Part three of an interview with Musa Ali of Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Topics include: Different job he held and businesses he owned. How he brought his children to the U.S. Where his children were educated and what they do for work. How he has been treated in the U.S. What churches he attends. What marriage customs are like. ; 1 SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Uh, he say, "Give me $10 more and me wash dishes." I say, "No, my friend, me like wash dishes." And he can't kick me out because I'm the boss. SPEAKER 1: Boss, right. [Laughs] ALI: And I start working in the kitchen. This Chinese is a short fellow. What he do, I write in my. with Arabic language. I write what he do. Every time, what he do-do, I write it until I learned all the cook. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: I fired the cook, I hired dishwasher. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: And I start cooking for two and a half years Chinese food. SPEAKER 1: Wow, you stayed that one. ALI: I stayed two and a half years. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yes. And after, American government send me to Russia. SPEAKER 1: For what? ALI: Business. SPEAKER 1: Business? [Laughs] ALI: And I went to Russia and I have to sell my business. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: I sold it, I think, $11,000. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: The restaurant. I stayed six months, less than a few days to six months. When I came back, I find the place go to pieces. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right. And I took over. I be. I-I bought it $450. SPEAKER 1: Back? You bought it? ALI: Back. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] Yeah. 2 ALI: And then we changed it from Chinese to American again. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yeah. And I took it over. I bought it $450. I fire all the help and I hire good girls, nice-looking girls. She wants to take picture in Fox and Hound, if you know that place, Fox and Hound Nightclub in Quincy. She take picture and take the picture, put your picture in a match. SPEAKER 1: Oh, yeah? ALI: She's a beautiful girl. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Big, tall, hair up to. I hire her behind the counter and I see a lot of customers look at her. And her dance is very, very good and after. Uncle Sam again, called me up again. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Send me back to Palestine. SPEAKER 1: Business again? ALI: Business again. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I have to sell it. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I sold it. When I came back again, I have to take hairdresser. I went to school. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? You went to school? ALI: A hairdresser. Yeah. SPEAKER 1: Where was this, did you go to school? ALI: In Boston. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Academy something school. Yes. And I took a license. And after when we talk, I became. me and Harry J. Sullivan, and Harry L. Barker, we had a meeting together and I said, "I'd like to get my business back to be doctor." He said, "Ali, you can't. You have to 3 go to school." I went to Harvard College. When I went to Harvard College, naturally they talk big words, the dean of the college. I don't understand. I go to library. In state hospital, you have a beautiful library, American here. I went to library and that's where the boys who were in the same class with me, some of them were in the army too, you know, and started to look at dictionary what this word mean. I don't understand even the meaning of the word. I look what's the meaning of this word way back two or three times. I got lost. I said, "I don't want to lose my time in the government." The government pay for the school and gave me $125 a week. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right. They pay me $125 a week and I don't understand nothing. That's why I thought make the government pay money for nothing and I don't understand nothing. It make you feel ashamed. Number two, it make you feel ashamed, an intelligent man, you don't understand English. It looks bad. SPEAKER 1: It's not an easy language. ALI: That's right. I say, "Okay, forget it." See? And I open sponge business. SPEAKER 1: Sponge? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: They call it [unintelligible - 00:03:40] Sponge Company in Boston. That's my name. Yes. I have 250 men diver for me. SPEAKER 1: Oh, yeah? ALI: Yes, in Boston. I made good business. Yes. And I have a boat go to Middle East and come back. Yes, with captain. I go with them once in a while. I've done a very good business. Yes. And after, I sold the business and I came to Fitchburg. 4 SPEAKER 1: Well, all this time you were in Boston, were you still living with your brother? ALI: No. SPEAKER 1: No? You moved out? ALI: I move out. I live alone. I hire apartment, one doctor. I mean, doctor. him and I, we live together. SPEAKER 1: But you still didn't have enough family to bring your family over here? ALI: No, I bring my family. SPEAKER 1: When did you bring your family? ALI: In 1946, I bring my son. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Just your son or.? ALI: My son, the one who died. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: I bring him; I put him in high school in Boston. After, I put him in Northeastern College. After, I put him to Harvard College. Yes. SPEAKER 1: Did you bring your wife or the rest of the.? ALI: No, my wife she. SPEAKER 1: She had died. ALI: In 1948. SPEAKER 1: And what about the rest of your children? ALI: Lived with my mother and father. My father, he lived 107. SPEAKER 1: To 107 years old? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: And the other children lived with him? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Why did you just bring the one boy and not the others? Because. ALI: No, no, because he's old enough. He was 17. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. 5 ALI: And the other one was younger. He didn't need mother. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, they had to be taken care of while he was work. ALI: We have to be [unintelligible - 00:05:07]. If I bring with me women here. because I hear here, in old country, they say he's a playboy. SPEAKER 1: Oh, yeah. ALI: And I don't want to say that. I don't want somebody give me a bad name. I don't want no woman to live with me with my children. You see? Right away, they say, "It's not for his children – he playboy." SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I don't like that. See? I bring my son then he finish and I bring other son when he grow when I came to Fitchburg here. In 1950, I bring my other son. And after, I bring my daughter. See? And my son, that number two, he don't like the school. I put him in Fitchburg High School here three months and I walk with him – I don't take him in a car, walk with him – he go to school, inside. He see when I go and he walk out. He don't go to school. SPEAKER 1: Do they speak English at all? ALI: A little bit. SPEAKER 1: A little bit. Yeah. ALI: Because down there, they teach you A, B, C, D, open the door, close the door, thank you, goodbye, how are you, you know. SPEAKER 1: He just didn't like it. ALI: He don't like the school. We have to learn some trade. He said, "I like to be mechanic." I put him to mechanic here in [unintelligible - 00:06:25] summer school, a mechanic. I put him there, two weeks, he said, "Too dirty." SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I said, "All right." And he start to smoke. I beat him up. And he see me a few time I go to Fidelity Bank, to Mr. Barrett. He 6 ask him, he say, "My father need $200, Mr. Barrett. Can you give me please?" Mr. Barrett did give him $200, the president of the bank. SPEAKER 1: Oh, geez. ALI: He took $200 and he took the bus from here to Boston. He was only five months in this country. And he went to Boston by bus. And from Boston, he took the taxi to the airport and he took the airplane to Dearborn, Michigan. This boy here, you met him, Abdullah? SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: He's the one who was there in Dearborn, Michigan, because he came the same day, this my nephew, because. both cousin. And he went to see him. He started work with him. From there, he went to volunteer to the air force, American Air Force, four years. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. What's he doing today? ALI: Now, he wants to work with me, barber. I put him in school here to be barber because he don't like. SPEAKER 1: He came back, yeah. ALI: He came back. He get married and he get six kid now. I put him to work with me for 14 years, you know, barber. I gave him $225 a week, five days, for barber. He was [Unintelligible - 00:08:01] for me in barbershop here. SPEAKER 1: In Fitchburg? ALI: In Fitchburg. And after the business dropped down because everybody gets. starts to get long hair. And then he left. He went to Somerville. He bought packages store, you know, variety store. And he bought house there, see. And now, he has then. making a good living. SPEAKER 1: What about your daughter? How did.? ALI: My daughter, she got married. SPEAKER 1: So she came here? 7 ALI: No. I send her to Harvard College. I want to be doctor. Because I found out you can't open a hospital, you can't do nothing until you be doctor. And I was thinking, "She's young and she know English." I put her in Harvard College, took a medical degree, and she get doctors. And I work on her hair. And after two or three years, could be, maybe, I get my practice license doctor, too. See? And she went over a year and a half. And I was her hairdresser myself in Fitchburg here. She don't like to be doctor. She said, "Dad, I don't like it – too hard for me. Can I take hairdressing and work with you?" I said, "Okay." I put her hairdresser, in a school. She stays seven months in school and then she got her practice license, hairdresser. And she came work with me in Fitchburg as hairdresser. She don't like it. I said, "What do you want?" She said, "Well, let me work with you in the house." I have a house. SPEAKER 1: Take care of your house? ALI: My house. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: I put her in the house. Then she hit 18, 19 and I said, "Now, you can't stay like this. You have to be married." I send her back to old country. She met my cousin. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: It was an arranged type of marriage? ALI: Yes. Yes. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. Your other boy got married though. That wasn't arranged, was it? ALI: Arranged by my father. SPEAKER 1: Oh, it was? ALI: Yes. I send them there from here, from the air force. SPEAKER 1: So he married an Arab? ALI: Yes. 8 SPEAKER 1: And your other son, he went to a school here? ALI: Yes, he went to Northeastern College. He went to Harvard College. SPEAKER 1: For any special thing? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: To be a doctor? ALI: No. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: Number one, he was engineer, see. And after, he took, I don't know what kind of thing. He took another one. Subject, he took another subject. And after, he went to the air force. He once worked for the government intelligence service six and a half years, see. And after he get discharged, he came here. He opened supermarket in Detroit, Michigan. And the American government went after him, took him. He went on postmaster in Saudi Arabia. After, they took him back to ambassador. Two months ago, the American government, they want me to go back. They came here to the barbershop and ask me to follow. I thought about it. They want me to go back to the service. SPEAKER 1: They want you, too? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? And you said no? ALI: No. I told them the story about when that tourist was hunting. Do you remember? SPEAKER 1: I think. ALI: One Arabian champion and one German champion went to hunt. They say, "There can't be two champions. There got to be one." When he went to Germany, he say, "Okay, you're my guest tomorrow morning." Next morning, they went to hunt. The German fellow took the eagle with him – pheasants, they're called pheasants. He let the pheasant cock, cock, cock, and all the 9 pheasant come in. German fellow, he took the gun and shot five. He said, "Boy, that's why you're champion?" He says, "Well, that's my limit now. Five minute, five pheasants. Let's go back home." He said, "Before you go, you want to sell me the pheasant? He said, "It cost too much money." He said, "Why?" "Because they take me a long time to teach them, making the pheasant come in and after I kill them, he come in with them. You know, because they're dead and it becomes alive and put them with me and go home. It cost me too much time and money." He said, "I don't care. How much you want to sell it?" He said, "A thousand mark." He said, "Here's a thousand mark, my friend." Look at him, the smartest man. He said, "I'll buy it. The German fellow, he said, "A thousand marks for one pheasant is a lot of money." He took it, and the Arabian man, he took the gun and shot him, he kill him. He said, "Why you kill him?" He said, "Well, he's not worth to live. He doesn't deserve to live." He said, "Why?" He said, "He double-cross his kind." SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: Double-cross his kind. The German fellow, he always said, "You're right." He said, "He's not worth to live." Am I going against my people? No. And I told that story to the people who come to see me. They say, "You're still American." I say, "I don't care. Still, I'm Arabian blood." SPEAKER 1: Yeah, you can't go against your people. ALI: I can't. SPEAKER 1: When you started to live in this area, did you look for a neighborhood of your own nationality or weren't there enough people? ALI: No, when I came here, I don't find nobody except one man, I told you, Mr. Joseph. He's Lebanese and he's Catholic. And the Catholic, they don't like the Muslim. 10 SPEAKER 1: They don't? No? ALI: No. This people here that came tonight, they don't like Muslims. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: But just he work for me one time. When he came to this country to. he didn't have no license. I took him with me to Boston and I help him out to get his license. And he work with me one year, see. And I give him good money. But, of course, I'm Muslim, he quit. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right, after I give him license. He work in the plastic. He come and his finger all burned here because of the plastic. SPEAKER 1: The chemicals? ALI: Because I get factory in New Hampshire. SPEAKER 1: You have a factory now? ALI: Yeah, I sold it. SPEAKER 1: Oh, you sold it? ALI: Yeah, last year. I get plastic factory, Green, in New Hampshire? SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: That's my name. SPEAKER 1: Geez. You have a lot of things going. Well, how did the people treat you when you came into this area? ALI: Well, like I say, when I came here, I think I told you I met that man, Mr. [Lowell], and I took him home, I make Christmas dinner. I told you a story about it. And when I ask him to get. I give him $2 and dinner with us. She took it the wrong way. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, to be a waitress. ALI: Yeah, and after I went to First Baptist Church, where is the library now exactly, I make dinner for 250. When we were finished, I show you the papers here. I fed him next year. I asked him, he said, no, he get to be only a Baptist member, a First Baptist Church member. I said, "No, my friend, every man, the Greek, Italian, 11 Jews, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, I don't care who it is, over 6 years, they are invited. We call the mother, father of the town or the city. I invite everybody. And I have cars, transportation. I have. each car, two people to bring man or woman in wheelchair and put them in a car. When they come out, they can bring them to the dinner. And I have nurses; I hire 10 nurses. Every time I went to [unintelligible - 00:15:28] Hospital with my high English. I have a hard time even to rent 10 girls, to hire girls to feed the people and wash them out and send them back. Even one fellow is named Father O'Brien. He was in charge of the Saint Camilla Church. He was a waiter. And he didn't believe it. He came, kiss me, and hug me two or three time in my cheek. He say he never see that in his life and he was waiter with the George Burke last time and the policemen in five minutes, city council – waiters. And Father O'Brien, he volunteered. He say, "Honest to God, Mo, I give one man five times, you know, what's called second, second, second, five dishes. He eat five dishes in all, all men. And this man, he never eat before." I said, "That's what I would love to have. I want people to eat." The last time, last year, when I get. I get 15 years in Fitchburg here. The last time was 2,200 people. It was on TV, channel 4, 5, and 7. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: Yes, ma'am. SPEAKER 1: I don't remember. ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: A year ago? ALI: Yes. No, eight years ago. SPEAKER 1: Oh, eight years ago. ALI: Yes. Then they take me to the court. I have 500 letters. Over 10 letter come in from Tokyo, Japan. SPEAKER 1: Really? 