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This paper contributes to the limited literature on the welfare impacts of market concentration by developing a simple model that shows how exogenous variations in market power affect poverty. Increased market power leads to economy-wide welfare losses, because it raises the prices of goods and services for all agents in an economy and thus reduces the relative incomes of households, particularly among the poor. Declines in poverty in this context are only possible in the case wherein the poor have access to a share of oligopolistic rents. Although this scenario seems highly unlikely, this result has important implications for public policy, particularly for economies with less-than-perfect markets and social objectives of poverty eradication. This result suggest the possibility of taxing extranormal rents extracted by firms with market power and redistributing them through targeted lump-sum social transfers, thereby contributing to poverty reduction by mitigating welfare losses from the negative price effect.

The Great Depression in Weber County, Utah, is an Oral History Project by Mack S. Taft for completion of his Master's Thesis at Utah State University during the summer of 1969. The interviews address the Great Depression through the eyes of individuals in several different occupations including: Bankers, Laborers, Railroad Workers, Attorneys, Farmers, Educators, Businessmen, Community and Church Leaders, Housewives, Children and Physicians. All of these individuals lived in Weber County from 1929 to 1941. The interviews were based on what they remembered about the depression, how they felt about those events and how it affected their life then and now. ; This is an oral history interview with Calvin J. Mason. Mr. Mason describes his years in the Civilian Conservation Corps during the Depression, working in Milford, Utah, in Salt Lake City, at the Bird Refuge, for the Forest Service, and so on. ; 13p.; 29cm.; 2 bound transcripts; 4 file folders. 1 sound disc: digital; 4 3/4 in. ; Oral History Program Calvin J. Mason Interviewed by Mack S. Taft circa 1960s Oral History Program Weber State University Stewart Library Ogden, Utah Calvin J. Mason Interviewed by Mack S. Taft circa 1960s Copyright © 2016 by Weber State University, Stewart Library iii Mission Statement The Oral History Program of the Stewart Library was created to preserve the institutional history of Weber State University and the Davis, Ogden and Weber County communities. By conducting carefully researched, recorded, and transcribed interviews, the Oral History Program creates archival oral histories intended for the widest possible use. Interviews are conducted with the goal of eliciting from each participant a full and accurate account of events. The interviews are transcribed, edited for accuracy and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewees (as available), who are encouraged to augment or correct their spoken words. The reviewed and corrected transcripts are indexed, printed, and bound with photographs and illustrative materials as available. The working files, original recording, and archival copies are housed in the University Archives. Project Description The Great Depression in Weber County, Utah, is an Oral History Project by Mack S. Taft for completion of his Master's Thesis at Utah State University during the summer of 1969. The forty-five interviews address the Great Depression through the eyes of individuals in several different occupations including: Bankers, Laborers, Railroad Workers, Attorneys, Farmers, Educators, Businessmen, Community and Church Leaders, Housewives, Children and Physicians. All of these individuals lived in Weber County from 1929 to 1941. The interviews were based on what they remembered about the depression, how they felt about those events and how it affected their life then and now. ____________________________________ Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account. It reflects personal opinion offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable. ____________________________________ Rights Management This work is the property of the Weber State University, Stewart Library Oral History Program. It may be used freely by individuals for research, teaching and personal use as long as this statement of availability is included in the text. It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows: Mason, Calvin J., an oral history by Mack S. Taft, circa 1960s, WSU Stewart Library Oral History Program, University Archives, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden, UT. 1 Abstract: This is an oral history interview with Calvin J. Mason. Mr. Mason describes his years in the Civilian Conservation Corps during the Depression, working in Milford, Utah, in Salt Lake City, at the Bird Refuge, for the Forest Service, and so on. The interviewer is Mack Taft. MT: Where were you from originally, before you came to Weber County? CM: I came from southern Arkansas. MT: What were the circumstances that brought you here to Weber County, and when did you come? CM: I was an enrollee in the CCC and was transferred here from Southern Utah to the regional grazing office in Salt Lake City for about eight months. When our camp was transferred, I came to Weber County with the Bureau of Reclamation Camp at Hooper, Utah, and the Ogden Bay Bird Refuge. MT: Did you work right on the Refuge there, and what type of work did you do there? CM: Well, I didn't work on birding the refuge. I was in charge of the office, maintaining a record of the work projects, the money that was expended on each work project. I also did the buying and using federal monies and also state monies – the federal monies that were given to the State of Utah, and we used part of it. MT: What type of projects were carried out down at the Bird Refuge? CM: There were some 30 different projects, or work projects, I should say, because each specific job had a project number. One of them was the building of the dike and the road around two of the units, I believe, out there. It's been so many years, I've forgotten exactly. Each one of these had a project number to identify it in the commission. We also had a project for building a small maintenance shop 2 and a service station for our trucks and equipment. We had several spearways with rock rip wrapping around them. We did this. We also built several bridges, and each one of them was an individual project; 30 or 40 were completed in a year, or a year and a half. MT: What type of projects did you do down in Millard? CM: That was Milford. Down in Milford, I was only there for a short time. This was grazing service. Our camp was working for and under the jurisdiction of the grazing service. I was only there about three weeks. I'd been transferred in from a Bureau of Reclamation camp in Yuma, Arizona. After being there for about three weeks, I came to Salt Lake to go to school. Primarily it was well drilling. They drilled some wells. They planted feed in recovery of grazing lands that had been depleting. They planted many of the wild plants that had been depleted through grazing. There was some road building, a slight amount of road building, but not appreciable. MT: What about water conservation? CM: I was there such a short time, I don't remember. But I believe there were some small ponds or lakes that they maintained for the grazing service. Primarily this is what they were doing – land re-seeding and water. MT: Are you acquainted with the Bountiful Peak area up here, and the work that was done up on there? CM: No, I was in a camp in Bountiful, but I worked in Salt Lake. I was just attached there for food and lodging actually. My work was in the grading service in Salt Lake, and this was in the Forest Service, a Forest Service camp, I believe. I was 3 familiar with what the CC Camp in Huntsville was doing. It was another Forest Service camp. They were actually building a lot of road and improving and maintaining parks, small parks and camping areas throughout the Huntsville Valley and on into the Monte Cristo area. I've seen much of their work in there, and it was still evident during World War II and after World War II. Even yet some of it is very evident, and it was very beneficial. It was beneficial in more ways than just sustaining a natural habitat and resources. It also benefitted a lot of young men. MT: Could you give me a little description of the circumstances that caused you to sign up with the CC Camp? CM: Well, anyone who remembers the late 1920s, and early 1930s, would easily recognize that a young man, many young men, didn't have an opportunity. Of course I was able to continue my education, and jobs were rather scarce. In fact, much of the time it was a virtual impossibility to get a job. You would see a man with a Master's degree in Engineering selling papers on the street at that time, and I had been a farm boy all my life. It had reached rock bottom, and so I did it for two reasons. One, I had no job, and second, I wanted to see some of the world and some other part of the country. This resulted in my coming in. I, of course, went to Yuma, Arizona, for six months and transferred to Milford to work in the Regional Mapping Office. We did map work of all types, and I got a lot of good training there. Then into Weber County, over into the Bureau of Fish and Wild Services. So this is what brought me into the camps and into the West. MT: Do you remember enough to compare the conditions in southern Arkansas to 4 what you found here in Utah at the time that you arrived here? CM: There wasn't an appreciable amount of difference. It could be that a few things were different. There was probably a little more industry here in Utah at that time than there was in southern Arkansas. But there was not an appreciable difference in the economic conditions. It was rough in both places. MT: How were you received as a man in the CC Camp with all these Mormons? CM: In Southern Utah, I wasn't too well received by the miners and sheep herders, but the main populace received me very well. MT: Well, Cal, you're one of our leading citizens here now, and have certainly done a tremendous job with yourself, your family, and everything. This is interesting to me, to find out how a person coming into a strange community would be received in these little communities. How much did you get paid in the CC Camp? CM: When I was first in the camp, the pay was $30 a month. We were furnished three uniforms, somewhat of an army uniform, and three sets of fatigues or blue denim work clothing, the necessary underwear, towels, bed clothing, and of course a barracks for sleeping, and very good food – the food was very good. It was just like the army actually, amazingly, I think. There was an allowance of 38 or 40 cents a day to feed each man, which would hardly buy your bread today; but it was a very good diet, well prepared. The cooks were well-trained, and it was similar to army life. The camp was commanded by an army officer. The personnel was turned over to work service, with the exception of the people that ran the camp, and they stayed in camp all the time. The others of us went out on 5 the job. This was basically the nuclei for an army, a quickly assembled army at the beginning of World War II. I think some six million young men in the nation had been enrolled in the CCC, and the camps were being disbanded at the time, on December 7, 1941. So these men were readily adaptable and readily trainable, and many of them had learned counterpart actions to an army base. They had been on an army base and could adapt with no problems. This was indeed a welcome thing to have available at that time, even though they had no military training. MT: How long were you in the Civilian Conservation Camps? CM: Approximately three months in total, in Arizona, Milford, Salt Lake City, and Weber County. MT: Did you get married during that time? CM: I did not get married until after World War II had started. MT: Who else do you know in the area who came into the county, that is still around here, that came in through the CCC? CM: I know there are two people who were in the camp with me. I don't know if they are still in Weber County or not, but there was a man named Charles Eppley, and a man named Leland Tutter. They were in Ogden here a few years ago. There's an additional man named James Crook, who is still in this Ogden area. He works for the railroad, I think. I haven't seen him for about five years. MT: Was there money sent home to your parents, in addition to what you received, Cal? CM: Yes. Incidentally, I did not finish telling you about this $30 a month. Eight dollars 6 was being paid to the enrollee, and $22 going home. Some of this came back, but $8 was hardly enough for a man to provide the toilet articles. Generally some of this, or most of this, came back. Then there was a leader position that paid $36 a month, with still $22 of it going home, and then there was another leader where the pay was $45 a month. I quickly attained the higher rate and was getting $45 a month for at least three-fourths of the time that I was in. But this money, $22 of the check of each enrollee, did go to his parents. MT: Then you were single all during the Depression years? CM: Yes, I was single, and I didn't earn enough financially to sustain a home. MT: Do you think of anything else now that might be of interest concerning the Corps, or any other part of your life during the Depression years? CM: Well, I'm not liberal. I feel that the programs that they instituted were better, rather than taking all the tax money away from the working people to give to the young people today to get an education. But we need to reduce the permissiveness and force these young people into accepting a responsibility in learning how to work until this could be more appropriately spent. But to just give it to them and permit them to wreck, tear up and tear down, the basic foundation of our nation, this is what's happening. They have nothing to offer but the instability. If these young people had to live and work as I did, today they wouldn't have time to march and shout down the establishment. There are things about the establishment that everyone doesn't like, but there's ways and means to correct the situation, and fighting against things and having nothing to replace it is strictly no good. It leads to anarchy. 