and Russia in Search of Strategic Partnership 47 Aaron Matta : Updating the EU-Russia Legal Approximation Process: Problems and Dilemmas 59 Paul Kalinichencko: Problems and Perspectives on Modernizing the Legal Background to the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership 71 III. The EEA Model and Norway's Legal Traditions Karin Bruzelius: The Impact of EU Values on Third Countries' National Legal Orders: EU Law as a Point of Reference in the Norwegian Legal System 81 Tor-Inge Harbo: The EEA and Norway: A Case of Constitutional Pluralism 91 IV. The Swiss "Bilateral Way" to Integration Andrés Delgado Casteleiro: Relations Between the European Union and Switzerland: a Laboratory for EU External Relations? 103 Francesco Maiani: Legal Europeanization as Legal Transformation: Some Insights from Swiss "Outer Europe" 111 René Schwok: Towards a Framework Agreement in the Context of New Bilateral Agreements between Switzerland and the European Union 125 Concluding Remarks 137 Marc Franco Contributors 139
Correspondence between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles who is living in exile in San Diego, CA and Gen. Abelardo L. Rodríguez. Gen. Calles informs he will be interviewed by the magazine Today whose director is Mr. Moley and who asked him to write an article regarding the situation in Europe. Gen. Abelardo L. Rodríguez replies informing he visited Scotland and Ireland and that he received the copy of the magazine. He congratulates him for the article. He asks Gen. Calles to clarify the statements by the American press that he was a dictator. Gen. Calles replies he has not made statements regarding his role in Mexican politics because the newspapers do not publish them. Gen. Abelardo L. Rodríguez sends a letter to Gen. Calles complaining about the weather in London and talks about the situation in Germany, Japan, Italy, the United States, London, Spain and Russia. Gen. Calles sends a newspaper clipping of the San Diego Union to Gen. Rodríguez. Gen. Rodríguez sends a letter to Melchor Ortega in February 1937. He writes about the arbitration system regarding worker conflicts and states that President Roosevelt will legislate about it. He analyzes strikes and how they have functioned in France. He tells him he read in Times that President Cárdenas decreed freedom of religion to practice Catholicism in Mexico due to a violent event in which the police in Jalapa, Veracruz interrupted a mass and killed a person. Gen. Rodríguez writes to Gen. Calles saying he is not surprised the amnesty decreed by the president does not include him. They exchange birthday, Christmas and New Year's greetings, and sympathy for the death of the mother of Gen. Rodríguez. "Notes on my trip to Russia" by Gen. Rodríguez in 1938. The notes were published by El Universal in seven different articles between October 24 and November 14, 1938. There are copies of articles 1 (two copies), 2, 3, 5 (three copies), 6 (two copies) and 7 (two copies). Gen. Rodríguez criticizes Stalin. The titles of the articles are "The Stalin regime", "Woman and Family", "Where does capital gain go?", "Natural Resources" (three copies), "Land Exploitation", "Communism and Democracy". Article "The Ex-President Gen. Rodríguez confirmed his statements about Russia". Article "Sharp statements and mendacious claims against A.L. Rodríguez" El Universal November 15. Gen Calles asks Gen. Rodríguez to recommend Enrique Ferreira since he was dismissed from his consular appointment. / Correspondencia entre el general PEC, que se encuentra en el exilio en San Diego, Cal., y el general Abelardo L. Rodríguez, quien vive primero en Londres, Inglaterra y luego en Ensenada, Baja California. El general PEC informa al general Abelardo L. Rodríguez que concedió una entrevista a la revista Today, que dirige el señor Moley, quien además le pidió que escribiera un artículo acerca de la situación mundial, de los regímenes totalitarios en Europa y de los importantes acontecimientos que estaban por ocurrir. Se lamenta del avance del comunismo en nuestro país y de la nueva ley monetaria promulgada en México. Contestación del general Abelardo L. Rodríguez, quien le comenta que visitó Escocia e Irlanda; que ya recibió un ejemplar de la revista Today y lo felicita por su artículo que hace un análisis muy preciso del radicalismo con el que se gobiernan las naciones y manifiesta que él no cree que vaya a estallar la guerra en Europa porque es mucho lo que los países tienen que perder ya que han invertido mucho en armamento y si situación económica no es muy estable. Solicita además al general PEC que desmienta los constantes infundios de la prensa, sobre todo norteamericana, de que fue el dictador, el Jefe Máximo hasta su exilio en San Diego. Dice que ya le ha pedido esta aclaración varias veces pero que no ha encontrado respuesta. El general PEC, desde Los Geysers en Cloverdale, Cal., E.U.A., donde está recibiendo un tratamiento de aguas termales, le contesta que agradece su opinión sobre su artículo publicado en Today y que si no ha hecho una terminante aclaración de su papel en la política mexicana desde que dejó la presidencia es porque no se la publican, porque al público lector norteamericano no le interesan esos asuntos políticos sino los escándalos y notas amarillistas y que además su aclaración no tendría fuerza, ya que provendría de él mismo, que es el directamente implicado; pero que siempre que tiene oportunidad explica cuál fue su papel en la política mexicana durante los años que participó en ella. El general Abelardo L. Rodríguez envía una carta con saludos al general PEC, se queja del clima de Inglaterra y reitera que él considera que una conflagración mundial es remota y explica la situación en que se encuentran Alemania, Japón, Italia, Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, España y Rusia y las posiciones de sus respectivos gobernantes. El general PEC envía al general Abelardo L. Rodríguez un recorte del diario The San Diego Union. El general Abelardo L. Rodríguez escribe una carta a Melchor Ortega en febrero de 1937 en la que comenta el mecanismo operativo del sistema de arbitraje obligatorio en materia de conflictos obreros; asegura que hasta el presidente Roosevelt legislará en esta materia porque son graves los trastornos que causan a la economía las constantes huelgas; hace un análisis de todas las posibilidades de este recurso y cómo ha funcionado en Francia. Por último le comenta la noticia que leyó en "El Times" acerca de que el presidente Cárdenas decretó el libre ejercicio de la religión católica en todo el país, después de los desmanes de la policía del gobierno en Jalapa, que interrumpió una misa y mató a una persona. El general Abelardo L. Rodríguez escribe al general PEC informando que no le extraña que no lo hayan incluido en la amnistía general decretada ya que las causas de su exilio son distintas a los delitos incluidos en la misma. El general Abelardo L. Rodríguez y el general PEC intercambian felicitaciones por sus onomásticos, por la Navidad y año nuevo y un pésame por el fallecimiento de la madre del primero. "Notas de mi viaje a Rusia", serie que escribió el general Abelardo L. Rodríguez con sus impresiones de la Rusia de Stalin, que visitó en 1938. Fueron publicadas en siete entregas en el periódico El Universal, entre el 24 de octubre y el 14 de noviembre de 1938. Sólo se conservan recortes de la 1a. (dos copias), de la 2a., de la 3a., de la 5a. (tres ejemplares), de la 6a. (dos ejemplares), y de la última (dos ejemplares). En esta serie el autor critica muy duramente el régimen impuesto por Stalin, a quien considera como un dictador sanguinario y brutal que ha establecido un sistema que no respeta ninguna libertad, que reprime cualquier intento de superación personal por méritos propios y que sólo favorece a los miembros del partido. Los títulos son "El Régimen Stalinista", "La mujer y la familia", "¿Adónde va la plusvalía?", "Los recursos naturales" (tres copias), "La explotación de la tierra". "El comunismo y la democracia. Ratifica el ex presidente de México, Gral. Rodríguez cuanto ha dicho de Rusia. Desde Ensenada, Baja California, envía esta ratificación de lo escrito en sus artículos anteriores acerca de la Rusia stalinista y piensa que los desmentidos provienen de agentes asalariados de Stalin. Agradece a Excélsior la hospitalidad que le dio en sus páginas para publicar sus impresiones de viaje. El Universal publica la misma aclaración el 15 de noviembre: "Desahogos virulentos y afirmaciones mendaces contra A. L. Rodríguez". El general PEC solicita al general Abelardo L. Rodríguez que recomiende a Enrique Ferreira, que injustamente y sólo por considerársele emparentado con él, fue cesado de su cargo consular.
