Suchergebnisse

Natural resources offer opportunities, but also bring challenges. They have generally been linked to a series of negative outcomes like economic decline, corruption, and conflict. Oil and minerals reserves, in particular, are often very spatially concentrated, and their discovery becomes a potential source of conflict between the governments, the people of the producing areas, and those of the rest of the country. But can this increased risk of conflict be prevented? Are there ways for the government to change this course of events? This paper tries to contribute to this discussion by looking at the international practices in raising and sharing natural resource revenues (NRR) among different levels of government. The study observes that sharing NRR with subnational governments of the producing areas is the prevailing practice worldwide. There is a rationale to compensate the subnational government of the producing areas for the negative environmental, social, and economic impact of production activities. Assignment to all - including the non-producing - subnational governments is less frequent, although it is increasingly used (particularly in Latin America). This option increases the number of stakeholders and gives them incentives to exert control. This is a relevant argument, particularly in countries with a weak capacity of public scrutiny of government activities. The volatility of revenue or the low absorption capacity of small government units may nevertheless create problems. Similarly, the allocation of NRR to individuals with direct transfers, a complement to the intergovernmental allocation rather than an alternative, can increase the welfare of citizens by increasing their scrutiny of NRR use by government.

The European Union's proudest achievement, in the view of its founding fathers, was to make war between France and Germany unthinkable. For five centuries, every generation on both sides of the Rhine river were either engaged in bloody combat or preparing for conflict. The permanent cessation of this nonstop cycle of bloodshed was seen as a necessary first step toward peaceful reconciliation of the continent. In the postwar era, successive French and German leaders made a priority of setting aside conflicting perspectives and building close personal partnerships. Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer launched the concept of a French-German tandem that guided Europe from wartime devastation to unimagined prosperity. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt bonded as finance ministers and later as national leaders charted a path toward Europe's single currency. François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, despite their disparate temperaments and ideologies, steered Europe through the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a reunified Germany. Yet today, the vaunted motor of European unity is stalled and in dire need of repair. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, uncertainty over America's security commitment to Europe, and how to govern a future European Union that could soon grow to 35 members have called into question the model of French-German leadership that has shaped the destiny of Europe for the past eight decades. The historic split has been magnified by a personality clash between French president Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Macron relishes his role as a disruptive provocateur, willing to shake up other leaders and compel them to take bold and decisive action beyond the least objectionable option. His powers as president of France ensure a near total monopoly over his country's foreign and security policy. Scholz, on the other hand, is a cautious and stubborn Social Democrat lawyer who hates to be pushed into accepting rash judgements. He must also juggle the demands of a contentious three-party ruling coalition, including pro-Russian and pacifist factions within his own party. Their biggest argument has been over how Europe should respond to the threat of a belligerent Russia and support Ukraine in its desperate efforts to thwart the territorial ambitions of Vladimir Putin. Macron, who once insisted the West must not humiliate Russia and sought to include Moscow in a new European security order, now says he was betrayed by Putin's lies and insists Europe must do everything in its power to prevent a Russian victory over Ukraine. He warned that Europe will be "sleepwalking into catastrophe" if it allows Russia to win the war and that Western allies should not rule out sending troops to Ukraine. "Europe clearly faces a moment when it will be necessary not to be cowards," Macron said during a visit to Prague in early March. That comment infuriated Scholz and other German officials who believe the Nazi past requires their country to make painstaking efforts to avoid being drawn into conflicts beyond its borders. Germany's defense minister Boris Pistorius retorted "we don't need, from my perspective at least, discussions about boots on the ground or having more courage or less courage." But Macron persisted in claiming that Western allies needed to take firm stand to dissuade Moscow from further aggression that would jeopardize European security. He said Europe and the United States must maintain "strategic ambiguity" about what steps they were prepared to take in their support of Ukraine. "If, faced with someone who has no limits, faced with someone who crossed every limit that he had given us, we tell him naively that we won't go any further than this or that – at that moment, we are not deciding peace, we are already deciding defeat. And if Russia wins this war, Europe's credibility will be reduced to zero," Macron said in a French television interview. Like the Biden administration, Scholz's government has rejected sending any troops or advanced weaponry that could bring the West into direct confrontation with Russia. Despite pleas from Ukraine and Germany's opposition Christian Democrats, Scholz has refused to send long-range Taurus missiles to Kyiv because they are capable of hitting targets deep inside Russia. Nonetheless, Germany remains by far Europe's leading contributor of financial and military aid to Ukraine, which has assumed greater importance with a $60 billion American aid package blocked in Congress. Noting France's relatively paltry amount of aid delivered so far to Ukraine, Germany's deputy chancellor Robert Habeck said instead of considering the dispatch of troops, France "should give Ukraine the munitions and tanks that can be supplied now." Like other European nations that still rely on NATO and the American nuclear umbrella, Germany has been reluctant to follow Macron's lead in pushing too hard for greater "strategic sovereignty" in Europe. The phrase has become diplomatic code for curtailing Europe's dependence on the United States as American foreign and security policy has shifted toward China. Many Europeans now concede that Macron has a point in his repeated exhortations that Europe must do much more to protect its own interests at a time when a resurgence of big-power rivalry pitting the United States against Russia and China risks drawing Europe into conflicts against its will. That conviction has become even more urgent with the prospect of Donald Trump winning the White House and making good on past declarations about pulling the United States out of NATO. But foreign and security policy is not the only obstacle to getting the French-German engine purring again. The "big bang" expansion of the European Union that embraced former communist states of the Soviet empire has shifted the EU's center of gravity toward the East. The prospect of further expansion, including several Balkan states and eventually even Ukraine and Turkey, means that the European Union will need to dramatically overhaul its decision-making machinery and even its basic institutions. What was possible to achieve as a twelve-state union will become inconceivable if the EU grows to as many as 35 members in coming years. Even though France and Germany still represent the EU's biggest economies and populations, they no longer seem capable on their own to dictate the course of the EU's development. The estrangement between Europe's two major powers has been percolating for several years, with policy conflicts on everything from nuclear energy to the size of EU budgets blocking progress toward the construction of a more responsive Europe that can meet the demands of nearly 500 million citizens. In the future, France and Germany will need to include other key nations in the power hierarchy of Europe. On some matters, such as dealing with the challenge of illegal immigration across the Mediterranean, Italy and Spain will become increasingly vital partners in finding effective solutions. A promising new event appears to be the resurrection of the "Weimar Triangle" that would include Poland as part of an EU triumvirate. In the 1990s, this trio of nations helped prepare the path toward NATO and EU membership for Baltic, Central and Eastern European states. Now that a pro-Europe government headed by former European Council president Donald Tusk has returned to power in Warsaw following eight years of rule by the rightwing Law and Justice party, there are hopes that Poland can become the next major player in EU decision-making. Tusk has already made it clear that he believes Poland can help alleviate tensions between France and Germany and get Europe moving again. He has a proven record in conflict mediation, having brokered a last-minute deal in 2015 that kept Greece in the Eurozone and defused a major financial crisis that could have shattered the single European currency. At a three-way summit in Berlin held on March 15, the leaders of France, Germany and Poland emerged with big smiles and fresh promises to find ways to reconcile their differences concerning Ukraine, Russia and the future of Europe. At a meeting earlier that week with President Biden at the White House, Tusk vowed the three EU powers were determined to work together and make a big impact in shaping Europe's future. "More and more attention will be paid to the triangle of Paris, Berlin and Warsaw," Tusk said. "In my opinion, these three capitals have the task and the power to mobilize all of Europe."

The European Union's proudest achievement, in the view of its founding fathers, was to make war between France and Germany unthinkable. For five centuries, every generation on both sides of the Rhine river were either engaged in bloody combat or preparing for conflict. The permanent cessation of this nonstop cycle of bloodshed was seen as a necessary first step toward peaceful reconciliation of the continent. In the postwar era, successive French and German leaders made a priority of setting aside conflicting perspectives and building close personal partnerships. Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer launched the concept of a French-German tandem that guided Europe from wartime devastation to unimagined prosperity. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt bonded as finance ministers and later as national leaders charted a path toward Europe's single currency. François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, despite their disparate temperaments and ideologies, steered Europe through the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a reunified Germany. Yet today, the vaunted motor of European unity is stalled and in dire need of repair. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, uncertainty over America's security commitment to Europe, and how to govern a future European Union that could soon grow to 35 members have called into question the model of French-German leadership that has shaped the destiny of Europe for the past eight decades. The historic split has been magnified by a personality clash between French president Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Macron relishes his role as a disruptive provocateur, willing to shake up other leaders and compel them to take bold and decisive action beyond the least objectionable option. His powers as president of France ensure a near total monopoly over his country's foreign and security policy. Scholz, on the other hand, is a cautious and stubborn Social Democrat lawyer who hates to be pushed into accepting rash judgements. He must also juggle the demands of a contentious three-party ruling coalition, including pro-Russian and pacifist factions within his own party. Their biggest argument has been over how Europe should respond to the threat of a belligerent Russia and support Ukraine in its desperate efforts to thwart the territorial ambitions of Vladimir Putin. Macron, who once insisted the West must not humiliate Russia and sought to include Moscow in a new European security order, now says he was betrayed by Putin's lies and insists Europe must do everything in its power to prevent a Russian victory over Ukraine. He warned that Europe will be "sleepwalking into catastrophe" if it allows Russia to win the war and that Western allies should not rule out sending troops to Ukraine. "Europe clearly faces a moment when it will be necessary not to be cowards," Macron said during a visit to Prague in early March. That comment infuriated Scholz and other German officials who believe the Nazi past requires their country to make painstaking efforts to avoid being drawn into conflicts beyond its borders. Germany's defense minister Boris Pistorius retorted "we don't need, from my perspective at least, discussions about boots on the ground or having more courage or less courage." But Macron persisted in claiming that Western allies needed to take firm stand to dissuade Moscow from further aggression that would jeopardize European security. He said Europe and the United States must maintain "strategic ambiguity" about what steps they were prepared to take in their support of Ukraine. "If, faced with someone who has no limits, faced with someone who crossed every limit that he had given us, we tell him naively that we won't go any further than this or that – at that moment, we are not deciding peace, we are already deciding defeat. And if Russia wins this war, Europe's credibility will be reduced to zero," Macron said in a French television interview. Like the Biden administration, Scholz's government has rejected sending any troops or advanced weaponry that could bring the West into direct confrontation with Russia. Despite pleas from Ukraine and Germany's opposition Christian Democrats, Scholz has refused to send long-range Taurus missiles to Kyiv because they are capable of hitting targets deep inside Russia. Nonetheless, Germany remains by far Europe's leading contributor of financial and military aid to Ukraine, which has assumed greater importance with a $60 billion American aid package blocked in Congress. Noting France's relatively paltry amount of aid delivered so far to Ukraine, Germany's deputy chancellor Robert Habeck said instead of considering the dispatch of troops, France "should give Ukraine the munitions and tanks that can be supplied now." Like other European nations that still rely on NATO and the American nuclear umbrella, Germany has been reluctant to follow Macron's lead in pushing too hard for greater "strategic sovereignty" in Europe. The phrase has become diplomatic code for curtailing Europe's dependence on the United States as American foreign and security policy has shifted toward China. Many Europeans now concede that Macron has a point in his repeated exhortations that Europe must do much more to protect its own interests at a time when a resurgence of big-power rivalry pitting the United States against Russia and China risks drawing Europe into conflicts against its will. That conviction has become even more urgent with the prospect of Donald Trump winning the White House and making good on past declarations about pulling the United States out of NATO. But foreign and security policy is not the only obstacle to getting the French-German engine purring again. The "big bang" expansion of the European Union that embraced former communist states of the Soviet empire has shifted the EU's center of gravity toward the East. The prospect of further expansion, including several Balkan states and eventually even Ukraine and Turkey, means that the European Union will need to dramatically overhaul its decision-making machinery and even its basic institutions. What was possible to achieve as a twelve-state union will become inconceivable if the EU grows to as many as 35 members in coming years. Even though France and Germany still represent the EU's biggest economies and populations, they no longer seem capable on their own to dictate the course of the EU's development. The estrangement between Europe's two major powers has been percolating for several years, with policy conflicts on everything from nuclear energy to the size of EU budgets blocking progress toward the construction of a more responsive Europe that can meet the demands of nearly 500 million citizens. In the future, France and Germany will need to include other key nations in the power hierarchy of Europe. On some matters, such as dealing with the challenge of illegal immigration across the Mediterranean, Italy and Spain will become increasingly vital partners in finding effective solutions. A promising new event appears to be the resurrection of the "Weimar Triangle" that would include Poland as part of an EU triumvirate. In the 1990s, this trio of nations helped prepare the path toward NATO and EU membership for Baltic, Central and Eastern European states. Now that a pro-Europe government headed by former European Council president Donald Tusk has returned to power in Warsaw following eight years of rule by the rightwing Law and Justice party, there are hopes that Poland can become the next major player in EU decision-making. Tusk has already made it clear that he believes Poland can help alleviate tensions between France and Germany and get Europe moving again. He has a proven record in conflict mediation, having brokered a last-minute deal in 2015 that kept Greece in the Eurozone and defused a major financial crisis that could have shattered the single European currency. At a three-way summit in Berlin held on March 15, the leaders of France, Germany and Poland emerged with big smiles and fresh promises to find ways to reconcile their differences concerning Ukraine, Russia and the future of Europe. At a meeting earlier that week with President Biden at the White House, Tusk vowed the three EU powers were determined to work together and make a big impact in shaping Europe's future. "More and more attention will be paid to the triangle of Paris, Berlin and Warsaw," Tusk said. "In my opinion, these three capitals have the task and the power to mobilize all of Europe."