7 MT: How would you evaluate the programs of the CCC, looking back on it now after this many years? CM: Well, I feel it probably taught many young men, 17 to 22 years old, how to work. Many of them didn't know how to work. This is one thing that is sadly lacking in our nation today, and this is the fact that the young people don't know how to work, and they don't want to work. They expect something for nothing. Now, I feel that this organization probably, within the time that it was organized into being, it probably did more to help the youth of the nation of that time than any other thing that could have been done except for one thing. There was no means whereby young men of ability and capability had way to get a higher education, which was sorely needed. It was recognized immediately after World War II that we had a nation of men who were not educated to the degree that would have been desirable at the time. But I feel that, overall, it was one of the best programs that the government has ever established. There were many things done. It was equally evident in the benefit to the nation in the Bureau of Reclamation camps, your Fish and Wildlife Service, in the conservation of fish and wildlife, and other areas where they did, particularly the Forest Service. They did much work all over the nation in all your forested areas, even fighting forest fires. In fact, we assisted the Forest Service in fighting forest fires when I was in the Camps. But this was a beneficial program. It was not an expensive program. It would have been better if it had had a little more educational facilities there. Both vocational and academic, it would have been a much better program, and it could have been very easily – establishing in an 8 area, or arranging with colleges for classes and this type of thing, but this was not done. It should have been done. MT: You are aware that there are proposals to set up programs like this to help with the youth problems that we have today? CM: Yes, I've read a little about this. I don't feel that the Job Corps is successful because it's too expensive, especially these contract jobs, such as Thiokol. Of course it costs more to keep one of those kids down there and to prepare them vocationally than it costs me to buy a home and maintain it and send four kids to college. And they use the tax money that I earn for one kid in a year, and this denotes to me gross inefficiency. That is, inefficiency on the part of the contractor. So I feel that a program such as this, re-instituted, would be very effective with some means of establishing vocational and academic work at higher levels. Some youngsters have never even finished high school, of course. But this could be remedied. Some youngsters who have finished, and some even with college who are financially unable to complete their college academic work. It could be arranged and then with the youngster, you wouldn't be giving it to him, or loaning it to him, and making it so easy that he isn't really benefitting.

Nel passato l'approccio territorialista ha sviluppato una critica alla pianificazione intesa come mera strumentazione disegnata su carta e su mappe, caratterizzata da rigidità, incapace spesso di cogliere i processi socio-economici e di trasformazione urbana e territoriale reali o di raccogliere le sollecitazioni che provengono dalle dinamiche sociali e dagli abitanti, come tali o organizzati in associazioni e comitati. Le elaborazioni sul "progetto di territorio" hanno teso a superare questi limiti e a prospettare processi e progettualità molto più ricche ed articolate, e radicate nei territori e nelle società locali. I limiti della pianificazione si sono mostrati più forti nei contesti urbani dove non è stata in grado, se non nei casi virtuosi e difficilmente nelle grandi aree metropolitane, di arginare la rendita e gli interessi economici. La stagione dell'"urbanistica negoziata" ha anzi aperto all'azione meno controllata del capitale privato, creando inevitabilmente più occasioni di carattere speculativo. Oggi, quindi, è reclamato anche dalle voci più critiche un recupero della pianificazione, sia come argine alle forme speculative, sia come necessità di rispondere alle esigenze sociali emergenti, sia con l'obiettivo di ridare senso all'azione pubblica e ad una dimensione di programmazione. Si tratta di un recupero della pianificazione in forma più aperta e articolata, come processo complesso in grado di coinvolgere tutti gli attori (compresi gli abitanti) e di ricostruire una dimensione di "interesse pubblico". La dimensione della partecipazione è stata sollecitata nel passato come modalità di superamento di molti limiti della pianificazione e di coinvolgimento dei vari soggetti sociali in processi decisionali più inclusivi e coinvolgenti. La lunga stagione della partecipazione (soprattutto negli anni '90, dopo la "stagione dei sindaci", fino a tutti i primi anni 2000), pur dando vita a tante esperienze interessanti, si è rivelata – soprattutto nelle grandi aree urbane – deludente e ha disatteso le aspettative, lasciando molta frustrazione e aumentando la sfiducia nelle amministrazioni. Nel tempo, non solo gli abitanti hanno progressivamente con sospetto le ambiguità delle proposte di processi partecipativi, ma davanti all'inefficienza delle amministrazioni hanno dato vita a molte esperienze di autogestione ed autorganizzazione, sia nella gestione delle aree aperte e degli spazi verdi, sia nella risposta al problema abitativo, sia nell'attivazione di servizi ed attrezzature a livello locale, spesso sviluppando politiche che in realtà sarebbero proprie dell'amministrazione pubblica (consumo di suolo zero, recupero aree ed edifici dismessi, ecc.). Le forme di autorganizzazione rispondono ad un'esigenza di riappropriazione dei luoghi, ma allo stesso tempo rischiano di essere sostitutive della pubblica amministrazione. In questo senso sono portatrici di ambiguità da guardare con attenzione. D'altronde sollevano una riflessione sui limiti oggi del soggetto pubblico. Il contributo intende evidenziare l'importanza e l'utilità del lavoro sul campo e direttamente con i soggetti coinvolti nella riqualificazione urbana (e sarebbe opportuno sviluppare una riflessione critica sulla stessa dizione di "rigenerazione urbana", usata così frequentemente), con particolare attenzione ai contesti urbani in cui è stato sviluppato. Tale approccio permette di cogliere la complessità dei problemi e il punto di vista dell'abitare, permette di valorizzare (all'interno di una cornice critica rispetto al modello di sviluppo e alle "idee di città") il protagonismo sociale, le azioni e le progettualità condivise che emergono sui territori, permette di creare contesti di maggiore coinvolgimento dei soggetti sociali, anche all'interno di dinamiche conflittuali (e persino antagoniste), ma costruttive. A partire dalle esperienze sviluppate, soprattutto nei contesti della periferia romana, si intende evidenziare il ripensamento della pianificazione come sistema articolato e integrato di: - assetti e regole condivise (attraverso processi di coinvolgimento sociale); - politiche (che riguardano, ad esempio, la casa, l'organizzazione del commercio, il sociale, ecc.); - azioni e interventi; - modalità di gestione (che siano in grado anche di valorizzare le energie sociali presenti); all'interno di un quadro di programmazione, di cui si sente molto la mancanza, soprattutto in quei territori che sono stati abbandonati dalla politica e dalle istituzioni. Tale sistema non è limitato alle questioni urbanistiche, ma ricomprende le diverse dimensioni della vita quotidiana, comprese quelle sociali e culturali. Si tratta di pensare una sorta di "rigenerazione dal basso", anche riconsiderando il dibattito sui beni comuni e il "diritto alla città", nonché i suoi limiti e le sue retoriche. In questi processi emerge un ripensamento delle istituzioni, un diverso ruolo del pubblico e forme innovative di collaborazione tra il pubblico e le realtà sociali. ; In the past, the territorialist approach has developed a critique of planning understood as mere instrumentation drawn on paper and maps, characterized by rigidity, often unable to grasp the real socio-economic and urban and territorial transformation processes or to collect the stresses that come by social dynamics and by inhabitants, as such or organized in associations and committees. The elaborations on the "territorial project" have tended to overcome these limits and to envisage processes and projects that are much richer and more articulated, and rooted in the local territories and societies. The limits of planning have proved stronger in urban contexts where it has not been able, except in virtuous cases and hardly in large metropolitan areas, to stem income and economic interests. The season of "negotiated urban planning" has indeed opened up to less controlled action than private capital, inevitably creating more speculative opportunities. Today, therefore, even the most critical voices are demanding a recovery of planning, both as a barrier to speculative forms, and as a need to respond to emerging social needs, both with the aim of giving back meaning to public action and a dimension of programming. It is a recovery of planning in a more open and articulated form, as a complex process capable of involving all the actors (including the inhabitants) and of reconstructing a dimension of "public interest". The dimension of participation has been called upon in the past as a way of overcoming many planning limits and involving the various social subjects in more inclusive and involving decision-making processes. The long season of participation (especially in the 90s, after the "Mayors' season", up to the early 2000s), despite giving rise to many interesting experiences, proved to be disappointing - especially in large urban areas - and disregarded expectations, leaving much frustration and increasing distrust in administrations. Over time, not only the inhabitants have gradually suspected the ambiguities of the proposals for participatory processes, but faced with the inefficiency of the administrations, they have given rise to many experiences of self-management and self-organization, both in the management of open areas and green spaces, both in response to the housing problem, both in the activation of services and equipment at the local level, often by developing policies that in reality would be proper to the public administration (zero land consumption, recovery of abandoned areas and buildings, etc.). The forms of self-organization respond to a need for re-appropriation of places, but at the same time they risk being substitutes for the public administration. In this sense, they are ambiguity bearers to look at carefully. On the other hand, they raise a reflection on the limits of the public today. The contribution aims to highlight the importance and usefulness of field work and directly with the subjects involved in urban redevelopment (and it would be appropriate to develop a critical reflection on the same term of "urban regeneration", used so frequently), with particular attention to urban contexts in which it was developed. This approach allows to grasp the complexity of the problems and the point of view of living, it allows to enhance (within a critical framework with respect to the development model and the "city ideas") the social protagonism, the actions and the shared projects that emerge on the territories, allows you to create contexts of greater involvement of social subjects, even within conflicting (and even antagonistic), but constructive dynamics. Starting from the experiences developed, especially in the contexts of the Roman suburbs, we intend to highlight the rethinking of planning as an articulated and integrated system of: - shared structures and rules (through social involvement processes); - policies (which concern, for example, the home, the organization of commerce, the social sector, etc.); - actions and interventions; - management methods (which are also capable of enhancing the social energies present); within a programming framework, which is very lacking, especially in those territories that have been abandoned by politics and institutions. This system is not limited to urban planning issues, but includes the different dimensions of daily life, including social and cultural ones. It is a matter of thinking a sort of "regeneration from below", also reconsidering the debate on common goods and the "right to the city", as well as its limits and rhetoric. In these processes, a rethinking of institutions emerges, a different role of the public and innovative forms of collaboration between the public and social realities.

