Product Name: Fat Decimator System Author Name: Kyle Cooper Bonus: Yes Official Website: CLICK HERE Add to Cart - Buy only on $17 ($20 OFF) - Click Here Fat Decimator System is a 131-page program that is based on more than a decade of research. Focusing on how the human body works, this guide will help you shed that stubborn belly fat you just can't seem to get rid of. Broken down into three components, you will need to focus on diet, exercise, and your motivational mindset. As you lose weight, you'll improve your health — it's a win-win. Fat Decimator System is based on years of research, over 500 medical studies, and real-world testing. Helping users shed belly fat quickly and safely, this program is truly one-of-a-kind. As long as you follow the system as directed, you will lose up to 20 pounds in just 3 weeks! Best of all, you will learn why you are doing what you're doing. WHAT IS THE FAT DECIMATOR SYSTEM? At its core, the Fat Decimator System is a weight loss program. However, it's also an educational tool. By investing in this system, you will learn so much about the myths that influence the weight loss industry. Combining the three elements discussed above, this system is one of the most comprehensive and easy-to-use systems currently available. If you're sick of trying one diet after another, it's time to put a stop to ineffective programs. The Fat Decimator System works! WHO CREATED THE FAT DECIMATOR SYSTEM? Kyle Cooper is no stranger to health and fitness. Serving as a marine, he was also a certified trainer. Helping both civilians and those in the military, he would help train those in need. After serving overseas, he met a Korean medical student who introduced him to some of the most effective weight loss solutions. Based on science, he now uses his knowledge and experience to transform the bodies (and lives) of people just like you. WHAT CAN I EXPECT FROM THE FAT DECIMATOR SYSTEM? Opening up with a well-written intro, Kyle stresses the importance of following this program exactly as its designed. In order to achieve results, you MUST complete the program from start to finish. Offering a personal look into his journey in terms of publishing this system, you'll immediately feel at ease. You're in good hands! "Launch" is the first section, helping you better prepare for your journey ahead. Broken down into three subsections, you'll know exactly what areas you'll be addressing — diet, exercise, and lastly, willpower, motivation and mindset. Next, "Rapid Weight Loss" focuses on the fact that most people want to lose weight and lose it now! In fact, most diets fail because it takes too long to see results — but not this one! Helping you boost your motivation, you'll want to get started! Focusing on the scientific evidence behind this, "Why 3 Weeks?" explains the effectiveness of this timeline. Then, "21 Days to Make a Habit" supports a whole new mindset. After all, for three weeks, you will need to eat healthy and go to the gym. If you have ever wondered WHY the weight loss industry is SO confusing, you'll get your answer in "The Truth About Weight Loss." All of this information is helping you better understand why you will be doing what it is you're asked to do. This is followed by one informative, highly interesting section after the other, including: How to Get FatHow to Get ThinNutrientsFiberFruits and Vegetables – The "Miracle Fiber"Protein, Fat, CarbohydratesWaterMetabolismA Surprisingly Simple Way Anyone Can Rapidly Accelerate Weight LossThe Undisputable Rules of Fat LossHow to Increase Catecholamines (And Lower Insulin)Reducing Calories the Right WayReduced Carbohydrate IntakeStarvation ModeExerciseStubborn Body FatFat-Burning SupplementsSummary Focusing on a 100 percent natural approach, you will learn to work with your body to achieve the results you desire. From the foods you eat to the habits you develop, you will begin to see how your current lifestyle has influenced your inability to lose weight in the past. As you read through each section, you will love how this program is designed. The information is so clear and well-presented it truly is a treat to read. Best of all, the information you'll learn will help you transform your body. Today is the day that you invest in your body, mind, and future — you can do it! HOW WILL I BENEFIT FROM THE FAT DECIMATOR SYSTEM? If you have been trying to lose weight, you know that it is a tough journey. Whenever possible, it's encouraging to find programs that are not only effective, but interesting. This is exactly what you will experience when ordering the Fat Decimator System. After all, it was developed based on years of scientific research and real-world testing. By investing in this system, you will be provided with the tools you need to succeed. Best of all, as you lose weight, you'll also support your long-term health. From the power of superfoods to the importance of exercise, this program will help you build healthy, sustainable habits. In terms of the program itself, it is so well-researched and the layout is beautifully designed. This makes the program itself enjoyable to read — you won't want to put it down! Once you're finished, you can then continue learning based on the four included bonus materials: The Fastest Weight Loss Week Action Plan; 100 Great-Tasting Green Smoothies; Powerful Sex Foods and Stimulants; and the 3-Minute Belly Shrinker Video Series. IN CONCLUSION Busting belly fat no longer needs to feel like an impossible task. You CAN take control of your weight and health. Although this system is highly effective, if you're still unsure, know that this system comes with a money-back guarantee. That is how confident Kyle is that you will achieve the results you desire. You no longer need to be a slave to your belly fat. It's time to think about your health and future. Invest in the Fat Decimator today! You can order online here and before you know it, you'll be on your way to true weight loss success!
Publisher's version (útgefin grein). ; Quantifying the genetic correlation between cancers can provide important insights into the mechanisms driving cancer etiology. Using genome-wide association study summary statistics across six cancer types based on a total of 296,215 cases and 301,319 controls of European ancestry, here we estimate the pair-wise genetic correlations between breast, colorectal, head/neck, lung, ovary and prostate cancer, and between cancers and 38 other diseases. We observed statistically significant genetic correlations between lung and head/neck cancer (rg = 0.57, p = 4.6 × 10−8), breast and ovarian cancer (rg = 0.24, p = 7 × 10−5), breast and lung cancer (rg = 0.18, p =1.5 × 10−6) and breast and colorectal cancer (rg = 0.15, p = 1.1 × 10−4). We also found that multiple cancers are genetically correlated with non-cancer traits including smoking, psychiatric diseases and metabolic characteristics. Functional enrichment analysis revealed a significant excess contribution of conserved and regulatory regions to cancer heritability. Our comprehensive analysis of cross-cancer heritability suggests that solid tumors arising across tissues share in part a common germline genetic basis. ; The authors in this manuscript were working on behalf of BCAC, CCFR, CIMBA, CORECT, GECCO, OCAC, PRACTICAL, CRUK, BPC3, CAPS, PEGASUS, TRICL-ILCCO, ABCTB, APCB, BCFR, CONSIT TEAM, EMBRACE, GC-HBOC, GEMO, HEBON, kConFab/AOCS Mod SQuaD, and SWE-BRCA. The breast cancer genome-wide association analyses: BCAC is funded by Cancer Research UK [C1287/A16563, C1287/A10118], the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (grant numbers 634935 and 633784 for BRIDGES and B-CAST, respectively), and by the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement number 223175 (grant number HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS). The EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme funding source had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. Genotyping of the OncoArray was funded by the NIH Grant U19 CA148065, and Cancer UK Grant C1287/A16563 and the PERSPECTIVE project supported by the Government of Canada through Genome Canada and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (grant GPH-129344) and, the Ministère de l'Économie, Science et Innovation du Québec through Genome Québec and the PSR-SIIRI-701 grant, and the Quebec Breast Cancer Foundation. Funding for the iCOGS infrastructure came from: the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement n° 223175 (HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS), Cancer Research UK (C1287/A10118, C1287/A10710, C12292/A11174, C1281/A12014, C5047/A8384, C5047/A15007, C5047/A10692, C8197/A16565), the National Institutes of Health (CA128978), and Post-Cancer GWAS initiative (1U19 CA148537, 1U19 CA148065, and 1U19 CA148112—the GAME-ON initiative), the Department of Defence (W81XWH-10-1-0341), the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) for the CIHR Team in Familial Risks of Breast Cancer, and Komen Foundation for the Cure, the Breast Cancer Research Foundation, and the Ovarian Cancer Research Fund. The DRIVE Consortium was funded by U19 CA148065. The Australian Breast Cancer Family Study (ABCFS) was supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute (USA). The content of this manuscript does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Cancer Institute or any of the collaborating centers in the Breast Cancer Family Registry (BCFR), nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the USA Government or the BCFR. The ABCFS was also supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, the New South Wales Cancer Council, the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (Australia), and the Victorian Breast Cancer Research Consortium. J.L.H. is a National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Senior Principal Research Fellow. M.C.S. is a NHMRC Senior Research Fellow. The ABCS study was supported by the Dutch Cancer Society [grants NKI 2007-3839; 2009 4363]. The Australian Breast Cancer Tissue Bank (ABCTB) is generously supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, The Cancer Institute NSW and the National Breast Cancer Foundation. The ACP study is funded by the Breast Cancer Research Trust, UK. The AHS study is supported by the intramural research program of the National Institutes of Health, the National Cancer Institute (grant number Z01-CP010119), and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (grant number Z01-ES049030). The work of the BBCC was partly funded by ELAN-Fond of the University Hospital of Erlangen. The BBCS is funded by Cancer Research UK and Breast Cancer Now and acknowledges NHS funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, and the National Cancer Research Network (NCRN). The BCEES was funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia and the Cancer Council Western Australia and acknowledges funding from the National Breast Cancer Foundation (JS). For the BCFR-NY, BCFR-PA, and BCFR-UT this work was supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute. The content of this manuscript does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Cancer Institute or any of the collaborating centers in the Breast Cancer Family Registry (BCFR), nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the US Government or the BCFR. For BIGGS, ES is supported by NIHR Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre, Guy's & St. Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust in partnership with King's College London, United Kingdom. IT is supported by the Oxford Biomedical Research Centre. BOCS is supported by funds from Cancer Research UK (C8620/A8372/A15106) and the Institute of Cancer Research (UK). BOCS acknowledges NHS funding to the Royal Marsden/Institute of Cancer Research NIHR Specialist Cancer Biomedical Research Centre. The BREast Oncology GAlician Network (BREOGAN) is funded by Acción Estratégica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS PI12/02125/Cofinanciado FEDER; Acción Estratégica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS Intrasalud (PI13/01136); Programa Grupos Emergentes, Cancer Genetics Unit, Instituto de Investigacion Biomedica Galicia Sur. Xerencia de Xestion Integrada de Vigo-SERGAS, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain; Grant 10CSA012E, Consellería de Industria Programa Sectorial de Investigación Aplicada, PEME I + D e I + D Suma del Plan Gallego de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica de la Consellería de Industria de la Xunta de Galicia, Spain; Grant EC11-192. Fomento de la Investigación Clínica Independiente, Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad, Spain; and Grant FEDER-Innterconecta. Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad, Xunta de Galicia, Spain. The BSUCH study was supported by the Dietmar-Hopp Foundation, the Helmholtz Society and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ). The CAMA study was funded by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACyT) (SALUD-2002-C01-7462). Sample collection and processing was funded in part by grants from the National Cancer Institute (NCI R01CA120120 and K24CA169004). CBCS is funded by the Canadian Cancer Society (grant # 313404) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. CCGP is supported by funding from the University of Crete. The CECILE study was supported by Fondation de France, Institut National du Cancer (INCa), Ligue Nationale contre le Cancer, Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire, de l'Alimentation, de l'Environnement et du Travail (ANSES), Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR). The CGPS was supported by the Chief Physician Johan Boserup and Lise Boserup Fund, the Danish Medical Research Council, and Herlev and Gentofte Hospital. The CNIO-BCS was supported by the Instituto de Salud Carlos III, the Red Temática de Investigación Cooperativa en Cáncer and grants from the Asociación Española Contra el Cáncer and the Fondo de Investigación Sanitario (PI11/00923 and PI12/00070). COLBCCC is supported by the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Heidelberg, Germany. D.T. was in part supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The American Cancer Society funds the creation, maintenance, and updating of the CPS-II cohort. The CTS was initially supported by the California Breast Cancer Act of 1993 and the California Breast Cancer Research Fund (contract 97-10500) and is currently funded through the National Institutes of Health (R01 CA77398, UM1 CA164917, and U01 CA199277). Collection of cancer incidence data was supported by the California Department of Public Health as part of the statewide cancer reporting program mandated by California Health and Safety Code Section 103885. H.A.C eceives support from the Lon V Smith Foundation (LVS39420). The University of Westminster curates the DietCompLyf database funded by Against Breast Cancer Registered Charity No. 1121258 and the NCRN. The coordination of EPIC is financially supported by the European Commission (DG-SANCO) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. The national cohorts are supported by: Ligue Contre le Cancer, Institut Gustave Roussy, Mutuelle Générale de l'Education Nationale, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM) (France); German Cancer Aid, German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (Germany); the Hellenic Health Foundation, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (Greece); Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro-AIRC-Italy and National Research Council (Italy); Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands (The Netherlands); Health Research Fund (FIS), PI13/00061 to Granada, PI13/01162 to EPIC-Murcia, Regional Governments of Andalucía, Asturias, Basque Country, Murcia and Navarra, ISCIII RETIC (RD06/0020) (Spain); Cancer Research UK (14136 to EPIC-Norfolk; C570/A16491 and C8221/A19170 to EPIC-Oxford), Medical Research Council (1000143 to EPIC-Norfolk, MR/M012190/1 to EPIC-Oxford) (United Kingdom). The ESTHER study was supported by a grant from the Baden Württemberg Ministry of Science, Research and Arts. Additional cases were recruited in the context of the VERDI study, which was supported by a grant from the German Cancer Aid (Deutsche Krebshilfe). FHRISK is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. The GC-HBOC (German Consortium of Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer) is supported by the German Cancer Aid (grant no 110837, coordinator: Rita K. Schmutzler, Cologne). This work was also funded by the European Regional Development Fund and Free State of Saxony, Germany (LIFE - Leipzig Research Centre for Civilization Diseases, project numbers 713-241202, 713-241202, 14505/2470, and 14575/2470). The GENICA was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Germany grants 01KW9975/5, 01KW9976/8, 01KW9977/0, and 01KW0114, the Robert Bosch Foundation, Stuttgart, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (DKFZ), Heidelberg, the Institute for Prevention and Occupational Medicine of the German Social Accident Insurance, Institute of the Ruhr University Bochum (IPA), Bochum, as well as the Department of Internal Medicine, Evangelische Kliniken Bonn gGmbH, Johanniter Krankenhaus, Bonn, Germany. The GEPARSIXTO study was conducted by the German Breast Group GmbH. The GESBC was supported by the Deutsche Krebshilfe e. V. [70492] and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ). GLACIER was supported by Breast Cancer Now, CRUK and Biomedical Research Centre at Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust and King's College London. The HABCS study was supported by the Claudia von Schilling Foundation for Breast Cancer Research, by the Lower Saxonian Cancer Society, and by the Rudolf-Bartling Foundation. The HEBCS was financially supported by the Helsinki University Central Hospital Research Fund, Academy of Finland (266528), the Finnish Cancer Society, and the Sigrid Juselius Foundation. The HERPACC was supported by MEXT Kakenhi (No. 170150181 and 26253041) from the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, Culture and Technology of Japan, by a Grant-in-Aid for the Third Term Comprehensive 10-Year Strategy for Cancer Control from Ministry Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, by Health and Labour Sciences Research Grants for Research on Applying Health Technology from Ministry Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, by National Cancer Center Research and Development Fund, and "Practical Research for Innovative Cancer Control (15ck0106177h0001)" from Japan Agency for Medical Research and development, AMED, and Cancer Bio Bank Aichi. The HMBCS was supported by a grant from the Friends of Hannover Medical School and by the Rudolf Bartling Foundation. The HUBCS was supported by a grant from the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education (RUS08/017), and by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research and the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations for support the Bioresource collections and RFBR grants 14-04-97088, 17-29-06014, and 17-44-020498. ICICLE was supported by Breast Cancer Now, CRUK, and Biomedical Research Centre at Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust and King's College London. Financial support for KARBAC was provided through the regional agreement on medical training and clinical research (A.L.F.) between Stockholm County Council and Karolinska Institutet, the Swedish Cancer Society, The Gustav V Jubilee foundation and Bert von Kantzows foundation. The KARMA study was supported by Märit and Hans Rausings Initiative Against Breast Cancer. The KBCP was financially supported by the special Government Funding (E.V.O.) of Kuopio University Hospital grants, Cancer Fund of North Savo, the Finnish Cancer Organizations, and by the strategic funding of the University of Eastern Finland. kConFab is supported by a grant from the National Breast Cancer Foundation, and previously by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), the Queensland Cancer Fund, the Cancer Councils of New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia, and the Cancer Foundation of Western Australia. Financial support for the AOCS was provided by the United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command [DAMD17-01-1-0729], Cancer Council Victoria, Queensland Cancer Fund, Cancer Council New South Wales, Cancer Council South Australia, The Cancer Foundation of Western Australia, Cancer Council Tasmania and the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (NHMRC; 400413, 400281, 199600). G.C.-T. and P.W. are supported by the NHMRC. RB was a Cancer Institute NSW Clinical Research Fellow. The KOHBRA study was partially supported by a grant from the Korea Health Technology R&D Project through the Korea Health Industry Development Institute (KHIDI), and the National R&D Program for Cancer Control, Ministry of Health & Welfare, Republic of Korea (HI16C1127; 1020350; 1420190). LAABC is supported by grants (1RB-0287, 3PB-0102, 5PB-0018, 10PB-0098) from the California Breast Cancer Research Program. Incident breast cancer cases were collected by the USC Cancer Surveillance Program (CSP) which is supported under subcontract by the California Department of Health. The CSP is also part of the National Cancer Institute's Division of Cancer Prevention and Control Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program, under contract number N01CN25403. L.M.B.C. is supported by the 'Stichting tegen Kanker'. D.L. is supported by the FWO. The MABCS study is funded by the Research Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology "Georgi D. Efremov" and supported by the German Academic Exchange Program, DAAD. The MARIE study was supported by the Deutsche Krebshilfe e.V. [70-2892-BR I, 106332, 108253, 108419, 110826, 110828], the Hamburg Cancer Society, the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Germany [01KH0402]. MBCSG is supported by grants from the Italian Association for Cancer Research (AIRC) and by funds from the Italian citizens who allocated the 5/1000 share of their tax payment in support of the Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Nazionale Tumori, according to Italian laws (INT-Institutional strategic projects "5 × 1000"). The MCBCS was supported by the NIH grants CA192393, CA116167, CA176785 an NIH Specialized Program of Research Excellence (SPORE) in Breast Cancer [CA116201], and the Breast Cancer Research Foundation and a generous gift from the David F. and Margaret T. Grohne Family Foundation. MCCS cohort recruitment was funded by VicHealth and Cancer Council Victoria. The MCCS was further supported by Australian NHMRC grants 209057 and 396414, and by infrastructure provided by Cancer Council Victoria. Cases and their vital status were ascertained through the Victorian Cancer Registry (VCR) and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), including the National Death Index and the Australian Cancer Database. The MEC was support by NIH grants CA63464, CA54281, CA098758, CA132839, and CA164973. The MISS study is supported by funding from ERC-2011-294576 Advanced grant, Swedish Cancer Society, Swedish Research Council, Local hospital funds, Berta Kamprad Foundation, Gunnar Nilsson. The MMHS study was supported by NIH grants CA97396, CA128931, CA116201, CA140286, and CA177150. MSKCC is supported by grants from the Breast Cancer Research Foundation and Robert and Kate Niehaus Clinical Cancer Genetics Initiative. The work of MTLGEBCS was supported by the Quebec Breast Cancer Foundation, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research for the "CIHR Team in Familial Risks of Breast Cancer" program – grant # CRN-87521 and the Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation and Export Trade – grant # PSR-SIIRI-701. MYBRCA is funded by research grants from the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education (UM.C/HlR/MOHE/06) and Cancer Research Malaysia. MYMAMMO is supported by research grants from Yayasan Sime Darby LPGA Tournament and Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education (RP046B-15HTM). The NBCS has been supported by the Research Council of Norway grant 193387/V50 (to A.-L. Børresen-Dale and V.N. Kristensen) and grant 193387/H10 (to A.-L. Børresen-Dale and V.N. Kristensen), South Eastern Norway Health Authority (grant 39346 to A.-L. Børresen-Dale and 27208 to V.N. Kristensen) and the Norwegian Cancer Society (to A.