Modern health care systems are characterized by pronounced prevention and cost-optimized treatments. This dissertation offers novel empirical evidence on how useful such measures can be. The first chapter analyzes how radiation, a main pollutant in health care, can negatively affect cognitive health. The second chapter focuses on the effect of Low Emission Zones on public heath, as air quality is the major external source of health problems. Both chapters point out potentials for preventive measures. Finally, chapter three studies how changes in treatment prices affect the reallocation of hospital resources. In the following, I briefly summarize each chapter and discuss implications for health care systems as well as other policy areas. Based on the National Educational Panel Study that is linked to data on radiation, chapter one shows that radiation can have negative long-term effects on cognitive skills, even at subclinical doses. Exploiting arguably exogenous variation in soil contamination in Germany due to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the findings show that people exposed to higher radiation perform significantly worse in cognitive tests 25 years later. Identification is ensured by abnormal rainfall within a critical period of ten days. The results show that the effect is stronger among older cohorts than younger cohorts, which is consistent with radiation accelerating cognitive decline as people get older. On average, a one-standarddeviation increase in the initial level of CS137 (around 30 chest x-rays) is associated with a decrease in the cognitive skills by 4.1 percent of a standard deviation (around 0.05 school years). Chapter one shows that sub-clinical levels of radiation can have negative consequences even after early childhood. This is of particular importance because most of the literature focuses on exposure very early in life, often during pregnancy. However, population exposed after birth is over 100 times larger. These results point to substantial external human capital costs of radiation which can be reduced by choices of medical procedures. There is a large potential for reductions because about one-third of all CT scans are assumed to be not medically justified (Brenner and Hall, 2007). If people receive unnecessary CT scans because of economic incentives, this chapter points to additional external costs of health care policies. Furthermore, the results can inform the cost-benefit trade-off for medically indicated procedures. Chapter two provides evidence about the effectiveness of Low Emission Zones. Low Emission Zones are typically justified by improvements in population health. However, there is little evidence about the potential health benefits from policy interventions aiming at improving air quality in inner-cities. The chapter ask how the coverage of Low Emission Zones air pollution and hospitalization, by exploiting variation in the roll out of Low Emission Zones in Germany. It combines information on the geographic coverage of Low Emission Zones with rich panel data on the universe of German hospitals over the period from 2006 to 2016 with precise information on hospital locations and the annual frequency of detailed diagnoses. In order to establish that our estimates of Low Emission Zones' health impacts can indeed be attributed to improvements in local air quality, we use data from Germany's official air pollution monitoring system and assign monitor locations to Low Emission Zones and test whether measures of air pollution are affected by the coverage of a Low Emission Zone. Results in chapter two confirm former results showing that the introduction of Low Emission Zones improved air quality significantly by reducing NO2 and PM10 concentrations. Furthermore, the chapter shows that hospitals which catchment areas are covered by a Low Emission Zone, diagnose significantly less air pollution related diseases, in particular by reducing the incidents of chronic diseases of the circulatory and the respiratory system. The effect is stronger before 2012, which is consistent with a general improvement in the vehicle fleet's emission standards. Depending on the disease, a one-standard-deviation increase in the coverage of a hospitals catchment area covered by a Low Emission Zone reduces the yearly number of diagnoses up to 5 percent. These findings have strong implications for policy makers. In 2015, overall costs for health care in Germany were around 340 billion euros, of which 46 billion euros for diseases of the circulatory system, making it the most expensive type of disease caused by 2.9 million cases (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017b). Hence, reductions in the incidence of diseases of the circulatory system may directly reduce society's health care costs. Whereas chapter one and two study the demand-side in health care markets and thus preventive potential, chapter three analyzes the supply-side. By exploiting the same hospital panel data set as in chapter two, chapter three studies the effect of treatment price shocks on the reallocation of hospital resources in Germany. Starting in 2005, the implementation of the German-DRG-System led to general idiosyncratic treatment price shocks for individual hospitals. Thus far there is little evidence of the impact of general price shocks on the reallocation of hospital resources. Additionally, I add to the exiting literature by showing that price shocks can have persistent effects on hospital resources even when these shocks vanish. However, simple OLS regressions would underestimate the true effect, due to endogenous treatment price shocks. I implement a novel instrument variable strategy that exploits the exogenous variation in the number of days of snow in hospital catchment areas. A peculiarity of the reform allowed variation in days of snow to have a persistent impact on treatment prices. I find that treatment price increases lead to increases in input factors such as nursing staff, physicians and the range of treatments offered but to decreases in the treatment volume. This indicates supplier-induced demand. Furthermore, the probability of hospital mergers and privatization decreases. Structural differences in pre-treatment characteristics between hospitals enhance these effects. For instance, private and larger hospitals are more affected. IV estimates reveal that OLS results are biased towards zero in almost all dimensions because structural hospital differences are correlated with the reallocation of hospital resources. These results are important for several reasons. The G-DRG-Reform led to a persistent polarization of hospital resources, as some hospitals were exposed to treatment price increases, while others experienced reductions. If hospitals increase the treatment volume as a response to price reductions by offering unnecessary therapies, it has a negative impact on population wellbeing and public spending. However, results show a decrease in the range of treatments if prices decrease. Hospitals might specialize more, thus attracting more patients. From a policy perspective it is important to evaluate if such changes in the range of treatments jeopardize an adequate nationwide provision of treatments. Furthermore, the results show a decrease in the number of nurses and physicians if prices decrease. This could partly explain the nursing crisis in German hospitals. However, since hospitals specialize more they might be able to realize efficiency gains which justify reductions in input factors without loses in quality. Further research is necessary to provide evidence for the impact of the G-DRG-Reform on health care quality. Another important aspect are changes in the organizational structure. Many public hospitals have been privatized or merged. The findings show that this is at least partly driven by the G-DRG-Reform. This can again lead to a lack in services offered in some regions if merged hospitals specialize more or if hospitals are taken over by ecclesiastical organizations which do not provide all treatments due to moral conviction. Overall, this dissertation reveals large potential for preventive health care measures and helps to explain reallocation processes in the hospital sector if treatment prices change. Furthermore, its findings have potentially relevant implications for other areas of public policy. Chapter one identifies an effect of low dose radiation on cognitive health. As mankind is searching for new energy sources, nuclear power is becoming popular again. However, results of chapter one point to substantial costs of nuclear energy which have not been accounted yet. Chapter two finds strong evidence that air quality improvements by Low Emission Zones translate into health improvements, even at relatively low levels of air pollution. These findings may, for instance, be of relevance to design further policies targeted at air pollution such as diesel bans. As pointed out in chapter three, the implementation of DRG-Systems may have unintended side-effects on the reallocation of hospital resources. This may also apply to other providers in the health care sector such as resident doctors. ; Moderne Gesundheitssysteme zeichnen sich sowohl durch eine ausgeprägte Prävention als auch durch kostenoptimierte Behandlungen aus. Diese Dissertation bietet neue empirische Erkenntnisse darüber, wie nützlich solche Maßnahmen sein können. Das erste Kapitel analysiert, wie Strahlung, ein Hauptschadstoff im Gesundheitswesen, die kognitive Gesundheit negativ beeinflussen kann. Das zweite Kapitel konzentriert sich auf die Auswirkungen von Umweltzonen auf die öffentliche Gesundheit, da die Luftqualität die wichtigste externe Quelle für Gesundheitsprobleme ist. Beide Kapitel zeigen Potenziale für präventive Maßnahmen auf. Schließlich wird in Kapitel drei untersucht, wie sich Änderungen von Behandlungspreisen auf die Reallokation von Krankenhausressourcen auswirken. Im Folgenden fasse ich jedes Kapitel kurz zusammen und diskutiere die Relevanz für Gesundheitssysteme und andere Politikbereiche. Basierend auf dem Nationalen Bildungspanel, welches wir mit Strahlungsdaten verknüpfen, zeigt Kapitel eins, dass Strahlung, auch in geringen Dosen, negative Langzeitwirkungen auf die kognitiven Fähigkeiten haben kann. Dazu nutzen wir die exogene Variation der Bodenkontamination in Deutschland nach der Tschernobyl-Katastrophe von 1986. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Menschen, die einer höheren Strahlung ausgesetzt waren, 25 Jahre später in kognitiven Tests deutlich schlechter abschneiden. Die Identifizierung wird durch anormale Niederschläge innerhalb eines kritischen Zeitraums von zehn Tagen nach dem Reaktorunfall gewährleistet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Effekt bei älteren Kohorten stärker ist als bei jüngeren Kohorten, was mit der Theorie übereinstimmt, dass Strahlung den altersbedingten Rückgang der kognitiven Leistungsfähigkeit beschleunigt. Im Durchschnitt ist eine Erhöhung des Anfangsniveaus von CS137 um eine Standardabweichung (ca. 30 Thoraxröntgenaufnahmen) mit einer Abnahme der kognitiven Fähigkeiten um 4,1 Prozent einer Standardabweichung verbunden (ca. 0.05 Schuljahre). Die Ergebnisse in Kapitel eins zeigen, dass geringe Strahlungswerte auch nach der frühen Kindheit negative Folgen haben können. Dies ist von besonderer Bedeutung, da sich der Großteil der Literatur auf die Exposition in sehr frühen Lebensphasen konzentriert, oft während der Schwangerschaft. Die nach der Geburt exponierte Bevölkerung ist jedoch über 100-mal größer. Diese Ergebnisse deuten auf erhebliche externe Humankapitalkosten der Strahlung hin, die zum Beispiel durch die Wahl medizinischer Verfahren reduziert werden können. Es bestehen große Reduktionspotenziale, da beispielsweise etwa ein Drittel aller CT-Scans als medizinisch nicht gerechtfertigt angesehen werden (Brenner and Hall, 2007). Unter der Annahme, dass Menschen aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Anreize unnötige CT-Scans erhalten, weist dieses Kapitel auf zusätzliche externe Kosten von Gesundheitsmaßnahmen für die Gesundheit der Patienten hin. Außerdem erweitern die Ergebnisse die Informationsgrundlage für Risiko-Nutzen-Abwägungen medizinischer Behandlungen. Kapitel zwei liefert Belege für die Wirksamkeit von Umweltzonen. Umweltzonen sind in der Regel durch eine Verbesserung der Gesundheit der Bevölkerung gerechtfertigt. Es gibt jedoch wenig Belege für den gesundheitlichen Nutzen solcher politischen Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Luftqualität in Innenstädten. In dem Kapitel analysieren wir, wie sich die Ausdehnung der Umweltzonen auf die Luftverschmutzung und die Krankenhausaufenthalte auswirkt. Dazu nutzen wir zeitliche Unterschiede bei der Einführung der Umweltzonen in Deutschland. Hierfür kombinieren wir Informationen über die geografische Abdeckung der Umweltzonen mit umfangreichen Paneldaten von allen deutschen Krankenhäusern im Zeitraum von 2006 bis 2016. Die Krankenhausdaten enthalten präzise Informationen über Krankenhausstandorte und die jährliche Häufigkeit detaillierter Diagnosen. Um sicherzustellen, dass unsere Schätzungen der gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen der Umweltzonen auf eine Verbesserung der lokalen Luftqualität zurückzuführen sind, verwenden wir Daten aus dem offiziellen deutschen Luftmessnetz und ordnen den Umweltzonen Monitorstandorte zu. Hierdurch prüfen wir, ob Messungen der Luftverschmutzung durch die Abdeckung einer Umweltzone beeinflusst werden. Die Ergebnisse in Kapitel zwei bestätigen frühere Ergebnisse, die zeigen, dass die Einführung von Umweltzonen die Luftqualität durch die Reduzierung der NO2- und PM10-Konzentrationen deutlich verbessert. Darüber hinaus zeigt das Kapitel, dass Krankenhäuser, deren Einzugsgebiete in eine Umweltzone fallen, deutlich weniger durch Luftverschmutzung bedingte Krankheiten diagnostizieren, insbesondere durch die Verringerung von chronischen Krankheiten des Kreislaufs und der Atemwege. Der Effekt ist vor 2012 stärker, was sich durch eine allgemeine Verbesserung der Abgasnormen für Fahrzeuge erklären lässt. Wird der Anteil eines Krankenhauseinzugsgebiets mit Umweltzone um eine Standardabweichung erhöht, reduziert sich die jährliche Anzahl der entsprechenden Diagnosen um bis zu 5 Prozent. Diese Ergebnisse sind für politische Entscheidungsträger von Bedeutung. Im Jahr 2015 gab Deutschland 46 Milliarden Euro für Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen aus, die teuerste Krankheitsform mit 2,9 Millionen Fällen. Die Reduktion von Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen würde die Gesundheitskosten der Gesellschaft unmittelbar senken. Während Kapitel eins und zwei die Nachfrageseite in Gesundheitsmärkten und damit das Präventionspotenzial untersuchen, analysiert Kapitel drei die Angebotsseite. Unter Verwendung desselben Krankenhauspaneldatensatzes wie in Kapitel zwei untersuche ich die Auswirkungen von veränderten Behandlungspreisen auf Krankenhausressourcen in Deutschland. Ab 2005 wurden die Behandlungspreise für Patienten durch das G-DRG- System umgewandelt, was bis 2010 zu allgemeinen idiosynkratischen Preisschocks für einzelne Krankenhäuser führte. Die vorhandene Literatur bildet den Effekt von allgemeinen Preisschocks auf Krankenhausressourcen jedoch nur unzureichend ab. Außerdem erweitere ich die vorhandene Literatur indem ich zeige, dass Preisänderungen auch dann langfristige Auswirkungen auf Krankenhausressourcen haben können, wenn die Preisschocks verschwinden. Einfache OLS-Regressionen würden den wahren Effekt aufgrund von endogenen Preisschocks unterschätzen. Unter Zuhilfenahme von hochauflösenden Satellitendaten nutze ich eine Instrumentenvariablenstrategie, welche exogene Schwankungen der Wetterbedingungen im Einzugsbereich von Krankenhäusern nutzt. Eine Besonderheit der Reform führt dazu, dass Abweichungen der Wetterbedingungen zum Zeitpunkt der Reformeinführung einen nachhaltigen Einfluss auf die Behandlungspreise hatten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Preiserhöhungen im Laufe der Zeit zu einem Anstieg des Pflegepersonals, von Ärzten und der Vielfalt der angebotenen Behandlungen führen, aber zu einem Rückgang des Behandlungsvolumens. Bei privaten und größeren Krankenhäusern sind die Auswirkungen stärker. Darüber hinaus sinkt die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Krankenhausfusionen und Privatisierungen. IV-Ergebnisse zeigen gegen Null verzerrte OLS-Schätzungen in fast allen Dimensionen, da strukturelle Krankenhausunterschiede mit der Reallokation von Ressourcen korreliert sind. Diese Ergebnisse sind aus mehreren Gründen wichtig. Die G-DRG-Reform führte zu einer anhaltenden Polarisation von Krankenhausressourcen, da Krankenhäuser sowohl Preisanstiege als auch Preissenkungen erfuhren. Wenn Krankenhäuser das Behandlungsvolumen durch unnötige Therapien erhöhen, hat das negative Auswirkungen auf die öffentliche Gesundheit der Bevölkerung und die öffentlichen Ausgaben. Andererseits zeigen die Ergebnisse einen Rückgang der Bandbreite der angebotenen Behandlungen bei sinkenden Preisen. Krankenhäuser könnten sich stärker spezialisieren und so mehr Patienten anziehen. Aus politischer Sicht ist es wichtig zu beurteilen, ob solche Veränderungen in der Vielfalt der angebotenen Behandlungen eine angemessene flächendeckende Versorgung gefährden. Des Weiteren zeigen die Ergebnisse einen Rückgang der Zahl der Krankenschwestern und Ärzte, wenn die Preise sinken. Dies könnte die Pflegekrise, welche die Bundesregierung in Deutschland beschreibt, teilweise erklären. Da sich die Krankenhäuser jedoch stärker spezialisieren, können sie möglicherweise Effizienzsteigerungen erzielen, die eine Verringerung der Inputfaktoren rechtfertigen, ohne an Qualität zu verlieren. Weitere Untersuchungen sind notwendig, um die Auswirkungen auf die Qualität der Gesundheitsversorgung nachzuweisen. Ein weiterer wichtiger Aspekt sind Veränderungen in der Organisationsstruktur. Viele öffentliche Krankenhäuser werden privatisiert oder mit anderen Krankenhäusern fusioniert. Meine Ergebnisse zeigen, dass dies zumindest teilweise auf die G-DRG-Reform zurückzuführen ist. Dies kann zu einem Mangel an angebotenen Behandlungen in einigen Regionen führen, wenn sich fusionierte Krankenhäuser spezialisieren oder wenn Krankenhäuser von kirchlichen Organisationen übernommen werden, die aus moralischen Gründen nicht alle Behandlungen anbieten. Insgesamt unterstreicht diese Dissertation das große Potenzial von Gesundheitsvorsorgemaßnahmen und hilft, Reallokationsprozesse im Krankenhaussektor zu erklären. Darüber hinaus haben die Ergebnisse potenziell relevante Auswirkungen auf andere Bereiche der Politik. Kapitel Eins identifiziert einen Einfluss von geringer Radioaktivität auf die kognitive Gesundheit. Auf der Suche nach neuen Energiequellen wird die Kernenergie wieder populär. Die Ergebnisse von Kapitel Eins deuten jedoch auf erhebliche Kosten von Kernenergie hin, die in der aktuellen Debatte noch nicht berücksichtigt wurden. Kapitel Zwei findet starke Hinweise darauf, dass die Verbesserung der Luftqualität durch Umweltzonen, selbst bei relativ geringer Luftverschmutzung, zu einer Verbesserung der Gesundheit führt. Diese Ergebnisse können für die Einführung weiterer Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Luftverschmutzung von Bedeutung sein, wie beispielsweise Fahrverbote für Dieselfahrzeuge. Wie in Kapitel Drei dargelegt, kann die Einführung von DRG-Systemen unbeabsichtigte Effekte bei der Reallokation von Krankenhausressourcen haben. Dies kann auch für andere Anbieter im Gesundheitswesen wie niedergelassene Ärzte gelten.

During the past decade, Georgia's pursuit of economic reforms led to impressive economic growth, capital inflow, and investments. It helped improve the business environment and infrastructure, strengthened public finances, and liberalized trade. Georgia achieved most of the human development targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This progress did not result, however, in improved environmental governance or better management of natural resources. Nowadays, environmental policies are receiving increasing attention from Georgian policy and decision makers, recognizing that sustainable development is about a profound change of policies that drive systemic transformation of production, consumption, and behavioral patterns. The list of the country's environmental challenges is long. Current policies and instruments lack the rigor to effectively reduce pressures on natural assets and protect public health from poor environmental quality. Georgia does not have a comprehensive assessment of the cost of inaction to environmental degradation linking it to economic growth, poverty, and shared prosperity. This is a central issue on which the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA) is focused. The main objective of the CEA is to assist the government, civil society, and development partners of Georgia in identifying and analyzing critical environmental constraints to sustainable growth and shared prosperity. Georgia's Country Partnership Strategy for 2014-2017 points to lagging public policies on protecting the environment and natural resources, against impressive economic growth. It further highlights several areas needing attention, such as air and water quality, waste management, land and landscape management, and nature resource use and protection.

