Suchergebnisse

Accepted manuscript version, licensed CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Published version available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2019.03.017. ; Aquaculture (i.e., farming of aquatic organisms, including fish, molluscs, crustaceans, and aquatic plants) is playing an increasingly important role in the global food supply. The contribution of aquaculture to total fish production has risen steadily, reaching 44% in 2014 (Moffitt and Cajas-Cano, 2014). The future growth of aquaculture is expected to help accomplish the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by reducing environmental consequences associated with livestock while simultaneously increasing food security and promoting the nutritional benefits of marine food products (Thilsted et al., 2016). An increase in aquaculture is, however, dependent on its expansion to new sites outside the traditional aquaculture areas. Sweden, especially its southwest region, is one potential new area for mariculture development. The Swedish government has adopted a national strategy to develop the mariculture industry to become a profitable and sustainable industry with ethical production standards.1 While Swedish aquaculture produces moderate quantities today, its year-on-year growth target between the present and 2020 is an average increase of 8% annually (corresponding to a 71% increase from 2013 to 2020). This goal corresponds to an annual production in 2020 of fish for consumption and crayfish and mussels of approximately 23,000 tonnes as well as a total annual production of 25,000 tonnes of fish and crustaceans. While the biological and geographical conditions in the area seem promising, Bailey et al. (1996) showed that mariculture development is influenced not only by natural and physical conditions but also by conditions that are inherently economic and social in nature. Research has proven that there may be positive effects (Ceballos et al., 2018; Toufique and Belton, 2014) or no impact (Nguyen et al., 2016) on the economy. Little research, however, has examined the perceived contribution in social and economic terms. The increasing importance of mariculture as an industry and its development in coastal areas outside traditional mariculture areas (Oyinlola et al., 2018) has prompted a need to integrate an understanding of the social and economic conditions as a prerequisite for sustainable development (Barrington et al., 2010; Bucklin and Howell, 1998). Consideration of the local population within communities is a fundamental precept of new mariculture development to understand the views and perspectives of the local residents and to ensure local acceptance (Memery and Birch, 2016; Salgado et al., 2015). Despite the increased attention paid to mariculture development, research on social conditions is limited (Mazur and Curtis, 2008; Nash, 2004), and no studies have included local residents' perspectives on social and economic conditions. The expansion of mariculture of most species requires access and use of coastal areas. This requirement is also anticipated for mariculture development in the archipelago in the southwest of Sweden, a coastal region suitable for mariculture development. Because the development initiatives may potentially affect archipelago communities, local residents and second-home owners, who have invested in their properties and proximity to the sea as valuable assets, will be affected. Their attitudes and reaction towards mariculture will therefore be important in the future development. However, researchers are still struggling to answer the most basic question: How will local residents react to new mariculture development in their region? The aim of the present study is to investigate the attitudes and resistance intention of residents in southwest Sweden regarding the development of new mariculture. Understanding the perceived social consequences will assist policy makers, mariculturists, mariculture advocates and other professionals seeking to further develop a sustainable mariculture industry.

Introduction -- Part I-New Teaching-Learning Models in Economic Education -- Chapter 1. Pedagogical Framework Targeting the Enhancement of Instruction in Quantitative Economic and Business disciplines -- Chapter 2. Enhancing Teaching Innovations in Business Administration and Management Through Interdisciplinary Coordination in Quantitative Subjects -- Chapter 3. Enhancing Visual Literacy and Data Analysis Skills in Macroeconomics Education: A Beveridge Curve Analysis Using FRED® Data -- Chapter 4. Methodology for Analyzing Educational Forums with NLP: Searching for Economic Terms -- Chapter 5. Adaptive Self-Assessment through the Virtual Campus: A Tool to Improve the Teaching-Learning Process -- Part II-Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainability in Economics Teaching -- Chapter 6. Uncovering the Impact of Developing a Sustainability Mindset on Business and Economics Students' Motivation to Learn about the Sustainable Development Goals -- Chapter 7. Sustainability Reports in the Classroom -- Chapter 8. Education on Sustainability and Sustainable Development Goals in University Teaching through Community Service Delivery -- Chapter 9. 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Learning: Access to Justice as an Instrument of Guarantee in the Face of the Social Inequalities of Globalisation -- Chapter 10. Climate Change and Emissions Rights: Teaching Experience Using Artificial Intelligence Tools -- Part III-Technology and Innovation in Economics Education -- Chapter 11. Generative Artificial Intelligence in Education: Risks and Opportunities -- Chapter 12. Acceptance of Technological Innovations in Economic Education: Key Factors for Implementation -- Chapter 13. SADMER: A System to Aid the Teaching of Econometric Modeling Using the R Language -- Chapter 14. Scientometrics, Data Science and Teaching Innovations in Economics. Reality or Utopia? -- Part IV-Methodologies and Tools for Active Learning -- Chapter 15. Enhancing Learning in Family Business Management through Art: Integrating Creative Methodologies in Higher Education -- Chapter 16. Peer-to-Peer Training in UAM Economics Faculty to Increase Scores and Motivation, Lower Defection Rates and Boost Employability in the Economy-Business Field -- Chapter 17. Improving Active Learning: Innovation in Statistics Education -- Chapter 18. Exploring the Impact of Problem-Based Learning on the Emotions of Business Administration and Management Students -- Chapter 19. Autonomous Collaborative Learning: Topic Development and Oral Presentation -- Part V-Gamification as a Teaching Methodology -- Chapter 20. The Implication of Expected Grades in the Evaluation of Traditional Pedagogical Materials and Gamification -- Chapter 21. Gamification, Learning and Satisfaction: An Empirical Approach -- Chapter 22. Strengthening Higher Education for Sustainable Development: Gamification and SDG 16 -- Chapter 23. Development of Practical Skills in Probability: A Teaching Innovation Project to Make Applied Economics More Fun with Games of Chance -- Chapter 24. Applying a Gamification Technique for Learning Sustainable Finance -- Part VI-Curriculum Design -- Chapter 25. Field Work: Designing a Professionalising Master's Degree in Honduras -- Chapter 26. Attitudes towards Statistics in Business and Economic Studies: Implications for Teaching Innovation in Undergraduate Education -- Chapter 27. Strategies for Innovative Teaching of Entrepreneurship Skills: Developing Business Plans for Undergraduate Final Year Projects -- Chapter 28. The Project for Innovation and Improvement of External Internships in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Castilla-La Mancha at Cuenca.

Despite reforms in early 2021, including a devaluation of the currency and a liberalization of imports, there remain significant distortions in Sudan's wheat value chain, especially related to subsidized sales prices of flatbread. This flatbread subsidy, a key component of wheat policy, is not well-targeted. Calculations based on 2009 national household survey data and current 2021 prices and wheat supply show that urban poor households annually receive slightly less from this subsidy than urban non-poor households (18,900 and 20,800 SDG/capita). Rural poor households receive only 2,700 SDG/capita. This paper presents the results of several simulations of a partial equilibrium model of Sudan's wheat economy that are designed to analyze the impacts of recent shocks and various policy options. Model simulations show that increased wheat imports, such as those financed by food aid, add to supplies for processing into wheat flour, flatbread, and other wheat products, resulting in lower prices for consumers and increased consumption, but also disincentives for production. A 300,000 ton increase in wheat imports, as occurred in early 2021, results in an 8 percent increase in wheat consumption and a 35 percent decline in the market price of non-flatbread wheat products. Production falls by 12 percent. Since flatbread prices are unchanged, wheat consumption of the urban poor, for whom flatbread is the major wheat product consumed, increases by only 4 percent. Raising flatbread prices by 30 percent to reduce the size of the fiscal subsidy reduces total consumption of flatbread by 17 percent and sharply reduces wheat consumption and real incomes of the urban poor. All households suffer a loss of 41 to 45 percent in the value of flatbread subsidies received. The urban poor experience the largest decline in total consumption of wheat (14 percent) and in total income (11 percent). (The average total income loss for all households is only 3 percent.) Reducing the flatbread subsidy without a compensating income transfer would significantly reduce the welfare of the urban poor and likely threaten political stability. Our results suggest that a combination of key wheat policies involving high levels of imports – including injection of food aid wheat into the economy in late 2020 – and subsidized flatbread will significantly benefit urban poor households. Nonetheless, the are important data gaps on several aspects of the wheat sector, including no recent nationally representative household expenditure survey data. In addition, greater transparency, including publication of quantities and prices of government purchases, sales of wheat and wheat flour, and quantities and prices of subsidized flatbread across the country has the potential to significantly increase the efficiency of the entire wheat sector. As shown in this paper, Sudan's wheat policies in recent years, such as increased wheat imports, price subsidies in the wheat value chain, and low prices of flatbread, have in general favored consumers, to the detriment of producers. These interventions in the wheat value chain, especially those related to subsidies on flatbread, have especially large effects on the welfare of urban households, making these policies particularly politically sensitive. However, they have entailed high fiscal costs, threatening macro-economic stability and crowding out other possible investments to promote growth and poverty reduction. Careful policy analysis and ongoing monitoring of outcomes and new developments will be needed to help guide the important choices ahead. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; CRP2; 2 Promoting Healthy Diets and Nutrition for all; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; SSSP ; DSGD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

n the last centuries, Humankind has lived sourced by fossil fuels and under a linear economic perspective based on extractive activities, environmental depletion and lack of circularity. Ironically, what goes around, comes around. The prevailing paradigm of production-consumption-waste (take-make-dispose) that excluded the environmental perspective was wrong. How production and consumption patterns are settled nowadays, have repercussions in all the spheres (economy, society and the environment). Consequently, the world is currently facing significant challenges that affect all the people: Climate Change, energy security, increasing electricity demand, economic growth and employment creation are among the top concerns today. They are present in the national agendas as reflected in the Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs) to achieve sustainability resilience and, ultimately, welfare. The economy and energy systems strongly condition these goals. Regarding the former, production processes now are more distant due to globalisation, information and communication technologies (ICT), offshoring and the international trade growth, and have made that production and consumption develop through complex global value chains (GVC) with different countries that produce different parts of a final product that is eventually consumed elsewhere. The Covid19's pandemic is a recent example of how the GVC phenomenon has propagated the economic shocks across sectors and countries (via lockdowns, upstream bottlenecks, dependencies and transportation problems). Understanding how GVC behave is fundamental to describing the dependencies and networks that define today's world economy. Hence, GVC become the backbone of this thesis. Concerning the later, energy coming from fossil fuels is still mainstream. This fact hinders the efforts to fight against Climate Change, which implies meeting the Paris Agreement goals. Countries are committed to reducing their greenhouse gases emissions for the year 2030. The strategy to achieve the mitigation goals needs a low carbon economy and energy transition path, so countries worldwide have launched national policy packages to increase renewable energy sources (RES). However, two main issues arise: on the one hand, these green investments planned are insufficient. On the other side, the required energy transition may impact other aspects of sustainability and resilience that imply both synergies and trade-offs between SDGs and social and economic spheres of sustainability that should be assessed. Furthermore, world energy demand is expected to increase. In developing countries, growth is dramatic. For example, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region grew at a rate of 6-8% per year in the past years. It is expected to triple by 2030. Developing countries face the same challenges as developed ones, departing from a disadvantaged position (in terms of technology, labour skills and capital endowments, institutional robustness, and political priorities). In this context, an energy transition towards decarbonisation, focused on developing regions, plays cardinal importance in the thesis. Renewable electricity ensures climate protection and energy security, as well as employment opportunities, economic growth and human welfare. It becomes part of the solution to today's problems to achieve sustainability. With Covid19, the future of energy and the global value chains is uncertain. The debate about the virtues GVC and the dependencies in the production process obviously affect the citizens' health and safety and have implications for international trade and investment (renewables included). Policymakers responsible for taking today's critical investment decisions need complete analysis and evidence of their choices' broad impacts. This is the main objective of the thesis. Aiming to depict the current functioning of the production processes focused on RES deployment, this document covers the insertion of developing regions in GVC (their role, insertion and implications), through socioeconomic and environmental indicators, and policy recommendations. The present thesis, entitled "Sustainability assessment of green investments on the path to the energy transition and the decarbonisation of the economy. The importance of global value chains", is structured in six chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the two intertwined concepts present in the whole document: energy and the global value chains. Chapters 3 to 5 deal with these two concepts at different levels (regional, national and local, respectively). It also presents the main research questions and lists the work performed up to the present date. Chapter 2 links RES deployment and value chains through a common methodological framework: the input-output analysis. It is a widely used way to measure GVC and sustainability impacts related to investments such as renewables. One of the main advantages of this method is its ability to account for a wide range of dimensions in the three spheres of sustainability along with detailed full inclusion of the GVC, including both direct and indirect effects. However, one of the main shortcomings of this methodology is the lack of data available for developing regions: many countries are not covered in the main multi-regional input-output (MRIO) databases, hindering the measurement of GVC in regions like South America or Africa. Chapter 3 addresses data shortcomings by using a regional input-output table (RIOT). Chapter 3 analyses South America's role in GVC through the Koopman, Wang and Wei (KWW) decomposition. The KWW scheme is extended to explain the limitations when using a RIOT. A novel adaptation of the KWW gross exports decomposition scheme, suitable for any RIOT, is created to this end. The implications of using a RIOT are assessed. Besides, the results are complemented with those obtained using a Multiregional Input-Output (MRIO) table. It is confirmed the low insertion of South America in GVC and its upstream position as a provider of intermediate goods and services: imported content in South American exports comes primarily from outside the region, and only Uruguay is vertically integrated. Finally, using a RIOT is not recommended for a complete sustainability analysis when MRIO tables are available. In chapter 4, Mexico's green investments for the period 2018-2030 are assessed in terms of value added, employment, materials, land use, water and CO2eq emissions in a multiregional input-output framework. These green investments are expected to account for nearly an increase of 1%, both GDP and employment, in Mexico and scheduled mitigation of around 63 Mt CO2eq, once the new facilities are fully deployed. Nevertheless, the deployment and operation, and maintenance phases will increase the emissions (0.82%), the water and material footprint (0.19 and 0.9%, respectively) and the land use (0.19%) with a substantial share of the positive and negative effects leaked outside the country borders. We compare the results with the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) proposal, aligned with the COP21 goals. If additional RES to meet the Paris Agreement is deployed in Mexico, GDP and employment are estimated to almost triple concerning the national package assessed. Chapter 5 presents a sustainability assessment of concentrated solar power (CSP) hybridisation with biomass technology to be installed in Tunisia. Environmental impacts have been assessed by Life Cycle Analysis (LCA). For socioeconomic impacts, an MRIO analysis was used to estimate the production of goods and services, value added and employment creation. Regarding the results, the system reports 22 gCO2eq per kWh. The most critical component in terms of emissions is the gasifier system, due to biomass transport. Socioeconomic results show significant impacts on Tunisia's employment creation, coming essentially from the operation and maintenance (O&M) phase. The multiplier effect of the direct investment in producing goods and services amounts to 2.4 (3.5 accounting induced impacts). Domestic value added in investment is low, only 28.9% of the overall value added created. Thus, increasing the national content of the investment stage would bring additional local benefits. Using extended MRIO, CO2 emissions have also been calculated, and the CO2 emission differences with both methodologies are discussed. This thesis concludes with some final remarks regarding the importance of RES deployment in achieving the Paris Agreement and some of the Agenda 2030 goals while identifying how GVC affect these green investments, especially in developing countries. GVC potential weaknesses and the benefits of fostering local RES components niches should be considered to create policy actions. Finally, brief comments on current and future research lines include exploring other technologies such as carbon capture, storage and use (CCUS), capital endogenisation and methodological hybridisations to contribute to identifying the benefits of green investments in the way to sustainability.

The world continues to grow wealthier, but not necessarily better governed. The rapid economic growth of the last several decades has resulted in a majority of the world's most impoverished citizens now living in middle-income countries. The inequality this implies is perhaps the clearest indication of stagnation in government: the systems required to manage and deploy newly created wealth to support broader development goals have not kept pace with wealth creation itself. Direct evidence of this fact is most visible in the widespread and severe shortcomings in everyday public services that even citizens in relatively prosperous middle-income countries continue to expect from their governments. To name a few examples, recent studies in India have found a 23.6% rate of workplace absence among teachers in rural schools, climbing to up to 30% for primary health providers—and when the latter do show up, more than half the time they lack formal training. Service delivery-related protests in South Africa in 2018 were at their highest levels since 2004. Despite 2018 being marked as the "Year of Anti-Corruption", half of surveyed citizens in Sub-Saharan African nations believed their country was becoming more corrupt, with one in four acknowledged having to pay a bribe to access health care or education.6 In much of the world, driver's licenses are commonly bought rather than earned. At the same time, there are limitations in public service delivery despite considerable investments in and focus on the "modernization" of systems, technology and human capacity in government in recent years. The World Bank's International Development Assistance program has committed more than $14 billion from 2015-2019 to public administration reform—its largest sectoral commitment to date—not counting an additional $1 billion for technology upgrades.8 Other multilateral and bilateral agencies routinely make commitments in the billions of dollars for similar goals.

2019 was the year for sciences in Colombia has been a milestone after the official structuring of Science, Technology and Innovation's Ministry (MinCiencias), allowing scaling decisions of research, development and innovation to executive power and whose main challenges will be in the coming years, continue process of building a knowledge-based country, technology, scientific capabilities and improving of academy, industry and government linkage; this challenges requires a collective construction of main science authority and different higher education organizations, groups, research and technological development centers, but especially the participation of researchers in all knowledge areas. In addition to the creation of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the work leaded by "Misión de Sabios 2019", have defined the roadmap for scientific development in Colombia since eight thematic axes constituted in: 1. Biotechnology, bioeconomy and environment, 2. Basic and space sciences, 3. Life and health sciences, 4. Social sciences, development and equity, 5. Sustainable energy, 6. Creative and cultural industries, 7. Oceans and hydrobiological resources and 8 Converging technologies, nano, info and cogno industries 4.0; strategic knowledge areas which guide formulations and decisions on different activities that promote high level formation and commitment to scientific research. The journal "Liderazgo Estratégico", attached to School of Business of Universidad Simón Bolívar, reaffirms its work and commitment with research formation and the promotion of science, technology and innovation on new Colombian researchers, positioning itself as a part of knowledge's social appropriation on administrative, economic and accounting sciences, consolidating in its ninth volume with new publications result of the articulated work of professors and students, as well as the critical analysis and argumentation of the main argues on the academic field of the different disciplines which are linked to business and management area. Transcendental challenges for scientific activity are glimpsed at the doors of a 2020 year, not only in Colombia and the Latin American region, too it's consolidating global perspectives that urge researchers on the continuous construction of a knowledge-based society, an intelligent and autonomous industry is strengthened based on the so-called fourth industrial revolution promoting efficiency and productivity, innovation and technology are advancing at rates that promote the transformation of paradigms in society and the first five years of the global declaration of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) are fulfilled. How much progress has been made in the consolidation of global goals that will contribute to the construction of a just, equitable and sustainable society ?; from the School of Business and all its instances, scientific research will continue to be promoted as part of its core activity on the construction of knowledge for its different actors, because according to MinCiencias (2019) "#ElConocimientoNosHaceGrandes". ; 2019 para la ciencia en Colombia ha sido un hito tras la estructuración oficial del Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (MinCiencias), escalando las decisiones de investigación, desarrollo e innovación en el ejecutivo y cuyo principal reto será en los próximos años continuar en el proceso de construir país desde el conocimiento, la tecnología, las capacidades científicas y la articulación de la academia, el sector productivo y las organizaciones del jefe del estado; desafíos que exigen una construcción colectiva de parte de la autoridad principal y las distintas instituciones, grupos, centros de investigación y desarrollo tecnológico, pero en especial de los investigadores en todos sus ámbitos. Se suma a la creación del Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación, el trabajo liderado por la Misión de Sabios, quienes han definido como hoja de ruta para el desarrollo de la ciencia en Colombia ocho ejes temáticos constituidos en: 1. Biotecnología, bioeconomía y medio ambiente, 2. Ciencias básicas y del espacio, 3. Ciencias de la vida y la salud, 4. Ciencias sociales, desarrollo y equidad, 5. Energía sostenible, 6. Industrias creativas y culturales, 7. Océanos y recursos hidrobiológicos y 8. Tecnologías convergentes, nano, info y cogno industrias 4.0; áreas estratégicas que orientan las formulaciones y decisiones lideradas en diferentes actividades que impulsen la formación y el compromiso con la investigación científica. La revista Liderazgo Estratégico adscrita a la Facultad de Administración y Negocios de la Universidad Simón Bolívar, reafirma su labor con la formación y fomento de la ciencia, tecnología e innovación en los noveles investigadores de Colombia, posicionándose como un órgano de apropiación social de conocimiento de las ciencias administrativas, económicas y contables, consolidando en su noveno volumen nuevas publicaciones como resultado del trabajo articulado de profesores y estudiantes, así como del análisis y argumentación crítica de los principales debates en el ámbito académico de las distintas disciplinas que se vinculan a la facultad. A puertas de un 2020 se vislumbran desafíos trascendentales para la actividad científica no solo en Colombia y la región latinoamericana, sino consolidándose perspectivas globales que instan a los investigadores en la continua construcción de una sociedad basada en el conocimiento, se fortalece una industria inteligente y autónoma basada en la denominada cuarta revolución industrial promotora de eficiencia y productividad, la innovación y la tecnología avanzan a ritmos que promueven la transformación de paradigmas en la sociedad y se cumple el primer quinquenio de la declaración mundial de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) ¿qué tanto se ha avanzado en la consolidación de las metas mundiales que contribuirán a la construcción de una sociedad justa, equitativa y sostenible?; desde la Facultad de Administración y Negocios y todas sus instancias se continuará promoviendo la investigación científica como parte de su actividad misional en la construcción de conocimiento para sus diferentes actores, porque de acuerdo con MinCiencias (2019) "#ElConocimientoNosHaceGrandes".