-L. Børresen-Dale and 419616 - 71248 - PR-2006-0282 to V.N. Kristensen). It has received funding from the K.G. Jebsen Centre for Breast Cancer Research (2012-2015). The NBHS was supported by NIH grant R01CA100374. Biological sample preparation was conducted the Survey and Biospecimen Shared Resource, which is supported by P30 CA68485. The Northern California Breast Cancer Family Registry (NC-BCFR) and Ontario Familial Breast Cancer Registry (OFBCR) were supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute (USA). The content of this manuscript does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Cancer Institute or any of the collaborating centers in the Breast Cancer Family Registry (BCFR), nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the USA Government or the BCFR. The Carolina Breast Cancer Study was funded by Komen Foundation, the National Cancer Institute (P50 CA058223, U54 CA156733, and U01 CA179715), and the North Carolina University Cancer Research Fund. The NGOBCS was supported by Grants-in-Aid for the Third Term Comprehensive Ten-Year Strategy for Cancer Control from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan, and for Scientific Research on Priority Areas, 17015049 and for Scientific Research on Innovative Areas, 221S0001, from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan. The NHS was supported by NIH grants P01 CA87969, UM1 CA186107, and U19 CA148065. The NHS2 was supported by NIH grants UM1 CA176726 and U19 CA148065. The OBCS was supported by research grants from the Finnish Cancer Foundation, the Academy of Finland (grant number 250083, 122715 and Center of Excellence grant number 251314), the Finnish Cancer Foundation, the Sigrid Juselius Foundation, the University of Oulu, the University of Oulu Support Foundation, and the special Governmental EVO funds for Oulu University Hospital-based research activities. The ORIGO study was supported by the Dutch Cancer Society (RUL 1997-1505) and the Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI-NL CP16). The PBCS was funded by Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. Genotyping for PLCO was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Institutes of Health, NCI, Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics. The PLCO is supported by the Intramural Research Program of the Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics and supported by contracts from the Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health. The POSH study is funded by Cancer Research UK (grants C1275/A11699, C1275/C22524, C1275/A19187, C1275/A15956, and Breast Cancer Campaign 2010PR62, 2013PR044. PROCAS is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. The RBCS was funded by the Dutch Cancer Society (DDHK 2004-3124, DDHK 2009-4318). The SASBAC study was supported by funding from the Agency for Science, Technology and Research of Singapore (A*STAR), the US National Institute of Health (NIH) and the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation. The SBCGS was supported primarily by NIH grants R01CA64277, R01CA148667, UMCA182910, and R37CA70867. Biological sample preparation was conducted the Survey and Biospecimen Shared Resource, which is supported by P30 CA68485. The scientific development and funding of this project were, in part, supported by the Genetic Associations and Mechanisms in Oncology (GAME-ON) Network U19 CA148065. The SBCS was supported by Sheffield Experimental Cancer Medicine Centre and Breast Cancer Now Tissue Bank. The SCCS is supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Health (R01 CA092447). Data on SCCS cancer cases used in this publication were provided by the Alabama Statewide Cancer Registry; Kentucky Cancer Registry, Lexington, KY; Tennessee Department of Health, Office of Cancer Surveillance; Florida Cancer Data System; North Carolina Central Cancer Registry, North Carolina Division of Public Health; Georgia Comprehensive Cancer Registry; Louisiana Tumor Registry; Mississippi Cancer Registry; South Carolina Central Cancer Registry; Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Cancer Registry; Arkansas Department of Health, Cancer Registry, 4815 W. Markham, Little Rock, AR 72205. The Arkansas Central Cancer Registry is fully funded by a grant from National Program of Cancer Registries, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Data on SCCS cancer cases from Mississippi were collected by the Mississippi Cancer Registry which participates in the National Program of Cancer Registries (NPCR) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The contents of this publication are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the CDC or the Mississippi Cancer Registry. SEARCH is funded by Cancer Research UK [C490/A10124, C490/A16561] and supported by the UK National Institute for Health Research Biomedical Research Centre at the University of Cambridge. The University of Cambridge has received salary support for PDPP from the NHS in the East of England through the Clinical Academic Reserve. SEBCS was supported by the BRL (Basic Research Laboratory) program through the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2012-0000347). SGBCC is funded by the NUS start-up Grant, National University Cancer Institute Singapore (NCIS) Centre Grant and the NMRC Clinician Scientist Award. Additional controls were recruited by the Singapore Consortium of Cohort Studies-Multi-ethnic cohort (SCCS-MEC), which was funded by the Biomedical Research Council, grant number: 05/1/21/19/425. The Sister Study (SISTER) is supported by the Intramural Research Program of the NIH, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (Z01-ES044005 and Z01-ES049033). The Two Sister Study (2SISTER) was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the NIH, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (Z01-ES044005 and Z01-ES102245), and, also by a grant from Susan G. Komen for the Cure, grant FAS0703856. SKKDKFZS is supported by the DKFZ. The SMC is funded by the Swedish Cancer Foundation. The SZBCS was supported by Grant PBZ_KBN_122/P05/2004. The TBCS was funded by The National Cancer Institute, Thailand. The TNBCC was supported by a Specialized Program of Research Excellence (SPORE) in Breast Cancer (CA116201), a grant from the Breast Cancer Research Foundation, a generous gift from the David F. and Margaret T. Grohne Family Foundation. The TWBCS is supported by the Taiwan Biobank project of the Institute of Biomedical Sciences, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. The UCIBCS component of this research was supported by the NIH [CA58860, CA92044] and the Lon V Smith Foundation [LVS39420]. The UKBGS is funded by Breast Cancer Now and the Institute of Cancer Research (ICR), London. ICR acknowledges NHS funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre. The UKOPS study was funded by The Eve Appeal (The Oak Foundation) and supported by the National Institute for Health Research University College London Hospitals Biomedical Research Centre. The US3SS study was supported by Massachusetts (K.M.E., R01CA47305), Wisconsin (P.A.N., R01 CA47147) and New Hampshire (L.T.-E., R01CA69664) centers, and Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. The USRT Study was funded by Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. The WAABCS study was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health (R01 CA89085 and P50 CA125183 and the D43 TW009112 grant), Susan G. Komen (SAC110026), the Dr. Ralph and Marian Falk Medical Research Trust, and the Avon Foundation for Women. The WHI program is funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, the US National Institutes of Health and the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHSN268201100046C, HHSN268201100001C, HHSN268201100002C, HHSN268201100003C, HHSN268201100004C, and HHSN271201100004C). This work was also funded by NCI U19 CA148065-01. D.G.E. is supported by the all Manchester NIHR Biomedical research center Manchester (IS-BRC-1215-20007). HUNBOCS, Hungarian Breast and Ovarian Cancer Study was supported by Hungarian Research Grant KTIA-OTKA CK-80745, NKFI_OTKA K-112228. C.I. received support from the Nontherapeutic Subject Registry Shared Resource at Georgetown University (NIH/NCI P30-CA-51008) and the Jess and Mildred Fisher Center for Hereditary Cancer and Clinical Genomics Research. K.M. is supported by CRUK C18281/A19169. City of Hope Clinical Cancer Community Research Network and the Hereditary Cancer Research Registry, supported in part by Award Number RC4CA153828 (PI: J Weitzel) from the National Cancer Institute and the office of the Directory, National Institutes of Health. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health. The colorectal cancer genome-wide association analyses: Colorectal Transdisciplinary Study (CORECT): The content of this manuscript does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Cancer Institute or any of the collaborating centers in the CORECT Consortium, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products or organizations imply endorsement by the US Government or the CORECT Consortium. We are incredibly grateful for the contributions of Dr. Brian Henderson and Dr. Roger Green over the course of this study and acknowledge them in memoriam. We are also grateful for support from Daniel and Maryann Fong. ColoCare: we thank the many investigators and staff who made this research possible in ColoCare Seattle and ColoCare Heidelberg. ColoCare was initiated and developed at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center by Drs. Ulrich and Grady. CCFR: the Colon CFR graciously thanks the generous contributions of their study participants, dedication of study staff, and financial support from the U.S. National Cancer Institute, without which this important registry would not exist. Galeon: GALEON wishes to thank the Department of Surgery of University Hospital of Santiago (CHUS), Sara Miranda Ponte, Carmen M Redondo, and the staff of the Department of Pathology and Biobank of CHUS, Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria de Santiago (IDIS), Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria Galicia Sur (IISGS), SERGAS, Vigo, Spain, and Programa Grupos Emergentes, Cancer Genetics Unit, CHUVI Vigo Hospital, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain. MCCS: this study was made possible by the contribution of many people, including the original investigators and the diligent team who recruited participants and continue to work on follow-up. We would also like to express our gratitude to the many thousands of Melbourne residents who took part in the study and provided blood samples. SEARCH: We acknowledge the contributions of Mitul Shah, Val Rhenius, Sue Irvine, Craig Luccarini, Patricia Harrington, Don Conroy, Rebecca Mayes, and Caroline Baynes. The Swedish low-risk colorectal cancer study: we thank Berith Wejderot and the Swedish low-risk colorectal cancer study group. Genetics & Epidemiology of Colorectal Cancer Consortium (GECCO): we thank all those at the GECCO Coordinating Center for helping bring together the data and people that made this project possible. ASTERISK: we are very grateful to Dr. Bruno Buecher without whom this project would not have existed. We also thank all those who agreed to participate in this study, including the patients and the healthy control persons, as well as all the physicians, technicians and students. DACHS: we thank all participants and cooperating clinicians, and Ute Handte-Daub, Renate Hettler-Jensen, Utz Benscheid, Muhabbet Celik, and Ursula Eilber for excellent technical assistance. HPFS, NHS and PHS: we acknowledge Patrice Soule and Hardeep Ranu of the Dana-Farber Harvard Cancer Center High-Throughput Polymorphism Core who assisted in the genotyping for NHS, HPFS, and PHS under the supervision of Dr. Immaculata Devivo and Dr. David Hunter, Qin (Carolyn) Guo, and Lixue Zhu who assisted in programming for NHS and HPFS and Haiyan Zhang who assisted in programming for the PHS. We thank the participants and staff of the Nurses' Health Study and the Health Professionals Follow-Up Study, for their valuable contributions as well as the following state cancer registries for their help: A.L., A.Z., A.R., C.A., C.O., C.T., D.E., F.L., G.A., I.D., I.L., I.N., I.A., K.Y., L.A., M.E., M.D., M.A., M.I., N.E., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., O.H., O.K., O.R., P.A., R.I., S.C., T.N., T.X., V.A., W.A., W.Y. In addition, this study was approved by the Connecticut Department of Public Health (DPH) Human Investigations Committee. Certain data used in this publication were obtained from the DPH. We assume full responsibility for analyses and interpretation of these data. PLCO: we thank Drs. Christine Berg and Philip Prorok, Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute, the Screening Center investigators and staff or the Prostate, Lung, Colorectal and Ovarian (PLCO) Cancer Screening Trial, Mr. Tom Riley and staff, Information Management Services Inc., Ms. Barbara O'Brien and staff, Westat Inc. and Drs. Bill Kopp, Wen Shao and staff, SAIC-Frederick. Most importantly, we acknowledge the study participants for their contributions for making this study possible. The statements contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not represent or imply concurrence or endorsement by NCI. PMH: we thank the study participants and staff of the Hormones and Colon Cancer study. WHI: we thank the WHI investigators and staff for their dedication, and the study participants for making the program possible. A full listing of WHI investigators can be found at https://cleo.whi.org/researchers/Documents%20%20Write%20a%20Paper/WHI%20Investigator%20Short20List.pdf. CORECT: The CORECT Study was supported by the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health (NCI/NIH), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (grant numbers U19 CA148107, R01 CA81488, P30 CA014089, R01 CA197350; P01 CA196569; and R01 CA201407) and National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences, National Institutes of Health (grant number T32 ES013678). The ATBC Study was supported by the US Public Health Service contracts (N01-CN-45165, N01-RC-45035, N01-RC-37004, and HHSN261201000006C) from the National Cancer Institute. The Cancer Prevention Study-II Nutrition Cohort is funded by the American Cancer Society. ColoCare: This work was supported by the National Institutes of Health (grant numbers R01 CA189184, U01 CA206110, 2P30CA015704-40 (Gilliland)), the Matthias Lackas-Foundation, the German Consortium for Translational Cancer Research, and the EU TRANSCAN initiative. Genetics and Epidemiology of Colorectal Cancer Consortium (GECCO): funding for GECCO was provided by the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (grant numbers U01 CA137088, R01 CA059045, and U01 CA164930). This research was funded in part through the NIH/NCI Cancer Center Support Grant P30 CA015704. The Colon Cancer Family Registry (CFR) Illumina GWAS was supported by funding from the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health (grant numbers U01 CA122839, R01 CA143247). The Colon CFR/CORECT Affymetrix Axiom GWAS and OncoArray GWAS were supported by funding from National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health (grant number U19 CA148107 to S.G.). The Colon CFR participant recruitment and collection of data and biospecimens used in this study were supported by the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health (grant number UM1 CA167551) and through cooperative agreements with the following Colon CFR centers: Australasian Colorectal Cancer Family Registry (NCI/NIH grant numbers U01 CA074778 and U01/U24 CA097735), USC Consortium Colorectal Cancer Family Registry (NCI/NIH grant numbers U01/U24 CA074799), Mayo Clinic Cooperative Family Registry for Colon Cancer Studies (NCI/NIH grant number U01/U24 CA074800), Ontario Familial Colorectal Cancer Registry (NCI/NIH grant number U01/U24 CA074783), Seattle Colorectal Cancer Family Registry (NCI/NIH grant number U01/U24 CA074794), and University of Hawaii Colorectal Cancer Family Registry (NCI/NIH grant number U01/U24 CA074806), Additional support for case ascertainment was provided from the Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) Program of the National Cancer Institute to Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Control Nos. N01-CN-67009 and N01-PC-35142, and Contract No. HHSN2612013000121), the Hawai'i Department of Health (Control Nos. N01-PC-67001 and N01-PC-35137, and Contract No. HHSN26120100037C, and the California Department of Public Health (contracts HHSN261201000035C awarded to the University of Southern California, and the following state cancer registries: A.Z., C.O., M.N., N.C., N.H., and by the Victoria Cancer Registry and Ontario Cancer Registry. ESTHER/VERDI was supported by grants from the Baden–Württemberg Ministry of Science, Research and Arts and the German Cancer Aid. MCCS cohort recruitment was funded by VicHealth and Cancer Council Victoria. GALEON: FIS Intrasalud (PI13/01136). The MCCS was further supported by Australian NHMRC grants 509348, 209057, 251553, and 504711 and by infrastructure provided by Cancer Council Victoria. Cases and their vital status were ascertained through the Victorian Cancer Registry (VCR) and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), including the National Death Index and the Australian Cancer Database. MSKCC: the work at Sloan Kettering in New York was supported by the Robert and Kate Niehaus Center for Inherited Cancer Genomics and the Romeo Milio Foundation. Moffitt: This work was supported by funding from the National Institutes of Health (grant numbers R01 CA189184, P30 CA076292), Florida Department of Health Bankhead-Coley Grant 09BN-13, and the University of South Florida Oehler Foundation. Moffitt contributions were supported in part by the Total Cancer Care Initiative, Collaborative Data Services Core, and Tissue Core at the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center & Research Institute, a National Cancer Institute-designated Comprehensive Cancer Center (grant number P30 CA076292). SEARCH: Cancer Research UK (C490/A16561). The Spanish study was supported by Instituto de Salud Carlos III, co-funded by FEDER funds –a way to build Europe– (grants PI14-613 and PI09-1286), Catalan Government DURSI (grant 2014SGR647), and Junta de Castilla y León (grant LE22A10-2). The Swedish Low-risk Colorectal Cancer Study: the study was supported by grants from the Swedish research council; K2015-55 × -22674-01-4, K2008-55 × -20157-03-3, K2006-72 × -20157-01-2 and the Stockholm County Council (ALF project). CIDR genotyping for the Oncoarray was conducted under contract 268201200008I (to K.D.), through grant 101HG007491-01 (to C.I.A.). The Norris Cotton Cancer Center - P30CA023108, The Quantitative Biology Research Institute - P20GM103534, and the Coordinating Center for Screen Detected Lesions - U01CA196386 also supported efforts of C.I.A. This work was also supported by the National Cancer Institute (grant numbers U01 CA1817700, R01 CA144040). ASTERISK: a Hospital Clinical Research Program (PHRC) and supported by the Regional Council of Pays de la Loire, the Groupement des Entreprises Françaises dans la Lutte contre le Cancer (GEFLUC), the Association Anne de Bretagne Génétique and the Ligue Régionale Contre le Cancer (LRCC). COLO2&3: National Institutes of Health (grant number R01 CA060987). DACHS: This work was supported by the German Research Council (BR 1704/6-1, BR 1704/6-3, BR 1704/6-4, CH 117/1-1, HO 5117/2-1, HE 5998/2-1, KL 2354/3-1, RO 2270/8-1, and BR 1704/17-1), the Interdisciplinary Research Program of the National Center for Tumor Diseases (NCT), Germany, and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (01KH0404, 01ER0814, 01ER0815, 01ER1505A, and 01ER1505B). DALS: National Institutes of Health (grant number R01 CA048998 to M.L.S). HPFS is supported by National Institutes of Health (grant numbers P01 CA055075, UM1 CA167552, R01 137178, and P50 CA127003), NHS by the National Institutes of Health (grant numbers UM1 CA186107, R01 CA137178, P01 CA087969, and P50 CA127003), NHSII by the National Institutes of Health (grant numbers R01 050385CA and UM1 CA176726), and PHS by the National Institutes of Health (grant number R01 CA042182). MEC: National Institutes of Health (grant numbers R37 CA054281, P01 CA033619, and R01 CA063464). OFCCR: National Institutes of Health, through funding allocated to the Ontario Registry for Studies of Familial Colorectal Cancer (grant number U01 CA074783); see Colon CFR section above. As subset of ARCTIC, OFCCR is supported by a GL2 grant from the Ontario Research Fund, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, and the Cancer Risk Evaluation (CaRE) Program grant from the Canadian Cancer Society Research Institute. T.J.H. and B.W.Z. are recipients of Senior Investigator Awards from the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research, through generous support from the Ontario Ministry of Research and Innovation. PLCO: Intramural Research Program of the Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics and supported by contracts from the Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute, NIH, DHHS. Additionally, a subset of control samples was genotyped as part of the Cancer Genetic Markers of Susceptibility (CGEMS) Prostate Cancer GWAS, Colon CGEMS pancreatic cancer scan (PanScan), and the Lung Cancer and Smoking study. The prostate and PanScan study datasets were accessed with appropriate approval through the dbGaP online resource (http://cgems.cancer.gov/data/) accession numbers phs000207.v1.p1 and phs000206.v3.p2, respectively, and the lung datasets were accessed from the dbGaP website (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap) through accession number phs000093.v2.p2. Funding for the Lung Cancer and Smoking study was provided by National Institutes of Health (NIH), Genes, Environment and Health Initiative (GEI) Z01 CP 010200, NIH U01 HG004446, and NIH GEI U01 HG 004438. For the lung study, the GENEVA Coordinating Center provided assistance with genotype cleaning and general study coordination, 23 and the Johns Hopkins University Center for Inherited Disease Research conducted genotyping. PMH: National Institutes of Health (grant number R01 CA076366). VITAL: National Institutes of Health (grant number K05-CA154337). WHI: The WHI program is funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services through contracts HHSN268201600018C, HHSN268201600001C, HHSN268201600002C, HHSN268201600003C, and HHSN268201600004C. The head and neck cancer genome-wide association analyses: The study was supported by NIH/NCI: P50 CA097190, and P30 CA047904, Canadian Cancer Society Research Institute (no. 020214) and Cancer Care Ontario Research Chair to R.H. The Princess Margaret Hospital Head and Neck Cancer Translational Research Program is funded by the Wharton family, Joe's Team, Gordon Tozer, Bruce Galloway and the Elia family. Geoffrey Liu was supported by the Posluns Family Fund and the Lusi Wong Family Fund at the Princess Margaret Foundation, and the Alan B. Brown Chair in Molecular Genomics. This publication presents data from Head and Neck 5000 (H&N5000). H&N5000 was a component of independent research funded by the UK National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) under its Programme Grants for Applied Research scheme (RP-PG-0707-10034). The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health. Human papillomavirus (HPV) in H&N5000 serology was supported by a Cancer Research UK Programme Grant, the Integrative Cancer Epidemiology Programme (grant number: C18281/A19169). National Cancer Institute (R01-CA90731); National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (P30ES10126). The authors thank all the members of the GENCAPO team/The Head and Neck Genome Project (GENCAPO) was supported by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) (Grant numbers 04/12054-9 and 10/51168-0). CPS-II recruitment and maintenance is supported with intramural research funding from the American Cancer Society. Genotyping performed at the Center for Inherited Disease Research (CIDR) was funded through the U.S. National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research (NIDCR) grant 1 × 01HG007780-0. The University of Pittsburgh head and neck cancer case-control study is supported by National Institutes of Health grants P50 CA097190 and P30 CA047904. The Carolina Head and Neck Cancer Study (CHANCE) was supported by the National Cancer Institute (R01-CA90731). The Head and Neck Genome Project (GENCAPO) was supported by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) (Grant numbers 04/12054-9 and 10/51168-0). The authors thank all the members of the GENCAPO team. The HN5000 study was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) under its Programme Grants for Applied Research scheme (RP-PG-0707-10034), the views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health. The Toronto study was funded by the Canadian Cancer Society Research Institute (020214) and the National Cancer Institute (U19-CA148127) and the Cancer Care Ontario Research Chair. The alcohol-related cancers and genetic susceptibility study in Europe (ARCAGE) was funded by the European Commission's 5th Framework Program (QLK1-2001-00182), the Italian Association for Cancer Research, Compagnia di San Paolo/FIRMS, Region Piemonte, and Padova University (CPDA057222). The Rome Study was supported by the Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro (AIRC) IG 2011 10491 and IG2013 14220 to S.B., and Fondazione Veronesi to S.B. The IARC Latin American study was funded by the European Commission INCO-DC programme (IC18-CT97-0222), with additional funding from Fondo para la Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (Argentina) and the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (01/01768-2). We thank Leticia Fernandez, Instituto Nacional de Oncologia y Radiobiologia, La Habana, Cuba and Sergio and Rosalina Koifman, for their efforts with the IARC Latin America study São Paulo center. The IARC Central Europe