In climate change mitigation policy, carbon taxation is seen as an effective and efficient policy instrument. However, some caveats like carbon leakage may hamper its performance. This thesis presents an assessment of various alternative market-based climate policy instruments: A residence-based tax on capital income, a source-based tax on capital input in production, and cap-and-trade policy. For the latter, two regimes are analyzed: local and global permit markets. An essential aspect, which connects all chapters, is that the assumption that countries do not cooperate but set their policies in a strategic, non-cooperative manner. The resulting inefficiencies are identified for all the above listed instruments. In Chapter 2, we analyze a multi-country, 2-period, Nash tax competition game to evaluate Sinn's proposal to use interest income taxation as a means to decelerate fossil fuel extraction (Sinn, 2008, p. 384). The interest rate is determined on a perfectly competitive consumer loan market on which the resource extractor acts as the loan supplier. Households, which constitute the demand side, pay a local capital income tax on their loan. We find that this tax is effective in back loading extraction to the future, which limits damage from climate change. Yet, equilibrium tax rates are inefficiently low, given countries are symmetric. Inefficiency is due to presence of two externalities - the intertemporal fiscal distortion and the environmental externality. The second result is that, in an asymmetric setting with resource-exporting and -importing countries, cooperation among the latter leads to welfare gains for these compared to the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we find that given the cooperation among resource-importing countries, there are cases where the resource-exporting country has an incentive to join the policy cooperation so that full cooperation is self-enforcing. Chapter 3 assesses the 2-period, non-cooperative equilibrium of an n country policy game where countries chose either (i) carbon taxes, (ii) cap-and-trade policy with local permit markets or (iii) cap-and-trade policy with internationally linked permit markets and potential central redistribution of permit revenues. Policy makers maximizes welfare, which depends on household consumption over time and environmental damage from period-1 resource use. We assume costless and complete extraction of this non-renewable resource, so damage only depends on speed of extraction. Tax policy is the least efficient option due to carbon leakage, which introduces a second externality adding to the environmental externality. Cap-and-trade policy does not show any leakage since all symmetric countries will employ caps. Its equilibrium thus only suffers from the environmental externality and welfare is higher than under carbon taxation. The policy scenario with linked permit markets and central redistribution yields an efficient outcome. The redistribution of revenues creates a negative externality which offsets the positive environmental externality. Chapter 4 analyses and compares the performance of carbon taxes and capital taxes in financing public goods while considering positive effects of public expenditure on firm productivity. It is motivated by Franks et al. (2017), who ask whether using carbon taxes could be motivated on fiscal rather than by environmental grounds, arguing that the advantage of the carbon tax consists in its potential to reap foreign resource rents. I employ an analytical general equilibrium framework of n identical countries, where local firms use internationally mobile capital and imported fossil fuel in production as well as local public infrastructure. The latter is financed solely by either taxing the input of fossil fuels or capital. The choice of the policy instrument is exogenous to policy makers and symmetric across countries. I find that the effect of policy on the fossil fuel price (terms-of-trade effect) leads to higher public good provision under carbon taxation. However, tax-competition could cause either policy instrument to yield higher provision depending on how strongly either tax base reacts to changes in the tax rate. Therefore, the ranking of the two policy scenarios is ambiguous when considering tax competition and the terms-of-trade effect simultaneously. A numerical exercise shows cases for higher provision of either policy. In Kapitel 2 analysieren wir ein 2-Perioden-Nash-Steuerwettbewerbsspiel mit mehreren Ländern, um Sinns Vorschlag zu bewerten, die Zinsbesteuerung als Mittel zur Verlangsamung der Extraktion fossiler Brennstoffe einzusetzen (Sinn, 2008, S. 384). Der Zinssatz wird auf einem Konsumentenkreditmarkt mit perfektem Wettbewerb ermittelt, auf dem der Rohstoffextrakteur als Kreditgeber fungiert. Haushalte, die die Nachfrageseite bilden, zahlen eine lokale Kapitaleinkommenssteuer auf ihren Kredit. Wir stellen fest, dass diese Steuer, wie anvisiert, die Verschiebung der Ressourcenextraktion in die Zukunft bewirkt, wodurch Schäden durch den Klimawandel begrenzt werden. Unter der Annahme symmertischer Länder sind Gleichgewichtssteuersätze jedoch ineffizient niedrig. Die Ineffizienz ist auf das Vorhandensein von zwei Externalitäten zurückzuführen: eine intertemporale fiskalische Externalität und eine Umweltexternalität. Das zweite Ergebnis ist, dass in einem asymmetrischen Umfeld mit ressourcenexportierenden und -importierenden Ländern die Zusammenarbeit zwischen diesen Ländern zu Wohlfahrtsgewinnen im Vergleich zum Nash-Gleichgewicht führt. Im Falle dass ressourcenimportierende Länder ihre Kapitaleinkommenssteuern kooperativ setzen gibt es Fälle, in denen das ressourcenexportierende Land auch einen Anreiz hat, sich der kooperativ zu verhalten, sodass sich die vollständige Kooperation sich von selbst durchsetzt. In Kapitel 3 wird das Politik-Gleichgewicht in einem nichtkooperativen 2-Perioden-Modell mit n Ländern untersucht, wobei jedes Land entweder (i) CO2-Steuern, (ii) die Menge der Emissionszertifikate (Cap) im Kontext eines lokalen Zertifikatehandels (Cap-and-Trade Politik) oder (iii) einen Cap im Kontext eines glablen Zertifikatehandels mit der Option zentraler Umverteilung der Zertifikatserlöse bestimmt. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger maximieren die Wohlfahrt, welche vom Konsum der privaten Haushalte über die Zeit und vom Umweltschaden durch den Ressourcenverbrauch der ersten Periode abhängt. Wir gehen davon aus, dass die hier modellierte nicht erneuerbare Ressource kostenlos und vollständig abgebaut wird, sodass der Schaden nur von der Abbaugeschwindigkeit abhängt. Die Steuerpolitik ist aufgrund der Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen die am wenigsten effiziente Option, da der Verlagerungseffekt eine zweite Externalität neben der Umweltexternalität erzeugt. Die Cap-and-Trade-Politik weist keine Verlagerungseffekte auf, da wir annehmen, dass alle (symmetrischen) Länder die Cap Politik nutzen. Die Politikwahl im Gleichgewicht leidet also nur unter der Umweltexternalität und die Wohlfahrt ist höher als bei der CO2-Besteuerung. Das Politik-Szenario mit globalem Zertifikatehandel und zentraler Umverteilung führt zu einem effizienten Ergebnis. Durch die Umverteilung der Einnahmen entsteht eine negative Externalität, die die positive Umweltexternalität ausgleicht. Kapitel 4 analysiert und vergleicht wie CO2-Steuern und Kapitalsteuern bei der Finanzierung öffentlicher Güter unter Berücksichtigung der positiven Auswirkungen öffentlicher Ausgaben auf die Produktivität von Unternehmen abschneiden. Es ist motiviert von Franks et al. (2017), die die Frage aufwerfen, ob die Verwendung von Kohlenstoffsteuern nicht aus Umweltgründen, sondern aus fiskalpolitischen Gründen motiviert werden könnte. Sie argumentieren, dass der Vorteil der CO2-Ssteuer darin besteht, dass ausländische Rohstoffpreise erzielt werden können. Ich setze einen analytischen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsrahmen von n identischen Ländern ein, in denen lokale Firmen international mobiles Kapital und importierte fossile Brennstoffe in der Produktion sowie die lokale öffentliche Infrastruktur nutzen. Letztere wird ausschließlich durch die Besteuerung des Einsatzes fossiler Brennstoffe oder des Kapitals finanziert. Die Wahl des politischen Instruments ist für die politischen Entscheidungsträger exogen und länderübergreifend symmetrisch. Ich stelle fest, dass die Auswirkung der Politik auf den Preis für fossile Brennstoffe (Terms-of-Trade-Effekt) zu einer höheren Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern im Rahmen der Kohlenstoffbesteuerung führt. Der Steuerwettbewerb könnte jedoch dazu führen, dass eines der beiden politischen Instrumente eine höhere Rückstellung abwirft, je nachdem, wie stark eine Steuerbemessungsgrundlage auf Änderungen des Steuersatzes reagiert. Daher ist die Rangfolge der beiden politischen Szenarien bei gleichzeitiger Berücksichtigung des Steuerwettbewerbs und des Terms-of-Trade-Effekts nicht eindeutig. Eine numerische Übung zeigt Fälle für eine höhere Bereitstellung einer der beiden Richtlinien. ; In der Klimaschutzpolitik wird die C02-Besteuerung als wirksames und effizientes politisches Instrument angesehen. Einige Aspekte, wie z. B. internationale Verlagerungseffekte, können jedoch die Leistung beeinträchtigen. Diese Dissertation präsentiert eine Bewertung verschiedener alternativer marktbasierter klimapolitischer Instrumente: eine auf dem Wohnsitz beruhende Steuer auf Kapitaleinkommen, eine Quellensteuer auf den Kapitaleinsatz in der Produktion und die Emissionszertifikate-Politik. Für Letztere werden zwei Regime analysiert: lokale und globale