The blue economy can be a driver of sustainable economic development, but it is both subject and a contributor to climate change and environmental degradation.Ocean health starts with freshwater health, but freshwater and ocean policies are disconnected, and water security is a blind spot in blue economy strategies.Subnational governments are competent in policy areas that can improve water quality, such as water and sanitation, waste management and land use; and their investment responsibilities in grey and green infrastructure can foster resilience to growing water risks.1. Understanding the blue economyThere is no single definition of blue, ocean or marine economy, which are often used. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines the ocean economy as "the sum of the economic activities of ocean-based industries, together with the assets, goods and services provided by marine ecosystems" (OECD, 2016), and divides ocean-based into "established" and "emerging" sectors. The classification of sectors differs from one framework to another: the EC and UN-World Bank propose a synthesised classification of 14 and 15 sectors respectively, while the OECD has a more detailed classification of 21 sectors (see table 1).Considering only established sectors, the OECD conservatively valued the ocean economy at USD 1.5 trillion annually in 2010, accounting for around 2.5% of global GDP and 30 million direct job. In a business-as-usual scenario, in 2030, these sectors are anticipated to employ over 40 million people and to grow to more than USD 3 trillion, maintaining its share of 2.5% of total global GVA (Gross Value Added). Across almost all sectors, employment would grow faster than average for the world economy.Economic growth and employment in many countries, regions and cities hinge upon water and ocean-based economic activities. For instance, Cambodia's blue economy has been valued at USD 2.4 billion in 2015, accounting for around 16% of the country's GDP and 2.4 million jobs (World Bank, 2023). In the state of California (United States), 1 in 9 jobs connects to port-related activity; in the state of Louisiana, the inland Port of South Louisiana ranks first in the country in terms of dry bulk cargo handled. In Barcelona (Spain), 15 000 people are employed in the blue economy, while in the region of Andalusia,the ocean economy accounts for around 10% of workers and 10.5% of GDP. However, given the range of differing definitions of the blue economy or ocean economy across countries, regions and cities, these estimates are challenging to compare – even within the same jurisdiction. For instance, the blue economy strategy of the city of Barcelona (Spain) highlights that estimates of the value of the blue economy are not comparable between the city, the region and the central government, as all three levels of government have different definitions of its scope. The blue economy also includes the ecosystem services or non-market benefits provided by freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems (e.g. natural river systems, wetlands, mangroves and coral reefs), such as carbon storage, flood protection, food provision and cultural values. Globally, ecosystem services are worth 1.5 times total GDP (OECD, 2021). In the European Union, an average EUR 400 billion of ecosystem services are generated on a 10km coastal zone (European Commission, 2023). Coral ecosystems alone contribute an estimated USD 172 billion per year to the world economy with benefits such as food and raw materials, water purification, recreation and biodiversity (OECD, 2022). Mangroves across several Indonesian regions provide valuable ecosystem services (e.g., coastal protection, climate regulation, raw materials provision) that contribute to human wellbeing, providing on average USD 15 000 and 50 000 per hectare per year in benefits in Java and Bali respectively (WWF, 2022). Investing in natural assets such as mangroves and coral reefs can be beneficial for tourism as well as flood protection, carbon capture and biodiversity. For instance, investing USD 1 in mangrove conservation and restoration can generate a financial, environmental and health benefit of USD 3-17 over a 30-year period (Ocean Panel, 2020).The blue economy holds some of the keys to unlocking the energy transition. Water-based renewable energy (e.g. offshore wind power, floating solar panels or tidal energy) can power the clean energy transition; aquaculture solutions (e.g. oyster reefs) can mitigate coastal flood risks; and blue bioeconomy and biotechnology (e.g. seaweed farming) can capture carbon and nutrient pollution. The number of global ocean renewable energy inventions grew 7% annually on average between 2000 and 2019 (OECD, 2023). Offshore wind provided just 0.3% of global electricity supply in 2018, but it has the potential to generate more than 420 000 terawatt-hours per year worldwide, which represents 18 times current global electricity demand (OECD, 2022).However, the blue economy can be an important source of carbon emissions, pollution and other environmental stressors. Maritime transport alone accounted for almost 3% of global CO2 emissions in 2018, and pollution from shipping (e.g. noise, untreated sewage and oil spills) affects both freshwater and marine habitats and biodiversity. Moreover, ghost fishing gear contributes to around 10% of plastic pollution in the ocean (Greenpeace, 2019), and resource-intensive activities such as tourism and coastal development can be large water abstractors and waste generators. For example, coastal tourism in Greece leads to a 26% increase in plastic waste influx, contributing to the 11 500 tonnes of plastic leaking into the Mediterranean every year, 28% of which stems from sea-based sources such as ghost fishing equipment (WWF, 2019). An international review of water use in tourism suggested that direct water use in tourism varied between 80 to 2000 litres per tourist per day, depending on the geographic location and the type of hotel (Gössling et al., 2012), significantly above the average consumption of 124 litres per day in Europe (EurEau, 2021).Several blue economy strategies consider the importance of "greening" the blue economy (e.g. through decarbonisation or pollution mitigation) and preserving ocean and coastal ecosystems. For instance, Portugal's National Ocean Strategy (2021-20230) has 9 strategic goals including decarbonisation, supporting the country's efforts to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 while improving the health of marine and coastal ecosystems. At subnational level, the state of Washington's (US) Maritime Blue Strategy (2022) aims to accelerate the decarbonisation of its maritime industry through technological innovations, infrastructure, and incentives to facilitate local, coastal, and international maritime operations (e.g. modernisation of state and regional ferries and shore-side infrastructure with cleaner low-carbon fuels). Similarly, the Port of Vigo's (Spain) Blue Growth Plan (2021-2027) has set a target to become a carbon sink by 2030 by increasing renewable energy use in port operations and business activities, using cleaner alternative fuels such as hydrogen on ships, and fostering seabed regeneration and CO2 sequestration through artificial reefs, for instance.Recognising the potential of the blue economy for sustainable economic development and the need to protect coastal and marine ecosystems, a growing number of international declarations and frameworks aim to boost its contribution to sustainable development agendas. Against the backdrop of the Paris Agreement on climate, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (2015) and the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030), the blue economy discussion has seen:• Statements of intent making the blue economy a priority for sustainable economic development at global and regional levels, with the Nairobi Statement of Intent on Advancing the Global Sustainable Blue Economy (2018), the Jakarta Declaration on Blue Economy (2017) and the Communication on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the European Union (2021). • Guiding principles for a sustainable blue economy including the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 14 – Life below water), UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles and the Chennai High-Level Principles on Sustainable and Resilient Blue/Ocean-based Economy (2023) adopted by members of the G20. • International treaties aiming to protect the ocean from existing and emerging stressors, such as the ongoing meetings of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee established to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment (2022-2024), and the Treaty on the High Seas adopted by the UN General Assembly's Intergovernmental Conference on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (2023).• However, few of these national strategies, declarations and frameworks recognise subnational governments' crucial role in marine and freshwater conservation, water-related risk prevention and the blue economy. Recognising that subnational governments have a key but often underexploited role to play in unleashing the potential of a sustainable blue economy, the OECD programme on Cities and Regions for a Blue Economy aims to shed light on how a territorial approach to the blue economy can leverage place-based policies and subnational government competences to accelerate efforts towards sustainable blue economies.2. Water security as a condition for thriving blue economiesShedding light on the link between the blue economy and water securityClimate change magnifies water risks, which the OECD (n.d.) defines as "the risk of too much, too little, too polluted water and disruption to freshwater systems", by affecting the water cycle: more than 90% of natural disasters are related to water (UNEP, n.d.). Achieving water security means maintaining acceptable levels of these four water risks (OECD, 2013). Rooted in seas, coasts, rivers or lakes, blue economy sectors are particularly vulnerable to water-related risks in freshwater, coastal and marine environments, which are inextricably linked to one another. For instance, 72% of fish and invertebrate species representing 77% of total catch are estimated to be linked to river flows at some point in their life cycle (Broadley et al., 2022).Water risks can have severe economic impacts, especially in cities, which generate around 60% of GDP and employment in OECD countries. For example, a drought can cost up to 6% of GDP per annum by 2050 (World Bank, 2016), reduce a city's economic growth by up to 12% (Zaveri et al., 2021) and damage buildings and infrastructure due to the expansion and retraction of soils and land subsidence. Droughts, floods, and storms could wipe USD 5.6 trillion from global GDP between 2022 and 2050 (Aquanomics, 2023). "Too little" water can make rivers too shallow for fluvial transport or energy generation, with ripple effects beyond the blue economy. Shipping on the Rhine river was down 27% in 2018 due to low water levels, leading German industrial production to fall by 1.5%, and the production of chemicals and pharmaceuticals to drop by 10% for three months (OECD, 2023). Since mid-August, the persistent drought in the Panama Canal region has compelled authorities to impose traffic restrictions, resulting in a bottleneck of more than 100 large vessels transporting commodities thought to be worth billions of dollars (Earth.org, 2023). The Panama Canal anticipates a reduction of approximately USD 200 million in revenue during its upcoming fiscal year due to these crossing restrictions (Reuters, 2023).Floods, sea level rise and coastal erosion can disrupt marine and freshwater ecosystems while damaging waterfront infrastructure and assets such as ports and shipyards. With almost 11% of the global population living in Low Elevation Coastal Zones in 2020 (IPCC, 2022), sea level rise is projected to affect 800 million people living in one of the 570 cities exposed to sea level rise of at least 0.5 metre (C40 Cities, 2018). In the state of California (US), which has the largest ocean economy in the country valued at over USD 44 billion annually, USD 8-10 billion of existing property value is likely to be underwater by 2050, and an additional USD 6-10 billion to be at risk during high tides. In the San Francisco Bay Area alone, 104 000 existing jobs and the creation of 85 000 new jobs could be threatened by sea-level rise in the next 40-100 years (Ocean & Climate Platform, 2023).Water pollution from land-based sources can wreak havoc on both freshwater and marine ecosystems. Currently, about 60% of plastic marine debris is estimated to originate from urban centres, and around 80% of marine pollution comes from land-based sources such as untreated sewage (UNEP, 2021). The cost of water pollution exceeds billions of US dollars annually in OECD countries (OECD, 2017): for instance, in the US, the loss in lakefront property values due to nutrient pollution, which causes eutrophication and can trigger toxic algal blooms, has been estimated to cost between USD 300 million and USD 2.8 billion. Plastic pollution affects rivers and oceans alike: to date, 30 mega tonnes (Mt) of plastics have accumulated oceans, but more than triple that amount – 109 Mt – has piled up in rivers (OECD, 2022). Plastic pollution alone costs fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand USD 23 million per year (IUCN, 2020) and around EUR 13 million per year to the Scottish fishing industry (KIMO, 2010).Exacerbated by climate change, phenomena such as acidification, freshwater and marine heatwaves adversely impact fisheries, tourism and the ecosystem services provided by waterbodies (e.g. recreation, carbon capture and water purification). Marine heatwaves, whose frequency has doubled since the 1980s, can cause long-lasting or irreversible damage to many marine species, leading to mass mortality events and ultimately threating food security (OCP, 2023). Ocean warming and acidification cause damage to coral reefs (e.g. bleaching), which increases coastal flood risk and dampens reef-related tourism. In the state of Queensland (Australia), for example, the bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef could cause the loss of 1 million visitors to the region each year, equivalent to at least AUD 1 billion in tourism spending and 10 000 jobs (Australian Climate Council, 2017). In the state of Florida (US), coral reef degradation could increase the coastal flood risk to more than 7 300 people, costing an additional USD 823 million every year (Storlazzi et al., 2023).Water security in blue economy policyDespite the intrinsic link between water resilience and economic resilience, water security is generally a blind spot of national and subnational blue economy strategies, which tend to focus on boosting blue economy growth. Nevertheless, some blue economy strategies make the connection between the blue economy and water security. For instance, the US Blue Economy Strategic Plan (2021) piloted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) aims to increase the resilience of the country's coasts and oceans as well as the Great Lakes communities. The Blue Economy Vision for Scotland (2022) insists that the country's marine and inter-linked freshwater and coastal environments need to be sustainably managed, restored and resilient to climate change.Protecting and restoring the coastal and marine environment is considered in some strategies, but the resilience of coastal and marine environments and related economic activities is not often linked to freshwater resilience. This may be due to most blue economy strategies being led by government departments responsible for economic development or oceans, and freshwater and oceans often belonging to separate departments. Globally, government entities responsible for ocean health are often not the decision-makers or regulators of many of the activities that threaten its well-being in freshwater and on land (SIWI, 2020). The IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (2019) highlights that water-related governance arrangements (e.g., marine protected areas, spatial plans and water management systems) are often too fragmented across administrative boundaries and sectors to provide integrated responses to the increasing and cascading risks from climate-related changes in the ocean and/or cryosphere. A counter-example is the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, a newly created government entity responsible for protecting, restoring and ensuring the sustainable use of freshwater and marine resources, including fisheries management. Similarly, one of the departmental mandates of Fisheries and Oceans Canada is to protect oceans, freshwater and aquatic ecosystems through science, in collaboration with indigenous communities.3. The case for resilient, inclusive, sustainable and circular (RISC-proof) blue economies: a comprehensive frameworkThe blue economy has both a direct (e.g. pollution) and indirect (e.g. climate change) impact on freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems. The literature reveals the dual dynamics at play. On the one hand, the blue economy is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, which mainly manifests through disruptions to the water cycle. This underscores the need for a blue economy that is resilient to climate change and inclusive of local communities adversely affected by water-related risks. On the other hand, as a potentially significant source of carbon emissions and pollution, blue economies should embrace sustainability by striking a balance between economic growth and environmental preservation while integrating circularity to minimise waste and promote resource efficiency.The OECD programme on Cities and Regions for a Blue Economy therefore suggests a framework encapsulating four dimensions that national and subnational governments ought to consider in the context of the blue economy: resilience, inclusiveness, sustainability and circularity (Figure 1). The Programme suggests that governments should aim for a blue economy that is:• Resilient to water-related risks exacerbated by climate change by using tools to ensure water security (e.g. disaster risk reduction, nature-based solutions, water pollution prevention, etc.). For example, in the French overseas archipelago of Guadeloupe, 400 companies in the fields of commerce, services and fishing experienced a combined revenue loss of nearly EUR 5 million in the first half of 2015 alone as a result of sargassum proliferation (CCI-IG, 2016). To tackle this issue, Guadeloupe joined the Sargassum Algae Cooperation Programme, which aims to strengthen the resilience of Caribbean territories by facilitating knowledge-sharing for sargassum management and valuation (e.g. to decontaminate agricultural soils loaded with pesticides).• Inclusive of local communities and stakeholders through engagement, employment opportunities in the blue economy and the protection of the most vulnerable (e.g. those living in informal settlements or sub-standard housing) from water risks. For example, the 2018 Maritime Strategy of Catalonia (Spain) prioritises community-led fishing management structures based on co-management, where each stakeholder interested in achieving sustainable fishing can participate with equal decision-making power and take on shared responsibilities in the co-management process. The strategy also aims to increase the share of women employed in fisheries and aquaculture, as they currently make up just 2.6% of the Catalan workforce in the sector. The Seine-Normandie Water Agency (France) organised Water Stakeholder Forums in 2022 to discuss the implementation of the Water Development and Management Plan (SDAGE) for 2022-2027 with around 900 local stakeholders. The Plan includes measures to protect and restore wetlands while limiting new coastal developments; collect and treat wastewater discharges from ports, boats, and campsites; and anticipate the need for drinking water in areas of demographic and tourist development to control water abstraction and prevent saline intrusion.• Sustainable environmentally, by limiting greenhouse gas emissions and pollution from blue economy sectors, sustainably managing coastal, marine and freshwater resources (e.g. fish and minerals) and conserving freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems (e.g. wetlands). To promote sustainability, the Port of Seattle's (US) Smith Cove Blue Carbon Pilot Project is restoring underwater habitats and biodiversity, particularly with oysters, to sequester carbon, filter water and mitigate flood risk. In the port of Valencia (Spain), CO2 emissions dropped 30% between 2008 and 2019 despite activity growing 42%, due to initiatives such as fleet replacement with hybrid and electric vehicles, the adoption of cleaner fuels like liquid natural gas (LNG) and hydrogen, and the upgrade of lighting systems in port areas.• Circular, to foster resource efficiency and reduce waste, by using resources efficiently and keeping resources in use for as long as possible, preventing waste and transforming waste and/or by-products into resources. As part of a circular economy, the city of Rotterdam, Netherlands has created Blue City in 2019, a platform and accelerator for circular entrepreneurs that contribute to reducing waste and pollution by reusing existing products and materials. The nautical and naval industries of the region of New Aquitaine (France) and the state of Washington (US) carry out repair activities to maintain existing commercial and recreational vessels, thus keeping existing resources in use for as long as possible.To foster resilient, inclusive, sustainable and circular blue economies, the preliminary results of the OECD Programme on Cities and Regions for a Blue Economy point to three emerging priorities.First, better explore the role of subnational governments. Few of the mounting international declarations and agreements and national strategies related to oceans and the blue economy recognise the importance of a localised approach that leverages the role of place-based solutions, even though many of the most powerful tools for water security – land use, spatial planning, waste and water management – are in the hands of subnational governments. Cities and regions can also invest in infrastructure and nature-based solutions to mitigate flood risk and improve the resilience of local economies. They are also guardians of local culture and traditions linked to water-related economic activities, which can help ensure that solutions win the approval and active support of local communities. More broadly, cities and regions are crucial to achieving the SDGs: at least 105 of the 169 SDG targets will not be achieved without proper engagement and co-ordination with local and regional governments (OECD, 2020).Second, foster policy coherence across oceans, freshwater and land. Ocean and freshwater decision-making are often disconnected from one another, even though healthy oceans start with healthy freshwater. If freshwater and land do not have a seat at the ocean decision-making table, the ocean's main environmental stressors risk being overlooked. Similarly, coastal and inland cities cannot be disconnected from the basins they sit in. Basin organisations, which are set up by political authorities, or in response to stakeholder demands, deal with water resource management issues in river basins, lake basins, or across important aquifers. They can help cities and regions tackle the risks of "too much", "too little" and "too polluted" water and unlock the potential of the blue economy through engaging stakeholders across catchments, planning, coordination, data collection and monitoring.Third, create the right enabling environment. For a resilient, inclusive, sustainable and circular blue economy to thrive in cities and regions, technical solutions are not enough. Subnational governments need to find new funding mechanisms to support marine and freshwater protection; set sound incentives and frameworks to catalyse investments; develop partnerships with private actors, community organisations, cooperatives, think tanks and research institutes and stimulate blue entrepreneurship; create synergies across policies such as spatial planning, waste, energy, transport that affect the quantity and quality of water; and foster dialogue between scientists and policy makers, amongst others. These solutions are outlined in the Multi-Stakeholder Pledge on Localising the Blue Economy developed by the OECD in partnership with Atlantic Cities, International Association of Cities and Ports (AIVP), ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability, International Network of Basin Organisations (INBO), Ocean & Climate Platform, Resilient Cities Network, and United Cities and Local Governments Africa (UCLG-Africa).4. ConclusionThe blue economy is gaining traction as a means of combining economic growth with environmental protection, health and wellbeing. Considered as the sum of economic activities taking places in oceans, coasts, rivers and lakes, the blue economy can be a powerful driver of sustainable development in coastal and inland cities, regions and countries. However, the blue economy is both subject and a contributor to climate change, water risks and environmental degradation. This raises the need for a blue economy that is resilient to climate change; inclusive of local communities; sustainable, by balancing economic growth with environmental preservation; and circular, to minimise waste and promote resource efficiency. A review of the existing literature, including international declarations and agreements, national and subnational strategies related to the ocean and blue economy, reveals that water security and subnational governments are often absent from considerations. Further research may focus on:• Elucidating the link between freshwater and marine ecosystems and the blue economy;• Highlighting how the blue economy can both magnify water risks (e.g. through unsustainable fishing practices and coastal development) and mitigate them (e.g. through sustainable aquaculture and ecosystem-based approaches to coastal management);• Documenting how "territorialising" the blue economy, i.e. tailoring blue economy strategies and policies to local and regional needs, marine and freshwater ecosystems, cultural practices and economic priorities, can make measures more effective and integrated, with co-benefits for other policy areas (e.g. climate mitigation, climate adaptation and water security);• Better understanding roles and responsibilities across levels of government in managing ocean, coastal and freshwater resources based on institutional frameworks, capacities and priorities.Authors: Oriana Romano, Head of Unit, Water Governance, Blue and Circular Economy, OECD Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Regions and Cities (CFE)Juliette Lassman, Policy Analyst, Water Governance, Blue and Circular Economy, OECD Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Regions and Cities (CFE)Georges Laimé, Junior Policy Analyst, Water Governance, Blue and Circular Economy, OECD Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Regions and Cities (CFE)