study was supported by European Commission's INCO-COPERNICUS Program (IC15- CT98-0332), NIH/National Cancer Institute grant CA92039, and the World Cancer Research Foundation grant WCRF 99A28. The IARC Oral Cancer Multicenter study was funded by grant S06 96 202489 05F02 from Europe against Cancer; grants FIS 97/0024, FIS 97/0662, and BAE 01/5013 from Fondo de Investigaciones Sanitarias, Spain; the UICC Yamagiwa-Yoshida Memorial International Cancer Study; the National Cancer Institute of Canada; Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro; and the Pan-American Health Organization. Coordination of the EPIC study is financially supported by the European Commission (DG-SANCO) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. The lung cancer genome-wide association analyses: Transdisciplinary Research for Cancer in Lung (TRICL) of the International Lung Cancer Consortium (ILCCO) was supported by (U19-CA148127, CA148127S1, U19CA203654, and Cancer Prevention Research Institute of Texas RR170048). The ILCCO data harmonization is supported by Cancer Care Ontario Research Chair of Population Studies to R. H. and Lunenfeld-Tanenbaum Research Institute, Sinai Health System. The TRICL-ILCCO OncoArray was supported by in-kind genotyping by the Centre for Inherited Disease Research (26820120008i-0-26800068-1). The CAPUA study was supported by FIS-FEDER/Spain grant numbers FIS-01/310, FIS-PI03-0365, and FIS-07-BI060604, FICYT/Asturias grant numbers FICYT PB02-67 and FICYT IB09-133, and the University Institute of Oncology (IUOPA), of the University of Oviedo and the Ciber de Epidemiologia y Salud Pública. CIBERESP, SPAIN. The work performed in the CARET study was supported by the National Institute of Health/National Cancer Institute: UM1 CA167462 (PI: Goodman), National Institute of Health UO1-CA6367307 (PIs Omen, Goodman); National Institute of Health R01 CA111703 (PI Chen), National Institute of Health 5R01 CA151989-01A1(PI Doherty). The Liverpool Lung project is supported by the Roy Castle Lung Cancer Foundation. The Harvard Lung Cancer Study was supported by the NIH (National Cancer Institute) grants CA092824, CA090578, CA074386. The Multi-ethnic Cohort Study was partially supported by NIH Grants CA164973, CA033619, CA63464, and CA148127. The work performed in MSH-PMH study was supported by The Canadian Cancer Society Research Institute (020214), Ontario Institute of Cancer and Cancer Care Ontario Chair Award to R.J.H. and G.L. and the Alan Brown Chair and Lusi Wong Programs at the Princess Margaret Hospital Foundation. NJLCS was funded by the State Key Program of National Natural Science of China (81230067), the National Key Basic Research Program Grant (2011CB503805), the Major Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (81390543). The Norway study was supported by Norwegian Cancer Society, Norwegian Research Council. The Shanghai Cohort Study (SCS) was supported by National Institutes of Health R01 CA144034 (PI: Yuan) and UM1 CA182876 (PI: Yuan). The Singapore Chinese Health Study (SCHS) was supported by National Institutes of Health R01 CA144034 (PI: Yuan) and UM1 CA182876 (PI: Yuan). The work in TLC study has been supported in part the James & Esther King Biomedical Research Program (09KN-15), National Institutes of Health Specialized Programs of Research Excellence (SPORE) Grant (P50 CA119997), and by a Cancer Center Support Grant (CCSG) at the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, an NCI designated Comprehensive Cancer Center (grant number P30-CA76292). The Vanderbilt Lung Cancer Study—BioVU dataset used for the analyses described was obtained from Vanderbilt University Medical Center's BioVU, which is supported by institutional funding, the 1S10RR025141-01 instrumentation award, and by the Vanderbilt CTSA grant UL1TR000445 from NCATS/NIH. Dr. Aldrich was supported by NIH/National Cancer Institute K07CA172294 (PI: Aldrich) and Dr. Bush was supported by NHGRI/NIH U01HG004798 (PI: Crawford). The Copenhagen General Population Study (CGPS) was supported by the Chief Physician Johan Boserup and Lise Boserup Fund, the Danish Medical Research Council and Herlev Hospital. The NELCS study: Grant Number P20RR018787 from the National Center for Research Resources (NCRR), a component of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The Kentucky Lung Cancer Research Initiative was supported by the Department of Defense [Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command Program] under award number: 10153006 (W81XWH-11-1-0781). Views and opinions of, and endorsements by the author(s) do not reflect those of the US Army or the Department of Defense. This research was also supported by unrestricted infrastructure funds from the UK Center for Clinical and Translational Science, NIH grant UL1TR000117 and Markey Cancer Center NCI Cancer Center Support Grant (P30 CA177558) Shared Resource Facilities: Cancer Research Informatics, Biospecimen and Tissue Procurement, and Biostatistics and Bioinformatics. The M.D. Anderson Cancer Center study was supported in part by grants from the NIH (P50 CA070907, R01 CA176568) (to X.W.), Cancer Prevention & Research Institute of Texas (RP130502) (to X.W.), and The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center institutional support for the Center for Translational and Public Health Genomics. The deCODE study of smoking and nicotine dependence was funded in part by a grant from NIDA (R01- DA017932). The study in Lodz center was partially funded by Nofer Institute of Occupational Medicine, under task NIOM 10.13: Predictors of mortality from non-small cell lung cancer—field study. Genetic sharing analysis was funded by NIH grant CA194393. The research undertaken by M.D.T., L.V.W., and M.S.A. was partly funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR). The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health. M.D.T. holds a Medical Research Council Senior Clinical Fellowship (G0902313). The work to assemble the FTND GWAS meta-analysis was supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) grant number R01 DA035825 (Principal Investigator [PI]: DBH). The study populations included COGEND (dbGaP phs000092.v1.p1 and phs000404.v1.p1), COPDGene (dbGaP phs000179.v3.p2), deCODE Genetics, EAGLE (dbGaP phs000093.vs.p2), and SAGE. dbGaP phs000092.v1.p1). See Hancock et al. Transl Psychiatry 2015 (PMCID: PMC4930126) for the full listing of funding sources and other acknowledgments. The Resource for the Study of Lung Cancer Epidemiology in North Trent (ReSoLuCENT)study was funded by the Sheffield Hospitals Charity, Sheffield Experimental Cancer Medicine Centre and Weston Park Hospital Cancer Charity. The ovarian cancer genome-wide association analysis: The Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium (OCAC) is supported by a grant from the Ovarian Cancer Research Fund thanks to donations by the family and friends of Kathryn Sladek Smith (PPD/RPCI.07). The scientific development and funding for this project were in part supported by the US National Cancer Institute GAME-ON Post-GWAS Initiative (U19-CA148112). This study made use of data generated by the Wellcome Trust Case Control consortium that was funded by the Wellcome Trust under award 076113. The results published here are in part based upon data generated by The Cancer Genome Atlas Pilot Project established by the National Cancer Institute and National Human Genome Research Institute (dbGap accession number phs000178.v8.p7). The OCAC OncoArray genotyping project was funded through grants from the U.S. National Institutes of Health (CA1X01HG007491-01 (C.I.A.), U19-CA148112 (T.A.S.), R01-CA149429 (C.M.P.), and R01-CA058598 (M.T.G.); Canadian Institutes of Health Research (MOP-86727 (L.E.K.) and the Ovarian Cancer Research Fund (A.B.). The COGS project was funded through a European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme grant (agreement number 223175 - HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) and through a grant from the U.S. National Institutes of Health (R01-CA122443 (E.L.G)). Funding for individual studies: AAS: National Institutes of Health (RO1-CA142081); AOV: The Canadian Institutes for Health Research (MOP-86727); AUS: The Australian Ovarian Cancer Study Group was supported by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (DAMD17-01-1-0729), National Health & Medical Research Council of Australia (199600, 400413 and 400281), Cancer Councils of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania and Cancer Foundation of Western Australia (Multi-State Applications 191, 211, and 182). The Australian Ovarian Cancer Study gratefully acknowledges additional support from Ovarian Cancer Australia and the Peter MacCallum Foundation; BAV: ELAN Funds of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg; BEL: National Kankerplan; BGS: Breast Cancer Now, Institute of Cancer Research; BVU: Vanderbilt CTSA grant from the National Institutes of Health (NIH)/National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) (ULTR000445); CAM: National Institutes of Health Research Cambridge Biomedical Research Centre and Cancer Research UK Cambridge Cancer Centre; CHA: Innovative Research Team in University (PCSIRT) in China (IRT1076); CNI: Instituto de Salud Carlos III (PI12/01319); Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (SAF2012); COE: Department of Defense (W81XWH-11-2-0131); CON: National Institutes of Health (R01-CA063678, R01-CA074850; and R01-CA080742); DKE: Ovarian Cancer Research Fund; DOV: National Institutes of Health R01-CA112523 and R01-CA87538; EMC: Dutch Cancer Society (EMC 2014-6699); EPC: The coordination of EPIC is financially supported by the European Commission (DG-SANCO) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. The national cohorts are supported by Danish Cancer Society (Denmark); Ligue Contre le Cancer, Institut Gustave Roussy, Mutuelle Générale de l'Education Nationale, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM) (France); German Cancer Aid, German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (Germany); the Hellenic Health Foundation (Greece); Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro-AIRC-Italy and National Research Council (Italy); Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands (The Netherlands); ERC-2009-AdG 232997 and Nordforsk, Nordic Centre of Excellence programme on Food, Nutrition and Health (Norway); Health Research Fund (FIS), PI13/00061 to Granada, PI13/01162 to EPIC-Murcia, Regional Governments of Andalucía, Asturias, Basque Country, Murcia and Navarra, ISCIII RETIC (RD06/0020) (Spain); Swedish Cancer Society, Swedish Research Council and County Councils of Skåne and Västerbotten (Sweden); Cancer Research UK (14136 to EPIC-Norfolk; C570/A16491 and C8221/A19170 to EPIC-Oxford), Medical Research Council (1000143 to EPIC-Norfolk, MR/M012190/1 to EPIC-Oxford) (United Kingdom); GER: German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Programme of Clinical Biomedical Research (01 GB 9401) and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ); GRC: This research has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund—ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF)—Research Funding Program of the General Secretariat for Research & Technology: SYN11_10_19 NBCA. Investing in knowledge society through the European Social Fund; GRR: Roswell Park Cancer Institute Alliance Foundation, P30 CA016056; HAW: U.S. National Institutes of Health (R01-CA58598, N01-CN-55424, and N01-PC-67001); HJO: Intramural funding; Rudolf-Bartling Foundation; HMO: Intramural funding; Rudolf-Bartling Foundation; HOC: Helsinki University Research Fund; HOP: Department of Defense (DAMD17-02-1-0669) and NCI (K07-CA080668, R01-CA95023, P50-CA159981 MO1-RR000056 R01-CA126841); HUO: Intramural funding; Rudolf-Bartling Foundation; JGO: JSPS KAKENHI grant; JPN: Grant-in-Aid for the Third Term Comprehensive 10-Year Strategy for Cancer Control from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; KRA: This study (Ko-EVE) was supported by a grant from the Korea Health Technology R&D Project through the Korea Health Industry Development Institute (KHIDI), and the National R&D Program for Cancer Control, Ministry of Health & Welfare, Republic of Korea (HI16C1127; 0920010); LAX: American Cancer Society Early Detection Professorship (SIOP-06-258-01-COUN) and the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), Grant UL1TR000124; LUN: ERC-2011-AdG 294576-risk factors cancer, Swedish Cancer Society, Swedish Research Council, Beta Kamprad Foundation; MAC: National Institutes of Health (R01-CA122443, P30-CA15083, P50-CA136393); Mayo Foundation; Minnesota Ovarian Cancer Alliance; Fred C. and Katherine B. Andersen Foundation; Fraternal Order of Eagles; MAL: Funding for this study was provided by research grant R01- CA61107 from the National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, MD, research grant 94 222 52 from the Danish Cancer Society, Copenhagen, Denmark; and the Mermaid I project; MAS: Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education (UM.C/HlR/MOHE/06) and Cancer Research Initiatives Foundation; MAY: National Institutes of Health (R01-CA122443, P30-CA15083, and P50-CA136393); Mayo Foundation; Minnesota Ovarian Cancer Alliance; Fred C. and Katherine B. Andersen Foundation; MCC: Cancer Council Victoria, National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (NHMRC) grants number 209057, 251533, 396414, and 504715; MDA: DOD Ovarian Cancer Research Program (W81XWH-07-0449); MEC: NIH (CA54281, CA164973, CA63464); MOF: Moffitt Cancer Center, Merck Pharmaceuticals, the state of Florida, Hillsborough County, and the city of Tampa; NCO: National Institutes of Health (R01-CA76016) and the Department of Defense (DAMD17-02-1-0666); NEC: National Institutes of Health R01-CA54419 and P50-CA105009 and Department of Defense W81XWH-10-1-02802; NHS: UM1 CA186107, P01 CA87969, R01 CA49449, R01-CA67262, UM1 CA176726; NJO: National Cancer Institute (NIH-K07 CA095666, R01-CA83918, NIH-K22-CA138563, and P30-CA072720) and the Cancer Institute of New Jersey; If Sara Olson and/or Irene Orlow is a co-author, please add NCI CCSG award (P30-CA008748) to the funding sources; NOR: Helse Vest, The Norwegian Cancer Society, The Research Council of Norway; NTH: Radboud University Medical Centre; OPL: National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) of Australia (APP1025142) and Brisbane Women's Club; ORE: OHSU Foundation; OVA: This work was supported by Canadian Institutes of Health Research grant (MOP-86727) and by NIH/NCI 1 R01CA160669-01A1; PLC: Intramural Research Program of the National Cancer Institute; POC: Pomeranian Medical University; POL: Intramural Research Program of the National Cancer Institute; PVD: Canadian Cancer Society and Cancer Research Society GRePEC Program; RBH: National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia; RMH: Cancer Research UK, Royal Marsden Hospital; RPC: National Institute of Health (P50-CA159981, R01-CA126841); SEA: Cancer Research UK (C490/A10119 C490/A10124); UK National Institute for Health Research Biomedical Research Centres at the University of Cambridge; SIS: NIH, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Z01-ES044005 and Z01-ES049033; SMC: The bbSwedish Research Council-SIMPLER infrastructure; the Swedish Cancer Foundation; SON: National Health Research and Development Program, Health Canada, grant 6613-1415-53; SRO: Cancer Research UK (C536/A13086, C536/A6689) and Imperial Experimental Cancer Research Centre (C1312/A15589); STA: NIH grants U01 CA71966 and U01 CA69417; SWE: Swedish Cancer foundation, WeCanCureCancer and VårKampMotCancer foundation; SWH: NIH (NCI) grant R37-CA070867; TBO: National Institutes of Health (R01-CA106414-A2), American Cancer Society (CRTG-00-196-01-CCE), Department of Defense (DAMD17-98-1-8659), Celma Mastery Ovarian Cancer Foundation; TOR: NIH grants R01-CA063678 and R01 CA063682; UCI: NIH R01-CA058860 and the Lon V Smith Foundation grant LVS39420; UHN: Princess Margaret Cancer Centre Foundation-Bridge for the Cure; UKO: The UKOPS study was funded by The Eve Appeal (The Oak Foundation) and supported by the National Institute for Health Research University College London Hospitals Biomedical Research Centre; UKR: Cancer Research UK (C490/A6187), UK National Institute for Health Research Biomedical Research Centres at the University of Cambridge; USC: P01CA17054, P30CA14089, R01CA61132, N01PC67010, R03CA113148, R03CA115195, N01CN025403, and California Cancer Research Program (00-01389V-20170, 2II0200); VAN: BC Cancer Foundation, VGH & UBC Hospital Foundation; VTL: NIH K05-CA154337; WMH: National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, Enabling Grants ID 310670 & ID 628903. Cancer Institute NSW Grants 12/RIG/1-17 & 15/RIG/1-16; WOC: National Science Centren (N N301 5645 40). The Maria Sklodowska-Curie Memorial Cancer Center and Institute of Oncology, Warsaw, Poland. The University of Cambridge has received salary support for PDPP from the NHS in the East of England through the Clinical Academia Reserve. The prostate cancer genome-wide association analyses: we pay tribute to Brian Henderson, who was a driving force behind the OncoArray project, for his vision and leadership, and who sadly passed away before seeing its fruition. We also thank the individuals who participated in these studies enabling this work. The ELLIPSE/PRACTICAL (http//:practical.icr.ac.uk) prostate cancer consortium and his collaborating partners were supported by multiple funding mechanisms enabling this current work. ELLIPSE/PRACTICAL Genotyping of the OncoArray was funded by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (U19 CA148537 for ELucidating Loci Involved in Prostate Cancer SuscEptibility (ELLIPSE) project and X01HG007492 to the Center for Inherited Disease Research (CIDR) under contract number HHSN268201200008I). Additional analytical support was provided by NIH NCI U01 CA188392 (F.R.S.). Funding for the iCOGS infrastructure came from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement n° 223175 (HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS), Cancer Research UK (C1287/A10118, C1287/A 10710, C12292/A11174, C1281/A12014, C5047/A8384, C5047/A15007, C5047/A10692, and C8197/A16565), the National Institutes of Health (CA128978) and Post-Cancer GWAS initiative (1U19 CA148537, 1U19 CA148065, and 1U19 CA148112; the GAME-ON initiative), the Department of Defense (W81XWH-10-1-0341), the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) for the CIHR Team in Familial Risks of Breast Cancer, Komen Foundation for the Cure, the Breast Cancer Research Foundation, and the Ovarian Cancer Research Fund. This work was supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme grant agreement n° 223175 (HEALTH-F2-2009-223175), Cancer Research UK Grants C5047/A7357, C1287/A10118, C1287/A16563, C5047/A3354, C5047/A10692, C16913/A6135, C5047/A21332 and The National Institute of Health (NIH) Cancer Post-Cancer GWAS initiative grant: No. 1 U19 CA148537-01 (the GAME-ON initiative). We also thank the following for funding support: The Institute of Cancer Research and The Everyman Campaign, The Prostate Cancer Research Foundation, Prostate Research Campaign UK (now Prostate Action), The Orchid Cancer Appeal, The National Cancer Research Network UK, and The National Cancer Research Institute (NCRI) UK. We are grateful for support of NIHR funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre at The Institute of Cancer Research and The Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust. The Prostate Cancer Program of Cancer Council Victoria also acknowledge grant support from The National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia (126402, 209057, 251533, 396414, 450104, 504700, 504702, 504715, 623204, 940394, and 614296), VicHealth, Cancer Council Victoria, The Prostate Cancer Foundation of Australia, The Whitten Foundation, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Tattersall's. E.A.O., D.M.K., and E.M.K. acknowledge the Intramural Program of the National Human Genome Research Institute for their support. The BPC3 was supported by the U.S. National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute (cooperative agreements U01-CA98233 to D.J.H., U01-CA98710 to S.M.G., U01-CA98216 to E.R., and U01-CA98758 to B.E.H., and Intramural Research Program of NIH/National Cancer Institute, Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics). CAPS GWAS study was supported by the Swedish Cancer Foundation (grant no 09-0677, 11-484, 12-823), the Cancer Risk Prediction Center (CRisP; www.crispcenter.org), a Linneus Centre (Contract ID 70867902) financed by the Swedish Research Council, Swedish Research Council (grant no K2010-70 × -20430-04-3, 2014-2269). The Hannover Prostate Cancer Study was supported by the Lower Saxonian Cancer Society. PEGASUS was supported by the Intramural Research Program, Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health. RAPPER was supported by the NIHR Manchester Biomedical Research Center, Cancer Research UK (C147/A25254, C1094/A18504) and the EU's 7th Framework Programme Grant/Agreement no 60186. Overall: this research has been conducted using the UK Biobank Resource (application number 16549). NHS is supported by UM1 CA186107 (NHS cohort infrastructure grant), P01 CA87969, and R01 CA49449. NHSII is supported by UM1 CA176726 (NHSII cohort infrastructure grant), and R01-CA67262. A.L.K. is supported by R01 MH107649. We would like to thank the participants and staff of the NHS and NHSII for their valuable contributions as well as the following state cancer registries for their help: AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, WY. The authors assume full responsibility for analyses and interpretation of these data. ; Peer Reviewed
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ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.). Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/docCIDOB.2024.15/enE-ISSN: 2339-9570
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Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"The Norwegian peace engagement: New challenges in a new world order". NORAD, (20 August 2018), (on-line) [Date accessed 25.04.2023]: https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/news/2018/evaluation-views-the-norwegian-peace-engagement---new-challenges-in-a-new-world-order/ Spetalnik, Matt, Vivian Sequera et al. "US tells UN it will shield Venezuelan humanitarian fund from creditors". Reuters, (19 May 2023), (on-line) [Date accessed 20.05.2023]: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-tells-un-it-will-shield-venezuela-humanitarian-fund-creditors-sources-2023-05-18/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Political Realism in International Relations. plato.stanford.edu, (2017) (on-line) [Date accessed 08.05.2023]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ Stokke, Kristian. "Peace-building as Small State Foreign Policy: Norway's Peace Engagement in a Changing International Context". International Studies, vol. 49, no. 3-4, (September 2014), p. 207-231, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171453233 Stokke, Kristian. "The Soft Power of a Small State: Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices in Norway's Peace Engagement". Power, Conflict, Democracy Journal, vol. 2, no.1, (2010), p. 138-173, DOI: 10.22146/pcd.25724 Touval, Saadia. "Mediation and Foreign Policy". International Studies Review, vol.5, no. 4, (December 2003), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504009.x, p. 91–95. The Venezuelan Negotiation Process, Oslo, regjeringen.no (2023) [Date accessed 13.05.2023]: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/venezuela_negotiations/id2674295/ Voz de América. "Diálogo: Opción que Guaidó y Maduro no descartan para salvar a Venezuela". Voz de América, (30 May 2019), (on-line), [Date accessed 12.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezuela-noruega-negociaciones-para-poner-fin-a-la-crisis-/4936901.html Voz de América. "Tras fracaso en Barbados, Venezuela sigue esperando una solución". Voz de América, (11 August 2019), (on-line) [Date accessed 14.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/tras-fracaso-en-barbados-venezuela-sigue-esperando-una-solucion/5037644.html Voz de América. "Funcionarios de EE.UU. viajan a Venezuela y se reúnen con oficiales del gobierno: según medios". Voz de América, (6 March 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/funcionarios-eeuu-viajaran-venezeula-reunen-oficiales-gobierno-/6472694.html Voz de América. "Gobierno y oposición de Venezuela coinciden en Noruega". Voz de América, (20 June 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/delegaciones-maduro-dialogo-noruega-/6625220.html Wilson, Peter. "Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.).Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolution
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Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.
1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.
3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.
In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.
A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.
And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.
Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.
CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution
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Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution
Consists of thesaurus used in indexing the public papers of Leonor K. Sullivan, housed in the Saint Louis University School of Law Library. ; SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSDY GE JK1323 1952 .S34 1989 c.3 THE HONORABLE Leo nor K. (Mrs. John B.) Sullivan A Guide to the Collection St. Louis University Law Library Saint Louis University Schoo( of Law 3700 Lirufeff B(vd., St. Louis, MO 63108 LEONOR K. SULLIVAN 1902-1988 A Guide to the Collection Researched and prepared by: Joanne C. Vogel Carol L. Moody Loretta Matt LAW LIBRARY ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY 3700 LINDtLL BLVD. ST. LOUIS, MO 63108 Copyright 1989 Saint Louis University Law Library 00 ' ()) THE HONORABLE LEONOR K. SULLIVAN 1902-1988 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Portrait of Leonor K. Sullivan II. Biography III. Sullivan Plaques and Awards IV. The Leonor K. Sullivan Collection V. List of Subject Headings LEONOR K. SULLIVAN Leonor K. Sullivan, the first woman from Missouri to serve in the United States House of Representatives, was born Leonor Alice Kretzer, August 21, 1902, in St. Louis. She attended public and private schools in St. Louis, including Washington University. Prior to her marriage, Mrs. Sullivan pursued a business career and eventually became the director of the St. Louis Comptometer School. She married Missouri Congressman John B. Sullivan on December 27, 1941, and served as his administrative assistant and campaign manager until his death in January, 1951. Following her husband's death, Mrs. Sullivan unsuccessfully attempted to win the local Democratic party's nomination to succeed Congressman Sullivan in the special election. The seat was lost to a Republican candidate. In 1952, Leonor K. Sullivan running on her own, without party support, defeated six opponents in the primary election to become the Democratic nominee for the Third Congressional District. In the general election, she defeated her Republican opponent and recaptured the seat once held by her husband. Mrs. Sullivan represented the Third Congressional District until her retirement in 1976. While in Congress, Leonor K. Sullivan was known as a champion of consumer issues and she had a key role in enacting legislation to improve the quality of food. The Poultry Inspection Law and the Food Additives Act are just two of her important triumphs. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Mrs. Sullivan was responsible for the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, which included the Truth in Lending Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970. Mrs. Sullivan also authored the original food stamp plan to distribute government surplus food to the needy and she worked to solve the housing problems in our cities. At the time of her retirement, she was the senior member of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing. She was a member of the National Commission on Food Marketing, 1964-66; the National Commission on Mortgage Interest Rates, 1969; the National Commission on Consumer Finance, 1969-72; and she helped found the Consumer Federation of America in 1966. Mrs. Sullivan served as chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Her support of the American Merchant Marine earned her the American Maritime Industry's Admiral of the Ocean Seas Award (AOTOS) in 1973. The men and women who served in the Coast Guard and the Merchant Marine continuously honored Mrs. Sullivan for her support, understanding, and dedication. Always active in waterways projects, she fought to allow the 51 year old DELTA QUEEN to continue as an overnight excursion vessel. Mrs. Sullivan's work as chairman of the Subcommittee on Panama was especially important as she became involved with the political, economic, and social challenges of the Canal Zone and the people who lived and worked there. Leonor K. Sullivan worked hard for St. Louis. She sponsored legislation to fund the development of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial on the St. Louis Riverfront, to keep St. Louis a well managed port city on the Mississippi trade route, and to preserve the buildings so important to the history and heritage of St. Louis. Wharf Street has been renamed Leonor K. Sullivan Boulevard to honor her support of the Gateway Arch project and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Following her retirement, Mrs. Sullivan returned to her river bluff home which overlooked the Mississippi River. She remained active in civic affairs, serving on numerous boards and committees. She became a director of Southwest Bank, chairman of the Consumer Advisory Council to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, a member of the Board of Directors of Downtown St. Louis, Inc., a member of the Lay Advisory Board of Mount St. Rose Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, and she sponsored a consumer award program through the Better Business Bureau. Mrs. Sullivan was always in demand as a featured speaker at business, educational, and social functions. In 1980, Mrs. Sullivan married Russell L. Archibald, a retired vice president of the American Furnace Company. Mr. Archibald died March 19, 1987. Leonor K. Sullivan died, in St. Louis, on September 1, 1988. SULLIVAN PLAQUES AND AWARDS The Sullivan Collection includes many awards, citations, plaques, letters of recogn1tlon, pictures, and other memorabilia. During her career, Mrs. Sullivan received over 200 awards, some of which are permanently displayed in the Law Library. 1. Missouri State Labor Council, AFL-CIO - a proclamation designating Leonor K. Sullivan as organized labor's First Lady. Presented September 8, 1976. 2. Robert L. Hague Merchant Marine Industries Post #1242 - Distinguished Service Citation for Mrs. Sullivan's work as Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. 3. Oceanographer of the Navy - presented by RADM J. Edward Snyder, Jr., USN, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary or the Navy. 4. Panama Canal Gavel - made from one of the original beams of the Governor's House, the gavel was presented to Mrs. Sullivan by Governor W. E. Potter as a "token of appreciation for demonstrated interest in the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone Government." 5. Consulting Engineers Council of Missouri - expresses appreciation for Mrs. Sullivan's concern and understanding of the role of the consulting engineer. 6. St. Louis Democratic City Central Committee - Special Award recognizes Leonor K. Sullivan's "dedicated service to the people of Missouri, the United States of America, and the Democratic Party . ," presented September, 19, 1976. 7. Consumer Federation of America - CFA Distinguished Public Service Award, June 14, 1972. 8. Reserve Officers' Association, Missouri - President's Award recognizing Mrs. Sullivan's service to the nation during her 24 years in Congress. 9. American Waterway Operators, Inc. - recognizes Mrs. Sullivan's " . Instrumental Role in the Development of the Inland Waterways of the United States." I 0. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, St. Louis Section - 1976 Civic A ward for Outstanding Contributions to Communities and Nation during 24 years in the House of Representatives, May 11, 1976. 11. Federal Land Banks 50th Anniversary Medal - " . awarded in 1967, to Leon or K. Sullivan for outstanding contributions to American Agriculture." 12. St. Louis Board of Aldermen - Resolution #101 (March 12,1976) honoring Mrs. Sullivan for her 24 years in Congress. 13. Human Development Corporation of Metropolitan St. Louis - Certificate of Recognition, September 29, 1978. 14. Older Adults Special Issues Society (OASIS) - Confers honorary membership upon Leonor K. Sullivan, August 22, 1974. 15. National Health Federation - Humanitarian Award, October 11, 1958 - especially recognizes Mrs. Sullivan's efforts for protective legislation against injurious additives in food and beverages. 16. U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York - an award presented to Mrs. Sullivan by the Alumni of Kings Point. 17. American Numismatic Association - a 1972 award presented to Mrs. Sullivan for her generous support. 18. Official Hull Dedication for New Steamboat - replica of the dedication plaque unveiled by Mrs. Sullivan in Jeffersonville, Indiana, November 11, 1972. Hull 2999 was the official designation of the new passenger riverboat being built for the Delta Queen Steamboat Company. The dedication also recognized Leonor K. Sullivan's successful legislative efforts on behalf of the DELTA QUEEN. 19. Jewish War Veterans of the United States, Department of Missouri - 1963 Americanism Award for "her unselfish devotion and untiring efforts on behalf of all Missourians regardless of race or creed." 20. National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO - recognizes Mrs. Sullivan's service and support of the U.S. Merchant Marine, February 26, 1975. 21. Child Day Care Association - 1973 award for sponsoring child welfare legislation. 22. St. Louis Democratic City Central Committee - 1973 Harry S. Truman Award. 23. Seal of the Canal Zone Isthmus of Panama - a wooden copy of the Seal "presented in appreciation to Hon. Leonor K. Sullivan . " Canal Zone; Masters, Mates, and Pilots Association; National Maritime Union; Central Labor Union; Joint Labor Committee, 1969. 24. Atlantic Offshore Fish and Lobster Association - recognizes Leonor K. Sullivan's efforts to preserve and protect the Northwest Atlantic Fishing Industry, June, 1973. 25. Photographic portrait of President and Mrs. Johnson inscribed to Leonor K. Sullivan. 26. Photographic portrait of Lyndon Johnson inscribed to Leonor Sullivan. 27. Photographic portrait of Hubert H. Humphrey inscribed to Congressman (sic) Leonor K. Sullivan 28. H.R. I 0222 - Food Stamp Act of 1964 - first page of the engrossed copy of the bill, signed by John McCormack, Speaker of the House. 29. St. Louis University School of Law - Dedication of the New Law School, October 17-18, 1980 - recognizes Mrs. Sullivan's leadership gift. 30. West Side Baptist Church Meritorious Achievement Award, 1974. 31. Inaugural visit to St. Louis of the MISSISSIPPI QUEEN, July 29, 1978. 32. Gold-framed reproduction of a portrait of Mrs. Sullivan which hangs in the Longworth House Office Building. 33. Flora Place Association, November 4, 1976 - an award recognizing Mrs. Sullivan's 24 years in Congress. 34. St. Louis Police Relief Association, July 24, 1974. 35. St. Louis Argus Distinguished Citizen's Award, 1978. 36. George M. Khoury Memorial Award- "Woman of the Year," February 2, 1974. 37. Distinguished Service to the United States Coast Guard, February, 1976. 38. National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents - Federal Woman of the Year, October 12, 1974. 39. Chief Petty Officers Association, United States Coast Guard - Keynote speaker at Sixth Annual Convention, October 7-12, 1974, in St. Louis, MO. 40. Home Builders Association - Distinguished Service A ward, November 7, 1970. 41. Young Democrats of St. Louis - Distinguished Service Award, 1964. 42. Bicentennial Year Award, 1976 - a Waterford crystal bell and base presented to Mrs. Sullivan during the nation's Bicentennial. 43. Cardinal Newman College - Mrs. Sullivan's Cardinal Newman College Associates membership certificate presented during her tenure as Chairman, Board of Trustees, November 3, 1981. THE LEO NOR K. SULLIVAN COLLECTION Before her retirement, Leonor K. Sullivan made arrangements to donate her congress ional papers, correspondence, and memorabilia to St. Louis University Law Library. Mrs. Sullivan chose St. Louis University Law Library because her husband, Congressman John B. Sullivan (1897 -1951 ), was a graduate of the law school, having received his LL. B. degree in 1922, and his LL. M. degree in 1923. In 1965, Mrs. Sullivan founded a scholarship at St. Louis University for young women interested in studying political science. The collection covers Mrs. Sullivan's 24 years in the U.S. House of Representatives and is arranged according to her own subject headings. In this way, the materials provide insight into the way her office files and correspondence were organized. Mrs. Sullivan was known as one of the hardest working members of Congress and the wealth of materials in her collection attests to this. She had a tremendous concern for the average American family and much of her work dealt with their needs. Mrs. Sullivan often said the · best legislative ideas came from constituents, so she read every letter ever sent to her. Not only did she learn how the voters felt about current issues, but where there were problems which needed to be current issues. Papers from Leonor K. Sullivan's years as a member of the House Merchant Marine Committee and the Banking and Currency Committee provide background information for much of the legislation proposed during the period. Mrs. Sullivan was known as a consumer advocate long before such a position was popular and her efforts to improve the quality of food, drugs, and cosmetics are well documented. Materials are also available on Mrs. Sullivan's struggle for credit protection for the consumer, truth-in-lending, and fair credit reporting. Mrs. Sullivan was a strong supporter of the American Merchant Marine, the U.S. supervision of the Panama Canal, and the development of America's inland waterways. Her collection includes in-depth information on all these areas. Local St. Louis concerns are well represented in Leonor K. Sullivan's papers. She spent untold hours on the development of the Gateway Arch, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, and the port of St. Louis. She worked hard to maintain and increase the river traffic which is so important to St. Louis. After her retirement, Mrs. Sullivan continued to receive letters from former constituents and friends. She was active in civic affairs and her opinion on current issues was frequently solicited. The collection includes newspaper clippings, letters, and personal materials from this post-retirement period. Persons interested in using the Leonor K. Sullivan Collection should contact Joanne C. Vogel or Eileen H. Searls at St. Louis University Law Library, (314)658-2755. Written requests for information may be sent to: St. Louis University Law Library Leonor K. Sullivan Collection 3700 Lindell Blvd. St. Louis, MO 63108 Arthritis Research Arts Arts and Humanities see also Grants--National Endowment for the Arts Grants-- National Endowment for the Humanities Assassination of John F . Kennedy see Kennedy, John F. - -Assassination Assassinations--Select Committee to Investigate see Select Committee to Investigate Assassinations Atlantic Convention Atlantic Union Atomic Accelerator Laboratory Atomic Bomb--Fallout Shelter see a/ SO Nuclear Weapons-- Radioactive Fallout Atomic Energy see also Nuclear Energy Nuclear Weapons Auto Inspection Safety Auto Insurance Auto Insurance and Compensation Study Automotive Industry Automotive Transport Research and Development Act Aviation see a/ SO Airlines, Airport and Airway B-1 Program Development Act Airports Civil Aeronautics Board Concorde Supersonic Tra nsport Federal Aviation Administration Banking and Currency Committee Banking and Currency Committee-- Aluminum Penny Bill Banking and Currency Committee--Area Redevelopment Program Banking and Currency Committee Failures see a/so Independent Bankers Association of America Banking and Currency Committee- -Bank Holdings Company Act see a/so Banking and Currency Committee-Citicorp Banking and Currency Committee--Bank Holding Company Issues Banking and Currency Committee--Bank Lobbying Banking and Currency Committee--Bank Mergers 83nking and Currency Committee- -Bank Protection Act of 1968 Banking and Currency Committee- -Bank Safety Regulations Banking and Currency Committee--Bank Security Measures Banking and Currency Committee--Banking Act of 1965 Banking and Currency Committee -- B a nk i11~ Changes Banking and Currency Committee- Bankruptcy B:mking and Currency Committee--Taxation Banking and Currency Committee--Trust Activities Ban king and Currency Committee-- Certificates of Deposit Banking and Currency Committee--Citicorp see also Bank Holding Company Banking and Currency Committee-- Committee Business Banking and Currency Committee-Committee Notices Banking and Currency Committee-- Conferee Banking and Currency Committee-Congressional Record Entries Banking and Currency Committee-Consumer Credit see also National Commission on Consumer Finance Banking and Currency Committee-Correspondence with Boyd Ewing Banking and Currency Committee--Credit Information Ban king and Currency Committee-- Credit Union Financial Institutions Act Banking and Currency Committee--Credit Unions see also General Accounting Office- - Credit Unions Banking and Currency Committee- - Credit Unions--Insurance on Deposits Banking and Currency Committee- - Credit Unions--National Credit Union Bank Bill Banking and Currency Committee--Credit Uses Reporting Act of 1975 Banking and Currency Committee- - Debt Collection Banking and Currency Committee -- Defense Production Act see a[ so Joint Committee on Defense Production Banking and Currency Committee-Democratic Caucus Banking and Currency Committee-Disclosure Act Banking and Currency Committee-- Economic Development Act ee a[ SO Economic Development Banking and Currency Committee-- Economic Stabilization Act --Amendments B3nking and Currency Committee -- Economic Stabilization Act -- Correspondence Banking and Currency Committee-- Economic Stabilization Act--Mark-Up Session Banking and Currency Committee-- Economic Stabilization Subcommittee Banking and Currency Committee-- Emergency Financial Assistance Act see a[ so Banking and Currency Committee- lntergovermental Emergency Assistance Act Banking and Currency Committee--New York City-- Correspondence Banking and Currency Committee--New York City- -Legislation Banking and Currency Committee--Energy Conservation Legislation see also Energy Conservation Banking and Currency Committee--Export Control see a/so Export Administration Act Export Control Act International Trade Commission Banking and Currency--Export/Import Bank Banking and Currency Committee- -FINE Study (Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy) Banking and Currency Committee- -FINE Study--Hearings Banking and Currency Committee--Farmers Home Administration- Low Interest Loans Banking and Currency Committee-- Financial Reform Act of 1976 Banking and Currency Committee--Gold Backing and Federal Reserve Notes Banking and Currency Committee- -Gold Price Banking and Currency Committee- Insurance see also Insurance Banking and Currency Committee-Interamerican Bank see also Agency for International Development Banking and Currency Committee--Interest Rates see also Interest Rates Banking and Currency Committee--Prime Interest Rate Banking and Currency Committee- -Savings and Loans- - Interest Rates Banking and Currency Committee-- Interest Rates-- Hearings Banking and Currency Committee- Intergovernmental Emergency Assistance Act see a/so Banking and Currency Committee-Emergency Financial Assistance Act Banking and Currency Committee- International Banking Act Banking and Currency Committee-- International Development Association Banking and Currency Committee-- International Monetary Policy see a/ o Banking and Currency Committee- - Monetary Policy Banking and Currency Committee--Laws of the State of Missouri Relating to Banks and Trust Companies Banking and Currency Committee-Lockheed Case Banking and Currency Committee-Monetary Policy see also Banking and Currency Committee-International Monetary Policy Banking and Currency Committee-Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy Banking and Currency Committee-- Mortgage Interest Rates see also Federal National Mortgage Association Banking and Currency Committee-Mortgage Interest Rates--District of Columbia Banking and Currency Committee-Mortgage Interest Rates--Hearings Banking and Currency Committee--Mutual Savings Banks Banking and Currency Committee--National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality Banking and Currency Committee--National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act see also Consumer Interest--Miscellaneous Banking and Currency Committee--National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act see a/so Consumer Interest--Miscellaneous Banking and Currency Committee--New York City-Correspondence see also Banking and Currency Committee- Emergency Financial Assistance Banking and Currency Committee--New York City- - Legislation see also Banking and Currency Committee-Emergency Financial Assistance Banking and Currency Committee--NOW Account Banking and Currency Committee--One Bank Holding Company Bill Banking and Currency Committee--One Bank Holding Company Bill- -Clippings Banking and Currency Committee--One Bank Holding Company Bill- - Committee Information Banking and Currency Committee--One Bank Holding Company Bill--Letters Banking and Currency Committee--One Bank Holding Company Bill--Reports from Interested Groups Banking and Currency Committee--One Dank ll nlclinR c: . np:111y Bill-- Reports from Other Agencies Banking and Currency Committee--Penn Central see a/so Railroad Legislation Banking and Currency Committee--Prime Interest Rates see a/so Interest Rates Banking and Currency Committee--Record Maintenance in Banking Institutions Banking and Currency Committee-- Recurring Monetary and Credit Crisis Banking and Currency Committee-- Reven ue Bonds Banking and Currency Committee--Safe Banking Act Banking and Currency Committee- - St. Louis Banking Banking and Currency Committee-- Savings and Loan Companies see a/so Housing-- Savings and Loans Housing--Savings and Loans Bill Housing--Loans Banking and Currency Committee- -Savings and Loan Companies-Holding Companies Banking and Currency - - Savings and Loan Companies-- Interest Rates see a/so Interest Rates Banking and Currency Committee--Interest Rates Banking and Currency Committee-- Savings and Loan Companies-Investigation Banking and Currency Committee--Silver Banking and Currency Committee--Small Business see a/so Sma ll Business Administration Poverty Program-- St . Louis Small Business Development Center St . Louis--Small Business Administration Banking and Currency Committee- - Steering Committee Banking and Currency Committee-Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy ,,,.,. also Banking and Currency Committee- Monetary Policy Banking and urrt!ncy Committee--Swiss Bank Accounts Uanking and Currency Committee--Taxing of National Banks Banking and Currency Committee- - Variable Interest Rate Mortgage Loans Bankrupt see Banking and Currency Committee -Bankruptcy Barge Lines see also Federal Barge Lines Dccf Research and Information Act n ct•J" Ucllcr Communities Ad see Housing--Better Communities Act Bicentennial Civic Improvement Association see a/ SO American Revolution Bicentennial Bicentennial Civic Improvement Bicentennial Coinage see also Coinage Bicentennial Material Billboards Association-- Clippings see Highways-- Beautification- - Billboards Birth Control see also Family Planning Illegitimacy Population Growth Sex Education Black Lung Act see also Coal Black Militants see Militants Mine Safety Act see also Negroes--Black Militants Bl ackman's Development Center Blind see also Handicapped Blood ::,ee Health -- Blood Banks Blumeyer P roject see Housing-- Blumeyer Project Boating see also Coast Guard Boggs , Hale Bookmobile National Safe Boating Week Recreation see Education --Bookmobile Books Sent to Libraries and Schools see also Lib raries Bowlin Project see Housing -- Bowlin Project for the Elderly Braceros see National Commission on Food Marketing Bracero Study Brazil see Foreign Affairs- - Brazil Bretton Woods Agreement Bride's Packet see Publications --Packets for the Bride Bridges see Martin Luther King