Das Demokratieprinzip ist im Völkerrecht verankert. Seine normativen Grundlagen sind zum einen das Vertragsrecht, insbesondere der Internationale Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte, sowie die regionalen Verankerungen in Europa und in Amerika durch die Satzungen der jeweiligen internationaler Organisationen und ihrer Menschenrechtsinstrumente. Substantielle vertragliche Verpflichtungen ergeben sich auch aus den bilateralen Verträgen der EG. Zum anderen fußt es auf der Staatenpraxis, insbesondere im Rahmen der UNO. So ist die internationale Gemeinschaft auf die Errichtung demokratischer Strukturen verpflichtet, wenn sie staatliche Funktionen in failed states übernimmt oder den Wiederaufbau eines Staatswesens begleitet. Die Demokratieresolutionen der UNO lassen erkennen, daß alle Staaten verpflichtet sind, das Ziel der Demokratie anzustreben und erreichte demokratische Errungenschaften zu gewährleisten. Das Demokratieprinzip beinhaltet normativ die Legitimation staatlichen Handelns durch freie Wahlen und die Absicherung durch Menschenrechte, Gewaltenteilung und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Staatliche Entscheidungen bedürfen daher einer legitimierenden Rückbindung an den frei geäußerten Willen des konstituierenden Staatsvolkes, wobei die Freiheit dieser Willensäußerung in dynamischer Perspektive die Freiheit der Willensänderung garantiert. Sowohl der Vertragsschluß als Akt staatlichen Handelns als auch der Inhalt des Vertrages bedürfen der Legitimation, und zwar über die Zeit hinweg. Das geltende Völkervertragsrecht berücksichtigt das Demokratieprinzip jedoch nur unzureichend. Die Verletzung innerstaatlichen Rechts beim Vertragsschluß kann nur eingeschränkt geltend gemacht werden. Es existiert auch kein Verfahren, mit dem die fortdauernde Legitimation eines Vertrages überprüft werden könnte. Angesichts der Zunahme von Verträgen, die innere Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaften regeln, bedarf das Spannungsverhältnis einer Lösung. Das Problem wird illustriert durch Frankreichs Ausstieg aus der NATO, Senegals Kündigung der Seerechtskonventionen, den Streit um den deutschen Atomausstieg, das Verfahren um den Donaustaudamm Gabcíkovo Nagymaros, die Frage der Vereinbarkeit von Drogenkonsumräumen mit den UN-Anti-Drogenkonventionen, das Schiedsverfahren zwischen Aminoil und Kuwait sowie der Kündigung des ABM-Vertrages durch die USA. Ein erster Ansatz zur Lösung kann in einer Neuinterpretation der völkervertragsrechtlichen Regeln liegen. So bietet sich der Grundsatz der "demokratiefreundlichen Interpretation" an. Internes Recht, das der Kontrolle der Exekutive dient, muß beim Vertragsschluß Berücksichtigung finden. Und Verträgen, die "innere Angelegenheiten" betreffen, kann ein implizites Kündigungsrecht zugebilligt werden. Der wesentliche Ansatz ist aber kautelarjuristischer Natur. Revisions-, Experimentier- und Kündigungsklauseln können bei der Abfassung von Verträgen die Vertragsbeziehung so ausgestalten, daß zukünftige Meinungsänderungen berücksichtigt werden können. Schließlich ist de lege ferenda ein Recht auf Revision, kombiniert mit einem subsidiären Kündigungsrecht, wünschenswert. Mit einem solchen Mechanismus könnten neue normative Lösungen eingeführt werden und die Legitimation bestehender Normen auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden. ; International law provides for a democratic principle. It is based both on treaty law and customary law. The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights as well as the regional treaties in Europe and the Americas - the statutes of the respective regional organisations and their human rights instruments - form a substantial body of treaty obligations toward democracy, which is complemented by bilateral treaties of the EC safeguarding democracy. State practice, especially within the framework of the UN, indicates an obligation to establish democratic structures whenever the international community takes upon itself the task of nation building in failed states. The democracy resolutions of the UN point out that all member states are obliged to strive for democracy and uphold democratic achievements so far. The normative democratic principle includes the legitimation of public affairs through free and fair elections and the guarantee of human rights, separation of powers and the rule of law. Acts of states therefore must be legitimised through the freely expressed will of the people. Under a dynamic perspective, the free will includes the possibility for changes of policy. The conclusion of treaties as an act of state as well as the content of the treaty as a rule of law need to be legitimised through the times. The current law of treaties does not acknowledge the democratic principle, however. Violations of internal law at the conclusion of a treaty can only be claimed to a limited extent. Nor does international law provide for a formal procedure to validate the on-going support for the content of the treaty. Facing an ever-growing expansion of the number of treaties dealing with the internal affairs of societies, solutions must be found. The problem is being illustrated by France's withdrawal from NATO, Senegal's withdrawal from the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the dispute related to the question of the use of nuclear energy in Germany, the judgement of the ICJ in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, the question of the compatibility of drug consumption rooms with UN anti-drug conventions, the dispute settlement award in the Aminoil case and last not least the denunciation of the ABM treaty by the US. Realigning the interpretation of the law of treaties to the democratic principle is one way to deal with the problem. Interpretation of treaties should take into account the democratic principle. Internal law controlling the executive has to be complied with where conclusion of treaties is concerned. And treaties dealing with "internal affairs" can be considered to contain an implicit right of withdrawal or denunciation. The proper solution lies in respecting the democratic principle when drafting treaties, though. Clauses of revision, clauses allowing for experiments and clauses of denunciation or withdrawal help shaping a contractual relationship that can take into account changes of the political will. Last not least, a right of revision is recommended de lege ferenda, combined with a subsidiary right of denunciation or withdrawal. Such a mechanism allows for introducing new normative solutions and for validating the on-going legitimation of existing treaty rules. (See also the English summary at the end of the thesis.)

It speaks volumes that the death of Henry Kissinger, announced on Wednesday, drew major news obituaries that rivaled those of late American presidents' in length and depth. The news was met with equal parts of vitriol and paeans across social media, the former reflected in words like "war criminal" and "monster," the latter, "genius" and "master."His intellectually-driven, hard-nosed statecraft and strategy has long been embraced by realists who appreciate Kissinger's rejection of ideological doctrine in favor of interest-driven realpolitik. They credit him with détente and managing the Soviet threat in the Cold War. His critics say his approach was responsible for government-led massacres in developing nations and Washington's scorched earth policies in Indochina. Humanity suffered while the "great game" was played, no matter how well, from the Nixon White House and in later presidencies (12 total) for which Kissinger advised.But was his impact on U.S. foreign policy ultimately positive or negative? We asked a wide range of historians, former diplomats, journalists and scholars to pick one and defend it.Andrew Bacevich, George Beebe, Tom Blanton, Michael Desch, Anton Fedyashin, Chas Freeman, John Allen Gay, David Hendrickson, Robert Hunter, Anatol Lieven, Stephen Miles, Tim Shorrock, Monica Duffy Toft, Stephen WaltAndrew Bacevich, historian and co-founder of the Quincy InstituteI met Kissinger just once, at a small gathering in New York back in the 1990s. When the event adjourned, he walked over to where I was sitting and spoke to me. "Did you serve in the military?" "Yes," I said. "In Vietnam?" "Yes." His tone filled with sadness, he said: "We really wanted to win that one."I did not reply but as he walked away, I thought: What an accomplished liar.George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy, Quincy InstituteHenry Kissinger's impact on American foreign policy, although controversial, was on balance overwhelmingly positive. As he entered office in 1968, America was overextended abroad and beset by domestic political conflict. An increasingly powerful Soviet Union threatened to achieve superiority over America's nuclear and conventional arsenals. The United States needed to extract itself from Vietnam and focus on domestic healing, yet any retreat into isolationism would allow Moscow a free hand to intimidate Western Europe and spread communism through the post-colonial world. Kissinger's answer to this problem, conceived in partnership with President Nixon, was a masterwork of diplomatic realism. Seeing an opportunity to exploit tensions between Moscow and Beijing, he orchestrated a surprise opening to Maoist China that reshaped the international order, counterbalancing Soviet power and complicating the Kremlin's strategic challenge. In parallel, the United States pursued détente with Moscow, producing a landmark set of trade, arms control, human rights, and confidence-building arrangements that helped to constrain the arms race and make the Cold War more manageable and predictable.By comparison to 1968, the scale of the problems we face today seems more daunting. The Cold War architecture of arms control and security arrangements is in tatters. Our middle class is more distrustful and disaffected, our international reputation more damaged, and our ability to manage the challenges of a peer Chinese rival more limited. A statesman with Kissinger's strategic acumen and diplomatic skill is very much needed. Tom Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington UniversityThe declassified legacy of Henry Kissinger undermines the triumphant narrative he labored so hard to build, even for his successes. The opening to China, for example, turns out to be Mao's idea with Nixon's receptiveness, initially dissed by Kissinger. His shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East did reduce violence but it took Anwar Sadat and then Jimmy Carter to make the peace that Kissinger failed to accomplish. The 1973 Vietnam settlement was actually available in 1969, but Kissinger mistakenly believed he could do better by going through Moscow or Beijing. Meanwhile, Kissinger's callousness about the human cost runs through all the documents. Millions of Bangladeshis murdered by Pakistan's genocide while Kissinger stifled dissent in the State Department. A million Vietnamese and 20,000 Americans who died for Kissinger's "decent interval." Some 30,000 Argentines disappeared by the junta with Kissinger's green light. Thousands of Chileans killed by Pinochet while Kissinger joked about human rights. Untold numbers of Cambodians dead under Kissinger's secret bombing.Adding insult to all these injuries, Kissinger cashed in over the past 45 years through sustained influence peddling and self-promotion, paying no price for repeated bad judgments like opposing the Reagan-Gorbachev arms cuts, and supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion. A dark legacy indeed.Michael Desch, Professor of International Relations at the University of Notre Dame Almost all of the obituaries for Henry Kissinger characterize him as the quintessential realist, harkening back to a bygone era of European great power politics in which statesmen played the 19th century version of the board game Risk otherwise known as the balance of power. Kissinger seemed straight out of central casting for this role with his deep, sonorous voice and perpetual Mittel-Europa accent. All that was missing was a monocle and a Pickelhaube. But in reality, Kissinger was at best an occasional realist. His best scholarly book — "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22" — came out in 1957 and was more of a work of history than an articulation of a larger realpolitik theory of global politics in which power is used, and more importantly not used, to advance a country's national interest.And while his (and Richard Nixon's) opening to the People's Republic of China in 1972 remains a masterstroke of balance of power politics in action, at the drop of an egg-roll dividing the heretofore seemingly monolithic Communist Bloc, he was more often an inconstant realist.At times Kissinger embraced a crude might-makes-right approach (think of the Athenians bullying of the Melians in Book V of Thucydides) epitomized by the escalation to deescalate the war in Vietnam by invading Cambodia and the meddling in the fractious politics of Third World countries like Chile, seemingly to no other end than that's what great powers do. More recently, he's worked to remain the indispensable statesman through an embarrassingly obsequious pattern of making himself indispensable to nearly every subsequent president, whether or not they were really interested in sitting at the knee of the master realpolitiker. His hedged endorsement of George W. Bush's disastrous Iraq war is exhibit A on this score.Kissinger kept himself in the limelight for much of his career but not as a consistent voice of realism in foreign policy.Anton Fedyashin, associate professor of history, American UniversityIn his long and distinguished career, Henry Kissinger made many decisions that history may judge harshly, but oversimplifying and exaggerating complex geopolitical issues was not one of them. With their instinctive aversion to the trap of conceptual binarism, Kissinger and Nixon applied their flexible realism to China and the USSR in 1972. Abandoning the assumption that all communists were evil forced Beijing and Moscow to outbid each other for U.S. favors. Treating the USSR as a post-revolutionary state that put national interests above ideology, Nixon and Kissinger decided to bring the Soviets into the American-managed world order while letting them keep their hegemony in Eastern Europe.In Kissinger's realist version of containment, statesmanship was judged by the management of ambiguities, not absolutes. As Kissinger put it in an interview with The Economist earlier this year, "The genius of the Westphalian system and the reason it spread across the world was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive." Kissinger's realist wisdom would serve American leaders well as they navigate the rough waters of transitioning to a multipolar world order. The era of great power balancing is back, and non-binarist realism can help Washington manage hegemonic decline rather than catalyzing it.Ambassador Chas Freeman, visiting scholar at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public AffairsKissinger embodied a global and strategic view and because it was global, it often offended specialists in regional affairs. Because it was strategic, he often made tactical sacrifices for strategic gain. And the tactical sacrifices that he made were often rather ugly at the regional or local level. The classic example of that is the refusal to intervene in the war in Bangladesh. Obviously, he had nothing but contempt for ideological foreign policy. This has led ideologues, of which we have an abundance, to see him as an enemy, and you're seeing this now with some of the coverage after his passing.Kissinger's achievement of detente at a crucial point in the Cold War will be remembered for its