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US military aid to Ukraine is back, and not a moment too soon. After months of suspended arms deliveries, Ukrainian defenses have buckled and news from the front lines is grim. The lurching, grinding advance of Russian forces, particularly the recent withdrawal of Ukraine's defenders from Avdiivka, tells us much about the true state of the full-scale invasion now in its third year. Most international attention has understandably focused on the state of US aid in Congress, and its wider implications for European security, and rightly so. Even with US aid back in the pipeline, the retreat from Avdiivka and broader Ukrainian struggles on the battlefield are an apt prism into a longer view of Russia's imperial tenacity, Ukraine's desperate and obstinate capacity for survival, and the Kremlin's challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Between October of last year and March, according to recent estimates, Russian forces lost some 17,000 troops and nearly 700 combat vehicles in its offensive against Avdiivka—a staggering casualty rate for a city that, on its own, represents a marginal prize for the Russian war effort. However, like Bakhmut or Severodonetsk before it, single-minded Russian attacks en masse towards questionable territorial objectives have, even after achieving breakthroughs, done little to appreciably impact the direction of the war. In some cases, they have even heralded Ukrainian counteroffensives. In such engagements, Ukrainian forces made industrious use of Russian-ruined, treacherous urban terrain to hold and attrite much larger Russian attacking formations. Estimates of upwards of nearly 400,000 Russian combat losses since the invasion was launched in 2022 should be seen in this context. Yet Avdiivka's fall is invariably associated, and is symbolically coterminous, with US failures to provide long-promised military aid and wider concerns about Western political fecklessness in the face of evident Russian imperial aggression. Although it is uncertain to what extent Avdiivka's defenses were tenable, given inherent Russian advantages in material superiority and mass from the start, there is widespread agreement in the analytical community that troop and, particularly, ammunition shortages sharply hindered the city's defenses.[1] Because of relatively modest gains from Ukraine's 2023 summer counteroffensive and the subsequent assessments of operational stalemate, alarm has set in across the Euro-Atlantic as the mythological powers of seemingly infinite Russian mass seem to have materialized. Increasingly, analysts had been taking fears of Russian victory in Ukraine seriously.An Empire Called ForeverAt its low points, the heroic, ferocious stand of a few in Avdiivka against the inexorable advance of Russian mass might seem to describe the war in Ukraine as a whole. The restoration of US arms flows notwithstanding, the prospects of Russian victory in Ukraine had appeared to be a more urgent consideration, which stoked understandable concerns in frontline European states over the possibility of an eventual direct conflict with Russia. Just this year so far, Romanian, Danish, and German political and military leaders have issued warnings about the potential of open war with Russia should Ukraine fall.[2] France, most significantly, has adopted a more forward-leaning policy in support of Ukraine's defense. It has even refused to rule out the potential deployment of troops,[3] which according to some sources are already on the ground in limited capacities.[4] However, besieged and wounded though it has been, Ukraine's agency and capacity for survival in recent months has been underrated. When given the basic means of self-defense, Ukraine has proven over and over again to be more than equal to the task. With US arms now again en route, the world will likely be reminded of this fact.At the same time, Russia's destructive tenacity in pursuit of demonstrably imperial aims has been evident to Ukraine, and other wary neighbors, for some time. Russia can seem an empire forever called to external expansion and dominion, and today has made its regime legitimacy inseparable from aggressive militarism and severe historical revisionism. Even a year ago, we could see Russia's willingness to accept otherwise unfathomable losses, endure extended material privation, and risk domestic political instability in pursuit of victory in Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian national resilience and superior battlefield leadership, alongside a hodgepodge of secondhand Western and Soviet weaponry, was often enough to best Russian forces in the field. However, it has not been enough on its own to dislodge Russia's imperial agenda, particularly as western arms have petered out. As such, a more complete Ukrainian victory demands a more aggressive and urgent Western policy of defensive aid. While certain high-value Western systems were eventually green-lit—such as F-16s, key long-range strike platforms, and cluster munitions—they came after much consternation and delay, typically in limited quantities, and often lagged battlefield conditions. Ukraine has never been able to enjoy decisive advantage in any one military capability, and no superiority of mass in any domain. Over the past year, Russia has leaned into its quantitative edge as a decisive (if cumbersome) tool, while implementing some key battlefield lessons,[6] to gain momentum.Putin's prosecution of its war on Ukraine demonstrates that imperialism is not merely a feature of Russian strategic thinking, but perhaps its central feature. It should give Western defense analysts and policymakers pause that Russia has been both willing and able to absorb such horrendous losses in such a gruesome enterprise. These losses have been made more palatable to the elite, certainly, by the systematic and deliberate exploitation of ethnic minority, indigenous, and marginalized populations in the imperial periphery.[7] Any assumptions that Russian political or material exhaustion will be sufficient to compel the abandonment of the war are implausible in the near-term, except perhaps in the face of overwhelming and immovable Ukrainian military might. Just as Ukraine's capacity for survival should not be underrated, neither should analysts ignore Russia's willingness to broadly prosecute a war of national mobilization, its evident capacity for regeneration, and perhaps even the perceived political advantages to the Kremlin of a totalitarian war footing.A Warrior RepublicAlthough it may not always be recognized in Western capitals, Ukrainians have no doubt that they are fighting an existential war in the most literal sense: for the preservation of their state, their national identity, and their very lives. As highlighted in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Vancouver Declaration last summer, by recent Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe statements,[8] and further among several Euro-Atlantic national parliaments, the Russian pattern of atrocities in Ukraine is deliberate and recognizably genocidal in its character.[9] Any cursory review of Russian state news media reveals a casual embrace of Ukrainian cultural and physical extermination as an operational necessity. Even outside of growing scholarly consensus and international recognition, that reality is a salient organizing principle in Ukrainian society.