Zertifikatsmärkte. Ein wesentlicher Aspekt, der alle Kapitel miteinander verbindet, ist die Annahme, dass Länder nicht kooperieren, sondern ihre Politik strategisch und nicht kooperativ gestalten. Die daraus resultierenden Ineffizienzen werden für alle oben aufgeführten Instrumente ermittelt. Kapitel 1 und 5 dienen der Einführung in Thematik und Literatur sowie der Zusammenfassung. In Kapitel 2 analysieren wir ein 2-Perioden-Nash-Steuerwettbewerbsspiel mit mehreren Ländern, um Sinns Vorschlag zu bewerten, die Zinsbesteuerung als Mittel zur Verlangsamung der Extraktion fossiler Brennstoffe einzusetzen (Sinn, 2008, S. 384). Der Zinssatz wird auf einem Konsumentenkreditmarkt mit perfektem Wettbewerb ermittelt, auf dem der Rohstoffextrakteur als Kreditgeber fungiert. Haushalte, die die Nachfrageseite bilden, zahlen eine lokale Kapitaleinkommenssteuer auf ihren Kredit. Wir stellen fest, dass diese Steuer, wie postuliert, die Verschiebung der Ressourcenextraktion in die Zukunft bewirkt, wodurch Schäden durch den Klimawandel begrenzt werden. Unter der Annahme symmetrischer Länder sind Gleichgewichtssteuersätze jedoch ineffizient niedrig. Die Ineffizienz ist auf das Vorhandensein von zwei Externalitäten zurückzuführen: eine intertemporale fiskalische Externalität und eine Umweltexternalität. Das zweite Ergebnis ist, dass in einem asymmetrischen Umfeld mit ressourcenexportierenden und -importierenden Ländern die Zusammenarbeit zwischen diesen Ländern zu Wohlfahrtsgewinnen im Vergleich zum Nash-Gleichgewicht führt. Gegeben dass ressourcenimportierende Länder ihre Kapitaleinkommenssteuern kooperativ setzen, gibt es Fälle, in denen das ressourcenexportierende Land auch einen Anreiz hat, sich der kooperativ zu verhalten, sodass sich die vollständige Kooperation sich von selbst durchsetzt. In Kapitel 3 wird das Gleichgewicht in eines nicht-kooperativen 2-Perioden-Politikspiels zwischen n Ländern bewertet, in dem die Länder entweder über (i) CO2-Steuern, (ii) die Menge der Emissionszertifikate bei lokalem Zertifikatehandel – (lokale) Cap-and-Trade-Politk - oder (iii) über die Menge der Emissionszertifikate bei globalem Zertifikatehandel und möglicher internationaler Umverteilung der Zertifikatserlöse entscheiden. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger maximieren die heimische Wohlfahrt, welche vom Konsum in beiden Perioden und von den Umweltschäden durch den Ressourcenverbrauch der ersten Periode abhängt. Wir treffen die Annahme, dass diese nicht-erneuerbare Ressource kostenlos und vollständig abgebaut wird, sodass der Schaden nur von der Abbaugeschwindigkeit abhängt. Die Steuerpolitik ist aufgrund der Verlagerung von CO2-Emissionen die am wenigsten effiziente Option, da der Verlagerungseffekt neben der Umweltexternalität eine weitere Externalität entstehen lässt. Die Cap-and-Trade-Politik weist keine Verlagerungseffekte auf, gegeben dass symmetrischen Länder Caps einsetzen. Die gleichgewichtige Politikwahl wird also nur durch die Umweltexternalität beeinträchtigt und die Wohlfahrt ist höher im Gleichgewicht der CO2-Besteuerung. Das Politikszenario mit globalem Zertifikatehandel und zentraler Umverteilung von Zertifikatseinnahmen führt zu einem effizienten Ergebnis. Durch die Umverteilung der Einnahmen entsteht eine negative Externalität, die die positive Umweltexternalität ausgleicht. Kapitel 4 analysiert und vergleicht Abschneiden von CO2-Steuern und Kapitalsteuern bei der Finanzierung öffentlicher Güter unter Berücksichtigung positiver Effekte öffentlicher Ausgaben auf die Produktivität von Unternehmen. Es ist motiviert durch Franks et al. (2017), welche der Frage nachgehen, ob die Verwendung von CO2-Steuern nicht aus Umweltgründen, sondern aus steuerlichen Gründen motiviert werden könnte. Sie argumentieren, dass der Vorteil der CO2-Steuer darin besteht, dass Importländer damit ausländische Ressourcenrenten appropriieren können. Zu diesem Zweck nutze ich ein analytisches allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell mit n identischen Ländern, in welchem lokale Firmen international mobiles Kapital und importierte fossile Brennstoffe sowie die lokale öffentliche Infrastruktur als Produktionsfaktoren einsetzen. Die öffentliche Infrastruktur wird ausschließlich durch die Besteuerung fossiler Brennstoffe oder des Kapitals finanziert. Die Wahl des politischen Instruments ist für die politischen Entscheidungsträger exogen und länderübergreifend symmetrisch. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Auswirkung der Politik auf den Preis für fossile Brennstoffe (Terms-of-Trade-Effekt) zu einer höheren Bereitstellung der öffentlichen Infrastruktur im Rahmen der CO2-Besteuerung führt. Der Steuerwettbewerb könnte jedoch dazu führen, dass eines der beiden politischen Instrumente eine höhere Rückstellung abwirft, je nachdem, wie stark eine Steuerbemessungsgrundlage auf Änderungen des Steuersatzes reagiert. Daher ist die Wohlfahrts-Rangfolge der beiden politischen Szenarien bei gleichzeitiger Berücksichtigung des Steuerwettbewerbs und des Terms-of-Trade-Effekts nicht eindeutig. Ein numerisches Beispiel zeigt Fälle für höhere Bereitstellung sowohl unter CO2-Besteuerung als auch unter Kapitalbesteuerung.

У представленій статті охарактеризовано специфіку функціонування політичної опозиції в площині політичної системи сучасної Росії. Унікальність політичного життя визначає наявність політичної опозиції як один із механізмів забезпечення ефективності політичних інституцій всередині будь-якої держави. Можливість критично висловлювати думки на адресу політичних сил що мають законно визнане право на політичну владу в соціумі, це одна з ознак демократичного політичного режиму. Проте останнім часом у політичній системі деяких країн, які позиціонують себе як країни демократії, можна спостерігати за утисканням опозиційних сил або ж створення «керованих» чи «протоопозицій». На нашу думку, одним із прикладів діяльності такого виду опозиції є російська.Встановлено, що існуюча політична опозиція, яка діє в Росії, не є достатньо ефективною, через її сегментарність, внутрішні конфлікти і головне відсутність серед лідерів опозиції консолідуючої мети. Як наслідок, партія влади «Єдина Росія» та визнаний більшістю росіян політичний лідер – Президент РФ В. Путін застосовує всі методи протидії опозиції, зводячи нанівець протестні дії опозиціонерів. У статті виявлено, що сучасно політична опозиція має декілька груп серед яких виділяються «стара» частина так звана пострадянська представлена Г. Зюгановим, В. Жириновським тощо. Тобто ті постаті, які скоріше грають роль опозиції за правилами, які визначає партія влади. Молоде крило опозиціонерів, в якому постійно відбувається суперництво серед лідерів за право очолити рух і мати підтримку більшості електорату. Важливо розуміти, що окремо в опозиції Росії представлені ультраправі та радикальні течії, які позиціонують себе як об'єднувачі земель в єдину «Велику Русь». Але простежуючи організовані і проведені акції непокори з боку опозиційних сил, чітко простежується їх неефективність, діюча при владі політична еліта завжди на крок попереду, навіть коли застосовує силові методи для протидії мирним зібранням. Більш того, політична опозиція неготова до реального приходу до влади, це чітко видно через відсутність конкретних програм економічного реформування Росії виходячи не із закордонного досвіду, а із вітчизняної специфіки. Політичні акції у вигляді проведення проекту «Відкрита Росія» ще раз довели той факт, що опозиція відірвана від потреб потенційного електорату, якому виявилися необхідними не лише нові обличчя при владі, але й гарантії, що ці нові обличчя будуть здатні покращити соціально-економічне життя пересічного росіянина байдуже в якій частині Росії він мешкає. Доведено, що політична опозиція не враховує ментальність росіян, їх потяг не до м'якої демократії, а до лідера-господаря, захисника Вітчизни від зовнішньої загрози. У свою чергу правляча еліта і її лідер вдало й ефективно реалізують цей імідж на практиці і, незважаючи на погіршення економічних показників, утримують підтримку серед населення. Таким чином, російська політична опозиція є незрілою і переважно керованою з боку діючої влади. ; The peculiarities of functioning of opposition parties and movements in the sphere of modern Russian political system have been characterized in the submitted paper. The uniqueness of political life determines the presence of political opposition as one of the facilitating mechanism of political institutеs' effectiveness within the state. The ability to express critical thoughts about political forces, political actors who have received the legal right of political power in society is one of the attributes of democratic political regime. Nevertheless, recently in the political system of some countries which position themselves as democratic countries, one can observe the oppression of opposition forces or creation of «managed» or «proto-oppositions». According to our opinion, one of such countries is Russia.It has been established that the existing political opposition is not sufficiently effective in its actions, due to its segmentation, internal conflicts and general absence of unity among the opposition leaders in aims and means of achieving them. Consequently, the party of power «United Russia» which political leader is recognized by the majority of Russians - the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, applies all methods of opposition resistance, negating the protest actions of the opposition parties. It has been shown in the article that the modern political opposition has several groups, among which outstands the «old» part, so-called post-Soviet opposition, represented by G. Zyuganov, V. Zhirinovsky