학위논문 (석사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사범대학 체육교육과,글로벌스포츠매니지먼트전공, 2020. 8. Yongho Lee. ; 국문초록 신체활동과 완성의 실천권(스포츠)은 인간이 창조된 이래의 기본적 인권이다. 패럴림픽 스포츠는 특히 용기, 결단력, 평등, 영감을 보편적으로 유지시키고 최소의 비용으로 높은 영향력을 행사한다. 장애인스포츠 개발은 불가피하게 정책의호의성 정도와 지방당국, 중앙정부 및 다른 개발파트너들의 역동성에 의존한다. 카메룬에서의 법적프레임 워크의 평가는 2004년과 2018년에 통과되고 지방개발과 통치가 그들의 핵심추진력이라는 지방분권법을 밝히게되었다. 본 연구의 제목은 패럴림픽 스포츠발전에 대한시의회(MC)의 역할과 카메룬의 지속가능한 개발(SD)에 미치는 영향이다. 본연구의 목표는 카메룬에서 2016-18년 기간 동안의 정책, 조직구성, 인적자원개발전략, 장애인스포츠시설 소유 및 관리, 장애인스포츠 개발 예산할당, 장애인스포츠 및 기타경기 조직 등을 탐구함으로써 장애인스포츠발전에 대한 MC들의 역할 및 공헌을 알리는것이다. 본 연구는 카메룬에서의 장애인스포츠 개발과정은 정책, 제도적틀, 인적자원, 그리고 모든 이해당사자들이 장애인스포츠 개발을 완전히 실행할 수 있는 재정준비상태에 달려있다고 주장한다. 기존 연구에 따르면 카메룬의 스포츠는 기술, 사회-경제, 문화, 특히 정부의 주도적 영향과 종종 축구에 주어지는 우선 순위의 다수에 직면해있다(Joanne Clarke & John Ojo, 2017). 이것이 유엔기구가 2015년 회원국들에 대한 결의안 A/RES/70/1을 채택하고, 세계적으로 인간 삶의 질을 개선하기 위한 청사진으로 17개의 SDG (Sustainable Développent Goals) Agenda 2030을 채택한 이유를 설명한다(UN, 2018) 상기 고려사항을 기반으로 장애인 스포츠에 대한 관심이 커지고 있으며, 최근 몇년 동안 정부가 더 이상 그 다양성과 범위에서 스포츠 발전을 위한 모든 것을 단일적이고 공평하게 제공할 수 없다는 사실을 인지하였다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 카메룬 스포츠 산업의 지속가능한 개발을 위한 수단으로서 2016, 2018년 기간 동안 장애인 스포츠의 개발에 대한 시의회들의 역할과 카메룬의 지속가능한 발전에 미치는 영향에 초점을 맞추었다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 목표를 달성하기 위하여 제1장에서는 서론, 제2장 문헌검토, 제3장 방법론, 제4장 결과, 제5장 논의와 제안으로구성하였다. 연구는 다음과 같은 데이터 수집과 분석으로 진행했다. 대상으로 두 시의회를 고려했으며 첫번째는 Yaoundé VI Etoug-Ebe, 두번째는 Yaoundé III Efoulan으로 선택하였다. 연구방법으로 자료수집은 문헌검토, 설문 및 인터뷰를 시행하였다. 총 50명의 응답자를 대상으로 설문을 실시하였고, 총 40명의 응답을 데이터를 이용하였으며 온라인 인터뷰는 총 12명을 대상으로 실시하였다. 데이터 수집의 과정을 용이하게 하기위해, 설문지는 시의회 정책, 예산할당, 경기조직, 스포츠시설의 소유와관리, 운동선수와 직원의 전환, 고정관념과 같은 주제들에 초점을 맞추었다. 수집된 데이터 분석 결과는 다음과같다: 시의회들은 장애인스포츠 개발을 촉진하기 위해 효과적인 정책이 필요하고, 스포츠교육과 스포츠의 실천과 학습을 용이하게 하기 위한 스포츠시설을 소유하고 관리할 필요가 있으며, 인적자원의 개발이 필요한 것으로 나타났다. 또한시의회들은이와같은지속가능한개발을촉진할준비가되어있고의지가있으며, 2030년까지지속가능한개발의이점을충분히얻기위해 NPC, UCCC, 국제지방당국연합, 카메룬의다른시의회,그리고해외사이에상호연계가필요하다고나타났다. 따라서 본 연구는 각 시의회에 장애자문위원회(DAC)를 조직하고, 위원장은 UCCC 위원으로 공동활동을 할 것으로 제안한다. 또한 장애인 스포츠 발전을 위한 기금은 총회중 DAC 위원장이 만들고, 관리하고, 책임지고 UCCC와 각 시의회는 스포츠교육, 레저, 레크리에이션의 실천을위한 시설을 저렴한 비용으로 조성 및 재활용해야할 것을 제안한다. 주요어: 지속가능한개발, 패럴림픽스포츠, 시의회 ; Abstract The role of Municipal Councils on Paralympics sports development and its impacts on Sustainable Development in Cameroon OBEN Philip Apai Global Sport Management, Department of Physical Education The Graduate School Seoul National University The right to the practice of physical activity and sports is a fundamental Human Right since human creation. The Paralympics sports has the immense build-in virtues notably courage, determination, equality and inspiration. These values remain universal, least costs yet uphold high impacts, and which would hardly be harnessed by any other normative activity away from Para sports. Para sport development in any context inevitably relies on the extent of the dynamism of the actors involves precisely local authorities, central governments, and other development partners. In Cameroon, an assessment of its legal framework would reveal that the decentralization laws were passed in 2004 and 2018 with local development and governance as key thrust The title of my research is the role of Municipal Councils (MCs) on Paralympics sports development and its impacts on sustainable development (SD) in Cameroon. My key aim is to inform on the active role/contributions of MCs on the development of Para sports in the domains of policies, organizational set up, human resources development strategies, ownership and management of Para sports facilities, budget allocation for Para sports development, and the organization of Para sports and other competitions during the period 2016 and 2018 in Cameroon I claim that the process of Para sports development in Cameroon like elsewhere depends on policies, institutional frameworks, available and equipped human resources, and financial readiness to enable all stakeholders to fully initiate and implement Para sports development initiatives. Academic literature reveal that sports in Cameroon is faced with a plurality of technological, socio-economic, cultural, and especially Government-led influences with priority often given to football (Joanne & John, 2017). However, in order to optimize the gains from sports development, the UN adopted Resolution A/RES/70/1 in 2015 for member states, known as 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Agenda 2030 as blueprint to improve on the quality of human life globally It is with the above considerations, the growing interests in Para sports as a vehicle for the SD of the Cameroonian sports industry, and the fact that Governments in recent years can no longer single and even-handedly provide everything for sports development in its diversity and scope (Holly Collison…et al, 2019), that I shall focus on the role of MCs on the development of Para sports and its impacts on sustainable development in Cameroon during the period 2016 to 2018 In order to attain the above-mentioned objective, I considered two (2) MCs; Yaoundé VI (big), and Efoulan Yaoundé III (small yet sensitive MC) for my data collection and analyses. Equally, to facilitate the understanding and evolution of my study, it shall be presented in five chapters as follows: chapter one shall treat the introduction, chapter two- literature review, chapter three-methods I used for data collection and analyses, chapter four- results, and chapter five- discussions and recommendation As a research procedure, I stated with data collection from my literature review, the administration of questions to both MCs, and documents from the libraries of the Universities of Yaoundé 1&11, Buea, and Seoul National Universities. I targeted a total population of fifty (50) participants but effectively got data from forty (40) participants. Twelve (12) semi-structured and twenty eight (28) structured questions in total were administered. In order to facilitate the process of data collection, my questions were focused on themes such as MCs policies, budget allocation, organization of competitions, ownership and management of sports facilities, athletes and staff transition, and stereotypes By and large, the socio-political, and security situations in Cameroon prohibited public gatherings, and retarded my data collection schedule. The following conclusions were arrived at the end of my study: that MCs need effective policies in order to foster Para sports development; that MCs need to own and manage sports facilities to ease the practice and learning of PE and sports for all; that there is readiness and willing by MCs to promote sustainable development; that there is need for human resource development; that there is need for an inter alia between the NPC, UCCC, International Union of Local Authorities, other MCs in Cameroon and abroad for engage the process of SD, and facilitate benefits of Para sports by 2030 in Cameroon. It was deduced from data collected that a Disability Advisory Committee (DAC) be created in each MCs to serve as the technical organ, and that a chairperson of DAC be co-opted as a member of the UCCC, that a Solidarity Fund for the development of Para sports be created by the 360 MCs in Cameroon. This fund should be managed and be accountable for by the chairperson of DAC during the General Assembly meetings of the UCCC and also that each MC should create and/or rehabilitate a permanent space, and facilities for the practice of PE, leisure and recreation for all at affordable costs Keywords: Sustainable Development, Paralympics Sports, Municipal Councils ; CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background to the study 2 1.2 Statement of the problem 4 1.2.1 Research Purpose 4 1.2.2 Research Questions 5 1.2.3 Justification and significance of this study 5 1.2.4 Area of research study Cameroon 7 1.2.5 Definition of basic concepts and notions 9 Sustainable Development 10 Municipal Council 10 Physical Activity 10 Sports 11 Condition and impairment 11 Functional classification 11 2.1 Strategies for Paralympic sports development and SD in Cameroon 16 2.1.1 Disability Advisory Committee DAC 16 2.1.2 Terms of Reference 16 2.1.3 Duties and areas the DAC should be consulted upon 17 2.1.4 Functions of the DAC 17 2.1.5 Membership and Composition of DAC 18 2.1.6 Criterion for the selection of DAC Members 18 2.1.8 Treatment of vacancies at DAC 19 2.1.9 Expression of Interest through a public advertising process in DAC 19 2.1.10 Treatment of observers at DAC 20 CHAPTER 3. METHODS 25 3.1 Sample Size of population for the present study 25 3.2 Measurements 26 3.3 Data collection methods and analyses used in my research 30 3.3.3 Stage 2: Creation of initial codes 29 3.3.4 Stage 5: Define themes 31 3.3.5 Stage 6: Writing-up 31 3.4 Research Design 32 3.4.1 Data collection process 33 3.4.2 Semi-structured Questions/Interviews 34 3.4.3 Observations 34 3.4.4 Data Analyses 35 3.4.5 Triangulation, peer examination, member-checking 36 3.4.6 Audit Trail 36 3.4.7 Role I played in this Research 36 3.5 Primary Research 37 3.5.1 Secondary research 37 3.5.2 Measurement 37 3.5.3 Selection of the topic 38 CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 42 4.1 Personally Enrichment 42 4.2 Sports development and growth 43 4.3 Research Enhancements 44 4.4 Impacts of Para sports on Sustainable Development in Cameroon 44 4.5 Challenges of SDGs 48 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 49 5.1 Conclusion 49 5.2 Recommendations 50 5.3 Limitations 51 5.4 Future Research 52 References 53 ; Master

The Angkor. The Mayans. The Indus Valley.
A common element played a crucial role in the rise and fall of these ancient civilisations: water. Their ability to control, manage, and utilise water, through intricate networks of reservoirs, canals and storage facilities, allowed them to build thriving societies. They helped agriculture to flourish all year round and sustain large populations, whether to cultivate rice in Angkor in what is modern-day Cambodia, maize and beans in Central America for the Mayans, or wheat and barley in the Indus Valley in South Asia.
It was also water that doomed these civilisations. A combination of misuse and environmental changes, such as shifts in monsoon patterns and severe, prolonged droughts, contributed to their decline, research has shown.[1] Mass migration and the abandonment of urban centres ensued. Centuries on, these civilisations continue to fascinate and captivate scholars and ordinary people alike, yet the world seems to have missed the most relevant lesson: water security is key to stability and prosperity.
Not only is water essential for the functioning of the human body, it is also the basis of agriculture, which is especially important as the global population inches northward of 8 billion people. A community's fortune is directly related to its proximity and access to safe, clean water, whether to prevent the spread of waterborne diseases, improve sanitation and hygiene, or power industrial processes, energy production and transportation.
Unfortunately, a water crisis is brewing due to a potent mix of climate change and mismanagement (from overuse and contamination to inequitable distribution and the destruction of watersheds). Roughly half of the world's population is already experiencing severe water scarcity for at least part of the year.[2]
Yet water security and governance often take a back seat in international and national discussions around food, climate change and security, even though experts have called the climate crisis "a water resilience crisis".[3] The topics remain under-researched. The 2015 Paris Agreement did not mention water once.[4] Recommendations from the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit did not fully address the role of water. In March 2023, the United Nations finally convened the first global conference on water in 50 years, but there were no binding resolutions.
The presence of separate policies, agencies, and funding streams for water, agriculture, and environmental protection also often leads to "fragmented approaches where water security is not adequately integrated into food security strategies", said Nathaniel Matthews, Visiting Professor at King's College London and former Chief Executive Officer of the non-profit Global Resilience Partnership.[5]
Water must become a key part of climate negotiations and food security discussions at all levels. Governments, corporations and individuals must share a collective responsibility in the usage and protection of water resources. Failure to collaborate in the effective managing and distribution of this finite resource is likely to have severe repercussions on global hunger and climate action.The water-food-climate nexus
The sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has already warned that drought and flood risks and societal damages from these disasters are expected to increase with every degree of global warming. In large areas of northern South America, the Mediterranean, western China and high latitudes in North America and Eurasia, "extreme agricultural droughts" may become increasingly common as global temperatures rise: they could be at least twice as likely with a 1.5°C warming, 150 to 200 per cent more likely at 2°C, and over 200 per cent at 4°C.[6] Agricultural drought happens when soil moisture is low and insufficient for plant growth, causing crops to dry out, wrote the European Union's Copernicus programme.[7]
This creates a dilemma: the world will need more water to grow crops and raise animals just as it becomes scarce. The most tangible and pressing impacts could indeed emerge in food production. Agriculture is already the largest user of water worldwide, accounting for more than 70 per cent of freshwater withdrawals.[8] In some developing countries, agriculture's water usage can be as high as 95 per cent. On average, it takes 1,432 litres of water to produce a kilogram of rice in an irrigated lowland production system,[9] nearly 6,000 litres for a kilogram of pork, and more than 15,000 litres for a kilogram of beef.[10]
Farming is also a major source of water pollution, arising primarily from the run-off of nutrients, pesticides and other contaminants into water bodies, and posing potential risks to both human and planetary health. At the same time, water-related disasters, particularly drought and scarcity, are already wreaking havoc on nations rich and poor.
In Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, a severe drought linked to El Niño has wrecked crops, pushed up food prices, and caused an estimated 20 million people to face acute hunger. In Asia, a "punishing heat wave" has threatened the production of wheat and other crops in India and caused rice prices to soar in Indonesia. Rain deficit and record-high temperatures in January 2024 had an impact on both shores of the Mediterranean, hitting winter crops and fruit trees on the coasts of Spain, Italy and Greece, and causing a reduction in crop growth in Morocco and Algeria, as reported by the EU's Joint Research Centre.[11]
Yet the world has been extracting water as if it is an inexhaustible resource. Over the last century, global water use has increased at more than twice the rate of population growth.[12] In the United States, a groundwater crisis is looming, mainly as a result of overexploitation, including from agriculture.
Furthermore, as awareness of water stress rises, it is critical that adaptation actions in one country do not worsen the situation in another. For example, if India's water-short farmers were to adopt more efficient methods of irrigation, cutting evaporation from their fields, farmers in East Africa might see less rainfall and worsening drought, as evaporation and subsequent moisture flows from large-scale irrigated farming in India contribute up to 40 per cent of rainfall in East Africa.[13] In turn, a reduction in rainfall in key months could have knock-on effects on crop productivity, food security, and migration, that might lead to wider repercussions including social unrest.[14]
"We face a systemic crisis of water, which is both local and global", the Global Commission on the Economics of Water, a group of experts, community leaders, and policymakers, wrote in its landmark report last year.[15] The same report added that demand for freshwater is expected to outstrip its supply by 40 per cent by the end of this decade.Elevate, collaborate, adapt and mitigate
Averting this crisis requires water to become a key part of the discussions on climate, food and biodiversity, from the UNFCC-led annual climate negotiations to the next Food Systems Stocktake. It means mainstreaming water security and governance across all aspects of public policy. It means abandoning a myopic focus on short-term economic wins.
As water resources continue to dwindle, merely adjusting to scarcity won't address the underlying issue. Indeed, latest research findings show that water-related adaptation becomes less effective as warming increases.[16] Urgent efforts must be made to reduce demand and usage across agriculture. The Global Commission on the Economics of Water has recommended nations "must phase out some USD 700 billion of subsidies in agriculture and water each year, which tend to generate excessive water consumption and other environmentally damaging practices".[17]
Reforming subsidies is a crucial but knotty issue, so it could be accompanied by country-level efforts to encourage and promote water-saving technologies. Tried-and-tested methods include drip irrigation (which distributes water directly to plant roots by dripping water onto the soil at very low rates), collecting and storing rainwater for agricultural use, crop rotation (growing different types of crops in the same area), which retains soil moisture and water, and growing trees on farmland and pastures to conserve water.
Collaboration and cooperation across agencies, ministries and non-governmental organisations, both at the national and international levels, is also crucial. The G7 has already taken a positive step towards this. The recent joint communiqué from the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment ministers included a pledge to establish a G7 Water Coalition "to tackle the global water crisis" and which organises at least an annual meeting on the topic.[18]
More such efforts are needed: approximately 40 per cent of the world's population lives in transboundary river and lake basins, many of which are in areas of current or past interstate tensions, but only a fifth of countries have cross border agreements to jointly manage these shared resources equitably, wrote the UN.[19]
Africa, in particular, could benefit. A significant number of states suffer from water scarcity while two-thirds of the continent's freshwater resources are transboundary. Aside from the G7's new pledge, efforts on regional cooperation are still embryonic but there are promising signs that world leaders are becoming more aware of the importance of transboundary water management to optimise water use. In Asia, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), a body comprising eight nations along the Hindu Kush Himalaya, has called on governments to use climate change "as the urgent catalyst for collaboration over three key river basins in Asia: the Indus, the Ganga, and the Brahmaputra".[20]
The responsibility to improve water security, however, does not rest only with governments and corporations. Actions at community and individual levels also play a role. Reducing food waste, for example, saves water indirectly since producing food requires significant volumes of water. Consuming fewer thirsty crops and meat and eating more seasonally is another option.
Overall, the combination of innovative technologies, centuries-old knowledge and established best practices – large-scale water conservation and recycling programmes, restoring wetlands and watersheds, investing in water storage and distribution infrastructure, just to give a few examples – could go a long way in ensuring water security for the current and future generations.
Water security and governance, however, is not just a technical issue. Water is "a global common good, to be protected collectively and in the interests of all", to quote the Global Commission on the Economics of Water.[21] This collective responsibility, together with collaboration, equitable management of shared water sources, innovative solutions and learning from the past, would help the world to chart a course toward resilience and prosperity, ensuring a future that transcends the fate of past civilisations.Thin Lei Win is an award-winning multimedia journalist specialising in the intersections of food systems and climate change. This commentary was prepared within the framework of the project Nexus25–Shaping Multilateralism. Views expressed are the author's alone.[1] The Earth Institute, "Did Climate Influence Angkor's Collapse?", in The Earth Institute News, 29 March 2010, https://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/2661; Joseph Stromberg, "Why Did the Mayan Civilization Collapse? A New Study Points to Deforestation and Climate Change", in Smithsonian Magazine, 23 August 2012, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/why-did-the-mayan-civilization-collapse-a-new-study-points-to-deforestation-and-climate-change-30863026; Emma Marris, "Two-hundred-year Drought Doomed Indus Valley Civilization", in Nature, 3 March 2014, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature.2014.14800.[2] IPCC, Fact Sheet: Food and Water, October 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/outreach/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FactSheet_FoodAndWater.pdf.[3] Nathanial Matthews et al., "Elevating the Role of Water Resilience in Food System Dialogues", in Water Security, Vol. 17 (December 2022), Article 100126, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasec.2022.100126; International Water Management Institute, Water Governance for Resilient Food Systems for Future Climates, September 2021, https://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/water-resilient-food-systems-statement.pdf; Dietrich Knorr and Mary Ann Augustin, "Vanishing Water: Rescuing the Neglected Food Resource", in Food Engineering Reviews, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 2023), p. 609-624, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12393-023-09349-z.[4] UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, https://unfccc.int/node/512.[5] Interview with the author, April 2024.[6] IPCC, Fact Sheet: Food and Water, cit.[7] Copernicus, Observer: What Impact Does Drought Have on Vegetation, and How Does Copernicus Help?, 5 March 2020, https://www.copernicus.eu/en/node/8499.[8] UN Water, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024. Water for Prosperity and Peace, Paris, UNESCO, March 2024, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000388948.[9] Rice Knowledge Bank website: How to Manage Water, http://www.knowledgebank.irri.org/step-by-step-production/growth/water-management.[10] Heike Holdinghausen, "Water: Thirsty Animals, Thirsty Crops", in Meat Atlas 2021, September 2021, https://eu.boell.org/en/node/8903.[11] Joint Research Centre (JRC), Prolonged Drought and Record Temperatures Have Critical Impact in the Mediterranean, 20 February 2024, https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/node/9424.[12] United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2019, New York, United Nations, 2029, p. 35, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/goal-06.[13] Patrick W. Keys et al., "Anthropocene Risk", in Nature Sustainability, Vol. 2, No. 8 (August 2019), p. 667-673, DOI 10.1038/s41893-019-0327-x.[14] Thin Lei Win, "Researchers Warn of 'Unexpected Implications' as Climate Risks Converge", in Reuters, 22 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1UH1UZ.[15] Mariana Mazzucato et al., Turning the Tide. A Call to Collective Action, Paris, Global Commission on the Economics of Water, March 2023, p. 11, https://watercommission.org/?p=8410.[16] Tabea K. Lissner et al., "Effectiveness of Water-related Adaptation Decreases with Increasing Warming", in One Earth, Vol. 7, No. 3 (15 March 2024), p. 444-454, DOI 10.1016/j.oneear.2024.02.004.[17] Mariana Mazzucato et al., Turning the Tide, cit., p. 7.[18] G7, Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers' Meeting Communiqué, Torino, 29-30 April 2024, point 33, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/G7-Climate-Energy-Environment-Ministerial-Communique_Final.pdf.[19] UN Water, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024, cit.[20] ICIMOD, Future of One Billion People and Globally Significant Ecosystems Relies on Collaboration over Indus, the Ganga and the Brahmaputra, 20 March 2024, https://www.icimod.org/?p=66108.[21] Mariana Mazzucato et al., Turning the Tide, cit., p. 7.

