Suchergebnisse

ABSTRAKTesis ini membahas tentang Penerapan Penyelesaian Konflik Bagi Penguasaan Dan Pemanfaatan Tanah Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden (Perpres) Nomor 88 Tahun 2017 Tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah Dalam Kawasan Hutan (Studi Di Kantor Atr/Bpn Kabupaten Kubu Raya). Kesimpulan Dari Tesis Ini Adalah Pola-Pola Penyelesaian Konflik Bagi Penguasaan Dan Pemanfaatan Tanah Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden (Perpres) Nomor 88 Tahun 2017 Tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah Dalam Kawasan Hutan Di Kantor ATR/BPN Kabupaten Kubu Raya untuk bidang tanah yang telah dikuasai dan dimanfaatkan dan/atau telah diberikan hak di atasnya sebelum bidang tanah tersebut ditunjuk sebagai kawasan hutan, Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah dalam Kawasan Hutan, dilakukan dengan mengeluarkan bidang tanah dari dalam kawasan hutan melalui perubahan batas kawasan hutan.Peraturan Presiden (PERPRES) Nomor : 88 Tahun 2017 tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah dalam Kawasan Hutan tersebut secara tegas melindungi hutan konservasi. Terhadap hutan konservasi, apapun kondisinya, semua jenis penguasaan dan pemanfaatan tanah diselesaikan dengan pola resettlement. Adapun dalam hutan lindung dan hutan produksi, pola penyelesaiannya ditentukan oleh jenis pemanfaatan, luas kawasan hutan lebih atau kurang 30%, serta lama penguasaan lahan lebih atau kurang dari 20 tahun. Jenis pemanfaatan lahan yang berupa lahan garapan di kawasan hutan lindung dan hutan produksi diselesaikan dengan perhutanan sosial apabila luas kawasan hutan kurang dari 30%. Tetapi di lokasi ini, apabila jenis pemanfaatannya berupa pemukiman dan fasilitas sosial, harus dilakukan resettlement.Kendala-kendala yang dihadapi oleh Kantor ATR/BPN Kabupaten Kubu Raya Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik Terhadap Penguasaan Dan Pemanfaatan Tanah. Walaupun posisi Peraturan Presiden (PERPRES) Nomor : 88 Tahun 2017 tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah dalam Kawasan Hutan (PPTKH) dalam tata urutan peraturan perundang-undangan lebih tinggi dari peraturan menteri, Peraturan Presiden (PERPRES) Nomor : 88 Tahun 2017 tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah dalam Kawasan Hutan (PPTKH) ini menghilangkan pembelajaran baik dari proses yang sudah berjalan, yaitu:Tidak sejalan dengan Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No: P.44/MENHUT- II/2012 juncto Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No: P.62/Menhut­II/2013 tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan Nomor P.44/Menhut-II/2012 tentang Pengukuhan Kawasan Hutan. Tidak sinkron dengan Peraturan Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan No: P.83/Menlhk/Setjen/Kum.1/10/2016 tentang Perhutanan Sosial. Perpres tersebut mengatur perhutanan sosial sebagai salah satu pola penyelesaian bagi penguasaan dan pemanfaatan tanah yang ditunjuk sebagai kawasan hutan dengan fungsi lindung atau produksi. Sementara kawasan hutan dengan fungsi konservasi adalah resettlement. Menghambat penerapan Peraturan Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan No: P.32/Menlhk-Setjen/2015 tentang Hutan Hak, Menghambat pelaksanaan Peraturan Menteri Agraria Dan Tata Ruang/Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional No: 10 Tahun 2016 tentang Tata Cara Penetapan Hak Komunal Atas Tanah Masyarakat Hukum Adat dan Masyarakat Yang Berada Dalam Kawasan Tertentu.Upaya yang dilakukan oleh Pemerintah dan Kantor ATR/BPN Kabupaten Kubu Raya Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik Terhadap Penguasaan Dan Pemanfaatan Tanah ialah dengan melakukan Mediasi. Kantor ATR/BPN Kabupaten Kubu Raya merupakan lembaga pemerintahan yang bertugas untuk melaksanakan dan mengembangkan administrasi pertanahan. Dalam melaksanakan tugas tersebut, penyelesaian masalah pertanahan merupakan salah satu fungsi yang menjadi kewenangan Kantor ATR/BPN Kabupaten Kubu Raya. Khususnya dalam menyelesaikan konflik terhadap penguasaan dan pemanfaatan tanah berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden (PERPRES) Nomor: 88 Tahun 2017 tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah dalam Kawasan Hutan jo Peraturan Menteri Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Kepala Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2016 tentang Penyelesaian Kasus Pertanahan. Mengacu pada semangat Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, maka kebijakan pertanahan (land policy) senantiasa diarahkan pada peningkatan dan pemanfaatan serta penggunaan tanah secara adil, transparan, dan produktif dengan mengutamakan hak-hak rakyat setempat termasuk hak ulayat dan masyarakat adat, serta berdasarkan tata ruang wilayah yang serasi dan seimbang dalam koridor peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku berlandaskan system administrasi public yang dapat dipertanggungjawabkan. Kebijakan pertanahan tersebut, dijabarkan lebih lanjut dalam kerangka tertib pertanahan, yang meliputi:Tertib hukum pertanahan;Tertib administrasi pertanahan;Tertib penggunaan tanah; dan Tertib pemeliharaan tanah dan lingkungan hidup.Kata Kunci: Penerapan ,Penyelesaian Konflik, Penguasaan, Pemanfaatan Tanah.ABSTRACTThis thesis discusses the Application of Conflict Resolution for Land Use and Utilization based on Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 88 of 2017 concerning the Settlement of Land Control in Forest Areas (Study at the Office of the Attorney General Office of Kubu Raya Regency). Conclusions from this thesis are patterns of conflict resolution for control and use of land based on presidential regulation (Perpres) Number 88 of 2017 concerning the completion of land ownership in forest areas at the ATR / BPN office in Kubu Raya Regency for land parcels that have been mastered and utilized and / or has been granted rights before the land is designated as a forest area, Settlement of Land Tenure in the Forest Zone, is carried out by removing land parcels from within the forest area through changes in forest area boundaries. Presidential Regulation (PERPRES) Number: 88 of 2017 concerning Settlement Land Tenure in the Forest Zone explicitly protects conservation forests. Regarding conservation forest, whatever the conditions, all types of land acquisition and utilization are resolved by resettlement patterns.As for protected forests and production forests, the settlement pattern is determined by the type of utilization, forest area is more or less 30%, and the length of land tenure is more or less than 20 years. The type of land use in the form of arable land in protected forest areas and production forests is solved by social forestry if the forest area is less than 30%. But in this location, if the type of utilization is in the form of settlements and social facilities, resettlement must be carried out. Constraints faced by the ATR / BPN Office in Kubu Raya Regency in Resolving Conflict over the Control and Use of Land. Although the position of the Presidential Regulation (PERPRES) Number: 88 of 2017 concerning Settlement of Land Control in Forest Areas (PPTKH) in the order of legislation is higher than the ministerial regulation, Presidential Regulation (PERPRES) Number: 88 of 2017 concerning Settlement of Land Tenure This Forest Zone (PPTKH) eliminates good learning from the process that has been running, namely: Not in line with Minister of Forestry Regulation No: P.44 / MENHUT-II / 2012 juncto Forestry Minister Regulation No: P.62 / Menhut¬II / 2013 concerning Amendment to Forestry Minister's Regulation Number P.44 / Menhut-II / 2012 concerning Forest Area Inauguration. Not synchronized with Minister of Environment and Forestry Regulation No: P.83 / Menlhk / Setjen / Kum.1 / 10/2016 concerning Social Forestry.The Perpres regulates social forestry as one of the patterns of settlement for the control and use of land designated as a forest area with a protected or production function. While the forest area with a conservation function is resettlement. Inhibiting the application of Minister of Environment and Forestry Regulation No: P.32 / Menlhk-Setjen / 2015 concerning Forest Rights, Inhibiting the implementation of Minister of Agrarian and Spatial Planning / Head of National Land Agency No: 10 of 2016 concerning Procedures for Determining Communal Rights on Community Land Customary Law and Communities Within Specific Areas. The efforts made by the Government and the Office of the ATR / BPN in Kubu Raya Regency in Resolving Conflict Against the Control and Use of Land are by conducting Mediation. ATR / BPN Office Kubu Raya Regency is a government institution whose task is to implement and develop land administration. In carrying out this task, the settlement of land issues is one of the functions that become the authority of the ATR / BPN Office in Kubu Raya Regency.Particularly in resolving conflicts over control and use of land based on Presidential Regulation (PERPRES) Number: 88 of 2017 concerning Settlement of Land Control in Forest Areas in conjunction with Minister of Agrarian and Spatial Planning / Head of Agrarian and Spatial Planning / Head of National Land Agency of the Republic of Indonesia Number 11 Year 2016 concerning Land Case Settlement. Referring to the spirit of Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, land policy is always directed at increasing and using and using land fairly, transparently and productively by prioritizing the rights of local people including customary rights and indigenous peoples , and based on a regional spatial plan that is harmonious and balanced in the corridor of legislation that applies based on a public administration system that can be accounted for. The land policy, further elaborated in the framework of orderly land, which includes: Orderly land law; Orderly land administration; Orderly use of land; and Orderly maintenance of land and the environment.Keywords: Application, Conflict Resolution, Mastery, Land Use.

Horizon Environmental Services, Inc. (Horizon) was selected by Berg-Oliver Associates, Inc. (BOA) on behalf of the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) to conduct a cultural resources inventory and assessment for the proposed Schiel Storm Water Detention Basin Project in Harris County, Texas (HCFCD Project No. L500-09-00-E003). The proposed undertaking would consist of constructing an extensive system of storm water detention basins and other drainage control measures within an approximately 335.8-hectare (829.9-acre) tract located near Hockley in northwestern Harris County. The project area generally flanks Little Cypress Creek and is bounded roughly on the west by Becker Road, on the south by Schiel Road, and on the east by Mason Road. For purposes of the cultural resources survey, the project area was assumed to consist of the entire 335.8-hectare (829.9-acre) tract. The proposed undertaking is being sponsored by HCFCD, a political subdivision of the state of Texas; as such, the project would fall under the jurisdiction of the Antiquities Code of Texas. In addition, the project would require the use of federal permits issued by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Galveston District, under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA). As such, those portions of the overall project area that fall within the federal permit area would also fall under the jurisdiction of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). As the proposed project represents a publicly sponsored undertaking, the project sponsor is required to provide the applicable regulatory agencies with an opportunity to review and comment on the project's potential to adversely affect historic properties listed on or considered eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under the NHPA and/or for designation as State Antiquities Landmarks (SAL) under the Antiquities Code of Texas, as appropriate. Between February 2019 and April 2020, Horizon archeologists Charles E. Bludau, Jr., Luis Gonzalez, and Amanda Kleopfer conducted an intensive cultural resources survey of the project area. Jeffrey D. Owens acted as Principal Investigator, and the survey was conducted under Texas Antiquities Permit No. 8700. The purpose of the survey was to locate any significant cultural resources that potentially would be impacted by the proposed undertaking. Horizon's archeologists traversed the tract and thoroughly inspected the modern ground surface for aboriginal and historic-age cultural resources. The project area consists of a vast tract that largely follows the channel of Little Cypress Creek. Areas adjacent to the creek were largely undeveloped and covered in moderately dense hardwood forests with a dense understory of shrubs, grasses, forbs, brambles, vines, and various grasses. Portions of the project area consisted of extensive cleared fields, some of which appeared to have been formerly cultivated, and most of which were in use as pastureland. Vegetation in the more open areas consisted of dense pasture grasses with isolated copses of hardwood trees. Whereas most of the project area is undeveloped and appears to be largely intact, various disturbances were observed. Several roadways traverse the project area, including State Highway (SH) 99, Bauer Road, and Mason Road, and a linear pipeline corridor passes northeast to southwest through the northern portion of the project area. An extensive sand-mining pit located immediately west of SH 99 has effectively destroyed approximately 35.8 hectares (88.5 acres) of the project area. Two large, contoured drainage channels have been constructed in the western portion of the project area that have disturbed a collective area of approximately 13.2 hectares (32.5 acres) of the project area. These drainage channels appear to be associated with a small residential subdivision located to the west of the project area off the eastern side of Becker Road that was under construction at the time of the survey. Visibility of the modern ground surface ranged from poor (<20%) in more heavily vegetated areas to excellent (80 to 100%) in cleared areas. The cultural resources survey was conducted prior to the implementation of revised archeological survey guidelines by the Council of Texas Archeologists (CTA) and Texas Historical Commission (THC) on April 17, 2020; as such, the prior guidelines of 2014 were utilized for the project. Under these guidelines, the Texas State Minimum Archeological Survey Standards (TSMASS) require a minimum of one shovel test per 1.2 hectares (3.0 acres) for project areas measuring 40.9 hectares (101.0 acres) or more in size. As such, a minimum of 211 shovel tests would be required within the 335.8-hectare (829.9-acre) project area. Horizon excavated a total of 633 shovel tests, thereby exceeding the TSMASS for a project area of this size. Shovel tests typically revealed sandy clay loam to sandy loam sediments overlying sandy clay. Mottling and iron staining was ubiquitous in shovel tests, suggesting that large portions of the project area are likely saturated on a seasonal or perennial basis. Extensive areas of standing water were observed over the course of the year during which the cultural resources survey was conducted. The majority of the project area is characterized by fluviomarine terraces created during the Late Pliocene and Early Pleistocene epochs, though the terraces of Little Cypress Creek are of Holocene age. While not all shovel tests contained iron concretions, they were encountered in enough of the shovel tests to suggest that shovel testing was capable of penetrating Holoceneage sediments with the potential to contain subsurface archeological resources. It is Horizon's opinion that shovel testing was capable of fully penetrating sediments with the potential to contain archeological deposits; as such, mechanical deep testing was not utilized. One newly recorded archeological site, 41HR1241, was documented within the project area during the survey. This site consists of the remains of the 20th-century farm of Alfred William (A.W.) and Mary Kathryn Petry. Historical maps indicate the farm was in operation as early as 1920, and it appears to have been abandoned by the 1980s. Formerly, the farm was composed of a domicile, at least one large outbuilding, and several smaller outbuildings, but all of the historicage structures have been demolished. Numerous large bulldozer push piles were observed on the site that contained concrete rubble and other construction debris, and it is likely these push piles are all that remains of the historic-age buildings that once stood on the site. Currently, all that remains of the Petry farm are several abandoned vehicles, a concrete well covered over with an overturned wheelbarrow, and a low-density surface and shallow subsurface scatter of domestic debris, including clear and brown glass shards, metal wire fragments, a railroad spike, a spark plug, construction debris (primarily concrete chunks), aluminum beer cans, glass beer bottles, and some polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping. Aside from the beer bottles and cans and the PVC piping, which are clearly of modern age and date from the end of the lifecycle of the farm, most of the cultural materials observed on the farm are only generally diagnostic of the 20th century. The only standing structure remaining on the site is a modern metal garage. Site 41HR1241 has been largely destroyed, and very little remains of the Petry farm. Based on the lack of standing historic-age buildings or intact cultural features, the ephemeral character of the surficial and shallow subsurface archeological deposits, and the absence of any known historical distinction of the members of the Petry family or association of the farm with events or trends of historical importance, site 41HR1241 is recommended as ineligible for inclusion in the NRHP and for designation as an SAL. Based on the results of the survey-level investigations documented in this report, no potentially significant cultural resources would be affected by the proposed undertaking. In accordance with 36 CFR 800.4, Horizon has made a reasonable and good-faith effort to identify historic properties within the project area. No cultural resources were identified within the project area that meet the criteria for designation as SALs according to 13 TAC 26 or for inclusion in the NRHP under 36 CFR 60.4. Horizon recommends a finding of "no historic properties affected," and no further archeological work is recommended in connection with the proposed undertaking. However, human burials, both prehistoric and historic, are protected under the Texas Health and Safety Code. In the event that any human remains or burial objects are inadvertently discovered at any point during construction, use, or ongoing maintenance in the project area, even in previously surveyed areas, all work should cease immediately in the vicinity of the inadvertent discovery, and the THC should be notified immediately. Following completion of the project, project records will be prepared for permanent curation at the Texas Archeological Research Laboratory (TARL).