Bridge Buchanan, Mrs. Vera Budget see also Management and Budget, Office of Budget and Impoundment Control Act Budget Material Building Sciences Act see Housi ng-- Building Sciences Act Bur"r'u of Standards see Food and Drug Administration--Bureau of Standards Bus Service see also Transi t -- Bi- State Business and Professional Women's Clubs see also Women's Organizations Busing see Education- - Busing Buy American Act Care see Foreign Affairs--Care Cabanne Turnkey Project see Housing--Cabanne Turnkey Project Calley, William L. Cambodia see Foreign Affairs - -Cambodia Campaign Conference for Democratic Women see a/so Women in Politics Campaigns Campus Riots see also Education--Campus Unrest Cancer see a/ SO Medical Insurance for Radiation Treatment Cannon Dam see Conservation--Cannon Dam Capital Punishment Capitol- - United States Carpentry see Housing--Building Sciences Act Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs Cattle see Food and Drug Administration- -Cattle Cemeteries see National Cemeteries Census see also Population Growth Central Intelligence Agency Century Electric Company see National Labor Relations Board-Century Electric Company Chain Stores see National Commission on Food Chamber of Commerce Cha rities Marketing- -Chain Stores Child Abuse and Neglect Child and Family Services Act see a/so Comprehensive Child Development Act Child Care see Poverty Program--Day Care Centers see also Poverty Program--Head Start Centers Poverty Program- -St. Louis Day Care St. Louis Day Care Child Protection Act Children , Youth , Maternal, and Infant Health Care Programs Chile see Foreign Aff:1irs--Chile Chirm sec Foreign Affairs--Red China China's Art Exhibit Cigarette Advertising Cities see Urban Affairs see a/so Housing--Urban Renewal Revenue Sharing Citizenship see Immigration -- Naturalized Citizens City Planning see a/ 0 Urban Affairs Civil Aeronautics Board see a/so Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Civil Air Patrol Civil Defense see also Emergency Preparedness Missouri--Disaster Area Civil Rights- -Clippings see also Integration Militants Negroes--Black Militants Negroes--National Assocation for the Advancement of Colored People Civil Rights- -Discharge Petition Civil Rights-- Equal Employment Opportunity see a/so Equal Employment Opportunity Equal Opportunity Civil Rights- -Equality for Women see a/so Women- -Equal Rights Amendment Civil Rights-- Housing see a/so Housing--Fair Housing Housing--Open Negroes--Housing Civil Rights- -Ireland's Roman Catholics Civil Rights--Legislation Civil Rights--Mississippi Seating Civil Rights --Pro Civil Rights-- Webster Groves Incident Civil Service Health Benefits Civil Service Legislation see also Federal Employees Civil Service Retirement Clara Barton House Clean Air Act see also Air Pollution Pollution Coal see a/ SO Black Lung Act Energy Crisis Mine Safety Act Mineral Resources Coal Mine Surface Area Protection Act see a/ so Mining Coal Slurry Pipeline Act Coal Tar Products see Food and Drug Administration- - Hair Dye Coast Guard see also Boating National Safe Boating Week Coastal Areas see a/so Outer Continental Shelf Lands Coca-Cola Bottling Company Cochran Apartments see Housing--Public Housing-Cochran Apartments Coinage Sl!l' a/ SO Bicentennial Coinage National Stamping Act Colleges and Universities see Education- - College Loan Program see a/so Schools--College Debate Color Additives see Food and Drug Administration--Color Additives Commemorative Postage Stamp for Jeannette Rankin Commemorative Stamps see a/so Kennedy, John F . First Day Cover Issues see Food and Drug Administration-Cranberries Creating a Joint Committee to Investigate Crime Credit Unions see Banking and Currency Committee- Credit Unions see a/so General Accounting Office- - Credit Unions Crime--Bail Reform Act Crime--General see a/so J oint Committe to Investigate Crime Juvenile Delinquency Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Prisons Crime--Gun Control Crime--Riots see a/so Housing--Insurance--Riots Crime--Riots- - Clippings Crime- - Switch - -Blades Cruelty to Animals Current River see Conservation--Current River Power Line Customs Bureau Cyprus see Foreign Affairs - -Cyprus Czechoslovakia see Foreign Affairs--Czechoslovakia Daily Digest see Panama Canal--Daily Digest Dairy Products see Milk see a/so Food and Drug Administration-Milk Dams see Lock and Dam 26 Conservation- - Cannon Dam Danforth Foundation see a/ 0 Foundations Darst- -Webbe Public Housing see Housing- - Public Housing--Darst-Web be Davis- -Bacon Act see Labor- - Davis-Bacon Day Care Centers see Poverty Program--Day Care Center see a/ 0 Poverty Program--St. Louis Day Care St. Louis Day Care Daylight Savings Time Deafness see Hearing Aids Death with Dignity Debt Ceiling Bill See a/so Goverment Debt National Debt Decontrol of Certain Domestic Crude Oil see a/so Oil Leases Defense ee a/ 0 Nation:1l Defense Defense Appropriations see a/ SO Military Construction Appropriation Bill Military Expenditures Military Pay Military Procurement Defense Contracts See a/so Federal Government Contract Legislation Military Procurement Defense Mapping Agency Sl!£' n/so Aeronautical Chart and Information Center Defense Production Act see Banking and Currency Committee-Defense Production Act .\Ce a/ so Joint Committee on Defense Production Defense Production, Joint Committee see Joint Committee on Defense Production Delta Queen Delta Queen-- Clippings Delta Queen--Correspondence Delta Queen- -Extend Exemption Delta Queen/Mississippi Queen--Clippings Delta Queen/Mississippi Queen-- Correspondence Democratic City Central Committee Democratic Clubs Democratic Coalition Party Democratic Convention--1972 Democratic Convention--1976 Democratic National Committees Democratic Organizations Democratic Party see a/so Banking and Currency Committee-Democratic Caucus Campaign Conference for Democratic Women Democratic State Committees Democratic Cities see Housing- - Democratic Cities Dental Health see Health--Dental Deodorant see Food and Drug Administration-Deodorant Department of Housing and Urban Development see Housing- -HUD Department of Labor see Grants--Department of Labor--St . Louis Department of Peace see Peace, Dept. of Department of the Interior see Grants--Department of the Interior-- St. Louis Department of Transportation see Grants--Department of Transportation-- St. Louis Desoto-- Carr Project see Housing- - Desoto-Carr Project Detention see Emergency Detention Act Development Bank ·ce Housing--Na tional Development Bank Diabetes Research see a/so National Diabetes Advisory Board Diet Foods see Food and Drug Administration--Diet Foods Digestive Diseases :,ee National Digestive Disease Act of 1976 Direct Popular Election of the President Disabled American Veterans see Veteran's Organizations Disarmament see also Arms Control Postal Boutique Commission of Consumer Finance see National Commission on Consumer Finance Commission on Federal Paperwork Commission on Food Marketing sec National Commission on Food Marketing Commission on History and Culture :see Negroes-- Commission on History and Culture Commission on Neighborhoods see National Commission on Neighborhoods Committee on Political Education see Political Education, Committee On Committee on P opulation Crisis see Population Crisis Committee Committee on Standards of Official Conduct Committee Reform Commodity Exchange Act see also Re- Pricing Commodities Commodity Futures see a/so Re- Pricing Commodities Common Cause Communications see also Federal Communications Commission Communism Radio Telecommunications Television Community Development Act Community Services Administration Comprehensive Child Development Act see a/so Child and Family Services Act Comprehensive Employment and Training Act see also Employment Compton--Grand Association see Housing Compton-Grand Association Comptroller General of the United States Concorde Supersonic Transport see also Aviation Concentrated Industries Anti - Inflation Act see also Inflation Congress- - 91st Congress--9lst--Senate Subcommittees Congress- -92nd Congress- -93rd Congress--94th Congress--94th--Majority Rpt . Congress--94th--Member's Pay Raise see a/ so Congressional and Civil Service P ay Raise Congress- -Committee on House Administration Congress-- Economic Committee see J oint Economic Committee Congress-- House Beauty Shoppe Congress--House Budget Committee Congress- - House Unamerican Activities Committee see a/ so Internal Security Congress- - Redistricting SC'(' Missou ri - - Redistricting Congress--Rules of Congressional and Congress--Scandals see a/ 0 Powell, Adam Clayton Congressional and Civil Service Pay Raise see a/ o Congress- - 94th- -Member Pay Raise Federal Pay Raise Congressional Fellowship Congressional Office--Payroll Congressional Pay Raise Congressional Record Inserts see a/so Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Congressional Record Inserts Congressional Reorganization see a/ 0 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 Congressional Travel Conservation --Cannon Dam see a/so National Park Service Parks Conservation --Current River Power Line Conservation --Eleven Point River Conservation-- Harry Truman Dam Conservation- -Lock Dam 26 see Lock and Dam 26 Conservation--Meramec Basin Conservation--Meramac Park Reservoir Conservation- -Meramac Recreation Area Conservation- -Mineral Resources see Mineral Resources Conservation --Miscellaneous see a/so Recycling Waste Conservation- - Recreation Area Conservation--Redwood National Park Conservation--Upper Mississippi River National Recreation Area see a/so Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission Conservation-- Water Resources see a/so Water Resources Planning Act Conservation-- Wild Rivers Conservation - - Wilderness Conservation -- Wildlife .\ee a/ :so Lacey Act Constitutional Changes Consumer Credit see Banking and Currency Committee--Consumer Credit see also National Commission on Consumer Finance Right to Financial Privacy Act Consumer In terest Miscellaneous see a/so Banking and Currency Committee- National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act National Commission on Food Marketing-- Consumer Information Publications-- Packet for the Bride Consumer Prod uct Information Bulletin see a/so Publications- -Consumer Product Information Copyright Legislation Copyrights Cosmetics see Food and Drug Administration- - entries Cosmetologists see National Hairdressers and Cosmetologists Cost of Living Council Cost of Living Task Force Council of Catholic Women see a/so St. Louis Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women Women-- Organizations Cranberries Diseased Pets District of Columbia see also Home Rule-- District of Columbia Doctors see Immigration--Foreign Doctors see a/so Education--Nurses and Medical Students/Medical Schools Health Manpower Bill Douglas, William 0 . see Impeachment (Justice Douglas) Draft Dru'g Abuse see a/so Alcoholism, Narcotics Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act Drug Advertising Drug Cases Drug Cost Drug Legislation Drug Regulation Drug Testing and New Drugs Drugs, Baby Asprin Drugs, Chemical Names Drugs, Factory Inspection Drugs, Habit- Forming Drugs, Interstate Traffic Drugs, Krebior:en see a/so Krebiozen Drugs, Strontium 90 see a/so Strontium 90 Drugs, Thalidomide see also Thalidomide Earthquakes East - West Gateway Coordinating Council see a/so St. Louis--East West Gateway Coordinating Council East St. Louis Convention Center Ecology see also Environmental Education Act Economic Committee see Joint Economic Committee Economic Development see a/so Banking and Currency-- Economic Development Act Economic Development Administration see a/so Grants--Economic Development Administration Economic Program Economic Summit Conference Economics--Joint Economic Committee see Joint Economic Committee Editorials--KMOX-TV see Radio and T elevision --Editorials Education see a/ so Schools Ed ucntion --Adult see a/ SO Adult Education Missouri - -Adult Education Act Education--Aid to Parochial Schools see a/so Aid to P arochial Schools Education --Federal Aid to Education Parochial Schools Education- - Aid to Private Schools See a/ 0 Aid to Private Schools Education --Federal Aid to Education Private Schools Education--Appropriations Education -- Bookmobile see a/ 0 Bookmobile Libraries Education--Busing see also Busing Integration Education--Campus unrest see also Campus riots Militants Education -- Clippings see ah;o Schools - - Clippings Education--College Loan Program see a/so Colleges and Universities Education--Higher Education Education--St udent Aid Bill Loans- - Student Student Loans Education- -Elementary and Secondary see also Schools Education--Federal Aid to Education see a/so Education--Aid to Parochial Schools Education-- Student Aid Bill Federal Aid to Education Education-- F ederal Charter for Insurance and Annuity Association see ah;o Insurance Education -- Food and Nutrition Program see a/ SO School Lunch Program School Milk Program Education--HEW Appropriations see also Health , Education and Welfare Education--Higher Education see also Education-- College Loan Program Education --Student Aid Bill Higher Education Missouri -- University Education- - Miscellaneous see also Quality Education Study Education--National Defense Education Act see a/so National Defense Education Act Education- - Nurses and Medical Students see also Doctors Heal t h Manpower Bill Medical Education Medical Schools Nurse Training Act Nurses Education-- Residential Vocational Education see also Education- - Vocational Education Vocational Education Education--Student Aid Bill see also Education- - College Loan Program Education--Higher Education Education --Federal Aid to Education Loan-- Student Student Loans Education --Tax Deductions for Education see a/ SO Taxes- - Deduction for Education of Dependents Education- - T eachers Corps see a/ ·o Teachers Corps Education-- Upward Bound Branch see also Upward Bound Education--Vocational Education see also Vocational Education Educational Grants Grants - - Educational Grants--HEW-- Public Schools Egypt see Foreign Affairs--Egypt Eisenhower, Dwight David Eisenhower College Elderly see also Aging National Institute on Aging Older Americans Act Elderly-- Employment Opportunities see also Employment Opportunities for the Elderly Older Americans Act Elderly - - Housing see Housing--Bowlin Project for the Elderly see also Housing--Elderly Election Laws see Missouri--Election Laws Election Reform see also Voting Rights Act Election Reform--Post Card Registration see alSO Post Card Registration Voter Registration Elections Commission Electoral College see also Direct Popular Election of the President Electric and Hybrid Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1976 ee also Energy Conservation and Electric Power Electricity see Lifeline Rate Act Conversion Act of 1976 Elementray and Secondary Education Eleven Point River see Conservation- -Eleven Point River Elk Hills Oil Reserve see also Oil Leases Emergency Detention Act see also Detention Emergency Employment see also Employment Emergency Livestock Credit Act See a/so Agriculture Emergency Rail Transportation Improvement and Employment Act See Railroads--Emergency Rail Transportation Improvement and Employment Act Emergency Rooms see Medical Emergency Transportation and Services Act Emergency Security Assistance Act Emergency Telephone Number see a/ 0 Nine One One Emergency Unemployment Compensation Assistance ·ee a/so Unemployment Compensation Emergency Utility Loans and Grants for Witerizing Homes see a/ o Utility Loans Employment See a/ 0 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Immigration Labor entries Manpower Minimum Wage Unemployment Employment- - Equal Opportunity Employment of the Handicapped see also Handicapped Labor--Handicapped Workers Employment Opportunities for the Elderly see Elderly --Employment Opportunities Endowment for the Arts see Grants--National Endowment for the Arts Endowment for the Humanities see National Endowment for the Humanities Energy-- Correspondence Energy Conservation see also Banking and Currency Commission--Energy Conservation Federal Power Commission Natural Gas Act Protection of Independent Energy Conservation and Conversion Act of 1976 see also Electric & Hybrid Research, Development & Demonstration Act of 1976 Energy Crisis SC'e also Coal Fuel for Cars Gas and Gasoline and Oil Allocations Oil Imports Oil Leases Energy Crisis-- Correspondence Energy Crisis--Material Energy Excerpts Energy Independence Act of 1975 Energy- - Information & Material see also Arctic Gas Project Energy Research and Development Environmental Education Act see also Ecology Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1976 see alSO Pesticides Environmental Policy Act Environmental Protection Agency see also Grants--Environmental Protection Agency-- St. Louis Equal Employment see a/so Civil Rights- -Equal Employment Opportunity Minority Groups Women--Employment Opportunities Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Equal Opportunity see a/so Civil Rights-- Equal Employment Opportunity Equal Pay for Equal Work !:>Cl! also Women--Employment Opportunities Equal Rights- - Clippings Equ al Rights for Women see a/so Women--Equal Rights--Material Equal Time ee a/ ·o Federal Communications Commission Euclid Piau Radio Television see Housing--Euclid Plaza Excess Property see Missouri - - Excess Property see Federal Excess Property Executive Reorgan ization Export Administration Act see a/so Banking and Currency--Export entries Export Control Act see a/so Banking and Currency Committee -Export Control FBI see Federal Bureau of Investigation FCC see Federal Communications Commission FDIC see B & C Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Fair Labor Standards Act see Labor--Fair Labor Standards Fair Plan see Insurance --Fair P lan Fair Trade see also Trade--Expor ts and Imports Fallout Shelters see Atomic Bomb--Fallout Shelters see Nuclear Weapons--Radioactive Fallout Family Assistance Act see also Welfare Welfare--Family Support Family Assistance Material and Clippings See a/so Welfare--Clippings Family Assistance Plan Family Fare see Publications--Family Fare Family Planning see a/ so Birth Control Illegitimacy P opulation Growth Sex Education Family Planning Services Act Family Week see National Family Week Farm Bill see Agriculture--Farm Bill Farm Workers see also Agriculture National Commission on Food Marketing--Bracero Study Federal Advisory Committee Act Federal Aid to Education see Education --Federal Aid to Education Federal Aviation Administ ration see also Aviation Civil Aeronautics Board Federal Barge Lines see a/ so Barge Lines Federal Buildi ngs see a/ so Public Buildings Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Communications Commission see also Communications Equal Time Radio and Television Television Federal Deposit Insurance Corp see also FDIC Federal Employees See a/ SO Civil Service Legislation Federal Excess Property see a/so Excess Property Missouri --Excess Property Fede ral Government Contract Legislation see a/so Defense Contracts Federal Home Loan Bank Board Federal Housing Administration see Housing-- Federal Housing Administration Federal Judical Center see also J udiciary Federal Land Bank of St. Louis see also Land Bank Federal National Mortgage Association see a/so Banking and Currency--Mortgage Interest Rates Mortgages and Interest Rates Federal Pay Raise see a/so Congressional and Civil Service Pay Raise Federal Power Commission see a/so Energy Conservation Fuel and Energy Resources Commission Lifeline Rate Act Federal Reserve System Federal Trade Commission Federal Voting Assistance Program see a/so Voter Registration Federation of Independent Business see National Federation of Independent Business Feed Grain see a/so Agriculture Food and Drug Administration-- Grain Grain Purchases Fetal Experimentation see Health , Education and Welfare--Fetal Experimentation Fi nancial Disclosure see a/so Right to Financial Privacy Act Financial Institutions Act Fire Protection see a/so National Academy for Fire Prevention & Central Site Selection Board Fish and Fish Products see a/so Food and Drug Administration-Fish Fish Inspection Food and Drug Administration-- Trout Trout see a/so Inspection , Food Fl ag Day Flood Control Meat Inspection Poultry Inspection see a/so St. Louis- - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Flood, Daniel J. Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission see P anama Canal--Correspondence- - Flood, Daniel J . Flood Insurance Program see a/so Insurance--Flood National Flood Insurance Program Flood Protection Project see also St. Louis--U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Floods see a/so Missouri - - Disaster Area Missouri- - Flood National Flood Insurance Program Rivers Fluoridation of Water Fonda, Jane Food see also Agriculture National Commission of Food Marketing P oultry Food and Drug Administration Index Code Food and Drug Administration Appropriations Food and Drug Administration-- Botulism Food and Drug Administration--Bread Prices Food and Drug Administration--Bureau of Standards Food and Drug Administration --Cattle-General Food and Drug Administration- -Cattle-Legislation Food and Drug Administration--Color Additives Food and Drug Administ ration-Confectionery Food and Drug Administration - -Copy of Bill Food and Drug Administ ration - -Cranberri•·> Food and Drug Administ ration -- DeodorauL Food and Drug Administration -- Diet Foods see a/ o Nut rition Food and Drug Administration --Eye Make-up Food and Drug Administration--Facial Creams Food and Drug Administration-- Fish Flour Food and Drug Administ ration--Food Additives Cases See a/ 0 Addi tives Food and Drug Administration -- Food Additives -- General ee also Nutrition Food and Drug Administration- - Food Additives-- Legislation Food and Drug Amdinistration-- Freezone Food and Drug Administration-- General Commentary Food and Drug Administration-- General Information Food and Drug Administration -- General Letters Food and Drug Administration-- Grain see a/ 0 Feed Grain Food and Drug Administration--Hair Dye Food and Drug Administration -- Hair Preparations Food and Drug Administration -- Hai r Remover Food and Drug Administration- - Hair Sprays Food and Drug Administration -- Ice Cream Food and Drug Administration -- Investigation Food and Drug Administration-- Legislation Food and Drug Administration- - Lipsticks Food and Drug Administration--Medical Devices see Medical Device Amendments Food and Drug Administration--Milk Food and Drug Administration-- Miscellaneous Food and Drug Administration- - Nail Polish Food and Drug Administration--Packaging Food and Drug Administration--Packaging (Wax) Food and Drug Administration--Pesticide Cases Food and Drug Administration--Pesticide Legislation and General Information Food and Drug Administration--Pesticides Food and Drug Administration-Preservatives Food and Drug Administration--Pre- testing Food and Drug Administration-- Request for Copy of Research Food and Drug Administration--Soap Food and Drug Administration--Special Dietary Foods see also Nutrition Food and Drug Administration--Sun-tan Lotion Food and Drug Administration--Trout Food and Drug Administration--Vaporizers Food and Drug Administration--Varnish Food and Drug Administration--Vitamin Supplements see a/so Nutrition Food and Drug Administration- - Water see also Water Food Assistance Act see Foreign Aid- -Food Assistance Act Food Crisis see a/ SO Agriculture Food for Peace Hunger and Malnutrition Nutrition Population Crisis Committee Population Growth Right to Food Resolution see also Agriculture Food Prices see also Agriculture Food Stamp Plan 1954--Bills see a/ SV Agriculture Hunger and Malnutrition Food Stamp Plan 1954--Comments and Criticism Food Stamp Plan 1954-- Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1954--Food Surplus Food Stamp Plan 1954--St. Louis Food Stamp Plan 1954--Speeches and Testimony Food Stamp Plan 1955--Correspondence and Legislation Food Stamp Plan 1955--Food Surplus Food Stamp Plan 1956--Bills and Hearings Food St amp Plan 1956--Commodity Credit Corp. Food St amp Plan 1956- - Correapondence, Speeches, Testimony Food Stamp Plan 1956- - Food Surplus Distribution Food Stamp Plan 1956--Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1957-- Bills Food Stamp Plan 1957--Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1957--Food Surplus and Food Stamp Plan Food Stamp Plan 1957--Hearings Food Stamp Plan 1957--Speeches Food Stamp Plan 1957--Testimony Food Stamp Plan 1958--Activities Carried on Under PL 63 -4RO Food Stamp Plan 1958--Bills Food Stamp Plan 1958--Comments and Criticism Food Stamp Plan 1958--Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1958--Hearings and Reports Food Stamp Plan 1958--Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1958- - Speeches and Testimony Food Stamp Plan 1958--Study and Procedure Food Stamp Plan 1959- - Bills Food Stamp Plan 1959--Comments and Criticism Food Stamp Plan 1959--Congressional Record Entry Food Stamp Plan 1959--Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1959-- Hearings and Reports Food Stamp Plan 1959--Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1959--Releases Food Stamp P lan 1959-- Speeches and Testimony Food Stamp Plan 1959- -Studies and Procedure Food Stamp Plan 1960- -Activities Carried on Under PL-480 Food Stamp Plan 1960-- Bills, Hearings, Reports Food Stamp Plan 1960-- Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1960-- Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1961-- Correspondence and Clippings Food Stamp Plan 1961--Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1962--Bills, Correspondence, Testimony Food Stamp Plan 1962-- Clippings Food Stamp Plan 1962--Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1963--Bills Food Stamp Plan 1963--Comments and Criticism Food Stamp Plan 1963--Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1963- - Hearings Food Stamp Plan 1963-- Releases Food Stamp Plan 1963--Speeches Food Stamp Plan 1963--Studies and Procedures Food Stamp Plan 1964--Appropriations Food Stamp Plan 1964--Bills Food Stamp Plan 1964--Comments and Criticism Food Stamp Plan 1964--Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 196-t -- Hearings Food Stamp Plan Hl64 --Minority Views Food Stamp Plan 1964--Releases Food Stamp Plan 196-t -- Speeches Food Stamp Plan 196-t -- Studies and Procedures Food Stamp Plan 1965 --Appropriations Cut Food Stamp Plan 1965- - Correspondence Food Stamp Plan 1965 - -District of Columbia Food Stamp Plan 1965--Expansion Food Stamp Plan 1965--Kinlock MO Food Stamp Plan 1965 --Missouri Food Stamp Plan 1965--Personal Letters Food Stamp Plan 1965--St. Louis MO Food Stamp Plan--Legislative History Food Stamp Plan--Miscellaneous Statistics Food Stamp Plan--Petition 1967 Food Stores see National Commission on Food Ford Foundation see also Foundations Ford, Gerald Marketing- -Chain Stores see Nixon, Richard M.