12 ALI: That's right. I still got that mail. From Tokyo, Japan they thank me. They never see that man who do all that dinner, 82 turkey. I bought the smallest turkey, 35 pound from C.A. Cross. I don't know if you remember that name. It was a wholesale when you go to Wayland Park in your right-hand side. I bought. when I have my own restaurant. I have restaurant in [Parma], big dining. And I have the hotel. [Unintelligible - 00:17:29] I told you. And I had. SPEAKER 1: Barry? ALI: Barry. I have restaurant in [unintelligible - 00:17:37]. See, I have different places. And I buy a lot of food from them. And I ask Mr. Cross, young fellow, I say, "I want to make dinner." He say, "I hear about it." I say, "I want you to give me wholesale." He say, "Yes." He give me 82 turkeys but it's special because you have to order especially that big turkey. And nobody wanted that turkey, 38 and 40 pound, not 10, 15 pound. The smallest was 38 pound, see. I bought it and put them at table. And then the TV man, he came and took the picture. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yeah, he didn't believe it. One man, he volunteered to buy this stuff and cook them and slice them. He don't believe it. And nobody helped me here. And after, took me to the court. I told you that. They want to know where I got my money and what reason. I told them. SPEAKER 1: They just didn't know you could do something like that because you want to do it for people, to help them. ALI: I want it. I've done it in London. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: I fed in London in 1943. I fed 1,500 people in London. And the mayor of London, his name is Mr. Johnson—I not forgot it, old man with one eye—he worked with me all night long. And the 13 English is, everybody know, cold-blooded. But he's hot blooded. He worked with me. But the American here, nobody work with me. SPEAKER 1: No one helped you? ALI: Nobody. And even took me to the court. They want to know where I got my money. SPEAKER 1: So the people just weren't very friendly to you? ALI: No. No. Can you believe.? What reason, I can't tell you – just jealous because I run for politics here, for mayor? SPEAKER 1: When was that? ALI: Huh? SPEAKER 1: What year was that? ALI: I forget. Eight years ago since I start to run for mayor, this trouble starts in the city. SPEAKER 1: So do you still find a little bit of hostility now even? ALI: A little bit. I know they don't like me. Look now, I have a building, main street building – Dr. Rosenberg here, Dr. Benton here, and my building in the middle. Number one, I paint it white. They came and give me help, you see. "You can't paint it white. You have to paint it blue." I had one argument with my neighbor. I said, "Okay, I paint it blue but not dark blue, light blue." Dr. Benton and the dentist's wife, they came and they both gave me, "Are you blind? We're not this color." I say, "You told me blue. It is blue." He said, "No, it's light blue." I say, "Yes. It's barbershop. I want to grab people eyes, look. I don't want it dark." He said, "Where do you buy your paint?" I told him, "From Academy Paint Store." His name Phil, the manager, they went to see him. He said, "Phil?" He say, "Yes." He say, "We want a paint for Mr. Ali." He say, "Sure. No?" He say, "Yes." He say, "We need paint." They pick up the color – dark, dark blue. I could swear to God it's black. And he say, "[Unintelligible -14 00:20:51]. Is he color blind? He's stupid." He, he, he to the end. And then he came home to the office and he called me up. He say, "Ali?" I say, "Yes." "We got you the paint." I thought he pay for the paint. No. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. They wouldn't pay? ALI: No. He just pick up the color for me. I went to Phil. He said, "Ali, how do you live with this wife?" I said, "Why?" He said, "She call you stupid, she call you colorblind, she call you." I say, "That's not – you know how the women. They don't want to hear me. I didn't say nothing. SPEAKER 1: You didn't say it wasn't your wife? [Laughs] ALI: No. And he said, "What color?" He said, "This one." I said, "My gosh! Nobody died in my barbershop." SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: It's black. He say, "That's the wife. She." I say, "Give me that green." He says, "She's going to divorce you." I say, "Good. I like her to divorce me. I'll find another one." I painted it green. And since that time, he don't talk to me. He called me everything. We have a fire in that building. Fellow's name [unintelligible - 00:21:59]. He's the headman or the building inspector. He send me a letter by police – not by post office or by mail – by the police. I have to start remodeling my building before eight hours. If not, he can [unintelligible - 00:22:16] to make my building. I start for eight hours after the fire, start work on my building, three years ago. Now, Dr. Rosenberg is still there now. The window broke, the door broke. There's snow inside, frozen pipe. They didn't tell him, "You have to remodel your building." Why? He's a white man. I'm a white man. He's an American citizen. I'm an American citizen. He pay tax. I pay tax. I pay $800 tax – this year, $2,100 tax. But why they can't send him letter, "You have to fix this building." I went to John [unintelligible - 00:23:00]. I 15 said, "Mr. John, cousin," I say, "Will you please write letter to Dr. Rosenberg? He don't want to fix his building?" "All right, I can't force him. I'm not the City Hall." I say, "Can you give me permit at least for the window? Because it froze my pipe and I can't afford it. Even last week, when I was in old country, the pipe froze. They have to call the policeman; they have to call the fireman to close my water. It was leaking, fifth floor to the cellar, my pipe. It cost me $1,000. And they won't help me to [sell]. They won't help me. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: No. When I went to John [unintelligible - 00:23:41], he charged me $10. He wrote me a letter, a typewritten letter, good English, to Dr. Rosenberg to ask him permit, to give me permit. I buy the wood; I hire the carpenter, just for the window to hold the air. You sue me for $25,000. SPEAKER 1: They can do that? ALI: Yes. Now, I'm under court for $25,000 and that passing, what's that called in English? SPEAKER 1: Damages? ALI: No, pass. SPEAKER 1: Trespassing? ALI: Trespassing. And I send them up by mail, by lawyer. They charge me $10. See? SPEAKER 1: And they're going to sue you? ALI: They sue me already. My lawyer, Solomon, too, is Jewish; Dr. Rosenberg is Jewish. I say, "Two Jewish fight each other." See? To show you I'm not wanted here. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. You said something about you became an American citizen. When did you become one? Do you remember? 16 ALI: 1942 and they took me to intelligence service. Because you can be intelligence service; you have to be citizen. I took my citizen in Durham, North Carolina. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Really? Did you ever become involved in… well, there was no Muslim Church around here. You said that. where is the church? ALI: We have a church in Quincy. We have a church in New York. We have a big church in Washington, D.C. We have a church in Dearborn, Michigan. We have church in Detroit, Michigan. We have church in Cleveland, Ohio. SPEAKER 1: But none really that. do you go to churches around here? ALI: I go to every church. I go to Saint [unintelligible - 00:25:13], I go to Christ Church, I go to Saint Georgia's Church [unintelligible - 00:25:20], I go to Baptist Church. now they move it. It was here. They move it in John Fitch Highway [unintelligible - 00:25:30] down when you go to New Hampshire. Ashby? SPEAKER 1: Oh, Ashby? ALI: In the middle. We have a garage there, a new garage, in the church up the hill, building new. I go there. I go to Jew synagogue. SPEAKER 1: So you're really involved in all of them? ALI: I go to everyone. I don't mind. SPEAKER 1: It doesn't make any difference? ALI: No, we have one God in this world, like I told you yesterday. We have one God in this world, see. SPEAKER 1: Did you ever become involved in any social activities while you did those, you know. like you did the Christmas dinners with people. Anything else that you. any social activities like. did lots of Muslims ever get together and have like dates? ALI: No. SPEAKER 1: Nothing like that? 17 ALI: We have Arabian dance in Boston because [unintelligible - 00:26:14] get married, or [ring show] from Egypt, Lebanon, Beirut, [unintelligible - 00:26:19]. SPEAKER 1: But nothing in this area? ALI: Not in this area, because not much here people. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: The most 25, 30 people, just young boys. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. What were some of the things that you miss most about home, back in Arabia? Like did you miss the food or the.? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Do you still cook Arabian food? ALI: I cook any kind but I can't cook Arabian food. SPEAKER 1: You can't? ALI: I can't cook Arabian food. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: No. I have to go some time in Worcester. They call it [El Morocco]. You've been there? SPEAKER 1: I've heard of it, yeah. ALI: I go there sometime when I want Arabian food. But sometime, invite me, somebody like this people here, Lebanese, sometime invite me. I eat Arabian food. Sometime, I go to my son, I go to my nephew, see. SPEAKER 1: Do you miss that kind of food though? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: You're becoming adjusted to American food though? ALI: Yeah, I like American food. SPEAKER 1: [Unintelligible - 00:27:15]. ALI: Anything to fill your belly. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: That's all. SPEAKER 1: Do you miss the customs and things like that? 18 ALI: I wear it here. Yes. SPEAKER 1: You were telling me about the marriage customs. I thought that was kind of interesting, you know, how you don't get. like in your country, you don't even see them. ALI: No, you don't see them. SPEAKER 1: Each other before you're married. ALI: See, down there, like I say, I like the custom this way. And I like American custom like we talked yesterday because independent. how you look at it. Number one, down there, you can't have no girlfriend, no boyfriend, only through by your mother, by your father. See, you're married. Okay. When you're married, like I say, depending on your class, how much money you're worth; if you're worth money enough because the money belong to you because you belong to your wife, $2,000. You buy silk handkerchiefs. It's got to be white silk handkerchiefs. You give to the girl's father. The girl father count them. You have to replace it, match it. SPEAKER 1: Match it, yeah. ALI: He put $2,000, you put $2,000. He put $5,000, you put $5,000. He put $10,000, you put $10,000. The girl father, you have to match it. And he call the mother and he give the mother. The mother and the daughter, they go outside next day, buy jewelry, furnishing. SPEAKER 1: Stuff for the house? ALI: Stuff for the girl, for her future. Okay. And after, the boy, he invites everybody. Like I told you, we have dance three nights, see, until 12 or 1 o'clock in the morning. They bring like guitars in old country but call that oud. SPEAKER 1: Oud? ALI: Oud is different. It's round. SPEAKER 1: It's round? Yes. 19 ALI: Yes, beautiful. See? And they play sometime until 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning. Poem. SPEAKER 1: Singing? ALI: Yeah. And people have good time drinking coffee and cinnamon. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, cinnamon. ALI: Oh, beautiful. I love it. SPEAKER 1: But no liquor or nothing? ALI: No liquors, absolutely none. SPEAKER 1: It's against the religion? ALI: If you get caught with empty can beer in your hand or your body, three months in jail without court. SPEAKER 1: Because of your religion? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right. Now, I can tell you now. But in my time, you see, you can. not allowed. You remember my nephew when he told you I own the hotel. He get busy because I have nightclub. See? And I bring girl from Africa, Algiers, dancing from. from Italy, dancing and advertising in the papers and radio. And everybody, they want to see something different. Because you have to get [unintelligible - 00:30:06] to bring somebody and I bring a lot of people. And when the bartender. they have three bartender and too busy, see. I have to help them. They say, "Mo, give me Schlitz." "This cousin Schlitz?" "No, no, not this one." "This?" "No, no." I start to pick up. I don't care. Beer is the same thing to me. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Beer is beer. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Everyone has a different name, see. I have a cooler. I can put in 30 case, see. And I do not care. I just pick up. "I don't want this 20 one." "Okay, cousin. Open this." "Okay. No, not this one." "Okay, that's the one. Okay." They drive me. but fast. I want it fast. SPEAKER 1: So when you have your wedding celebrations, you just like to sit, have coffee, things like that. ALI: Coffee. SPEAKER 1: That lasts for three days? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: And the girls last three days, too? Separate? ALI: No, together. SPEAKER 1: Oh, together? ALI: Together, but men dance and sing and the girl behind – same area but not together, see. All right. And after, they make dinner. SPEAKER 1: For everybody? ALI: For everybody. Sometime, even four or five towns, depending how you are well known. I don't know what you call in English. How much you are well known. People know you. Two or three towns, sometimes 10 towns. Sometimes, nobody just your neighbors, see. Sometimes, a lot of people come in, 40, 50, 6000 lambs, sometimes two lamb. But like I say, how much people do you know? SPEAKER 1: So you kill a lamb? ALI: You kill them; you cook them, make dinner. And after, we eat dinner. No, before the dinner, we take the boy, ride in a horse, like I told you, and start a race, see. And after half or one hour, the men bring back the horse and they begin with the dance with the sword and poem./AT/mb/ee
Technical Report 2018-08-ECE-137 Technical Report 2002-09-ECE-006 Engineering of Enterprises a Transdisciplinary Activity Murat M. Tanik Ozgur Aktunc John Tanik This technical report is a reissue of a technical report issued September 2002 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Alabama at Birmingham August 2018 Technkal Report 2002-09-ECE-006 Engineering of Enter·prises A Transdisciplim•ry Activity Murat M. Tanik Ozgur Aktunc John Tanik TECHNICAL REPORT Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Alabama at Birmingham September 2002 ENGINEERING OF ENTERPRISES A TRANSDISCIPLINARY ACTIVITY OVERVIEW Contributed by: Murat M. Tanik, Ozgur Aktunc, and John U. Tanik This module is composed of two parts: Part I surveys and defines Enterprise Engineering in the context of transdiscipline. Part II introduces Internet Enterprise and addresses engineering implementation consider ations. PART I ENTERPRISE ENGINEERING ESSENTIALS 1 INTRODUCTION When Henry Ford rolJed out his first automobile assembly during 1913, he created the archetype of single-discipline enterprise. Ford's adventure was a self-contained and efficient exercise in mechankal engineering. With no competition, no regulatory constraints, and no pressing need for cross-disciplinary partnerships, from design development to process development, all ideas primarily originated from Ford's own engineers. The world is a different place today. Automobiles are complicated hybrids of mechanical, electrical, electronic, chemicaJ, and software components. Modern 4 manufacturers must now pay dose attention to new technological developments in hardware (mechanisms associated with physical world), software (mechanisms associated with computational world), netware (mechanisms associated with communications), and peopleware (mechanisms associated with human element). The changes experienced in the automotive industry exemplify the needs of the ever increasingly complex nature of today's modern enterprise. In other words, the ubiqui tous existence of the ";computing element" forces us to take into account disciplinary notions, ranging from psychology to ecology. In one word, the world is becoming transdisciplinary. In this world of transdisciplinary needs, we need to approach designing of enterprises as engineers, moving away from the traditional ad hoc approach of the past. This module expl ai n~ the changes to be made to current enterprise organization in order to be successful in the networked economy. A brief definition of Enterprise Engineering is given as an introduction, foJJowed by a summary of Enterprise Engineering subtopics, namely modeling, analysis, design, and implementation. In the last section of Part I, the definition of an intelJigent enterprise is made with an emphasis on knowledge management and integration using Extensible Markup Language (XML) technology [1]. 2 DEFINITION The Society for Enterprise Engineering (SEE) defined Enterprise Engineering as ";the body of knowledge, principles, and practices having to do with the analysis, design, implementation and operation of an enterprise" [2]. Enterprise Engineering methods include modeling, cost analysis, simulation, workflow analysis, and bottleneck analysis. 