Horizon Environmental Services, Inc. (Horizon) was selected by Berg-Oliver Associates, Inc. (BOA) on behalf of the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) to conduct a cultural resources inventory and assessment for the proposed Schiel Storm Water Detention Basin Project in Harris County, Texas (HCFCD Project No. L500-09-00-E003). The proposed undertaking would consist of constructing an extensive system of storm water detention basins and other drainage control measures within an approximately 335.8-hectare (829.9-acre) tract located near Hockley in northwestern Harris County. The project area generally flanks Little Cypress Creek and is bounded roughly on the west by Becker Road, on the south by Schiel Road, and on the east by Mason Road. For purposes of the cultural resources survey, the project area was assumed to consist of the entire 335.8-hectare (829.9-acre) tract. The proposed undertaking is being sponsored by HCFCD, a political subdivision of the state of Texas; as such, the project would fall under the jurisdiction of the Antiquities Code of Texas. In addition, the project would require the use of federal permits issued by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Galveston District, under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA). As such, those portions of the overall project area that fall within the federal permit area would also fall under the jurisdiction of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). As the proposed project represents a publicly sponsored undertaking, the project sponsor is required to provide the applicable regulatory agencies with an opportunity to review and comment on the project's potential to adversely affect historic properties listed on or considered eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under the NHPA and/or for designation as State Antiquities Landmarks (SAL) under the Antiquities Code of Texas, as appropriate. Between February 2019 and April 2020, Horizon archeologists Charles E. Bludau, Jr., Luis Gonzalez, and Amanda Kleopfer conducted an intensive cultural resources survey of the project area. Jeffrey D. Owens acted as Principal Investigator, and the survey was conducted under Texas Antiquities Permit No. 8700. The purpose of the survey was to locate any significant cultural resources that potentially would be impacted by the proposed undertaking. Horizon's archeologists traversed the tract and thoroughly inspected the modern ground surface for aboriginal and historic-age cultural resources. The project area consists of a vast tract that largely follows the channel of Little Cypress Creek. Areas adjacent to the creek were largely undeveloped and covered in moderately dense hardwood forests with a dense understory of shrubs, grasses, forbs, brambles, vines, and various grasses. Portions of the project area consisted of extensive cleared fields, some of which appeared to have been formerly cultivated, and most of which were in use as pastureland. Vegetation in the more open areas consisted of dense pasture grasses with isolated copses of hardwood trees. Whereas most of the project area is undeveloped and appears to be largely intact, various disturbances were observed. Several roadways traverse the project area, including State Highway (SH) 99, Bauer Road, and Mason Road, and a linear pipeline corridor passes northeast to southwest through the northern portion of the project area. An extensive sand-mining pit located immediately west of SH 99 has effectively destroyed approximately 35.8 hectares (88.5 acres) of the project area. Two large, contoured drainage channels have been constructed in the western portion of the project area that have disturbed a collective area of approximately 13.2 hectares (32.5 acres) of the project area. These drainage channels appear to be associated with a small residential subdivision located to the west of the project area off the eastern side of Becker Road that was under construction at the time of the survey. Visibility of the modern ground surface ranged from poor (<20%) in more heavily vegetated areas to excellent (80 to 100%) in cleared areas. The cultural resources survey was conducted prior to the implementation of revised archeological survey guidelines by the Council of Texas Archeologists (CTA) and Texas Historical Commission (THC) on April 17, 2020; as such, the prior guidelines of 2014 were utilized for the project. Under these guidelines, the Texas State Minimum Archeological Survey Standards (TSMASS) require a minimum of one shovel test per 1.2 hectares (3.0 acres) for project areas measuring 40.9 hectares (101.0 acres) or more in size. As such, a minimum of 211 shovel tests would be required within the 335.8-hectare (829.9-acre) project area. Horizon excavated a total of 633 shovel tests, thereby exceeding the TSMASS for a project area of this size. Shovel tests typically revealed sandy clay loam to sandy loam sediments overlying sandy clay. Mottling and iron staining was ubiquitous in shovel tests, suggesting that large portions of the project area are likely saturated on a seasonal or perennial basis. Extensive areas of standing water were observed over the course of the year during which the cultural resources survey was conducted. The majority of the project area is characterized by fluviomarine terraces created during the Late Pliocene and Early Pleistocene epochs, though the terraces of Little Cypress Creek are of Holocene age. While not all shovel tests contained iron concretions, they were encountered in enough of the shovel tests to suggest that shovel testing was capable of penetrating Holoceneage sediments with the potential to contain subsurface archeological resources. It is Horizon's opinion that shovel testing was capable of fully penetrating sediments with the potential to contain archeological deposits; as such, mechanical deep testing was not utilized. One newly recorded archeological site, 41HR1241, was documented within the project area during the survey. This site consists of the remains of the 20th-century farm of Alfred William (A.W.) and Mary Kathryn Petry. Historical maps indicate the farm was in operation as early as 1920, and it appears to have been abandoned by the 1980s. Formerly, the farm was composed of a domicile, at least one large outbuilding, and several smaller outbuildings, but all of the historicage structures have been demolished. Numerous large bulldozer push piles were observed on the site that contained concrete rubble and other construction debris, and it is likely these push piles are all that remains of the historic-age buildings that once stood on the site. Currently, all that remains of the Petry farm are several abandoned vehicles, a concrete well covered over with an overturned wheelbarrow, and a low-density surface and shallow subsurface scatter of domestic debris, including clear and brown glass shards, metal wire fragments, a railroad spike, a spark plug, construction debris (primarily concrete chunks), aluminum beer cans, glass beer bottles, and some polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping. Aside from the beer bottles and cans and the PVC piping, which are clearly of modern age and date from the end of the lifecycle of the farm, most of the cultural materials observed on the farm are only generally diagnostic of the 20th century. The only standing structure remaining on the site is a modern metal garage. Site 41HR1241 has been largely destroyed, and very little remains of the Petry farm. Based on the lack of standing historic-age buildings or intact cultural features, the ephemeral character of the surficial and shallow subsurface archeological deposits, and the absence of any known historical distinction of the members of the Petry family or association of the farm with events or trends of historical importance, site 41HR1241 is recommended as ineligible for inclusion in the NRHP and for designation as an SAL. Based on the results of the survey-level investigations documented in this report, no potentially significant cultural resources would be affected by the proposed undertaking. In accordance with 36 CFR 800.4, Horizon has made a reasonable and good-faith effort to identify historic properties within the project area. No cultural resources were identified within the project area that meet the criteria for designation as SALs according to 13 TAC 26 or for inclusion in the NRHP under 36 CFR 60.4. Horizon recommends a finding of "no historic properties affected," and no further archeological work is recommended in connection with the proposed undertaking. However, human burials, both prehistoric and historic, are protected under the Texas Health and Safety Code. In the event that any human remains or burial objects are inadvertently discovered at any point during construction, use, or ongoing maintenance in the project area, even in previously surveyed areas, all work should cease immediately in the vicinity of the inadvertent discovery, and the THC should be notified immediately. Following completion of the project, project records will be prepared for permanent curation at the Texas Archeological Research Laboratory (TARL).

En esta tesis abordamos los procesos de integración suramericana, a partir de la estrategia impulsada desde Brasil, por los gobiernos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, entre 2003 y 2011. Nos preguntamos por los entramados de la integración, para analizar el cruce entre el Estado brasilero y las clases dominantes, a partir de la política exterior, las políticas de desarrollo e infraestructura y la política económica. Desde una perspectiva analítica enfocada en los actores sociales de las clases dominantes, elegimos el Corredor Interocéanico Central para indagar en los intereses, posicionamientos y relaciones que hubo entre empresarios y Estado cuando se trató de las políticas de integración suramericana en el COSIPLAN- UNASUR, desde la región de São Paulo. La emergencia de los actores sociales elegidos, nos permite afirmar, que existieron múltiples formas de manifestación de sus intereses y posicionamientos, que van más allá de la consideración de su rol en la estructura productiva. A su vez, circunscribimos sus acciones en un proceso histórico particular que inscribe estas dinámicas nacionales en escenarios regionales e internacionales de grandes cambios. Así, las políticas de integración promovidas desde el Estado brasilero encontraron correspondencia con las reconfiguraciones propias del ciclo de regionalismo postliberal, y las transformaciones del capitalismo a nivel global. De esta manera, en esta tesis se articularon distintas dimensiones y escalas de análisis del problema de la integración suramericana en el nuevo siglo, con el objetivo de indagar en las disputas de poder entre los actores sociales seleccionados. Enmarcamos sus acciones en múltiples circunstancias y condiciones que encuadraron los conflictos y las divergencias que existieron. Como en todo fenómeno social, y en todo proceso que involucre al Estado y las clases dominantes, abordamos la ambigüedad de sus acciones. Así, nos preguntamos cómo se dio la relación oscilante y conflictiva entre la estrategia del gobierno, con sus instrumentos estatales, y las corporaciones empresariales. Construimos categorías y elementos analíticos que nos permitieron reconstruir, describir y explicar el fenómeno de la integración suramericana desde el protagonismo de algunos de sus actores, a saber; empresas como Odebrecht y federaciones representativas de sectores económicos como la FIESP; en su relación con el Estado lulista. El recorrido metodológico que vertebra esta tesis parte de la reconstrucción de la estrategia impulsada por el Estado brasilero en este período, en cuanto a su política exterior, sus políticas de integración y desarrollo, sus políticas de infraestructura y su política económica. Para ello, y en el marco de una estrategia cualitativa, además de la recopilación y el análisis de documentos y fuentes oficiales, se realizaron entrevistas a informantes clave. Estas resultaron en un recurso fundamental para la elaboración de esta tesis, en un campo en el que no es tan usual valerse de entrevistas para el abordaje de fenómenos de esta complejidad. ; Nesta tese abordamos os processos de integração sul-americana com base na estratégia promovida pelo Brasil, pelos governos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, entre 2003 e 2011. Nos perguntamos sobre as redes de integração, a fim de analisar a intersecção entre o Estado brasileiro e as classes dominantes, a partir da política externa, das políticas de desenvolvimento e infraestrutura e da política econômica. Através de uma perspectiva analítica centrada nos atores sociais das classes dominantes, escolhemos o Corredor Interoceânico Central para investigarmos os interesses, as posições e as relações entre empresários e o Estado nas políticas de integração sul-americana no COSIPLAN-UNASUL, a partir da região de São Paulo. A emergência de tais atores sociais nos permite afirmar que houve múltiplas formas de manifestação de seus interesses e de suas posições, para além da consideração de seu papel na estrutura produtiva. Ao mesmo tempo, circunscrevemos suas ações em um processo histórico particular, que integra essas dinâmicas nacionais em cenários regionais e internacionais de grandes transformações. Assim, as políticas de integração promovidas pelo Estado brasileiro encontraram correspondência com as reconfigurações próprias do ciclo de regionalismo pós-liberal e as transformações do capitalismo em nível global. Dessa forma, esta tese articulou diferentes dimensões e escalas de análise do problema da integração sul-americana no novo século, com o objetivo de investigar as disputas de poder entre os atores sociais escolhidos. Enquadramos suas ações em várias circunstâncias e condições que determinavam os conflitos e as divergências existentes. Como em todo fenômeno social, e em todo processo que envolve o Estado e as classes dominantes, abordamos a ambiguidade de suas ações. Assim, nos perguntamos como se deu a relação oscilante e conflitante entre a estratégia do governo, com seus instrumentos estatais, e as corporações empresariais. Construímos categorias e elementos analíticos que nos permitiram reconstruir, descrever e explicar o fenômeno da integração sul-americana a partir do protagonismo de alguns de seus atores, a saber; empresas como a Odebrecht e federações representativas de setores econômicos como a FIESP; em sua relação com o Estado lulista. O percurso metodológico que estrutura esta tese parte da reconstrução da estratégia promovida pelo Estado brasileiro naquele período, em relação à sua política externa, às suas políticas de integração e desenvolvimento, às suas políticas de infraestrutura e à sua política econômica. Para tal, e no âmbito de uma estratégia qualitativa, para além da coleta e da análise de documentos e fontes oficiais, foram realizadas entrevistas com informantes fundamentais. Estas resultaram em um importante recurso para a elaboração desta tese, em um campo no qual não é usual o emprego de entrevistas na abordagem de fenômenos dessa complexidade. ; In this thesis we address the processes of South American integration, based on the strategy promoted by Brazil, during the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, between 2003 and 2011. We look into the frameworks of integration, to explain the interwining of the Brazilian State and the dominant classes, with regards to foreign policy, development and infrastructure policies and economic policy. From an analytical perspective focused on the social actors of the ruling classes, we chose the Central Interoceanic Corridor to investigate the interests, positions and relationships that existed between businessmen and the State when dealing with South American integration policies in the COSIPLAN-UNASUR, from the region of São Paulo. The emergence of the elected social actors allows us to affirm that there were multiple forms of manifestation of their interests and positions, which go beyond the consideration of their role in the productive structure. At the same time, we circumscribe their actions in a particular historical process that registers these national dynamics in regional and international scenarios of great changes. Thus, the integration policies promoted by the Brazilian State found conection with the reconfigurations of the cycle of post-liberal regionalism, and the transformations of capitalism on a global level. In this way, this thesis expresses different dimensions and scales of analysis about the problem of South American integration in the new century, with the aim of investigating the power disputes between the selected social actors. We framed their actions in multiple circumstances and conditions that marked the conflicts and divergences that existed. As in any social phenomenon, and in every process that involves the State and the ruling classes, we express the ambiguity of their actions. Thus, we ask ourselves how the oscillating and conflicting relationship between the government's strategy, with its state instruments, and the business corporations came about. We set up categories and analytical elements that allowed us to reconstruct, describe and explain the phenomenon of South American integration from the protagonism of some of its actors; companies such as Odebrecht and representative federations of economic sectors such as FIESP; in its relation with the Lulista State. The methodological path that supports this thesis is based on the reconstruction of the strategy promoted by the Brazilian State in this period, in terms of its foreign policy, its integration and development policies, its infrastructure policies and its economic policy. For this, and in the framework of a qualitative strategy, in addition to the collection and analysis of official documents and sources, interviews with key informants were carried out. These resulted in a fundamental resource for the elaboration of this thesis, in a field in which it is not so usual to use interviews to deal with phenomena of this complexity. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