brilliance, as will his significant scholarship. His statecraft and scholarship were inseparable. He was a very good negotiator and probably had more experience negotiating great power relations than any secretary of state since early in the Republic. He was moderately successful in the short term. He was not successful in the long term because his interlocutors correctly perceived that he was manipulative. If one wishes to keep relationships open to future transactions, one must not cheat on current transactions. But this problem is not uncommon. It's very typical in American politics. For example, Jim Baker was famously uninterested in nurturing relationships. He was interested in immediate results in his dealings with foreign governments. He left a lot of anger and dissatisfaction in his wake. Kissinger less so, but the same for different reasons, reflecting his personality, his character, and the character of the president he served.John Allen Gay, Executive Director, John Quincy Adams SocietyKissinger's legacy in the Third World commands the most attention and criticism. He has been made the face of the tremendous toll the Cold War took on the wretched of the earth. Yet his work on great power relations deserves more regard. The opening to China he engineered with President Richard Nixon was a masterstroke to exploit division in the Communist world. Granted, the Sino-Soviet split had happened long before, and the opening was more a Nixon idea, but Kissinger set the table. And Kissinger was also a central figure in détente with the Soviet Union.Both policies were deeply unpopular with the forerunners to the neoconservative movement, but reflected the Continental realist mindset that Kissinger, along with thinkers like Hans J. Morgenthau, brought into the American foreign policy discourse. The opening to China and détente were, in fact, linked. As Kissinger pointed out, the opening to China challenged the Soviet Union to prevent the opening from growing; contrary to the advice of Sovietologists, this did not prompt new Soviet aggression, but made the Soviets more pliable. As Kissinger wrote in his 1994 book "Diplomacy" — "To the extent both China and the Soviet Union calculated that they either needed American goodwill or feared an American move toward its adversary, both had an incentive to improve their relations with Washington. […] America's bargaining position would be strongest when America was closer to bot communist giants than either was to the other." And so it was. Today's practitioners of great-power politics would do well to borrow more from this happier part of Kissinger's legacy. They have instead helped drive China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea together, and have no answer to this emerging alignment beyond lectures and sanctions. The19th century European statesmen Kissinger admired would have seen the failure of such a policy. David Hendrickson, author, "Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition"The great oddity of Nixon and Kissinger's record in foreign policy is that they gave up as unprofitable and dangerous the pursuit of ideological antagonism with the Great Powers (the Soviet Union and China), but then pursued the Cold War crusade with a vengeance against small powers. Kissinger's diplomatic career reminds me of the charge that Hauterive (a favorite of Napoleon's) brought against the confusions of the ancien regime, that it applied "the terms sound policy, system of equilibrium, maintenance or restoration of the balance of power . . . to what, in fact was only an abuse of power, or the exercise of arbitrary will."Parts of Kissinger's record, like the bombing of Cambodia, are indefensible, but there are good parts too: had Henry the K been in charge of our Russia policy over the last decade, we could have avoided the conflagration in Ukraine. He was sounder on China and Taiwan than 90 percent of the howling commentariat. He was, in addition, a serious scholar who wrote some good books about the construction of world order (A World Restored, Diplomacy). Young people should take his thought seriously, not consign him to the ninth circle.Robert Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATOLike all outstanding teachers, Henry Kissinger was also a showman — and he could be fun. He used his accent and self-deprecating humor as weapons for his policies and getting them taken seriously. Journalists might at times scorn what he was doing and how he did it, but they were still charmed and tended so often to give him the benefit of the doubt — as well as the credit, even when not deserved. Everyone recalls his roles in promoting détente with the Soviet Union and, even more, the opening to China, with Richard Nixon following in his wake. In fact, both policies sprang from Nixon's mind. But when the dust settled, Kissinger was the Last Man Standing."Henry," we could call him who never worked for him (!), made intelligent and literate speeches on foreign policy that everyone could understand, bringing it into the limelight. A man of great ego, he still recruited and inspired talented acolytes at the State Department and White House — matched only by Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski. He had other policy positives in the Middle East ("shuttle diplomacy") but major negatives in Chile, in prolonging the Vietnam War, and bombing Cambodia.Take him altogether, a true Man of History.Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy InstituteThe problem about any just assessment of Henry Kissinger is that the good and bad parts of his record are organically linked. His Realism led him to an awareness of the vital interests of other countries, a willingness to compromise, and a prudence in the exercise of U.S. power that all too many American policymakers have altogether lacked and that the United States today desperately needs. This Realist acceptance of the world as it is however also contributed to a cynical disregard for basic moral norms — notably in Cambodia and Bangladesh — that have forever tarnished his and America's name.When in office, reconciliation with China and the pursuit of Middle East peace took real moral courage on Kissinger's part, given the forces arrayed against these policies in the United States. But in his last decades, though he initially criticized NATO expansion and called for the preservation of relations with Russia and China, he never did so with the intellectual and moral force of a George Kennan.Perhaps in the end the best comment on Kissinger comes from an epithet by his fellow German Jewish thinker on international affairs Hans Morgenthau: "It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without Virtu" — an Italian term embracing courage, moral steadfastness and basic principle.Stephen Miles, President, Win Without WarNearly as many words have been spilled marking the end of Henry Kissinger's life as the lives he's responsible for ending, but let me add a few more. It would be easy to simply say that the devastating impact of Kissinger on U.S. foreign policy was clearly and wholly negative. As Spencer Ackerman noted in his essential obituary, few Americans, if any, have ever been as responsible for the death of so many of their fellow human beings. But Kissinger's true impact was not just in being a war criminal but in setting a new standard for doing so with impunity. Earlier this year, he was feted with a party for his 100th birthday attended not just by crusty old Cold Warriors remembering 'the good ole days,' but also by a veritable who's who of today's elite from billionaire CEOs and cabinet members to fashion megastars and NFL team owners. Sure, he may have been responsible for a coup here or a genocide there, but shouldn't we all just look past that and recognize his influence, power, and intellect? Does it really matter what he used those talents for?And in the end, that's the benefit of Kissinger's horrific life and decidedly not-untimely death. By never making amends for the harm he did and never being held accountable for the horrors he caused, he made clear just how truly broken and flawed U.S. foreign policy is. Perhaps now that he has finally left the stage, we can begin to change that. Tim Shorrock, Washington-based journalistKissinger nearly destroyed three Asian countries by causing the deaths of thousands in U.S. bombing raids, covertly intervened to subvert democracy in Chile, and encouraged an Indonesian dictator to invade newly independent East Timor and inflict a genocide upon its people. These were criminal acts that should have made him a pariah. Instead, he is lauded as a visionary by our ruling elite. And it was mostly accomplished through lies and deceit, in the name of corporate profit.I'll never forget in 1972 watching Kissinger declare "peace is at hand" in Vietnam. After years of protesting this immoral war, I truly thought that Vietnam's suffering, and my own countrymen's, was finally over; they had won and we had lost. But my hope was shattered that Christmas, when Kissinger and Nixon ordered B-52s to carpet-bomb Hanoi in an arrogant act of defiance and malice. Afterwards, a shaky peace agreement was signed that could have sparked an honorable U.S. withdrawal. But it took 3 more years of bloodshed before the United States was forced out.Kissinger broke my trust in America as a just nation and overseas sparked a deep hatred of U.S. foreign policy. Few statesmen have caused such harm.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityI have a pair of midcentury teak chairs once belonging to the late eminent scholar Samuel P. Huntington in my office. Sam was a colleague and friend of Henry Kissinger's, and a mentor to me. Sam and I sat in these chairs discussing world politics and the everyday challenges of running a scholarly institute. When a new set of chairs arrived, Sam insisted I take the old ones, but not before emphasizing their significance — reminders of the hours he and Kissinger spent in deep debate and casual banter. These chairs have history.Henry Kissinger was, and shall remain, a controversial figure. His gifts were two. First, across decades of U.S. foreign policy challenges, he remained consistent in his conception of power, and how U.S. power should be used to enhance the security of the United States. Second, he was gifted at assembling, mentoring, and deploying cross-cutting networks of influential people. Like many of my colleagues who study international politics, there are policies — his support of Salvador Allende's ouster in Chile, for example — I find odious. I am also uncomfortable with Kissinger's elitism: his preferred policies favored those with wealth and political power at the expense of those without.But what I admire about Kissinger's U.S. foreign policy legacy and, by extension, international politics, was his profound grasp of the importance of historical context: a thing as important to sound U.S foreign policy today as it is rare; and of which I am pleasantly reminded every time I sit in one of Sam's chairs.Stephen Walt, Quincy Institute board member, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy SchoolHenry Kissinger was the most prominent U.S. statesman of his era, and that era lasted a very long time. His main achievements were not trivial: a long-overdue opening to China, some high-wire "shuttle diplomacy" after the 1973 October War, and several useful arms control treaties during the period of détente. But he was also guilty of some monumental misjudgments, including prolonging the Vietnam War to no good purpose and expanding it into Cambodia at a frightful human cost. His diplomatic acrobatics in the Middle East were impressive, but they were only necessary because he had missed the signs that Egypt was readying for war in 1973 in order to break a diplomatic deadlock that he had helped orchestrate. His indifference to human rights and civilian suffering sacrificed thousands of lives and made a mockery of U.S. pretensions to moral superiority.Kissinger owed his enduring influence not to a superior track record as a pundit or sage but to his own energy, unquenchable ambition, unparalleled networking skills, and the elite's reluctance to hold its members accountable. After all, this is a man who downplayed the risks of China's rise (while earning fat consulting fees there), backed the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, opposed the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, and dismissed warnings that open-ended NATO enlargement would make Europe less rather than more secure. Kissinger also perfected the art of transmuting government service into a lucrative consulting career, setting a troubling precedent for others. Debates about his legacy will no doubt continue, but one suspects that the reverence that his acolytes exhibit today will gradually fade now that he is no longer here to sustain it.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

Relevance of the research The 20th century challenged the perception of the natural stages of life, ending in old age, which is normatively determined in connection with weakness and death. Modern demographic shift to population ageing and economic challenges to individuals, their families and states dictate the need to revise what are considered as the norms of age and to reinterpret the concepts of 'old age' and 'ageing'. Since the category of old age is not strictly biological, it is directly dependent on the meanings attached to this concept by society, while demographic, economic, political and other factors influence the public discourses and the very essence of ageing. At a time of astounding demographic change, social research and in particular discourse analysis are increasingly important in uncovering profound understanding of social processes and challenging areas. Researchers note that the structure of the global population has never changed so quickly in the history of mankind, especially in developed countries (Harper, 2014; Bloom, Mitgang & Osher, 2016). Significant quality changes in the life of a modern person allow them to retire full of energy and having financial opportunities to continue their life path and engage in their desired activities. These changes made it possible to identify a special concept for this reinterpreted period of life: the 'third age' (Laslett, 1989, p. 3) and even 'fourth age' (Higgs and Gilleard 2021). An optimistic view on the changed realities and mature age encourages many initiatives at the international and regional level to activate older people and ensure their full social inclusion. Furthermore, the 'activation' of older people is on the agenda of national and regional authorities, along with the task of studying the needs of the older population and possible barriers to social inclusion (Johnson & Falkingham, 1992; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2010; Stirling, 2010; WHO, 2010). The needs, as well as the issues and challenges of older people have become the object of rethinking for researchers and policy-makers of prosperous countries (WHO, 1982; UN, 2002, 2020); however, the increasing burden on the economies of states pushes politicians to consider this issue through the lens of the needs of a society in general and state budgets in particular. This is especially true in countries where demographic trends keep up with those of developed countries, but economic and political development is noticeably lagging behind (Martin & Kinsella, 1994; Mason, 2005; Mason & Lee, 2006). Policy incentives are adapted to extending working lives and to decrease early withdrawal from the labour market by offering additional bonuses for deferred pensions or even by raising the retirement age. Such changes are accompanied by rhetoric of usefulness for society and the individual: 'Active ageing is about helping older people to stay in work and share their experience. It is about them continuing to play an active role in society and living as healthy, independent and fulfilling lives as possible' (Eurofond, 2012). However, global Covid-19 pandemic showed the highest rate of death has been reported among old age people, and by this it highlights peculiar vulnerability of older citizens, their special needs and the relevance of discussions about old age as a category: 'later life has become a more actively constructed social space' (Higgs & Gilleard, 2021). Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, critical opinions about the concept of 'active ageing' were widening in sociological science; this did not prevent policymakers from continuing to actively promote and popularise it, shaping local social policies towards older people and causing changes in the perception of old age people and old age in society. Since the borrowing of such concepts by politicians and economists often occurs without attention to critical discourse and academic discussion, local discourse tends to neglect the variability of interpretations and considers only a part of the spectrum, setting the tone and securing a convenient interpretation. The very verbalisation of discrepancies and contradictions is the first step towards their further research with the help of large-scale quantitative sociological studies, as well as to the search for the solutions. Therefore, it seems extremely important in the current Belarusian socio-political situation the idea of studying discourse to discover crucial current and potential social issues. The concept of 'active ageing' was developed in Europe before the very first World Assembly on Ageing in Vienna in 1982, nevertheless the spread of 'active ageing'2 discourse in modern Belarusian realities is not accidental: negative economic and demographic trends (a decrease in the share of the working-age population and in revenues to the pension fund with a simultaneous decrease in GDP and an increase in inflation) in the region are becoming increasingly challenging for the state. The share of older people in the Belarusian population is growing, and the problem of the nation's ageing is becoming more and more obvious. Current UN forecasts (UN, 2019) suggest that while the population of Belarus will decrease, the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people over 65 per 100 working-age people) will almost double from 43 in 2015 to 82 in 2050 (Lisenkova & Bornukova, 2017). Striving to maintain its economy, Belarus is currently reforming the pension system. It was during this period that officials introduced and popularised the concept of 'active ageing', whose exact definition, however, has not yet been proposed. It was stated that the concept had to be developed by the end of 2019 along with 'The National Strategy for Senior Citizens' (its original name was 'The National Strategy for Active Longevity'). However, the concept of 'active ageing' is used in discussions about the need to rethink the concept of 'old age' in modern Belarusian discourse. The justification was based on economic factors, but no large-scale sociological research or analysis of public opinion had been conducted prior to the reform, neither had a broad public discussion been organised on this topic.

Relevance of the research The 20th century challenged the perception of the natural stages of life, ending in old age, which is normatively determined in connection with weakness and death. Modern demographic shift to population ageing and economic challenges to individuals, their families and states dictate the need to revise what are considered as the norms of age and to reinterpret the concepts of 'old age' and 'ageing'. Since the category of old age is not strictly biological, it is directly dependent on the meanings attached to this concept by society, while demographic, economic, political and other factors influence the public discourses and the very essence of ageing. At a time of astounding demographic change, social research and in particular discourse analysis are increasingly important in uncovering profound understanding of social processes and challenging areas. Researchers note that the structure of the global population has never changed so quickly in the history of mankind, especially in developed countries (Harper, 2014; Bloom, Mitgang & Osher, 2016). Significant quality changes in the life of a modern person allow them to retire full of energy and having financial opportunities to continue their life path and engage in their desired activities. These changes made it possible to identify a special concept for this reinterpreted period of life: the 'third age' (Laslett, 1989, p. 3) and even 'fourth age' (Higgs and Gilleard 2021). An optimistic view on the changed realities and mature age encourages many initiatives at the international and regional level to activate older people and ensure their full social inclusion. Furthermore, the 'activation' of older people is on the agenda of national and regional authorities, along with the task of studying the needs of the older population and possible barriers to social inclusion (Johnson & Falkingham, 1992; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2010; Stirling, 2010; WHO, 2010). The needs, as well as the issues and challenges of older people have become the object of rethinking for researchers and policy-makers of prosperous countries (WHO, 1982; UN, 2002, 2020); however, the increasing burden on the economies of states pushes politicians to consider this issue through the lens of the needs of a society in general and state budgets in particular. This is especially true in countries where demographic trends keep up with those of developed countries, but economic and political development is noticeably lagging behind (Martin & Kinsella, 1994; Mason, 2005; Mason & Lee, 2006). Policy incentives are adapted to extending working lives and to decrease early withdrawal from the labour market by offering additional bonuses for deferred pensions or even by raising the retirement age. Such changes are accompanied by rhetoric of usefulness for society and the individual: 'Active ageing is about helping older people to stay in work and share their experience. It is about them continuing to play an active role in society and living as healthy, independent and fulfilling lives as possible' (Eurofond, 2012). However, global Covid-19 pandemic showed the highest rate of death has been reported among old age people, and by this it highlights peculiar vulnerability of older citizens, their special needs and the relevance of discussions about old age as a category: 'later life has become a more actively constructed social space' (Higgs & Gilleard, 2021). Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, critical opinions about the concept of 'active ageing' were widening in sociological science; this did not prevent policymakers from continuing to actively promote and popularise it, shaping local social policies towards older people and causing changes in the perception of old age people and old age in society. Since the borrowing of such concepts by politicians and economists often occurs without attention to critical discourse and academic discussion, local discourse tends to neglect the variability of interpretations and considers only a part of the spectrum, setting the tone and securing a convenient interpretation. The very verbalisation of discrepancies and contradictions is the first step towards their further research with the help of large-scale quantitative sociological studies, as well as to the search for the solutions. Therefore, it seems extremely important in the current Belarusian socio-political situation the idea of studying discourse to discover crucial current and potential social issues. The concept of 'active ageing' was developed in Europe before the very first World Assembly on Ageing in Vienna in 1982, nevertheless the spread of 'active ageing'2 discourse in modern Belarusian realities is not accidental: negative economic and demographic trends (a decrease in the share of the working-age population and in revenues to the pension fund with a simultaneous decrease in GDP and an increase in inflation) in the region are becoming increasingly challenging for the state. The share of older people in the Belarusian population is growing, and the problem of the nation's ageing is becoming more and more obvious. Current UN forecasts (UN, 2019) suggest that while the population of Belarus will decrease, the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people over 65 per 100 working-age people) will almost double from 43 in 2015 to 82 in 2050 (Lisenkova & Bornukova, 2017). Striving to maintain its economy, Belarus is currently reforming the pension system. It was during this period that officials introduced and popularised the concept of 'active ageing', whose exact definition, however, has not yet been proposed. It was stated that the concept had to be developed by the end of 2019 along with 'The National Strategy for Senior Citizens' (its original name was 'The National Strategy for Active Longevity'). However, the concept of 'active ageing' is used in discussions about the need to rethink the concept of 'old age' in modern Belarusian discourse. The justification was based on economic factors, but no large-scale sociological research or analysis of public opinion had been conducted prior to the reform, neither had a broad public discussion been organised on this topic.

Relevance of the research The 20th century challenged the perception of the natural stages of life, ending in old age, which is normatively determined in connection with weakness and death. Modern demographic shift to population ageing and economic challenges to individuals, their families and states dictate the need to revise what are considered as the norms of age and to reinterpret the concepts of 'old age' and 'ageing'. Since the category of old age is not strictly biological, it is directly dependent on the meanings attached to this concept by society, while demographic, economic, political and other factors influence the public discourses and the very essence of ageing. At a time of astounding demographic change, social research and in particular discourse analysis are increasingly important in uncovering profound understanding of social processes and challenging areas. Researchers note that the structure of the global population has never changed so quickly in the history of mankind, especially in developed countries (Harper, 2014; Bloom, Mitgang & Osher, 2016). Significant quality changes in the life of a modern person allow them to retire full of energy and having financial opportunities to continue their life path and engage in their desired activities. These changes made it possible to identify a special concept for this reinterpreted period of life: the 'third age' (Laslett, 1989, p. 3) and even 'fourth age' (Higgs and Gilleard 2021). An optimistic view on the changed realities and mature age encourages many initiatives at the international and regional level to activate older people and ensure their full social inclusion. Furthermore, the 'activation' of older people is on the agenda of national and regional authorities, along with the task of studying the needs of the older population and possible barriers to social inclusion (Johnson & Falkingham, 1992; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2010; Stirling, 2010; WHO, 2010). The needs, as well as the issues and challenges of older people have become the object of rethinking for researchers and policy-makers of prosperous countries (WHO, 1982; UN, 2002, 2020); however, the increasing burden on the economies of states pushes politicians to consider this issue through the lens of the needs of a society in general and state budgets in particular. This is especially true in countries where demographic trends keep up with those of developed countries, but economic and political development is noticeably lagging behind (Martin & Kinsella, 1994; Mason, 2005; Mason & Lee, 2006). Policy incentives are adapted to extending working lives and to decrease early withdrawal from the labour market by offering additional bonuses for deferred pensions or even by raising the retirement age. Such changes are accompanied by rhetoric of usefulness for society and the individual: 'Active ageing is about helping older people to stay in work and share their experience. It is about them continuing to play an active role in society and living as healthy, independent and fulfilling lives as possible' (Eurofond, 2012). However, global Covid-19 pandemic showed the highest rate of death has been reported among old age people, and by this it highlights peculiar vulnerability of older citizens, their special needs and the relevance of discussions about old age as a category: 'later life has become a more actively constructed social space' (Higgs & Gilleard, 2021). Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, critical opinions about the concept of 'active ageing' were widening in sociological science; this did not prevent policymakers from continuing to actively promote and popularise it, shaping local social policies towards older people and causing changes in the perception of old age people and old age in society. Since the borrowing of such concepts by politicians and economists often occurs without attention to critical discourse and academic discussion, local discourse tends to neglect the variability of interpretations and considers only a part of the spectrum, setting the tone and securing a convenient interpretation. The very verbalisation of discrepancies and contradictions is the first step towards their further research with the help of large-scale quantitative sociological studies, as well as to the search for the solutions. Therefore, it seems extremely important in the current Belarusian socio-political situation the idea of studying discourse to discover crucial current and potential social issues. The concept of 'active ageing' was developed in Europe before the very first World Assembly on Ageing in Vienna in 1982, nevertheless the spread of 'active ageing'2 discourse in modern Belarusian realities is not accidental: negative economic and demographic trends (a decrease in the share of the working-age population and in revenues to the pension fund with a simultaneous decrease in GDP and an increase in inflation) in the region are becoming increasingly challenging for the state. The share of older people in the Belarusian population is growing, and the problem of the nation's ageing is becoming more and more obvious. Current UN forecasts (UN, 2019) suggest that while the population of Belarus will decrease, the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people over 65 per 100 working-age people) will almost double from 43 in 2015 to 82 in 2050 (Lisenkova & Bornukova, 2017). Striving to maintain its economy, Belarus is currently reforming the pension system. It was during this period that officials introduced and popularised the concept of 'active ageing', whose exact definition, however, has not yet been proposed. It was stated that the concept had to be developed by the end of 2019 along with 'The National Strategy for Senior Citizens' (its original name was 'The National Strategy for Active Longevity'). However, the concept of 'active ageing' is used in discussions about the need to rethink the concept of 'old age' in modern Belarusian discourse. The justification was based on economic factors, but no large-scale sociological research or analysis of public opinion had been conducted prior to the reform, neither had a broad public discussion been organised on this topic.