and others. They are political figures who rather play the role of the opposition and act clearly according to the rules that are determined by the party of power. The young generation of the opposition is characterized by constant rivalry among the leaders for the right to lead the movement and to have the support of the majority of the electorate. It is important to understand that the ultra-right and radical groups are represented separately in the opposition of Russia, they position themselves as unifiers of the lands in a single «Great Rus».Studying organized and conducted protest movements, which had been organized by opposition forces, one can see their inefficiency. As a result, the powerful political elite is always one-step ahead, even when applying methods of force counter to the peaceful assembly. Moreover, the political opposition is not ready for real rising to power, it is clearly seen because of the absence of specific programs for Russia's economic reforms. Also it is based not on foreign experience, but on native specifics. Political actions in the form of the «Open Russia» project have proved once again the fact that the opposition is separated from the needs of potential electorate. Not only new people in power are needed, but also guarantees are needed that these new people will be able to improve the socio-economic life of the ordinary Russians regardless of region of Russia where he\she lives.It has been proven that the political opposition does not take into account the mentality of Russians, their aspiration not to the mild model of Western democracy but to the host leader, the defender of the Motherland from external threat. Whereas, the ruling elite and its leader successfully and effectively implement this image in practice, and despite the deterioration of economic indicators, they get the support among the population. Consequently, the political opposition of Russia is immature and primary controlled by the current government. ; В представленной статье охарактеризована специфика функционирования политических оппозиционных партий и движений в плоскости политической системы современной России. Уникальность политической жизни определяет наличие политической оппозиции как одного из механизмов обеспечения эффективности политических институций внутри государства. Возможность критически высказывать мысли в адрес политических сил, политических акторов, которые получили законно признанное право на политическую власть в социуме - это один из признаков демократического политического режима. Тем не менее, в последнее время в политической системе некоторых стран которые позиционируют себя как страны демократии, можно наблюдать за притеснением оппозиционных сил или же созданием «управляемых» или «протооппозиций». По нашему мнению, одним из примеров деятельности такого вида оппозиции является действующая в России.Установлено, что существующая политическая оппозиция в своих действиях не является достаточно эффективной, через ее сегментированность, внутренние конфликты и главное - отсутствие среди лидеров оппозиции единства в целях и средствах их достижения. Как следствие, партия власти «Единая Россия» и признанный большинством россиян политический лидер - Президент РФ В. Путин применяет все методы противодействия оппозиции, сводя на нет протестные действия оппозиционеров. В статье показано, что современная политическая оппозиция имеет несколько групп, среди которых выделяются «старая» часть так называемая постсоветская оппозиция, представленная Г. Зюгановым, В. Жириновским и другими. Это те политические фигуры, которые скорее играют роль оппозиции и действуют четко по правилам, которые определяет партия власти. Молодое крыло оппозиционеров, в котором постоянно происходит соперничество среди лидеров за право возглавить движение и иметь поддержку большинства электората. Важно понимать, что отдельно в оппозиции России представлены ультраправые и радикальные течения, которые позиционируют себя как объединители земель в единую «Великую Русь».Прослеживая организованные и проведенные акции протестов оппозиционными силами, видна их неэффективность. Как результат, действующая при власти политическая элита всегда на шаг впереди, даже когда применяет силовые методы для противодействия мирным собраниям. Больше того, политическая оппозиция неготова к реальному приходу к власти, это четко видно из-за отсутствия конкретных программ экономического реформирования России выходя не из заграничного опыта, а из отечественной специфики. Политические акции в виде проведения проекта «Открытая Россия» еще раз доказали тот факт, что оппозиция оторвана от нужд потенциального электората, которому оказались необходимы не только новые лица при власти, но и гарантии, что эти новые лица будут способны улучшить социально-экономическую жизнь обычного россиянина не учитывая в какой части России он живет. Доказано, что политическая оппозиция не учитывает ментальность россиян, их стремление не к мягкой модели западной демократии, а к лидеру-хозяину, защитнику Отчизны от внешней угрозы. В свою очередь правящая элита и ее лидер удачно и эффективно реализуют этот имидж на практике и, несмотря на ухудшение экономических показателей, удерживают поддержку среди населения. Таким образом, российская политическая оппозиция является незрелой и преимущественно управляемой со стороны действующей власти.

Eine global wachsende Bevölkerung, die steigende Nachfrage nach Nahrungsmitteln sowie die Veränderungen der Ernährungsgewohnheiten bei begrenzten Ressourcen stellt die Agrarproduktion vor wachsende Herausforderungen. Ungeachtet der steigenden Erträge durch technologische Fortschritte in der Europäischen Landwirtschaft (z.B. Gentechnologie) ist die Agrarproduktion und -produktivität direkt von den klimatischen Bedingungen und der Wettervariabilität abhängig. Klimatische Veränderungen beeinflussen die Anbau- und Produktionsbedingungen und somit die künftige Produktion von Nahrungsmitteln wobei der Einfluss von Klima- und Wetteränderungen auf die Agrarproduktion stark von der Vulnerabilität der Technologien abhängt. Um die Anfälligkeit von Agrartechnologien gegenüber Umweltveränderungen zu reduzieren, muss die Produktion an die Veränderungen angepasst werden. Hierfür werden Prognosen benötigt, die zeigen, wie sich die Bedingungen für die landwirtschaftliche Produktion bei unterschiedlichen klimatischen Bedingungen unter Berücksichtigung von technologischem Fortschritt und Anpassungsverhalten kurz- bis langfristig verändern. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, eine erste Einschätzung der potentiellen Auswirkungen von Wetter- und Klimaveränderungen auf die europäische Landwirtschaft zu geben. Grundlage bildet die Zusammensetzung eines neuen Paneldatensatzes von etwa 80.000 landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben in 27 EU-Mitgliedsstaaten mit monatlichen Niederschlags- und Temperaturdaten sowie qualitativen und quantitativen Bodendaten auf NUTS-Ebene. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden kurz- bis mittelfristige Auswirkungen künftiger Wetter- und Klimavariabilität durch retrospektive empirische Analysen der Produktion, finanziellen und operationellen Leistung landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe geschätzt, um so Betriebe in klimasensitiven Regionen zu identifizieren und effiziente Anpassungsstrategien aufzuzeigen. Um die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels unter Berücksichtigung langfristiger Anpassungsstrategien (z.B. Ausweitung der Agrarfläche) und Veränderungen am Weltmarkt zu simulieren, werden im zweiten Teil der Arbeit die Regressionsergebnisse in ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell integriert. Die Simulationen ermöglichen es, einen effektiveren politischen Rahmen zur Reduktion der Vulnerabilität zu bilden. Im 2. Kapitel werden regionale Produktionsfunktionen empirisch geschätzt, um kurzfristige Auswirkungen von Wettervariabilität auf etwa 50,000 bewässerte und nicht bewässerte Getreidebetriebe zu quantifizieren. Mit Hilfe von dynamischen Panelmethoden kann erstmals auch die Anpassung landwirtschaftlicher Produktionsfaktoren an Produktivitätsschocks berücksichtigt werden. Anschließend werden die abgeschätzten Produktionsfunktionen mit Klimaszenarien des regionalen Klimamodells REMO verknüpft, um die Sensitivität der Getreideerträge für künftige Temperatur- und Niederschlagsänderungen zu bestimmen. Die Analysen zeigen, dass insbesondere süd- und osteuropäische Regionen anfällig für Temperatur- und Niederschlagsänderungen sind und ohne entsprechende Anpassung der Produktionstechnologien die Getreideerträge in den Mediterranen Regionen bis 2100 um bis zu 55% zurückgehen könnten, während die nordeuropäischen Regionen im gleichen Zeitraum von den klimatischen Änderungen profitieren könnten. Netto könnten im A2-Szenario die Erträge in der EU bis 2100 um 19% zurückgehen. Ohne klimatische Anpassung der Produktionstechnologien könnte dies erhebliche Konsequenzen für die Getreideproduktion in Europa haben und langfristig zu einer Verlagerung der Produktion in den Norden und zu entsprechenden Landnutzungsänderungen in Südeuropa führen. Im 3. Kapitel wird ein neuer Ricardianischer Ansatz (long-differences) angewendet, der implizit Anpassungsstrategien berücksichtigt (z.B. Landnutzungsänderung) und so die mittelfristigen Auswirkungen des Klimawandels für 1000 NUTS-Regionen in 12 EU-Mitgliedsstaaten prognostizieren kann. Der long-differences Ansatz nutzt langfristige Temperatur- und Niederschlagstrends um Einflüsse wetterbedingter Schwankungen auf die Landpreise zu reduzieren und so Klimaeinflüsse besser von Wettereinflüssen unterscheiden zu können. Der Vergleich mit