[10] Ukrainians are under no illusions about the enemy they face and the existential consequences of defeat. However, while Russian victory may have seemed a possibility, especially in the wake of the Avdiivka withdrawal, neither is it necessarily an obvious outcome—despite Russia's increasingly totalitarian war footing and the fatalist lurch in Western media and policy discourse. For one, most conceptions of Ukrainian victory tend to be tied to the full restoration of Ukrainian internationally recognized territory. However, territorial gain is not a sufficient indicator for the achievement of either Ukrainian or Russian political aims. For Ukraine, the preservation of an independent and recognizably Ukrainian nation-state with the integral features of its territorial boundaries would be a legitimate victory. By contrast, Russian victory depends on the decapitation of Ukrainian political leadership and the wholesale subjugation of the Ukrainian nation-state. For at least the foreseeable future, even absent US military aid, the first scenario remains far more likely than the second one. At the same time, the months-long suspension of US military aid lends clues about the strategic calculus for Ukraine and the wider region, where outright defeat in the near- to medium-term is but one (low) possibility. Other potentially higher propensity scenarios are entirely conceivable and may even be already playing out—and in some cases pose other types of risks.For one, the US strategic detour did not appear to contribute to a collapse in European support for Ukraine, but rather served as a galvanizing force for a more muscular approach to Ukraine. France's more hawkish turn is only one expression of this shift. The European Union's recently announced 50-billion-euro package for Ukraine, as well as additional pledges for financial and military aid, highlight a converging appreciation for the stakes among many European leaders. And although Ukraine had come to rely primarily on the United States for its pipeline of munitions stocks, their abrupt interruption led to a diversification approach, as Washington was no longer seen as entirely reliable. While it is a positive dynamic to see Europe playing a more proactive role in Ukrainian and continental security, broader European remilitarization amid US disengagement could threaten the postwar success of arresting ruinous cycles of intra-European warfare. More muscular European rhetoric and actions during suspended US arms deliveries also revived quiet speculation that European states, acting independently or in some kind of secondary coalition outside of NATO or the EU, could be forced to intervene directly to prevent Russian victory and Ukrainian defeat. While this possibility is typically muted in public, it is a scenario that has been taken seriously within some Western analytical circles.[11] It is widely believed that Poland alone, for example, likely has the military and material capacity to successfully intervene and decisively turn the tide of the conflict; other potential Central/Eastern European and possibly Nordic members of such a coalition are not difficult to conceive. Such an intervention, however successful, would widen the war and likely lead to a fundamental crisis within NATO. Yet, if Russia is seen as likely to test NATO's Article 5 mutual defense clause, as is increasingly believed, a preemptive military action to rescue Ukraine from capitulation may be a preferable option for several frontline European states. There are also risks to more complete abandonment of Ukraine. Alone, Ukraine would further its transformation as a warrior republic, where the maintenance of war in the desperate enterprise of survival is the prevailing principle under which all other ideals are subsumed. This Ukraine would be unconstrained by the niceties of Western guardrails and caveats delivered out of concern for escalation and would take the war to Russia in an uncompromising fashion, with a ferocity could make some of its liberal international supporters wince. The debate over Ukrainian raids against Russian oil refineries, an entirely legitimate military target, is a relatively low-stakes example of this phenomenon playing out recently.[12] It should be noted that Ukraine continues to act with relative restraint, including its attacks within Russian borders, reflecting deference to US and European admonitions to limit the scope of war. However, if Western support dawdles and dwindles, and the specter of successful Russian genocide looms, incentives for restraint deplete. Left isolated, it is difficult to imagine a scenario of where Kyiv does not seriously entertain nuclear rearmament, given the large nuclear arsenal it surrendered in exchange for Western security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. While ample ink has been spilled over the failure of those guarantees and the harm it has done to nuclear nonproliferation as a principle or concept, in no country is this betrayal more evident and immediate than in Ukraine. Russia's invasion itself seems to have crystallized the decision of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament as a potential error, given the eminent failure of the Bucharest Memorandum and the privileged position that nuclear powers enjoy. Meanwhile, western-provided arms deliveries are variously sourced, with some even arriving in poor or unusable condition, and tend to follow cycles of Western deliberation and delay. In addition, both the arms and instructions for their use are burdened with caveats, illustrating powerful fears over Russian nuclear blackmail. Even with robust US and European aid, it would be understandable for Kyiv to consider the deterrent effect of an independent nuclear strike capability as significantly more valuable than the warm regards of Western diplomats.[13]Crumbling EdificesAnticipating Russian victory, under even current conditions, underplays Ukrainian strategic agency as well as significant other downstream risks. Meanwhile, although the threat posed by a total Russian victory is widely discussed, the potential risks of broad Russian advances without Ukrainian collapse have not been adequately considered. For example, it is conceivable that Ukraine, desperate in its war for survival, triggers a wave of nuclear proliferation in Europe as the nominally protective fabric of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture lies in tatters. In this scenario, US influence and the power it derives from the alliance systems it created could be severely compromised, undermining already narrowing options for responding to contingencies elsewhere around the globe, including in the Indo-Pacific. In the immediate term, the demands of the moment are plain enough. Ukraine must see robust and unified support from both the United States and Europe to stave off Russian advances and create the conditions for military victory—and with urgency. Russian forces must face not only extended losses in manpower and resources, but such losses without hope of victory. For Russia, Ukraine must symbolize not imperial tenacity, but hubris, incapacity, and strategic impotence. Ukraine, and this war, should be associated in the Russian mind with total military and political defeat. In practical terms, the resumption of US aid is a welcome and necessary development, but insufficient. The shape of that aid should be more purposeful and emphasize the ability for Ukraine to not merely attrite Russian forces, but to make rapid advances in the near to medium term. This will require more comfort with Ukrainian raids in Russia, the provision of long-range precision strike in volume, and certain escalation dynamics inherent in such an approach.Looking at the medium term, while Ukraine's territorial contours in a ceasefire should be at the Ukrainians' sole discretion, the overriding