-- Pardon Foreign Affairs--Amnesty Foreign Affairs--Angola Foreign Affairs- -Brazil Foreign Affairs--CARE Foreign Affairs--Cambodia see a/so Moratorium War Protest Foreign Affairs--Chile Foreign Affairs-- Cyprus Foreign Affairs- - Czechoslovakia Foreign Affairs-- Egypt see also Foreign Affairs - -Middle East Foreign Affai rs - - General Countries Foreign Affairs-- Genocide Treaty Foreign Affairs- - Indochina Foreign Affairs -- Israel see a/ 0 Foreign Affiars --Middle East Foreign Affairs-- Israel-Arab War see a/so Foreign Affairs- -Middle East Foreign Affairs - -Jordan see also Foreign Affairs--Middle East Foreign Affairs --Lebanon see a/so Foreign Affairs--Middle East Foreign Affairs --Middle East see also Foreign Affairs- - Egypt Foreign Affairs -- Israel Foreign Affairs -- Israel Arab War Foreign Affairs --Jordan Foreign Affairs--Lebanon Oil Imports Foreign Affairs- -Mid-East Sinai Pact Foreign Affairs --Non-Proliferation Treaty Foreign Affai rs --Peru Foreign Affairs- - Pueblo Foreign Affaris- -Puerto Rico see a/ SO Puerto Rico Foreign Affairs--Red China Foreign Affairs--Republic of China see Republic of China Foreign Affairs -- Rhodesia Foreign Affairs - - Soviet Union Foreign Affairs--Turkey Foreign Affai rs --United Nations Foreign Affairs -- United Nations Development Program Foreign Affairs -- Vietnam ee a/ SO Missing in Action Prisoners of War Select Committee to Investigate Missing in Action Foreign Affairs -- Vietnam- - Mrs. Sullivan 's Voting Record (as of 1972) see a/so Sullivan, L.K. Voting Record Foreign Affairs Legislation Foreign Aid Foreign Aid- - Food Assistance Acl Foreign Policy Foreign Visitors Forest Park Blvd. Turnkey Project see Housing--Forest Park Blvd. Turnkey Project Forestry Legislation see also Lumber Fort San Carica see Jefferson National Expansion Memorial--Building a Replica of Fort San Carlos Foster Grandparents see Poverty Program--Foster Grandparents Foundations see also Ford Foundation Danforth Foundation Grants Grants--National Science Foundation National Science Foundation Four Freedoms Study Group Franchises Franchising Practice Reform Act Freedom of Information Act see also Sunshine Bill Freedom of the Press see also Newspapers Radio Television Fuel and Energy Resources Commission see a/so Energy Conservation Federal Power Commissron Fuel for Cars see also Energy Crisis Gas and Gasoline and Oil Allocation Fur see also Laclede Fur Co. GAO see General Accounting Office GPO see Government Printing Office GSA see General Services Administration Gambling see also Lotteries Gas--Laclede Gas see also Natural Gas Gas--Natural Gas and Gasoline and Oil Allocation see also Energy Crisis Fuel for Cars Gateway Arch see Jefferson National Expansion Memorial General Accounting Office General Accounting Office--Credit Unions see also Banking and Currency--Credit General Electric General Motors Unions General Services Administration see also Grants--General Services Administration- - St . Louis Genocide Treaty see Foreign Affairs--Genocide Treaty Georgetown University Gerontology Cold Star Wives Goldenrod Showboat see Jefferson National Expansion Memorial- -Showboat Goldenrod Government Debt see also Debt Ceiling Bill National Debt Government Insurance Government Operations Government Printing Office Government Regional Offices Government Reorgani~:ation Program see Reorganiution Program Grace Hill Area see Housing--Grace Hill Grading, Meat see Meat Grading Grain Purchases ee also Agriculture Feed Grain Grand Canyon see Conservation--Grand Canyon Grandparents, Foster see Poverty Program--Foster Grandparents Grants see also Foundations National Science Foundation Grants- - Clippings Grants-- Dept. of Housing and Urban Development see Housing- - St . Louis--Grants from HUD Grants-- Department of Labor--St . Louis Grants-- Department of the Interior- -St. Louis and MO Grants-- Department of Transportation--St. Louis see also Transportation Grants - -Economic Development Administration- - St. Louis see also Economic Development Administration Grants-- Educational see also Educational Grants Learning Business Centers Grants- -Environmental Protection Agency-St. Louis Grants--General Services Administration -St. Louis Grants- - Health, Education and Welfare-- Miss& uri Grants--HEW--Public Schools Grants--HEW--St. Louis Grants--HEW--St. Louis University Grants--HEW-- Washington University see also Washington University Grants to Hospitals G r·an ts- - Housing see Housing-- St. Louis- - Grants from HUD Grants--Law Enforcement Assistance Administration -Missouri ee also Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Grants--Law Enforcement Assistance Administratiou - - SL . Louis see also Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Gran ta--M any Sou rcea-- Colleges Grants--Many Sources- -Missouri Grants--Many Sources--St. Louis University Grants--Many Sources--Universities Grants--Many Sources- -University of Missouri Grants--Many Sources- - Washington University see also Washington University Grants- - Miscellaneous Grants--National Endowment for the Arts see also Arts and Humanities Grants--National Endowment for the Humanities see also Arts and Humanities Grants--National Science Foundation see also National Science Foundation Foundations G ranta--OEO- - Missouri Poverty Program--Office of Equal Opportunity Grants- -Post Office--St. Louis see also Postal Service St . Louis - -Post Office -Operations Grants--Roth Study Grocery Stores see National Commission on Food Marketing--Chain Stores Guam Guatemalan Earthquake Gun Control see Crime--Gun Control HUAC See Congress-- House Unamerican Activities Committee Hair Car Products see Food and Drug Administration H ai rd ressers see National Haridressers and Cosmetologists Halpern, Seymour see Resignations Handicapped see also Blind Herman, Philip Employment of the Handicapped Labor--Handicapped Workers see Panama Canal--Correspondence-Harry Flannery Herman, Philip See Radio and Television- -Harry Flannery Harry Truman Dam See Conservation--Harry Truman Dam Hatardous Material see a/so Transportation -- Dept. of Proposed Regulations Hazardous Occupational Safety and Health Act see a/ 0 Mine Safety Act Occupational Safety and Health Administration Head Start Center See Poverty Program--Head Start Centers Health -- Blood Banks Sl!<' (1/ SO Medical Care Health--Dental Health and Welfare Council of Greater St. Louis see a/ SO Welfare Health Education and Welfare see also Grants--Health Education and Welfare- -Missouri Housing--Public--HEW Task Force Health, Education and Welfare--Fetal Experimentation see also Human Experimentation Health Insurance see a/so Medical Insurance for Radiation Treatment National Health Insurance Health Insurance for the Unemployed see a/so Unemployment Health Legislation see a/so National Health Care Act Health Manpower Bill see also Education--Nurses and Medical Health, Mental Students Immigration--Foreign Doctors Manpower Nurse Training Act !!JI!<' Mental Health Health Program Health- - Polio Vaccine Health Security Act Hearing Aids Higher Education see a/so Education -- Higher Education Higher Education Act Highway Beautification see a/so Anti--Billboard Law High way-- Clippings Highway Patrol ee Missouri- -Highway Patrol Highway Safety see a/so National Bicentennial Highway Safety Year Highway Through St. Louis see a/so St . Louis Highways Highway Trust Fund Highways see a/so Martin Luther King Bridge High ways- - Beautification-- Billboards The Hill see Housing--The Hill Hill-Burton Act see Hospitals--Hill-Burton Historic Preservation see a/so National Historic Preservation Act HolidaJ.s see a SO Kennedy, John F, Holiday Home Owners Mortgage Loan Corp see Housing--Home Owners Mortgage Loan Corp Home Rule--D.C. see a/ SO Distict of Columbia Hospitals- - Closing ·ee a/ so Public Health Services Hospi tals Hospitals--Emergency Rooms ee Medical Emergency Transportation and Services Act Hospitals--General Hospitals--General MAST Program Hospitals- - Grants see Grants--Hospitals Hospitals- -Hill-Burton Hospitals- -Non-profit House Administration, Committee on House Beauty Shoppe see Congress. House Beauty Shoppe House Budget Committee House Un - American Activities Committee see also Congress. House Un-American Acitivities Comm1 Ll ee Household P ets Housing Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 see also Housing--HUD Housing--Anonymous letters Housing--Arson-- Clippings Housing--Better Communities Act Housing Bills Housing Bills- - Letters Housing--Bingham's Bill Housing--Blumeyer Project Housing- - Blumeyer Project--Clippings Housing-- Bowlin Project for the Elderly Housing- - Building Sciences Act see also Lumber Housing--Cabanne Turnkey see also Housing--Forest Park Blvd Turnkey Project Housing--Turnkey Projects Housing- -College Loan Programs Housing- - Community Development Block Grants Housing--Compton Grand Association Housing--CR Excerpts Housing- -Correspondence- -Out of State Housing-- Demonstration Cities Housing- - Dept. of Community Developmt!IIL Housing--DeSoto- Carr Housing-- Elderly see also Nursing Homes Housing--Emergency Housing--Energy Conservation see also Energy Conservation Housing- - Euclid Plan Housin~r - -Fair Housing see also Civil Rights--Housing Housing- - Open Housing- - Fair House Enforcement in Missouri Housing- -Federal Housing Administration Housing--Forest Park Blvd .--Turnkey Project see also Housing- -Cabanne Turnkey Project Housing- -Turnkey P rojects Housing-- General Housing- -Grace Hill Housing- -The Hill Housing- -Home Owners Mortgage Loan Housing- -HUD Corps. see also Housing and Urban Development Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 Houiang--St. Louis -Applications to Jill f) Housing- -St. Louis - -Grants from HUD Housing--Missouri-- Grants from HUD Housing--HUD- - Consolidated Supply Program Housing--HUD --Housing Material Housing- -Housing Authoriution Act Housing-- Inspection Housing-- Insurance--Riots see also Crime- -Riots Insurance Housing-- Jeff- Vander-Lou Housing--KMOX Editorials see also Radio and Television Editorials Housing--Laclede Town Housing--Laclede Town-- Clippings Housing-- LaFayette Square Housing- - LaSalle Park Housing-- Lead Paint Housing-- Lead Poisoning see also P oisons Housing-- Loans see also Banking and Currency- -Savings and Loan Entries Interest Rates Housing--Low Income see also Housing-- President's Task Force on Low Income Housing Poverty Program- -General Housing--Mansion House Housing--Maryville Housing--Mill Creek Valley Housing--Miscellaneous Clippings Housing--Miscellaneous Letters Housing--Missouri Housing--Mobile Homes Housing- -Model Cities Housing- -Model Cit ies- - Clippings Housing--Mullanphy Project Housing--National Development Bank Housing--National Housing Act Housing-- National Tenants Organir;ation Housi ng--Negro see also Civil Rights--Housing Housing--Open Negroes- - General Housing- - Neighborhood F acilities Grant Housing- -Newcastle Project Housing- -O'Fallon Housi ng- -Ombudsman Housi ng- -Open see also Civil Rights--Housing Housing--Fair Housing Negroes- -Housing Housing--Open- -Against (District) Housing-- Open- -For (District) Housing- -Open--Against (Out of District) Housing--Open--For (Out of Dist rict) Housing- -Open- -Clippings Housing- -Operation Breakthrough Housing--Operation Breakthrough-- Clippings Housing--Operation Rehab ee also Housing-- Rehabilitation Housing--Rock Springs Rehabilitation Association Housing Panel Housing- - Para Quad Housing--Peabody- -Clippings Housing--President's T ask Force on Low Income Housing see also Housing--Low Income Housing Program Cute Housing--Public Housing Bills Proposed Housing-- Public Housing--Cochran Apts.-- Clippings Housing--Public Housing-- Darst-W ebbe Public Housing Housing- -Public Housing- -Darst- Web be Clippings Housing- - Public Housing-- General- - Clippings Housing--Public Housing--General Letters Housing--Public--HEW Task Force see also Health, Education,&: Welfare Housing--Public Housing--Kosciuksko St. Housing- - Public Housing- -Mailing List Housing--Public Housing- - Neighborhood Gardens Housing- - Public Housing- -Pruitt- lgoe Housing--Public Housing- - Pruitt - Igoe-Clippings Housing- - Public Housing-- Pruitt- lgoe-Proposals Housing- - Public Housing-- Rent Strike-see also Strikes Clippings Housing--Public Housing- -Rent Strike-- Reports Housing--Public Housing--Reports Housing--Red Tape Housing- -Rehabilitation see also Housing-- Operation Rehab Housing--Rock Springs Rehabilitation Association Housing-- Rent Supplements Housing-- Reports and Materials Housing-- Rock Springs Rehabilitation Association see also Housing--Operation Rehab Housing-- Rehabilitation Housing- - St. Louis Housing--St. Louis-- Applications to HUD see also Housing--HUD Housing- -St. Louis--Area Expeditar Housing--St. Louis--Code Enforcement Housing--St. Louis- -Code Enforcement-- Clippings Housing-- St. Louis--Grants from HUD see also Housing--HUD Housing- -St . Louis Housing and Land Clearance Authority Housing- - St. Louis Housing Plan Housing-- St. Louis Meeting Housing-- St. Louis-- Workable Program Housing -- Savings and Loans See a/ 0 Banking and Currency Committee- Savings and Loan Companies Housing- - Savings and Loan Bill see also Banking and Currency Committee-Savings and Loan entries Housing- - Section 8 Housing-- Section 22l(d)(2) Housing- - Section 221(d)(3) Housing-- Section 221(h) Housing- - Section 235 Housing- - Section 236 Housing- -Section 701 Housing- -Soulard Area see a/so National Historic Preservation Act Housing--South Broadway Housing-- South Side Housing- - State of Missouri Housing-- State of Missouri- - Grants from HUD see also Housing--HUD Housing--Subcommittee Notices Housing - -Ten Park Improvement Association Housing- -Town House Project Clippings Housing-- Turnkey Projects see a/so Housing- - Cabanne Turnkey Project Housing- - Forest Park Blvd Turnkey Project Housing- -Turnkey Projects--Clippings Housing--Twelfth and Park Housing-- Union--Sarah Housing-- Urban Reports Housing-- Urban Renewal Housing-- Urban Renewal- - Clippings Housing-- Urban Renewal-- Letters Housing- -Urban Renewal--Material Housing-- Vaughn Area- - Clippings Housing-- Villa de Ville Housing- -Washington University Medical Housing-- Wellston Housing--West End Center Housing--West End- - Clippings Housing- - West Pine Apartments Human Development Corporation see Poverty Program- - Human Development Corporation see also Poverty Program- - St. Louis Human Development Corporation Human Experimentation see also Health, Education and Welfare-- Fetal Experimentation Humanities see National Endowment for the Humanities Hunger and Malnutrition see a/so Food Crisis ICC Food Stamp Plan entries Right to Food Resolution see Interstate Commerce Commission Ice Cream see Food and Drug Administration--Ice Cream Ill egitimacy see also Birth Control Immigration Family Planning Sex Education ee a/so P opulation Growth Employment Immigration and Naturalir.ation Service Immigration-- Foreign Doctors Immigration- -Material Immigration--N aturalir.ed Citizens Immunity (Nixon) Against see also Nixon, Richard Milhouse Immunity (Nixon) For Immunity (Nixon) Out of State Impeachment (Justice Douglas) see also Supreme Court Judiciary Impeachment see also Nix on , Rich ard M Impeachment- -Against Impeachment Bill Impeachment-- Clippings Impeachment-- For Impeachment --Not Answered Impoundment Control/ Spending Ceiling Independent Bankers Association of America see also Banking and Cu rrency Committee-Bank-- Entries Independent Business Federation see Nation al Federation of Independent Business Independent Meat P ackers see also Meat P ackers Indians see also Minority Groups Indochina see Foreign Affai rs-- Indochina Industry Funds Inflation see also Concentrated Industries Anti- Infl ation Act Inflation--House Resolution Inspection--Food see F ish Inspection see also Meat Inspection Poultry Inspection Institute of Psychiatry see Missouri-- Instit ute of Psychiatry Insurance see also Banking and Currency Committee- Insurance Education- - Federal Charter for Insu rance and Amminty Association Goverment Insurance Housing--Insurance- -Riots Insurance Coverage for Women see also Women Insurance--Fair Plan Insurance - -Floods see National Flood Insurance P rogram Insurance, Health see Health Insurance Insurance--No Fault Insurance--Shoppers Guide Integration see also Civil Rights entries Education --Busing Negroes - - entries Interest Rates ee also Banking and Currency Commitr.·c Interest Rates Banking and Currency Committee--Prime Interest Rate Banking and Currency Committe--Savings and Loan Interior (Dept. Of} Interior (Dept . of}--Oil Shale Program see also Energy Crisis Oil Leases Intelligence, Select Committee See Select Committee on Intelligence Internal Security see also Congress--House Unamerican Activities Committee Wire Tapping and Bugging Intern ational Development Association see Banking and Currency Committee-International Development Association International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act see also Arms Control Internation al Trade Commission see also T rade--Exports and Imports In ternat ional T rade Subcommittee Not ices In te rstate Commerce Commission see also Movers of Household Goods Interstate Horseracing Act In terviews see also News Releases--Radio Press Comments Press and News Reporters Intra-Ut erine Devices see Medical Device Amendments Invi tations Israel see Foreign Affairs--Israel Jeanette Rankin see Commemorative Postage Stamp for Jeanette Rankin J efferson Barracks J efferson Barracks- - Landmark Status J efferson Barracks--National Cemetery Memorial Chapel J effe rson Barracks Park J efferson Nation al Expansion Memorial see also Lewis and Clark National Park Services St. Louis- -Arch St . Louis--Jefferson Nation al Expansion Memorial Jefferson National Expansion Memorial- - Bills J efferson Nat ional Expansion Memorial- Brochure J efferson Nat ional Expansion Memorial-Budget Material Jefferson National Expansion Memor ial-Building a Replica of Fort San Carlos J efferson Nat ional Expansion Memorial-Clippings J efferson Nat ional Expansion Memorial-Congressional Record Inserts J effe rson National Expa nsion Memorial-Dedication Jefferson National Expansion Memorial-File for Hearing J effe rson Nat ional Expansion Memorial-Ground Breaking Ceremonies Jefferson National Expansion Memorial-Releues, etc. J efferson National Expansion Memorial-River Music Barge J efferson National Expansion Memori al-Showboa t Goldenrod J effe rson National Expansion Memorial-Testimony of Mrs. Sullivan Jefferson National Expansion Memorial - Visitors Center Jeff-- Vander-Lou see Housing--Jeff- Vander-Lou Jewish War Veterans see also Veterans' Administration Job Training Program see also Labor- -Manpower Development and Training Poverty Program- - St. Louis Job Corps Center St. Louis Job Corps Center Johnson, Lyndon Baines Joint Committee on Defense Production See also Banking and Currency Committee-- Defense Production Act Joint Committee to Investigate Crime see also Crime- - General Joint Economic Committee Jordan see Foreign Affairs--Jordan Judge Oliver see Oliver, Judge Judiciary see also Federal Judicial Center Impeachment (Justice Douglas) Supreme Court Justice Department Junior Village Juvenile Delinquency see also Crime--General Prisons KMOX see Radio and Television entries see also Housing KMOX Editorials News Releases--Radio KWK, Radio Station see Radio Station KWK Kansas-Texas RR see Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR Kennedy, John F . Kennedy, John F .--Assasination Kennedy, Jonn F .- -Eulogies Kennedy, John F .- -Holiday see a/ so Holidays Kennedy, John F .--Inaugural Address Kennedy, John F .