konventionellen räumlichen und nicht räumlichen Querschnittsanalysen zeigt, dass die Gewinne von Farmern, bei einem 0.76°C höherem Temperaturanstieg maximiert werden. Im A2-Klimaszenario könnte dies einen Rückgang der Landwerte bis 2100 um 17% mit dem long-differences Ansatz bzw. bis zu 64% mit Querschnittsmethoden zur Folge haben. Obwohl der long-differences Ansatz hier andeutet, dass Schäden, die durch klimatische Veränderungen verursacht werden, geringer sein könnten als bisher angenommen, beleuchtet er auch das Schadenspotential von Wettervariabilität. Dessen ungeachtet zeigen beide Ansätze, dass die Schäden vor allem in den südeuropäischen Regionen konzentriert sind (84% bis 92%ige Reduktion der Landwerte). Im 4. Kapitel werden mögliche indirekte Klimaeinflüsse auf die operationelle Leistung der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe untersucht sowie mittelfristige Möglichkeiten zur Reduktion der Anfälligkeit aufgezeigt, indem empirisch die (i) Einflüsse von Klimavariabilität auf die Effizienz und (ii) Anpassungsstrategien abgeschätzt werden. Mit Hilfe einer output-orientierten Distanzfunktion wird die Ineffizienz von mehr als 100.000 Betrieben in 12 EU-Mitgliedsstaaten abgeschätzt, wobei die Ineffizienz von den Eigenschaften des Betriebes und der Klimaerfahrung des Farmers abhängt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass fehlende oder geringe Klimaerfahrung die Effizienz signifikant reduzieren kann und deshalb Temperaturveränderungen auch indirekt die Produktion beeinflussen könnten. Verschiedene Adaptionsmaßnahmen, wie die Anpassung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsfaktoren (z.B. Erhöhung des Düngemitteleinsatzes) oder der Produktionsstrukturen (z.B. Mix der Feldfrüchte), könnten zwar die Anfälligkeit gegenüber Temperatur- und Niederschlagsänderungen zu einem gewissen Grad reduzieren, aber fehlende Erfahrung im Umgang mit klimatischen Änderungen könnten die Effizienz und somit die Produktivität signifikant mindern. Eine exemplarische Sensitivitätsanalyse zeigt auch hier, dass primär die südeuropäischen Regionen von einer Effizienzminderung betroffen wären. Bis 2100, könnte die Effizienz ohne Erfahrungszuwachs (z.B. klimabezogene Bildung, Training) netto um bis zu 50% sinken. Im 5. Kapitel werden die empirischen Modelle in ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell integriert, um den Wert und die Wirksamkeit unterschiedlicher Anpassungsstrategien für die landwirtschaftliche Produktion auf Betriebsebene (z.B. Bewässerung, Anbauportfolio, Ausbau der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzflächen) und Politikebene (z.B. Handelsliberalisierung) beurteilen zu können. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass einerseits landwirtschaftliche Flächen für die Nahrungsmittelproduktion signifikant durch umfangreiche Bioenergieproduktion zurückgehen, da Ressourcen für die Nahrungsmittelproduktion zur Bioenergieproduktion verwendet werden sodass Anpassungsstrategien stark an Bedeutung gewinnen. Andererseits kann Handel den Anpassungsdruck und die Landnutzungskonkurrenz zwischen Nahrungsmittel und Energiepflanzen reduzieren, da durch eine Handelsliberalisierung mehr Land virtuell importiert werden kann. Die Ergebnisse weisen besonders auf die Bedeutung der Verkettung von Handel, Anpassung und Bioenergie in Modellen zur Klimafolgenabschätzung hin, da die Interdependenzen von Entscheidungen in der Landwirtschaft und der Politik die landwirtschaftliche Produktion und Wirksamkeit von Anpassungsmaßnahmen maßgeblich beeinflussen können. ; Future changes in the weather, climate and climate variability could alter growing and production conditions in the agricultural sector and consequently affect food production negatively if technologies and farming practices are not adapted in anticipation of regional climate change impacts. The severity of climate and weather impacts on agriculture, however, highly depends on the vulnerability of farming activities and technologies as well as on the adaptation capacities of regions and farms. Although climate change impacts have been studied extensively, the net impact of climate change on northern latitudes is yet unclear. The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the potential impacts of climate change on European agriculture. For this purpose, a novel and unique 20-year panel of 80,000 agricultural holdings represented in all the 27 EU member states is constructed, by pairing the farm data with a gridded weather and soil dataset. In a first step (Chapter 2-4), the impacts of climate and weather variability on production, as well as the financial and the operational performance of farms are assessed and efficient adaptation strategies are derived at a farm-level. These chapters are based on a set of econometric analyses and identify the most vulnerable regions in the European Union by investigating short-term to medium-term impacts of climate change - a time frame in which adaptation is limited. In a second step (Chapter 5), long-term climate change impacts on adapted production technologies are projected using a partial equilibrium model considering world market and policy adjustments. These simulations can assist in building more effective and efficient policy frameworks to support efficient adaptation of European farms in the long-run. Following a brief literature review, the second chapter quantifies regional weather impacts on 45,000 irrigated and rainfed cereal farms using a production function approach and dynamic panel methods, which makes the consideration of agricultural input adjustments feasible. Subsequently, the sensitivity of yields is evaluated using temperature and precipitation averages for 2021-2050 and 2071-2100 obtained from the regional climate model REMO. The analyses reveal that southern and central European cereal farms are highly vulnerable to temperature and rainfall changes (e.g. a yield decrease by up to 55%), whereas Northern Europe is more likely to benefit from a long-term warming. Overall, net cereal yields could decrease by 19% without efficient adaptation in the A2 scenario by 2100. This could have serious long-term consequences for the cereal production (e.g. shift of the production to Northern Europe). The third chapter introduces a novel Ricardian approach to project potential climate change impacts on the welfare of European farmers. Using a 20-year panel of 1000 NUTS regions in the EU-12, three Ricardian models are estimated applying spatial and aspatial cross-sectional methods and a novel long differences approach, which exploits long-run temperature and precipitation trends and reduces inter-annual fluctuations in land values. The long differences approach suggests that maximum gains occur at a temperature of 0.76°C higher than in the cross-sectional models. In the A2 scenario, this would result in a net reduction of land value of 17% for the long-differences approach but up to 64% for the cross-sectional models. Even though the novel approach suggests that climate damages could be significantly lower than expected, it also indicates a considerable influence of short-term variability on welfare. Both methods show that most losses are concentrated in southern Europe (-84% to -92%) despite the significant differences between the approaches. The fourth chapter investigates the impact of climate change on the operational performance of farms and potential response strategies by empirically assessing (i) the impacts of climate variability on efficiency and (ii) options for adaptation. For this purpose, an output-oriented distance function for more than 100,000 farms in 12 EU member states is estimated. The inefficiency term is explicitly modelled as a function of farm characteristics and climate variability as a proxy for climate-related experience of farmers. The results suggest that a lack of climate-related experience reduces the efficiency significantly, confirming the hypothesis that temperature variability can also affect the production indirectly. A sensitivity analysis suggests that by 2100, the average efficiency level in the EU-12 could be reduced by 28% in the A2 scenario, whereas the efficiency level could drop by up to 50% in the Mediterranean regions. The results also indicate that adaptation through input adjustments (e.g. increased fertiliser) or crop choice (e.g. higher share of fruits) is possible to a certain degree, but a drop in the efficiency could additionally reduce productivity. The last chapter integrates the statistical results into a partial equilibrium model to assess the value and effectiveness of farm-level (e.g. irrigation, crop portfolio, cropland expansion) and macro-economic adaptation strategies (e.g. trade liberalisation) on crop production in Europe. The results suggest that farm-level adaptation, especially cropland expansion and crop portfolio adjustments, can largely mitigate negative impacts of climate change on regional crop production. The results further demonstrate that on the one hand crop production is significantly reduced by large-scale bioenergy policies because of resources shifting from crop production to bioenergy production, which can make large-scale adaptation necessary (i.e. cropland expansion), and on the other hand, that trade can play a moderating role by allowing for virtual land import which reduces domestic land use competition and pressure for extensive adaptation. Overall, the results stress the importance of linking trade, adaptation and bioenergy in climate impact assessments because of the interdependencies between farm and policy decisions and agricultural production and their influence on the value of adaptation.