Relevance of the research The 20th century challenged the perception of the natural stages of life, ending in old age, which is normatively determined in connection with weakness and death. Modern demographic shift to population ageing and economic challenges to individuals, their families and states dictate the need to revise what are considered as the norms of age and to reinterpret the concepts of 'old age' and 'ageing'. Since the category of old age is not strictly biological, it is directly dependent on the meanings attached to this concept by society, while demographic, economic, political and other factors influence the public discourses and the very essence of ageing. At a time of astounding demographic change, social research and in particular discourse analysis are increasingly important in uncovering profound understanding of social processes and challenging areas. Researchers note that the structure of the global population has never changed so quickly in the history of mankind, especially in developed countries (Harper, 2014; Bloom, Mitgang & Osher, 2016). Significant quality changes in the life of a modern person allow them to retire full of energy and having financial opportunities to continue their life path and engage in their desired activities. These changes made it possible to identify a special concept for this reinterpreted period of life: the 'third age' (Laslett, 1989, p. 3) and even 'fourth age' (Higgs and Gilleard 2021). An optimistic view on the changed realities and mature age encourages many initiatives at the international and regional level to activate older people and ensure their full social inclusion. Furthermore, the 'activation' of older people is on the agenda of national and regional authorities, along with the task of studying the needs of the older population and possible barriers to social inclusion (Johnson & Falkingham, 1992; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2010; Stirling, 2010; WHO, 2010). The needs, as well as the issues and challenges of older people have become the object of rethinking for researchers and policy-makers of prosperous countries (WHO, 1982; UN, 2002, 2020); however, the increasing burden on the economies of states pushes politicians to consider this issue through the lens of the needs of a society in general and state budgets in particular. This is especially true in countries where demographic trends keep up with those of developed countries, but economic and political development is noticeably lagging behind (Martin & Kinsella, 1994; Mason, 2005; Mason & Lee, 2006). Policy incentives are adapted to extending working lives and to decrease early withdrawal from the labour market by offering additional bonuses for deferred pensions or even by raising the retirement age. Such changes are accompanied by rhetoric of usefulness for society and the individual: 'Active ageing is about helping older people to stay in work and share their experience. It is about them continuing to play an active role in society and living as healthy, independent and fulfilling lives as possible' (Eurofond, 2012). However, global Covid-19 pandemic showed the highest rate of death has been reported among old age people, and by this it highlights peculiar vulnerability of older citizens, their special needs and the relevance of discussions about old age as a category: 'later life has become a more actively constructed social space' (Higgs & Gilleard, 2021). Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, critical opinions about the concept of 'active ageing' were widening in sociological science; this did not prevent policymakers from continuing to actively promote and popularise it, shaping local social policies towards older people and causing changes in the perception of old age people and old age in society. Since the borrowing of such concepts by politicians and economists often occurs without attention to critical discourse and academic discussion, local discourse tends to neglect the variability of interpretations and considers only a part of the spectrum, setting the tone and securing a convenient interpretation. The very verbalisation of discrepancies and contradictions is the first step towards their further research with the help of large-scale quantitative sociological studies, as well as to the search for the solutions. Therefore, it seems extremely important in the current Belarusian socio-political situation the idea of studying discourse to discover crucial current and potential social issues. The concept of 'active ageing' was developed in Europe before the very first World Assembly on Ageing in Vienna in 1982, nevertheless the spread of 'active ageing'2 discourse in modern Belarusian realities is not accidental: negative economic and demographic trends (a decrease in the share of the working-age population and in revenues to the pension fund with a simultaneous decrease in GDP and an increase in inflation) in the region are becoming increasingly challenging for the state. The share of older people in the Belarusian population is growing, and the problem of the nation's ageing is becoming more and more obvious. Current UN forecasts (UN, 2019) suggest that while the population of Belarus will decrease, the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people over 65 per 100 working-age people) will almost double from 43 in 2015 to 82 in 2050 (Lisenkova & Bornukova, 2017). Striving to maintain its economy, Belarus is currently reforming the pension system. It was during this period that officials introduced and popularised the concept of 'active ageing', whose exact definition, however, has not yet been proposed. It was stated that the concept had to be developed by the end of 2019 along with 'The National Strategy for Senior Citizens' (its original name was 'The National Strategy for Active Longevity'). However, the concept of 'active ageing' is used in discussions about the need to rethink the concept of 'old age' in modern Belarusian discourse. The justification was based on economic factors, but no large-scale sociological research or analysis of public opinion had been conducted prior to the reform, neither had a broad public discussion been organised on this topic.

China's agricultural productivity has achieved remarkable accomplishments in agricultural sector after China's accession to World Trade Organization (WTO). According to National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), the total meat production in 2018 is 43% more than in 2000, and the total cereal production in 2018 is 51% more than in 2000. However, the rapid development of agriculture is associated with environmental pollution. Since China's rice output has quadrupled compared to the level in 1949, the rice production growth has serious repercussions on environment, which results in severe chemical fertilizer pollution. The amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied (209 kg ha-1) during rice production in China is 90% higher than global average level (Chen et al., 2014), and the N taken by rice is only 30-35% (Peng et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2012). In general, this research focuses on two empirical issues: one is the trade effects on China's agricultural productivity, the other is measuring environmental efficiency and finding solutions for N pollution problem. First, we try to investigate the trade impacts on China's agricultural productivity change and answer following questions. How productivity changes after China's entry to WTO? Is there a substantial productivity growth behind yield growth? What's the main factor behind TFP change? Second, we focus on evaluating environmental performance within the framework of productivity analysis and tackling N pollution issue. We try to measure China's environmental efficiency and nitrogen use efficiency in particular to examine whether NUE is low, what factors lead to current NUE and what are the possible ways to abate N pollution. To measure China's productivity change before and after China's entry to WTO and analyze trade impacts on agriculture, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) method is adopted. For the measurement of environmental efficiency, both Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and SFA are applied to estimate environmental productivity. Furthermore, based on empirical researches, both agricultural and environmental TFP are decomposed into explicit components to explore the decisive factors accounted for productivity change. In Chapter 2, we measure total factor productivity change in China's agricultural sector before and after China's entry to WTO, and obtain following conclusions. First, land, labor, intermediate input and capital could all lead to output growth. Second, China's productivity increases during the whole research period, and TFP growth rate rises slightly after China's entry to WTO. Third, the main contributors to TFP growth are not the same for the two sub-samples. Before China's accession to WTO, productivity growth majorly owes to allocative effect of pork and other meat and the considerable technical progress, while allocative effect of crop and land and technical progress are contributing factors after China's accession to WTO. Fourth, the development of technology achieves steady and substantial progress during the research period. Fifth, export has significant positive effect on technical efficiency before China's entry to WTO, while import presents negative effect on technical efficiency after China's entry to WTO. In Chapter 3, we measure and decompose China's environmental productivity when production technology exhibits VRS. Based on the empirical research on rice production, we obtain following findings. First, the annual INE scores experience a mild fluctuation in 2004-2010, and the average INE indicates there is large potential to reduce current N input by 39%. Second, rice farmers in Hubei Province are already located at the most productive scale size. Third, RDTFP presents an annual decreasing rate owing to technical regress. Fourth, due to time lags and overestimation of inefficiency, the changing direction of TEC and TC are different. Fifth, rice farmers could decrease 19% of the nitrogen emissions based on the technical-efficient point on the CRS frontier. Sixth, NASEC is found to be more strongly correlated with NTFPC. Seventh, the changing direction of NTFP is consistent with RDTFP. In Chapter 4, we measure current TFP in rice production using SFA and analyze factors behind environmental productivity variation. After our empirical research on rice production, the main findings are as follows. First, increases in fertilizer N contents, land N contents, rice output, labor and intermediate input could all lead to N growth. Second, compared with fertilizer N contents, land N contents variation could lead to a larger rise in total N. Third, due to the complementary relationship between fertilizer and quasi-fixed input, increases in labor and intermediate input can also lead to total N growth indirectly through fertilizer increase. Fourth, technical efficiency in rice production remains stable during 2004-2010. Fifth, TFP is decreasing at an average annual rate of 2%, which is attributed to the negative impacts of the allocative effect of fertilizer nutrient, the effect of capital and technical regress. Sixth, the negative allocative effect of fertilizer N contents indicates that farmers use more fertilizer than they need. Seventh, due to the improvement of industrialization and low NUE, total N slightly increases at a rate of 1.6% every year. The empirical findings provide several policy implications. First, encouraging technological innovation and developing an efficient fertilizer application approach may be a prior choice for promoting agricultural development and soil conservation in the future. Second, to become crop production allocative-efficient, government could cut subsidies and national support concerning crop production. Third, enacting more proposals and regulations on perfecting the land circulation market and protecting arable land from using for commercial purpose could help reduce land allocative inefficiency. Fourth, government's intervention and punishment on overuse of N fertilizer is necessary, due to the great potential of reducing N pollution by using less N. Fifth, after satisfying the current minimum amount of N input to become technical-efficient and scale-efficient, policy makers could guide farmers to reallocate their input combination to become environmental-efficient, since it is an effective way to prevent N pollution. Sixth, using less fertilizer, integrating small fragmented land and using land efficiently are beneficial to eliminating nutrient allocative inefficiency and improving TFP. Seventh, developing sustainable agriculture instead of high energy consumption, high waste and low efficiency agriculture could help to prevent N pollution growing over the years. ; 2021-06-07

