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First published in 1992. In this lively and controversial book, Kevin Theakston examines the Yes, Minister-style argument popularised by Tony Benn and Richard Crossman that the civil service obstructs Labour government policies. He argues that in fact the Labour party's problems and failures in office are largely political in origin. The book surveys the development of socialist thinking about Whitehall, and examines the claim of a Labour MP in 1979 that 'It is as if Labour in office has now lost all stomach for administrative reform.' Theakston looks at the effectiveness of Labour's various reform schemes, raising important issues such as politicisation and power in the civil service, Whitehall management, elitism in civil service recruitment, and secrecy and 'open government'. This book will appeal to researchers and students of British politics, public administration, and history, as well as to all those with an interest in Whitehall reform, or in Labour Party politics.

First published in 1925. Robert Owen was, in the author's words, 'that rarest of phenomena, an utterly disinterested critic of a system by which he had himself risen to greatness', and in studying his life this work reveals with a remarkable clarity the first phases of the Industrial Revolution crowded as it was with events, changes, ideas, and characters. This title will be of great interest to scholars and students of labour history.

Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of figures; Preface; Introduction; Political marketing; And propaganda; Questions and reservations; A note on Selling Hitler: Propaganda and the Nazi Brand; Notes; PART I: Advocacy: The Nazi brand and its protagonists; 1. Was there a Nazi brand?; Was there a Nazi brand?; Brand management; Brand imagery: signs and symbols; Conclusions; Notes; 2. Political marketing managers of the Reich: A chaos theory of government; Part 1: Hitler and his henchmen; Introduction; Management -- structure; Hitler's personal supervision.

A radical reappraisal of how Hitler and the Nazis conceived of themselves from the outset as a propagandistic state, rather than propaganda being merely an accessory to power. Hitler was one of the few politicians who understood that persuasion was everything, deployed to anchor an entire regime in the confections of imagery, rhetoric and dramaturgy. The Nazis pursued propaganda not just as a tool, an instrument of government, but also as the totality, the raison dêtre, the medium through which power itself was exercised. Moreover, Nicholas OShaughnessy argues, Hitler, not Goebbels, was the prime mover in the propaganda regime of the Third Reich--its editor and first author. Under the Reich everything was a propaganda medium, a building-block of public consciousness, from typography to communiqués, to architecture, to weapons design. There were groups to initiate rumours and groups to spread graffiti. Everything could be interrogated for its propaganda potential, every surface inscribed with polemical meaning, whether an enemy citys name, an historical epic or the poster on a neighbourhood wall. But Hitler was in no sense an innovator--his ideas were always second-hand. Rather his expertise was as a packager, fashioning from the accumulated mass of icons and ideas, the historic debris, the labyrinths and byways of the German mind, a modern and brilliant political show articulated through deftly managed symbols and rituals. The Reich would have been unthinkable without propaganda-- it would not have been the Reich.--

Der Handel mit geraubter Kunst ist das größte Thema der NS-Vergangenheit, das noch auf seine Aufarbeitung wartet. Der Name Hildebrand Gurlitt steht für dieses ungesühnte Unrecht, seit die Welt 2013 von der Entdeckung seiner Kunstsammlung erfuhr. Doch wer war der Mann, der als junger Museumsdirektor für die moderne Kunst kämpfte und sie dann als "entartet" verkaufte? Der als "Vierteljude" Raubkunst für Hitlers Führermuseum erwarb und daran Millionen verdiente? Meike Hoffmann und Nicola Kuhn legen die erste Biographie von Hitlers berüchtigtem Kunsthändler vor

Society and Communication --The United Kingdom Is(a)land of Utopia: Self-Representation of City Councils and Communicative Strategies towards Citizens /Miriam Bait --The Utopia of Communication The Myth of Communication as a Positive Value /Federico Boni --Sex and the City: Berlin and the Utopia of a New Discursive and Visual Urban Frontier in the Branding of the Creative Place /Paola Bozzi --2.Economics and Communication --Self-adaptive Organisms: The Evolution of Organizational Models and Systems /Paola De Vecchi Galbiati --Technology, Artificial Intelligence and Keynes' Utopia: A Realized Prediction? /Raffaella Folgieri --The "Green Beautiful" Option for the WTO-Multilateral Trading System: Cutting the Edge between Feasibility, Pragmatic Approach and Utopia in Governing the Multiple Aspects of Globalization in Food Markets /Angela Lupone --Administrative Simplification Between Utopia And Nightmare /Gloria Regonini --3.Education and Communication --Online University Presentations in German: Virtual, Utopian and Green. A Multimodal Analysis /Marina Brambilla-Valentina Crestani --The Care Factor: A Proposal for Improving Equality in Scientific Careers /Giampietro Gobo.

This edited collection is a timely and in-depth analysis of the EU's efforts to bring coherency and strategy to its security policy actions. Despite a special European Council summit in December 2013 on defence, it is generally acknowledged that fifteen years since its inception the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has yet to acquire a clear sense of purpose. This book investigates those areas where the EU has established actorness in the security and defence field and asks whether they might constitute the elements of an emergent more coherent EU strategy on security. Taking a critical view, the contributors map the EU's strategic vision(s) across particular key regions where the EU has been active as a security actor, the strategic challenges that it has pinpointed alongside the opportunities and barriers posed by a multiplicity of actors, interests and priorities identified by both member states and EU actors. By doing this we demonstrate where gaps in strategic thinking lie, where the EU has been unable to achieve its aims, and offer recommendations concerning the EU's future strategic direction. This book will be of much interest to students of European security, EU policy, strategic studies and IR in general.--