Aboriginal representatives contemplating an open argument with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission(ATSIC) about funding or representation sometimes caution each other:'don't shoot the banker'. There is little doubt that this volume of essays on ATSIC will be taken in some quarters to be doing just that, but they are intended, and should be viewed, in a more constructive light. They are a collective attempt to analyse this complex organisation after six years of its operation, and to open up debate about reform. The writers adopt a variety of perspectives on the role and impact of ATSIC, and they do not agree with each other on all points. The volume as a whole concentrates on the representative role of ATSIC, its presentation of itself as the supreme Aboriginal representative and political body. It does not echo the fairly common, and often misplaced, criticisms of waste and inefficiency of ATSIC as a development program funding organisation. The writers understand the difficulties faced by staff, councillors and Commissioners in meeting the massive problem of Aboriginal material advancement. They would all feel, however, that ATSIC can also make its problems greater by ignoring much of the advice, experience and community knowledge of other Aboriginal organisations and individuals. The essays in this book span the wide area in Aboriginal politics that ATSIC itself covers. HC (Nugget) Coombs opens the volume with a reminder of the history and origin of the present structure, which is a far cry from the recommendations of his report that led to the abolition of its predecessor, the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). He is particularly critical of ATSIC's electoral system which neglects to include existing community-based representative organisations. Several of the chapters are concerned with problems of ATSIC Regional Councils. In particular, Rowse's examination of the emerging political consciousness of Regional Councillors complements Finlayson and Dales's analysis of the frustrations of Regional Planning from the participants' perspective, and the tensions this produces between the Regional Councils and ATSIC itself. Smith's chapter concerns the problem of dealing with Aboriginal cultural complexity and diversity in a single structure. The chapter places the regional concerns examined by Rowse, and Finlayson and Dale, in the context of ATSIC's national funding and policy strategies. Both my chapter and Dillon's are concerned also with these 'big picture' issues. I examine ATSIC's role as the political representative of a distinct and separate people which, due to Australia's international obligations, has a right of political self-determination in association with the nation state. I find it is not constituted to perform this well, and has its effectiveness further reduced by having the incompatible responsibility of Aboriginal development and welfare funding. Dillon looks for the reasons for confusion and ineffectiveness of ATSIC's many roles in the turbulent history of its foundation, and the complexities of Aboriginal political life. He concludes ATSIC would do better if it did less, backed off from its claim to be supremely representative, and made better use of its unique position within government, rather than distinct from it. The range of these essays shows clearly one immediate problem with assessing ATSIC - it has no single and easily grasped corporate nature. Any statement about ATSIC must suffer from being aimed at only one of the manifestations of this highly complex organisation to the neglect of others. This is as true for an outside observer as for the varied participants. Even a Regional Council Chairperson may from time to time be heard to refer to their Council's 'trouble with ATSIC', as if they were not themselves ATSIC. Thus, there is a danger of allowing critical points levelled at one aspect of the organisation to overshadow or neglect contradictory elements of the same organisation that are moving in alternative directions. In comparison with previous administrative arrangements ATSIC has been an enormous step forward for indigenous control of important aspects of life. Equally, it has over its first six years of operation provided a proving ground for much indigenous expertise and raised, wittingly or not, high expectations. It is the voices of those pushing at the outer limits of ATSIC's capabilities that, by and large, the authors of the essays in this volume are used to hearing. From these essays on diverse regions and areas of ATSIC's operation some common themes emerge. All papers reveal that greater regionalisation of the ATSIC structure and greater integration with Aboriginal communities and their organisations is called for. Regionalisation is now recognised to be a positive step by many people within ATSIC itself, but this needs to go further than simply increasing local control over development plans. Most of the papers, but in particular Rowse's analysis of the opinions of Regional Councillors, and Finlayson and Dale's description of their planning problems, lead to the conclusion that: • Funding needs to be aggregated much more than at present. Blocks of funds for broad purposes should be made rather than the multitude of single project schemes that now abound. Many block grants could be allocated on at least a triennial basis rather than following the present annual bidding cycle. Problems of accountability can be overcome, as they are in other publicly-funded organisations. • Regional Councils should be integrated much more firmly with existing regional and local community organisations. • If this is done, Regional Councils must be better resourced to act as regional representatives. Regional Plans must be seen as part of the political accommodation between whites and Aborigines in a particular region, not just as money grant wish-lists. This requires greater use of Regional Office resources, and a reexamination of the role of the Regional Office itself. Changes of this nature are being increasingly driven by the need for better representation of Aboriginal interests in the regions, particularly as a result of the Native Title Act 1993 and the mediation requirements of the National Native Title Tribunal. More powerful regional bodies, with more security of funding, which gain a wider role for themselves as representatives, rather than simple distributors of funds, would bring into question ATSIC's national role. While firmly defending itself from outside criticism, ATSIC nationally often does not seem to have a clear policy about its role. • Is it the cradle-to-grave care provider it often suggests it ought be? • Is it the Aboriginal parliament its original conservative critics feared it would be? • Or should it simply be a coordinating and consultation body to render more effective development programs administered by other bodies? The confusion of functions, and resultant frustration, revealed in many of the chapters in this book lead to the conclusion that ATSIC should not try to be all of these things it is neither possible nor required. Its representative structure relies too much on rather simple and formal electoral principles at the national Board level, providing no means of ensuring the necessary synthesis and balancing of community voices. To have a 'representative structure' is not the same as to actually be politically representative. Nor does ATSIC's control of Aboriginal material development programs mean that Aborigines are at last running their own affairs. There is more to self-determination than this. In practical terms as well it cannot fund and administer every aspect of Aboriginal development. It does not have the expertise, and if it were to acquire it this would be a wasteful duplication. As presently structured, it is equally far from being able to offer Aborigines self-government, either regionally or nationally. Self­ government must necessarily develop regionally. Even if the regional developments suggested here do occur, this will not automatically make the elected board, or the bureaucratic office­ holders, more authentically representative of Aboriginal voices. A broader forum is required for this. One in which Regional Councils and community organisations can directly participate, as my chapter suggests. Mike Dillon also points out, ATSIC would be more effective accepting itself as part of government - a rather privileged and potentially influential part. It should use its power of closeness to government, coupled with its relative independence, to influence more effectively the other Commonwealth program and policy providers. It could then strategically allow the emergence of a more independent forum for the diversity of Aboriginal political views. This may be the role it eventually accepts at the national level- the coordinator of national Aboriginal development policy. With a regional structure more effectively empowered to reflect regional needs it could perform this function well, and contribute its voice as the arm of Aboriginal material development - one powerful voice among many of the legitimate Aboriginal representative organisations throughout the country.

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 정치학과, 2012. 2. 박찬욱, 강원택. ; 본 연구는 제18대 국회 전반기 2년간 본회의 표결 기록을 분석하여 개인 의원의 당론이탈투표 행위를 결정하는 유의미한 변수를 찾아내는데 그 목적이 있다. 구체적으로 본 논문은 강한 정당기율의 전통에도 불구하고 국회의원들이 표결 현장에서 당론을 이탈해 독립적으로 행동하는 현상을 목격하고, 이를 결정하는 요인을 분석하고자 한다. 이러한 목적에서 18대 국회 전반기동안 의원직을 유지한 한나라당과 민주당 의원 241명의 본회의 전자표결 기록을 분석하여 이들이 당론과 다른 표결을 하도록 결정하는 요인을 찾는다. 한국의 국회 내 표결행태에 관한 다양한 연구는 의원 행위를 결정하는 다양한 요인 중 정당의 제도적 영향력을 크게 평가한다. 이에 따르면 한국의 정당은 형성기부터 권위주의 시기를 거치면서 그 기율을 강화하였고, 의원들의 행위를 제한하고 통제하는 역할을 수행해왔다. 그러나 국회의원이 단순히 정당기율만을 따라 수동적으로 행동하는 존재가 아니라는 증거 또한 여럿 찾아볼 수 있다. 구체적으로 표결의 영역에서 의원들은 당론에 배치되는 두 가지 선택을 할 수 있다. 즉, 의원은 적극적으로 본회의에서 당론에 일치하지 않는 방향으로 투표하거나 소극적으로 기권이나 표결불참을 택할 수 있다. 비록 많은 비중을 차지하지 않더라도 국회의원들이 당론으로부터 이탈하여 독립적으로 표결하는 경우가 발견된다는 사실은 강한 정당기율만을 강조해왔던 기존의 연구 전통에서 벗어나 새로운 관점에서 의원 표결을 바라볼 필요성을 제기한다. 이러한 관점에서 본 연구는 의원을 전략적 행위자로 가정하고, 18대 국회 전반기에 의원들이 당론을 이탈하여 표결하는 데 영향을 미친 유의미한 결정요인을 찾는데 주목하였다. 이를 위하여 특정 의원의 소속 정당 다수가 투표한 선택지를 당론으로 정의하고, 개인 의원이 모든 표결에 대하여 당론을 이탈하여 투표한 비율을 종속변수로 설정하였다. 연구는 표결불참을 분석대상에 포함한 포괄적 당론이탈투표 모형과 표결불참을 제외한 단순 당론이탈투표 모형의 두 차원으로 구성된다. 의원의 당론이탈투표를 결정하는 요인을 찾기 위하여 제도적, 지역구적, 의원 개인적 요인의 세 가지로 분류된 독립변수를 설정하였고, 가중최소제곱 그룹 로지스틱 회귀분석을 통한 계량 분석을 시행하였다. 연구 결과는 다음과 같이 요약될 수 있다. 첫째, 포괄적 당론이탈투표 모형에서 국회의원들이 당론을 이탈하여 투표하는 데 영향을 미친 유의미한 결정요인은 제도적 변수로 밝혀졌다. 먼저, 국회의원들은 그들이 정당으로부터 자율성을 획득할 때 정당 다수로부터 이탈하여 표결할 가능성이 높다. 구체적으로 당내에서 경험과 연륜을 통하여 비공식적인 리더십을 획득하고 있는 선수가 높은 의원들이 상대적으로 더 자율적이므로 당론을 이탈할 가능성이 높다. 반면, 정당 지도부에 위치한 의원들은 정당 전체를 책임져야 하는 입장에 있으므로 정당으로부터 자유로운 선택을 할 수 없으며 따라서 당론을 고수할 가능성이 높다. 둘째, 단순 당론이탈투표 모형에서 그 동안 크게 주목받지 못하였던 변수 중 하나인 이념이 유의미한 변수로 확인되었다. 분석에 따르면, 진보적인 의원일수록 당론으로부터 이탈하여 표결할 가능성이 높다. 특히, 표결불참을 분석에서 제외했을 때 이념이 중요한 결정요인으로 대두되었다는 사실이 시사하는 바는 크다. 의원들이 표결을 통해 전면적으로 당론에 배치되는 입장을 표명할 수 있는 것은 정당이 줄 수 있는 제도적 인센티브를 뛰어넘는 개인의 강한 이념적 속성 때문이라는 것이다. 그러나 본 연구에서 이념 변수는 정책과 이념과의 연계성 측면에서 해석된 것이 아니라 의원이 당론을 따를 것인가 이탈할 것인가를 결정하는 일반적인 이념성향으로, 이념이 정책과의 연계 속에서 당론이탈투표에 직접적으로 미치는 영향력을 측정하지는 못하였다는 한계를 갖는다. 본 연구는 건강한 대의 민주제도를 수립하는 데 필요한 요인들에 대한 함의를 제공하였다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다. 당론이탈투표의 결정요인을 연구한 결과 당론이탈투표가 의원들의 제도적 자율성에서 비롯된 것임을 알 수 있었다. 이는 그동안 많은 학자들이 한국 국회의 갈등과 비효율성을 고질적인 문제로 지적하면서 그 원인으로 강한 정당기율과 당내 비민주성을 꼽아온 것과도 일맥상통하는 결과이다. 