En esta tesis abordamos los procesos de integración suramericana, a partir de la estrategia impulsada desde Brasil, por los gobiernos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, entre 2003 y 2011. Nos preguntamos por los entramados de la integración, para analizar el cruce entre el Estado brasilero y las clases dominantes, a partir de la política exterior, las políticas de desarrollo e infraestructura y la política económica. Desde una perspectiva analítica enfocada en los actores sociales de las clases dominantes, elegimos el Corredor Interocéanico Central para indagar en los intereses, posicionamientos y relaciones que hubo entre empresarios y Estado cuando se trató de las políticas de integración suramericana en el COSIPLAN- UNASUR, desde la región de Sao Paulo. La emergencia de los actores sociales elegidos, nos permite afirmar, que existieron múltiples formas de manifestación de sus intereses y posicionamientos, que van más allá de la consideración de su rol en la estructura productiva. A su vez, circunscribimos sus acciones en un proceso histórico particular que inscribe estas dinámicas nacionales en escenarios regionales e internacionales de grandes cambios. Así, las políticas de integración promovidas desde el Estado brasilero encontraron correspondencia con las reconfiguraciones propias del ciclo de regionalismo postliberal, y las transformaciones del capitalismo a nivel global. De esta manera, en esta tesis se articularon distintas dimensiones y escalas de análisis del problema de la integración suramericana en el nuevo siglo, con el objetivo de indagar en las disputas de poder entre los actores sociales seleccionados. Enmarcamos sus acciones en múltiples circunstancias y condiciones que encuadraron los conflictos y las divergencias que existieron. Como en todo fenómeno social, y en todo proceso que involucre al Estado y las clases dominantes, abordamos la ambigüedad de sus acciones. Así, nos preguntamos cómo se dio la relación oscilante y conflictiva entre la estrategia del gobierno, con sus instrumentos estatales, y las corporaciones empresariales. Construimos categorías y elementos analíticos que nos permitieron reconstruir, describir y explicar el fenómeno de la integración suramericana desde el protagonismo de algunos de sus actores, a saber; empresas como Odebrecht y federaciones representativas de sectores económicos como la FIESP; en su relación con el Estado lulista. El recorrido metodológico que vertebra esta tesis parte de la reconstrucción de la estrategia impulsada por el Estado brasilero en este período, en cuanto a su política exterior, sus políticas de integración y desarrollo, sus políticas de infraestructura y su política económica. Para ello, y en el marco de una estrategia cualitativa, además de la recopilación y el análisis de documentos y fuentes oficiales, se realizaron entrevistas a informantes clave. Estas resultaron en un recurso fundamental para la elaboración de esta tesis, en un campo en el que no es tan usual valerse de entrevistas para el abordaje de fenómenos de esta complejidad. ; In this thesis we address the processes of South American integration, based on the strategy promoted by Brazil, during the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, between 2003 and 2011. We look into the frameworks of integration, to explain the interwining of the Brazilian State and the dominant classes, with regards to foreign policy, development and infrastructure policies and economic policy. From an analytical perspective focused on the social actors of the ruling classes, we chose the Central Interoceanic Corridor to investigate the interests, positions and relationships that existed between businessmen and the State when dealing with South American integration policies in the COSIPLAN-UNASUR, from the region of Sao Paulo. The emergence of the elected social actors allows us to affirm that there were multiple forms of manifestation of their interests and positions, which go beyond the consideration of their role in the productive structure. At the same time, we circumscribe their actions in a particular historical process that registers these national dynamics in regional and international scenarios of great changes. Thus, the integration policies promoted by the Brazilian State found conection with the reconfigurations of the cycle of post-liberal regionalism, and the transformations of capitalism on a global level. In this way, this thesis expresses different dimensions and scales of analysis about the problem of South American integration in the new century, with the aim of investigating the power disputes between the selected social actors. We framed their actions in multiple circumstances and conditions that marked the conflicts and divergences that existed. As in any social phenomenon, and in every process that involves the State and the ruling classes, we express the ambiguity of their actions. Thus, we ask ourselves how the oscillating and conflicting relationship between the government's strategy, with its state instruments, and the business corporations came about. We set up categories and analytical elements that allowed us to reconstruct, describe and explain the phenomenon of South American integration from the protagonism of some of its actors; companies such as Odebrecht and representative federations of economic sectors such as FIESP; in its relation with the Lulista State. The methodological path that supports this thesis is based on the reconstruction of the strategy promoted by the Brazilian State in this period, in terms of its foreign policy, its integration and development policies, its infrastructure policies and its economic policy. For this, and in the framework of a qualitative strategy, in addition to the collection and analysis of official documents and sources, interviews with key informants were carried out. These resulted in a fundamental resource for the elaboration of this thesis, in a field in which it is not so usual to use interviews to deal with phenomena of this complexity. ; Nesta tese abordamos os processos de integraçao sul-americana com base na estratégia promovida pelo Brasil, pelos governos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, entre 2003 e 2011. Nos perguntamos sobre as redes de integraçao, a fim de analisar a intersecçao entre o Estado brasileiro e as classes dominantes, a partir da política externa, das políticas de desenvolvimento e infraestrutura e da política econômica. Através de uma perspectiva analítica centrada nos atores sociais das classes dominantes, escolhemos o Corredor Interoceânico Central para investigarmos os interesses, as posiçoes e as relaçoes entre empresários e o Estado nas políticas de integraçao sul-americana no COSIPLAN-UNASUL, a partir da regiao de Sao Paulo. A emergência de tais atores sociais nos permite afirmar que houve múltiplas formas de manifestaçao de seus interesses e de suas posiçoes, para além da consideraçao de seu papel na estrutura produtiva. Ao mesmo tempo, circunscrevemos suas açoes em um processo histórico particular, que integra essas dinâmicas nacionais em cenários regionais e internacionais de grandes transformaçoes. Assim, as políticas de integraçao promovidas pelo Estado brasileiro encontraram correspondência com as reconfiguraçoes próprias do ciclo de regionalismo pós-liberal e as transformaçoes do capitalismo em nível global. Dessa forma, esta tese articulou diferentes dimensoes e escalas de análise do problema da integraçao sul-americana no novo século, com o objetivo de investigar as disputas de poder entre os atores sociais escolhidos. Enquadramos suas açoes em várias circunstâncias e condiçoes que determinavam os conflitos e as divergências existentes. Como em todo fenômeno social, e em todo processo que envolve o Estado e as classes dominantes, abordamos a ambiguidade de suas açoes. Assim, nos perguntamos como se deu a relaçao oscilante e conflitante entre a estratégia do governo, com seus instrumentos estatais, e as corporaçoes empresariais. Construímos categorias e elementos analíticos que nos permitiram reconstruir, descrever e explicar o fenômeno da integraçao sul-americana a partir do protagonismo de alguns de seus atores, a saber; empresas como a Odebrecht e federaçoes representativas de setores econômicos como a FIESP; em sua relaçao com o Estado lulista. O percurso metodológico que estrutura esta tese parte da reconstruçao da estratégia promovida pelo Estado brasileiro naquele período, em relaçao à sua política externa, às suas políticas de integraçao e desenvolvimento, às suas políticas de infraestrutura e à sua política econômica. Para tal, e no âmbito de uma estratégia qualitativa, para além da coleta e da análise de documentos e fontes oficiais, foram realizadas entrevistas com informantes fundamentais. Estas resultaram em um importante recurso para a elaboraçao desta tese, em um campo no qual nao é usual o emprego de entrevistas na abordagem de fenômenos dessa complexidade. ; Fil: Barrenengoa, Amanda. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Argentina.