5 In a continually changing and unpredictable competitive environment, the Enterprise Engineer addresses a fundamental challen ge: ";How to design and improve all elements associated with the total enterprise through the use of engineering and analysis methods and tools to more effectively achieve itsgoals and objectives" [3]. Enterpr.ise Engineering has been considered as a disdpline after its establishment in the last decade of the 20th Century. The discipline has a wor]dvicw that is substantial enough to be divided into sub-areas, with a foundation resting on several reference disciplines. In the Enterprise Engineering worldview, the enterprise is viewed as a complex system of processes that can be engineered to accompli sh specific organizational objectives. Enterprise Engineering has used several reference disciplines to develop its methods, technologies, and theories. These reference disciplines can be listed as the following: Industrial Engineering, Systems Engineering, Information Systems, Information Technology, Business Process Reengineeling, Organizational Design, and Human Systems [2]. 2.1 Understanding Enterprise Engineering Like most engineering profession als, Enterprise Engineers work on four main areas: modeling, analyzing, design, and implementation. One important issue facing Enterprise Engi neering is the development of tools and techniques to support the work of analyzing, designing, and imp1ementjng organizational systems. These tools must assist enterprise engineers in the initial transformation of functional, often disjoint, operations into a set of integrated business processes replete with supporting information and control systems [4]. To develop new models of enterprises, the enterprise should be analyzed 6 using process analysis, simulation, activity-based analysis, and other tools. Also an abstract representation of the enterprise and the processes should be modeled in a graphical, textual, or a mathematical representation. The . design issues in Enterprise Engineering consist of developing vision and strategy, integration and improvement of the enterprise, and developing technology solutions. Lastly, implementation deals with the transformation of the entetprise, integration of corporate culture, strategic goals, enterprise processes, and technology. We will take a look at these areas in the fol1owing section: • Enterprise Engineering Modeling (EEM), • Analyzing Enterprises, • Design of Enterprises, and • Implementation. 2.2 Enterprise Engineering Modeling Enterprise Engineering Modeling (EEM) is basically dealing with the abstraction of engineering aspects of enterprises and connecting them to other business systems. The model encompasses engineering organizations' products, processes, projects, and, ultimately, the ";engineered assets" to be operated and managed. EEM coordinates design and deployment of products and assets at the enterprise level. It integrates engineering information across many disciplines, allows engineering and business data to be shared through the combinatjon of enterprise IT (information technology) and engineering IT, and simulates the behavior of intelligent, componentbased models [5). 7 The selection and design of enterprise processes for effective cooperation is a prime objective of Enterprise Engineering. Enterprise models can assist the goal of Enterprise Engineering by helping to represent and analyze the structure of activities and their interactions. Models eliminate the irrelevant details and enable focusing on one or more aspects at a time. Effective models also facilitate the discussions among different stakeholders in the enterprise, helping them to reach agreement on the key fundamentals and to work toward common goals. Also it can be a basis for other models and for different information systems that support the enterprise and the business. The enterprise model will differ according to the perspective of the pers.on creating the model, including the visions of the enterprise, its efficiency, and other various elements. The importance of an enterprise model is that it wm provide a simplified view of the business structure that will act as a basis for communication, improvements, or innovations and define the Information Systems requirements that are \ necessary to support the business. The term business in this context is used as a broad term. The businesses or the activities that can be represented with Enterprise Engineering models do not have to be profit making. For example, it can be a research environment with the properties of an enterprise. Any type of ongoing operation that has or uses resomces and has one or more goals, with positive or negative cash flow, can be referred to as a business [6]. The ideal business model would be a single diagram representing all aspects of a business. However this is impossible for most of businesses. The business processes are so complex that one diagram cannot capture all the information. Instead, a business model is composed of different views, diagrams, objects, and processes: A business 8 model is illustrated with a number of different views, and each captu~cs infmmation about one or more specific aspects of the businesses. Each view consists of a number of diagrams, each of which shows a specific part of the business structure. A diagram can show a ~1ructure (e.g., the organization of the business) or some dynamic collaboration (a number of objects and their interaction to demonstrate a process). Concepts are related in the diagrams through the use of different objects and processes. The objects may be physical such as people, machines, and products or more abstract such as instructions and services. Processes are the functions in the business that consume, refine, or use objects to affect or produce other objects. There are cunently hundreds of modeling tools for enterprises, and many modeling techniques such as Integrated Definition Language (IDEF), Petri-Net, Unified Mode1ing Language (UML), and meta-modeling. Modeling involves a modeling language and the associated modeling tools. Different enterprises may need different modeling tools according to the nature of the enterprise. Before selecting the modeling tool, a detailed analysis should be made to select the most appropriate modeling language and the tool. For the software industry, UML has become the standard modeJjng language [7]. 2.3 Enterprise Analysis The increasing complexity of enterprises has stimulated the development of sophisticated methods and tools for modeling and analysis of today's modern enterprises. Recent advances in information teclu1ology along with significant progress in analytical and computational techniques have facilitated the use of such methods in industry. 9 Applying Enterprise Analysis methods results in a documentation that supports a number of programs, which are as follows: strategic information resource planning, information architecture, technology and services acquisition, systems design and development, and functional process redesign. Most organizations have a wealth of data that can be used to answer the basic questions supporting strategic planning: who, what, where, and bow much. By modeling with these data using an Enterprise Analysis toolset, the enterptise models can be built incrementally and in less time. The most important use of Enterprise Analysis is that it presents the organization's own business, demographic, and workload data in a compelling manner to tell the story. Whether they are used to support programs for acquisitions, information architectures, or systems development, Enterprise Analysis studies are rooted in the business of the organization and thus are easily understood and supported by executive management. 2.4 Enterprise Design The design of an enterprise deaJs with many issues, including development of a vision and a strategy, the establishment of a corporate cu.lture and identity, integration and improvement of the enterprise, and development of technology solutions. Optimization of several perspectives within an enterprise is the objective of Enterprise Design. Examples of enterprise perspectives include quality, cost, efficiency, and agility ,. and management perspectives s uch as motivation, culture, and incentives. For example, consider the efficiency perspective. The modeling task will provide ontologies (i.e., object libraries) that can be used to construct a model of the activities of a process, such as its resource usages, constraints, and time. Based on these models the efficiency 10 perspective will provide tools to design, analyze, and evaluate organizational activities, processes, and structures. These tools will also be capable to represent and model the current status of an enterprise and to analyze and assess potential changes. One issue is wbetber there exists sufficient knowledge of the process of designing and optimizing business activities/processes to incorporate in knowledge-based tools. The main goal of an Enterprise Design application is to deveJ~p a software tool that enables a manager to explore alternative Enterprise Designs that encompass both the stmcture and behavior of the enterprise over extended periods of time. lssues such as motivation, culture, and incentives are explored, along with other relevant parameters such as organizational structure, functions, activity, cost, quality, and information [8]. 3 STRATEGY FORMULATION FORE-BUSINESS Electronic commerce is becoming a growing part of industry and commerce. The speed of technological change is enabling corporations large and small to transact business in a variety of ways. Today, it is routine practice to transact some aspect of business electronically from e-mail to exchanging data via Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), World Wide Web (WWW), and various shades these technologies. Numerous benefits accrue to corporations when they use automated capabilities. In order to maximize such benefits, electronic enterprises must base their efforts on welJdeveloped strategies. In this manner, tbe probability of success is increased many folds. Embarking on electronic commerce or business should never be thought of as the sole quest of the information systems department. The following strategies are a synthesis of II best practices introduced to assist information systems departments to prepare the organization for the information age [9, 1 0]. 3.1 Strategy 1 - Improve Corporate System DeveJopment Skms In addition to developing technical skills, corporations must pay close attention to effective communication, eliminating cross-functional language barriers, and improving inadequate facilities in geographically dispersed systems. 3.2 Strategy 2 -Build a Proactive Infrastructure There must be a constant effort to keep up with technological changes. Frequently, these changes trickle down from the top as a result of various business strategies. For example, top managers may discover that they need video-conferencing capability, and the information technology people are under pressure to deliver it. This kind of approach will put the chief information officer(CIO) in a reactive posture, trying to put out fires as they appear. In putting out such fires, local resources may be used to satisfy higher level needs without any obvious benefits to local managers who may resent this fact and create barriers against success. CIOs should try to get the cooperation of all users in anticipating system needs. If users are not satisfied with an imposed system, they wiiJ try to build their bootleg systems for their own needs. Thus, project needs should be anticipated as far as possible and should be planned to meet both short-term goals of management and yield benefits for the development of the infrastmcture of the corporation in the Jong term. 12 3.3 Strategy 3 - Consolidate Data Centers A corporation embar1dng on developing an e-business system must realize that there do already exist semiautonomous data centers distributed throughout various geographical locations. There may have been a time when such data centers were desirable. Today, e-business demands integrated information systems, and the data centers must be consolidated. An integrated information system is far more effic ient in controlling corporate operations. Obviously, operating fewer facilities, maintaining minimum levels of inventory, and giving better service to customers will bring handsome returns to corporations. During the consolidation process, a number of problems of compatibility and standardization will occm, but tackling such problems is better than having semiautonomous data centers. 3.4 Strategy 4 - Standardize Data Structures As corporations grow, different data processing systems and data centers proliferate, especiaUy in transnational corporations. Consolidating data centers and systems as suggested in strategy 3 may not be sufficient. Corporations need to determine data needed at global levels and standarclize them. Standardization may not be possible for certain applications in an international setting since regulatory accounting of different countries may be a roadblock. However, this should not be taken as a signal for nonstandardization. Standardization will make useful information available throughout the corporation. For example, these days many corporations are adapting XML as part of data stmcture consolidation strategy. XML issues are addressed in the next section with more detail. 13 3.5 Strategy 5 - Accommodate Linkages with Cui-rent Strategic Allies and Provide Expansion for Future Str ategic Alliances Recent developments in globalization and Internet technology are spurring corporations to form sliategic alliances. Automobile manufacturers are, for example, forming alliances to influence prices and qualities of their raw materials and parts purchases. Similar alliances are growing at an accelerated pace in other industries. These alliances are designed to create not only purchasing power but also a variety of other mutual interests, from technological co-operation to joint production. 3.6 Strategy 6 - Globalize Human Resource Accounting As companies centralize their information systems through computerization, a global inventory of human skills should be developed. Frequent human resource problems arjse when Information Systems (IS) personnel focus locally rather than globally. Recmiting of specialists, for example, must be done not with a local perspective but with a global one. This will help eliminate possible redundancies with potential savings. 4 INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISES Enterprises competing in global markets assume complex organizational forms such as supply chain, virtual enterprise, Web-based enterprise, production network, e-business, and e manufacturing. Common traits of these organizations are willingness to cooperate, global distributed product development and manufacturing, and high coordination and communication. These traits have led the trend of transformation from 14 capital intensive to intelligence intensive entetprises [1 1]. Visions of the organization's future e-Business roles as an intelligent enterprise could be formulated as follows [12]: • Transparent - Intelligent enterprises will contain substantial amounts of information on capabilities, capacities, inventories, and plans that can be exchanged between tools, servers, and optimizing agents that will augment capabilities of their human masters. • Timely - Intelligent enterprises will be designed to meet a customer need exactly when the customer wants it. • Tuned - Through collaboration and sharing of knowledge, the intel1igent enterprise wiJl serve customer needs with a mjnimum of wasted effort or assets. 4.1 Knowledge Management and Integration with XML One important challenge for enterprises today is storing and reusing knowledge. For many organizations, up-to-dale knowledge of what is relevant and important to customers distinguishes their offerings. The challenge is to assimilate this rapidly changing knowledge about products and services quickly and distribute it rapidly to leverage it for improved performance and quality service. This means finding all knowledge that is embedded in and accessed through technologies and processes and stored in documents and external repositories and being able to share it quickly with the customers. The capital-based organization needs to transform into bigh-perforrn.ing, processbased, knowledge-based enterprises, characterized by agility, f lexibility, adaptability, and willingness to learn. To overcome the difficulties during the transformation, powetful tools are needed to manage the knowledge within the enterprise and to develop the 15 communication between the company and the customers. The key tool to be used within this process is XML, which will set the standards of communication and wm help to manage the knowledge [13]. To understand how XML will help us managing the knowledge, a def111ition of a knowledge-based business is needed. 