The impact of infectious diseases on populations all over the world has long been recognized as an imminent global crisis.[1]The 21st century has seen an increase in outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases ("EIDs"), which threaten the health and safety of citizens all over the globe.[2]EIDs are diseases that have "recently appeared in a population or have already existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range,"[3]which explains the widespread fear such disease outbreaks can incite. However, despite how many times EID outbreaks have made global news headlines in contemporary history, the international community has struggled to adequately respond, leaving vulnerable populations at risk. Many factors contribute to the disproportionate impact of EIDs on vulnerable populations, including those stemming from disparities regarding poverty and gender. Socioeconomic status influences health, to the point where "poverty breeds disease and ill health leads to poverty."[4]Data on gender differences in infectious disease outbreaks also show that disease does not affect everyone equally.[5]Although both men and women suffer from different diseases due to biological inequalities and social differences,[6]women are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of attention and integration of women in global health policies and management strategies of EID outbreaks. One case study that demonstrates the disparate impact on vulnerable populations during EID outbreaks is the current Ebola Virus Disease ("EVD") outbreak in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"). This outbreak began in August 2018 and has grown to become the second largest EVD outbreak on record.[7]As observed in the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak and other large-scale EID outbreaks such as Zika or SARS,[8]the 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak has had a significant impact on women. While research has been conducted on "diseases of poverty" and the vulnerability of women in EID outbreaks, the preference to deal with the immediate outbreak instead of addressing more systemic societal concerns forgoes the focus on the individual and their human rights. As a result, little has been done to bring in a human rights perspective to the management and response mechanisms of such outbreaks. A human rights perspective not only brings to the forefront these core issues of inequality, but also introduces supplemental and useful tools for considering how to achieve the most effective response to these emergencies. The first section of this paper provides an important background to the relationship between poverty, women, and EIDs by considering both legal and public health perspectives. The second section analyzes the role of women in global health, particularly in responses to EIDs, by examining how women have been impacted in past EID outbreaks and the current 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak as a case study. Finally, this paper concludes with a discussion of how global health policymakers and healthcare professionals can address this gap by applying a gendered lens to EID outbreak management. Background The human right to health as a foundation for addressing inequality in poverty and gender As human rights have developed throughout history, the issue of health has consistently been regarded as a core, fundamental human right.[9]Beginning with the United Nations ("UN") Charter (1945), this emphasized the need for international cooperation in Chapter IX, particularly for finding solutions to health problems.[10]In 1946, the World Health Organization ("WHO") Constitution declared that the objective of the WHO is the "attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health."[11]In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") referenced this same objective for health in Article 25(1): "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care, and necessary social services . . . ."[12]In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") stated in Article 12: "The States Parties . . . recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health"[13]and to achieve this, highlighted the "prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases"[14]as a vital prerequisite for success. The drafting history of this provision demonstrates that the object and purpose of this provision was to obligate States to address the prevention of disease and malnutrition, two major factors which pose obstacles for achieving health for all.[15]Additionally, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR") General Comment 14 further explained ICESCR Article 12(2)(c), stating that "The right to treatment includes the creation of a system of urgent medical care in cases of accidents, epidemics and similar health hazards, and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations"[16]and "[t]he control of diseases refers to States' individual and joint efforts to . . . make available relevant technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data collection on a disaggregated basis, the implementation or enhancement of immunization programmes and other strategies of infectious disease control."[17]With these core international instruments, basic standards of health, treatment, and particularly disease management all set the stage for a baseline of States' obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health. Currently, the Sustainable Development Goals ("SDG") also highlight the right to health. In SDG 3.3, States' target to end "the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases . . . ."[18]is particularly relevant because neglected tropical diseases ("NTDs") are a subset of EIDs and mainly affect the poorest populations in the world.[19]SDG 3.c to "substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries . ." and 3.d to "strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks"[20]are both also important goals for addressing the disproportionate disease burden on States that currently lack the capacity to respond to health crises such as EIDs. These goals, voluntarily assumed by States, continue to build upon the human rights foundation of the right to health and further solidify the importance of addressing health through a human rights framework. Just as the right to health has been established through international treaties, women's rights have also been protected through Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), which "obligates States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care and to ensure women access to appropriate services in connection with pregnancy."[21]Like the CESCR, the CEDAW Committee further explained the importance of protections for women's health through its General Recommendation regarding CEDAW Article 12, stating that the "duty of States parties to ensure . . . access to health care services, information and education implies an obligation to respect, protect and fulfill women's rights to health care."[22]Additionally, another CESCR General Comment addresses women's health in particular by articulating "State obligations as including identifying how gender roles affect health and removing legal restrictions on reproductive health, among other things."[23]These international treaty provisions demonstrate the importance of protecting the right to health especially as it applies to women. Poverty as a determining factor of health outcomes in EIDs Poverty is a main determining factor of EIDs in communities[24]because "poor health and poverty are intertwined in developing countries. Poverty breeds disease and ill health leads to poverty."[25]With almost 900 million people living in extreme poverty[26]across the globe, understanding how poverty and disease are related is urgent.[27]Poverty is an important factor which contributes to more opportunities for infectious diseases to impact humans.[28]NTDs are a subset of EIDs which particularly thrive and persist under conditions of poverty.[29]One disease example is tuberculosis ("TB"), which is often described as a "disease of poverty" because it is "significantly associated with poor housing, low literacy and nutritional status, and lack of access to health services."[30]NTDs are often called infectious diseases of poverty and are the result of the "complex interaction of biological, social, and environmental factors [because they] disproportionately affect poor and disadvantaged populations in which the poverty context reinforces risk and vulnerability."[31]This is compounded by the fact that disease "control tools such as drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics often do not reach the populations that most need them because of social issues . or because they are ill adapted to the cultural, social, and economic realities in which people live."[32] Another connection between poverty and disease is that since EID outbreaks such as the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, the 2015–2016 Zika outbreak, and the current 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak can have a very significant impact on a community, they can essentially reach the level of a crisis or disaster. When disasters hit, people living in poverty are much more vulnerable.[33]On top of this, women make up approximately 70% of people living in poverty worldwide, so this indicates that overall, women are more likely to be affected by disasters in poverty-stricken areas.[34] Gender as a determining factor of health outcomes in EIDs Another key determinant of health is gender.[35]The term "gender" refers to societal and cultural factors that are different between traditional male and female roles.[36]Studies on the relationships between sex and gender to infectious diseases have been conducted across a variety of disciplines, which has actually acted as a barrier to application of this research in outbreak settings because each discipline tends to work in isolation.[37]Thus, to fill this gap, it is important to integrate a gendered lens into outbreak response and management. Disease does not affect men and women equally.[38]Women are a particularly vulnerable group because they "disproportionately bear the burden of poverty and disease."[39]Thus, vulnerability is deeply gendered.[40]Not only do over 80% of women in the world live in low- or middle-income countries,[41]putting them at higher risk for more EIDs, women also live longer in general. Over a lifetime, the "social context of women's lives place exceptional burdens on the quality of life lived." Understanding the pre-existing biological and socio-cultural conditions in which women live is an important foundation for understanding their vulnerability in crises and disasters. Risks related to health concerns from cooking fumes in the home and complications with pregnancy "overlap with developing countries and are exacerbated in the contexts of poverty combined with conflict . [and] such risks are further aggravated in situations of humanitarian crisis."[42] State and international core obligations to protect health for all Although there are international instruments protecting health, given the vulnerabilities of those living in poverty, especially women, it is not surprising that many States lack the capacity to "progressively realize and ensure that a minimum core of a properly functioning health system and infrastructure . exists for people to gain access to health services."[43]While States are required to "take all appropriate measures subject to available resources,"[44]to prevent diseases, the States that experience the most NTDs "are least able to counter the existing imbalance in disease prevention research and development."[45]The lack of capacity in many States in the Global South has been attributed to "historical vulnerability from slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, bad governance, and neoliberal reform policies like structural adjustment."[46]In addition to States' obligations, there is also an "obligation of international co-operation under the right to health."[47]If a State lacks capacity, the international community is called upon to address this problem via a 'collective responsibility.'[48]The ICESCR addressed collective responsibility, stating that States should realize the rights in the Covenant "individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical."[49] Case study on the 2018 DRC EVD outbreak The most recent EVD outbreak began in August 2018 in the eastern region of the DRC, originally concentrated in North Kivu and Ituri provinces.[50]It has since grown to be the second largest EVD outbreak on record, the largest being the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak.[51]Although this is the tenth EVD outbreak to take place in the DRC, there are many factors which differentiate this outbreak from those in the past.[52] First, past outbreaks in the DRC have not been concentrated in the eastern region of the DRC. This region has been a conflict zone for decades and violence continues today.[53]Compared to the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, North Kivu province houses an even denser population than Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone combined, and also shares borders with four more provinces and two other countries.[54]This subregion of the DRC has a history of insecurity and presence of well over one hundred active non-state armed groups,[55]which still remain in the region after conflicts such as the DRC independence in 1960, the bordering 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the civil war that established the regime of recent President Joseph Kabila.[56] In the broader context, the history of the DRC has not provided a backdrop conducive to effective management of deadly EIDs. Centuries of colonialism led to decades of armed conflict, which continues today and has spread deep-rooted mistrust for the government across the country, especially in the Eastern DRC.[57]The DRC is also one of the three poorest countries in the world, despite its rich natural resources, so while colonialization may no longer be an issue, there is still an ongoing presence of exploitation.[58]These elements all contribute to the context in which the current 2018 Eastern DRC EVD outbreak is taking place, which is important to understand for the purposes of analyzing the impact of EIDs on women in poverty. Women play an integral role in global health and applying a gendered lens in all levels of EID responses provides better protections for women and more effective management strategies of EID outbreaks The role of women in global health Informal caregivers The 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak began in December 2013, but in just eight months, data reported that "55-60% of all Ebola fatalities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were women."[59]Additionally, news headlines asking "Why Are So Many Women Dying from Ebola?" revealed that "women in Ebola-hit countries do not enjoy the promise of equality called for under human rights law."[60]Since increased risk in transmitting EVD comes from basic day-to-day interactions, traditional gender roles put women in especially vulnerable positions.[61] One role that women in many societies fill is that of the caregiver in the home. This societal expectation for women to care for the family greatly contributes to the disproportionate impact that EIDs such as EVD and HIV have on women.[62]For especially fatal diseases such as EVD, women are not only caring for more individuals, but the work is also laborious and dangerous because the disease is spread through direct contact with bodily fluids.[63]This is a particular challenge because often the intensity of the care given at home is equal to that given at a health care facility, yet not all women are formally trained health care professionals.[64]There is a gap in education and important information for women as informal caregivers, which further perpetuates the disparate impact of EIDs on women. As caregivers and due to traditional gender roles, women are also often heavily involved in the mourning and burial rituals once their loved ones have died and they are the "ones to perform funeral rites such as washing bodies and preparing them for burial."[65]During the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, one area of Sierra Leone reported that as many as 365 deaths were connected to one funeral, and when the outbreak first began in Guinea, approximately 60% of all EVD cases were connected to traditional burial practices.[66]Since EVD is still transmissible after death and women play such a prominent role in these rituals, their gender role as caregiver and mourner puts them at a disproportionately higher risk of infection.[67] Additionally, while women in many societies are seen as the primary caregivers in the household, when they fall ill the roles are not reversed. Instead of the men taking care of the women, other women in the community are responsible for caring for each other.[68]This is partially due to socio-cultural aspects of what are appropriate roles for men and women, and also contributes to women being more vulnerable to EIDs. Nevertheless, while the role of women as caregivers is clear, in past EVD outbreaks it is shown that "men dominated informational meetings on the disease,"[69]leaving out the key voice of women and putting them in a vulnerable place without adequate information or agency to voice their concerns during these discussions. Health workers The healthcare workforce is also a vulnerable population during EID outbreaks due to the nature in which the disease is spread, such as EVD. Since EVD is spread through contact with bodily fluids once the patient has started to show symptoms and even after death during burial, the level of close contact that healthcare workers have to infected patients puts them higher risk of transmission. Healthcare workers are between 21 to 32 times more likely to be infected with EVD than the general adult population during an outbreak.[70]Especially in countries where the healthcare workforce is already scarce (i.e. West African countries during the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak), losing healthcare workers to EVD is especially challenging for effective management of the outbreak.[71] While men often perform higher-level healthcare positions such as doctors due to gendered differences in education levels, women also play a very important role in the healthcare workforce. In almost all countries, the nursing staff is predominately female, and nurses make up a considerable amount of the healthcare workforce.[72]For example, during the 2014–2016 EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone, 70% of the healthcare workers were nurses and midwives.[73]The work conducted by nurses differs from doctors because nurses are often the healthcare workers who are in direct contact with the most patients, making them more vulnerable to contracting diseases.[74]The WHO reports that "nurses and nurse aids account for more than half of all health worker infections."[75]As a result, since nurses are overwhelmingly female and the duties of nurses put them at higher risks of contracting diseases, "the occupational exposure of nurses can be considered a gender related exposure."[76] Another important consideration related to the high infection rates of healthcare workers is that a decrease in healthcare workers also results in a decrease in availability of health care services for women.[77]This is especially significant in States that already lack adequate health infrastructure and resources. Because women already experience many health inequalities, disasters such as EID outbreaks only exacerbate them further.[78]Especially given the specific provisions under international law to protect women's health, the lack of available health care services for women due to a decrease in healthcare workers is a serious concern. Global health security requires a gendered lens to adequately address the disparate impact of EIDs on women Global health security recently emerged in the 21st century. It expands upon the definition of public health security[79]and also includes "the health consequences of human behavior, weather-related events and infectious diseases, and natural catastrophes and man-made disasters . . . ."[80]Also, "public health emergency preparedness" brings in an additional legal aspect, in both a proactive and reactive manner to best prepare and respond to such emergencies.[81] Because women play such an integral role in global health and are greatly and differentially impacted by EIDs, it is important to consider these issues with a gendered lens. The CESCR recognized this by recommending that States "integrate a gender perspective in their health-related policies, planning, programmes and research in order to promote better health for both women and men [because] a gender-based approach recognizes that biological and sociocultural factors play a significant role in influencing the health of men and women."[82]Thus, women are a key voice that should be "included at all levels of planning and operations to ensure the effectiveness and appropriateness of a response."[83] However, though these recommendations have been made by many international actors, little has been done to integrate women into global health security responses. During the 2014–2016 West African EVD outbreak, women were "invisible" at every point of international response.[84]It is clear how women are closely intertwined in EID responses, "yet they are invisible in global health strategy, policy or practice . [and] only made visible through motherhood."[85]When it comes to addressing gender during a disaster such as an EID outbreak like EVD, the tendency is to focus on "Ebola first, gender later," as if gender concerns are an optional add-on that others can address after the outbreak has ended.[86] However, not only do women play important roles in global health security, but particularly in societies like the DRC's North Kivu province, women are often leaders and heads of households. They are not only responsible for caring for their families, but their position gives them social power as well, and they care for entire communities.[87]This is especially important for EIDs like EVD because community fear and distrust of governmental and international actors in recent outbreaks have greatly complicated the EVD management response. In just seven months after the start of the 2018 Eastern DRC outbreak, studies reported "low levels of trust in government institutions and widespread belief in misinformation about EVD,"[88]which has led to "reduced adherence to EVD preventative behaviors" such as vaccinations.[89]To combat these challenges, it is vital to build up community trust by "engaging locally trusted leaders and service providers . . . to build trust with Ebola responders who are not from these communities."[90] One example of how the WHO has tapped into women as a resource[91]to address this is through a partnership with Mama Mwatatu, a woman so well known in her community in North Kivu she earned the nickname "Mother Counsellor of Beni."[92]Listeners of her radio show are mostly female, so the impact she has had on the EVD management efforts in Beni has been significant.[93]On her broadcast, she answers her listeners' questions about EVD, emphasizing the reality of the disease. If she is unable to answer a question, she "carefully notes it down and consults with WHO experts,"[94]thus forming an invaluable partnership between the WHO and the local female community. Julienne Anoko, a social anthropologist for the WHO has also proven the power of women by collaborating with the Collectif des Associations Feminines to educate 132 women leaders about EVD and send them out to their local communities to conduct a two-week information campaign, explaining EVD vaccines, treatment, contract tracing, and the vulnerability of women and children to EVD, ultimately reaching over 600,000 people that would not have otherwise been reached due to fear and stigma.[95]These are just a few examples of ways in which women can contribute to the management of an EID outbreak. They are a key connection to the local population, and at a time when trust of authority figures is low and belief in misinformation is high, it is vital to reach all corners of affected communities. Conclusion Gender might not be the first element global health policymakers and healthcare professionals responding to an EID consider, but it should be. Applying a gendered lens to EID outbreaks reveals the disproportionate impact of EIDs on women, due to their higher rate of living in poverty and susceptibility to disease as a result of gendered roles in many societies. Women's rights in health have been codified in many provisions in international law, but the connection between gender and EID response has not yet been developed. Due to women's heightened susceptibility and integrated role in EID management, empowering women to do global health work in their communities and supporting them is an extremely effective way to combat not just this current EVD outbreak, but to strengthen global health security as a whole.