On April 9th, the Karen National Liberation Army—the armed wing of the ethnic armed organization, the Karen National Union (KNU)—units from a formerly military-aligned Border Guards Force that has pulled back from the junta, and elements of the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) seized the Myanmar side of a border crossing in the city of Myawaddy along the Thai border. Although fighting continues in the city of 200,000 and the junta can be expected to retaliate via the air, the apparently impending fall of Myawaddy caps off a five-month string of resistance successes on the battlefield in Myanmar. With the Myanmar junta continuing to lose ground to the loose (but growing) coalition of pro-democracy forces, led by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), and ethnic armed groups, the balance of power in Myanmar is shifting against the military. From a strategic perspective, it is increasingly evident that the military's hold on power is slipping, but the resistance likely needs more leverage to achieve its Spring Revolution. The international community should therefore refrain from pushing the pro-democracy resistance to negotiate before it is ready. Falling Dominoes Along Myanmar's PeripheryAfter slowly building momentum leading into 2023, resistance forces fighting the Myanmar military that seized power in a coup in February 2021 have seized significant territory and towns throughout Myanmar in a stunning series of offensives over the past five months.On October 27th, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) suddenly attacked junta targets throughout northern Shan State along the border with China. Previously, the groups had quietly backed anti-junta forces but declined to the enter the war directly. But, in October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance took advantage of Chinese consternation about international crime to seize major towns and cut key highways. This marked the first instance of significant losses of towns and revenue by the junta. Signaling the junta's crumbling morale, entire battalions now regularly surrender in the months since October.Taking advantage of the junta's weakness, the Arakan Army soon launched its own highly successful offensive in Rakhine State on Myanmar's western edge. The Arakan Army has taken six out of 17 townships in the state and has now neared the port of Kyaukphyu, a vital terminus for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor with a strategic oil and gas pipeline. The AA shows few signs of halting its offensive as it approaches Sittwe, the state capital. It clearly harbors ambitions of taking the whole western seaboard.Resistance gains are far from limited to the Three Brotherhood Alliance. To the north of Rakhine, Chin resistance forces—along with AA—have steadily wrapped up junta forces along the Myanmar-India border, while PDFs and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are also particularly active in Sagaing Region's international borderlands. Despite losing the initially captured district capital of Kawlin in early 2024, anti-junta forces continue to make gains against the Myanmar military deeper in Sagaing and Magway Regions. Further to the north, the KIA launched its own large-scale assaults on junta positions in Kachin State in March 2024, having since seized numerous bases and the important China-Myanmar border town of Lweje. Meanwhile, on Myanmar's eastern side, the junta's position is similarly shaky. The Pa-O National Liberation Organization decided to enter the war against the junta in January 2024, targeting Hsihseng town in southern Shan State. In Kayah State, anti-junta troops took most of the state capital Loikaw and the majority of the state's territory. KNU forces in Kayin State have surrounded Kawkareik, which they had previously failed to seize in 2022. Resistance units have now also driven off junta forces from much of the Asia Highway linking Myanmar and Thailand. With the town of Myawaddy close to complete resistance control, the junta's position in the east—and leading to Myanmar's capital—is in real jeopardy.Despite the junta cracking down on urban guerillas earlier in the war, the NUG and its PDFs have launched daring strikes in recent days in Myanmar's central plains and largest urban areas. Drone operators recently gained a symbolic victory by hitting the military's headquarters and junta head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's residence in the capital, Naypyidaw. After these recent gains along the country's periphery, the expectation is that fighting will soon spread more directly into the country's Bamar-majority regions. Resistance Gains and a Desperate JuntaFollowing five months of military gains, the resistance enters 2024 in a far better strategic position than in any of the years since 2021. Zooming out, the coalition has steadily cut the junta off from its borders with Bangladesh, India, China, and now Thailand, thus forcing it to hold on under what amounts to a nationwide siege of the country's center. The junta is on the backfoot, an assessment supported by the lack of strategic counteroffensives and its desperate search for manpower. There are three key takeaways for international policymakers from these developments.For one, the war is far from over, and the junta still maintains the air power and artillery to inflict unimaginable damage upon Myanmar's people. Indeed, it has only ramped up its terror tactics, opting to destroy Kawlin in Sagaing Region rather than see the NUG effectively govern a town. The junta sees targeting the pro-democracy NUG and PDFs and attempting (unsuccessfully so far) to split the ethnic armed groups from the rest of the anti-junta coalition as its main strategic objectives. Inflicting punishment on the population is one of the few tools left to it, and Myanmar's humanitarian crisis can only be expected to worsen significantly due to the junta's destructiveness.Two, while the resistance is cooperating strategically at an unprecedented level, a political framework that satisfies Myanmar's many diverse actors and ensures the Spring Revolution comes to fruition is still far away. Signs of concern include intra-coalition disputes over control in Chin State, the AA's worrying statements regarding the Rohingya, and lingering frustrations with the NUG's leadership among many youth leaders, PDFs, and ethnic minority groups. However, despite these challenges, it is important to reiterate that Myanmar has long been "fragmented," and the current revolution constitutes the best chance for a stable, democratic, and inclusive Myanmar. Signs of improvement include the recent hosting of a second People's Assembly and the January 2024 joint statement by the NUG, Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, and the KNU. Moreover, battlefield cooperation can create the trust necessary to build towards a political framework. Military coordination between the NUG and the ethnic armed organizations has improved over time. Indeed, although command and control is a perennial issue among Myanmar's anti-junta resistance, the recent offensives across the country point towards unprecedented strategic cooperation. While motivations vary for joining the resistance offensives against the junta, many ethnic armed groups see the military's weakened position as an opportunity and the best chance in Myanmar's modern history for creating an inclusive, federal democracy. Importantly, Myanmar's people remain committed and supportive of the struggle.Third, despite the military's desperation and a shifting balance of power, it is not the time for international actors to push the resistance to enter peace negotiations. The military remains fundamentally intransigent and the core cause of instability in Myanmar. Because the military still holds onto the large towns and cities in the Bamar heartland, its forces maintain an airpower and artillery advantage, and the resistance has not yet developed a mutually agreed-upon postwar political framework, a premature ceasefire and negotiated settlement risks "freezing" the conflict in place.China and many of Myanmar's other neighbors are above all concerned with stability, and Beijing in particular would be fine with an internally divided but quiescent Myanmar so long as its Belt and Road investments can continue unhindered. China out of concern for its own interests has already compelled Three Brotherhood Alliance to enter into a tenuous ceasefire with the junta in northern Shan State and is reportedly attempting another one in Rakhine State with the AA. In response to the impending fall of Myawaddy, Thailand's prime minister recently stated that "maybe it's time to reach out and make a deal" with the military. But, until the battlefield situation develops to the point where the military has no choice but to accept civilian control, negotiations undertaken now—especially under China's auspices—would not result in the Spring Revolution's goals of an inclusive, federal democracy. Indeed, Myanmar would remain internally divided and perpetually unstable, likely with a politically active military either still in power or waiting on the wings to again leave the barracks. With their forces continuing to make gains on the battlefield and in need of more time to advance a political framework acceptable across the coalition, the pro-democracy resistance's demands that it will not accept a political role for the military after the war should be respected. The military will not negotiate in good faith unless it no longer believes it can survive as an institution at war with the whole country.For policymakers in Washington, this means that the United States should expand its support for the pro-democracy resistance in Myanmar to buy them more time. Importantly, it should expand its material support, including by providing funding for the resistance's governance and political cooperation efforts. Additionally, it should rapidly increase its humanitarian aid to reduce civilian suffering. But, above all, US policy should aim to ensure that the Spring Revolution continues to make gains against the military. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.

On April 9th, the Karen National Liberation Army—the armed wing of the ethnic armed organization, the Karen National Union (KNU)—units from a formerly military-aligned Border Guards Force that has pulled back from the junta, and elements of the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) seized the Myanmar side of a border crossing in the city of Myawaddy along the Thai border. Although fighting continues in the city of 200,000 and the junta can be expected to retaliate via the air, the apparently impending fall of Myawaddy caps off a five-month string of resistance successes on the battlefield in Myanmar. With the Myanmar junta continuing to lose ground to the loose (but growing) coalition of pro-democracy forces, led by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), and ethnic armed groups, the balance of power in Myanmar is shifting against the military. From a strategic perspective, it is increasingly evident that the military's hold on power is slipping, but the resistance likely needs more leverage to achieve its Spring Revolution. The international community should therefore refrain from pushing the pro-democracy resistance to negotiate before it is ready. Falling Dominoes Along Myanmar's PeripheryAfter slowly building momentum leading into 2023, resistance forces fighting the Myanmar military that seized power in a coup in February 2021 have seized significant territory and towns throughout Myanmar in a stunning series of offensives over the past five months.On October 27th, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) suddenly attacked junta targets throughout northern Shan State along the border with China. Previously, the groups had quietly backed anti-junta forces but declined to the enter the war directly. But, in October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance took advantage of Chinese consternation about international crime to seize major towns and cut key highways. This marked the first instance of significant losses of towns and revenue by the junta. Signaling the junta's crumbling morale, entire battalions now regularly surrender in the months since October.Taking advantage of the junta's weakness, the Arakan Army soon launched its own highly successful offensive in Rakhine State on Myanmar's western edge. The Arakan Army has taken six out of 17 townships in the state and has now neared the port of Kyaukphyu, a vital terminus for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor with a strategic oil and gas pipeline. The AA shows few signs of halting its offensive as it approaches Sittwe, the state capital. It clearly harbors ambitions of taking the whole western seaboard.Resistance gains are far from limited to the Three Brotherhood Alliance. To the north of Rakhine, Chin resistance forces—along with AA—have steadily wrapped up junta forces along the Myanmar-India border, while PDFs and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are also particularly active in Sagaing Region's international borderlands. Despite losing the initially captured district capital of Kawlin in early 2024, anti-junta forces continue to make gains against the Myanmar military deeper in Sagaing and Magway Regions. Further to the north, the KIA launched its own large-scale assaults on junta positions in Kachin State in March 2024, having since seized numerous bases and the important China-Myanmar border town of Lweje. Meanwhile, on Myanmar's eastern side, the junta's position is similarly shaky. The Pa-O National Liberation Organization decided to enter the war against the junta in January 2024, targeting Hsihseng town in southern Shan State. In Kayah State, anti-junta troops took most of the state capital Loikaw and the majority of the state's territory. KNU forces in Kayin State have surrounded Kawkareik, which they had previously failed to seize in 2022. Resistance units have now also driven off junta forces from much of the Asia Highway linking Myanmar and Thailand. With the town of Myawaddy close to complete resistance control, the junta's position in the east—and leading to Myanmar's capital—is in real jeopardy.Despite the junta cracking down on urban guerillas earlier in the war, the NUG and its PDFs have launched daring strikes in recent days in Myanmar's central plains and largest urban areas. Drone operators recently gained a symbolic victory by hitting the military's headquarters and junta head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's residence in the capital, Naypyidaw. After these recent gains along the country's periphery, the expectation is that fighting will soon spread more directly into the country's Bamar-majority regions. Resistance Gains and a Desperate JuntaFollowing five months of military gains, the resistance enters 2024 in a far better strategic position than in any of the years since 2021. Zooming out, the coalition has steadily cut the junta off from its borders with Bangladesh, India, China, and now Thailand, thus forcing it to hold on under what amounts to a nationwide siege of the country's center. The junta is on the backfoot, an assessment supported by the lack of strategic counteroffensives and its desperate search for manpower. There are three key takeaways for international policymakers from these developments.For one, the war is far from over, and the junta still maintains the air power and artillery to inflict unimaginable damage upon Myanmar's people. Indeed, it has only ramped up its terror tactics, opting to destroy Kawlin in Sagaing Region rather than see the NUG effectively govern a town. The junta sees targeting the pro-democracy NUG and PDFs and attempting (unsuccessfully so far) to split the ethnic armed groups from the rest of the anti-junta coalition as its main strategic objectives. Inflicting punishment on the population is one of the few tools left to it, and Myanmar's humanitarian crisis can only be expected to worsen significantly due to the junta's destructiveness.Two, while the resistance is cooperating strategically at an unprecedented level, a political framework that satisfies Myanmar's many diverse actors and ensures the Spring Revolution comes to fruition is still far away. Signs of concern include intra-coalition disputes over control in Chin State, the AA's worrying statements regarding the Rohingya, and lingering frustrations with the NUG's leadership among many youth leaders, PDFs, and ethnic minority groups. However, despite these challenges, it is important to reiterate that Myanmar has long been "fragmented," and the current revolution constitutes the best chance for a stable, democratic, and inclusive Myanmar. Signs of improvement include the recent hosting of a second People's Assembly and the January 2024 joint statement by the NUG, Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, and the KNU. Moreover, battlefield cooperation can create the trust necessary to build towards a political framework. Military coordination between the NUG and the ethnic armed organizations has improved over time. Indeed, although command and control is a perennial issue among Myanmar's anti-junta resistance, the recent offensives across the country point towards unprecedented strategic cooperation. While motivations vary for joining the resistance offensives against the junta, many ethnic armed groups see the military's weakened position as an opportunity and the best chance in Myanmar's modern history for creating an inclusive, federal democracy. Importantly, Myanmar's people remain committed and supportive of the struggle.Third, despite the military's desperation and a shifting balance of power, it is not the time for international actors to push the resistance to enter peace negotiations. The military remains fundamentally intransigent and the core cause of instability in Myanmar. Because the military still holds onto the large towns and cities in the Bamar heartland, its forces maintain an airpower and artillery advantage, and the resistance has not yet developed a mutually agreed-upon postwar political framework, a premature ceasefire and negotiated settlement risks "freezing" the conflict in place.China and many of Myanmar's other neighbors are above all concerned with stability, and Beijing in particular would be fine with an internally divided but quiescent Myanmar so long as its Belt and Road investments can continue unhindered. China out of concern for its own interests has already compelled Three Brotherhood Alliance to enter into a tenuous ceasefire with the junta in northern Shan State and is reportedly attempting another one in Rakhine State with the AA. In response to the impending fall of Myawaddy, Thailand's prime minister recently stated that "maybe it's time to reach out and make a deal" with the military. But, until the battlefield situation develops to the point where the military has no choice but to accept civilian control, negotiations undertaken now—especially under China's auspices—would not result in the Spring Revolution's goals of an inclusive, federal democracy. Indeed, Myanmar would remain internally divided and perpetually unstable, likely with a politically active military either still in power or waiting on the wings to again leave the barracks. With their forces continuing to make gains on the battlefield and in need of more time to advance a political framework acceptable across the coalition, the pro-democracy resistance's demands that it will not accept a political role for the military after the war should be respected. The military will not negotiate in good faith unless it no longer believes it can survive as an institution at war with the whole country.For policymakers in Washington, this means that the United States should expand its support for the pro-democracy resistance in Myanmar to buy them more time. Importantly, it should expand its material support, including by providing funding for the resistance's governance and political cooperation efforts. Additionally, it should rapidly increase its humanitarian aid to reduce civilian suffering. But, above all, US policy should aim to ensure that the Spring Revolution continues to make gains against the military. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.