4.2 Knowledge-Based Businesses The following six characteristics of knowledge-based business were defined in Davis and Botkin [14]. ~hese characteristics are actually guidelines for businesses to put their information to productive use. 4.2.1 The More You Use Knowledge-Based Offerings, The Smarter They Get This characteristic fits in the customer-defined offerings the companies give. For example, a credit card company can build a system that could understand the buying patterns of a customer that can protect the customer from fraud. A news agency can change the interface of its system to give the type of news that a newspaper or journal requests. Knowledge-based systems not only get smcuter but also enable their users to learn. For example, General Motors' computer-aided maintenance system not only helps novice mechanics to repair automobiles but also helps expe1t mechanics to refine their knowledge. As the technology advances, the amount of information that a mechanic needs to know expands rapidly. With tllis system a mechanic can leverage the knowledge of all mechanics using the system. As a result, the system continually improves, as does the service quality. 16 4.2.2 Knowledge-Based Products And Services Adjust To Changing Circumstances When knowledge is built into a product, the product may adjust itself in a smart manner to changing conditions. For example, a glass window that may reflect or transmit sunlight according to temperature is such a product. Producing tbese producl:s will not only be marketed well but also have important economical advantages. Tbe smart pr~ducts will guide their users as well. 4.2.3 Knowledge-Based Businesses Can Customize l1teir Offerings Knowledge-based products and servkes can determine customers' changing paltems, idiosyncrasies, and specific needs. For example, a smart telephony system can understand which language will be used on specific num bers~ also by using the voice recognition system, the need for telephone credit cards can be diminished. 4.2.4 Knowledge-Based Products A11d Services Have Relatively Short Life Cycles Many knowledge-based products have short life cycles, because they depend on the existing market conditions; their viability is short-lived. For example, the foreign exchange advisory services offered by a commercial bank are highly specialized and customized for corporate clients. Such services should be constantly upgraded to keep the profits and the proprietary edge. 4.2.5 Knowledge-Based Businesses Enable Customers To Act In Real Time Information becomes more valuable when it can be acted on constantly. A system that will deliver the tour book information while you are driving the car will have a great 17 value. An interactivity. added to the system will make the product's value even higher. Knowledge-based products can also act in real time. For example, a copier machine that calJs the maintenance provider when an error occurs wiJJ have a great value in this sense. 4.3 XML's Role in Business Applications The smallest cluster of knowledge is data. These are basic building blocks of information that come in four particular forms: numbers, words, sounds, and images. Manipulation of the data determines its value. The arrangement of data into meaningful patterns is information. For example, numbers can be arranged in tables, which is information; a series of sounds, which is music, can also be considered as information. Today, an important challenge for Internet-based businesses is using the information efficiently and in a productive way that will upgrade the information to knowledge. Thus, we say that knowledge is the application and productive use of information. The shift from the information to knowledge age will be via technology. The new enabling technologies of software development such as XML, J2EE, and Visual Studio are forcing e-businesses to build knowledge-based businesses. Here we will explain the most important enabling technology, XML, within the development of e~businesses. XML can be used effecti~ely for exchanging of business documents and information over the Internet. XML is a standard language that simultaneously presents content for display on the Intemet and describes the content so that other software can understand and use the data. Therefore XML can be a medium through which any business application can share documents, transactions, and workload with any other 18 business application [15]. In other words, XML can become the common language of ebusi. ness and knowledge management. One impmtant property of XML is providing .information about the meaning of the data. Thus, an XML-Jonnatted document could trigger a software application at a receiving company to launch an activity such as shipment loading. But to provide that level of data integration, trading partners would have to agree on definiti ons for the various types of documents as well as standard ways of doing business. In addition to facilitating e-commerce, having common defini tions and uses for data also enable an enterprise to better leverage the .knowledge ctmenrly stored in information silos. XML supports the searching and browsing of such information sHos [16]. It structures documents for granularity, such as alJowing access to sections within documents and fine-tuning retrieval Also, it annotates documents, which enables users to not restrict themselves to what is in the document. XML organizes documents by classifying documents into groups and supports browsing them. AdditionaiJy, it has Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML)-like linking options that help the information users to find the documents they arc seeking. Fig. I shows the tools that are common in the organization of information through XML. XML is the next evolution in knowledge management, and organizations are beginning to understand the potential of this technology to develop enterprise-wide information architectures. As a technology, XML does not bring any value to an organization. The value of XML wHI depend on how it js used within a company. The agreement on data definitions within an enterprise has always been a hard task. At rn.inlmum, XML should be implemented strategically within the organization. Ideally, the 19 Annotate Documents I RDF I Schemas J:: I XML I (.---, X-Poin- ter--, Fig. 1. Organization of information through XML. implementation should include strategic partners and other organizations that have a need to share data and information. XML is a majm advance in the standardization of information sharing across traditional information boundaries, both internal and external Information security and privacy issues are major concerns revolving around customer and corporate data flowing across wires. Successful knowledge management in a company often depends on having access to information outside the enterprise walls. XML can also be of value here by helping to improve the functioning of supply chains and the extranet. In conclusion, it becomes obvious that managing knowledge requires better tools. We need to create systems that manage documents, as people would do, and we know that better tools need better documents. Thus by building on a solid knowledge management strategy using XML, we believe an organization can gain competitive differentiation in the near future. 20 PART II INTERNET ENTERPRISE IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 1 INTRODUCTION In the first section of this module we introduced essential elements of enterprise engineering in abstract and general terms. Building on the notions explored in the first section, we will address here, specifics concerning designing and implementation of Internet enterprises. In this section, a review is provided of the key concepts and concerns an Internet enterprise engineering (IEE) project would encounter and need to address. Business engineering fundamentals, technologies, and strategies for the lrlternet such as Unified Modeling Language, Cosmos Model, Enterprise Maturity Model, Web Business . Models, Methods of Electronic Transaction, Online Contracts, Security Protocols, selected integrated development tools, Next Generation Internet, and Internet2 arc covered. Over 20 occupational roles within IEE are identified and described separately. A technology implementation platform and strategy are introduced, along with marketing and customer retention technologies and strategies on the Internet A detailed overview is provided of the various Internet business tools, technologies, and terminology for the systematic construction of new ventures on the Internet l7]. For convenience, all these issues are summarized in table fmm at the end of this section. 2 BUSINESS ENGINEERING FUNDAMENTALS 2.1 UML: Officially introduced in November 1997, UML has quickly become the standard modeling language for software development [6]. It bas a business model approach that provides a plan for engineering an orchestrated set of business functions. It 21 provjdes a framework by which business is to be performed, allowing for changes and various improvements in the process. The model is designed to be able to anticipate changes in business function in order to maintain an edge on the competition. One of the advantages of modeling in UML is that it can visually depict functions, relationships, and paradigms. UML is a recommended tool for business analysts to break down a large-scale business operation into its constituent parts. Capturing a business model in one diagram is not realistic, so it should be noted that a business model is actually composed of a number of different views. Each view is designed to capture a separate purpose or function without losing any important overall understanding of the business operation. A view is composed of a set of diagrams, each of which shows a specific aspect of the business structure. A diagram can show a structure or a kind of dynamic collaboration. The diagrams contain objects, processes, rules, goals, and visions as defined in the business analysis. Objects contain information about mechanisms in the business, and processes are functions that use objects to affect or produce other objects. Objectoriented techniques can be used to describe a business. There are similar concepts in business functions that mn parallel to object-oriented techniques of designconceptualization. Another advantage of UML is derived from the ability of business modelers and software developers to use the same conceplualization tools and techniques to achieve a common business end. Additionally, the power of UML is derived :from its ability to transcend tbe standard organizational chart [ 17]. 22 2.2 Cosmos Model: A generic approach for a business to manage change is through a holistic framework as described by Yeh in his three-dimensional model called Cosmos (Fig. 1). One of the important aspects of this model is that three dimensions exist interdependently because each dimension behaves as an enabler and an inhibitor to the other dimensions. The ";activity structure" dimension covers how work is structured in an organization, factoring in the steps and tasks that are taken to achieve an appropriate level of workflow. The ";infrastructure dimension" covers how resources are allocated and factors in the assets of an enterprise. The ";coordination dimension" covers how information is created, shared, and distributed. The cultural aspects of the enterprise are factored in here. The Cosmos model provides a conceptual space bounded by concrete factors for successfully navigating from one point of an organizational situation to another. Infrastructure Long-term vs. short-term objectives Activity Structure Stability vs. Flexibility Target Coordination Structure Modu]arity vs. Interconnectedness Fig. l. Cosmos model--holistic framework for managing change. [13) 23 The Cosmos model is an abstract tool for managers to guide their company along the best possible path. The trade-offs between the three dimensions at each point in the journey along the path are what the manager must determine to be most effective and best for the organization as a whole. In the case of work structure, there is an inherent tradeoff between stability and flexibility. In the case of a coordination structure, there is a tradeoff between strictly aligning of human resources with company objectives and providing each operating unit with sufficient autonomy. More autonomous organizations are generally organized with a greater degree of modularity, allowing for the ability to make rapid decisions by adapting to changing market conditions. In the case of infrastlucture, there is a trade-off between seeking short-term gain versus long-term gain. Overall, the Cosmos mode] provides an executive or project manager with another technique to visualize the overaJJ situation and path of an organization by laking into account the three dimensions that correspond to the three main forces that affect its future [ 18]. 2.3 Enterprise Maturity Model: In order to characterize a business in terms of its level of maturity, focus, activity, coordination, and infrastructure, please refer to Table l, provided by Yeh [18]. The table provides an overview of the various levels of enterprise maturity. 2.4 Web Business Models: Entrepreneurs who wish to start e-businesses need to be aware of e-business models and how to implement them effectively. The combination 24 of a company's policy, operations, technology, and ideology defines its business model. Table 2 describes in more detail the types of business models in existence today [6, 19]. 2.5 IVIethods of Elech·onic Transaction: There are various methods and mechanisms that merchants can collect income through electronic transactions. Table 3 provides the types of transactions covered such as credit card, e-walJets, debit cards, digital currency, peer-to-peer, smartcards, micro-payments, and e-billing [19]. 2.6 OnJine Contracts: An online contract can be accomplished throt1gh the use of a digital signature. Digital signatures are the electronic equivalent of written signatures. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-sign Bi11) recently passed into law were developed for use in public-key cryptography to solve the problems of authentication and integrity. The purpose of a digital signature is for electronic authorization. The U.S. government's digital authentication standard is called the Digital Signature Algorithm. The U.S. government also recently passed digitalsignature legislation that makes digital signatures as legally bindiqg as handwritten signatures. This legislation is designed to promote more activity in e-business by legitimizing online contractual agreements. 2.7 Security Protocols: Netscape Communkations developed the SSL protocol, developed as a non-proprietary protocol commonly used to secure communication on the Internet and the Web. SSL is designed to use public-key technology and digital 25 certificates to authenticate the server. in a transaction and to protect private information as it passes from one party to another over the Tnternet. SSL can effectively protect information as it is passes through the Internet but does not necessarily protect private information once stored on the merchant's server. An example of private information would be credit card numbers. When a merchant receives credit-card information with an order, the information is often decrypted and stored on the merchant's server until the order is placed. An insecure server wi th data that are not encrypted is vulnerable to unauthorized access by a third party to that information. SET protocol was developed by Visa International and MasterCard and was designed speci.tically to protect e-commerce payment transactions [20]. SET uses digital certificates to authenticate each party in an e-commerce transaction, including the customer, merchant, and the merchant's bank. In order for SET to work, merchants must have a digital certificate and special SET software to process transactions. Additionally, customers must have complementary digital certificate and digital walJet software. A digital wallet is similar to a real wallet to the extent that it stores credit (or debit) card information for multiple cards, as well as a digital certificate verifying the cardholder's identity. Digital wallets add convenience to online shopping because customers no longer need to re-enter their credit card information at each shopping site. 2.8 Integrated Tool Example: Drumbeat 2000: Macromedia Drumbeat 2000 is a tool capable of accepting and delivering complex infmmation and functionality through a web-interface [21]. The tool aids a visually skilled Web designer in competitively building a website without necessarily having to do any coding, which is useful in the 26 initial prolotyping phase. It is a tool that can interact with the back-end database with the ability to build a user-friendly client-side using Active Server Page (ASP) Web technology. ASP technology enables a real-time connection to the database, so any changes made to the database are immediately re flected on the client side. Macromedia D1umbeat 2000 claims to provide everything needed to build dynamic Web applications and online stores visually at a fraction of the typical development time and expense. The designers of Drumbeat 2000 also cl aim that the development environment can keep up with continuously evolving web technology, thus making it a future-oriented technology. 2.9 NGI: This initiatjve is a mulli-agency Federal research and development program began on October 1, 1997 with the participation of the following agencies: DARPA, DOE, NASA, NIH, NIST, and NSF (Table 4). These agencies arc charged with the responsibility of developing advanced networking technologies and revolutionary applications that require advanced networkjng. 