나아가, 이념이 당론으로부터의 이탈을 촉진하는 요소 중 하나임이 밝혀졌다는 점에서 의원들이 보다 자율성을 가질 수 있는 민주적인 원내외 정당구조가 확립된다면 의원들이 보다 이념 등에 기반하여 표결할 수 있는 정치적 환경이 확립될 것이라 예상할 수 있다. ; The purpose of this study is to identify meaningful variables effecting individual national assembly member's party defection votes by analyzing floor voting records for the first two years of the 18th National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. Specifically, the study will analyze the factors that result in party defection voting behavior by assembly members, a practice that betrays the tradition of strong party discipline. To this end, the study analyzes the roll-call voting record of 241 Grand National Party and Democratic Party assembly members having held office during the first half of the 18th National Assembly to analyze the factors that cause party defection votes. Various studies on voting behavior within the National Assembly assess that party is the major influence on assembly member's voting behavior. The logic is that Korean political parties, from their inception, and, experiencing phases of authoritarian government, strengthened party discipline in kind, giving birth to a tradition of party exercising significant control over assemblymen's behavior. However, plenty of evidence indicating that assembly members are more than just passive beings submissive to party discipline is to be found. In the act of voting, two choices in disagreement with the party line are available. The first is active party defection voting, wherein a vote is cast in a direction out of line with one's party. Second is passive defection behavior, wherein one chooses abstention or absence to avoid casting a party-line vote. Although not common, the fact that assembly members on occasion display independent voting behavior, defecting from party majority, raises the need for a new explanation other than strong party discipline, which has been identified in the existing literature as the significant determinant of voting behavior. The study assumes that assemblymen are strategic actors seeking utility through floor voting, and focuses on identifying significant determinants of assembly members' party defection votes in the first half of the 18th National Assembly. For this purpose, the party-line was identified as the voting choice of the majority of assembly members in a party, and party defection voting behavior by individual assembly member was set as the dependent variable. The study is divided into two models: In the comprehensive defection model, absences from floor voti are included in the analysis, where as in the simple defection model, they are not. To identify deciding factors of assembly members party defection votes, independent variables were categorized as institutional, representational, and individual variables. Weighted least squares group logistic regression analysis was performed. The results of the study can be summarized in three points. First, institutional variables were identified as having a significant effect on assembly members' party defection voting. Assembly members are more likely to defect from the party-line in voting when they have autonomy from their party. This is because assembly members having served multiple terms, who are not part of the official party leadership, but who, with relatively more experience, in effect are part of party leadership, can afford to be more autonomous. On the other hand, assembly members who are officially in party leadership are accountable for the entire party, and are relatively less able to vote in a direction not in agreement with the party line. They can therefore be expected to vote in line with the party. Second, in the simple defection model, ideology, a variable that had largely been dismissed in the past was confirmed as having a statistically significant influence. Analysis showed that the more progressive an assembly membern, the higher the likelihood of party defection voting behavior. The fact that the influence of ideology was only visible when absences were not included in analysis has wide implications. This indicates that assembly members' making known their personal standing on issues through floor voting, directly opposing the party-line, is only possible because the strength of individual ideology is such that it outweighs the institutional incentives offered by party. However, in the study, the ideology variable was not interpreted in connection with policy; rather, ideology was defined as a general tendency to defect or vote in line with party majority. Therefore, the direct influence of ideology on party defection in a policy context could not be measured. The study's significance lies in unearthing new implications regarding the building blocks of a healthy representative democracy. The results of the study, which analyzed the deciding factors of party defection votes, showed that party defection was the result of assembly members' institutional autonomy. Such results are in line with existing literature, which points to strong party discipline and undemocratic intra-party structure as the key causes of the Korean National Assembly's chronic inefficiency and confrontations. The study identified ideology as a factor that increases the likelihood of party defection; it can therefore be forecast that once a more democratic party system is established both on and off the floor, assemblymen will be able to exercise greater autonomy, leading to a political environment in which factors such as ideology may have a more pronounced influence on voting behavior. ; Master

As a small economy, Moldova's growth and development prospects are closely related to its performance in international and regional markets. In this report the authors have looked at the export performance and competitiveness of the Moldovan economy. This report provides an overview of Moldova's trade competitiveness. Its objectives are twofold: (i) to present a comprehensive analysis of Moldova's recent trade performance and (ii) to identify policy measures and interventions that can enhance the competitiveness of Moldova's export firms and the value added of their exports. The report is divided into two main parts. Part one contains an exports outcome analysis. It assesses export performance along four dimensions that contribute to form a comprehensive picture of the sustainable competitiveness of the export sector, including (i) the level, growth, and market share performance of existing exports (the "intensive margin"); (ii) diversification of products and markets (the "extensive margin"); (iii) the quality and sophistication of exports (the "quality" margin); and (iv) the survival of export flows (the "sustainability margin"). Part two investigates constraints on Moldova's competitiveness, focusing specifically on a series of supply-side factors, such as the role of backbone and input services and utilities, and access to finance; and the business environment, particularly government regulations affecting trade and governance and institutional quality. The rest of the report is structured as follows: Section two examines overall trends in trade flows, including the growth of exports and imports, the degree of trade openness, and the recent evolution in foreign direct investment flows. In Section three, the authors concentrate on export outcomes, analyzing the sectoral composition, the growth orientation, and degree of diversification of Moldovan exports. The authors also analyze the evolution in the quality and sophistication of exports and the survival of export relationships in different markets and sectors. In the second part of the report, the authors look at productivity dynamics of Moldovan firms in comparative perspective, and then investigate the impact of access to finance, backbone services, trade and customs regulations, and corruption on firm productivity. The authors conclude this report with policy recommendations to improve Moldova's export competitiveness and increase the product and market scope, quality, and sophistication of its export basket.

With the success of the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in reducing conventional tariff barriers, much of the recent focus of regional and multilateral trade agreements has switched to non-tariff measures, both border and behind-the-border policies. This paper considers the recent empirical and theoretical literature on non-tariff measures in the world trading system. It provides a set of stylized facts based on available data on non-tariff measures and reviews the key methods used to estimate their trade impact. It considers the theoretical treatment of these measures in the trade literature with a focus on the rules and institutions that govern non-tariff measures in the world trading system. It discusses some of the major issues regarding international cooperation in these policy areas, in particular whether such cooperation should entail deep integration (involving precise legally binding obligations) or shallow integration (which allows countries greater discretion in the setting of non-tariff measures). Finally, this paper reviews some of the specific features the World Trade Organization uses in dealing with non-tariff measures such as national treatment rules and non-violation complaints, and considers policy options beyond the WTO such as harmonization and mutual recognition of standards.

Even nearly ten years of solid growth cannot guarantee long-term income convergence. The countries of the Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC), like other emerging economies, have benefited from a decade of remarkable growth and some income per capita convergence towards the United States and other industrialized countries. Yet, despite this recent progress, LAC still faces a significant per capita income gap with the developed world. The studies in this volume contribute to the ongoing debate on the reasons for this persistent income gap and the potential drivers of convergence, and propose some broad avenues for reform.

Economic activity in many African countries remains highly concentrated and exports are often dominated by mineral resources or a few primary products. The World Bank's 2011 report on light manufacturing in Africa identified poor trade logistics performance as a constraint that especially penalized African exporters that relied on imported inputs, very often making them uncompetitive. The report highlighted research that demonstrated how poor logistics added roughly a 10 percent production cost penalty in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia across the five subsectors of light manufacturing where opportunities were identified as greatest in Africa. The report outlined how in Africa poor trade logistics increase production costs (often wiping out the labor cost advantage) and lead to long and unreliable delivery times, making local firm's unattractive suppliers to lead firms in global value chains (GVCs), particularly for light manufacturing. This note seeks to contribute to a review of progress in achieving export diversification through greater exports of light manufacturing products. It looks at recent trends in the exports of the five categories of light manufacturing identified as having strong potential in Africa. The note reviews progress in improving trade logistics in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on the three countries highlighted in the light manufacturing study: Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia, and additionally Kenya and Uganda.

This paper analyzes the impacts of selected trade facilitation measures on international trade flows. A gravity model is used to estimate four equations: a pooled cross-section model; a fixed-effects model; a random effects model; and a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the analysis uses a recent data set, a panel that includes trade data from 2011 and 2012 for 72 countries. Second, to measure the impacts of trade facilitation measures, the analysis includes dummy variables for the presence of an authorized economic operator program, the existence of a single-window program in the countries in the sample, and the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement between pairs of countries in the sample. The results show that the presence of an authorized economic operator program and the existence of a single-window program will improve countries' trade performance. By contrast, the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement will not necessarily improve countries' trade performance. These results suggest that, in general, trade facilitation measures as a whole will help countries improve their trade performance.

Tunisian social development policy making has always counted on energy subsidies to play a pivotal role. Due to the increasingly unsustainable budget implications, a new strategy has begun to reform the subsidy system in the energy sector while striking a balance between improving fiscal and equity considerations without increasing social tensions. This paper presents an analysis of the fiscal and distributive consequences of the changes to the subsidy setup announced by the government at the end of 2014. The results show that raising electricity prices for consumers and removing subsidies for other energy sources would lead to a short-term increase in the poverty rate of 2.5 percentage points. In addition, compensation mechanisms that could be readily implemented (such as universal coverage or building on the existing health cards system) will not bring substantive counterweight to the increased poverty, even if all savings of reforms could be perfectly channeled as cash transfers. The analysis suggests that bold reforms of energy subsidies need to be accompanied by equally bold improvements to the targeting schemes of public spending if poverty and disparities are to be substantively reduced.

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transfer programs to increase investment in human capital has generated considerable excitement in both research and policy forums. This article surveys the existing literature, which suggests that most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentially one of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalities exist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households. The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in some instances there is tension between the efficiency and equity objectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gains and losses associated with each objective.