This article was co-published with The New Arab.Close watchers of Israel's war in Gaza have faced a question in recent months: If the U.S. is rushing weapons to Israel, then why hasn't the public heard of any arms sales besides two relatively small transfers late last year?The Washington Post delivered an answer last week. Reporter John Hudson revealed that the Biden administration has approved over 100 smaller weapons packages for Israel since Oct. 7 that fell under the $25 million threshold for formally notifying Congress — and thus the public — about the transfers. In total, these mini sales could add up to more than $1 billion worth of U.S. military aid.The decision to deliver U.S. aid in smaller packages is far from unusual. The U.S. government has done so in the past for practical and nefarious purposes alike; only about 2% of weapons transfers occur above the threshold to notify Congress, according to former officials. But what is abnormal is the fact that many of those weapons were likely pre-positioned on Israeli territory before the war. Unlike other countries, Israel has a stockpile of American weapons on its soil to which it has privileged access. When a U.S.-made bomb slams into Gaza, there's a real chance that it started the day in an American facility, managed by American soldiers and governed by American law."It's clear that it's been a major source of arms for Israel," said Josh Paul, a former State Department official who resigned in protest of U.S. support for Israel's war. Unfortunately, Paul added, "it's an opaque process, so it's hard to say exactly what weapons they're getting" from the stockpile.This cache of arms is just a small piece of the puzzle. Taken as a whole, U.S. efforts to shield Israel from human rights restrictions and guarantee its access to continued military aid go further than for any other country, according to experts and former senior U.S. officials. These advantages include modified human rights vetting, special access to U.S. weapons, and a veto on American arms sales to Israel's neighbors. Up to this point, the State Department hasn't carried out a formal assessment of Israel's compliance with the law in its Gaza war.Experts claim these arms transfer cutouts have continued or, in some areas, been expanded since Israel launched its campaign in Gaza, which has left over 31,000 Palestinians dead and much of the strip's population in famine or famine-like conditions. Even last month, as war crime accusations mounted, the U.S. reportedly gave Israel at least 1,000 precision-guided munitions and artillery shells."The bottom line is that either you have human rights standards and legal standards or you don't," Paul said. When U.S. officials fail to hold Israel accountable for alleged abuses, "it not only creates an exception for Israel, but it also undermines your diplomacy with other countries," he told Responsible Statecraft/ The New Arab."I have serious concerns that the continued transfer of weapons to Israel is facilitating indiscriminate bombing that may violate international humanitarian law," Rep. Joaquin Castro told Responsible Statecraft/ The New Arab in a statement. "Congress needs to push the Biden administration to hold Benjamin Netanyahu accountable for any use of U.S. security assistance that violates international law."State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller told Responsible Statecraft/ The New Arab that all transfers to Israel since Oct. 7 have followed U.S. law and policy, including notifications to Congress. "We have followed the procedures Congress itself has specified to keep members well-informed and regularly brief members even when formal notification is not a legal requirement," Miller said in a statement, adding that claims that the U.S. has cut up weapons packages in order to avoid public scrutiny are "unequivocally false."The White House did not respond to a request for comment.Exceptions make the rulesWhen a Middle Eastern country asks the U.S. for weapons, American officials' minds go straight to Israel. Would Tel Aviv approve of the transfer? Could new fighter jets give Egypt an edge over Israel on the battlefield if their peace deal fell apart? Would Israeli officials come around if we offer them better weapons to sweeten the pot?This line of reasoning doesn't have anything to do with the personal opinions of U.S. officials. In fact, U.S. law explicitly states that the U.S. must give Israel a "qualitative military edge" over its neighbors to counter a threat from "any individual state or possible coalition of states or [...] non-state actors."U.S. partners are starkly aware of — and unhappy about — this reality, according to a former senior U.S. military official in Cairo who requested anonymity to speak freely about his experience. Egyptian officials would sometimes request high-tech weapons just to "watch us squirm and come up with some way to say 'no' without saying the Israelis won't approve it," the former official recalled."This is another place where it's very explicit that Israel has a special status that no other country enjoys," said John Ramming-Chappell of the Center for Civilians in Conflict.This qualitative advantage is enforced by the quantitative side. Since World War II, Israel is far and away the largest recipient of U.S. military aid. Washington's funding for the Israeli military, which now totals $3.8 billion per year, makes up about 16% of its total budget, according to the Congressional Research Service. Israel, which can spend part of its U.S. aid on Israeli weapons, gets this cash in an interest-bearing account in New York, making it one of only two states that get a multimillion-dollar tip on top of baseline U.S. support.When it comes to human rights, Israel also gets special protections. Take the Leahy law, a statute that prevents specific units of foreign militaries from receiving U.S. aid if American officials have evidence they've committed "gross violations of human rights." For most countries, Leahy vetting happens before aid is disbursed. Israel gets the equipment first, and the ensuing vetting process looks different than for other countries. Lower-level State Department officials have found multiple cases in which Israeli units should lose access to American weapons under U.S. law, but those cases are consistently blocked by higher-ups in government who usually don't weigh in on such cases for other countries, according to Paul.The result is that, unlike Egypt and other U.S. partners in the Middle East, no Israeli unit has ever been sanctioned under the Leahy law despite numerous credible allegations of human rights abuses, a fact that the statute's namesake has loudly railed against. The State Department has previously justified this disparity by pointing to Israel's judicial system, which U.S. officials believe is capable of handling human rights violations internally.In recent weeks, congressional attention has focused on whether Israel is violating a U.S. law that prevents countries from receiving American weapons if they block U.S. humanitarian aid in whole or in part. While the statute has rarely been enforced, the Biden administration promised to hold states accountable to the law in a recent memorandum.At this point, many experts and lawmakers believe Israel is in clear violation of this law given how little aid now enters Gaza. Yet the White House has still not offered a reason — or a formal waiver — to justify its failure to enforce its own commitment."I really haven't heard a good response to the question of why we should not apply existing U.S. law [...] to ensure that U.S. military assistance is used in accordance with our values," said Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md."Given the evidence that Israel is intentionally blocking the passage of humanitarian aid to Gaza, the Biden administration has an obligation to enforce Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act and move towards limitations on further offensive aid to Israel as long as the aid blockade continues," Rep. Castro said.'As supportive as possible'When the White House moved to expedite weapons transfers to Israel after Oct. 7, it faced an unusual problem. The president already had more than enough authority to make this happen, but officials wanted to signal that they were being "as supportive as possible." The solution was to further loosen laws around U.S. arms transfers, according to Paul, who still worked in government at the time.
"It's not that those were things that we'd been previously thinking about," Paul said. "The previous position within government had been [that] Israel already has more than you could possibly want in terms of authorities and funding."
Now, the Senate's supplemental spending package for Israel has provisions that would dramatically expand the secretive U.S. stockpile on Israeli soil while loosening public reporting requirements about transfers from it. A bill with similar changes passed the House as well, signaling broad support for the proposal in Congress.
Alongside already existing loopholes, these new restrictions weaken America's case that it is committed to protecting human rights on the world stage, according to Ramming-Chappell.
"The exceptional status that Israel enjoys in U.S. arms transfer policy and law, when taken in conjunction with the devastating effects of Israel's current campaign in Gaza, really undermines U.S. leadership and claims to moral authority in the international sphere," he said.

International audience ; According to the mainstream literature in economic geography, agglomeration economies are so powerful drivers for polarization in the larger metro areas that a center-periphery pattern is almost inescapable, making any peripheral location clearly disadvantageous for firms (Dicken and Lloyd, 1992; Fujita and Thisse, 2003). Urban studies also support such views by demonstrating the growing, steadily trend towards metropolization.However these statements are not fully confirmed by some empirical results. Indeed the stated entrepreneurs' locational preferences of firms localized in medium-sized (and even small) cities situated in peripheral areas do not always meet these theoretical interpretations. Innovative entrepreneurs and successful companies are usual in such locations, making necessary to explain such unexpected location choices and how they can be successful despite their so-called locational constraints due both to their remote position in badly connected peripheries (as demonstrated by population and economic potential models at the national and European scales) and to the lack of localized external economies of scale.To enlighten such apparently irrational business location choices, we could refer to the behavioural approach (Pred, 1967) as the perception of the quality of location characteristics has been neglected by the literature (Eickelpasch and al., 2015). Indeed the mental maps of the peripheral entrepreneurs –as revealed by our survey– do not exhibit the same perception of their working-area as expected from the theoretical works that consider peripheral locations are damaging due to various backwash effects (Myrdal, 1957; Haggett, 1979). As it has often been established by numerous surveys, the first locational factor of SMEs is often the birthplace of their manager, especially for family-owned companies, considering that entrepreneurial spirit is often more common in areas dominated by small firms (Baudelle and Ollivro, 2000; Ejermo and Hansen, 2015). Therefore the rationale of their location choice does not necessarily match the requisites of profit maximization. But despite this kind of path dependency due to the faithfulness of these entrepreneurs to their native region, we need to understand how such firms can be innovative and therefore successful notwithstanding their non- optimal location in small and medium-sized cities of peripheral areas.At this point we need another theoretical framework, namely the institutional approach (Granovetter, 1973). This perspective is required to explain why and how entrepreneurs can be successful in spite of their non-metropolitan location in modest cities situated far not only from the core of Europe but also from the national and sub-national metropolises. More specifically our study mobilizes the sociology of networks (Krauss, 2011 & 2013) to explain the paradoxical success-stories of peripheral firms. Such an approach is congruent with the evolutionary perspective that is paying more and more attention (but not so much) to networks and institutions as parts of complex adaptative systems to explain regional resilience (Boschma, 2015).Therefore our theoretical assumption is the following: professional networks and personal networking are crucial for these companies and their managers to give them access to various kinds of resources that are necessary to run their business. This is consistent with the theory striking the need for embeddeness among the entrepreneurs to make them possible to run their business with success (Granovetter, 1973; Krauss, Sternberg, 2014). The final goal of the study is to understand how the access to various informational and human resources is made possible by the construction of networks used by innovating companies to develop their business. Consequently the objective is to identify the configuration of the networks –strong or weak, local or distant, central or peripheral– of the interviewed entrepreneurs to understand their possible role in their success stories.The field-study area is a corridor along the Southern Brittany Coast (France). In this area of about 939 000 inhab., there is no large metropolis. The three main cities (Lorient, Quimper, Vannes) are simply medium-sized cities: their built-up areas have respectively 115 000, 80 000 and 75 000 inhab. only and their travel-to-work areas 180 000, 120 000 and 135 000 people. Outside them, only small cities can be found.Moreover these cities are far from the rest of France and Europe and even from the larger metro area in Western France, Nantes (622 000 inh.), which is more than 3 hours away by car from Western Brittany and even 4 hour and a half by train. Even from the closest city (Vannes) the journey to Nantes requires more than 2 hours. Paris, the national capital-city, remains from 3h30 to 6h30 away by train. Some local domestic airports compensate this remoteness but not totally and with a high flight cost due to monopolies. As a result this area is a typical periphery, far from the metropolitan engines of the globalizing economy. The French division of labour between Paris metro area and the province even worsens the gap between the Breton Western periphery and the French World City.To understand how the entrepreneurs overcome such a physical distance, a sample of about 20 successful business leaders were interviewed (Marinos, 2015). The selected companies (mainly SMEs) are deliberately very competitive ones: they are intensive in technology, exhibit a high level of innovation (as demonstrated by the number of patents) allowing high added values and significant export rates, they attract international investors and look for clients and suppliers all around the world.The objective of the study was to evaluate how important the networks are to compensate the possible theoretical locational constraints due to peripheral sites (Krauss, 2009). The literature often points out the possible negative locking effects of excessive local inward-looking ties, suggesting a trade-off between immediate adaptation and later adaptability (Grabher, 1993; Boschma and Frenken, 2010; Braun and Schulz, 2012; Boschma, 2015). However our study shows clearly that such a distinction between strong local, proximate connections and weak, outward-looking networks does not fit with our empirical results, which leads to reconsider the present literature about the connectedness of entrepreneurs working in peripheries seen as so-called autarkic and poorly connected places.The survey reveals that the entrepreneurs do not ignore the drawbacks of peripheral locations. However the professionals met for the survey express great satisfaction about their business in Southern Brittany. The participation of three quarters of them in local networks (business associations, chambers of commerce, development agencies.) is presented as necessary for their business development process, and even crucial during the start-up stage. It allows them to open up to their immediate environment and to enhance their external visibility. Belonging to a network also improves their collective capacity for concerted actions. Doing so, entrepreneurs become more audible by politicians and influence local public policies.Small and medium-sized cities are perceived as a favorable ground to confident relationships even if that kind of links rarely exceeds the TTWA boundaries. Local political staff and administration are more easily approachable and quicker to react than in bigger cities.More surprisingly, these employers are involved in the local economic life even if their clients are not local. The more entrepreneurs operate on the globalized market, the more they express that need for local commitment: "my company needs roots to have wings".The local territory acts as a medium between stakeholders: "partnerships, collaborations, it is first and foremost a human-based process". A collaborative way of working is considered essential. The importance of trusting is at the heart of networks' efficiency because it facilitates the exchanges and improves the flow of information. The information quality control is operated by network members. Immaterial resources access constitutes a favorable ground for entrepreneur's social capital. Thisaccess opportunity participates to the process of innovation. Therefore mutual trust can be regarded as an implicit knowledge transmission accelerator that fosters innovation.Higher education (including alumni associations) is complementarily highly structuring for entrepreneurs' networks, offering good opportunities to develop sustainable partnerships. When they exist, links with experts and academic researchers are sustainable and lead to success. These relations take time and depend on the leader's background. They vary a lot according to how long the company has been based on the territory. However most of the local research fields are different from those which are of interest to local companies to such an extent that some companies prefer working with metropolitan research organizations, particularly for those which operate in niche activities.In terms of cooperation, employers display a very pragmatic behavior: they get to the closest companies, sometimes even at the expense of the quality of the resource. Geographic proximity fosters working together, a round trip in the afternoon being considered as the symbolic border. This is particularly true for interpersonal networks, restricted to everyday life territory. But for commercial partnerships there is no geographic border.Eventually these networks are helpful to overcome some challenges such as hiring talented employees or getting a convenient job for their partners in small TTWAs. But they do not solve all the usual problems the peripheral entrepreneurs face to such as good air connectivity within an hour drive ("If the airport closes, I leave"). Moreover the companies operating in specialized activities or in a niche productions do suffer from the lack of dense sectorial networks, generating a feeling of isolation. This can impact the open innovation process and even inhibit the organization of events supposed to provide new interactions.Finally the network approach helps to understand why companies located in peripheral areas do not move towards larger central metro areas despite of their locational disadvantage underlined by the neoclassic locational theory.