2.10 Internet2: The Intemet2 is a consortium of over 180 uruversit ies leading the way towards a partnership with industry and government to develop advanced network applications and technologies in order to accelerate formation of a more advanced Internet. The primary goals of Internct2 are to create a leading edge network capability for the national research community, enable revolutionary Internet applications, and ensure the rapid transfer of new network services and applications to the broader Internet community. Through Intemet2 working groups and initiatives, Internet2 members are 27 collaborating on advanced app.lications, middleware, new networking capabilities, advanced network infrastructure, partnerships, and alliances [22). 3 OCCUPATIONAL ROLES IN illE In order to build, deploy, and maintain an Internet Enterprise, certain roles and positions most be filled for the organization to be effective. Table 5 lists and describes many of the relevant roles required within an enterprise initiative, such as Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), in addition to the more traditional organizational roles such as Chief Executive Ofilcer (CEO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) [20, 23]. 4 TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION AND STRATEGY 4.1 Microsoft Dotsmart Initiative: There are various approaches to imp.lementing strategic planning and technology implementations. For illustrative purposes, Microsoft is considered in this thesis to be one such approach for enterprise planning. Once the overall conceptualization and business pattern is created and a.ll the necessary occupational roles within the organization are identified, it is necessary to identify exactly which technology to utilize in order to build and implement the business venture. As the requirements of a business are analyzed, a useful guide is the Microsoft Dotsmarl Initiative. This mode of business analysis will help determine which business engineering concepts to use and what kinds of personnel are needed to 1un the operation. Additionally, the Microsoft Dotsmatt Initiative provides key points to address when building an Intemet operation from scratch. 28 4.2 Microsoft Technology Centers (MTCs): MTCs are areas designed for groups of entrepreneurs, Information Technology personnel, and businessmen for the rapid development. of robust e-commerce solutions. At these facilities, developers, entrepreneurs, and high-technology business persons use Microsoft Technology and the relevant knowledge to build enterprise solutions. The centers provide the essentials a team would need to develop an enterptise from the initial conception of the idea to launch. Microsoft provides essential equipment, support, and expe11ise, with an application of a ";best-practices" approach. These best practices have been tested before at MTCs, expediting the development progress and time to market. Laboratory sessions are designed to bring together an assortment of entrepreneurial individuals as they facilitate the development process using the latest Microsoft products. The MTCs offer customers wishing to capitalize on emerging Microsoft.NET technologies the service, infrastltlctme, and development environment to accelerate their projects and reduce thejr risk. The working laboratory is intended to help customers develop and test next-genera6on e-commerce technologies and demonstrate further the value of Windows platforms and other industry-standard systems for powering ebusiness. 4.3 Impact of XML: XML represents a more general way of defining text-based/ documents compared to Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). Both HTML and XML descend from Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML). The greatest difference between HTML and XML is the flexibi lity of the allowable tag found in XML. An XMLbased document can define its own tags, in addition to including a set of tags defined by a 29 third-party. This ability may become very useful for those applications that need to deal with very complex data structures. An example of an XML-based language is the Wireless Markup Language (WML). WML essentially allows text pm1ions of Web pages to be displayed on wireless devices, such as cellular phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs). WML works with the Wireless AppHcation Protocol (W AP) to deliver this content. WML is similar to HTML but does not require input devi ces such as a keyboard or mouse for navigation. In the case of a PDA thal requests a Web page on the Intemet, a WAP gateway receives the request, translates it, and sends it to the appropriate Internet server. In response, the server replies by sending the requested WML document. The WAP gateway parses this document's WML and sends the proper text to the PDA. This introduces the element of device portability. 4.4 Microsoft.Net Initiative: Microsoft announced a new generation of software called Microsoft .NET. This software is intended to enable every developer, business, and consumer to benefit from the combination of a variety of new Internet devices and programmable Web services that characte1ize NGI. Microsoft is trying to create an advanced new generation of software that wiiJ drive NGI. This initiative is called Microsoft.NET and it.s key purpose is to make information available at any time, in any place, and on any device. 4.5 Microsoft BizTalk 0 1·chestration: For IEE purposes, BizTalk Server 2000 is the considered a nex t-generation software that plays an important role in forming the infrastructure and tools for building successful e-commerce communities. The core of 30 BizTalk Server offers business document routing, transformation, and tracking infras tructure that is mles based. BizTalk Server offers many services that allow for quickly building dynamic business processes for smooth integration of applications and business partners while utilizing pubJic standards to ensure interoperability. Essentially, BizTalk server provides a method to build dynamic business processes quickly. 4.6 Back-end Configurations Using Microsoft Technology: In the design of the backend of a website, special considerations must be given to security. This is done by providing a kind of safety buffer from the greater world of the Internet using a demiUtarized-zone (DMZ) strategy. The components of a DMZ such as the firewall, the front-end network, the back-end nelwork, and the secure network function as a security buffer from the outside world. 4.7 Rapid Economic Justification (RE.fl: The REJ framework makes it possible for IT and business executives to demonstrate how specific investments in IT will eventually benefit the business, ensuring in the process that the IT projects are aligned with the specific business strategies and priorities. IT investments play a critical role in Internet enterprises. Important decision-making at the early stages of any venture does require an effective methodology to identify the best strategic IT investments. Leaders in the upper echelon of organizations such as CEOs, CTOs, and CFOs are being overwhelmed with complex information. REJ may prove to be a reliable method to quickly evaluate the true value worth and potential of a company by taking into consideration its intangible IT assets. 31 In the past, companies developed metrics for the valuation of IT investments on the basis of cost improvements. Metric methodologies have focused on Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), whereas the strategic role of IT in boosting new opportunities for business has been largely ignored. Understandably, the benefits of IT can be traced to ways of measuring business value the traditional way. Unfortunately, current business practices are not necessarily adequately equipped to handle the complexities of the New Economy. Although the economic justification of IT projects has been researched extensively in the past decade, the problem is that these metiJods and techniques require too much data-crunching power and time to prepare. These unwieldy research techniques need to be replaced by a new and practical approach to quantify swiftly and accurately the true value of IT investments. 5 MARKETING AND CUSTOMER RETENTION 5.1 Online Marketing: The Internet provides marketers with new tools and convenience that can considerably increase the success of their marketing efforts. An Internet marketing campaign such as advertising, promotions, public relations, partnering and Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems are all an integral prut of the marketing process. Table 6 describes the various techniques at the marketer's disposal when using the Internet as the medium of customer information delivery [19]. 5.2 CRM Systems: CRM is a general but systematic methodology using both business and technological techniques to maintain and grow a business's customer base. CRM systems enable a business to keep detaj led records on the activity of its c ustomers 32 by using new, sophisticated tracking systems on the Internet. Table 7 shows various areas where CRM technology and CRM business techniques can assist in managing a customer base [19]. 5.3 Web Design Technology Example: Dreamweaver Technology: Macromedia Dreamweaver is Web technology for building websites on the Internet without the need for programming directly in HTivlL [21]. Also, Web designers are easily able to create Web-based leaming content with Dreamweaver 4.0. A Web designer has the ability to create site maps of the website that can be easily maintained and enhanced. This is a very popular technology available on the market that can be used to make professional quality websites for marketing and promotional purposes. 5.4 Web Enhancement Technology Example: Flash Technology: Macromedia Flash is a multimedia technology for applications on the Web. This technology gives the user, especially one not artistically talented, the ability to develop interactive animations that can look quite impressive. A flash movie can be embedded into a Web site or run as a standalone program, and Flash is compatible with Dreamweaver. Flash movies can be made with sound and animation, so it is useful as a software tool to produce demonstrations at the user-interface. Flash can be used on CD-ROMs and allows for the construction of cross-platform audio/video animations and still jmages. 33 \ 6 SUMI\-IARY TABLES We would like to reiterate emphasis areas for Electronic Enterprise as listed in the introduction of this module. These are a) hardware (mechanisms associated with physical world), b) software (mechanisms associated with computational world), c) netware (mechanisms associated with communications), and d) peopleware (mechanisms associated with human element) [23, 24]. Following tables provide a useful Jist in all these areas. For convenience, we include all summary tables in following order: Table 1 Enterprise Maturity Levels Table 2 Web Business Models Table 3 Electronic Transactions Table 4 NGI Participating Agencies Table 5 Occupational Roles in lEE Table 6 Marketing Techniques on the Internet Table 7 Customer Relationship Management 34 Table 1 Enterprise Maturity Levels Levels Focus Activity Coordination Infrastructure 5. Whole Human-society Process Self-directed teams Long-term oriented; in engineering dominate orientation, harmony with methodology workplace; toLal personal mastery, nature, people institutionalized; alignment; open, heavy investments routinely do the Flexible and honest in IT, continuous right things: predictable communication improvement change is second process, right the channels institutionalized nature first time, value- throughout adderl activities only 4. Wise Stakeholders and Process monitored Organjzational Organi:z.ation community automatically for structure based on competency oriented in high performance; cross-trained case management; harmony with dominated by teams; vision continuing community; value-added al igned with the education; team-people routinely activities; high needs of the based structure; doing things right. degrl:e of society tenm-oriented HR Changes are concurrency; few policy planned and handoffs mannged 3. Mature Customer oriented; Process defined Vision defined Integrated customer's needs and is measured with extensive capacity, are anticipated; buy-ins, multi- con sol ida ted people are proud to functional project function; work here teams exist; investment in participatory training and work culture with force planning; managers as flattened coaches organization 2. Stable Competition- Process under Internal focus, Short-term focus, oriented reactive statistical control; control oriented, fragmented bench-marking as functional division capacity, little IT, a result of reaction, hierarchical, inflexible process, difficult to get has many information, no handoffs and a formal HR policy substantial number of non-value-added tasks I . Ignorant Disoriented- Fire-fighting Ad- No clear vision, Don' t know where chaotic hoc, unpredictable, resources exist fragmented Rumor mill rampant 35 e-Business Model Storefront Model Auction Model Portal Model Dynamic Pricing Model Comparison Pricing Model Demand-Sensitive Pricing Model Table 2 Web Business Models Description The~ storefront model is what many persons think of when they bear the word ebusiness. The storefront model combines transaction processing, security, online payment and information storage to enable merchants to sell their products on lhe web. This is a basic form of e-commcrce where the buyer and seller interact directly. To conduct storefront c-commerce, merchants need to organize an online catalog of products, take orders through their Web sites, accept pnyments in a secure envi ronment, send merchandise to customers, and manage customer data. One of the most commonly used e-commercc enablers is the shopping cart. This order-processing technology allows customers to accumulate items they wish to buy as they continue to shop. www.amazon.com is a good example. Forrester Research reveals that an estimated $3.8 billion will be spent on online person-to-person auctions in the year 2000 alone. This number is expected to rise to $52 billion for Business-to-Business (B2B) auctions. Usually auction sites act as forums through which Internet users can log-on and assume the role of either bidder or seller. As a seller, you are able to post an item you wish to sell, the minimum price you require to sell it, your item, and a deadline to close the auction. As a bidder, you may search the site for availability of the item you are seeking, view lhe current bidding activity and place a bid. They usually do not involve themselves in payment and delivery. www.ebay.com is a good example. Portal sites give visitors the chance to find almost everything they are looking for in one place. They often offer news, sports, and weather, as weU as the ability to search the Web. Search engines are h01i zontal portals, or portals that aggregate information on a broad range of topics. Yahoo! at www.yahoo.com is an example of a horizontal portal. America Online (AOL) www.aol.com is an example of a vertical portal because it is a community-based site. The Web has changed the way business is done and the way products are priced. Companies such as Priceline (www.pricelinc.com) and Imandi (www.imandi.com) have enabled customers to name their prices for travel, homes, automobiles, and consumer goods. The name-your-price model empowers customers by allowing them to choose their price for products and services. The comparison pricing model allows customers to polJ a variety of merchants and find a desired product or service at the lowest price (i.e. www.bottomdollar.com). The Web has enabled customers to demand bener, faster service at cheaper prices. It has also empowered buyers to shop in large groups to achieve a group rate (i.e., www.rnercata.com). Customers become loyal to Mercata because it helps them save money. 