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

As of January 2024, Italy has assumed the presidency of the G7, setting an ambitious agenda reflecting its domestic priorities and foreign policy interests. Alongside energy, migration and ongoing conflicts as top issues on the agenda, the presidency has made food security and sustainable food systems a priority, with particular attention to the needs of Africa.[1] This aligns with Italy's interest in the continent, exemplified by the recently launched Mattei Plan – an ambitious initiative meant to guide Italy's renewed partnership with African nations.[2]Addressing food security and sustainable food systems
The renewed focus on food security and sustainable food systems is a positive and necessary move. Food insecurity has been rising globally since 2017, driven by climate change, conflict, economic shocks and persistent poverty and inequality. This trend has been exacerbated by the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine with its ripple effect on food and fertiliser prices.[3] In 2022 alone, about 800 million people worldwide faced hunger,[4] with Africa being the continent where the food crisis is most severe.[5]
At the same time, food systems are major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and freshwater consumption.[6] They are also heavily impacted by climate change, which disrupts production and exacerbates food insecurity, especially in Africa. The critical need to transition to more sustainable food practices and adapt to the changing climate is evident.
With only six years left to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, coordinated international action is more urgent than ever. In this context, the Italian G7 presidency has a crucial opportunity to spearhead progress on global food security, build resilience and promote sustainable food systems.Setting the Italian G7 priorities
At the upcoming G7 Leaders' Summit in June, the Italian presidency will unveil the Apulia Food Systems Initiative (AFSI).[7] Although specifics are not yet fully disclosed, its title draws inspiration from precedents such as the 2009 G8 L'Aquila Food Security Initiative and the 2021 G20 Matera Declaration.[8] The AFSI prioritises Africa, recognising its vulnerability to food insecurity, underinvestment and climate change, while acknowledging its significant agricultural potential. Two main interrelated priorities will be at the core of the AFSI: (i) advancing efforts to address the food-climate nexus and (ii) scaling up finance and investments for food security and sustainable food systems.
Regarding the food-climate nexus, the AFSI will contribute to implementing the COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action,[9] endorsed by 159 Heads of State. The Declaration calls for scaled-up financial and technical support to align policies and investments to reduce carbon emissions from the food and agriculture sectors, while also building resilience and helping food producers adapt to climate change, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).[10] Italy pledged to channel 10 million euros over the next two years to a programme devoted to supporting the Declaration's implementation, co-led by the UAE, World Bank and FAO.[11] Additionally, President Meloni committed to using 70 per cent of Italy's 4.2 billion euro Climate Fund to finance adaptation and mitigation objectives in African countries through the Mattei Plan, utilising a mix of loans, grants and blended investments.[12] The commitment to bolstering adaptation action, including in the food and agriculture sectors, has also been reaffirmed at the G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministerial in April.[13]
As for the second priority area of finance and investment, the Italian presidency aims to promote innovative solutions to stimulate public, private and public-private investments to transform food systems and achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2, Zero Hunger. The food systems' finance gap is vast, with projections indicating an additional 350 billion US dollars needed annually by 2030.[14] However, this investment could yield significant returns, translating into annual net benefits of 5 to 10 trillion US dollars by reducing unaccounted health and environmental costs.[15]
The Italian public development bank, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, has led efforts to foster collective action among public development banks and development finance institutions from G7 countries. This resulted in a joint Statement of Intent highlighting the banks' ambition to increase operational cooperation on co-investment and risk mitigation initiatives and strengthen incentives to attract private sector capital to food-related projects.[16]
Given the limited fiscal space and high debt vulnerability of many LMICs in Africa,[17] the G7 leaders could significantly contribute to easing these constraints by exploring innovative solutions to debt relief such as debt swaps. Under this arrangement, sovereign debt could be forgiven in exchange for a country's commitment to allocate the freed-up funds towards investments in food security and sustainability. Similar approaches have proven effective in other sectors.[18]
Rechannelling special drawing rights (SDRs) – an international reserve asset issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that can be traded for hard currency – to bolster food security efforts is another crucial opportunity.[19] This move would inject much-needed liquidity into countries grappling with severe food crises, enabling them to invest in adaptation actions and support vulnerable populations. Regrettably, the Stresa Communiqué adopted by G7 Finance ministers falls short of seizing these opportunities: it lacks guiding principles for a new approach to debt and notably overlooks any mention of SDRs.[20]Aligning with African needs and priorities
Finance, investments and the food-climate nexus are critical areas for Africa's agri-food system transformation. However, the devil lies in the details.
First, while more finance is needed, it must reach the thousands of African small-scale farmers and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially women and youth, who struggle to access the financial resources they need to develop viable and more sustainable business models.[21] The G7 initiative needs to focus on creating a more supportive financial ecosystem for these actors by scaling up innovative de-risking strategies, developing products that meet their specific needs, building inclusive financial and business support services, and finding innovative ways to channel resources directly to the farmers and their organisations. Additionally, climate finance for food systems adaptation must increase dramatically, as only 1.7 per cent of global climate finance currently targets smallholder farmers.[22]
Moreover, focusing solely on investments poses a risk of leaving least-developed countries behind. G7 resources must also reach fragile and conflict-affected regions, not just those more attractive to private capital. These resources should go beyond emergency response and finance anticipatory actions to prevent future crises.
Second, supporting the integration of food and climate plans, as committed at COP28, is essential. For too long, these interconnected issues have remained in siloes.[23] However, guidance for implementing this commitment remains vague.[24] Concrete options for integrating these plans need to build on existing African and international policy processes. A key opportunity lies in the ongoing formulation of the next phase of the African Union's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) – the continent's main policy framework for agri-food systems transformation since 2003.[25] The revision of countries' climate plans – known as Nationally Determined Contributions – in 2025 presents another crucial opportunity to enhance ambitions for climate adaptation and mitigation in the agri-food sector.[26]
Moreover, while it is commendable that G7 countries prioritise support for the most vulnerable countries in addressing the food-climate nexus, it is important to recognise that this nexus and the imperative to transform food systems are equally relevant in G7 countries – with significant incoherencies existing between agricultural subsidies and climate commitments within G7 nations. Although politically sensitive, these inconsistencies must be acknowledged and addressed to ensure comprehensive and effective action on the transition to more sustainability.
Beyond finance and climate, other domains require attention. First, Africa urgently needs to reduce its import dependency to decrease its vulnerability to disruptions in global value chains and international price shocks.[27] This requires boosting intra-regional food trade through the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) through policies and investments in regional value chain development, infrastructure and improved processing, storage and market access.[28] In this regard, Italy's G7 presidency should connect the AFSI to its efforts to revitalise the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), for instance through flagship projects in selected corridors supporting industrialisation based on crop and livestock transformation.
Second, with low agricultural yields in Africa being a key constraint to more sustainability,[29] G7 countries should commit to strengthening Africa's fertiliser industry, investing in greener and organic fertilisers and promoting efficient fertiliser use. Investment in integrated soil and water management practices is also crucial for enhancing soil health, nutrient efficiency and climate resilience – as highlighted in the Nairobi Declaration recently endorsed at the Africa Fertiliser and Soil Health Summit.[30] Also, investing in research and innovation to promote the uptake of climate-resilient agricultural practices tailored to Africa's heterogeneous agricultural systems is key.
Third, food security initiatives in Africa should deliberately support the strengthening of social protection and safety nets to help food-insecure households build resilience in the face of recurrent food crises and afford healthy diets.[31]
Lastly, with almost two-thirds of African women employed in agrifood systems as food producers, agro-dealers, processors, distributors and traders, a transformation to sustainable food systems cannot be achieved without measures to promote gender equality and support women's empowerment.[32] Committing to support to the roll-out of the recently endorsed CFS' Voluntary Guidelines on Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment in the context of food security and nutrition, would offer G7 countries the opportunity to advance these interconnected agendas.[33]Key conditions for success
A true partnership approach is needed for the G7 initiative to achieve its goals. With the plethora of international initiatives in the food systems space, it is key to ensure Africa is in the driver's seat, with the AFSI building on existing continental, regional and national food- and climate-related policy processes and plans. Bottlenecks constraining the implementation of such plans need to be identified and addressed, and the capacities of institutions and actors to strategise, innovate, coordinate and regulate should be strengthened at all levels. This includes promoting horizontal and vertical coordination across governments and integrated policies across agriculture, water, environmental, trade, industrial and energy objectives. Mutual accountability, inclusivity and leveraging the voices of diverse stakeholders are also essential.
Building momentum and maintaining coalitions for change require strong leadership and coordination, addressing donor fragmentation and focusing on impactful initiatives while coordinating the deployment of bilateral and multilateral resources. This includes synergising efforts with the Brazilian G20 Presidency and its proposed Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty,[34] and ensuring continuity across global policy milestones such as COP29, the UN Food Systems Summit+4 and the South African G20 presidency leading up to COP30. This collaboration can pave the way for ambitious and long-lasting results towards more inclusive and resilient African agri-food systems.Cecilia D'Alessandro is the Deputy Head of the Sustainable Food Systems team at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), in Maastricht and Brussels. This commentary is part of a broader IAI project, "Climate mitigation, energy and food security goals within the Italian G7 Presidency", supported by the European Climate Foundation (ECF).[1] FAO, UNGA: FAO and the G7, UN Food Systems Summit+2 and COP28 Presidencies Join Hands to Position Agrifood Systems Transformation High on the International Agenda, 20 September 2023, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/unga--fao-and-the-g7--un-food-systems-summit-2-and-cop28-presidencies-join-hands-to-position-agrifood-systems-transformation-high-on-the-international-agenda/en; and Italian Government, President Meloni's Speech at the United Nations Food Systems Summit, 24 July 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/23272.[2] Daniele Fattibene and Stefano Manservisi, "The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy's Development Cooperation Policy?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|10 (March 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18219.[3] Hanne Knaepen and Koen Dekeyser, "Russia's Invasion Leaves North Africa with a Food Crisis – What Can Europe Do?", in ECDPM Commentaries, 14 March 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/russias-invasion-leaves-north-africa-food-crisis-what-can-europe-do.[4] FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023, Rome, FAO, 2023, p. vii, https://doi.org/10.4060/CC3017EN.[5] Sevil Omer, "Africa Hunger Crisis: Facts, FAQs, How to Help", in World Vision, 16 April 2024, https://www.worldvision.org/?p=17548.[6] Massimo Crippa et al., "Food Systems Are Responsible for a Third of Global Anthropogenic GHG Emissions", in Nature Food, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 2021), p. 198-209, DOI 10.1038/s43016-021-00225-9.[7] Global Summitry Project website: G7 Italy 2024, Apulia Summit, https://globalsummitryproject.com/?p=3677.[8] G8 et al., L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security - L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, 10 July 2009, https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2009-g7-italy-leaders-leaders-language-laquila-joint-statement-on-global-food-security-laquila-food-security-initiative; G20, Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems, 29 June 2021, http://www.g20italy.org/italian-g20-presidency/ministerial-meetings/g20-foreign-affairs-and-development-ministers-meetings.html.[9] COP28, Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, 10 December 2023, https://www.cop28.com/en/food-and-agriculture.[10] Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Opening Remarks by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Edmondo Cirielli at UNGA78 Side Event co-organized by Italy "Catalysing Global Action for Sustainable and Resilient Agri-Food Systems Transformation to Accelerate the SDGs", 20 September 2023, https://italyun.esteri.it/en/?p=5406.[11] CGIAR, CGIAR Joins Global Commitments at COP28's Food, Agriculture and Water Day, 12 December 2023, https://www.cgiar.org/news-events/news/cgiar-joins-global-commitments-at-cop28s-food-agriculture-and-water-day.[12] "Meloni Pledges €100 Million, Global South Food Security Efforts at COP28", in Decode39, 1 December 2023, https://decode39.com/?p=8408.[13] G7, Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers' Meeting Communiqué, Turin, 29-30 April 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/G7-Climate-Energy-Environment-Ministerial-Communique_Final.pdf.[14] International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2022 Global Food Policy Report: Climate Change and Food Systems, Washington, IFPRI, 2022, https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896294257.[15] Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi et al., Global Policy Report: The Economics of the Food System Transformation, Food System Economics Commission, February 2024, p. 7, https://foodsystemeconomics.org/policy/global-policy-report.[16] Cassa Depositi e Prestiti et al., G7 Public Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions Statement of Intent. Leveraging the Role of G7 Development Finance in Addressing Global Challenges during the 2024 G7 Italian Presidency, 9 May 2024, https://www.cdp.it/resources/cms/documents/2024_G7_Development_Finance_Statement_of_Intent.pdf.[17] FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises, 2024 Global Report on Food Crises, May 2024, p. 168, https://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024.[18] SDG2 Advocacy Hub, Unlocking Finance to End the Cycle of Food Crises, 10 April 2024, https://sdg2advocacyhub.org/?p=9676.[19] On the rechannelling of SDRs to promote investments in food systems see Francesco Rampa et al., "Using Special Drawing Rights for Climate-Resilient Food Systems and Food Security", in ECDPM Commentaries, 4 December 2023, https://ecdpm.org/work/using-special-drawing-rights-climate-resilient-food-systems-and-food-security; and San Bilal et al., "Rechannelling Special Drawing Rights for Food Security and Sustainable Food Systems", in ECDPM Briefing Notes, April 2024, https://ecdpm.org/work/rechannelling-special-drawing-rights-food-security-and-sustainable-food-systems.[20] G7, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Communiqué, Stresa, 23-25 May 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Stresa-Communique-25-May-2024.pdf.[21] Cecilia D'Alessandro, "Is Anyone Worried about the Farmer? Don't Just Express Worry in Words, Do Something about It", in ECDPM Commentaries, 30 October 2023, https://ecdpm.org/work/anyone-worried-about-farmer-dont-just-express-worry-words-do-something-about-it.[22] Daniela Chiriac and Baysa Naran, Examining the Climate Finance Gap for Small-Scale Agriculture, Climate Policy Initiative, November 2020, p. 4, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/?p=32593.[23] Thin Lei Win, "Food Systems Take the Stage at COP28: But Will Actions Match Rhetoric?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|68 (December 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17918.[24] Lauren Evans, "At COP 28, Countries Pledged to Transform Their Food Systems. Now What?", in Devex, 27 February 2024, https://www.devex.com/news/107121.[25] African Union, African Union Launches the 4th CAADP Biennial Review Report and Post-Malabo Roadmap, 20 March 2024, https://au.int/en/node/43649.[26] Haseeb Bakhtary et al., COP28 Agriculture, Food and Climate National Action Toolkit, Gland, WWF, 2023, https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cc9049en.[27] Francesco Rampa, "Russia's War against Ukraine Should Trigger Structural Solutions to Food Insecurity", in ECDPM Commentaries, 20 June 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/russias-war-against-ukraine-should-trigger-structural-solutions-food-insecurity.[28] Poorva Karkare, "What It Would Take to Provide Structural Solutions to Food Insecurity in Africa", in ECDPM Commentaries, 4 July 2022, https://ecdpm.org/work/what-it-would-take-provide-structural-solutions-food-insecurity-africa.[29] Hannah Ritchie, "Increasing Agricultural Productivity across Sub-Saharan Africa Is One of the Most Important Problems this century" in Our World in Data, 4 April 2022, https://ourworldindata.org/africa-yields-problem.[30] African Union, Nairobi Declaration. Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Summit, 9 May 2024, https://au.int/en/node/43771.[31] SDG2 Advocacy Hub, A Global Plan to End Food Crises and Transform Food Systems, April 2024, https://sdg2advocacyhub.org/?p=9667.[32] Katrin Glatzel et al., Bridging the Gap: Policy Innovations to Put Women at the Center of Food Systems Transformation in Africa, Malabo Montpellier Panel, June 2023, https://www.mamopanel.org/resources/reports-and-briefings/bridginggappolicyinnovations-put-women-center-f.[33] UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), Voluntary Guidelines on Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Empowerment in the Context of Food Security and Nutrition, 14 June 2023, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/node/71037.[34] G20, Task Force for a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, 2024, https://www.g20.org/en/tracks/sherpa-track/hunger-and-poverty.

Text finalised on December 15th, 2024. This Nota Internacional is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team. Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, with contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Jordi Bacaria, Pol Bargués, Javier Borràs, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Daniel Castilla, Carmen Claudín, Patrizia Cogo, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Patrícia Garcia-Duran, Víctor García, Seán Golden, Rafael Grasa, Josep M. Lloveras, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Oscar Mateos, Pol Morillas, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Laia Tarragona and Alexandra Vidal. 2025 begins with more questions than answers. The world has already voted and now it is time to see what policies await us. What impact will the winning agendas have? How far will the unpredictability of Trump 2.0 go? And, above all, are we looking at a Trump as a factor of change or a source of commotion and political fireworks?In 2025 there will be talk of ceasefires, but not of peace. The diplomatic offensive will gain ground in Ukraine, while the fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad opens an uncertain political transition. These movements will test an international system incapable of resolving the structural causes of conflicts.The world is struggling with the posturing of new leaderships, the shifting landscapes that are redefining long-running conflicts and a Sino-US rivalry that may develop into a trade and tech war in the near future. Fear, as a dynamic that permeates policies, both in the migration field and in international relations, will gain ground in 2025.2025 will be a year of post-election hangover. The world has now cast its vote, and it has done so in many cases from a place of anger, discontent or fear. Over 1.6 billion people went to the polls in 2024 and in general they did so to punish the parties in power. The list of defeated rulers is a long one: US Democrats, UK Conservatives, "Macronism" in France, the Portuguese left. Even those who weathered the storm have been weakened, as shown by the election debacle of Shigeru Ishiba's ruling party in Japan, or the coalitions necessary in the India of Narendra Modi or the South Africa of Cyril Ramaphosa.The election super-cycle of 2024 has left democracy a little more bruised. The countries experiencing a net decline in democratic performance far outnumber those managing to move forward. According to The Global State of Democracy 2024 report, four out of nine states are worse off than before in terms of democracy and only around one in four have seen an improvement in quality. 2025 is the year of Donald Trump's return to the White House and of a new institutional journey in the European Union (EU) underpinned by unprecedentedly weak parliamentary support. The West's democratic volatility is colliding with the geopolitical hyperactivity of the Global South and the virulence of armed conflict hotspots. Which is why 2025 begins with more questions than answers. With the polls closed and the votes counted, what policies await us ? What impact will the winning agendas have? How far will the unpredictability of Trump 2.0 go? And, above all, are we looking at a Trump as a factor of change or a source of commotion and political fireworks?







Even if the United States today is a retreating power and power has spread to new actors (both public and private) who have been challenging Washington's hegemony for some time now, Donald Trump's return to the presidency means the world must readjust. Global geopolitical equilibriums and the various conflicts raging – particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East – as well as the fight against climate change or the levels of unpredictability of a shifting international order could all hinge on the new White House incumbent. The fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad opens an uncertain political transition, which reinforces the idea that 2025 will be a year of need for diplomatic processes that accompany the geopolitical rebalancing that may come in the coming months.We also live in a world still weighed down by the impact of COVID-19. Five years after the coronavirus pandemic, many countries continue to grapple with the debt they took on to combat the economic and social damage of that global health crisis. The pandemic left us a world deeper in debt, one that is more digitalised and individualistic, where the discordant voices among the major global powers have been gaining ground; where climate, economic and geopolitical goals are becoming increasingly divergent. It is a world in which not only policies clash, but discourses too. The old social and cultural fault lines have become more evident: from culture wars to the struggle for control over information and algorithmically inflated bubbles on social media. The elections in the United States, Pakistan, India, Romania, Moldova or Georgia are a clear illustration of the destabilising power of "alternative" narratives.







The US election hangover, then, will not be the type to be cured with rest and a broth. Trump himself will see to ramping up the political posturing as he makes his return to the Oval Office starting January 20th. Yet, above the rhetorical noise, it is hard to distinguish what answers will be put in place, to what extent we are entering a year that will further reinforce the barriers and withdrawal that have turned society inwards and fragmented global hyperconnectivity; or if, on the other hand, we shall see the emergence of a still tentative determination to imagine alternative policies that provide answers to the real causes of discontent and try to reconstruct increasingly fragile consensuses. 1-EGO-POLITICS AND INDIVIDUALISM2025 is the year of posturing and personalism. We shall see the emergence not just of new leaderships, but also of new political actors. The magnate Elon Musk's entry into the campaign and Donald Trump's new administration personify this shift in the exercise of power. The world's richest individual, clutching the loudest megaphone in a digitalised society, is stepping into the White House to act as the president's right-hand man. Musk is a "global power", the holder of a political agenda and private interests that many democratic governments do not know how to negotiate. In this shift in power (both public and private) the cryptocurrency industry accounted for nearly half of all the money big corporations paid into political action committees (PACs) in 2024, according to a report by the progressive NGO Public Citizen. The last political cycle – from 2020 to 2024 – was characterised by "election denialism": a losing candidate or party disputed the outcome of one in five elections. In 2025, this denialism has reached the Oval Office. The myth of the triumphant narcissist has been bolstered by the ballot box. It is the triumph of ego over charisma. Some call it "ego-politics".Ever more voices are challenging the status quo of democracies in crisis. Anti-politics is taking root in the face of mainstream parties that are drifting ever further away from their traditional voters. Trump himself believes he is the leader of a "movement" (Make America Great Again, or MAGA) that transcends the reality of the Republican Party. These new anti-establishment figures have gradually gained ground, allies and prophets. From the illiberal media phenomenon of the Argentinian president Javier Milei – who will face his first big test in the parliamentary elections of October – to Călin Georgescu, the far-right candidate for the presidency of Romania who carved a niche for himself against all odds, without the support of a party behind him and thanks to an anti-establishment campaign targeting young people on TikTok. He is the latest example of a 2024 that has also seen the arrival in the European Parliament of the Spanish social media personality Alvise Pérez and his Se Acabó la Fiesta ("The Party's Over") platform, garnering over 800,000 votes, or the Cypriot youtuber Fidias Panayiotou, among whose achievements to date number having spent a week in a coffin and having managed to hug 100 celebrities, Elon Musk included. All this also has an impact on a Europe of weak leaderships and fractured parliaments, with the Franco-German engine of European integration feebler than ever. Indeed, the hyper-presidentialism of Emmanuel Macron, who also embraced the idea of the En Marche movement to dismantle the Fifth Republic's system of traditional parties, will have to navigate 2025 as a lame duck, with no possibility of calling legislative elections again until June. Germany, meanwhile, will go to the polls in February with an ailing economic model, rampant social discontent and doubts about the guarantees of clarity and political strength that might be delivered by elections that have the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) lying second in the polls. In 2025, we shall also see an escalation of the political drama in the Philippines between the country's two most powerful political clans, brought on by the toxic relationship between the president, Fernando "Bongbong" Marcos, and his vice president, Sara Duterte, and which includes death threats and corruption accusations. The return to politics of the former president, Rodrigo Duterte, nicknamed the "Asian Trump", who in November registered his candidacy for the mayoralty of Davao, and the midterm elections in May will deepen the domestic tension and division in the archipelago. In South Korea, meanwhile, 2024 is ending with signs of resistance. President Yoon Suk Yeol, also considered an outsider who triumphed in what was dubbed the incel election of 2022, faced popular protests and action by the country's main trade unions after declaring martial law in response to political deadlock. The Korean Parliament has voted to initiate an impeachment process to remove Yoon Suk Yeol and, if it goes ahead, the country will hold elections before springThe year also starts with individualism on the rise. We live in a more emotional and less institutional world. If fear and anger have become what drive people when it comes to voting, this growing sense of despair is worryingly high among young people. In the 2024 European elections there was a decline in turnout among the under-25s. Only 36% of voters from this age group cast their ballot, a 6% decrease in turnout from the 2019 elections. Among the young people who failed to vote, 28% said the main reason was a lack of interest in politics (a greater percentage than the 20% among the adult population as a whole); 14% cited distrust in politics, and 10% felt their vote would not change anything. In addition, according to the Global Solidarity Report, Gen Z feel less like global citizens than previous generations, reversing a trend lasting several decades. This is true for both rich and poorer countries. The report also notes the perceived failure of the international institutions to deliver tangible positive impacts (such as reducing carbon emissions or conflict-related deaths). Disenchantment fuses with a profound crisis of solidarity. People from wealthy countries are "significantly less likely to support solidarity statements than those in less wealthy countries", and this indifference is especially evident in relation to supporting whether international bodies should have the right to enforce possible solutions.