International audience ; According to the mainstream literature in economic geography, agglomeration economies are so powerful drivers for polarization in the larger metro areas that a center-periphery pattern is almost inescapable, making any peripheral location clearly disadvantageous for firms (Dicken and Lloyd, 1992; Fujita and Thisse, 2003). Urban studies also support such views by demonstrating the growing, steadily trend towards metropolization.However these statements are not fully confirmed by some empirical results. Indeed the stated entrepreneurs' locational preferences of firms localized in medium-sized (and even small) cities situated in peripheral areas do not always meet these theoretical interpretations. Innovative entrepreneurs and successful companies are usual in such locations, making necessary to explain such unexpected location choices and how they can be successful despite their so-called locational constraints due both to their remote position in badly connected peripheries (as demonstrated by population and economic potential models at the national and European scales) and to the lack of localized external economies of scale.To enlighten such apparently irrational business location choices, we could refer to the behavioural approach (Pred, 1967) as the perception of the quality of location characteristics has been neglected by the literature (Eickelpasch and al., 2015). Indeed the mental maps of the peripheral entrepreneurs –as revealed by our survey– do not exhibit the same perception of their working-area as expected from the theoretical works that consider peripheral locations are damaging due to various backwash effects (Myrdal, 1957; Haggett, 1979). As it has often been established by numerous surveys, the first locational factor of SMEs is often the birthplace of their manager, especially for family-owned companies, considering that entrepreneurial spirit is often more common in areas dominated by small firms (Baudelle and Ollivro, 2000; Ejermo and Hansen, 2015). Therefore the rationale of their location choice does not necessarily match the requisites of profit maximization. But despite this kind of path dependency due to the faithfulness of these entrepreneurs to their native region, we need to understand how such firms can be innovative and therefore successful notwithstanding their non- optimal location in small and medium-sized cities of peripheral areas.At this point we need another theoretical framework, namely the institutional approach (Granovetter, 1973). This perspective is required to explain why and how entrepreneurs can be successful in spite of their non-metropolitan location in modest cities situated far not only from the core of Europe but also from the national and sub-national metropolises. More specifically our study mobilizes the sociology of networks (Krauss, 2011 & 2013) to explain the paradoxical success-stories of peripheral firms. Such an approach is congruent with the evolutionary perspective that is paying more and more attention (but not so much) to networks and institutions as parts of complex adaptative systems to explain regional resilience (Boschma, 2015).Therefore our theoretical assumption is the following: professional networks and personal networking are crucial for these companies and their managers to give them access to various kinds of resources that are necessary to run their business. This is consistent with the theory striking the need for embeddeness among the entrepreneurs to make them possible to run their business with success (Granovetter, 1973; Krauss, Sternberg, 2014). The final goal of the study is to understand how the access to various informational and human resources is made possible by the construction of networks used by innovating companies to develop their business. Consequently the objective is to identify the configuration of the networks –strong or weak, local or distant, central or peripheral– of the interviewed entrepreneurs to understand their possible role in their success stories.The field-study area is a corridor along the Southern Brittany Coast (France). In this area of about 939 000 inhab., there is no large metropolis. The three main cities (Lorient, Quimper, Vannes) are simply medium-sized cities: their built-up areas have respectively 115 000, 80 000 and 75 000 inhab. only and their travel-to-work areas 180 000, 120 000 and 135 000 people. Outside them, only small cities can be found.Moreover these cities are far from the rest of France and Europe and even from the larger metro area in Western France, Nantes (622 000 inh.), which is more than 3 hours away by car from Western Brittany and even 4 hour and a half by train. Even from the closest city (Vannes) the journey to Nantes requires more than 2 hours. Paris, the national capital-city, remains from 3h30 to 6h30 away by train. Some local domestic airports compensate this remoteness but not totally and with a high flight cost due to monopolies. As a result this area is a typical periphery, far from the metropolitan engines of the globalizing economy. The French division of labour between Paris metro area and the province even worsens the gap between the Breton Western periphery and the French World City.To understand how the entrepreneurs overcome such a physical distance, a sample of about 20 successful business leaders were interviewed (Marinos, 2015). The selected companies (mainly SMEs) are deliberately very competitive ones: they are intensive in technology, exhibit a high level of innovation (as demonstrated by the number of patents) allowing high added values and significant export rates, they attract international investors and look for clients and suppliers all around the world.The objective of the study was to evaluate how important the networks are to compensate the possible theoretical locational constraints due to peripheral sites (Krauss, 2009). The literature often points out the possible negative locking effects of excessive local inward-looking ties, suggesting a trade-off between immediate adaptation and later adaptability (Grabher, 1993; Boschma and Frenken, 2010; Braun and Schulz, 2012; Boschma, 2015). However our study shows clearly that such a distinction between strong local, proximate connections and weak, outward-looking networks does not fit with our empirical results, which leads to reconsider the present literature about the connectedness of entrepreneurs working in peripheries seen as so-called autarkic and poorly connected places.The survey reveals that the entrepreneurs do not ignore the drawbacks of peripheral locations. However the professionals met for the survey express great satisfaction about their business in Southern Brittany. The participation of three quarters of them in local networks (business associations, chambers of commerce, development agencies.) is presented as necessary for their business development process, and even crucial during the start-up stage. It allows them to open up to their immediate environment and to enhance their external visibility. Belonging to a network also improves their collective capacity for concerted actions. Doing so, entrepreneurs become more audible by politicians and influence local public policies.Small and medium-sized cities are perceived as a favorable ground to confident relationships even if that kind of links rarely exceeds the TTWA boundaries. Local political staff and administration are more easily approachable and quicker to react than in bigger cities.More surprisingly, these employers are involved in the local economic life even if their clients are not local. The more entrepreneurs operate on the globalized market, the more they express that need for local commitment: "my company needs roots to have wings".The local territory acts as a medium between stakeholders: "partnerships, collaborations, it is first and foremost a human-based process". A collaborative way of working is considered essential. The importance of trusting is at the heart of networks' efficiency because it facilitates the exchanges and improves the flow of information. The information quality control is operated by network members. Immaterial resources access constitutes a favorable ground for entrepreneur's social capital. Thisaccess opportunity participates to the process of innovation. Therefore mutual trust can be regarded as an implicit knowledge transmission accelerator that fosters innovation.Higher education (including alumni associations) is complementarily highly structuring for entrepreneurs' networks, offering good opportunities to develop sustainable partnerships. When they exist, links with experts and academic researchers are sustainable and lead to success. These relations take time and depend on the leader's background. They vary a lot according to how long the company has been based on the territory. However most of the local research fields are different from those which are of interest to local companies to such an extent that some companies prefer working with metropolitan research organizations, particularly for those which operate in niche activities.In terms of cooperation, employers display a very pragmatic behavior: they get to the closest companies, sometimes even at the expense of the quality of the resource. Geographic proximity fosters working together, a round trip in the afternoon being considered as the symbolic border. This is particularly true for interpersonal networks, restricted to everyday life territory. But for commercial partnerships there is no geographic border.Eventually these networks are helpful to overcome some challenges such as hiring talented employees or getting a convenient job for their partners in small TTWAs. But they do not solve all the usual problems the peripheral entrepreneurs face to such as good air connectivity within an hour drive ("If the airport closes, I leave"). Moreover the companies operating in specialized activities or in a niche productions do suffer from the lack of dense sectorial networks, generating a feeling of isolation. This can impact the open innovation process and even inhibit the organization of events supposed to provide new interactions.Finally the network approach helps to understand why companies located in peripheral areas do not move towards larger central metro areas despite of their locational disadvantage underlined by the neoclassic locational theory.

Dissertação de mestrado em Ecologia, apresentada ao Departamento de Ciências da Vida da Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade de Coimbra. ; Os ecossistemas marinhos têm vindo a enfrentar um aumento no número de ameaças como a exploração insustentável dos recursos marinhos (por exemplo a pesca excessiva), degradação e perda de habitats marinhos, efeitos da poluição, da introdução de espécies invasoras e efeitos das alterações climáticas. Uma possível forma de diminuir tais impactos é através da implementação de Áreas Marinhas Protegidas (Marine Protected Areas, MPAs), que desempenham um papel importante na conservação da biodiversidade e contribuem para a recuperação do ambiente marinho. No entanto a percentagem do oceano que está actualmente sob protecção (2.8%) é bastante baixo considerando um dos objectivos estabelecidos pela CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity): proteger pelo menos 10% da costa e áreas marinhas até 2020. As águas circundantes ao arquipélago das Berlengas têm um grande valor de conservação devido às suas características que levam à agregação de grande produtividade marinha, permitindo a subsistência de várias aves marinhas, algumas delas em perigo de extinção (como a Pardela-Balear Puffinus mauritanicus). Embora esta área esteja actualmente sob protecção, os limites da Área Marinha Protegida (MPA) não se sobrepõem totalmente à área definida como importante para as aves marinhas (marine Important Bird Area, mIBA) que foi estabelecida com base apenas na biodiversidade local. Os limites actuais da MPA das Berlengas foram definidos com a contribuição de informação de rastreamento das áreas de procura de alimento mais importantes para uma ave marinha predadora de topo com uma ampla distribuição, a Cagarra Calonectris diomedea, sobretudo durante a fase de alimentação às crias entre 2005 e 2008. Contudo, os limites da mIBA e MPA das Berlengas não foram avaliados usando informação de rastreamento de todo o ciclo reprodutivo da espécie durante vários anos (para englobar a estocasticidade ambiental inter-anual). O objectivo desta tese foi usar dados de rastreamento de uma ave marinha predadora de topo para definir importantes áreas de procura de alimento e avaliar a sua adequabilidade no estabelecimento de uma rede de Áreas Marinhas Protegidas ao longo de Portugal Continental. Mais especificamente este trabalho pretende responder às seguintes questões: (1) Que factores (ambientais ou antropogénicos) influenciam a distribuição de procura de alimento da Cagarra ao longo do período de reprodução e através dos anos? (2) Estarão os actuais limites (da mIBA e MPA das Berlengas) a proteger todas as importantes áreas de procura de alimento desta espécie? Para responder a estas questões fixaram-se dispositivos de GPS (Global Positioning System) nas penas do dorso dasaves para identificar as áreas de procura de alimento usadas pela espécie. Modelos de distribuição de espécies (MaxEnt) foram realizados usando informação de rastreamento e dados ambientais de forma a entender que variáveis ambientais desencadeiam a distribuição de procura de alimento da espécie. Para avaliar a adequabilidade dos limites das actuais mIBA e MPA das Berlengas usou-se o software Zonation, que pode ser usado para o delineamento e avaliação de Áreas Marinhas Protegidas, produzindo diferentes cenários dependendo das especificações das prioridades de conservação. Os resultados demonstraram diferentes padrões de procura de alimento em 2010 e 2012 comparativamente com os anos de 2011 e 2013; e também diferenças nas características das viagens, com viagens mais perto da colónia nos períodos de alimentação das crias. Estas diferenças anuais podem estar relacionadas com a variação climática, como reflectido pelo índice NAO (North Atlantic Oscillation), que mostra valores de índice positivos mais altos em 2012 (considerando o período de tempo de estudo) e valores de índice negativos mais baixos em 2010. Durante o período de alimentação das crias, as aves mostraram um comportamento de procura de alimento designado por central-place foraging, como consequência da constante necessidade de voltar para a colónia para alimentar as crias. Portanto, áreas na periferia da colonia são mais propensas a ser usadas durante o período de alimentação das crias do que durante os períodos de incubação e antes da postura do ovo. De forma geral, as aves exploraram sobretudo áreas produtivas sobre a plataforma continental nos arredores da colónia e áreas ao longo da costa Portuguesa, assim como áreas produtivas mais distantes perto de bancos e montes submarinos na região do Norte Atlântico. Os resultados permitem-nos concluir que a actual MPA está apenas a proteger 25.9% das áreas de procura de alimento mais relevantes para a Cagarra. Enquanto essas áreas de procura de alimento sobrepõem-se 45.5% com a mIBA das Berlengas. Um valor de sobreposição mais elevado (59.6%) é obtido ao comparar com as novas Áreas Marinhas Protegidas propostas que estão actualmente sob a avaliação do governo Português. A implementação das novas Áreas Marinhas Protegidas iria permitir a protecção das áreas de procura de alimento mais relevantes para a Cagarra. Isto porque a sua implementação iria gerar uma conectividade entre a maioria das áreas a norte e sul da actual MPA das Berlengas, providenciando um corredor ecológico para a Cagarra e outros organismos marinhos. ; Marine ecosystems have been facing an increasing number of threats such as unsustainable exploitation of marine resources (e.g. overfishing), degradation and loss of marine habitats, pollution, invasive species and climate change. A possible way to diminish the impact of such threats is through the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which play an important role in biodiversity conservation and contribute to restock the entire marine environment. However the percentage of ocean that are already protected (2.8%) is alarmingly low considering one of the targets set by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): to protect at least 10% of coastal and marine areas until 2020. Berlengas archipelago surrounding waters have great conservation value due to features that congregate a high marine productivity, allowing the survival and maintenance of several seabird species, some of them endangered (e.g. the Balearic shearwater Puffinus mauritanicus). Although this important area is currently under protection, the boundaries of the Berlengas Marine Protected Area (MPA) do not overlap fully with the Berlengas marine Important Bird Area (mIBA), which was designated based on the areas with great importance to the small range local biodiversity. The present boundaries of the Berlengas MPA were defined with the contribution of tracking information of the most important foraging areas of a wide range seabird top predator, the Cory's shearwater Calonectris diomedea, mostly during the chick-rearing phases of 2005 – 2008. Yet, the boundaries of the Berlengas mIBA and MPA have not been assessed, using tracking information for the whole breeding cycle of this species during several years (in order to take into account inter-annual environmental stochasticity). The aim of this thesis was to use tracking data of a seabird top predator to define boundaries of key foraging grounds and assess their adequacy on the establishment of a network of Marine Protected Areas within Mainland Portugal. More specifically, this work intended to answer the following questions: (1) Which factors (environmental or Human-related) drive the foraging distribution of Cory's shearwater along the breeding period and across years? (2) Are the current boundaries (from both Berlengas mIBA and Berlengas MPA areas) protecting all key foraging grounds of this species? To address these questions Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices were attached to the back feathers of Cory's shearwater in order to identify the foraging areas used by this species. Species Distribution Models (SDM; MaxEnt) were performed using foraging tracking data combined with environmentaldata in order to understand which environmental variables trigger the foraging distribution of the species. To better access the adequacy of the current Berlengas mIBA and MPA boundaries it was used the conservation planning software Zonation. This software can be used to design and evaluate Marine Protected Areas by producing different scenarios depending on specification of conservational priorities. Results showed very distinct foraging patterns in 2010 and 2012 comparing with 2011 and 2013 and also distinct foraging trip characteristics, with trips closer to the colony during chick-rearing periods. These annual differences may be related with climatic variation, as reflected by the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) index, with the highest positive index value in 2012 (considering our study period) and the lowest negative index value in 2010. During the chick-rearing period, birds showed a typical central-place foraging behaviour, as a consequence of the constant need to return to the colony to feed their chick. Therefore, areas in the vicinity of the colony are more likely to be used during chick-rearing than during pre-laying and incubation periods. Overall, birds mostly exploited productive areas above the continental shelf around the colony and along the Portuguese coast, as well as more distant productivity areas near known banks and seamounts of the north Atlantic region. Results also allowed to conclude that the actual Berlengas MPA is only protecting 25.9% of the most relevant foraging region for Cory's shearwater. While the same foraging region overlapped 45.5% with the Berlengas mIBA. A considerably higher overlapped area (59.6%) was obtained when comparing with new proposed Marine Protected Areas, under evaluation by the Portuguese government. The implementation of these new areas would protect the most relevant foraging areas of Cory's shearwater. This is because the implementation of these new areas would generate connectivity between the main areas north and south of the actual Berlengas MPA, thus providing an ecological corridor for Cory's shearwaters and other marine taxa.