determinant of victory is the permanent preservation of Ukrainian independence and fundamental territorial integrity to a maximally practicable degree. The dread that might accompany any hint of a ceasefire proposal will come not from the ceasefire itself, but because of fear of a return to a status quo ante that assumes, in the absence of all evidence, that Russia would negotiate in good faith. More fundamentally, a viable European security depends on an inclusive and enforceable architecture that dispenses with the notion that Russia is a legitimate security stakeholder and banishes the gray zones where Russia has most actively and successfully meddled. And the only way to do that is full Ukrainian inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture—the EU and NATO, respectively, or their equivalents.In the longer term, Russia must be dealt with plainly, based on its pattern of action, and not its deliberate misrepresentation and weaponization of international obligations and norms. Certain facts must be confronted and hardwired into Western approaches towards Moscow, which neither shares our values nor a common conception of peace. First, that for all its existence, Russia has always been an empire—one with varying periods of expansion and decline. The Russian imperium has been either a ruler or menace to its neighbors, and a reliable spoiler to dreams of a sustainable European peace. As with an aggressive Soviet Union, only hard constraints on Russian imperial ambitions can check these tendencies and coax some baseline of cooperation. Similarly, a more radical reimagining of Russia is in order: not as a partner or a political equal, but as a revanchist and unreconstructed empire without hope for peacefulness, much less democracy, until its imperial moorings are severed. This requires, at minimum, a Russia policy that proactively checks external aggression and interrogates its internal coloniality.For now, Western analysts and policymakers should look to the war in Ukraine not only as a function of Russian aggression, but a Ukrainian war for survival that transcends Western conceptions or expectations around escalation dynamics or political polarization. For Ukraine, this war could be its last war if Russia is victorious, and the end of its civilization. If it succeeds, however, Ukraine could be the cornerstone of a new age of Euro-Atlantic security and stability and a premier military power in the Black Sea region in its own right. But with or without Western aid, if anything has been made clear over the past two years, Ukraine and its people will not fade quietly.Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy advisor at the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the US Helsinki Commission. He is also an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. These views are his own.[1] Samya Kullab, "Analysis: A Key Withdrawal Shows Ukraine Doesn't Have Enough Artillery to Fight Russia," Associated Press, February 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-avdiivka-war-063ab1bd47a500ad4a815b12f3d1386d.[2] Sergey Goryashko, "We Need to Be Ready for War with Putin, Romania's Top General Says," Politico, February 1, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/we-need-to-be-ready-for-war-with-putin-says-romanias-top-general/; "Danish Defence Minister Warns Russia Could Attack NATO in 3–5 Years—Media," Reuters, February 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-defence-minister-warns-russia-could-attack-nato-3-5-years-media-2024-02-09/; and Nicolas Camut, "Putin Could Attack NATO in '5 to 8 Years,' German Defense Minister Warns," Politico, January 19, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-germany-boris-pistorius-nato/.[3] Sylvie Corbet, "Macron Again Declines to Rule Out Western Troops in Ukraine, but Says They're Not Needed Now," Associated Press, March 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/france-macron-ukraine-troops-caa788d2455dafb06dd87f79c4afe06f.[4]Elise Vincent and Philippe Ricard, "Ukraine's Western allies already have a military presence in the country," Le Monde, March 1, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/01/ukraine-s-western-allies-already-have-a-military-presence-in-the-country_6575440_4.html[5] Michael Hikari Cecire, "Ukraine as Russian Imperial Action: Challenges and Policy Options," Royal United Services Institute, March 9, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russian-imperial-action-challenges-and-policy-options.[6] Mick Ryan, "Russia's Adaptation Advantage," Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage.[7] Mariya Vyushkova and Evgeny Sherkhonov, "Russia's Ethnic Minority Casualties of the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine," Inner Asia, May 2, 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/inas/25/1/article-p126_11.xml#FN000009; and Laura Solanko, "Where Do Russia's Mobilized Soldiers Come From? Evidence from Bank Deposits," BOFIT Policy Brief, February 21, 2024, https://publications.bof.fi/handle/10024/53281.[8] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The forcible transfer and 'russification' of Ukrainian children shows evidence of genocide, says PACE, April 27, 2023,https://pace.coe.int/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-of-ukrainian-children-shows-evidence-of-genocide-says-pace?__cf_chl_tk=nsD2fTQl_qXokDkIipfYF4Y7yd1HqcxNvt6SWP474.c-1713537611-0.0.1.1-1855[9] OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Vancouver Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirtieth Annual Session, July 4, 2024, https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2023-vancouver/declaration-29/4744-vancouver-declaration-eng/file.[10] Denys Azarov, Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, and Volodymyr Venher, "Understanding Russia's Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide," Journal of International Criminal Justice 21, no. 2 (June 13, 2024): 233–264, https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/21/2/233/7197410; and Kristina Hook, "Many Ukrainians See Putin's Invasion as a Continuation of Stalin's Genocide," November 25, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/many-ukrainians-see-putins-invasion-as-a-continuation-of-stalins-genocide/.[11] Patrick Wintour, "Nato Members May Send Troops to Ukraine, Warns Former Alliance Chief," The Guardian, June 7, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/07/nato-members-may-send-troops-to-ukraine-warns-former-alliance-chief.[12] Christopher Miller, Ben Hall, Felicia Schwartz, and Myles McCormick, "US Urged Ukraine to Halt Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries," Financial Times, March 22, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4d-4d3c-9e57-cbdde122ac0c.[13] Josh Rogin, "Ukrainians Want to Know If NATO Still Wants Them," Washington Post, February 23, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/23/ukraine-munich-nato-membership/.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