--First Day Cover Issues see a/so Commemorative Stamps Kissinger, Henry see also State, Dept. of Kluxzynski Federal Office Building Korea see Foreign Affairs --Korea Koscuisko St. see Housing--Public--Kosciusko St. Krebiozen see Drugs, Krebiozen Labor see a/ 0 Employment Entries National Labor Relations Board -- Century Electric Company Postal Union Recognition Railroads - -Shopcraft Unions Strikes Unions Labor- - Davis-Bacon Labor-- Fair Labor Standards Labor-- Farm Labor See also Agriculture Labor--Handicapped W orkera see also Employment of the Handicapped Handicapped Labor Legislation see also Right to Work Labor--Manpower Development Training see also Job Training Corps Center Poverty Program--St. Louis Jobs Corps Center St. Louis Job Corps Center Labor Organizations--AFL-CIO Labor Orgnaizations--Misc. Labor- -Railroads see Railroads--Shopcraft Unions Labor- - Situs P icketing Labor Unions--Homes for the Aged Labor-- Workmen's Compensation Laws Lacey Act see also Conservation--Wildlife Laclede Fur Company Laclede Gas see Gas--Laclede Gas Laclede Town see Housing- - Laclede Town Lafayette Square see Housing--Lafayette Square Land Bank see Federal Land Bank of St . Louis Land Clearance see Housing--St. Louis Housing and Land Clearance Authority Land Management Organic Act Land Use Bill--Against Land Use Bill- - For LaSalle Park see Housing--LaSalle Park Lead Poisoning see Housing-- Lead Poisoning Law Enforcement Assistance Administratiom see also Crime--General Grants--Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Missouri--Highway Patrol League of Women Voters see also Voters Women Learning Business Centers see also Grants--Educational Unemployment Lebanon see Foreign Affairs- - Lebanon Legal Aid Society see also Crime--General Legal Services Corporation Legislative Activities Disclosure Act Legislative Proposals Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 see also Congressional Reorganization Lettuce see National Commission on Food Marketing--Lettuce Study Lewis and Clark see also Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Libraries see also Bookmobile Books sent to Libraries and Schools Education--Bookmobile Libraries--Depository Library Extension, Congressional Library of Congress Library Services Lifeline Rate Act see a/so Energy Conservation Federal Power Commission Union Electric Company Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission Loans--Student see Education- - College Loan Program see a/so Education--Student Aid Bill Lobby Groups Lobbying Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act see a/so Public Works Lock and Dam 26 at Alton, Ill. Lock and Dam 26--Clippings Lockheed Corp. see Banking and Currency Committee-Lockheed Case Lotteries see also Gambling Low Income Housing see Housing--President 's Task Force on Low Income Housing Lumber see a/ 0 Forestry Legislation Housing--Building Sciences Timber Supply Lumber Preservation Legislation see a/so T imber Supply Harry Lundeberg School see a/so Maritime Academies MAST Program MIA see Missing in Action See a/ SO Foreign Affairs -- Vietnam Magna Carta Select Committee to Investigate Missing in Action see a/so American Revolution Bicentennial Malpractice see Medical Malpractice Claims Settlement Assistance Act Management and Budget, Office of see also Budget Manpower see also Employment Labor- -Manpower Development and Training Health Manpower Bill Poverty Program-- Office of Economic Opportunity Mansion House Maritime Academies see a/ so Harry Lundeberg School Martin Luther King Bridge see a/ 0 Highways St. Louis- -Highways Maryville see Housing--Maryville Meals on Wheels see also Aging Meat Grading ee Grading, Meat Meat Imports see a/so Trade--Imports and Exports Meat Inspection see also Fish Inspection Inspection, Food Poultry Inspection Meat Inspection Bill Meat Inspection--St. Louis Independent Packing Company Meat Packers see a/so Independent Meat Packers Medical Care see a/so Health entries National Health Care Act Medical Device Amendments Medical Education see Education--Nurses and Medical Students see a/so Medical Schools Military Medical Schools Medical Emergency Transportation and Services Act Medical Insurance for Radiation Treatment see also Cancer Health Insurance Medical Malpractice Claims Set tlement Assistance Act Medical Schools see also Education--Nurses and Medical Students Mental Health Health Manpower Bill Nurse Training Act see also Health- -Mental Meramec Basin News Stories see also Conservation Meramec Basin or River see Conservation--Meramec Entries Merchant Marine see Harry Lundeberg School see also Coast Guard Maritime Academics Metric System Metropolitan Youth Commission see a/so Youth Affairs Middle East see Foreign Affairs- - Middle East Militants see also Civil Rights-- Clippings Education--Campus Unrest Negroes--Black Militants Military Construction Appropriation Bill see also Defense Appropriations Military Expenditures see a/so Defense Appropriations Military Medical School Military Pay see alSO Armed Forces Defense Appropriations Military Procurement see a/so Defense Appropriations Defense Contracts Military Retirement Milk see a/so Agriculture FDA--Milk Mill Creek Valley see Housing--Mill Creek Valley Mine Safety Act see a/so Black Lung Act Coal Hazardous Occupational Safety and Health Act Mining Mine Safety and Health Act Mineral Resources see also Coal Minimum Wage see a/so Employment Wage and Price Controls Mining see a/so Coal Mine Surface Area Protection Act Mine Safety Act Missouri Bureau of Mines Mink Ranchers Minority Groups see also Equal Employment Indians Negroes--Minority Groups Women Miscellaneous Organintions see a/so National Organintions Questionable Organizations Missiles see Nike Base Aeronautics and Space Arms Control Missini in Action ee also Foreign Affairs --Vietnam Missing in Action, Select Committee to Investigate ee Select Committee to Investigate Missing in Action Mississippi Queen see Delta Queen/Mississippi Queen Missouri, State of Missouri --Adult Education Act see a/ 0 Education--Adult Missouri--Area Redevelopment Missouri, Bureau of Mines see also Mining Missouri --Disaster Area see also Civil Defense Floods Missouri - - Election Laws see a/so Missouri-- Redistricting Missouri --Excess Property see a/so Federal Excess Property Missou ri - - Flood see also Floods National Flood Insurance Program Missouri -- Grants see Grants entries Missouri --Highway Patrol see a/ 0 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Missouri--Housing see Housing--Missouri Missouri - - Institute of Psychiatry Missouri --Kansas-Texas RR see a/ o Railroad entries Missouri --Motor Vehicles Missouri -- Ozarks Regional Commission Missouri - - Redistricting ee al o Missouri --Election Laws Redistricting Missouri - - Sesquicentennial Miaaouri - - State Politics see a/ SO St. Louia-- Politica Women in Politics Missou ri State Society Missouri-- University see also Education- -Higher Education Grants--Many Sources-University of Missouri Missouri-- Missouri A Missouri B Missouri C-Com Missouri Con-Dept. of D Missouri Dept. of EMissouri Dept of F-G Missouri H Missouri 1-N Missouri 0-P Missouri 0 -Z Mobil Homes see Housing- - Mobil Homes Model Cities see Housing--Model Cities Moratorium see a/so Foreign Affairs--Cambodia Foreign Affairs-- Vietnam Mortgages and Interest Rates see a/so Banking and Currency Committee-Variable Interest Mortgage Rates Federal National Mortgage Association Movers of Household Goods see also Interstate Commerce Commission Mullanphy Project see Housing- -Mullanphy Project NAACP see Negroes - - National Association for the Advancement of Colored People NLRB ee National Labor Relations Board- Century Electric Company National A-National H see also Miscellaneous Organiroations National !- National Q National R-National Z National Academy for Fire Prevention and Central Site Selection Board see a/ SO Fire Prevention National Aeronautics and Space Act see also Aeronautics and Space--Space Program National Air Guard Employment see a/so National Guard National Association for the Advancement of Colored People see Negroes--National Association for the Advancement of Colored People National Bicentennial Highway Safety Year see also American Revolution Bicentennial Highway Safety National Cemeteries (Jefferson Barracks) National Cemeteries . ee Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery Memorial Chapel National Center for Women ee also Women National Commission of Consumer Finance Appendices ee al 0 Banking and Currency Committee-Consumer Credit National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter I National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter II National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter Ill National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter IV National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter VI National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter VIII National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter IX National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter X National Commission on Consumer Finance Chapter XI National Commiaaion on Consumer Finance Chapter XII National Commission on Consumer Finance--Clippings National Commission on Consumer Finance-Correspondence National Commission on Consumer Finance--Press Kat National Commission on Consumer Finance-- Speeches National Commission on Consumer Finance- -Studies National Commission on Food Marketing see also Agriculture National Commission on Food Marketing -Attempt to Form Commission see also National Commission on Food Marketing- - Creation of the Commission National Commission on Food Marketing-Background Material National Commission on Food Marketing-Congratulatory Notes to Mrs. Sullivan National Commission on Food Marketing-- Hearings National Commission on Food Marketing-Bracero Study see also Farm Workers National Commission on Food Marketing-Chain Stores National Commission on Food Marketing-Clippings National Commission on Food Marketing-Commission Meetings National Commission on Food Marketing · Consumer lnformata on see a/ SO Consumer Interest - - Miscellaneous National Commission on Food Marketing- Correspondence National Commission on Food Marketing-Creation of the Commission See al;o,o Batuibak Commission on Food Marketing- -Attempts to Form the Commission National Commission on Food Marketing- Formal Interviews National Commission on Food Marketing-General Info National Commission of Food Marketing-Individual Views of the Report National Commission on Food Marketing-Lettuce Study National Commission on Food Marketing-Press Releases National Commission on Food Marketing-Questionaire Correspondence National Commission on Food Marketing-Report Status National Commission on Food Marketing-Speeches National Commission on Food Marketing-Staff Changes National Commission on Food Marketing-Staff Selection National Commission on Food Marketing National Commission on Food Marketing-Chapter 13 of Final Report National Commission on Neighborhoods National Commission on Productivity see also Banking and Currency entries National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act see Banking and Currency Commission-- National Debt National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act see also Debt Ceiling Bill Government Debt National Defense see a/ SO Armed Services Defense National Defense Education Act see Education- -National Defense Education Act National Development Bank see Housing--National Development Bank National Diabetes Advisory Board see also Diabetes Research National Digestive Disease Act of 1976 National Endowment for the Arts see Grants--National Endowment for the Arts National Endowment for the Humanities see Grants--National Endowment for the Humanities National Energy and Conservation Corporation see also Energy Conservation National Family Week National Federation of Independent Business see also Small Business Administration National Flood Insurance Co see also Flood Insurance Program Floods Missouri--Flood National Good Neighbor Day National Guard see also Air Guard Armed Services National Air Guard Employment National Hairdressers and Cosmetologists National Health Care Act see also Health Legislation Medical Care National Health Insurance Health Insurance National Historic Preservation Act Historic Preservation Housing--Operation Rehab Housing- - Soulard Area National Housing Act see Housing--National Housing Act National Institute on Aging see also Aging Elderly Older Americans Act Select Committee on Aging National Labor Relations Board- - Century Electric Company see also Labor National Opportunity Camps National Park Service see a/so Conservation entries Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Parks National Safe Boating Week see also Boating Coast Guard National Saint Elizabeth Seton Day National Service Corps see a/so Peace Corps National Science Foundation see a/so Foundations Grants--National Science Foundation National Stamping Act see also Coinage National Summer Youth Program see Poverty Program- - National Summer Youth Program National Tennants Organization see Housing--National Tenants Organization Natural Gas see a/so Energy Conservation Laclede Gas Natural Gas Act see a/so Energy Conservation Natural Gas Act--Amendments Naturalized Citir.ens See Immigration --Naturalir.ed Citizens Negroes --Black Militants see also Civil Rights--Clippings Militants Negroes--Commission on History and Culture Negroes - - General see a/so Housing--Negroes-- Integration Negroes--Minority Group see a/so Minority Groups Negroes-- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ee a[ SO Civil Rights entries Neighborhood Facilities Grant see Housing- -Neighborhood Facilities Grant Neighborhoods ee National Commission on Neighborhoods See a/so National Good Neighbor Day National Historic Preservation Act Nerve Gas see a/so Arms Control New York City Financial Crisis See Banking and Currency Committee-- Emergency Financial Assistance Act Newcastle Project see Housing-- Newcastle Project News Releases --Radio see a/so Interviews Press and News Reporters Presa Comments Radio Radio and Television--Press Releases and Interviews Sullivan, Leonor K., Press Releases Sullivan, Leonor K., Publicity Newspaper Preservation Act Newspapers see a/so Pulitr;er, Joseph Freedom of the Press Nike Base see a/so Arms Control Nine One One see Emergency Telephone Number Nixon, Richard M see also Agnew, Spiro T . Immunity (Nixon) Impeachment Vice President Watergate Nixon, Richard M.- -Pardon, Against Nixon, Richard M.--Pardon, For Nixon, Richard M.--Transition Allowance No-Fault Insurance see Insurance--No- Fault Noise Control Act Nuclear Energy see a/so Atomic Energy Energy Crisis entries Panama Canal- - Nuclear Technology Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty see Foreign Affain-- Non- Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Weapons see a/su Arms Control Atomic Bomb--Fallout Shelters Atomic Energy Weapons Nuclear W capons--Radioactive Fallout see a/so Atomic Bombs--Fallout Shelters Nuclear Weapons- -Testing Nurse Training Ad see a/so Education--Nurses Medical Students Health Manpower Medical Schools Nurses see a/so Education--Nurses and Medical Students Nursin!{ Homes see also Housing--Elderly Aging Nut rition see a/so FDA--Diet Foods OEO FDA--Special Dietary Foods FDA--Vitamin Supplements Food Crisis ee Grants--OEO-- Missouri see also Poverty Program entries OSHA see Hazardous Occupational SafeLy and Health Act see a/so Occupational Safety and Health Administration Obscene Literature Obscenity Occupational Safety and Health Administration see a/ SO Hazardous Occupational Safety and Health Act O'Fallon Area see Housing--O'Fallon Office of Economic Opportunity see Granta--OEO--Miuouri see a/so Poverty ProiJ'am--Office of Economic Opportunity Office of Management and Budget see Management and Budget, Office of Office of Technology Alleaament see a/so Technology Aaaeasment Office Official Gazette-- List Oil lmporta see also Energy Crisis Oil Leases Foreign Affairs--Middle East Trade--Imports and Exports ee a/ 0 Elk Hills Oil Reserve En rgy Crisis Interior (Dept. of) - - Oil Shale Program Older Americans Act ee a/ o Aging Oliver, Judge Olympic Games Olympics Ombudsman Elderly- -Employment Opportunitiea Nation I Institute on Aging Select Committee on Aging see Housing--Ombudsman Omnibus Operation Breakthrough see Housing- - Operation Breakthrough Opportunity Camps see National Opportunity Campa Outer Continental Shelf Landa see a/ o Coaat Coa~tal Area~ Overseaa Private Investment Corporation Onrk Lead Company Onrka Regional Commisaion Ozone Protection Act Pow·. ee Foreign Affaira-- Vietnam P cemakers See Medical Device Amendments Pacific Air Routes ee a/ 0 Airlines Panama Canal- - Clipping• Panama Canal--Congressional Record Jnaerta Panama Canai--Corr apondence-Armatrong, Anthony Pan am a Canal--Correspondence--Flood, Daniel J Panama Canal--Correspondence--General Panama Canal Correspondence--Harman, Philip Panama Canal Correspondence- - Raymond , David Panama Canal--Daily Digest Panama Canal--Finance Panama Canal--Hearings Panama Canal--Inspection Visit Panama Canal-- Legislation Panama Canal--Legislative Correspondence Panama Canal--Living Conditions Panama Canal --Military Penonnel Panama Canal--Miscellaneous and Reports Panama Canal--Nuclear Technology see also Nuclear Energy Panama Canal- -Operations Panama Canal--Panama and Treaty Panama Canal--Sea Level Canal Study Commission-Correspondence Panama Canal--Sea Level Canal Study Commission--Legislation Panama Canal--Sea Level Canal Study Commission--Reports P anama Canal Tolla Pam- medica see Medical Emergency Transportation and Services Act P ara-quad Housing see Housing- -Para-quad P ardon of Richard Nixon see Nixon, Richard M. --Pardon Parks see a/so Conservation entries National Park Service P arochial Schools see Education- -Aid to Parochial Schools Passports Patents Peabody Area see Housing--Peabody--Clippings Peace Corpa see also National Service Corps Peace, Dept. of Penn Central Railroad ee Banking and Currency Committee--Penn Central P ension Plan Pension Reform Peru see Foreign Affain--Peru Pesticides see Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1976 ee a/so FDA--Pesticide entries Pets see Household Peta Photograph Request see Sullivan, Leonor K.--Photograph Request Physicians--Malpractice ee Medical Malpractice Claims Settlement Assistance Act Poelker, J ohn H see also St. Louis--Mayor Poisons see a/ so- -Housing--Lead Poisoning Polio Vaccine see Health --P olio Vaccine Political Education, Committee On Politics see Missouri --State Politica see also St. Louis--Politics Women in Politics Pollution Sl!£' a/so Air Pollution Clean Air Act Solid Waste P ollution Water Pollution Pollution--Noise see Noise Control Act Pollution--Solid Waste see Solid Waste Pollution see also Air Pollution Water Pollution Poor People 's Campaign Pope John XX:IIl Population Crisis Committee see also Food Crisis Population Growth see also Birth Control Census Family Planning Food Crisis Immigration Sex Education Portraits--Presidents see Presidents' P ortraits Post Card Registration see a/so Election Reform--Post Card Registration Voter Registration Post-Dispatch see Pulitzer, Joseph Newspapers Post Office Closings Post Office Department Post Office Regulations Postage Increase Postal Boutiuqea see also Commemorative Stamps Postal Clippings Postal Legislation Postal Pay Raise Postal Rate Commission Postal Rates Postal Rates --REA Postal Reform Legislation Postal Reform Material Postal Reorganization and Salary Postal Service Adjustment Act see a/so Grants--Post Office-- St . Loui£ Postal Strike see also Strikes Postal Union Recognition see a/ so Labor Unions Potato Bill Poultry- - Application to Make St. Louis see a/ o Food Poultry Indemnity Bill Poultrr Inspection see a/. 0 Fish Inspection Meat Inspection Poverty Program- -Clippings Poverty Program--Day Care Center see also Poverty Program-- Head Start Centers Poverty Program- -St. Louis-Daycare St. Louis Day Care Poverty Program- - Foster Grandparents Poverty Program--General see also Housing--Low Income Poverty Program--Head Start Centers see a/so Poverty Program--Day Care Centers Poverty Program--St. Louis -Day Care Centers St. Louis Day Care Poverty Program--Human Development Corporation see also Poverty Program--St. Louis-Human Development Corp Poverty Program--Material Poverty Program--Micellaneous Poverty Program--National Summer Youth Program see also Poverty Program--Summer Youth Program Summer Youth Employment and Recreation Poverty Program--Office of Economic Opportunity see also Grants--OEO--Missouri Labor--Manpower Development and Training Manpower Poverty Program--Office of Economic Opportunity-Amendments Poverty Program--Office of Economic Opportunity--Cuts Poverty Program--St. Louis--Day Care see also Poverty Program--Day Care Centers Poverty Program- - Head Start Centers St. Louis Day Care Poverty Program--St. Louis Human Development Corporation see a/so St. Louis Human Development Corp. Poverty Program--St. Louis Job Corps Center see also Job Training Program Labor--Manpower Development and Training St. Louis Job Corps Center Poverty Program--St. Louis Small Business Development Center see also Banking and Currency-- Small Business Administration St. Louis--Small Business Administration Small Business Administration Poverty Program--St. Louis Workers Poverty Program--Summer Youth Programs see also Poverty Program--National Summer Youth Program Summer Youth Employment and Recreation Poverty Program--Total Bay Project Poverty Program- - VISTA Powell , Adam Clayton see also Congress--Scandala Prayer in School see Religion- - Prayer in School Preservatives see Food and Drug Adminislralion-- Preserv atives President Ford see Nixon, Richard M.--Pardon President Johnson see Johnson, Lyndon Baines President Kennedy see Kennedy, John Fihgerald President Nixon see Nixon, Richard M Presidential Pardon see Nixon, Richard M.,--Pardon Presidents' Portraits President.' Task Force on Low Income Housing see Housing--President'• Taak Force on Low Income Housing "Presidio 27" see also Armed Service• Press Comments see a/so Interviews News Releaaes --Radio Preas and News Reporters Sullivan, Leonor K.--Press Releases Sullivan, Leonor K.-- Reaction to Presidenti al Statements Press and News Reporters see a/ SO Interviews Price Freeze News Releases--Radio Press Comments Sullivan, Leonor K.-- Press Releases Sullivan, Leonor K.--Reaction to Presidental Statements see also Wage and Price Controls Prisoners of War See Foreign Affaire --Vietnam Prisons ee also Crime- - General Juvenile Deliquency Privacy See a/so Right to Financial Privacy Act Private Schools See Education--Aid to Private Schools Productivity See Banking and Currency Committee-National Commission on Productivity Protection of Independent Service Station Operators see also Energy entries Pruitt - Igoe See Housing--Public Housing-- Pruitt - lgoe Public Buildings see alSO Federal Buildings Public Health Service Hospitals see also Hospitals --Closing Public Housing See Housing--Public Housing Public Relations See also FDA--Cranberries Public Works see a/ 0 Local Public Works Capital Development and lnveatment Act Publications--Consumer Product Info See al 0 Consumer Product Information Bulletin Publications-- Family Fare Publications-- Packet for the Bride see a/so Consumer Interest --Miscellaneous Publications Request Publications Request for Seal Plaques Pueblo Affair see Foreign Affairs--Pueblo Puerto Rico see a/so Foreign Affaire--Puerto Rico Pulitzer, Joseph see also Newspapere Quality Education Study see also Education--Miscellaneous Queen Isabella Questionable Organizations see also Miscellaneous Organizations REA see Postal Rates--REA ROTC see Reserve Officere Training Program Radiation Treatment see Medical Insurance for Radiation Treatment Radio see a/ SO Communications Equal Time Federal Communications Commission Freedom of the Press News Releases- -Radio Sullivan, Leonor K.--Publicity Radio and Television--Clippings Radio and Television Correspondence Radio and Television Editorials see a/so Housing--KMOX Editorials Radio and Television--Harry Flannery Radio and Television--Press Releases and Interviews see also Sullivan, Leonor K.