Hamas's attack into Israel and massacre of Israelis, followed by Israel's war of obliteration on Gaza backed by the United States, is a political earthquake in the Middle East. Its tremors are shaking up the politics of the Horn of Africa, bringing down an already tottering peace and security architecture. It's too early to discern the shape of the rubble, but we can already see the direction in which some of the pillars will fall.The most obvious impact is that the Israel-Palestine war has legitimized and invigorated protest across the wider region. Hamas showed that Israel was not invincible, and Palestine would no longer be invisible. Many in the Arab street — and Muslims more widely — are ready to overlook Hamas's atrocious record as a public authority and its embrace of terror, because it dared stand up to Israel, America, and Europe.Hamas's boldness has given a shot in the arm to Islamists, such as Somalia's al-Shabaab. As the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia draws down, al-Shabaab remains a threat— and will likely be emboldened to intensify its operations both in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.Kenyan President William Ruto gave strong backing to Israel while also calling for a ceasefire. For the U.S. and Europe, Kenya is now the anchor state for security in the Horn — but it desperately needs financial aid if it is to shoulder that burden.The war is consuming Egyptian attention and terrifies President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is treading a fine line between sponsoring pro-Palestinian protests and suppressing them.Red Sea SecurityThe Red Sea is strategic for Israel. One quarter of Israel's maritime trade is handled in its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is Israel's back door, vital in case the Mediterranean coast is under threat. Israel has long seen the littoral countries of the Red Sea — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia — as pieces in the jigsaw of its extended security frontier.Historically, Egypt has shared the same concern. Last year, revenues from the Suez Canal were $9.4 billion— its third largest foreign currency earner after remittances from Egyptians working in the Gulf States and tourism. Neither Israel nor Egypt can afford a disruption to maritime security from Suez and Eilat to the Gulf of Aden.The Red Sea is also the buckle on China's Belt and Road Initiative, with China's first overseas military base — strictly speaking a "facility" — in the port of Djibouti near the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. More than 10 percent of world maritime trade is carried on 25,000 ships through these straits every year.Having long neglected its Red Sea coastline, Saudi Arabia has reawakened to its significance in the last decade. In the 1980s, amid fears that Iran might block tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia built an east-west pipeline from the Aqaig oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr. Its strategic significance is back in focus.In parallel, the United Arab Emirates is well on track to securing a monopoly over the ports of the Gulf of Aden, which forms the eastern approaches to the Red Sea. It has de facto annexed the Yemeni island of Socotra for a naval base. The UAE is looking for a foothold in the Red Sea proper, and a string of satellite states on the African shore.All these factors intensify the scramble for securing naval bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Djibouti is already host to the U.S.'s Camp Lemonnier along with French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese facilities. Turkey and Russia are actively seeking bases too, focusing on Port Sudan and Eritrea's long coastline.Empowered Gulf StatesWell before the recent crisis, the Horn of Africa was becoming dominated by Middle Eastern powers. This process is now intensified. Decades of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for alignment of Sudan and Eritrea has swung different ways. Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-B­­urhan, formerly political partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and signatory to the Abraham Accord, cut an ill-timed deal with Iran in early October, to obtain weapons, which has embarrassed his outreach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Turkey and Qatar's regional ambitions have clashed with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially over the Muslim Brothers — supported by the former, opposed by the latter. The latest emerging rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional anchor. While running for president, Joe Biden called Saudi Arabia a "pariah." But it is now indispensable to the U.S.Among the Arab states. the UAE has been the most restrained in condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. It has also said that it doesn't mix trade and politics— meaning that it will continue to implement the economic cooperation agreements it signed with Israel following on from the Abraham Accords. The UAE is also positioned at the center of the U.S.-sponsored India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the September G20 summit in India as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.The UAE also has a free hand in the Horn of Africa, and in the last five years it has moved more rapidly and decisively than Saudi Arabia.Sudan's Fate between Riyadh and Abu DhabiAfter the eruption of war in Sudan in April, the joint Saudi-American mediation was in large part a gift from Washington to try to mend fences with the Kingdom. Talks in Jeddah resumed in late October, with the modest agenda of a ceasefire and humanitarian access, and a pro forma "civilian track" delegated to the African Union, which has shown neither commitment nor competence.Meanwhile, the Emiratis are backing General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," who is currently driving the Sudan Armed Forces out of their remaining redoubts in Khartoum. This followed more than six months of fighting in which Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces gained a reputation for military prowess and utter disregard for the dignity and rights of civilians. Despite widespread revulsion against the RSF, especially among middle class Sudanese, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, stuck with his man.In charge of the ruins of Sudan's capital city, Hemedti will soon be in a position to declare a government, perhaps inviting civilians for the sake of a veneer of legitimacy. What's holding him back is the ceasefire talks in Jeddah. His rival, Gen. al-Burhan is meanwhile floating a plan to form a government based in Port Sudan — raising the prospect of two rival governments, as in Libya. The real negotiations there are between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If the two capitals agree on a formula, the U.S. and the African Union will applaud, and the Sudanese will be presented with a fait accompli.Ethiopia Goes RogueIn Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's rule is underwritten by Emirati treasure. MBZ has reportedly paid for Abiy's vast new palace, a vanity project whose $ 10 billion price tag is paid for entirely off-budget. Abiy told lawmakers that this bill was none of their business as it was funded by private donations, directly to him. Other megaprojects in and around the capital Addis Ababa, such as glitzy museums and theme parks, have similarly opaque finances.Ethiopia's wars have depended on largesse from the UAE. Ethiopian federal forces prevailed against Tigray, forcing the latter into an abject surrender a year ago, on account of an arsenal — especially drones — supplied by the UAE. Abiy is currently rattling his saber against his erstwhile ally, Eritrea, demanding that landlocked Ethiopia be given a port, or it will take one by force. The likely target is Assab in Eritrea, though other neighbors such as Djibouti and Somalia have been rattled too.Eritrea unexpectedly finds itself as a status quo power and is relishing this role, tersely expressing its refusal to join in the confusing discourse from Addis Ababa. It suddenly has allies in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and even Kenya — all of them threatened by Abiy's bellicosity.If Abiy does invade Eritrea, he will violate the basic international norm — the inviolability of state boundaries — and risk plunging his already failing economy deeper into disaster. This will pose a sharp dilemma for the UAE. It is ready to override multilateral principles, but whether it would bail out its errant client in Addis Ababa, and jeopardize its winning position in Sudan, is a different matter. It would also present Saudi Arabia with the dilemma of whether to back Eritrea's notorious dictator, President Isaias Afewerki.America and the Pax AfricanaPeace and security in the Horn of Africa isn't a priority for the Biden administration. Despite a rhetorical commitment to a rule-based international order, Washington has neither protected Africa's painstakingly-constructed peace and security architecture nor brought the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises to the U.N. Security Council.While the American security umbrella was in place over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Horn of Africa had the chance to develop their own peace and security system, based on a layered multilateral structure involving the regional organization, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and United Nations, with peacekeepers and peace missions funded by the Europeans. This emergent Pax Africana was already imperiled as the U.S. drew down and the Middle Eastern middle powers became more assertive. President Donald Trump authorized his favored intermediaries — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to pursue their interests across the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration has not pulled that back.It's possible that the administration cares about peace, security and human rights in Africa. But for as long as the U.S.'s Horn of Africa policy is handled by the Africa Bureau at the State Department — whose diplomats scarcely get the time of day from their counterparts in the Gulf Kingdoms — Washington's views will remain all-but-irrelevant. The Horn of Africa doesn't make the cut when staffers prepare talking points for President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or national security adviser Jake Sullivan to speak to their Arab counterparts. It's a prioritization that leaves the region in a deepening crisis, at the mercy of ruthless transactional politics.America's well-established practice of treating Israel as an exception to international law is rubbing off on Israel's allies and apologists across the Middle East, who are actively dismantling the already-tottering pillars of Africa's norm-based peace and security system. Those African countries most in need of principled multilateralism are paying the price.

The present study, in a politically sensitive manner, narrates and interprets the related facts with the armed conflict between 1998 and 2001, on the sidewalk El Salto, of the municipality of El santuario , located in the subregion of the Near East Antioquia. This territory went to be object of dispute between armed actors, because of their strategic role as a doorway to the corridor transit connecting the region to the North-East and the Magdalena Medio. In the area, the guerrilla and paramilitaries, in addition to making an armed presence, regulated trafficking in narcotic drugs, generated pressure on the reservoirs and extended their presence and instigation on the Medellín-Bogotá motorway, the circulation channel of all economic activity between this important region and the center of the country. Likewise, this subregion has been a high potential of agricultural, tourist and industrial production activities, being the epicenter for air traffic, hosted at José Maria Cordova Airport. The Oriente is one of the areas of the country where the conflict has been heightened and where the systematic violence of the armed actors was concentrated, Massacres, threats, forced displacement, targeted killings and illegal retains along with the incursions to urban helmets, the Operation of each other By. Long periods of time, the population of the area suffered the scourge of war, not counting with the presence of the State, beyond military interventions that increased zozobrae of peasants and locals in a countless municipalities, corrections and sidewalks. While the interest in a political study is to address reality social and political analysis, recognition of the situation in question is imperative for comprehensive political analysis by civil society, called by analysts from the time that this study "population" is dealing with civil", to designate communities of citizens who were not involved in the conflict, but they were his victims. In this spectrum of the study, emphasis was placed and an initial question was chosen: is it? factable to understand, through historical memory, the status of victims of the armed conflicts of citizens who developed their daily lives on a sidewalk? There are many research of high academic value that study fenomenon of the Oriente region, from descriptive, explanatory and interpretative; but there is still a great deal of need for such a discussion as the one proposed in this research: resort to victims of a small village and to know a voice alive; and appealing to historical memory, the experiences experienced by those citizens are not represented in the hegemonic versions of the State. Citizens who were doubly victimized: by the State itself, through the National Army, and by guerrilla and/or the paramilitars. The study also seeks to recognize what effects it has brought to the attention of the Commission these citizens' lives were initially displaced and then uprooted, carrying in his living the imprint of tragedy, after two decades for me, as the author of this study, it was a re-created challenge, in passages. Narratives, my status as a resident of El Salto, when I was a minor i was involved in the war games where I lived and my family environment, and then, When i joined displaced victims. Today, as a student of the master's in Political Studies, I assume the imperative task, as a social communicator and journalist, to give society a testimony from my memories and life history as a victim, seeking to provide it cristalisation of a society that creates and works for peace and reconciliation in times of post-agreements the families of El Salto lived the conflict, seeing how overnight they were violated by force of each of the boots, rifles and authoritarian speeches of the armed actors, who rotated them as "facilitators" of the enemy, without giving space to the narration of the ununderstandable: a forced invasion of their lives and their fields, to their estates and their "animals". After suffering from the pain of deaths from relatives and friends of a lifetime, they had to run away, abandon their properties and, in this way, their peasant life, due to violent and systematic actions that broke the different armies. The terror caused by the locals and the forced movement of families led to uproot that, with time passing, it was a part of their life . No chance to chose, they had to move to another kind of life, the inhospite, modern, and other that they had to fit. In their capacity as victims of the conflict, they only had the memory resource as a mechanism of resistance, non-acceptance, living in melancholy and longing for the place where they were violently expelled. finally, over the years, they aspire to the non-repetition of war and violence from the Colombian armed conflict. ; El presente estudio, de orden politológico, narra e interpreta los hechos relacionados con el conflicto armado ocurridos entre 1998 y 2001, en la vereda El Salto, del municipio de El Santuario, ubicado en la subregión del Oriente cercano antioqueño. Este territorio fue objeto de disputa entre los actores armados, por su papel estratégico como puerta al corredor de tránsito que conectaba la región con el Nordeste y el Magdalena Medio. En la zona, la guerrilla y los paramilitares, además de hacer presencia armada, regulaban el tráfico de estupefacientes, generaban presión sobre los embalses y extendían su presencia e instigación sobre la autopista Medellín-Bogotá, canal de circulación de toda la actividad económica entre esta importante región y el centro de país. Igualmente, esta subregión ha contado con un alto potencial de actividades agropecuarias, turísticas y de producción industrial, siendo epicentro de tráfico aéreo, por alojar el Aeropuerto José María Córdova. El Oriente antioqueño es una de las zonas del país donde el conflicto ha sido álgido y donde se concentró la violencia sistemática de parte de los actores armados, siendo las masacres, las amenazas, los desplazamientos forzados, los asesinatos selectivos y los retenes ilegales, junto con las incursiones a cascos urbanos, el modus operandi de unos y otros. Por largos periodos de tiempo, la población de la zona sufrió el flagelo de la guerra, sin contar con la presencia del Estado, más allá de intervenciones militares que aumentaban la zozobra de campesinos y lugareños de un sinnúmero de municipios, corregimientos y veredas. Si bien el interés en el marco de un estudio de orden político es abordar la realidad social y política, para el análisis político integral es imperativo reconocer la situación vivida por la sociedad civil, llamada por los analistas de la época que aborda este estudio "población civil", para designar a las comunidades de ciudadanos que no hacían parte del conflicto, pero eran sus víctimas. En este espectro del estudio, se hizo énfasis y se optó por una pregunta inicial: ¿es factible comprender, a través de la memoria histórica, la condición de víctimas del conflicto armado de ciudadanos que desarrollaron su vida cotidiana en una vereda? Pues existen un sinnúmero de investigaciones de gran valor académico que estudian el fenómeno de la región del Oriente antioqueño, desde lo descriptivo, explicativo e interpretativo; pero aún hacen mucha falta abordajes como el que se propone en esta investigación: recurrir a las víctimas de un pequeño poblado y conocer de viva voz, y apelando a la memoria histórica, las experiencias vividas por aquellos ciudadanos no representados en las versiones hegemónicas del Estado. Ciudadanos que fueron doblemente victimizados: por el propio Estado, a través del Ejército Nacional, y por la guerrilla y/o los paramilitares. Este estudio tiene, además, la pretensión de reconocer qué efectos trajo para la vida de estos ciudadanos haber sido inicialmente desplazados y luego desarraigados, llevando en su vivir la impronta de la tragedia, luego de dos décadas. Para mí, como autora de este estudio, se constituyó en un reto re-crear, en pasajes narrativos, mi condición de habitante de la vereda El Salto, cuando era una menor de edad envuelta en los juegos de guerra en que vivía mi entorno familiar; y cuando, luego, me sumé a las víctimas desplazadas. Hoy, como estudiante de la maestría en Estudios Políticos, asumo la imperiosa tarea, como comunicadora social y periodista, de entregar a la sociedad un testimonio desde la memoria y la historia de vida como víctima, procurando aportar a la cristalización de una sociedad que crea y trabaje por la paz y la reconciliación en tiempos de los pos-acuerdos. Las familias de El Salto vivieron el conflicto, viendo cómo de la noche a la mañana fueron violentadas por la fuerza de las botas, los fusiles y el discurso autoritario de cada uno de los actores armados, quienes los rotularon como "facilitadores" del enemigo, sin dar espacio a la narración de lo no comprensible: una invasión forzada a sus vidas y a sus campos, a sus fincas y a sus "animalitos". Luego de padecer los vejámenes y el dolor de las muertes de familiares y amigos de la vereda de toda una vida, tuvieron que huir, abandonar sus propiedades y, con ello, su vida campesina, debido a las acciones violentas y sistemáticas que infringieron los diferentes ejércitos. El terror provocado en los lugareños y el obligado desplazamiento de las familias llevó al desarraigo que, con el transcurrir del tiempo, se configuró en sus vidas. Sin oportunidad de elegir, tuvieron que transitar a otro tipo de vida, a la inhóspita urbe, moderna y ajena, a la que tuvieron que adecuarse. En su condición de víctimas del conflicto, solo les quedó el recurso de la memoria como mecanismo de resistencia, de no aceptación, viviendo en melancolía y añoranza del lugar de donde fueron expulsados de manera violenta. Finalmente, con el transcurrir de los años, aspiran a la no repetición de los hechos de guerra y violencia del conflicto armado colombiano. ; Maestría