US military aid to Ukraine is back, and not a moment too soon. After months of suspended arms deliveries, Ukrainian defenses have buckled and news from the front lines is grim. The lurching, grinding advance of Russian forces, particularly the recent withdrawal of Ukraine's defenders from Avdiivka, tells us much about the true state of the full-scale invasion now in its third year. Most international attention has understandably focused on the state of US aid in Congress, and its wider implications for European security, and rightly so. Even with US aid back in the pipeline, the retreat from Avdiivka and broader Ukrainian struggles on the battlefield are an apt prism into a longer view of Russia's imperial tenacity, Ukraine's desperate and obstinate capacity for survival, and the Kremlin's challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Between October of last year and March, according to recent estimates, Russian forces lost some 17,000 troops and nearly 700 combat vehicles in its offensive against Avdiivka—a staggering casualty rate for a city that, on its own, represents a marginal prize for the Russian war effort. However, like Bakhmut or Severodonetsk before it, single-minded Russian attacks en masse towards questionable territorial objectives have, even after achieving breakthroughs, done little to appreciably impact the direction of the war. In some cases, they have even heralded Ukrainian counteroffensives. In such engagements, Ukrainian forces made industrious use of Russian-ruined, treacherous urban terrain to hold and attrite much larger Russian attacking formations. Estimates of upwards of nearly 400,000 Russian combat losses since the invasion was launched in 2022 should be seen in this context. Yet Avdiivka's fall is invariably associated, and is symbolically coterminous, with US failures to provide long-promised military aid and wider concerns about Western political fecklessness in the face of evident Russian imperial aggression. Although it is uncertain to what extent Avdiivka's defenses were tenable, given inherent Russian advantages in material superiority and mass from the start, there is widespread agreement in the analytical community that troop and, particularly, ammunition shortages sharply hindered the city's defenses.[1] Because of relatively modest gains from Ukraine's 2023 summer counteroffensive and the subsequent assessments of operational stalemate, alarm has set in across the Euro-Atlantic as the mythological powers of seemingly infinite Russian mass seem to have materialized. Increasingly, analysts had been taking fears of Russian victory in Ukraine seriously.An Empire Called ForeverAt its low points, the heroic, ferocious stand of a few in Avdiivka against the inexorable advance of Russian mass might seem to describe the war in Ukraine as a whole. The restoration of US arms flows notwithstanding, the prospects of Russian victory in Ukraine had appeared to be a more urgent consideration, which stoked understandable concerns in frontline European states over the possibility of an eventual direct conflict with Russia. Just this year so far, Romanian, Danish, and German political and military leaders have issued warnings about the potential of open war with Russia should Ukraine fall.[2] France, most significantly, has adopted a more forward-leaning policy in support of Ukraine's defense. It has even refused to rule out the potential deployment of troops,[3] which according to some sources are already on the ground in limited capacities.[4] However, besieged and wounded though it has been, Ukraine's agency and capacity for survival in recent months has been underrated. When given the basic means of self-defense, Ukraine has proven over and over again to be more than equal to the task. With US arms now again en route, the world will likely be reminded of this fact.At the same time, Russia's destructive tenacity in pursuit of demonstrably imperial aims has been evident to Ukraine, and other wary neighbors, for some time. Russia can seem an empire forever called to external expansion and dominion, and today has made its regime legitimacy inseparable from aggressive militarism and severe historical revisionism. Even a year ago, we could see Russia's willingness to accept otherwise unfathomable losses, endure extended material privation, and risk domestic political instability in pursuit of victory in Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian national resilience and superior battlefield leadership, alongside a hodgepodge of secondhand Western and Soviet weaponry, was often enough to best Russian forces in the field. However, it has not been enough on its own to dislodge Russia's imperial agenda, particularly as western arms have petered out. As such, a more complete Ukrainian victory demands a more aggressive and urgent Western policy of defensive aid. While certain high-value Western systems were eventually green-lit—such as F-16s, key long-range strike platforms, and cluster munitions—they came after much consternation and delay, typically in limited quantities, and often lagged battlefield conditions. Ukraine has never been able to enjoy decisive advantage in any one military capability, and no superiority of mass in any domain. Over the past year, Russia has leaned into its quantitative edge as a decisive (if cumbersome) tool, while implementing some key battlefield lessons,[6] to gain momentum.Putin's prosecution of its war on Ukraine demonstrates that imperialism is not merely a feature of Russian strategic thinking, but perhaps its central feature. It should give Western defense analysts and policymakers pause that Russia has been both willing and able to absorb such horrendous losses in such a gruesome enterprise. These losses have been made more palatable to the elite, certainly, by the systematic and deliberate exploitation of ethnic minority, indigenous, and marginalized populations in the imperial periphery.[7] Any assumptions that Russian political or material exhaustion will be sufficient to compel the abandonment of the war are implausible in the near-term, except perhaps in the face of overwhelming and immovable Ukrainian military might. Just as Ukraine's capacity for survival should not be underrated, neither should analysts ignore Russia's willingness to broadly prosecute a war of national mobilization, its evident capacity for regeneration, and perhaps even the perceived political advantages to the Kremlin of a totalitarian war footing.A Warrior RepublicAlthough it may not always be recognized in Western capitals, Ukrainians have no doubt that they are fighting an existential war in the most literal sense: for the preservation of their state, their national identity, and their very lives. As highlighted in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Vancouver Declaration last summer, by recent Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe statements,[8] and further among several Euro-Atlantic national parliaments, the Russian pattern of atrocities in Ukraine is deliberate and recognizably genocidal in its character.[9] Any cursory review of Russian state news media reveals a casual embrace of Ukrainian cultural and physical extermination as an operational necessity. Even outside of growing scholarly consensus and international recognition, that reality is a salient organizing principle in Ukrainian society.[10] Ukrainians are under no illusions about the enemy they face and the existential consequences of defeat. However, while Russian victory may have seemed a possibility, especially in the wake of the Avdiivka withdrawal, neither is it necessarily an obvious outcome—despite Russia's increasingly totalitarian war footing and the fatalist lurch in Western media and policy discourse. For one, most conceptions of Ukrainian victory tend to be tied to the full restoration of Ukrainian internationally recognized territory. However, territorial gain is not a sufficient indicator for the achievement of either Ukrainian or Russian political aims. For Ukraine, the preservation of an independent and recognizably Ukrainian nation-state with the integral features of its territorial boundaries would be a legitimate victory. By contrast, Russian victory depends on the decapitation of Ukrainian political leadership and the wholesale subjugation of the Ukrainian nation-state. For at least the foreseeable future, even absent US military aid, the first scenario remains far more likely than the second one. At the same time, the months-long suspension of US military aid lends clues about the strategic calculus for Ukraine and the wider region, where outright defeat in the near- to medium-term is but one (low) possibility. Other potentially higher propensity scenarios are entirely conceivable and may even be already playing out—and in some cases pose other types of risks.For one, the US strategic detour did not appear to contribute to a collapse in European support for Ukraine, but rather served as a galvanizing force