36 e-Business Model Bartering Model Advertising Model Procurement Model B2B Service Provider Model · Online Trading Model Online Lending Model Online Recruiting Model Online Travel Service Model TabJe 2 (Continued) Description A popular method of conducting e-business is bartering, offering one item in exchange for anotiier. If a business is looking to get rid of an overstocked product, iSolve ~isolve.com) can help sell it PotenHal customers send their pricing pre ferences to the merchant who evaluates the offer. Deals are often part barter and part cash. Examples of items typically bartered are overstocked inventory items, factory surplus, and unneeded assets. Forming business models around advertising-driven revenue streams is the advertising model. Television networks, radio stations, magazines, and print media usc advertising to fund their operations and make a profit. www.Iwon.com is a portal site that rewards users with raffle points as they browse the site's content. www.freemerchant.com offers free hosting, a free store builder, a free shopping cart, free traffic logs, free auction tools and all the necessary elements for running an e-commerce storefront. Frccmerchanl makes money from its strategic partnerships and referrals. The procurement model means acquiring goods and services with effective supply chain management via a B2B Exchange. ICG Commerce Systems (www.icgcommerce.com) is a site that enables businesses, customers, suppliers, purchasers, and any combination of these to interact and conduct transactions over the Internet. The system supports B2B, B2C, and all variations of these models. · B2B service providers make B2B transactions on the Internet easier. These e-businesscs help other businesses improve policies, procedures, customer service, and general operations. Ariba (www.ariba.com) is a B2B service provider. The online trading model is essentially securities trading on the Internet. Trading sites allow you to research securities and to buy, sell, and manage all of your investments from your desktop; they usually cost less. Charles Schwab (www.schwab.com) is a notable example. Companies are now making loans online. E-loan (www.eloan.com) offers creditcard services, home equity loans, and the tools and calculators to help you make educated borrowing decisions. Recruiting and job searching can be done effectively on the Web whether you are an employer or a job seeker. Refer.com (www.refer.com) rewards visitors for successful job referrals. Web surfers can search for and arrange for all their travel and accommodations online, and can often save money doing so. Cheaptickets (www.cheaptic kets.com) .is a similar site that helps customers find discount fares for airl.ine tickets, hotel rooms, cruise vacations and rental cars. 37 e-Business Model Online Entertainment Model Energy Distribution Model Braintrust Model Online Learning Model Click-and-Mortar Model Table 2 (Continued) Description The entertainment industry has recognized this and has leveraged its power to sell movie tickets, albums and any other entertainment-related content they can fit on a Web page. ICast.corn (www.icast.com) is a multimedia-rich entertainment site. A number of companies have set up energy exchanges where buyers and sellers come together to corrununicate, buy, sell, and distribute energy. These companies sell crude oil, electricity, and the products and systems for distributing them. Altranet (_www.altranet.com) also sells energy commodities. Companies can buy patents and other intellectual property online. Yet2 (www.yct2.com) is an e-business designed to help companies raise capital by selling intellectuaJ property such as patents and trademarks. Universities and corporate-training companies offer high-quality distance education directly over the Web. Click2learn ~www.click2 1earn.com) has created a database of products and services to elp mdtvtdunls and companies fi.nd the education they need. Brick-and-mortar companies who wish to bring their businesses to the Web must determine the level of cooperation and integration the two separate entities will share. A company that can offer its services both offline and o nline is called click-and-mortar, such as Barnes & Noble (www.bn.com). 38 Electronic Transaction T e Credit Card Transactions E-wallets Debit cards Digital Currency Table 3 Electronic Transactions Descrjption Merchant must have a merchant. account with a bank. Specialized Internet merchant accounts have been established to handle online credit card transactions. These transactions are processed by banks or third-party services. To faci litate the credit card process, many companies are introducing electronic wallet services. E-wallets allow you to keep track of your billing and shipping information so it can be entered with one click. Banks and businesses are also creating options for online payment that do not involve credit cards. There are many forms of digital currency; digital cash is one example. It is stored electronically and can be used to make online electronic payments. Digjtal cash is often used with other payment technologies such as digital wallets. Digital cash allows people who do not have credit cards to shop online, and merchants accepting digital-cash payments avoid creditcard transaction fees. 39 Examples Companies like Cybercnsh (www.cybercash.com) and ICat (www.icat.com) enable merchants to accept credit card payments online like www.Charge.com. www. visa.com offers a variety of ewallets. Entrypoint.com offers a free, personalized desktop toolbar that includes an e-wallct to facltitate one click shopping at its affiliate stores. In order to standardize e-wallet technology and gain wider acceptance among vendors, Visa, Mastercard, and a group of e-wallet vendors have standardized the technology with the Electronic Commerce Modeling Language (ECML), unveiled in June 1999 and adopted by many online vendors. Companies such as AroeriNet allow merchants to accept a customer's checking-account number as a valid form of payment. AmeriNet provides authorization and account settlement, handles distribution and shipping (fulfi11ment), and manages customer service inquiries. E-Cash Technologies (www.ccas.b.com) is a secure digitalcash provider that allows you to withdraw funds from your traditional bank account. Gift cash is another form of digital currency that can be redeemed at leading shopping sites. Web. Flooz (www.Jlooz.wm) is an example of gift currency. Some companies offer points-based rewards. www.beenz.com is an international, points-based currency system. Electronic Transaction Peer-to-peer Smart Cards Micropaymenls Table 3 (Continued) Description Peer-to-peer transactions allow online monetary transfers between consumers. A card with a computer chip embedded on its face is able to hold more information than an ordinary credit card with a magnetic strip. There are contact and contactless smartcards. Similar to smart cards, ATM cards can be used to make purchases over the Internet. Merchants must pay for each credit card transaction that is processed. The cost of some items could be lower than the standard transaction fees, causing merchants to incur losses. Micropayments, or payments that generally do not exceed $10.00, offer a way for companies offering nominal.ly priced products and services to generate a profit. 40 Examples cCash runs a peer-to-peer payment services that allows the transfer of digital cash via email between two people who have accounts at eCashcnablcd banks. Pay Pal offers a digital payment system known as X payments. PayPal allows a user to send money to anyone with an email nddress, regardless of what bank either person uses or whether the recipient is pre-registered with the service. EConnect has technology in the form of a device that connects to your computer and scrambles financial data, making it secure to send the data over the Internet. EpocketPay is another product developed by eConnect that allows a consumer to make secure purchases from the ePocketPay portable device. This device acts as a cell phone with a card reader built into it and will allow you to make secure purchases anywhere. Millicent js a micropayment technology provider. Millicent handles all of the payment processing needed for the operation of an e-busi ness, customer support, and distribution services. Millicent's services are especially useful to companies that offer subscription fees and small pay-per-download fees for digjtal content. c-Billi ng Electronic llill Presentment and payment (EllPP) offers the ability to present a company's bill on multiple platforms online. Payments arc generally electronic transfers from consumer checking accounts. 41 The Automated Clearing House (ACH) is the current method for processing electronic monetary transfers. Table4 NGI Participating Agencies _A~c~ro~t~1Y~n_l_ _~ E_x~p_a_n_si~n --- ~ --- ~--~ --- DARPA Defense Advnnced Research Projects Agency DOE Department of Energy (beg inning in PY 1999) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NIH National Insti tutes of Health NIST National Institute of Standards and Tec hnology NSF National Science Foundation 42 Occupation Entrepreneur e-Commerce Program Manager Enterprise Architect Business and Infonnation Architect Table 5 Occupational Roles in illE Descdptjon An entrepreneur on the Internet is usually the person with the initial idea for the entire business and is involved in its early stages of inception before official management takes over. e-Commerce Program Managers are involved in enterprise-wide ecommerce initiatives and projects, managing e-cornmerce integration and overall business and technology architecture and infrastn1cture. Usually, they arc senior-level line managers who are effective at uniting the business and technology front by coordinating units within an organization and across the extended enterprise. Enterprise Arc hitects are involved in the definition, alignment, and refinement of the overall ente rprise architecture. Their responsibilities include seeing to it that many of the tasks of program management are can·ied out properly. More important, they must provide guidance so individual projects can make optimal use of infrastructure resources for e-Cornmerce. A balancing act between business requirements and tcchnologicnl capabilities is accomplished through their efforts . Enterprise Architects have a duty to identify the requirements, goals, and constraints of the project. They allocate responsibilities for each of the architectural elements. They are also responsible for lhe coordination of the modeling and design activities for the overall enterprise architecture. They are the chief e-commerce architects because they coordinate the work information, infrastructure and application architects. All architects and modelers should be completely capable in design patterns common to the many facets of business and technology. The design pattern movement has affected all aspects of analysis, design, and implementation of componentbased systems. Design patterns are the reusable material of architecture and have an important role in the complex distributed information systems lhat are conceived and developed today. Business and Information Architects have business domain knowledge, including business processes and logical information structures. They coordinate the work of business and technology analysts and modelers who develop abstract representations or business object models of the subjects, rules, roles, events, tasks, activities, and policies of the business domain. Application-neutral models that are built enable the reuse of business engineering analysis and design patterns and artifacts 43 Occupation Infrastructure Architect Application Architect Humru1 Factors Engineer Business Manager Internet Commerce Architect Table 5 (Continued) Description Infrastructure Architects identify the technical services required of the technology infrastructure to empower and support the logical busi ness and information architecture. They evaluate existing infrastructure services, s\~l ect those appropriate to a given project and acquire (via build or buy) new components needed in the infrastructure. They oversee the work of technical specialists in modeling the service architecture of the technical infrastmcturc. They maintain the technical components of the development repository. Application Architects coordinate the business process modeling activities across multiple projects and business domains. They coordinate the work of domain modelers and maintain the repository of business and component models. They evaluate existing business component services, sclectthose appropriate to a given project and (via build or buy) new components needed in the evolving business model. They maintain the business application components of thC development repository. Most importantly. tl1ey guide solution developers in blending the business object model with the infrastruchJre services needed to implement the models in an e~com merce platform. Human Factors Engineers are needed to design the next generation of user interfaces. While the graphical user Interface (GUD is recognized as the enabler of wide-spread personnl computing, task centered user interfaces provide assistance to end-users and can be a boon to productivity in the world of e-commerce. E-commerce transactions can involve a multitude of complex steps and processes. Well-designed user interfaces can help navigate and guide the user through these tasks, keeping track of the progress, and picking up where users leave off when transactions span multiple sessions of work. The Business Manager is responsible for the business approach on the Internet, creating and operating the Internet presence for the business, deciding what products and services are sold online, determining pricing, and establishing the key business relationships needed lo make a venture successful. This is primarily a business role, with particular attention paid to the success of the online business and bottom line. The Internet Commerce Architect is generally a systems analyst who turns the business requirements into a system design that incorporates the creation and management of content, the tnmsaction processing, fulfillment, and technical aspects of customer service 44 Occupation Solution Developer Content Designer Content Author Implementor Database Administrator Internet Sales and Marketing Customer Service Representative T~lble 5 (Continued) Description Solution Developers are application developers. They develop the use cases for the specific application at hand, compose solutions through extensive use of business object models, and use repositories. They assemble application components to implement c-commercc application. Unlike conventional programmers or programmer/analysts, they do not build or pmgram components. Instead, they assemble or glue together business solut ions from prefabricated components. They use highly integrated development environments (IDEs) such as IBM's VisuaiAge, Symantec's Visual Caf6, Sybase's PowcrJ, and Inprise's Jbuilder. Emerging Computer Assisted Software Engineering (CASE) tools and related methods will likely appear that tighten the link between business modeling and software development. Tools for understanding and managing business processes, such as Inte11icorp's LiveModel allows solution developers to build logical business that can automate the configuration and management of the SAP/R3 ERP system. The Content Designer is responsible for the look and feel of an Internet commerce system, including the graphic design, page layout, and user experience. The Content Author creates or adapts product information into a form that can be used for internet commerce, working within the design laid out by the content designer. The Impleme::ntor is responsible for creating any programs or software extensions needed to make the Internet commerce system work. For example, an Implementor might write the software or construct an ASP page using Drumbeat 2000 that takes product information from a database and dynamically renders it into a Web page. In the case that a database is used in the back-end, the Database Administrator (DBA) manages the creation and operation of the database to ensure its reliability, integrity, and performance. The Sales and Marketing team is responsible for focused efforts in promoting Internet-based commerce. Customer Service Representatives answer questions about products, assist buyers with registration or the purchasing of goods and services. 45 Occupation Component Developer Operations Manager System Supervisor System Administrator Security Officer Fulfillment Agent CPO Internet Lawyer Internet Accountant Table 5 (Continued) Description Component Developers usually build components in the form of coding projects. They are masters of component technology and know the intricacies of composition, delegation, and object-oriented systems analysis and design. They are proficient in component development languages (such as Java and C++), modeling standards (such as UMLand XMI), and distributed computing platforms (such as CORBA, DCOM, EJB). They understand and think in terms of architectural design patterns. In the meanti me, they will close the gap between business requirements and available components. Component developers must be highly qualified software engineers since quality'components do not just happen. They are carefully constructed using quality soflware engineering disciplines. Component Developers, therefore, must be highly trained specialists and masters of software quality processes such as CMM and ISO, as well as masters of component-based development methods. The Operations Manager is responsible for managing all service activities for the Internet commerce system. The System Supervisor manages the system staff. The System Administrator is responsible for the technical operations of the computer systems and networks. The Security Officer ensures that appropriate security measures have been taken in the design and implementation of the Internet commerce system. The Fulfillment Agent is responsible for shipping and handling of physical goods or delivery of services. In the case of digital goods, the fulfillment agent is responsible for overseeing the operation of the fulfillment system. The Chief Privacy Officer is io charge of measures for ensuring the security of vital company information, such as customer credit card numbers remains secure within the company network. An Internet Lawyer is a legal expert for Internet fu nctions. The .importance of this position cannot be overstated, because new laws and regulations could ki ll a company without legal assistance, prevention, or intervention. The Internet Accountant is responsible for ensuring that the proper accounting procedures have been followed for Internet-based transactions. 