2-TRUCE WITHOUT PEACE A year of global geopolitical turmoil ended with the surprise collapse of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria; but also, with a three-way meeting between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Emmanuel Macron in Paris, against the backdrop of the reopening of Notre Dame. The rhythms of diplomacy and the quickening pace of war are out of step on international political agendas. And Russia, the common thread running through recent events in Syria and Ukraine, is quick to issue a reminder that any diplomatic moves must also go through Moscow. Given this backdrop, in 2025 we may speak of ceasefires, but not of peace. For starters, the electoral announcements of a Trump intent on putting an end to the war in Ukraine "in 24 hours" prompted an escalation of hostilities on the ground with various actions: the appearance on the scene of North Korean soldiers in support of the Russian troops; authorisation for Ukraine to use US ATACMS missiles for attacks on Russian soil; and the temporary closure of some Western embassies in Kyiv for security reasons. Speculation about possible negotiations has increased the risk of a tactical escalation to reinforce positions before starting to discuss ceasefires and concessions. While the diplomatic offensive may gain traction in 2025, it remains to be seen what the plan is, who will sit at the table and what real readiness the sides will have to strike an agreement. Ukraine is torn between war fatigue and the need for military support and security guarantees that the Trump administration may not deliver. Although, given the prospect of a capricious Trump, nor can we rule out the possible consequences for Vladimir Putin of failing to accept a negotiation put forward by the new US administration. Trump is determined to make his mark from the very start of his presidency, and that might also mean, in a fit of pique, maintaining the military commitment to reinforcing the Ukrainian army. It is also an essential battle for Europe, which must strive to avoid being left out of negotiations on the immediate future of a state destined to be a member of the EU and where the continent's security is currently at stake. The EU will have Poland's Donald Tusk in charge of the 27 member states' rotating presidency as of January, with the former Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas, making her debut as the head of European diplomacy. She is currently feeling the vertigo of Trump snatching the reins of a hasty peace while the member states have proved incapable of reaching an agreement on the various scenarios that might emerge in the immediate future. In any case, the Middle East has already illustrated the frailty and limited credit of this strategy of a cessation of hostilities without sufficient capacity or consensus to seek lasting solutions. The ceasefire agreed in the war that Israel is waging against Hezbollah in Lebanon is more of a timeout in the fighting than a first step towards the resolution of the conflict. The bombings and attacks after the ceasefire are an indication of the fragility, if not emptiness, of a plan that neither side believes in. Meanwhile, the war in Gaza, where over 44,000 people have died, has entered its second year of devastation, transformed into the backdrop of this fight to reshape regional influence, but with a Donald Trump intent on pushing a ceasefire agreement and freeing hostages even before he takes office on January 20th.The year begins with a change of goals in the region, but with no peace. While the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, made it clear that his priority now was to focus on Iran, the regional escalation unexpectedly hastened the end of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, with Iran debilitated economically and strategically, and Hezbollah decimated by Israel's attacks, the Syrian president was bereft of the external support that had propped up his decaying dictatorship. The civil war festering since the Arab revolts of 2011 has entered a new stage, which also changes the balance of power in the Middle East. We are entering a period of profound geopolitical rearrangement because for years Syria had been a proxy battleground for the United States' relations with Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia.We are therefore faced with scenarios that have been thrown wide open, where any negotiation proposal put forward will be more a strategic move than a prior step to addressing the root causes of the conflicts. And yet these diplomatic moves – individual and personalist initiatives primarily – will once again put to the test an international system plagued by ineffectiveness when it comes to delivering broad global consensus or serving as a platform to resolve disputes. 3- PROTECTIONISM AND AUSTERITYDonald Trump's return to the US presidency steps up the challenge to the international order. If in his first term he decided to pull the United States out of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate agreement, now he is preceded by the announcement of a trade war in the making. The existing geo-economic fragmentation – in 2023 nearly 3,000 trade restricting measures were put in place, almost triple the number in 2019, according to the IMF – will now have to contend with an escalation of the spiral of protectionism should the new US administration keep its promise to raise tariffs to 60% on Chinese imports; 25% on goods coming from Canada and Mexico, if they fail to take drastic measures against fentanyl or the arrival of migrants at the US border; and between 10% and 20% on the rest of its partners. In 2025, the World Trade Organization (WTO) marks 30 years since its creation and it will do so with the threat of a trade war on the horizon, a reflection of the state of institutional crisis that is paralysing the arbiter of international trade.As a result, countries are looking to strengthen their positions through various alliances. The world is increasingly plurilateral. India is expanding its free trade agreements with the United Kingdom and in Latin America; in 2025 the EU must finally tackle a lengthy obstacle course to ratify the long negotiated deal with Mercosur. Trumpism, what's more, reinforces this transactional approach: it fuels the possibility of more unpredictable partnerships and the need to adapt. Among those that have begun to reconsider goals and partners is the EU. The European countries will foreseeably make more purchases of liquefied natural gas and defence products from the United States to appease Trump. Despite US pressure and the profile of the new European Commission appearing to presage a harder line from Brussels on China in the economic sphere, nor can we rule out seeing fresh tension among the EU partners over the degree of flexibility of its de-risking strategy. A US withdrawal from the global commitments to fight climate change, for example, would intensify the need for alliances between Brussels and Beijing in this field. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether the emergence of European countries more accommodating of this geopolitical dependence on China may expose a new fault line between member states.







Given this uncertainty, recipes for fiscal discipline are also making a comeback. Brazil ended the year announcing cuts in public spending to the value of nearly $12bn; Argentina's Javier Milei boasts of implementing "the world's toughest austerity policy"; Mexico's minister of finance and public credit, Rogelio Ramírez de la O, has vowed to reduce the fiscal deficit in 2025 by pursuing austerity in the public administration and cutting spending in Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos). In the United Kingdom, the prime minister, Labour's Keir Starmer, has embraced the "harsh light of fiscal reality" in the budget and plans to raise some £40bn by increasing taxes and cutting spending in order to address the fiscal deficit.The EU is also preparing to tackle US protectionism in the awareness of its own weakness, with the Franco-German axis failing and its economic model in question. Paris and Berlin are both in a moment of introspection, and the siren calls of austerity are once again ringing through some European capitals. In France, parliamentary division is impeding an agreement to avert a possible debt crisis, while in Germany it will be the next government – the one that emerges from the early elections of 23 February – that must address the stagnation of the economy and its lack of competitiveness.Even though inflation is set to slip out of the picture somewhat in 2025, the effects of what Trump calls "Maganomics" remain to be seen. In the United States, the introduction of tariffs and the potential decline in the workforce in the wake of "mass deportations", coupled with tax cuts, could increase inflation in the country and limit the Federal Reserve's capacity to continue lowering interest rates. While Republican control of both houses in Congress and their majority in the Supreme Court may facilitate the adoption of these measures, actually carrying out the deportations appears to be much more difficult in view of the legal and logistical challenges it poses.Meanwhile, despite the savings generated by a possible pared-back public administration and the income from tariffs, the independent organisation Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that Trump's measures could increase the deficit significantly and place the debt on a path towards topping 140% of GDP in 10 years, from 99% at present. This means investors will be more demanding when it comes to buying US debt in the face of the risk of a fiscal crisis. It will also be crucial to see whether the attempts to undermine the independent regulatory agencies or the independence of the central bank are successful.The IMF's global growth forecast for 2025 is 3.2%, much the same as the estimate for 2024, but below the pre-pandemic trend. This figure, however, masks significant differences between regions, where the strength of the United States and certain emerging economies in Asia stands in contrast to the weakness of Europe and China, as well as the rapid pace of the change taking place globally from consumption of goods to consumption of services. In Asia, all eyes will be on the ailing Chinese economy, weighed down by its real estate sector, and how its leaders respond to the new restrictions on trade, investment and technology from the United States. At the close of 2024, the main Asian economies were going against the austerity measures expected in Europe and America. Both China and Japan have announced economic stimulus packages, although the desire to cut the 2025 budget on the part of the opposition in Seoul has triggered political chaos domestically. In the circumstances, we can expect an increase in economic insecurity and an escalation of the fragmentation of the global economy, where we can already see like-minded nations moving closer together. Some key countries in the "reglobalisation" trend, like Vietnam or Mexico, which had acted as intermediaries by attracting Chinese imports and investments and increasing their exports to the United States, will see their model suffer in the face of pressure from the new US administration. The drop in interest rates worldwide, meanwhile, will allow some low-income countries renewed access to the financial markets, although around 15% of them are in debt distress and another 40% run the risk of going the same way.







4-GLOBAL DISMANTLING OF INSTITUTIONS The brazenness of this world without rules is only increasing. The undermining of international commitments and security frameworks and growing impunity have been a constant feature of this yearly exercise on the part of CIDOB. In 2025, the crisis of multilateral cooperation may even reach a peak if personalism takes the lead and does even further damage to the consensual spaces of conflict resolution, i.e. the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the WTO. We live in a world that is already less cooperative and more defensive, but now the debate over the funding of this post-1945 institutional architecture may help to compound the structural weakness of multilateralism. The United States currently owes the United Nations $995m for the core budget and a further $862m for peacekeeping operations. Donald Trump's return could lead to an even greater loss of funding for the organisation and prevent it from functioning properly. It remains to be seen whether, despite the geopolitical rivalry, there are areas where agreement among powers is still possible. We remain in a world marked by inequality, heightened by the scars of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2020, the gap between the more and the least developed countries has been growing steadily. In 2023, 51% of the countries with a low human development index (HDI) had not recovered their pre-COVID-19 value, compared to 100% of those with a high HDI. Given these circumstances, it will be crucial to see the outcome of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will take place in Seville in 2025.







In addition, 2024 ended with a bid from Brazil to seek an agreement in the G20 to levy the world's wealthiest people with an annual tax of 2% on the total net worth of the super-rich, those with capital in excess of $1bn. But for the time being Lula de Silva's proposal has gone no further than the debate stage. And while the United States is by far the country among the most industrialised nations where a much greater proportion of the wealth and national income ends up in the hands of the richest 1%, the arrival of the Donald Trump-Elon Musk entente in power in Washington will make it harder still to approve such a tax.







