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Taking a long‐term look at U.S. economic growth over 1870–2014, this paper focuses on the spillovers from the shadow or the unofficial economy to growth in the official sector. Shadow activities might spur or retard economic growth depending on their interactions with the formal sector and impacts on the provision of public goods. Nesting the analysis in a standard neoclassical growth model, we use a relatively new time series technique to estimate the short‐run dynamics and long‐run relationship between economic growth and its determinants. Results suggest that prior to World War II (WWII) the shadow economy had a negative effect on economic growth; however, post‐WWII the shadow economy was beneficial for growth. The sanding effect of the shadow economy in the earlier period is especially robust to alternate considerations of possible endogeneity and an alternate set of growth determinants. (JELE26, O43, O51, K42)

This paper provides a long term analysis of the determinants of the shadow economy. Using data for the United States over the years 1870–2014 we examine economic and political factors driving the underground sector. Results show that among the economic factors, greater economic prosperity increased the shadow sector, while greater openness to trade and a bigger government reduced it, with the effects of inflation being statistically insignificant. Politically, the efficacy of presidential vetoes and the effect of congressional party homogeneity are statistically insignificant. Further, the U.S. shadow economy increased during both world wars, but was lower during the great depression. However, in the short run, the relationship between the shadow economy and its determinants exhibit some remarkable differences.

Whether a country is able effectively to address collective action problems is a critical test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one particularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmental taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as pronounced. The evidence for the effect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling. Adapted from the source document.

Monetary policy rules have been considered as fundamental protection against inflation. However, empirical evidence for a correlation between rules and inflation is relatively weak. In this paper, we first discuss likely causes for this weak link and present the argument that monetary commitment is not credible in itself. It can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment based on panel data covering five decades and 22 OECD countries confirms the crucial role of a credibly backed monetary commitment to price stability.

In this article, we estimate the total costs of the German participation in the Afghanistan war, both past and future. This is a hugely complex and uncertain calculation, which depends on several important assumptions. These assumptions pertain to the different cost channels and the shares of these channels that can be attributed to the German participation in the war. By calculating the costs of the German participation, we provide a framework for other researchers to do the same with respect to other countries. The article can function as a roadmap for researchers focusing on this topic. In the end we find that, in the most realistic of several possible scenarios regarding the duration and intensity of the German participation in the war in Afghanistan, the German share of the net present value of the total costs of the war ranges from 26 billion Euro to 47 billion Euro. This large range reflects the uncertainties with which the costs must be estimated. On an annual basis, we estimate that the German participation in the war costs between 2.5 and 3 billion Euro. This contrasts with the official war budget, which is little over 1 billion Euro for 2010, showing that governments may not adequately represent the costs of military action.

In this article, we estimate the total costs of the German participation in the Afghanistan war, both past and future. This is a hugely complex and uncertain calculation, which depends on several important assumptions. These assumptions pertain to the different cost channels and the shares of these channels that can be attributed to the German participation in the war. By calculating the costs of the German participation, we provide a framework for other researchers to do the same with respect to other countries. The article can function as a roadmap for researchers focusing on this topic. In the end we find that, in the most realistic of several possible scenarios regarding the duration and intensity of the German participation in the war in Afghanistan, the German share of the net present value of the total costs of the war ranges from 26 billion Euro to 47 billion Euro. This large range reflects the uncertainties with which the costs must be estimated. On an annual basis, we estimate that the German participation in the war costs between 2.5 and 3 billion Euro. This contrasts with the official war budget, which is little over 1 billion Euro for 2010, showing that governments may not adequately represent the costs of military action. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

In diesem Beitrag werden die bisherigen sowie die zukünftigen Gesamtkosten der Beteiligung Deutschlands am Krieg in Afghanistan geschätzt. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Berechnung mit zahlreichen Unsicherheitsfaktoren, die auf mehreren wichtigen Annahmen basiert. Es werden verschiedene mögliche Szenarien bezüglich Dauer und Intensität der deutschen Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan berücksichtigt. In einem realistischen Szenario, in dem Deutschland noch einige Jahre in Afghanistan präsent bleibt, schätzen wir die Gesamtkosten der deutschen Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan auf 26 bis 47 Milliarden Euro. Sollte sich Deutschland dazu verpflichten, das Engagement in Afghanistan auszuweiten, und mit stärkerem Widerstand konfrontiert werden, stiegen die Kosten erheblich an. Falls sich Deutschland hingegen 2011 aus Afghanistan zurückzieht, belaufen sich die Gesamtkosten der deutschen Beteiligung am Afghanistankrieg auf 18 bis 33 Milliarden Euro. Diese großen Kostenspannen sind den Unsicherheitsfaktoren zuzuschreiben, auf deren Grundlage die Kosten geschätzt werden mussten. Unseren Schätzungen zufolge kostet jedes weitere Jahr, in dem Deutschland am Einsatz in Afghanistan teilnimmt, zusätzliche 2,5 bis 3 Milliarden Euro. Dies steht im Widerspruch zum offiziellen Kriegsbudget, das für das Jahr 2010 1 059 Millionen Euro beträgt.

Using modern methods for analyzing multi-level data, we find that, by and large, citizens of OECD countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if more environmental policies are in place and if environmental quality is higher. We also document that parents care about carbon dioxide emissions more than non-parents and that those with a high willingness to pay for environmental quality deplore intervention through government policies.