46 Technique Domain name FAQ Forum Networking Faci litation Promotions c-Business advertising Pay-per-click Pay-per-lead Pay-per-sale Webcasting Interactive Advertising Public Relations and press releases Trade shows Table 6 Marketing Techniques on the Internet Description The Universal Resource Locator (URL) represents the address of the domain name, which must be chosen with care because it reflects the company's values immediately and connotes immediate meaning to customers with its first impression. One can purchose a domain name at www.networksolutions.com. A frequently asked questions (FAQ) section contributes to a userfiiendly site. An onli ne forum on the website enables customers to congregate at a pre-de~ign at cd place on the site to post comments and to share ideas. This promotes site activi ty. It is important to make it easy for the customer to recommend a site to a friend. This can be accomplished with a quick button that brings up an email exchange. c-Business promotions can attract visitors to your s ite and can influence purchasing. Netcenlives.com is a company that can provide your business with customer reward programs. P ublicizing through traditional channels such as television slots, movies, newspapers, and magazines is effective. Pay-per-click is a mode of operation that calls for paying the host according to the number of click-throughs to a site. Pay-per-lead is a mode of operation that pays the host for every lead generated from the advertisement. Pay-per-sale is a mode of operation that pays the host for every sale resulting from a click through. Webcasting is a broadcasting technique on the Web that uses streaming media to broadcast an event over the Web. Interactive Advertising involves consumers in the advertising campaign. An example is WebRIOT, a game show on MTV. The game is aired on television, and viewers can join in the game at the same time by playing online. Public Relations (PR) and press releases keep customers and your company's employees current on the latest information about products, services, and intemal and external issues such as company promotions and consumer reactions. Trade shows arc excellent opportunities to generate site interest by speaking at conferences, which increases brand awareness 47 Table 7 Customer Relationship Management CR.M:Area Handling Sales tracking Transaction support Data-mining Call center Log-file analysis Cookie Customer registrntion Personalization One-to-one marketing Onsite Search engine Registering with Internet search engines Partnering Afffiiate Programs Culture management Description Handling is essentially the maintenance of out-bound and in-bound calls from customers and service representatives. Sales tracking is the process of tracing and recording all sales made. Transaction support entails technology and personnel used for conducting transactions. Data-mini ng is a wny to analyze information collected from visitors. Data-mining uses algorithms and statistical tools to find patterns in data gathered from customer visits. A call center gathers customer-service representatives who can be reached by an 800 number or through email, online text chatting, or real-time voice communications. A log-file analysis is a useful way to keep track of your visitors in tenns of site visits, including each visitor's location, IP address, time of visit, frequency of visits, and other key indicators. A cookie is a technology that keeps a profile on each visitor. Customer registration is an excellent method to create customer profiles because visitors fi ll out a form with personal information. Personalization technology can help a company understand the needs of its customers and the effectiveness of its website, thereby catering to the whims of the customer. One-to-one marketing such as e-mails confirms purchases and offers new products, showing customers that the business appreciates their patronage. Onsite Search engines allow people to find information relative to a subject of interest amidst the large amounts of information available on a personal website. Registering with Internet search engines is important because there are reportedly over 400 se::arch engines in usc on the Internet. This process makes a website known to the world by submitting the website as a searchable domain name in a sea of domain names. Partncring is a way of forming a strategic union with another company. Generally, legal contracts are usually written to define the relationship in a wf'ly to help a company provide customers with complimentary services and product<;. An Affiliate Program is an agreement between two parties that one will pay the other a commission based on a designated consumer action. Affi liate programs establish new income streams for companies and individuals that host the advertising affili ate websites. Culture management is the ability to understand and cater lo a target audience's patronage and culture, especially in global enterprises. 48 LIST OF REFERENCES [1] 0. Aktunc, ";The Role of Component Technologies on Enterprise Engineering,"; Masters Thesis, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2002. [2] D.H. Liles, M.E. Johnson, L.M. Meade, and D.R. Underdown, ";Enterprise Engineering: A Discipline?"; Society for Ente1prise Engineering Conference Proceedings, June 1995. [3] L. Whitman, Enterprise Engineeiing IE8801 class webpage, http://webs.twsu. edu/enteng, 2002. [4] W.D. Barnett and M.K. Raja, ";Object-Oriented Enterprise Engineering,"; http:/ /webs. twsu .edu/enteng/papers/OOEE. pdf, 1999. [5] J. Orr, ";Enterprise Engineedng Modeling,"; http://www.cadinfo.net/editorial!eem. htm, 2002. [6] H. Eriksson and M. Penker, Business Modeling with UML, New York: Wiley, 2000. [7] G. Herzum and 0. Sims, Business Component Factory, New York: Wiley, 2000. [8] ";Enterprise Design and Engineering,"; http://www.eil.utoronto.ca/ent-eng/, 2002. [9] M. Segal, M. N. Tanju, 0. Aktunc, and M. M. Tanik, ";Strategy Formulation for E-Business ,"; in The fifth World Conference on Integrated Design & Process Technology, 2000, Proceedings CD. [10] E.M. Roche, ";Managing Information Technology in Multinational Corporations,"; Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1992. [11] C. Chandra and A.V. Smirnov, ";Ontology-Driven Knowledge Integration for Consumer-Focused Smart Companies,"; Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Production and Operations Management Society, POM-2001, Orlando FL, 2001. [12] G.J. Cross, ";Now e-Business is Transforming Supply Chain Management,"; Journal of Business Strategy, March/April, pp. 36-39, 2000. [13] S. Chincholikar, 0. Aktunc, and M.M. Tanik, ";TheN-Queens Test-Bed,"; Technical Report 2001-1 0-ECE-0 11, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2001. [14] S. Davis and J. Botkin, ";The Coming of Knowledge-Bases Business,"; D. Tapscott, eds., Creating Value in the Network Economy, Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1999. 49
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With President Milei's election in Argentina, dollarization is suddenly on the table. I'm for it. Here's why. Why not? A standard of valueStart with "why not?'' Dollarization, not a national currency, is actually a sensible default. The dollar is the US standard of value. We measure length in feet, weight in pounds, and the value of goods in dollars. Why should different countries use different measures of value? Wouldn't it make sense to use a common standard of value? Once upon a time every country, and often every city, had its own weights and measures. That made trade difficult, so we eventually converged on international weights and measures. (Feet and pounds are actually a US anachronism since everyone else uses meters and kilograms. Clearly if we had to start over we'd use SI units, as science and engineering already do.) Moreover, nobody thinks it's a good idea to periodically shorten the meter in order to stimulate the economy, say by making the sale of cloth more profitable. As soon as people figure out they need to buy more cloth to make the same jeans, the profit goes away. PrecommitmentPrecommitment is, I think, the most powerful argument for dollarization (as for euorization of, say, Greece): A country that dollarizes cannot print money to spend more than it receives in taxes. A country that dollarizes must also borrow entirely in dollars, and must endure costly default rather than relatively less costly inflation if it doesn't want to repay debts. Ex post inflation and devaluation is always tempting, to pay deficits, to avoid paying debt, to transfer money from savers to borrowers, to advantage exporters, or to goose the economy ahead of elections. If a government can precommit itself to eschew inflation and devaluation, then it can borrow a lot more money on better terms, and its economy will be far better off in the long run. An independent central bank is often advocated for precommitment value. Well, locating the central bank 5,000 miles away in a country that doesn't care about your economy is as independent as you can get!The Siren Vase. Greek 480-470 BC. Source: The Culture CriticPrecommitment is an old idea. See picture. It's hard. A country must set things up so that it cannot give in to temptation ex post, and it will regret and try to wriggle out of that commitment when the time comes. A lot of the structure of our laws and government amount to a set of precommitments. An independent central bank with a price-level mandate is a precommitment not to inflate. A constitution and property rights are precommitments not to expropriate electoral minorities. Especially in Argentina's case, precommitment is why full dollarization is better than an exchange rate peg or a currency board. A true exchange rate peg -- one dollar for one peso, as much as you like -- would seem to solve the temptation-to-inflate problem. But the country can always abrogate the peg, reinstitute currency controls, and inflate. An exchange rate peg is ultimately a fiscal promise; the country will raise enough taxes so that it can get the dollars necessary to back its currency. When that seems too hard, countries devalue the peg or abandon it altogether. A currency board is tougher. Under a currency board, every peso issued by the government is backed by a dollar. That seems to ensure adequate reserves to handle any conceivable run. But a strapped government eyes the great Uncle-Scrooge swimming pool full of dollars at the currency board, and is tempted to abrogate the board, grab the assets and spend them. That's exactly how Argentina's currency board ended. Dollarization is a burn the ships strategy. There is no return. Reserves are neither necessary nor sufficient for an exchange rate peg. The peg is a fiscal promise and stands and falls with fiscal policy. A currency board, to the governmentFull dollarization -- the country uses actual dollars, and abandons its currency -- cannot be so swiftly undone. The country would have to pass laws to reinstitute the peso, declare all dollar contracts to be Peso contracts, ban the use of dollars and try to confiscate them. Dollars pervading the country would make that hard. People who understand their wealth is being confiscated and replaced by monopoly money would make it harder -- harder than some technical change in the amount of backing at the central bank for the same peso notes and bank accounts underlying a devalued peg or even an abrogated currency board. The design of dollarization should make it harder to undo. The point is precommitment, to make it as costly as possible for a following government to de-dollarize, after all. It's hard to confiscate physical cash, but if domestic Argentine banks have dollar accounts and dollar assets, it is relatively easy to pronounce the accounts in pesos and grab the assets. It would be better if dollarization were accompanied by full financial, capital, and trade liberalization, including allowing foreign banks to operate freely and Argentinian banks to become subsidiaries of foreign banks. Absence of a central bank and domestic deposit insurance will make that even more desirable. Then Argentinian bank "accounts" could be claims to dollar assets held offshore, that remain intact no matter what a future Peronist government does. Governments in fiscal stress that print up money, like Argentina, also impose an array of economy-killing policies to try to prop up the value of their currency, so the money printing generates more revenue. They restrict imports with tariffs, quotas, and red tape; they can restrict exports to try to steer supply to home markets at lower prices; they restrict currency conversion and do so at manipulated rates; they restrict capital markets, stopping people from investing abroad or borrowing abroad; they force people to hold money in oligopolized bank accounts at artificially low interest rates. Dollarization is also a precommitment to avoid or at least reduce all these harmful policies, as generating a demand for a country's currency doesn't do any good to the government budget when there isn't a currency. Zimbabwe dollarized in 2009, giving up on its currency after the greatest hyperinflation ever seen. The argument for Argentina is similar. Ecuador dollarized successfully in much less trying circumstances. It's not a new idea, and unilateral dollarization is possible. In both cases there was a period in which both currencies circulated. (Sadly, Zimbabwe ended dollarization in 2019, with a re-introduction of the domestic currency and redenomination of dollar deposits at a very unfavorable exchange rate. It is possible to undo, and the security of dollar bank accounts in face of such appropriation is an important part of the dollarization precommitment.) The limits of precommitmentDollarization is no panacea. It will work if it is accompanied by fiscal and microeconomic reform. It will be of limited value otherwise. I'll declare a motto: All successful inflation stabilizations have come from a combination of fiscal, monetary and microeconomic reform. Dollarization does not magically solve intractable budget deficits. Under dollarization, if the government cannot repay debt or borrow, it must default. And Argentina has plenty of experience with sovereign default. Argentina already borrows abroad in dollars, because nobody abroad wants peso debt, and has repeatedly defaulted on dollar debt. The idea of dollar debt is that explicit default is more costly than inflation, so the country will work harder to repay debt. Bond purchasers, aware of the temptation to default, will put clauses in debt contracts that make default more costly still. For you to borrow, you have to give the bank the title to the house. Sovereign debt issued under foreign law, with rights to grab assets abroad works similarly. But sovereign default is not infinitely costly and countries like Argentina sometimes choose default anyway. Where inflation may represent simply hugging the mast and promising not to let go, default is a set of loose handcuffs that you can wriggle out of painfully. Countries are like corporations. Debt denominated in the country's own currency is like corporate equity (stock): If the government can't or won't pay it back the price can fall, via inflation and currency devaluation. Debt denominated in foreign currency is like debt: If the government can't or won't pay it back, it must default. (Most often, default is partial. You get back some of what is promised, or you are forced to convert maturing debt into new debt at a lower interest rate.) The standard ideas of corporate finance tell us who issues debt and who issues equity. Small businesses, new businesses, businesses that don't have easily valuable assets, businesses where it is too easy for the managers to hide cash, are forced to borrow, to issue debt. You have to borrow to start a restaurant. Businesses issue equity when they have good corporate governance, good accounting, and stockholders can be sure they're getting their share. These ideas apply to countries, and the choice between borrowing in their own currency and borrowing in foreign currency. Countries with poor governance, poor accounting, out of control fiscal policies, poor institutions for repayment, have to borrow in foreign currency if they are going to borrow at all, with intrusive conditions making default even more expensive. Issuing and borrowing in your own currency, with the option to inflate, is the privilege of countries with good institutions, and democracies where voters get really mad about inflation in particular. Of course, when things get really bad, the country can't borrow in either domestic or foreign currency. Then it prints money, forcing its citizens to take it. That's where Argentina is. In personal finance, you start with no credit at all; then you can borrow; finally you can issue equity. On the scale of healthier economies, dollarizing is the next step up for Argentina. Dollarization and foreign currency debt have another advantage. If a country inflates its way out of a fiscal mess, that benefits the government but also benefits all private borrowers at the expense of private savers. Private borrowing inherits the inflation premium of government borrowing, as the effective government default induces a widespread private default. Dollarization and sovereign default can allow the sovereign to default without messing up private contracts, and all prices and wages in the economy. It is possible for sovereigns to