--Press Releases News Releases--Radio Radio and Television--Broadcasts which Demean Radio Station KWK Radioactive Fallout see Nuclear Weapons-- Radioactive Fallout Rail pax Railpax--Material and Information Railroad Brotherhoods and Organizations see a/ SO Railroad Strikes Railroads--Shopcraft Unions Strikes Unions Railroad Legislation see also Banking and Currency Committee-Penn Central Missouri-Kansas and Texas RR Railroad Passenger Service ee a/so Railroads--Discontinuance of Passenger Trains Railroads-- Rail fax/ Amtrak Railroad Retirement Legislation Railroad Safety Railroad Strikes see a/so Railroad Brotherhoods and Organizations Railroads- -Strikes Strikes Railroads see Miuouri-Kanau Texas RR see also Bankinc and Currency CommiLLee-Penn Central Rock Island Railroad Railroads--Discontinuance of Paasanger Tram Serv1ce see also Railroad P aaaencer Service Railroad•-- Rail pax/ Amtrak Railroads--Emercency Rail T ransportation Improvement and Employment Act Railroada--Railpax/ Amtrak see also Railpax Railroad P aaaenger Service Railroada--Discontinuance of Passenger T rain Service Railroads- - Strikea see also Railroad Brotherhoods and Organir.ations Railroad Strikes Strikes Unions Railroads - -Sbopcraft Unions see also Labor Rat Cont rol R ilroad Brotherhoods and Organir.ations Uniona Strike• see a/ 0 St. Louis Rat Control Raymond, David see Panama Canal - - Correspondence -Raymond, David Recipes Recreat ion ee a/ SO Boating Recycling Waste ee also Conservation --Misc. Red China Energy Conservation Solid Wute Pollution See Foreicn Affai re -- Red China Redistricting See a/so Missouri --Redist ricting Redwood National Parka see Conservation Redwood Nat ional P ark Referrals Regulat ion Q see Banking and Currency Commission -Citicorp Rehabilit ation See Housing- - Rehabilitation See a/so Housinc- -Operation Rehab Housing- - Rock Springs Rehabilitation Association Religion Religion -- Prayer in School Renegotiation Act of 1951 Rent Strikes see Housing--P ublic Housing--Rent Strike Rent Supplements See Housing--Rent Supplements Reorganir.ation P rogram Re-- Pricing Commodities ee a/so Commodity Exchange Act Commodity Futures Republic of China See For ign Affairs-- Republic of China Republican National Convention Reserve Officers Training Program Resignations Retirement :;ee Military Retirement see a/so Railroad Retirement Legislation Revenue Sharing see a/so Urban Affairs Revenue Sharing Information Rhodesia see Foreign Affairs- - Rhodesia Richards- -Gebaur Air Force Base see a/ SO Air Force Re.location to Scott AFB Rice see Agriculture--Rice Bill Right to Food Resolut ion see a/so Food Crisis Hunger and Malnutrition Right to Financial Privacy Act see a/so Consumer Credit Financial Disclosure Privacy Right to Work ee a/ ·o Labor Legislation Riots see Crime- -Riots ee a/so Housing--Insurance --Riots Rivers ee Floods Missouri--Flood National Flood Insurance Program Robinson- -Patman Act see a/ 0 Anti--Trust Laws Rock Island Railroad Rock Spring Rehabilitation Association see Housing--Rock Springs Rehabilitation Association Roth Study see Grants- -Roth Study Rural Development Act Rural Electr ification Administration Russia ·ee Foreign Affairs- - Soviet Union SALT Safe Drinking Water Act Safety - -Highway see Highway Safety Safety- -Railroad see Rai lroad Safety Sailors see Harry Lundeberg School see a/so Maritime Academies Saint Elizabeth Seton see National Saint Elir.abeth Seton Day St . Joesph 's Hospital St . Louis A-Me St . Louis My-Z Saint Louis St . Louis - -Airport see a/ 0 Airports St . Louis - -Arch see J effe rson National Expansion Memorial St. Louis- -Aldermanic Affairs St. Louis Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women see Council of Catholic Women St. Louis Area Council of Governments St . Louis--Banking see Banking and Currency--St. Louia Banking St . Louis Beautification Commia1ion St. Louis Bicentennial St. Louis--Bi-State Development Agency St. Louis--Bi-State Re(ional Medical Program St. Louis Board of Aldermen St. Louis Board of Education St. Louis- -Board of Education- -Property at 4100 Forest Park Ave St. Louis- -Board of Election Commiasioners St. Louis--Boards of Directors of Local St. Louis Bridges St. Louis Cardinal• Companies St. Louis - -Challenge of the 70's St. Louis - -City- County Consolidation St. Louis- -City Employees St. Louia--Civil Defenae St. Louis- - Clippings St. Louis--Comptroller's Report St. Louis- -Consumer Affairs Board see also Conaumer St. Louis Consumer Federation St . Louis Convention Center St. Louis Convention Piasa Land St. Louis - - Coroner St . Louis County St. Louis County- - Clippings St. Louis Courthouse St. Louis Day Care ee a/ 0 Poverty Program- -Day Care Centers Poverty Program- -Head Start Center Poverty Program--St. Louis Day Care St. Louis - -Dea Perea Project St. Louis--Downtown St . Louis - -East - West Gateway Coordinating Council see East - West Gateway Coordinating Council St. Louis--Federal Building St. Louis-- Federal Building- -Clippings St . Louis --Gateway Army Ammunition St. Louis--Grants see Grants- - Entries Plant St. Louis--Health & Welfare Council see Health & Welfare Council of Greater St. Louia St. Louis--Highwaya See a/so Highway through St. Louis Martin Luther King Bridge St . Louis Housing see Housing- - St . Louis entries St. Louis Housing and Land Clearance Authroity ·ee Housing-- St. Louis and Land Clearance Authority St . Lou1s Housing Code Enforcement See Housing--St . Louis Code Enforcement St . Louis Housing Plan see Housing- -St . Louis Housing Plan St. Louis Human Development Corporation see Poverty Program--St . Louis Human Development Corp. ee a/ 0 Poverty Program- -Human Development Corp. St. Louis Independent Packing Company see Meat Inspection--St . Louis Independent Packing Company St. Louis- - Indian Cultural Center St. Louis--Jefferson National Expansion Memorial see Jefferson National Expansion Memorial St. Louis Jobs Corps Center see also Job Training Program Labor--Manpower Development and Training Poverty Program--St. Louis Jobs Corps Center St. Louis--Labor Relations--St. Louis Plan St. Louis Layoffs St. Louis Levee St. Louis- -Mansion House see Mansion House St. Louis--Mayor see also Poelker, John H St. Louis- -Mayor- -Clippings St. Louis--Mayor's Council on Youth St. Louis --Municipal Opera St . Louis--National Museum St. Louis--National Park System St . Louis- -Old Post Office Building see a/so St. Louis Federal Building St. Louis Ordinance Plant see a/so St. Louis--Gateway Army Ammunition St. Louis--Parks St . Louis--Police St . Louis--Politics see a/so Missouri- -State Politics Women in Politics St . Louis --Port St. Louis--Port--Clippings St. Louis - -Port--Correspondence St. Louis Post- -Dispatch see Pulitr;er, Joseph Newspaper St . Louis Post Office--Curtailment of Service St . Louis--Post Office Discontinuance of Railway Post Office Service St . Louis Post Office--Operations see also Grants--Post Office--St. Louis St. Louis Post Office--Postal Data Center St . Louis --Poverty Program see Poverty Program--St. Louis entries St. Louis Public Service Employment St . Louis Rat Control see also Rat Control St. Louis Regional Industrial Development Corp. St . Louis Residential Manpower Center St . Louis--Revenue Sharing ee a/so Reven'ue Sharing St. Louis- -Savings and Loan Associations ee a/ so Banking and Currency Committee-Savings and Loan St. Louis School Lists St. Louis School Tax St . Louis Senior Citizens see also Elderly St . Louis -- Small Business Administration see a/so Banking and Currency--Small Business Administration Poverty Program--St. Louis Small Business Development Center Small Business Administr:oL1on St. Louis--Solomon Rooks St. Louis--Symphony St. Louis- - Union Station St. Louis--U.S. Army St. Louis--U.S. Army--Automates Logistics Management Agency St. Louis--U.S. Army Aviation Research Center St. Louis--U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command St. Louis--U.S. Army Corps of Engineers see also Flood Control Flood Protection Project St. Louis U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Correspondence St. Louis U.S. Army Corps of Engineers- Newsletters St. Louis--U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-North St. Louis Harbor St. Louis--U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Installations St. Louis--U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Material Command St. Louis- - U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Center St. Louis--U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis--U.S. Army Reserve St. Louis- - U.S. Army Support Center St. Louis- - U.S. Department of Agriculture Laboratory St. Louis--U.S. Medical Laboratory St. Louis--U.S. Military Installations St. Louis--U.S. Military Personnel Record Center St. Louis Records Center St. Louis University St. Louis University--Agency for International Development St. Louis University--Commemorative Stamp St. Louis University--Fordyce Conference St. Louis University--Grants see Grants- -HEW- - St. Louis University see al 0 Grants--Many Sources--St. Louis University St. Louis University Medical School St. Louis University--One Hundred Fiftieth Anniverary of Its Founding- -Resolution St. Louis University - - Scott Shipe Case St. Louis Witholding Tax Sales Representative Protection Act Salk Vaccine see Health--Polio--Vaccine Savings and Loan Companies see Banking and Currency Committee-Savings and Loan ee a/so Housing--Savings and Loan Scholarships and Fellowships School Lunch Program see also Education--Food and Nutrition Program School Milk Program see a/so Education--Food and Nutrition School Students Schools Program see a/ o Education entries Schools--Chrisiian Brothers ROTC Program Schools--Clippings see also Education--Clippings Schools--College Debate Topic Schools--Exchange Students Schools- -Grants see Grants--HEW- -Public Schools--High School Debate Topic Schools- - Integration see Integration Schools--Junior College District School Prayer see Religion --Prayer in Schools Schoir Investigation Scullin Steel Sea Level Canal see P anama Canal--Sea Level Canal Study Commission Seals see Publications Request for Seal Plaques Secret Service Securities Securities and Exchange Commission Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act Security Contract Guards Select Committee on Aging see also National Institute on Aging Older Americana Act Select Committee on Intelligence Select Committee to Investigate Assaainations Select Committee to Investigate Missing in Action see also Foreign Affairs--Vietnam Select Committee to Reform Congress see also Congress Selective Service Separation of Presidential Powers Series E Bonds Sesquicentennial of Missouri see Missouri--Sesquicentennial Seaton, Elizabeth see National Saint Elizabeth Seton Day Seven Day War see Foreign Affairs--Israel-Arab War Sex Education see also Birth Control Family Planning Illegitimacy Population Growth Shoe Imports Shoe Workers Silver . see Banking and Currency Committee- Silver Situs Picketing Against Situs Picketing For "Slug" Law see a/so Banking and Currency Coins Small Boat Owners see a/ so Boats Small Business Administration . see also Banking and Currency ~ommlttee-Small Buamess National Federation of Independent Business Poverty Program--St. Louis Small Business Devl. Center St. Louis- -Small Busm h Administration Smnll Businese Growth and Job Creation Act Smithsonian Snoapers Sonp see Food and Drug Admini1tration--Soap Soccer Team Social & Rehabilitation Services Social Security--ADC Social Security--Amendments Social Security--Benefits at Age 72 Social Security--Deduction for Education Social Security--Dis bility Social Security--Divorced Widows Social Security--Earning Limitations Social Security- - Equipment Rental & Purchase Social Security--General Social Security- - Health Insurance Social Security--Hospitallnaurance see also Social Security--Medicaid Social Security- - Include Qualified Drugs Social Security- - Increased Benefits Social Security-- Derr--Milla Social Security- -King/ Anderson Social Security- - Legislation Social Security Legislation--ADC Social Security-- Limitations on Earnings Social Security--Material and Reports Social Security--Medicaid see also Socinl Security- - Hospital Insurance Social Security--Medicare Social Security- - Medicare- -Clippings Social Security- -Medicare- -Coverage of Cancer Test Social Security- - Medicare for Physicians Social Security--Medicare-- Independent Laboratoriea Social Security- - Medicare- -Newaletter from HEW Social Security- - Medicare--Nursing Homes see a/so Nursing Homes Social Security--Medic re--Optometric and Medical Vision Care Soci al Security- -Medicare- -Profeseional Standards Review Organization Social Security- -Medicare- - Prescription Drugs Social Security--Medicare Reform Act Social Security- -Miniaters Social Security--Old Age Assistance Social Security--Old Age Insurance Social Security--Petitions Social Security Programs Social Security -- Proof of Age Social Security--Public As1istance see a/so Welfare Social Security --Reader'• Digest Soci al Security --Reducing Age Limit Social Security--Retirement at 62 Social Security--Supplementary Benefits Social Security--Widow'a Benefit• Social Service Regulations Soft Drink lnduatry Solar Energy Information Solar Heating Legislation Solid Waate Pollution see also Air Pollution Soula.rd Area Pollution Recycling Wute Water Pollution ee Housing-- Soulard Area South St. Louis see Housing--South Broadway see a/so Housing--South Side Soviet Jews--Foreign Affairs Soviet Union see Foreign Affairs--Soviet Union Space--Apollo 11 Space- - Apollo 13 Space Program see a/so Aeronautics and Space National Aeronautics and Space Act Space Program-- Russian Spanish Pavilion Special Prosecutor Spending Ceiling Sports Stamps ee Commemorative Stamps Postage lncreaae Postal Boutique Stamps, Food see Food Stamp Plan State, Dept. of ee also Kissinger, Henry State Department Authorization Bill State Dept.--Danny the Red's . . . Stockpile Strikes see also Housing-- Public Housing- - Rent Stip Mining Strontium 90 Strikes Labor Entries Postal Strike Railroad Brotherhoods and Organizations Railroads- -Strikes Taft-Hartley Billa see Drugs, Strontium 90 Student Loans see Education -- College Loan Program see a/ so Education- -Student Aid Bill Student Militants see Militants Subsidy Programs Sugar Act Sullivan, Leonor K.--Appointmenta Sullivan, Leonor K.--Billa Sullivan, Leonor K.--Conferee Appointments Sullivan, Leonor K.--Congressional Record Items Sullivan, Leonor K.- -Dura Letter Sullivan, Leonor K.--Election Material Sullivan, Leonor K.--House Subcommittees Sullivan, Leonor K.--lnterviews Sullivan, Leonor K.--lnvitations see Invitations Sullivan, Leonor K. - -Letters Sent in Multiple Copies Sullivan, Leonor K. --Letters to Other Members of Congress Sullivan, Leonor K.-- &en Sullivan, Leonor K.--Oftlce AdmiaiHra&ioa Sulliv n, Leonor K.--P Req t SullivM, Leonor K - -Por&raU Sullivan, Leonor K.- -P ~ Jg(IU see also Praa and • lleponen PreMCommeau Radio aad Televiaion --P . a.~a . aad lntervie a Sulliv n, Leonor K.--P.- Rele UNil-66 Sullivan, Leonor K.--P.- lUI•- Ul67-72 Sullivan, Leonor K -- P.- 1•- UI73- Sullivan, Leonor K.--PubllcitJ see also e • Rele --Radio Radio Sullivan, Leonor K.--Qu.UOnn.U. Sullivan, Leonor K.--R.edpee see Recipea Sulliv n, Leonor K.--Rerernb see Referrala Sullivan, Leonor K.--Scholanhip A arcl Sullivan, Leonor K.--Reaction ~ Presidential St tementa see a/ 0 Praa Commenta Preu and e 1 Reporters Sulhv n, Leonor K --Speech Inform tion R.equ . t Sullivan, Leonor K --Speech., Sulliv n, Leonor K --Speech., on the Floor ol the House Sullivan, Leonor K.--Speech., to Outaide Groupa Sullivan, Leonor K.--Tatimony Before CommiuSuJUvan, Leonor K.--Tributa Upon Retirement Sullivan, Leonor K.--Votinc Record See a/ 0 Foreicn Afrain--Vietnam- -Mn. Sullivan'• Voting Record Sullivllll, Leonor K.--Workinc Woman of the Year Award Summer Youth Employment and Recre tton see a/ 0 Poverty Program--National Summer Sun T n Lotion Youth Procram ee Food and Drug Adminiatration--Sun Sunshine Bill Tan Lotion See a/so Freedom of Information Act Superaonic Tranaport Supplemental Security Income Supreme Court see a/ o Impeachment (J uatice Douglu) Judiciary Surplua Property Swiss B nk Account. .see Banking and Currency- -Swiu Bank Account• Synthettc Fuela Loan Guarantee Bill Tart-Hartly Ad Taft -Hartly Billa see Strikea Tariffa Tariffa -- Canadian Tar~ffa -- Koken Comp niea, Inc. Tanff•--Reciprocal Trade Tariffa- -Shoe Import. Tariffa- -Shoe lmporta Congreaaion I Record lnHrtl and Background M teriala Tax IUbate ee a/ o Internal Revenue Service Tax a.duction Ad Tax Reform T:.x nerorm Correapondence Tax IUform- -Material Tax Study Legialation Taxa- -Airline Taxa--Airport Taxa--City Eaminp Tax Taxa- -Clippinp Taxa--Deduction for Dependent. Taxa--Deduction of Education of Dependents .)ee a/so Education--Tax Deduction for Education Taxea--Dividenda Taxea--Eatate Taxea--Exciae Taxea--Excise Can Taxes-- Excise Handbap Taxea- -Exise- -Truckl Taxe•·-Gu Taxea--Gu and Oil Depletion TI\Xet--Home Owners Tax Deductions Taxn-- lncome Taxa- -Single Persons Taxes-- Income Taxa Taxes-- Inspection of Tax Returns Taxes- - lnve•tment Tax Credit Taxn- -Mi•cellaneou• Taxes- -Municipal Bonds Taxes--Prnidential Election Campaign Taxn- -Self-Employed Person Taxe1--State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Taxes- -Surtax Taxes--Transportation of Household Goods Teachera Corps ee Education--Teacher'• Corps Teacher '• Ret irement Teamsters Teamsters- -Monitorship Teamsters - -Strike• Technology Asseament Office see a/ SO Office of Technology Aueasment Telecommunication• ee a/ o Communication• Telephone Rates Television ee a/ so Communications Equal Time Federal Communications Commi1sion Freedom of the Preas Televiaion and Radio Programa Television--CBS-- Selling of the Pentagon Televi1ion-- Education Television --Educational Television--KTVI Ten Park• Improvement Auociation see Housing--Ten Park Improvement Aaaociation Tennants' Organization see Hou•ing-- National Tennenta' Organization Thailidomide see Drugs, Thalidomide Thanks Youa Thomas J efreraon Day Till, Emmet Timber Supply see a/ o Lumber Lumber PreaervaLion Le(ialalion Total Boy Project see Poverty Program--Total Boy Program Tourism-- Legislation Town House Project see Housing- -T own Houae Project-Clipping Toxic Substances Control Act Trade--Imports and Exports ee a/ 0 Fair Trade Trade Bill International Trade Commiuion Oillmporta Trade- - Import/Export Clippinp Trade--Import/Export Rhodnian Chrome Trade Reform Act Trade--Shoe Import Trading Stamps Transit- - Bi- State ee a/ SO Bus Services Transit- - Bi-State Meeting Transit --Mass Transit- -Maaa- - St. Louis Transition Allowance for Rich rd Nixon see Nixon, Rich rd M.--Transition Allowance Transportation see a/so Grants-- Dept. of Transportation-St. Louis Transportation, Dept. of-- Proposed Regulations see a/ 0 Har;ardous Material Transportation Trust Fund Transportation- -Miscellaneous Treasury Treasury Bonds Troublemakers Truck Bill Trout See Food and Drug Administration--Trout Truman , Harry S.--Medal of Honor Truman, Harry S.--Memorial Scholarship Fund Turkey See Foreign Affai rs--T urkey Turnkey Projects see Housing--Cabanne T urnkey Project see also Housing--Forest Park Blvd Turnkey Project Housing--Turnkey Projects Twelfth and Park Area see Housing--Twel fth and P ark Unemployment 1.'1! also Employment Health Insurance for the Unemployed Learning Business Centers • Unemployment Compenaation see a[ 0 Emerg ncy Unemployment Compenaation Aesistance Unemployment Compensation Form Letter and Material Unidentified Flyinc Objecta Union Electric Company See a/ 0 Lifeline Rate Act Union - Sarah Area see Housing- - Union- Sarah Unions ~l'e a/so Labor Entriee United Nations Poetal Union Recognition Railroad Brotherhoods and Organisations Railroads- -Strikes Railroads--Shopcrart Unions see Foreign Affairs- - United Nations United Nations--Reception United States- - Dept. of Agriculture U.S. Forces Oversea& United States Information Agency United Steel Workers of America University of Missouri see Missouri- - University Upper Missippi River Baain Commission see a/so Conservation--Upper Missisaippi River National Recreation Area Flood Control Upward Bound see Education-- Upward Bound Urban Affairs see a/ 0 City Planning Revenue Sharing Urban Coalition Urban League Training Program Urban Renewal ee Housing- -Urban Renewal see also Housing--Rehabilitation USS Pueblo see Foreign Affairs--Pueblo Utility Regulation ee Lifeline Rate Act Utility Loans see Emergency Utility Loans VISTA see Poverty Program--VISTA Vaporir;ers see Food and Drug Administration-- Vaporir;ers Varnish see Food and Drug Administration--Varnish Vaughn Area see Housing--Vaughn Area Veteran 's Administration see also Jewish War Vetrans Veterans ' Administration- - St. Louis Regional Office Veterans ' Benefits--Miscellaneous Veterans' Day Veterans' Employment Legislation Veterans--GI Bill Veterans --General Veterans Hospitals Veterans Hospitals --Closing Veterans Hospital-- Cochran Veterans Hospital- - Cochran--Admissions Waiting List Veterans Hospitals- - Consolidation of Outpatient Clinic Veterans of Foreign Wars see Veterans ' Organisations Veterans Hospitala--Harry S. Truman Memorial Hospital Veterans Hospitals--Jefferson Barracks Veterans Hospitala--Jeffenon Barracks- Admissions Waiting List Ve ~erana Hoapitala- -Miacellaneoua Veterana' Hoapitali- - Nunin& Horne Care for V eteran• Veterans--St. Louia Conaolidation Veterana' - - Houainc Ve ~erans '-- Lecialation Veteran• - -Military Retirement Veterans-- National Cemeteriea see also Jefferaon Barraclu Veterans-- National Life lnauranee Service Veterans Orcanir.ationa Veterana Penaiona Veterans P naiona- - Miacellaneoua Veterans Pensiona- -Spaniah American War Widowa Veterans Penaiona--War Widowa Veterans Pensiona- -World War I Vice President see a/ SO Agnew, Spiro Nixon, Richard M. Vietnam see Foreign Affain- -Vietnam Vietnam--Miaaing in Action Vietnam--Prisionen of War see also Foreign Mfain Villa de Ville see Houaing-- Villa de Ville Vitamin Supplement• see Food and Drug Adminiatration -- Vitamin Supplement• Vocational Education see also Education--Residential Vocational Education Education- - Vocational Education Vocational Rehabilitation Voter Registration see also Election Reform--Post Card Voters Registration Federal Voting Assistance Program See also League of Women Voters Voting Age Voting Rights Act see also Election Reform Wage and Price Controls see also Minimun Wage Price Freer:e War Claims War Claims--Foreign War Insurance War Powers War Protest see Foreign Mfain--Vietnam see a/so F oreign Affaira--Cambodia Washington D.C. see District of Columbia Washington University see also Grants--HEW--Washington D.C. Grants--Many Sources-Washington University Washington University Medical Center see Housing--Washington University Medical Center Water see also Food and Drug Administration -Water Water Diveraion of the Misaiuippi River to Texas Water Flouridation :,ee Flouridation of Water Water Pollution see a/so Air Pollution Pollution Solid Waste Pollution Water Pollution Laboratory Water Resources Planning Act see Conservation--Water Resources Water,ate ee at so Nixon, Richard M Waterway User Changes see a/so Lock and Dam 26 Weapons see Arms Control see also Disarmament Nerve Gas Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Weapons--Testing Weather Weatherir.ation Assistance Act Welfare see also F amily Assistance Health and Welfare Council of Greater St . Louis Welfare-- Clippings ee also Family Assistance Material and Clippings Welfare--Family Support see also Family Assistance Act Wellston, MO see Housing--Wellston West End see Housing- -West End West Pine Apartments see Housing--West Pine Apartments Wheat Research and Promotion White House Conference on Aging White House Conference on Children White House Releases by President Wild Rivers Bill see Conservation--Wild Riven Wilderness see Conservation-- Wilderness Wire T apping and Bugging see also Internal Security Women see also Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs Anthony, Susan B. Insurance Coverage for Women League of Women Voters Minority Groups National Center for Women Women--Clippings Women- - Commissions on the Status of Women Women- -Employment Opportunities see also Equal Employment Equal Pay for Equal Work Women--Equal Rights Amendment see also Civil Rights--Equality for Women Women--Equal Rights--Clippings Women- - Equal Rights- - Congressional Material Women- - Equal Rights--Correspondence Women - - Equal Rights--Material Women--Higher Education Women in Military Academies Women in Politics see also Campaign Conference for Democn&ic Women Miaouri- -Sta&e Poli\ica St. Louia--Politica Women in Politica--Requ.ta for Jnfonnation Women in Public Service Women--Jnaurance see Jnaurance Covenc• for Women Women--International Women'• Year Women--Media Editorall and Repli• Women--Neweletten Women--Orcaniaatione see also Bueineu and Prof-ional Women'• Club Council of Catholic Women Workmen'• Compeneation Lawa see Labor- - Workmen'• Compeneation Lawa World Affaire Council World Federation Y oun1 Adult Coneervation Corpe Youn, American• for Freedom Youn& Democrat. of St. Louia Youth Affain see a/so Metropolitan Youth Commiuion Youth Appreciation Week Youth Camp Safety Act Youth Opportunity Unlimited 220-002738559 sro