The Government of Benin has requested an update of the 2005 Diagnostic Trade Integration Study and has asked the World Bank to take the leading role in this exercise. The update's objectives are to (a) take stock of progress in the mainstreaming of trade in the government's national development strategy and of implementation of the Action Matrix recommendations; (b) complement and deepen the analysis in selected areas; and (c) revise and update the Action Matrix to take account of the evolving context since 2006. The aim of the analysis is to assist the Government of Benin in defining an overall competitiveness strategy for inclusive, job-creating export-led growth in accordance with the key priorities identified in the 2013 Plan Stratégique de Développement du Commerce (PSDC), and to further mainstream trade into the general policy orientation defined by Benin's key policy documents, including the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) update. The DTIS Update (DTISU) offers a diagnosis, analytical framework and action plan, giving trade expansion a key role in the reduction of poverty and vulnerability. As mandated by the Paris Principles, the DTISU's approach is strongly aligned with the MICPME's PSDC (Trade Development Strategy Plan, henceforth TDSP) and draws also from the diagnosis in the Government of Benin's recent poverty assessment (INSAE 2014) as well as the 2011 update of the GPRSP. It emphasizes the linkages between poverty, jobs, and trade with two key objectives: (i) reducing poverty through trade-led growth, and (ii) reducing vulnerability.

Global decarbonisation requires massive and bold measures, sustained by consistent political support. The European Union has been a first mover with the launch of its European Green Deal in 2019 pursuing climate neutrality by 2050. To reach this ambition, cooperation among countries both within the EU and beyond its borders is crucial. This means planning to deliver structural change beyond the political cycle and building long-lasting partnerships to achieve climate neutrality and sustainable, inclusive economic growth. A lack of vision and long-term strategy, also triggered by electoral shifts, could fragment the EU, fragilise energy security, lead to economic losses as well as derail decarbonisation.
In this spirit, the recent developments in the North Sea – aiming at harnessing the abundant renewable energy potential of the region (especially offshore wind) and, consequently, enhancing energy security, accelerating the bloc's decarbonisation and promoting industrial competitiveness – go in the right direction. The initiative is thus very ambitious, although it does not come without obstacles and challenges[1] that these countries need to carefully assess and address. The inclusion of non-EU countries, such as the UK and Norway, together with the establishment of the EU-Norway Green Alliance,[2] is also an added value showing how the energy trilemma can be managed efficiently. The Green Deal will indeed be successful only if it manages to engage positively with the neighbourhoods and to mainstream its green pillars outside the borders and across its foreign policy.
Now, it is time to expand such an approach to the Mediterranean Sea. European Mediterranean countries should come together and work on their competitive and comparative advantages, contributing to the climate pathway of the entire region. The Med is well known for its renewable energy potential, in both solar and wind, well complementing the developments of the Northern European countries. The region is also strategic for EU foreign policy. The EU should indeed propose win-win partnerships for the region to promote its climate diplomacy and contrast the growing geopolitical presence and influence of external players, notably Russia and China.
Therefore, the EU Med countries can foster and launch partnerships for deploying clean energies (notably solar and offshore wind, alongside grids and flexibility tools), fostering energy efficiency, investing in cutting-edge technologies (like carbon capture, utilisation and storage [CCUS], and hydrogen) and strengthening infrastructure connectivity. These initiatives, carried out within the EU vision, should aim at strengthening energy security and accelerating the energy transition in the most cost-efficient way for the entire Union, as well as the entire region, rather than further fragmenting its energy landscape. By doing so, EuroMed countries will also address the rising, common challenge for the entire region: climate change. The Mediterranean is a climate hotspot currently warming 20 per cent faster than the rest of the globe, even though it is responsible only for 6 per cent of the global carbon emissions. The increase in intensity and frequency of climate change in the area is more visible than ever. An integrated regional and European vision toward the Med however still appears absent or embryonic.[3]We call EU Med countries to pursue and focus on the following actions and measures:
1) Countries should harness their vast renewable potential both in terms of solar and wind in the most cost-efficient way. Despite the growth of solar photovoltaic (PV), more can and must be done to increase solar generation in the region. EU Mediterranean countries could also benefit extensively from offshore wind, which is largely untapped with only a 30 MW project launched in 2022.[4] Therefore, countries need to accelerate permitting procedures to benefit from their potential, but they need also to team up in order to create economies of scale and joint projects. EU Med countries could also promote scientific cooperation on new renewables technologies, such as floating offshore wind.
2) The expansion of energy infrastructure both within the EU and abroad cannot be neglected by a Euro-Med Green Deal. As countries seek to increase the share of renewables in their mixes, developing the necessary electric grids is essential, otherwise the transition will be delayed.[5] The expansion of cross-border interconnections[6] provides economic benefits and security of supplies as well as the fast deployment of renewables into the system. Investing in cross-border interconnections will enhance energy security and allow better integration between wind from the North and solar energy from the South. EU Med countries should also invest in decarbonised gas infrastructure: Spain, Portugal and France for example have agreed to launch the "H2Med" energy interconnection project.[7] EU Med countries should also allocate funds for additional interconnections between the two shores of the Mediterranean, such as the one with Tunisia and Egypt. To import clean energy from the Southern shore, EU Med countries will need to ensure that these countries advance in their domestic decarbonisation. As of today, there is only a bidirectional interconnector between Spain and Morocco.
3) Another key issue is the development of CCS technologies given its potential coming from the depleted gas fields. Currently, the Med is lagging behind compared to the North Sea as there are only two projects under consideration in Italy and Greece.[8] EU Med countries should work jointly to build common infrastructures to decarbonise energy-intensive industries in the area and for the development of a hydrogen economy, which is a sector that the EU is eager to develop. This approach would also allow engaging with energy-producing countries in the Southern Mediterranean shore.
4) A true Euro-Med Green Deal cannot look only inward, but it must also be outward-looking. It is crucial to engage with non-EU Med countries to build solid, just energy and climate partnerships for the entire region's energy security and decarbonisation. Partnerships should consider different objectives and priorities, promoting mutual interests and cooperation, while advancing a solid decarbonisation pathway. A concrete area of cooperation can look at ways to fight methane emissions in the area – aiming at reducing environmental and economic damages for producing countries while increasing gas supplies for European gas markets as envisaged in the new EU External Energy Strategy.[9] EuroMed countries could also cooperate on energy efficiency (the low-hanging fruit of energy transition) through identifying and sharing innovative practices, technologies and data as well as investments aimed at capacity-building.
5) EuroMed countries could also invest in developing new technologies, such as hydrogen and clean electricity, to decarbonise existing industries and create jobs for the young, growing population. Imports from North African countries could potentially contribute to the EU target on hydrogen. Cooperation among EU countries as well as with Southern Med countries is necessary in this regard as shown by the joint development of the SoutH2 Corridor from Algeria to European markets.[10] On this matter, countries need to enhance existing EU frameworks with South Med countries, for example, the Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership. Alongside hydrogen imports, EU countries should focus initially on promoting the use of green hydrogen and electricity domestically aimed at decarbonising Southern Mediterranean energy-intensive industries. Morocco and Egypt have also taken measures to develop hydrogen capacity, and many European countries and companies have increasingly engaged with them over the past years. Developing hydrogen for domestic use would also allow South Med countries to reduce their liability to the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as well as foster the integration of value chains across the Mediterranean.
6) To implement all these measures, it is crucial for EU Med countries to enhance governance and financial cooperation.
(a) Governance: EuroMediterranean countries already share an intergovernmental institution (the Union for the Mediterranean) and several cooperative platforms related to energy (for example, MedReg and Med-TSO) as well as climate (MedECC, ClimateSouth, Cities for Climate, among others). Now, what is needed is a more integrated and holistic vision to harness the region's energy potential, to build long-lasting partnerships as well as a sustainable and secure future. To do so, EU Med countries could establish regular summits at the highest political level. Lastly, EU Med countries should coordinate their measures in a European perspective, by engaging with the European Commission to better coordinate the measures, ensure the achievement of EU climate targets and prevent fragmentation. In parallel, EU Med countries should prioritise inclusive and win-win solutions aimed at advancing decarbonisation and economic growth for the entire region.
(b) Finance: EU Med countries should pool their finance resources, also from multilateral institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), to put forward a financial plan to promote projects and partnerships for a sustainable transition in the entire region. Coordination on investments in the area is much needed to avoid fragmentation and duplication of efforts.This Commentary is based on an initiative launched by IAI. The main goal is to propose a common and coordinated approach within the EuroMediterranean area in terms of energy transition. To this end, IAI gathered the voices of some experts on energy with an interest in the area. All authors have contributed to the text in light of their specific expertise and knowledge.[1] Simone Tagliapietra, "North Sea Summit: Blowing in the Wind?", in Bruegel First Glance, 25 April 2023, https://www.bruegel.org/node/8988.[2] European Commission, European Green Deal: New EU-Norway Green Alliance to Deepen Cooperation on Climate, Environment, Energy and Clean Industry, 24 April 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2391.[3] See for example the latest Med 9 meeting in La Valletta in May 2023. Med 9 Energy Ministerial Summit Joint Statement, Valletta, 18 May 2023, https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/DOI/Press%20Releases/PublishingImages/Pages/2023/05/18/pr230740en/PR230740e.pdf.[4] Adrijana Bljan, "First Mediterranean Offshore Wind Farm Up and Running in Italy", in Offshore Wind, 22 April 2022, https://www.offshorewind.biz/?p=100224880.[5] Attracta Mooney, "Gridlock: How a Lack of Power Lines Will Delay the Age of Renewables", in Financial Times, 11 June 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/a3be0c1a-15df-4970-810a-8b958608ca0f.[6] Elisabeth Cremona, "Breaking Borders: The Future of Europe's Electricity Is in Interconnectors", in Ember Insights, 14 June 2023, https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/breaking-borders-europe-electricity-interconnectors.[7] Belén Carreño, "Hydrogen Pipeline between Spain and France to Cost $2.6 bln", in Reuters, 9 December 2022, http://reut.rs/3W1x2Ac.[8] International Energy Agency (IEA), Italy 2023 Energy Policy Review, Paris, IEA, May 2023, p. 49, https://www.iea.org/reports/italy-2023; and Greece 2023 Energy Policy Review, Paris, IEA, April 2023, p. 43-44, https://www.iea.org/reports/greece-2023.[9] European Commission, EU External Energy Engagement in a Changing World (JOIN/2022/23), 18 May 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52022JC0023.[10] Rachel More and Francesca Landini, "Germany, Italy Support New Hydrogen-Ready Pipeline Project", in Reuters, 8 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-italy-support-new-hydrogen-ready-pipeline-project-2023-06-08.