Likewise, in October 2024 Israel passed laws barring the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating in the country and curtailing its activity in Gaza and the occupied territories of the West Bank by stopping contact between Israeli government actors and the agency. The legislation will come into force at the end of January 2025, exacerbating the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Although most countries that paused their UNRWA funding have resumed contributions, the United States withdrew $230m. The mobilisation of the international community to ensure the survival of UNRWA once the Israeli law takes effect will be crucial to demonstrate the resilience of humanitarian action; alternatively, it may compound the collapse of another United Nations pillar. Similarly, the dismantling of the institutions and rules of democracy has impacted spaces for protest in civil society, whether in the United States itself, in Georgia or in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, political violence scourged Mexico, where as many as 30 candidates are thought to have been murdered in the runup to the presidential elections of 2024, and demonstrations were banned in Mozambique. The year 2024 was a tumultuous one globally, marked by violence in multiple regions: from the ongoing battle against al-Shabaab in East Africa and the escalating regional conflict in the Middle East to over 60,000 deaths in the war in Sudan to date. Global conflict levels have doubled since 2020, with a 22% increase in the last year alone. The space for peace is shrinking. In 2025, the EU will end various training or peacebuilding missions in Mali, the Central Africa Republic or Kosovo, while the number of United Nations peacekeeping missions will also decrease in Africa. Similarly, if it is not renewed, the extended mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will end on August 31st. Some 10,000 blue helmets from 50 nations are deployed in the south of the country and they came under Israeli attack during the incursion against Hezbollah. All these moves reflect both the broad changes underway in the international security system and the crisis of legitimacy UN peacekeeping operations are suffering. Even so, the eighth peacekeeping Ministerial on the future of these operations and the five-year review of the international peacebuilding architecture will take place in May 2025, at a time when the organisation is trying to restore some of its relevance in countries gripped by violence like Haiti or Myanmar.While political violence grows, international justice is faltering. Take the division in the international community caused by the ICC's arrest warrants against the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his former defence minister, Yoav Gallant, even among European countries that recognise the court. France refused to abide by the ruling, on the grounds of the supposed immunity of non-signatories of the Rome Statute, while Italy called it "unfeasible". The response stands in stark contrast to the resolve of the European countries regarding the arrest warrants issued against Vladimir Putin or the leader of the military junta in Myanmar, Min Aung Hliang. The situation will not improve with Trump in the White House. While US opposition to the ICC has traditionally been bipartisan, the hard-line stance towards the court of the first Trump administration went much further than rhetorical censure, resulting in sanctions against the court itself and its officials, which the Biden administration subsequently lifted. Which countries will best navigate this gradual dismantling of the international order? In 2025, we shall continue to see a highly mobilised Global South geopolitically, engaged in the reinforcement of an alternative institutionalisation, which is expanding and securing a voice and place for itself in the world, albeit with no consensus on a new reformed and revisionist order. In this framework, Brazil is preparing to preside another two strategic international forums in 2025: BRICS+ and COP30. As for Africa, the continent has become a laboratory for a multi-aligned world, with the arrival of actors such as India, the Gulf states or Turkey, which now compete with and complement more established powers like Russia and China. In late 2024, Chad and Senegal demanded the end of military cooperation with France, including the closure of military bases, in a bid to assert their sovereignty. South Africa, meanwhile, will host the G20, the first time an African nation will stage this summit on its soil, following the inclusion of the African Union (AU) into the group. It will mark the end of a four-year cycle in which the summit has been held in Global South countries. And in Asia there is the perception of some pacification processes underway: from the easing of tension on the border between China and India, with the withdrawal of troops in the Himalayas, to the return of trilateral summits among South Korea, Japan and China after a five-year hiatus. The region is withdrawing into itself in the face of the uncertainty that 2025 holds. 5- TECHNOLOGY CLASH AND (DE)REGULATORY PRESSURE The tech competition between the United States and China is set to gather further pace in 2025. The final weeks of Joe Biden's presidency have helped to cement the prospect of a clash between Beijing and Washington, which will mark the new political cycle. On December 2nd, 2024, the introduction of a third round of controls on exports to China, with the collaboration of US allies such as Japan and South Korea, further reduced the possibility of obtaining various types of equipment and software for making semiconductors. China, meanwhile, retaliated with a ban on exports of gallium, germanium and antimony, key components in the production of semiconductors, and tighter control over graphite, which is essential for lithium batteries. Apart from this bipolar confrontation, in 2025 we shall see how tech protectionism gains currency worldwide. Global South countries have begun to impose tariffs on the Chinese tech industry, albeit for different reasons. While countries such as Mexico and Turkey use tariffs to try to force new Chinese investment in their territories – particularly in the field of electric vehicles (EVs) – others, like South Africa, are doing it to protect local manufacturers. Canada too announced a 100% duty on imports of Chinese EVs, following the example of the EU and the United States, despite having no EV maker of its own to protect.Given the circumstances, for Xi Jinping 2025 will be a year to reassess the strategy that has enabled China to gain leadership of five of 13 emerging tech areas, according to Bloomberg: drones, solar panels, lithium batteries, graphene refining and high-speed rail. However, a decade on from the start of the Made in China 2025 plan – its road map towards self-sufficiency – development and innovation in the semiconductor sector in China has slowed, owing to its inability to secure more advanced chips, the machinery to produce them or more cutting-edge software. Will the chip war escalate with Trump's return to power? During the campaign, the president-elect accused Taiwan of "stealing the chip business" from the United States. Yet in 2025 the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (SMC) will start large-scale production of integrated circuits at its factory in the United States. The investment in Arizona by Taiwan's biggest chip maker was announced by the first Trump administration, so it is not hard to imagine another round of investment in the future on the part of the new Republican administration to reinforce supply chain security. In addition, Elon Musk's influence in the White House also promises greater symbiosis between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon. Tech competition and the rise in conflicts across the world have restored Big Tech's appetite for public contracts in the defence field, which means that with Trump's return its leaders are hoping to gather the fruits of their investments in the presidential campaign. Just two days after the elections of November 2024, Amazon and two leading AI companies, Anthropic and Palantir, signed a partnership agreement to develop and supply the US intelligence and defence services with new AI applications and models. It seems likely, then, that the consensus reached in April 2024 between Biden and Xi Jinping to "develop AI technology in the military field in a prudent and responsible manner" will be rendered obsolete under the new Trump administration.But hyper-technology extends beyond the military field, as it cuts across ever more sectors of the administration in ever more countries. The entry into force of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in Europe, for example, will be accompanied by new technological surveillance measures, from the deployment of drones and AI systems at the border in states such as Greece to the adaption of the Eurodac system – the EU database that registers asylum seekers – to gather migrants' biometric data. This will only consolidate a model of surveillance and discrimination against this group. It also remains to be seen what impact the new political majorities in the United States and the EU will have on tech governance. Following a flurry of regulation creation and legal action in the courts against the monopolistic power of the major tech firms, in 2025 we shall see a slowdown – if not a reduction – of new measures against Big Tech. The EU's new political priorities, moreover, will put the emphasis in tech on security over competition, and we shall see the emergence of an internal debate on current regulation; over whether it can be implemented effectively or whether it has been too ambitious. It is a shift that contrasts with the regulatory trend, particularly regarding the use of AI, developing in the rest of the world, from South Korea to Latin America. Lastly, the United Nations proclaimed 2025 as the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology (IYQ). Quantum computing is a branch of IT that will enable the development of more powerful computers that can run more complex algorithms, helping to make giant leaps in scientific research, healthcare, climate science, the energy sector or finance. Microsoft and another tech firm, Atom Computing, have announced they will begin marketing their first quantum computer in 2025. And Google has also unveiled Willow, a quantum chip that can perform a task in five minutes that it would take one of today's fastest supercomputers quadrillions of years to complete. This new generation of supercomputers harnesses our knowledge of quantum mechanics – the branch of physics that studies atomic and subatomic particles – to overcome the limitations of traditional IT, allowing a host of simultaneous operations. 6-A "THIRD NUCLEAR AGE"?While algorithmic complexity gathers pace, debates about nuclear safety take us back to the past, from a new rise of atomic energy to the constant recourse to the nuclear threat as a means of intimidation. With an increasingly weak global security architecture, the international arms race is hotting up without guardrails. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), both the number and type of nuclear weapons under development increased over the last year, as nuclear deterrence once again gains traction in the strategies of the nine states that store or have detonated nuclear devices. That is why the risk of an accident or miscalculation will still be very present in 2025, both in Ukraine and in Iran.Indeed, coinciding with 1,000 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and an escalation of fighting on the ground, Vladimir Putin approved changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The revised text states that an attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, will be treated as a joint assault on Russia. In order to drive home its message, the Kremlin threatened to use Russia's Oreshnik hypersonic missile on Ukraine, capable of carrying six nuclear warheads and travelling ten times faster than the speed of sound. Against this backdrop, the deployment of North Korean soldiers to support Russia on the Ukrainian front in late 2024 also means the involvement of another nuclear power in the conflict and raises fresh questions about what Pyongyang will receive in return. Commenting on the subject, the NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, said Russia was supporting the development of the weapons and nuclear capabilities of Kim Jong-Un's regime. As a result, the threat of a potential upsetting of the balance in the Korean Peninsula and Trump's return to power have further fuelled the nuclear debate in Seoul and Tokyo, which had already been reignited by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. There could also be changes in the United States' nuclear policy. Project 2025, the ultraconservative blueprint that means to guide the Trump administration, champions the resumption of nuclear testing in the Nevada desert, even though detonating an underground nuclear bomb would violate the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States signed in 1996. The nuclear arms industry already surged under the first Trump administration. This time, however, experts believe that if the programme is implemented, it would be the most dramatic build-up of nuclear weapons since the start of the first Reagan administration four decades ago.At the same time, the two European nuclear states – France and the United Kingdom – are also in a process of nuclear modernisation. The British government has been immersed in an expansion of its arsenal of nuclear warheads since 2021 and, as a member of the AUKUS trilateral agreement along with the United States and Australia, in 2025 it will train hundreds of Australian officials in the management of nuclear reactors in order to prepare Canberra for its future acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. France, too, is developing its own design for a "latest generation" sub. In addition, 2025 will be a decisive year for Iran's nuclear programme. The deadline is approaching for the world's powers to start the mechanism to reinstate all the sanctions lifted in the deal that put a brake on Iran's nuclear expansion, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). So far, Tehran has already warned that if the sanctions return, Iran will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The threat only adds to the risk of an escalation of hostilities in the Middle East and the possibility of Israel considering an attack on nuclear facilities in Iran. Similarly, the nuclear debate has been revived in Europe, following a global trend. Nuclear energy production is expected to break world records in 2025, as more countries invest in reactors to drive the shift towards a global economy looking to move beyond coal and diversify its energy sources. The EU, which is at a critical juncture as it tries to satisfy the demand for energy while boosting economic growth, is also witnessing fresh impetus in the nuclear debate. Around a quarter of the EU's energy is nuclear, and over half is produced in France. In all, there are more than 150 reactors in operation on EU soil. Last April, 11 EU countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) signed a declaration that urged regulators to "fully unlock" the potential of nuclear energy and "enable financing conditions" to support the lifetime extension of existing nuclear reactors. Italy is mulling whether to cease to be the only G7 member without nuclear energy plants and lift the ban on the deployment of "new nuclear reactor technologies". A possible return of the Christian Democrat CDU to the German chancellery, following the elections in February, could reopen the debate on the decision taken by Angela Merkel in 2023 to close the last nuclear reactor operating in the country.Lastly, Taiwan, despite a strong aversion to nuclear in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in its neighbourhood, is also immersed in a process of reflection on nuclear energy, in a year in which the last operating plant is to close. Indeed, the need to meet the growing demand for semiconductors thanks to the AI boom, mentioned in the previous section, has put a huge strain on the country's energy consumption. The Taiwanese government is not the only one in this situation. Microsoft is helping to restart the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, which closed in 2019, while Google (owned by Alphabet) and Amazon are investing in next-generation nuclear technology.7- CLIMATE EMERGENCIES WITH NO COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP2024 will be hottest year on record. It will also be the first in which the average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, marking a further escalation of the climate crisis and the failure of attempts to keep the global temperature below that threshold. To June 2024 alone, extreme climate phenomena had already caused economic damage to a value of more than $41bn and impacted millions of people across the planet. And yet the global mitigation struggle is faced with a growing absence of political leadership. This was evident in the debates and outcomes of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November, where every political effort was devoted to just one battle: finance. Even so, the pledge on the part of the wealthiest countries to provide $300bn a year by 2035 is considered insufficient to cover the needs of the poorest countries and ensure climate justice. The cost of mitigation and adaptation for developing countries is estimated at between $5tn and $6.8tn to 2030. The pessimism, moreover, is borne out by the facts: while in 2009 the developed countries made the pledge to devote $100bn a year to climate finance, they failed to meet that goal until 2022. In Baku, in the wake of Donald Trump's victory and the shadow of a political agenda that has relegated the climate to the back seat in the face of inflation or energy prices, the Global North chose not to fight the mitigation battle. If at COP28 in Dubai it was said for the first time that the world should embark on a transition beyond fossil fuels, at COP29 it was not even mentioned. The year 2025 will be one to measure commitments, both on finance and taking action. The signatories to the Paris Agreement (2015) must present their national action plans to demonstrate they are honouring the agreed mitigation commitments. The scheduled delivery date for this new round of national contributions is February, but it is looking like many countries will be late and that their level ambition will not match up to what the science and the climate emergency require. In addition, the United States – the world's second biggest greenhouse gas emitter after China – could deal a fresh blow to the global fight against climate change if Donald Trump again decides to withdraw his country from the Paris Agreement, in a repeat of his first term. He would find it harder, however, to leave the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the treaty that underpins the agreement and the multilateral talks on the climate. But this is not the only question mark over the United States' "green transition". Trump's pick of Chris Wright, an oil executive from Liberty Energy and a climate crisis denier, to lead the Energy Department may again put fossil fuels before green energy goals.The new European Commission must also decide what role it wants to play on the global climate stage. The new political majorities will make it difficult for the EU to act with one voice on climate matters, as demonstrated recently in the European Parliament with the controversial decision to postpone and dilute the European deforestation law. Thus in 2025 we will see growing tension in the EU to lower environmental regulations and standards.While global progress in the mitigation battle slows and US leadership on climate matters fades, China is expanding its ambition and its influence. In 2025, hopes are pinned on China's energy transition and its new role as voluntary financial contributor to the agreement sealed in Baku. According to the experts, China's coal and CO2 emissions could peak in 2025 – five years ahead of its target. The climate progress China is making will have a clear impact not only on the planet, but also on the Asian giant's economic and energy interests. Part of China's economic transition since the pandemic has been directed at incentivising the development and introduction of renewables, making it the sector that most contributed to the country's economic growth in 2023. But, at the same time, it also has geopolitical implications: the more its consumption of renewable energy grows, the less dependent it is on hydrocarbons imports from third countries, including Russia. According to the vice president, Ding Xuexiang, China has devoted $24.5bn to global climate finance since 2016. With greater pressure from Brussels for China to increase its contributions, we may see the Asian country trying to burnish its image through greater climate activism in 2025. Still, the major players in renewables are the countries of the Global South. According to a study published by the think tank RMI, nations of the South are adopting these technologies at a much quicker pace and on a much greater scale than in the North. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that new solar and wind energy facilities in these countries have grown by 60% in 2024, with Brazil, Morocco and Vietnam at the head of the pack, reporting a greater adoption rate of these energies than part of Europe and the United States. The staging of COP30 in 2025 in Brazil, one of the most ambitious countries in terms of climate commitments, raises even greater hopes and expectations of a new global impetus in the battle against climate change, one that takes account of the needs and demands of the Global South. While the adaptation discourse, a longstanding demand of these countries, is expected to begin to gain traction on the international and local agenda, the change of narrative could hide new challenges. For one, the need to think about a world beyond the 1.5°C temperature increase. And for another, the risk of compounding inequalities between communities and countries with greater adaptation capacity, since poverty is directly linked to a country's resilience to climate risks and its capacity to recover from them. This places developing countries in a situation of considerable risk, and the adaptation gap is getting wider.8- GENDER: THE END OF CONSENSUS In 2025, polarisation around gender consensus will increase. As conservative agendas gain political ground, the international agreements that for decades have enabled gender equality to advance are under challenge again. On the one hand, 2025 will be a year of celebration of two international milestones for women's rights: the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Celebrating the two agreements, adopted at a time marked by optimism and the successes of transnational feminist movements, will be an invitation to reflect on lost consensuses, present challenges and the lack of political will to secure their full adoption and implementation. On the other hand, the Generation Equality forum, launched in 2021 to mark 20 years since Resolution 1325 with the aim of consolidating progress on women's and girls' rights in five years, will have to account for its unfulfilled commitments. According to the Population Matters association, one in three countries has made no progress on gender matters since 2015, and the situation of women has worsened in 18 countries, particularly Afghanistan and Venezuela. The difficulty in achieving new consensuses, leaderships and political will is apparent in the bid to adopt new international plans to protect the rights of women and girls. According to WILPF figures, 30% of the National Action Plans (NAPs) for domestic implementation of the WPS agenda expired more than two years ago, and the national strategies of 32 countries or regional organisations will end between 2024 and 2025, raising a question mark about their updating and renewal in an international context marked by tension and disputes, the rise of the far right and polarisation around gender. Two agreements to promote gender equality will end in 2025 and must be renegotiated: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Equality Strategy and the EU's Gender Action Plan III (GAP III). In the latter case, it is hard to envisage a European Commission as committed to gender equality as it was during Ursula von der Leyen's first term. During that time, the German marked several gender equality milestones, like the Directive on combatting violence against women or EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. The first steps of her second term, however, have offered a glimpse of the difficulties she will encounter to continue down that path. While in her presentation of the political guidelines for the new commission, von der Leyen declared her commitment to gender equality and the LGBTIQ collective, the team of commissioners proposed by the member states has already challenged her desire for parity in the commission she leads. Just 11 of the 27 commissioners are women – including the president herself and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Estonia's Kaja Kallas. In addition, and as the name of the post indicates, the figure of commissioner for crisis management and equality – a competence first introduced in 2019 – will also be responsible for the management and prevention of crises now, diluting the emphasis on gender parity. Similarly, with a European Parliament that has shifted right and with a greater number of EU governments led by far right and antifeminist groups, it will be difficult to make headway on progressive measures. Against this backdrop, Donald Trump's return to the presidency of the United States augurs another severe setback for gender equality, particularly in the field of sexual and reproductive health rights. The arrival in power of Republican candidates is always accompanied by the restoration of the Mexico City policy (also known as the global gag rule), which places severe international restrictions on sexual and reproductive health rights. It is a policy that bars NGOs in the health sector from offering legal and safe abortion services or even actively promoting the reform of laws against voluntary termination of pregnancy in their own countries if they receive US funding – even if they do so with their own funds. Yet this restriction is not limited to the field of development assistance. Among other measures included in Project 2025, there is the elimination of language for gender equality, sexual orientation and gender identity, or the protection of sexual and reproductive health rights in future United Nations resolutions, but also in domestic policy and regulations of the United States.In 2017, countries such as Sweden and Canada – at the time the only ones to have adopted a feminist foreign policy – were quick to fill the void left by the change of US priorities, with the introduction of international projects like SheDecides, which sought to channel international political support to safeguard women's "bodily autonomy" throughout the world. Since 2022, however, with Sweden ditching the feminist flag in foreign policy and other countries such as Canada, France or Germany focusing on their upcoming elections and the domestic political instability they must face in 2025, it is hard to imagine alternative leaderships and funding. Europe is experiencing its own regression. But the reversals in political consensus at the highest level do not stop there. Following the US elections, harassment and misogynist texts have been sweeping social media with messages such as "your body, my choice", which has registered an increase of up to 4,600% on X (formerly known as Twitter). Cyberviolence against women is on the rise. According to a 2023 study, around 98% of deep fakes are pornographic and target women. These scandals have multiplied with AI, opening a debate on the regulation and possible criminalisation of such cases. 9- MIGRANT DEPORTATIONS AND RIGHTSAs 2024 comes to an end, thousands of Syrian refugees are returning home. After 14 years of civil war, the fall of Bashar al-Assad has raised hopes in a country facing the world's largest forced displacement crisis, according to the United Nations, with over 7.2 million internally displaced people – more than two-thirds of the population – and 6.2 million refugees, mainly living in the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Yet despite the uncertainty of the political moment and that fact that fighting is still taking place on the ground, some EU countries (Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland or Belgium) are rushing to suspend the asylum applications of Syrian refugees as others, like Greece and Austria, are taking measures to expel them. The Austrian government has even launched a deportation programme that is reassessing the situation of some 40,000 Syrians who had been granted refugee status in the country over the last five years. All these moves further aggravate the debate among European partners over the concept of "safe third country" so criticised by social organisations. 2025 will be a year of deportations, in terms of discourse and in practice. Immigration has been the cornerstone of Donald Trump's political career, and in his second presidential campaign he vowed to carry out the biggest deportation in history. How will it be done? It remains to be seen if we will see staged deportations or what the real impact might be on the US labour market of a policy that, according to multiple studies, is not a zero sum game in favour of US-born workers. Irregular migrants work in different occupations to those born in the United States; they create demand for goods and services; and they contribute to the country's long-term fiscal health. There are also doubts about the economic sustainability of this type of policy, particularly in view of the prospect of a growth in flows and the dramatic increase in the number of deportations in the United States already since the pandemic (some 300,000 people a year). Yet Trump's victory saw the value of firms engaged in the deportation of migrants and monitoring or supervising the border, as well as the management of detention centres, rocket on the stock market. The deportation business is booming.And deportation is not only an instrument of the Global North. Iran is considering mass deportations of Afghans; the Turkish deportation system has been bolstered by hundreds of millions of euros from the EU; and Tunisia too is conducting illegal "collective expulsions" of immigrants with funds from the EU. Egypt, meanwhile, for months has been carrying out mass arrests and forced returns of Sudanese refugees. On a European level, in 2025 the EU member states must present their national plans to implement the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. The rules are scheduled to enter into force in 2026, but Spain has asked for the use of new tools for border control and the distribution of migrants to be brought forward to next summer. The pact, however, has already been challenged by some member states, which are calling for it to be replaced by a model that allows migrants to be transferred to detention centres located outside the EU in countries that are deemd to be safe. Italy's decision last August to open centres of this type in Albania, though it ended in a resounding legal defeat for Georgia Meloni's government, offered a clear foretaste of the growing tension between policy and the rule of law. In these circumstances, moreover, in 2025 judges may become more acutely aware of the lack of tools to safeguard the rights to asylum and refugee status in a global environment that has been dismantling international protection for years. The war in Gaza – which in its first year caused the forced displacement of 85% of the population – illustrates the calamitous failure of international law, both in the humanitarian field and regarding asylum. Fear, as a dynamic that permeates policy both in the migration field and in international relations, will gain ground in 2025. That is why the staging of deportations has become a symbolic deterrent. The criminalisation of migrants – who feel targeted – and the social burden narrative that certain governments exploit with an agenda of public cuts, are setting the tone in an international system increasingly obsessed with border protection and lacking the interest (or tools) to ensure safe and regular migration. 10- MILITARISATION OF INSECURITYIn this world of fragile institutions, the cracks through which organised crime can seep and expand are growing. Organised crime networks are multimillion dollar, transnational businesses that construct hierarchies and strategic alliances. As the international order fragments, mob geopolitics is evolving with new actors and a change of methodology: rather than compete, organised crime groups are cooperating more and more, sharing global supply chains for the trafficking of drugs and people, environmental crimes, counterfeit medicine or illegal mining – which in some countries, like Peru or Colombia, are as profitable as drug-trafficking, if not more so. Global networks that stretch from China to the United States and from Colombia to Australia, thanks to "narco submarines", account for the diversification of businesses and locations, but they also explain their capacity to penetrate the structures of power and undermine the rule of law, because they exist in a context of increasing corruption of states and their legal and security systems. In Ecuador, for example, a hotspot of drug-trafficking on a global scale, the government has declared war on 22 criminal organisations and speaks of an "internal armed conflict". Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, today is a city in the grip of rival criminal groups locked in turf wars, which have led to the various armed gangs seizing control of neighbourhoods, police stations and even temporarily blocking the airport. The latest escalation of violence has left nearly 4,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced people inside the country, according to the UN Human Rights Office. Meanwhile, the geopolitical crisis of fentanyl, where the epicentre is Mexico as a well-established producer of this synthetic drug since the COVID-19 pandemic, has developed into a bilateral problem of the first order with the United States and Canada and a threat to Central America. In Europe too, port cities like Marseille, Rotterdam or Antwerp are major points of drug entry and seizure. Organised crime is currently the biggest threat facing the Swedish government, with 195 shootings and 72 bombings that have claimed 30 lives this last year alone. Globalisation means this new hyperconnected reality has even reached the islands of the Pacific, which now occupy a prominent place on the international strategic chessboard thanks to a proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security commitments. It has also transformed the region's criminal landscape, with the presence of Asian triads and crime syndicates, the cartels of Central and South America, and criminal gangs from Australia and New Zealand.According to the Global Organised Crime Index, at least 83% of the world's population lives in countries with high levels of crime, when in 2021 it was 79%. If organised crime is one of the winners in this new fragmented order, the rise in violence has also brought the imposition of policies of securitisation. In Latin America, for instance, the clear choice to militarise security – seeking national solutions (containing the violence) to what is a transnational challenge – has favoured "firm hand" responses.







The world is rearming. With the rise in conflicts, like the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, so revenues from sales of arms and military services have grown. According to the SIPRI, 2025 will the biggest year for military spending in a long time. Given these circumstances, the pressure on NATO countries to increase their defence spending will ramp up again with the return of Donald Trump to the White House, but also on account of the unpredictability of the international environment. Over the coming months, NATO must negotiate various internal fractures: for one, the demand to raise defence spending to 3.5% of GDP; for another, the differences among allies over the strategies used against Russia. Countries such as Poland and the Baltic nations are calling for a more aggressive stance against Moscow, while other members, such as Hungary or Turkey, are looking to maintain a more neutral approach. This could hinder the formulation of a unified strategy in the face of threats from Russia and future geopolitical scenarios in Ukraine. In addition, during his campaign Trump questioned the commitment to mutual defence enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. If the new US administration adopts a more isolationist stance, the European allies might doubt US reliability as a pillar of their security. There is also growing concern in the EU over the security of essential components and undersea cable infrastructures, which are critical to connectivity and the global economy, particularly in the wake of several episodes of suspected sabotage like those seen in the Baltic Sea in the last few months. Lastly, China's growing militarisation of its maritime periphery is also triggering fresh security fears in Asia. Beijing is promoting – ever more zealously – a Sinocentric view of the Indo-Pacific region. This is raising fears that 2025 will see an increase in the aggressiveness of China's strategy to turn East Asia into its exclusive sphere of influence.Against this backdrop, the quickening pace of geopolitics raises multiple questions both for analysts and for international relations actors themselves. The world is struggling with the posturing of new leaderships, shifting landscapes that are redefining long-running conflicts and a Sino-US rivalry that may develop into a trade and tech war in the near future. Given this prospect, the multi-alignment efforts that many countries across the world are trying to make, with security at heart, are becoming increasingly complex as confrontation escalates among the major global powers .