ABSTRAK PT Berau Coal merupakan perusahaan batubara yang terletak di Kabupaten Berau, Provinsi Kalimantan Timur. Sebagai perusahaan yang mempunyai visi menunjang perwujudan cemerlang melalui peran aktifnya sebagai pengalihragam energi yang eksponensial, PT Berau Coal komit terhadap program Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Dalam CSR Policy perihal Pengembangan Masyarakat, PT Berau Coal mempunyai tujuan untuk mendorong komunitas sekitar tambang untuk berperan secara aktif dalam pemberdayaan masyarakat melalui pengembangan sumberdaya manusia, penguatan pranata sosial budaya dan pengembangan sumber daya ekonomi menuju masyarakat yang berdaya sejahtera dan mandiri secara bekelanjutan. Pada tahun 2018, penyerapan tenaga lokal di Kabupaten Berau menurut data Dinas Ketenagakerjaan dan Transmigrasi (Disnakertans) Berau hanya 30 % dimana permohonan kerja sektor tambang masih mendominasi di masyarakat. Menurut Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Berau nomor 8 tahun 2018 tentang Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Lokal, pemerintah daerah memberikan aturan kepada pengusaha untuk wajib mengupayakan pengisian lowongan pekerjaan di dengan tenaga kerja lokal paling sedikit 80% sesuai dengan syarat kualifikasi yang dibutuhkan. Untuk menutupi kesenjangan tersebut, PT. Berau Coal melalui CSR-Yayasan Dharma Bakti Berau Coal memberikan pelatihan kerja (vokasional) berupa sistem pemagangan kepada pemuda lingkar tambang sebagai bentuk komitmen dan kepatuhan perusahaan terhadap regulasi daerah. Sesuai dengan pilar CSR, program vokasi memiliki tujuan untuk mengembangkan masyarakat lingkar tambang dan juga menjadi asset yang dibentuk oleh organisasi sehingga kemampuan ataupun hasil dari pendidikan vokasinya dapat diserap oleh perusahaan di area operasional PT Berau Coal. Salah satu pilot program tersebut adalah melalui Program Pendidikan Pengawas Pertambangan, dengan mengacu kepada kompetensi POP dan kompetensi teknis. Metodologi pengembangan masyarakat yang didesain oleh PT Berau Coal menggunakan pendekatan vokasional, dimana metode tersebut menggunakan beberapa tahapan : (1) Konsep link and match diterapkan dari mulai link dengan kebutuhan industri pada saat program akan dilaksanakan dan match dengan kompetensi yang dibutuhkan dalam dunia industri dengan menyisipkan kompetensi izin kerja di operasional PT Berau Coal disesuaikan dengan kurikulum dari peserta pendidikan vokasi. (2) Membuat dan mengadopsi skema kompetensi untuk internal sesuai dengan kebutuhan industri. (3) Pelatihan dengan komposisi 70% on-job-training dan 30% In-Class. (4) Melaksanakan sertifikasi uji kompetensi sebagai persyaratan lulus program dan bagian dari working permit. Target dari pada program tersebut adalah bagaimana peserta didik tersebut dapat siap bekerja dengan budaya organisasi yang ada di operasional PT Berau Coal sebagaimana layaknya karyawan bekerja. Dengan model pengembangan masyarakat tersebut, program dapat memberikan dampak positif secara langsung untuk organisasi, diantaranya dengan menyiapkan tenaga kerja yang siap kerja melalui talent pool. Selain itu, perusahaan juga dapat menutupi kesenjangan komposisi tenaga kerja lokal yang ada di PT. Berau Coal dengan cepat sesuai dengan kebutuhan operasional perusahaan. Ketiga, program tersebut memberikan dampak secara langsung terhadap blockade/isu-isu lokal mengenai serapan tenaga kerja lokal yang erat terjadi di perusahaan tambang yang dapat berdampak terhadap kegiatan operasional. Kata Kunci : Corporate social responsibility, pendidikan vokasi, pengembangan masyarakat lokal ABSTRACT PT Berau Coal is a coal company that is located at Berau Regency, East Kalimantan Province. As a company which has vision to enable a brighter future through becoming an exponential energy transformer, PT Berau Coal commits to have a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programme. In CSR Policy regarding people development, PT Berau Coal has an objective to enforce communities around mining activity to actively contribute in community empowerment through developing human resources, strengthening social and cultural institutions and developing economic resources towards a sustainable and prosperous community. According to Department of Manpower and Transmigration, local employees who work in the mining sector within Berau Regency only around 30% in 2018, where the job demand in mining sector is still dominated. Referring to Berau Regency Local Regulation no 8 year 2018 about Protection of Local Workers, it is stated that local government provides rules for employers that should fill the job occupancy with at least 80% local workers with required qualification requirements. To cover the gap , PT Berau Coal through CSR-Yayasan Dharma Bakti Berau Coal is giving vocational training in the form of an apprenticeship system for fresh graduates around mining company as company's commitment form and company's compliance to local regulation. According to CSR's pillar, vocational program has a vision to develop community around mining area and become a meaningful asset which is formed by organization so the result of vocational education can be absorbed by companies within PT Berau Coal operational area. One of the pilot programs is Mining Supervisor Development Program which is referring to POP competencies and technical competencies. Methodology of society development by using vocational approach is designed by PT Berau Coal. This method is using several steps (1) Link and Match concept which start to apply from link with industrial needs when the program starts and match it with competencies that are needed with industry, adding operational work permit competencies at PT Berau Coal, adjusted with curriculum from vocation education participants. (2) Creating and adopting scheme of competencies for internal in accordance with the industrial needs. (3) Training program with composition 70% on-job-training and 30% In-Class. (4) Implementing competencies test as requirement to pass the program and part of work permit. The target for this program is how program participants are ready to work with organization culture at PT Berau Coal. Through this society development model, the program can give positive impact directly for the organization by preparing workers who are ready to work through the talent pool. In addition, the company can also covered the gap in the composition of the local workforce in PT. Berau Coal quickly according to the operational needs of the company. Lastly, this program give direct impact to blockade and local issues regarding local worker absoprtion in mining companies that can have an impact on operational activities. Keyword: Corporate social responsibility, vocational educational, local society development

Changes to the global agro-food-energy system (e.g. changing consumption patterns in the North (SNF, 2012), Europe's Climate and biofuel policies, etc.) over the past few years have led to a renewed interest in agriculture and a rush to acquire land (Cotula, 2012; Anseeuw et al, 2013). The impacts of this rush on sustainability are not always evident as its assessments focus on the short-term and generally remain at a case study level, without considering the broader agrarian and socio-economic transformations it entails (Borras et al. 2012). If a consensus emerges regarding the necessity of additional investment into agriculture (FAO, 2010), it is less evident whether large-scale agricultural investments (LAI) are a vector for broader agrarian and socio-economic transformations in a sustainable manner (Borras et al. 2012, Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Collier and Dercon 2014). Despite a growing literature (World Bank, 2010; White et al., 2012, Cotula 2014 etc.), most assessments of LAI impacts tend to remain local, in the form of specific case-studies, and are often short term without broader contextualization (Fairhead et al., 2012). Efforts to overcome these limitations through different types of meta-analyis have been undertaken (Oberlack et al., 2015, Schoneveld 2014, Schoneveld 2017, Dell'Angelo et al. (2017). However, a more empirical understanding of the diverse changes and impacts at various levels is necessary for reflecting on visions for the planetary land system. Against this backdrop, this paper presents the results of a study aiming, on one hand, at assessing the changes and impacts of LAIs at various (individual, household, regional) levels within target regions, and on the other hand, at a nuanced account of how and why LAIs subsequently induce diverse regional development trajectories in these regions. We focus on LAIs in Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique. Specifically, this study provides a cross-national comparative analysis of business models, land-use changes, governance dynamics of LAIs and their socio-economic, food security, and environmental impacts in Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique. It brings together the individual results on these aspects, which were generated in the Afgroland project (www.afgroland.net). The following research question guides this analysis: How do contextual and institutional nuances of large-scale agricultural investments impact on land-use changes, the organization of production and investment processes, socio-economic outcomes, food security, and the environment in LAI target regions in Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique? Methodologically, this study utilizes a set-theoretic methodology for a case-based comparative analysis. It responds to calls for the use of robust empirical methodologies to provide reliable evidence on the impacts of LAIs and to expand the use of comparative methods to attribute LAI impacts to causal factors. Data were collected in six study areas in the three countries by means of household surveys with more than 1500 households, more than 200 key-informant and in-depth interviews with business managers, policymakers, households, development agencies, and NGOs; remotely sensed data between 2016 and 2018, and complemented with document analysis. Data analysis involved mixed qualitative and quantitative techniques. A first set of tentative results, more conceptual in nature, show that LAIs induce regional development trajectories with sustainability impact patterns that can be characterized as conflictual sustainability trade-offs; employment vs. land access and environment trade-offs; widespread hostility; or moderate impacts. The set-theoretic analysis shows that the operational farm size, labour intensity, experience in local agriculture or domestic origin of investors, and prior land uses have the most significant impact on land-use changes, evolution of business models and adaptation of governance systems:. These transformation patterns are described in detail in the paper. A second set of results shows how the same international drivers can have divergent impacts, with local-level outcomes which can differ significantly in terms of land use change, ecological impacts, food security, and livelihoods. These divergences are determined by national politics and policy frameworks, land tenure rights, business models, land and water resource endowments, and path-dependencies regarding investment and business practices. As such, in Kenya, and more particularly in the Nanyuki region characterised by longstanding LAIs, an agrarian normalisation process has established, based on labour intense production systems mainly in the flower and horticultural sectors. Better established labour rights, technology transfer and an agrarian sector that has developed over time leads presently to a relatively dynamic local economy with subsequent livelihood opportunities. In Mozambique, these regional dynamics are minimal however, albeit indirect through basic infrastructural and service development. On contrary, through land loss and increased land pressures, labour extensive crops and production models, and not well developed labour rights, major fractions of the local populations tend to be affected negatively. Lastly, in Madagascar, for the few investments that are still operational, they tend to function on an enclave model, with very little – if any – interactions and impacts on the regional economy and local populations. The paper concludes by repositioning these results in the broader framework of interactions among sustainable development goals (SDGs), representing a critical, but mostly overlooked aspect in the debate on LAIs. In policy debates, LAIs are frequently justified with the argument that LAIs would create new flows of investments to capital-poor regions; create new employment; enhance agricultural productivity. In other words, this narratives relates LAIs positively to SDG10.B and SDG17.3 (investment flows), SDG8.5 (employment), and SDG2.3 (agricultural productivity), among others. By contrast, a recent review finds that LAIs can affect 14 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in adverse ways. The results of this study and the analyses in terms of diverging development trajectories induced by LAIs allows to assess how LAIs shapes the interaction between multiple SDGs. These interactions among SDGs in the framework of LAIs can take the forms of trade-offs, co-benefits, and co-damage.