for a more muscular approach to Ukraine. France's more hawkish turn is only one expression of this shift. The European Union's recently announced 50-billion-euro package for Ukraine, as well as additional pledges for financial and military aid, highlight a converging appreciation for the stakes among many European leaders. And although Ukraine had come to rely primarily on the United States for its pipeline of munitions stocks, their abrupt interruption led to a diversification approach, as Washington was no longer seen as entirely reliable. While it is a positive dynamic to see Europe playing a more proactive role in Ukrainian and continental security, broader European remilitarization amid US disengagement could threaten the postwar success of arresting ruinous cycles of intra-European warfare. More muscular European rhetoric and actions during suspended US arms deliveries also revived quiet speculation that European states, acting independently or in some kind of secondary coalition outside of NATO or the EU, could be forced to intervene directly to prevent Russian victory and Ukrainian defeat. While this possibility is typically muted in public, it is a scenario that has been taken seriously within some Western analytical circles.[11] It is widely believed that Poland alone, for example, likely has the military and material capacity to successfully intervene and decisively turn the tide of the conflict; other potential Central/Eastern European and possibly Nordic members of such a coalition are not difficult to conceive. Such an intervention, however successful, would widen the war and likely lead to a fundamental crisis within NATO. Yet, if Russia is seen as likely to test NATO's Article 5 mutual defense clause, as is increasingly believed, a preemptive military action to rescue Ukraine from capitulation may be a preferable option for several frontline European states. There are also risks to more complete abandonment of Ukraine. Alone, Ukraine would further its transformation as a warrior republic, where the maintenance of war in the desperate enterprise of survival is the prevailing principle under which all other ideals are subsumed. This Ukraine would be unconstrained by the niceties of Western guardrails and caveats delivered out of concern for escalation and would take the war to Russia in an uncompromising fashion, with a ferocity could make some of its liberal international supporters wince. The debate over Ukrainian raids against Russian oil refineries, an entirely legitimate military target, is a relatively low-stakes example of this phenomenon playing out recently.[12] It should be noted that Ukraine continues to act with relative restraint, including its attacks within Russian borders, reflecting deference to US and European admonitions to limit the scope of war. However, if Western support dawdles and dwindles, and the specter of successful Russian genocide looms, incentives for restraint deplete. Left isolated, it is difficult to imagine a scenario of where Kyiv does not seriously entertain nuclear rearmament, given the large nuclear arsenal it surrendered in exchange for Western security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. While ample ink has been spilled over the failure of those guarantees and the harm it has done to nuclear nonproliferation as a principle or concept, in no country is this betrayal more evident and immediate than in Ukraine. Russia's invasion itself seems to have crystallized the decision of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament as a potential error, given the eminent failure of the Bucharest Memorandum and the privileged position that nuclear powers enjoy. Meanwhile, western-provided arms deliveries are variously sourced, with some even arriving in poor or unusable condition, and tend to follow cycles of Western deliberation and delay. In addition, both the arms and instructions for their use are burdened with caveats, illustrating powerful fears over Russian nuclear blackmail. Even with robust US and European aid, it would be understandable for Kyiv to consider the deterrent effect of an independent nuclear strike capability as significantly more valuable than the warm regards of Western diplomats.[13]Crumbling EdificesAnticipating Russian victory, under even current conditions, underplays Ukrainian strategic agency as well as significant other downstream risks. Meanwhile, although the threat posed by a total Russian victory is widely discussed, the potential risks of broad Russian advances without Ukrainian collapse have not been adequately considered. For example, it is conceivable that Ukraine, desperate in its war for survival, triggers a wave of nuclear proliferation in Europe as the nominally protective fabric of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture lies in tatters. In this scenario, US influence and the power it derives from the alliance systems it created could be severely compromised, undermining already narrowing options for responding to contingencies elsewhere around the globe, including in the Indo-Pacific. In the immediate term, the demands of the moment are plain enough. Ukraine must see robust and unified support from both the United States and Europe to stave off Russian advances and create the conditions for military victory—and with urgency. Russian forces must face not only extended losses in manpower and resources, but such losses without hope of victory. For Russia, Ukraine must symbolize not imperial tenacity, but hubris, incapacity, and strategic impotence. Ukraine, and this war, should be associated in the Russian mind with total military and political defeat. In practical terms, the resumption of US aid is a welcome and necessary development, but insufficient. The shape of that aid should be more purposeful and emphasize the ability for Ukraine to not merely attrite Russian forces, but to make rapid advances in the near to medium term. This will require more comfort with Ukrainian raids in Russia, the provision of long-range precision strike in volume, and certain escalation dynamics inherent in such an approach.Looking at the medium term, while Ukraine's territorial contours in a ceasefire should be at the Ukrainians' sole discretion, the overriding determinant of victory is the permanent preservation of Ukrainian independence and fundamental territorial integrity to a maximally practicable degree. The dread that might accompany any hint of a ceasefire proposal will come not from the ceasefire itself, but because of fear of a return to a status quo ante that assumes, in the absence of all evidence, that Russia would negotiate in good faith. More fundamentally, a viable European security depends on an inclusive and enforceable architecture that dispenses with the notion that Russia is a legitimate security stakeholder and banishes the gray zones where Russia has most actively and successfully meddled. And the only way to do that is full Ukrainian inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture—the EU and NATO, respectively, or their equivalents.In the longer term, Russia must be dealt with plainly, based on its pattern of action, and not its deliberate misrepresentation and weaponization of international obligations and norms. Certain facts must be confronted and hardwired into Western approaches towards Moscow, which neither shares our values nor a common conception of peace. First, that for all its existence, Russia has always been an empire—one with varying periods of expansion and decline. The Russian imperium has been either a ruler or menace to its neighbors, and a reliable spoiler to dreams of a sustainable European peace. As with an aggressive Soviet Union, only hard constraints on Russian imperial ambitions can check these tendencies and coax some baseline of cooperation. Similarly, a more radical reimagining of Russia is in order: not as a partner or a political equal, but as a revanchist and unreconstructed empire without hope for peacefulness, much less democracy, until its imperial moorings are severed. This requires, at minimum, a Russia policy that proactively checks external aggression and interrogates its internal coloniality.For now, Western analysts and policymakers should look to the war in Ukraine not only as a function of Russian aggression, but a Ukrainian war for survival that transcends Western conceptions or expectations around escalation dynamics or political polarization. For Ukraine, this war could be its last war if Russia is victorious, and the end of its civilization. If it succeeds, however, Ukraine could be the cornerstone of a new age of Euro-Atlantic security and stability and a premier military power in the Black Sea region in its own right. But with or without Western aid, if anything has been made clear over the past two years, Ukraine and its people will not fade quietly.Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy advisor at the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the US Helsinki Commission. He is also an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. These views are his own.[1] Samya Kullab, "Analysis: A Key Withdrawal Shows Ukraine Doesn't Have Enough Artillery to Fight Russia," Associated Press, February 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-avdiivka-war-063ab1bd47a500ad4a815b12f3d1386d.[2] Sergey Goryashko, "We Need to Be Ready for War with Putin, Romania's Top General Says," Politico, February 1, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/we-need-to-be-ready-for-war-with-putin-says-romanias-top-general/; "Danish Defence Minister Warns Russia Could Attack NATO in 3–5 Years—Media," Reuters, February 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-defence-minister-warns-russia-could-attack-nato-3-5-years-media-2024-02-09/; and Nicolas Camut, "Putin Could Attack NATO in '5 to 8 Years,' German Defense Minister Warns," Politico, January 19, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-germany-boris-pistorius-nato/.[3] Sylvie Corbet, "Macron Again Declines to Rule Out Western Troops in Ukraine, but Says They're Not Needed Now," Associated Press, March 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/france-macron-ukraine-troops-caa788d2455dafb06dd87f79c4afe06f.[4]Elise Vincent and Philippe Ricard, "Ukraine's Western allies already have a military presence in the country," Le Monde, March 1, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/01/ukraine-s-western-allies-already-have-a-military-presence-in-the-country_6575440_4.html[5] Michael Hikari Cecire, "Ukraine as Russian Imperial Action: Challenges and Policy Options," Royal United Services Institute, March 9, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russian-imperial-action-challenges-and-policy-options.[6] Mick Ryan, "Russia's Adaptation Advantage," Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage.[7] Mariya Vyushkova and Evgeny Sherkhonov, "Russia's Ethnic Minority Casualties of the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine," Inner Asia, May 2, 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/inas/25/1/article-p126_11.xml#FN000009; and Laura Solanko, "Where Do Russia's Mobilized Soldiers Come From? Evidence from Bank Deposits," BOFIT Policy Brief, February 21, 2024, https://publications.bof.fi/handle/10024/53281.[8] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The forcible transfer and 'russification' of Ukrainian children shows evidence of genocide, says PACE, April 27, 2023,https://pace.coe.int/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-of-ukrainian-children-shows-evidence-of-genocide-says-pace?__cf_chl_tk=nsD2fTQl_qXokDkIipfYF4Y7yd1HqcxNvt6SWP474.c-1713537611-0.0.1.1-1855[9] OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Vancouver Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirtieth Annual Session, July 4, 2024, https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2023-vancouver/declaration-29/4744-vancouver-declaration-eng/file.[10] Denys Azarov, Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, and Volodymyr Venher, "Understanding Russia's Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide," Journal of International Criminal Justice 21, no. 2 (June 13, 2024): 233–264, https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/21/2/233/7197410; and Kristina Hook, "Many Ukrainians See Putin's Invasion as a Continuation of Stalin's Genocide," November 25, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/many-ukrainians-see-putins-invasion-as-a-continuation-of-stalins-genocide/.[11] Patrick Wintour, "Nato Members May Send Troops to Ukraine, Warns Former Alliance Chief," The Guardian, June 7, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/07/nato-members-may-send-troops-to-ukraine-warns-former-alliance-chief.[12] Christopher Miller, Ben Hall, Felicia Schwartz, and Myles McCormick, "US Urged Ukraine to Halt Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries," Financial Times, March 22, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4d-4d3c-9e57-cbdde122ac0c.[13] Josh Rogin, "Ukrainians Want to Know If NATO Still Wants Them," Washington Post, February 23, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/23/ukraine-munich-nato-membership/.
Dottorato di ricerca in Storia e cultura del viaggio in età moderna ; La mia tesi è strutturata in quattro capitoli, tre dei quali incentrati sulle figure delle regine i cui viaggi a scopo matrimoniale sono stati da me analizzati e approfonditi. Il primo capitolo verte sul concetto di viaggio sia dal punto di vista materiale che da quello ontologico. Nel corso dei secoli il viaggio materiale ha subito molti cambiamenti, inutile dire infatti che un viaggio svolto in età moderna era più impegnativo dal punto di vista pratico di un viaggio svolto nell'era contemporanea del tutto compreso. Il viaggio però ha mantenuto le sue caratteristiche ontologiche, la curiosità, intesa come desiderio di scoprire cosa esiste al di là della propria quotidianità, del viaggiatore di oggi è la stessa che anima il viaggiatore delle varie epoche storiche. Un'altra teoria riportata nel primo capitolo della mia tesi è il forte cambiamento che esercita l'arte del viaggiare su ogni singola persona, è come se il viaggiare ci spogliasse di alcuni strati facenti parte il nostro essere ed è questo assottigliamento del proprio io che ci libera di caratteristiche ambientali e culturali del vissuto che faceva ormai parte di noi prima di diventare viaggiatori. Il viaggio è quindi una sorta di purificazione. Negli altri tre capitoli mi soffermo sui viaggi da me studiati e approfonditi svolti dalle tre regine Eleonora d'Austria, Maria Anna d'Asburgo-Spagna e Maria Ludovica Gonzaga Nevers. I suddetti viaggi sono stati analizzati sia dal punto di vista materiale che da quello personale, mi sono soffermata sulla durata del viaggio, sui mezzi di trasporto utilizzati, sulle spese affrontate, sulla complicata macchina cerimoniale organizzata per ricevere donne di così alto rango e infine sulle cerimonie matrimoniali e sui seguenti banchetti, balli e musica per festeggiare le tre unioni. Dal punto di vista personale i tre viaggi rappresentano il passaggio di queste donne dall'adolescenza all'età adulta attraverso il doloroso abbandono della terra natia per andare ad unirsi in matrimonio con un uomo a loro per lo più sconosciuto. Documento anche la sofferenza provata dalle tre giovani donne espressa attraverso lunghi addii e pianti causati da una partenza definitiva e probabilmente non desiderata. Le fonti da me studiate per riportare nella mia tesi al meglio i viaggi compiuti dalle tre regine sono: la prima parte del testo a stampa del Le Laboureur conservato presso la Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III" di Roma, Histoire et relation du voyage de la royne de Pologne, et du retour de madame la mareschalle de Guébrian, ambassadrice extraordinaire, & sur-intendante de sa conduitte. Par la Hongrie, l'Austriche, Styrie, Carinthe, le Frioul, & l'Italie, per lo studio del viaggio di Maria Anna