CIDOB calendar 2025: 80 dates to mark in the diary January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama and Somalia, which were elected in 2024, will join the council as non-permanent members, replacing Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Mozambique and Switzerland. Meanwhile Algeria, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and South Korea, which were elected in 2023, will start their second year as members.January 1 – Poland takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The government of Donald Tusk will focus council activity on moving forward with the accession processes of the countries aspiring to join the EU, comprehensive support for Ukraine and strengthening transatlantic ties with the United States. The latter priority must accommodate an uncomfortable truth for Brussels: the return of Donald Trump to the White House.January 1 – Bulgaria and Romania become full members of the Schengen area. In November 2024, Austria lifted its veto on the full integration of Bulgaria and Romania into the Schengen area. The two countries, members of the EU since 2007, were admitted to the borderless travel zone in March 2024, but checks on people were only lifted at ports and airports. Now the same will apply to land border checks, and the common visa policy will be in operation at the EU's external borders.January 1 – Finland takes up the yearly rotating chairmanship of the OSCE. The organisation responsible for maintaining security, peace and democracy in a hemisphere comprising 57 countries across Europe, Asia and North America has been through some low times since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which, despite the condemnation, remains a member. The 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council meeting will take place in Finland between November and December 2025. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who was barred from the council meeting in 2022, did however attend in 2023 and 2024.January 1 – Handover between the African Union's ATMIS and AUSSOM missions in Somalia. The AU will remain involved in the efforts to bring peace to Somalia and stabilise the country – stricken by the al-Qaeda allegiant organisation al-Shabaab – with a new mission, the third consecutive operation since 2007. However, AUSSOM will come up against escalating tension between the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia, after Addis Ababa struck a deal on naval access to the Gulf of Aden with the secessionist Republic of Somaliland.January 1 – 30th anniversary of the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO enters its third decade of activity in an international context marked by growing opposition to globalisation, the rise of protectionism worldwide, and Donald Trump's electoral promise to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese goods and 10-20% on other imports.January 7 – John Mahama is sworn in as president in Ghana. In the English-speaking West African country, which has one of the most robust democratic systems on the continent, John Mahama, former president of the Republic for the first time in 2012-2017 and candidate of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, will return to power. Mahama will take over from the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) president Nana Akufo-Addo, who defeated him in 2016 and 2020. January 15 – Daniel Chapo takes office as president of Mozambique. The fifth straight president from the leftist FRELIMO party since national independence in 1975 was declared the winner of the elections of October 9, 2024. His opponents claimed fraud and called for popular protests. The crackdown left over 30 dead, including children. While rich in natural resources, Mozambique remains mired in underdevelopment and faces jihadist threats and serious climate risks.January 20 – Donald Trump takes office as president of the United States. The Republican starts a second non-consecutive term after roundly defeating the Democrat Kamala Harris in the election of November 5, 2024, with promises to deport undocumented immigrants, cut taxes and levy new trade tariffs. Trump returns to the White House with a more radical nationalist rhetoric than the one that marked his first term between 2017 and 2021.January 20-24 – Annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (Davos forum). The influential group of thinkers each year convenes figures from politics, business, academia and civil society to a select and extremely high-profile international gathering in the Swiss town of Davos. In 2025, it will put three major global challenges up for discussion: geopolitical shocks, stimulating growth to improve living standards and stewarding a just and inclusive energy transition.January 26 – Presidential elections in Belarus. Unlike in 2020, the dictator Alexander Lukashenko will not even have to pretend there is a competition at the ballot boxes because the country's election commission will only allow token candidates to stand, and none from the gagged opposition. The longest-serving president in Europe – in power since 1994 – and staunch ally of Vladimir Putin is sure to win a seventh presidential term.January 31 – End of the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali. A regional instrument of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali was launched in 2015 to assist the government in the fight against organised crime. Its continuation remains in doubt after the EUTM training mission, geared towards the fight against jihadism, was not renewed in 2024 and following the anti-French turn taken by the military junta in Bamako. Its twin operation in Niger, EUCAP Sahel Niger, also ended in 2024. On September 19, the EUTM in the Central African Republic will likewise come to a end.February 9 – General elections in Ecuador. The centrist Daniel Noboa won the snap presidential election in 2023, called by his predecessor, the liberal conservative Guillermo Lasso, to avoid impeachment by the country's congress. Noboa will seek re-election, this time for a normal constitutional period of four years, in a climate overshadowed by the brutal wave of criminal violence afflicting Ecuador. His chief rival once again will be Luisa González, a protege of leftist former President Rafael Correa.February 10 and 11 – Artificial Intelligence Action Summit, France. The French government is staging one of many international AI-related events in 2025. Unlike the rest, this action summit will gather heads of state and government and leaders of international organisations, as well as company CEOs, experts, academics, artists and NGOs. Following on from the summits of 2023 in Bletchley, in the United Kingdom, and 2024 in Seoul, the Paris meeting will look at how AI can benefit public policy.February 11-13 – 13th World Governments Summit, Dubai. The WGS is a Dubai-based organisation that each year gathers leaders from government, academia and the private sector to debate technological innovation, global challenges and future trends in pursuit of good governance. The theme of the 2025 edition is "Shaping future governments".February 14-16 – 61st Munich Security Conference. Held every year since 1963, the MSC is recognised as the most important independent forum for the exchange of opinions on international security. In 2025, over 450 policymakers and high-level officials will discuss, among other topics, the EU's role in security and defence, the security implications of climate change and new visions of the global order.February 15 and 16 – 38th African Union Summit, Addis Ababa. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government will hold an ordinary session in which Mauritania will hand over the one-year chairpersonship, and the successor to the Chadian Moussa Faki as chairperson of the African Union Commission will be elected. The Pan-African organisation has been running the NEPAD development programme since 2001 and in 2015 it adopted its Agenda 2063 to hasten the continent's transformation. Six member states – Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan – are currently suspended following their respective military coups.February 23 – Federal elections in Germany. Six days after Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired his finance minister Christian Lindner, of the liberal party FDP, from the government over budget differences, on November 12, 2024, the Social Democrat came to an agreement with the Christian Democrat opposition to bring forward by seven months elections due in September. The SPD and The Greens, the only remaining partner following the collapse of the "traffic light" coalition, go into the vote languishing in the polls, with the CDU/CSU and the far-right AfD in the lead.March 1 – Yamandú Orsi takes office as president of Uruguay. The candidate from the leftist opposition Broad Front beat the conservative Álvaro Delgado, from the ruling National Party, in the runoff presidential election of November 24, 2024. The successor to the outgoing president, Luis Lacalle, has a five-year term. Broad Front's return, after holding power for the first time between 2005 and 2020, will precede the celebration of the bicentenary of Uruguay's Declaration of Independence on August 25.March 1 - End of the mandate of the new Transitional Government in Syria. This was the date announced on December 10, 2024, two days after the fall of the Baathist regime of Bashar al-Assad in the lightning offensive launched on November 27 against Damascus by a coalition of rebel groups, by the new Prime Minister, Muhammad al-Bashir. The day before, he was appointed to the post by the main rebel wing, the Islamist guerrilla group HTS (Hayat Tahrir al Sham) of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani and the Syrian Salvation Government, which Bashir himself had been leading.March 3-6 – 19th edition of the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona. A fresh yearly edition of the world's leading mobile communication technologies event, where device manufacturers, service providers, wireless carriers, engineers and scientists unveil the latest developments in the sector. The 2025 MWC, the theme of which is "Converge. Connect. Create", will focus on topics including the next phase of 5G, IoT devices and generative AI.First quarter – Sixth European Political Community Summit, Albania. The EPC came about in 2022 at the initiative of Emmanuel Macron. It is a biennial gathering of the leaders of 44 European countries that seeks to provide a platform to discuss strategic matters in a non-structured framework of dialogue among the 27 EU member states and a further 17 states from the continent that are candidates for accession or are associated with the EU.First quarter – Election of the president of Armenia by the National Assembly. The term of Vahagn Khachaturyan will come to a close no later than April 9. This is the date the tenure of the previous holder of the post, Armen Sarkissian, was due to end. Sarkissian resigned in 2022. A parliamentary republic, Armenia remains in Russia's orbit, a situation that is proving increasingly problematic for the authorities in Yerevan given Moscow's lack of action towards the country's military defence in the face of attacks by Azerbaijan. One of these attacks in 2023 forced the surrender of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.First quarter – First European Union-United Kingdom Summit. The Labour government of Keir Starmer champions a new era of bilateral relations between London and Brussels. Following Brexit in 2020, the United Kingdom's economic exchange with the 27 EU members takes place under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which provides a limited area of free trade in goods and services. The British prime minister is pursuing "constructive" ties with the EU that cover complex issues such as immigration, although he rules out a return to the free of movement of workers, the customs union and, in short, the single market.April 13-October 13 – Universal exhibition, Osaka. The Japanese city is organising a world's fair for the third time, after 1970 and 1990. The theme of Expo 2025 is "Designing future society for our lives".May 6 – 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the European Union and the People's Republic of China. Beijing and Brussels will celebrate half a century of diplomatic relations at a time defined by tensions over China's overcapacity, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles, and China's role in the war in Ukraine.May 9 – 75th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. In 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, made a proposal to place France and Germany's coal and steel production under a single authority. This was the genesis of a web of supranational integration institutions (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) that decades later would result in what today is the European Union.May 12 – General elections in the Philippines. The deterioration of the relationship between the Marcos and Duterte families, who lead the current ruling coalition, could trigger a competition between the two main governing parties in an election where more than 18,000 positions in the Senate, the House of Representatives, and provincial and local governments across the archipelago are up for renewal.May 19-23 – 29th World Gas Conference, Beijing. The growing importance of natural gas as an alternative fuel to petroleum products in the transition to carbon neutrality, its status as a raw material in the production of grey hydrogen and the greater demand for gas as a result of the war in Ukraine gives the triennial WGC gathering particular importance. The International Gas Union (IGU) has been staging the event since 1931. In China, production, imports and consumption of gas are increasing constantly.May 26 – End of Luis Almagro's tenure as OAS secretary general. Uruguay's Luis Almagro was elected head of the OAS in 2015, and in 2020 he secured re-election for a second and final five-year term. The candidates to succeed him are the Paraguayan foreign minister, Rubén Ramírez, and his counterpart from Suriname, Albert Ramdin. The vote will take place at the General Assembly, which in June will hold its 55th regular session in Antigua and Barbuda.May – Presidential elections in Poland. The Civic Platform (PO), a pro-European and liberal conservative party, returned to power in Poland in 2023 led by Donald Tusk. It is hoping to win this direct ballot and bid farewell to an uncomfortable cohabitation with the head of state elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2020, Andrzej Duda, from the right-wing party Law and Justice (PiS). The Polish system of government is a mixed one, where the president wields important powers.May – Pope's visit to Turkey. The Vatican is planning this papal visit, of a marked ecumenical nature, to commemorate 1,700 years since the First Council of Nicaea, whose doctrinal legacy is accepted by all the Christian churches. Pope Francis already made an apostolic visit to Turkey in 2014.June 9-13 – Third UN Ocean Conference, Nice. Three years after the second edition in Lisbon, the UN will stage a new thematic conference in the city on the French Riviera to support Sustainable Development Goal 14: "Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources". June 8, the day before the inauguration of the UNOC, marks World Oceans Day.June 14 – End of the EULEX Kosovo mission mandate. Since 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo has been the largest civilian mission to be launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). EU support for the Kosovar institutions on rule of law matters is one of the three pillars of the international commitment to peace, security and stability in Kosovo, the others being UNMIK, the UN interim administration mission, and KFOR, the NATO force. June 20 – World Refugee Day. According to the UN's specialist agency UNHCR, in 2024 there were 117 million forcibly displaced people in the world, of whom 43.4 million could be considered refugees; 40% of them were under 18. A total of 69% of refugees and other people in need of international protection live in countries bordering their countries of origin, and only 25% are hosted by high-income countries.June 21-29 – London Climate Action Week. LCAW, founded in 2009 by the think tank E3G and the Mayor of London, is an annual major get-together where individuals, communities and organisations swap ideas and propose collaborations to support decarbonisation and climate resilience. Also taking place within it is the Cites Climate Action Summit (CCAS), organised by the Smart Cities Network.June 24-25 – NATO Summit in The Hague. The North Atlantic Council will meet at heads of state and government level with the number of member states increased to 32 and with the Netherlands' Mark Rutte as the organisation's new secretary general. NATO is expected to make significant decisions regarding Ukraine and Russia, with a question mark over what new US president Donald Trump's strategic focus will be.June 25 – 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The event is being preceded by flaring tension on the Korean Peninsula, which is seeing out 2024 on a state of alert thanks to an escalation of hawkish action on the part of North Korea (fresh missile launches into the sea, the blowing up of road and rail links to the border with South Korea, the sending of troops to support Russia in the war in Ukraine) and, in response, joint manoeuvres by the armed forces of the United States, Japan and South Korea.June 30-July 3 – Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, Seville. The discussions of the high representatives of the nations attending this conference sponsored by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) will focus on the policies and resources required to fulfil the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs globally. FfD4 Seville will assess the progress made in the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus (2002), the Doha Declaration (2008) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015).June – 51st G7 summit, Kananaskis. Canada in 2025 will lead the annual gathering of the seven big powers from the Global North, plus the European Union. For the Canadian government, some of the priorities to be addressed are the inclusive economy, climate action and managing emerging technologies. Kananaskis, in the Rocky Mountains of Alberta province, west of Calgary, already played host to the G7 in 2002.July 1 – Denmark takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The rotating council presidency "trio" standing between January 1, 2025, and June 30, 2026, will be completed by Poland (as the outgoing holder) and Cyprus (as the incoming holder in 2026).July 1 – Bulgaria to adopt the euro. Bulgaria is looking to become the 21st eurozone country on this date, once the five convergence criteria on inflation, deficit, debt, interest rates and monetary stability are met, the latter through participation in the ERM II exchange rate mechanism. The initially planned date of January 1, 2025, had to be put back after the European Central Bank told Sofia inflation was still too high.July 27 – Elections for the House of Councillors in Japan.The elections to renew half of the upper house of Japan's legislative power could reaffirm the current weakness of the leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party, headed by the unpopular Ishiba Shigeru. Following the snap general elections of 2024, Japan faces a historic political anomaly: a minority government, which brings uncertainty to the otherwise stable Japanese politics.August 1 – 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The signing of this declaration in the Finnish capital by the 35 states participating in the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the precursor to the OSCE) marked a milestone in establishing a model of co-existence among blocs and neutral countries in the detente years, during the first phase of the cold war. The successor to this instrument was the Paris Charter of 1990.August 6 – Bicentenary of the independence of Bolivia. The Andean country is gearing up for the commemoration in a climate of serious political upheaval, with outbreaks of violence and hints of civil strife, at the heart of the ruling party Movement for Socialism (MAS), where there is an escalating feud between the current president of the republic, Luis Arce, and his predecessor in the post, Evo Morales. With their respective factions behind them, both are seeking to lead the MAS candidacy in the presidential elections of August 17. Arce's current five-year term ends in November.August – General elections in Gabon. In August 2023, General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema ousted the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, in a bloodless military coup. He immediately proceeded to proclaim himself president for a transitional period with a process to adopt a new constitution that, on paper, should end in August 2025. The transition charter does not expressly bar Oligui Nguema from standing in future presidential elections. The presumption is that the general will run for the presidency, in which case he is likely to win.September 8 – Legislative elections in Norway. The ballot will be a test of the performance of the coalition government comprising the Labour Party of Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and the centrists, which won power in 2021. During the term now nearing its end, the Nordic country has seen its strategic value soar as a hydrocarbons provider to European allies looking to reduce their dependence on Russia. In late 2024, the polls were worrying for the Labour Party, the most popular choice in every election since 1927, as they were trailing the Conservatives and even the right-wing Progress Party.September 15 – 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Signed after the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action represents the most ambitious commitment to gender equality to date, identifying 12 critical areas for action to end inequality. Its commemoration will coincide with the rise of anti-gender movements and the challenges posed by setbacks and ongoing backlash in gender equality in recent years.September 27 – Federal elections in Australia. This is the date on or before which the ballot to elect new members of the Australian House of Representatives must be held. The ruling Labor Party of Anthony Albanese, the prime minister since 2022 with a majority in parliament, will be up against the conservative Liberal-National coalition, headed by the Liberal's Peter Dutton.September – 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly gathering that brings together all the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and how they see the world. The regular session will begin on September 9 and the high-level general debate will start on September 23.September – End of the first phase of the conclusion of United States military operations in Iraq. That is the timeline put forward by the Department of Defense to move to the "second phase" of the "transition plan" that began in September 2024 for the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) the military operation to combat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria since 2014. The United States ended combat operations in Iraq in 2021 but left behind a contingent of soldiers on logistics and training missions.September – Artemis II mission to the Moon. Barring technical difficulties causing further delays, NASA will carry out the second launch – the first crewed mission – of the Artemis space programme around this time. The plan is for the Orion spacecraft, propelled by the SLS rocket, to leave the Earth's orbit, perform a flyby of the Moon and return to Earth in ten days. If all goes well, the following mission, Artemis III, also crewed by four astronauts, will mark the first time humans have set foot on the Moon since the lunar landing by Apollo 17 in 1972.October 6 – World Habitat Day. The UN General Assembly established this day of global observance in 1985. Previously, in 1977, the UN had created its Human Settlements Programme to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities. UN-Habitat held its third international conference (Habitat III) in Quito in 2016 and the next edition (Habitat IV) is scheduled for 2036. Looking ahead to World Habitat Day 2025, the agency is calling for reflection on how to tackle the sustainability crises affecting urban areas.October 17-19 – Annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group, Washington. Preceded by the "spring meetings", the main international organisations providing credit assistance to states will bring together their boards of governors and their advisory bodies, the Development Committee and the International Monetary and Financial Committee, in Washington, the corporate headquarters of both bodies. Bulgaria's Kristalina Georgieva has been in charge of the IMF since 2019 and the Indian-born American Ajay Banga has been the president of the World Bank since 2023.October 20 – Federal elections in Canada. The Liberal Party prime minister, Justin Trudeau, faces elections to the House of Commons with personal popularity ratings in free fall after a period in power stretching back to 2015. The centre-left leaning Liberals have run a minority government since 2019 and, after three straight victories, they are seeing how Pierre Poilievre's Conservatives have a commanding lead over them in the polls. Once hugely popular, a string of controversies and missteps have caused the progressive Trudeau's star to fade.October 26 – Legislative elections in Argentina. The South American country will elect a third of its senators (24) and half of the national deputies (127). A new feature in these elections will be that voters will mark their preferences on a single ballot paper. As a prior step, the "simultaneous and mandatory open primaries" (known by the Spanish acronym PASO), called for August 3, will be crucial. The government of President Javier Milei, however, wants to abolish them. In the 2023 legislative elections, Milei's La Libertad Avanza ("Liberty Advances") coalition debuted with 35 deputies, 23 fewer than the Peronist Unión por la Patria ("Union for the Homeland").October 31 – 25th anniversary of UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security. United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted resolution (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000 to reaffirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction. The resolution stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.October – Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire. The French-speaking country that carries most economic weight in sub-Saharan Africa goes into these elections in a climate of relative calm, compared to the violent upheavals of 1999-2011. The president, Alassane Ouattara, was elected in 2010, re-elected in 2015 and secured a third term in 2020, amid huge opposition protest. In late 2024, it was not known whether Ouattara, in a fresh – and dangerous – self-serving interpretation of the country's constitution, would stand for a fourth time. The controversial former president and opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo had confirmed he would run.October – Legislative elections in the Czech Republic. ANO, the populist right-wing party of Andrej Babiš, was dislodged from the government in 2021 by a five-member liberal conservative coalition headed by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Petr Fiala. The polls are predicting a resounding victory for Babiš, though falling short of an absolute majority. The businessmen turned politician under the shadow of corruption is tipped to secure a return as prime minister with a nationalist, Eurosceptic rhetoric that is hostile to military assistance for Ukraine.October – Presidential elections in Cameroon. Paul Biya, now in his nineties and the president of the republic since 1982 (he is the fourth longest serving head of state in the world, behind Equatorial Guinea's Obiang, the King of Sweden and the Sultan of Brunei) will run for the post for the eighth straight time. A 2008 amendment to the country's constitution abolished the limit on the number of seven-year terms a president can serve. The conservative and Francophile ruling party the RDPC, has closed ranks behind the elderly and ailing Biya, a de facto dictator at the head of an authoritarian regime that tolerates pluralism but not true electoral competition.October – General elections in Tanzania. Marked by increased political violence against the opposition during the 2024 local elections, these elections will test current President Samia Suluhu Hassan's commitment to democratic reforms or, instead, it will evidence a return of the African country to authoritarianism.October or November – 47th ASEAN Summit, Malaysia. This dynamic bloc of ten Southeast Asian countries, which operates its own free trade area and another, the RCEP, with its regional partners, holds summits twice a year, the autumn summit being the most important on account of the profusion of parallel meetings it hosts. Also taking place at the 2025 edition, then, is the 20th East Asia Summit, the 28th ASEAN+3 Summit and bilateral summits with China (28th edition), Japan (28th), South Korea (26th), India (22nd), the United States (13th) and Australia (5th), as well as one with the UN (15th).November 6 – 50th anniversary of the start of the Green March. The Moroccan occupation of parts of the Sahara through the march of 360,000 volunteers on foot, along with the Sahrawi people's refusal to abandon their right to self-determination, initiated the still-unresolved Western Sahara conflict. In recent years, Spain and France have shifted their stance from supporting a referendum in the territory to expressing interest in Rabat's autonomy plan as a solution.November 10-21 – 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference, Belém. Brazil will host three parallel meetings (COP30, CMP20 and CMA7) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as scientific alerts and extreme climate events mount up on account of global warming. In tune with the general sensation of emergency and to demonstrate its commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the government of Lula da Silva has chosen as venue for the event the capital of a state, Pará, that takes in the heart of the Amazon rainforest.November 16 – General elections in Chile. In Chile, the sitting president is not eligible to run for an immediate second term, which means that Gabriel Boric, who was elected in 2021 (and whose record in office has led to low approval ratings), will make way for another candidate from Alianza de Gobierno ("Government Alliance") the centre-left coalition in power and successor to Apruebo Dignidad ("Approve Dignity"). A year before the elections, neither the left nor the opposition centre-right or right had clearly defined figures to champion the various sectors.November 27 and 28 – 20th G20 summit, Johannesburg. The South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, the target of criticism at home on account of a relentless decline in electoral support and rifts within his party, the ANC, has pinned considerable hopes on the outcome of the 20th meeting of the most renowned and influential world leaders forum, which will be held in an African country for the first time. November 30 – General elections in Honduras. The vote will decide the successor to the president, Xiomara Castro, from the left-wing Libre (Liberty and Refoundation) party. Under the country's constitution, Castro is not eligible to seek a second term after the one that began on January 27, 2022. November – Second World Summit on Social Development, Qatar. A second summit, following the one held in Copenhagen in 1995, devoted to just and sustainable social development across the globe. WSSD2, convened by the UN General Assembly, will analyse shortcomings in the application of the Copenhagen Declaration and – say the organisers – should reinvigorate the programme of action for fulfilling the 2030 Agenda. Other directly related instruments are the FfD4, which is to take place in Seville in the summer, and the Summit of the Future, held in New York 2024.November – 32nd APEC summit, Gyeongju. The South Korean coastal city will play host to the heads of state and government of the world's biggest regional economic cooperation and trade group (ahead of the EU/EEA, the RCEP, the TPP and ASEAN), comprising 21 Pacific basin countries including China, the United States, Russia and Japan, as well as 12 of the 25 biggest economies by GDP. The APEC has not managed to form a free trade zone, but its leaders' summits have a deeply political and diplomatic aspect.December 1 – Centenary of the Locarno Treaties. The signing in 1925 of seven international agreements negotiated among Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia following a conference held in the Swiss city laid the foundations of a new order of peace, security and inviolability of the borders of Europe in the wake of the First World War. What was often referred to as "the spirit of Locarno" allowed Weimar Germany's entry into the League of Nations, but the advent of Nazism dashed those hopes.First week of December – 10th Summit of the Americas, Punta Cana. Since 1994, the Summit of the Americas has provided the format for the institutionalised political gatherings of the heads of the continent's 35 sovereign states, two of which are not included in the OAS. It takes place roughly once every three years. In 2022, President Biden did not invite the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua or Venezuela to the summit in Los Angeles as he considered their regimes were dictatorships, a decision that sparked controversy among the other Latin American delegations. The Dominican government is focusing on making the 2025 gathering an "inclusive" event and is looking to avoid controversy.December 14 – 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The accords signed at the U.S. military base in Dayton brought an end to the Bosnian War, with tragic episodes such as the Srebrenica genocide. In a peace negotiation that overlooked gender issues, Dayton condemned Bosnian women to be survivors of war and victims of peace by failing to address sexual violence as a weapon of war, leaving wounds that remain unhealed. Pending – Ninth CELAC summit and fourth CELAC-EU summit, Colombia. As holder of the presidency pro tempore, the South American country will be in charge of the annual gathering of the heads of state and government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, where 33 sovereign nations of the continent discuss their integration without the presence of the United States or Canada. The bi-regional CELAC-EU summit will seek a common agenda on cooperation and investment, providing a more multilateral context to the association or free trade agreements between the EU and several of America's countries and subregional blocs.Pending – 17th BRICS summit, Brazil. The intergovernmental association formed in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China is expanding rapidly, and in 2025 it will stage its 17th summit in the first of those founding countries. The leaders of the nine member states will attend, as well as those of associated countries and the candidates to join, gathered as BRICS+. The drivers of the forum frame their activities in the contest with the Western powers to achieve a multipolar world order that includes the Global South.Pending – 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China. The founding superpower will once again orchestrate the annual gathering of leaders from the SCO, which – alongside the Belt and Road Initiative – is the chief instrument of the People's Republic of China to extend its geopolitical and geo-economic influence in Eurasia on the intergovernmental plane, hand in hand with Russia, its strategic partner. The Heads of State Council of the ten member states will be joined by the leaders of observer and associate countries, under the SCO+ format. Pending – Sixth Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit, New Delhi. India for the first time will host a leaders' summit of the Quad, the discussion forum in which the Asian power engages with the United States, Japan and Australia on both diplomatic and security matters of interest, with an eye on China. The Quad dialogue takes place in conjunction with the Malabar joint air and naval military exercise conducted every year in waters of the Indian or Pacific Oceans.Pending – 34th Arab League summit, Baghdad. Iraq will host the annual meeting of Arab League leaders. Apart from the armed and territorial conflicts tearing several of its members apart (Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia), the organisation is proving incapable of having a positive influence on ending the wars Israel has been waging against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon since 2023. In addition, its stance on Iran is far from unanimous.Pending – 17th summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization, Baku. Azerbaijan, one of the countries gaining most strategic advantage from the war in Ukraine, will host the gathering of presidents of this organisation of ten Eurasian governments that includes Turkey, Iran and the whole of Central Asia, but not Russia or China. The oil-exporting Transcaucasian country already staged COP29 in 2024 and in 2025 it will also be the venue for a summit of the Organization of Turkic States.Pending – Bulgaria to join the OECD. In 2022, the OECD began talks for the entry of six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania. In 2024, they were joined by Thailand and Indonesia. Of them all, the country to have made most progress towards joining the club of developed market-based economies committed to democracy appears to be Bulgaria, which is hoping to become the 39th member state at the end of 2025.Pending – Norway to ban the sale of new petrol and diesel cars. The government in Oslo has set out to ensure that as of 2025 all new cars will have zero carbon emissions, i.e. they will be electric or they will run on hydrogen. The ban by Norway – a major hydrocarbons producer – is a decade ahead of the goal mapped out by the EU. As for overall climate neutrality, it aims to achieve it by 2030, 20 years before the EU. Norway generates much more energy than it consumes and is committed to clean energies like green hydrogenAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donorsDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/313/en