d'Asburgo mi sono basata sullo studio del manoscritto cartaceo Passaggio della Regina d'Ungheria di carte 20 contenuto nelle Carte Bellini e conservato nell'Archivio Storico della Santa Casa di Loreto, Relatione del viaggio per lo Stato de Santa Chiesa dalla Serenissima Regina d'Ungheria all'illustriss. Et eccell. Il Sig. Marchese de Bagni regina d'Ungheria testo a stampa conservato presso Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III" di Roma e infine Il passaggio di D. Maria d'Austria Regina d'Ungheria per lo Stato Ecclesiastico l'anno 1631, testo a stampa conservato presso la Biblioteca L. Jacobilli di Foligno. Per quanto riguarda l'ultimo viaggio da me preso in considerazione, ossia quello svolto da Eleonora d'Austria ho usufruito dell' Instruzione lasciata da Monsig. Galeazzo Marescotti Inquisitore di Malta à Monsignor Ranuzzi suo successore, Relazione della Nunziatura di Polonia fatta dal suddetto Monsignor Marescotti negli anni 1668-1669-1670, conservata presso l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano e della - Relatione del viaggio della sacra cesarea Real Maestà dell"imperatrice Eleonora nell"accompagnare la serenissima Leonora sua figlia alle nozze reali in Polonia, testo a stampa conservato presso la Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III" di Roma. ; Francesca Quatrini"s doctoral thesis focuses on the travels done by three queens during the XVII century for marriage reasons. The Three protagonists are: Maria Anna Habsburg Spain (1606-1646), daughter of Philip III of Spain and Margaret of Austria, Archduchess of Austria, Marie Louise Gonzaga Nevers (1611-1667) French-italian Princess, daughter of Charles I Gonzaga Nevers and Catherine of Mayenne and the Archduchess Eleonor Maria Josefa of Austria (1653-1697), daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand III and Eleanor of Mantua, sister of the future Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I. The doctoral candidate, analyzing the voyages of these three Queens, focuses both on the aspects concerning the material journey and personal and political aspects of the three marriages. According to the first aspects, the candidate highlights the length of the journey, means of transportation, effective expenses, the complicated etiquette to be respected for such noble women, received wedding gifts and many other practical features scrupulously transferred and emerged from the study of documents inherent to the journeys and the marriages of these three Queens. The personal aspect of the journeys analyzed in this dissertation emerges in the passage from childhood to adulthood through the sorrowful abandonment of the native land to get married with an mostly unknown man. The analyzed documents focus on the sufferance proved at the moment of leaving the parental home describing sad and long goodbyes. Moreover, the journeys of the three Queens reflect on of the typical features of the feminine journey: travelling for a man. At least until the XVII century, women used to travel to get married and change their social status from unmarried to wives. The dissertation also analyzes the political relevance characterizing all three marriages: these unions didn"t result from mutual feelings but from complicated political and diplomatic affairs of the European noble families. The first analyzed Queen is Maria Anna Habsburg Spain, who left her homeland in 1630 to go get married a year later, on February 20th, 1631, with her first cousin, the Archduch Ferdinand III of Habsburg Austria [1606-1657], King of Hungary and future Holy Roman Emperor. The Church of Rome was highly interested in the presence of this Queen in its territory and funded all the expenses done during the Queen"s passage. The Roman Church was highly interested in the political strengthening deriving from the union of the two branches of the Habsburg family resulted from this marriage. Strengthening this union, the Habsburg family would have found itself in a advantageous situationto France, its enemy during the long conflict of the Thirty years" war. Following a chronological order, the dissertation analyzes the figure of Marie Louise Gonzaga Nevers, married to two Polish Kings: Władysław IV Vasa, and John II Casimir Vasa, who were brothers. The first marriage was strongly desired from Cardinal Mazarin and was celebrated by proxy in the Chapel of the Royal Palace in Paris on November 15th, 1645. The influential French Cardinal wanted this marriage to solve the internal and external political problems of France. Marie Louise Gonzaga Nevers, in fact, was part of the noble rebellion against the Cardinal Richelieu called the Fronde. Given the Princess" support to this movement, Mazarin decided to move Marie Louise away from France, sending her to a Reign where she would have covered a strategic role for the French foreign affairs: Poland. In order to take advantage of the premature death of Cecilia Renata of Austria, Queen of Poland, Mazarin proposed Marie Louise for the candidature to the throne to converge the political sympathies on France and not the Empire. Once married, in fact, Marie Louise should have affirmed the French influence on central-eastern Europe through administrating Poland with an anti-Empire policy. The dissertation lastly focuses on the journey started by the Archduchess Eleonor Maria Josefa of Austria to go get married with Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, king of Poland. The ceremony was hold in the polish town of Częstochova in February 1670. The Queen of Poland found herself in a difficult period for the Reign characterized by continuous invasions coming from the south-east border of the Country. The aristocracy decided to arm itself and, leaded by King Wiśniowiecki himself and by John III Sobieski, Rotamaster of the Polish army, protected important strongholds such as the towns of Lublin, Lviv and Kaminiez. The political reason underneath this marriage is the Polish urgency to make an alliance with the Habsburg family in an historical moment in which the Turkish danger was becoming more and more oppressive. This doctoral thesis was made through the meticulous study of the followings documents and manuscripts: As far as Marie Louise Gonzaga Nevers concerns: Histoire et relation du voyage de la royne de Pologne, et du retour de madame la mareschalle de Guébrian, ambassadrice extraordinaire, & sur-intendante de sa conduitte. Par la Hongrie, l'Austriche, Styrie, Carinthe, le Frioul, & l'Italie. Printed text preserved in the Biblioteca nazionale centrale di Roma, written by J. Le Laboureur and published in 1648 at Robert de Nainnel "s press. Contract de marige du roy de Pologne avec la Princesse Marie, preserved in the Biblioteca Corsiniana di Roma, published in 1645 in Paris. Maria Anna Habsburg Spain: Carte Bellini"s collection, Passaggio della Regina d'Ungheria, ff. 1r-20r, preserved in the Archivio Storico della Santa Casa di Loreto, Relatione del viaggio per lo Stato de Santa Chiesa dalla Serenissima Regina d'Ungheria all'illustriss. Et eccell. Il Sig. Marchese de Bagni, printed text preserved in the Biblioteca nazionale centrale di Roma, written by Grazioli Naborio and published in 1631 in Fermo, Il passaggio di D. Maria d'Austria Regina d'Ungheria per lo Stato Ecclesiastico l'anno 1631, printed text preserved in the Biblioteca L. Jacobilli in Foligno, written by Celio Talucci and published in 1631 in Augusta. Archduchess Eleonor Maria Josefa of Austria: Relatione del viaggio della sacra cesarea Real Maestà dell'imperatrice Eleonora nell'accompagnare la serenissima Leonora sua figlia alle nozze reali in Polonia, printed text preserved in the Biblioteca nazionale centrale di Roma, written by Alfonso Zeffiri, published in Vienna in 1670; Instruzione lasciata da Monsig. Galeazzo Marescotti Inquisitore di Malta à Monsignor Ranuzzi suo successore, Relazione della Nunziatura di Polonia fatta dal suddetto Monsignor Marescotti negli anni 1668-1669-1670, preserved in the 'Archivio Segreto Vaticano.