pay higher interest rates than good companies, and the sovereign to be more likely to default than those companies. It doesn't always happen, because sovereigns about to default usually grab all the wealth they can find on the way down, but the separation of sovereign default from inflationary chaos is also an advantage. Greece is a good example, and a bit Italy as well, both in the advantages and the cautionary tale about the limitations of dollarization. Greece and Italy used to have their own currencies. They also had borders, trade controls, and capital controls. They had regular inflation and devaluation. Every day seemed to be another "crisis" demanding another "just this once" splurge. As a result, they paid quite high interest rates to borrow, since savvy bondholders wanted insurance against another "just this once."They joined the EU and the eurozone. This step precommitted them to free trade, relatively free capital markets, and no national currency. Sovereign default was possible, but regarded as very costly. Having banks stuffed with sovereign debt made it more costly. Leaving the euro was possible, but even more costly. Deliberately having no plan to do so made it more costly still. The ropes tying hands to the mast were pretty strong. The result: borrowing costs plummeted. Governments, people and businesses were able to borrow at unheard of low rates. And they did so, with aplomb. The borrowing could have financed public and private investment to take advantage of the new business opportunities the EU allowed. Sadly it did not. Greece soon experienced the higher ex-post costs of default that the precommitment imposed. Dollarizaton -- euroization -- is a precommitment, not a panacea. Recommitments impose costs on yourself ex post. Those costs are real. A successful dollarization for Argentina has to be part of a joint monetary, fiscal, and microeconomic reform. (Did I say that already? :) ) If public finances aren't sorted out, a default will come eventually. And public finances don't need a sharp bout of "austerity" to please the IMF. They need decades of small primary surpluses, tax revenues slightly higher than spending, to credibly pay down any debt. To get decades of revenue, the best answer is growth. Tax revenue equals tax rate times income. More income is a lot easier than higher tax rate, which at least partially lowers income. Greece and Italy did not accomplish the microeconomic reform part. Fortunately, for Argentina, microeconomic reform is low-hanging fruit, especially for a Libertarian president. TransitionWell, so much for the Promised Land, they may have asked of Moses, how do we get there? And let's not spend 40 years wandering the Sinai on the way. Transition isn't necessarily hard. On 1 January 1999, Italy switched from Lira to Euro. Every price changed overnight, every bank account redenominated, every contract reinterpreted, all instantly and seamlessly. People turned in Lira banknotes for Euro banknotes. The biggest complaint is that stores might have rounded up converted prices. If only Argentina could have such problems. Why is Argentina not the same? Well, for a lot of reasons. Before getting to the euro, Italy had adopted the EU open market. Exchange rates had been successfully pegged at the conversion rate, and no funny business about multiple rates. The ECB (really the Italian central bank) could simply print up euros to hand out in exchange for lira. The assets of the Italian central bank and other national central banks were also redenominated in euro, so printing up euros to soak up national currencies was not inflationary -- assets still equal liabilities. Banks with lira deposits that convert to Euro also have lira assets that convert to euro. And there was no sovereign debt crisis, bank crisis, or big inflation going on. Italian government debt was trading freely on an open market. Italy would spend and receive taxes in euros, so if the debt was worth its current price in lira as the present value of surpluses, it was worth exactly the same price, at the conversion rate, in euro. None of this is true in Argentina. The central problem, of course, is that the government is broke. The government does not have dollars to exchange for Pesos. Normally, this would not be a problem. Reserves don't matter, the fiscal capacity to get reserves matters. The government could simply borrow dollars internationally, give the dollars out in exchange for pesos, and slowly pay off the resulting debt. If Argentina redenominated interest-bearing peso debt to dollars at a market exchange rate, that would have no effect on the value of the debt. Obviously, borrowing additional dollars would likely be difficult for Argentina right now. To the extent that its remaining debt is a claim to future inflationary seigniorage revenues, its debt is also worth less once converted to dollars, even at a free market rate, because without seigniorage or fiscal reforms, budget deficits will increase. And that leads to the primary argument against dollarization I hear these days. Yes it might be the promised land, but it's too hard to get there. I don't hear loudly enough, though, what is the alternative? One more muddle of currency boards, central bank rules, promises to the IMF and so forth? How do you suddenly create the kind of stable institutions that Argentina has lacked for a century to justify a respectable currency? One might say this is a problem of price, not of quantity. Pick the right exchange rate, and conversion is possible. But that is not even clearly true. If the state is truly broke, if pesos are only worth anything because of the legal restrictions forcing people to hold them, then pesos and peso debt are genuinely worthless. The only route to dollarization would be essentially a complete collapse of the currency and debt. They are worth nothing. We start over. You can use dollars, but you'll have to export something to the US -- either goods or capital, i.e. stock and bonds in private companies -- to get them. (Well, to get any more of them. Lots of dollars line Argentine mattresses already.) That is enough economic chaos to really put people off. In reality, I think the fear is not a completely worthless currency, but that a move to quick dollarization would make peso and peso claims worth very little, and people would rebel against seeing their money holdings and bank accounts even more suddenly worthless than they are now. Maybe, maybe not. Just who is left in Argentina counting on a robust value of pesos? But the state is not worth nothing. It may be worth little in mark to market, or current dollar borrowing capacity. But a reformed, growing Argentina, with tax, spending, and microeconomic reform, could be a great place for investment, and for tax revenue above costs. Once international lenders are convinced those reform efforts are locked in, and Argentina will grow to anything like its amazing potential, they'll be stumbling over themselves to lend. So a better dollarization plan redeems pesos at the new greater value of the post-reform Argentine state. The question is a bit of chicken and egg: Dollarization has to be part of the reform, but only reform allows dollarization with a decent value of peso exchange. So there is a genuine question of sequencing of reforms. This question reminds me of the totally fruitless discussion when the Soviet Union broke up. American economists amused themselves with clever optimal sequencing of liberalization schemes. But if competent benevolent dictators (sorry, "policy-makers") were running the show, the Soviet Union wouldn't have failed in the first place. The end of hyperinflation in Germany. Price level 1919-1924. Note left-axis scale. Source: Sargent (1982) "The ends of four big inflations." A better historical analogy is, I think, the ends of hyperinflation after WWI, so beautifully described by Tom Sargent in 1982. The inflations were stopped by a sudden, simultaneous, fiscal, monetary, and (to some extent) microeconomic reform. The fiscal problem was solved by renegotiating reparations under the Versailles treaty, along with severe cuts in domestic spending, for example firing a lot of government and (nationalized) railroad workers. There were monetary reforms, including an independent central bank forbidden to buy government debt. There were some microeconomic reforms as well. Stopping inflation took no monetary stringency or high interest rates: Interest rates fell, and the governments printed more money, as real money demand increased. There was no Phillips curve of high unemployment. Employment and the economies boomed. So I'm for almost-simultaneous and fast reforms. 1) Allow the use of dollars everywhere. Dollars and pesos can coexist. Yes, this will put downward pressure on the value of the peso, but that might be crucial to maintain interest in the other reforms, which will raise the value of the peso. 2) Instant unilateral free trade and capital opening. Argentina will have to export goods and capital to get dollars. Get out of the way. Freeing imports will lower their prices and make the economy more efficient. Capital will only come in, which it should do quickly, if it knows it can get out again. Float the peso. 3) Long list of growth - oriented microeconomic reforms. That's why you elected a Libertarian president. 4) Slash spending. Reform taxes. Low marginal rates, broad base. Subsidies in particular distort prices to transfer income. Eliminate. 5) Once reforms are in place, and Argentina has some borrowing capacity, redenominate debt to dollars, and borrow additional dollars to exchange pesos for dollars. All existing peso contracts including bank accounts change on the date. Basically, you want people to hold peso bills and peso debt in the interim as claims on the post-reform government. Peso holders have an incentive to push for reforms that will raise the eventual exchange value of the peso. 6) Find an interim lender. The central problem is who will lend to Argentina in mid stream in order to retire pesos. This is like debtor in possession financing but for a bankrupt country. This could be a job for the IMF. The IMF could lend Argentina dollars for the purpose of retiring pesos. One couldn't ask for much better "conditionality" than a robust Libertarian pro-growth program. Having the IMF along for the ride might also help to commit Argentina to the program. (The IMF can force conditionality better than private lenders.) When things have settled down, Argentina should be able to borrow dollars privately to pay back the IMF. The IMF might charge a decent interest rate to encourage that. How much borrowing is needed? Less than you think. Interest-paying debt can simply be redenominated in dollars once you pick a rate. That might be hard to pay off, but that's a problem for later. So Argentina really only needs to borrow enough dollars to retire cash pesos. I can't find numbers, but hyper inflationary countries typically don't have much real value of cash outstanding. The US has 8% of GDP in currency outstanding. If Argentina has half that, then it needs to borrow only 4% of GDP in dollars to buy back all its currency. That's not a lot. If the peso really collapses, borrowing a little bit more (against great future growth of the reform program) to give everyone $100, the sort of fresh start that Germany did after WWII and after unification, is worth considering. Most of the worry about Argentina's borrowing ability envisions continued primary deficits with slow fiscal adjustment. Make the fiscal adjustment tomorrow."You never want a serious crisis to go to waste," said Rahm Emanuel wisely. "Sequencing" reforms means that everything promised tomorrow is up for constant renegotiation. Especially when parts of the reform depend on other parts, I'm for doing it all as fast as possible, and then adding refinements later if need be. Roosevelt had his famous 100 days, not a 8 year sequenced program. The Argentine reform program is going to hurt a lot of people, or at least recognize losses that had long been papered over in the hope they would go away. Politically, one wants to make the case "We're all in this, we're all hurting. You give up your special deal, preferential exchange rate, special subsidy or whatever, but so will everyone else. Hang with me to make sure they don't get theirs, and in a year we'll all be better off." If reforms are in a long sequence, which means long renegotiation, it's much harder to get buy in from people who are hurt earlier on that the ones who come later will also do their part. The standard answersOne standard critique of dollarization is monetary policy and "optimal currency areas." By having a national currency, the country's wise central bankers can artfully inflate and devalue the currency on occasion to adapt to negative shocks, without the inconvenience and potential dislocation of everyone in the country lowering prices and wages. Suppose, say, the country produces beef, and exports it in order to import cars. If world demand for beef declines, the dollar price of beef declines. The country is going to have to import fewer cars. In a dollarized country, or with a pegged exchange rate, the internal price of beef and wages go down. With its own country and a floating rate, the value of the currency could go down, leaving beef and wages the same inside the country, but the price of imported cars goes up. If lowering prices and wages causes more recession and dislocation than raising import prices, then the artful devaluation is the better idea. (To think about this question more carefully you need traded and non-traded goods; beef, cars, and haircuts. The relative price of beef, cars, and haircuts along with demand for haircuts is also different under the two regimes). Similarly, suppose there is a "lack of demand'' recession and deflation. (90 years later, economists are still struggling to say exactly where that comes from.) With its own central bank and currency, the country can artfully inflate just enough to offset the recession. A country that dollarizes also has to import not-always-optimal US inflation. Switzerland did a lot better than the US and EU once again in the covid era. This line of thinking answers the question, "OK, if Argentina ($847 bn GDP, beef exports) should have its own currency in order to artfully offset shocks, why shouldn't Colorado ($484 bn GDP, beef exports)?'' Colorado is more dependent on trade with the rest of the US than is Argentina. But, the story goes, people can more easily move across states. A common federal government shoves "fiscal stimulus" to states in trouble. Most of all, "lack of demand" recessions seem to be national, in part because of the high integration of states, so recessions are fought by national policy and don't need state-specific monetary stimulus. This is the standard "optimal currency area" line of thinking, which recommends a common currency in an integrated free trade zone such as US, small Latin American countries that trade a lot with the US, and Europe. Standard thinking especially likes a common currency in a fiscal union. Some commenters felt Greece should keep or revert to the Drachma because the EU didn't have enough common countercyclical fiscal policy. It likes independent currencies elsewhere.I hope you're laughing out loud by now. A wise central bank, coupled with a thrifty national government, that artfully inflates and devalues just enough to technocratically exploit price stickiness and financial frictions, offsetting national "shocks" with minimum disruption, is a laughable description of Argentina's fiscal and monetary policies. Periodic inflation, hyperinflation and default, together with a wildly overregulated economy with far too much capital and trade controls is more like it. The lure of technocratic stabilization policy in the face of Argentina's fiscal and monetary chaos is like fantasizing whether you want the tan or black leather on your new Porsche while you're on the bus to Carmax to see if you can afford a 10-year old Toyota. Another reason people argue that even small countries should have their own currencies is to keep the seigniorage. Actual cash pays no interest. Thus, a government that issues cash earns the interest spread between government bonds and interest. Equivalently, if demand for cash is proportional to GDP, then as GDP grows, say 2% per year, then the government can let cash grow 2% per year as well, i.e. it can print up that much cash and spend it. But this sort of seigniorage is small for modern economies that don't have inflation. Without inflation, a well run economy might pay 2% for its debt, so save 2% by issuing currency. 2% interest times cash which is 10% of GDP is 0.2% of GDP. On the scale of Argentinian (or US) debt and deficits, that's couch change. When inflation is higher, interest rates are higher, and seigniorage or the "inflation tax" is higher. Argentina is living off that now. But the point is not to inflate forever and to forswear bigger inflation taxes. Keeping this small seigniorage is one reason for countries to keep their currency and peg to the dollar or run a currency board. The currency board holds interest-bearing dollar assets, and the government gets the interest. Nice. But as I judge above, the extra precommitment value of total dollarization is worth the small lost seigniorage. Facing Argentina's crisis, plus its catastrophic century of lost growth, lost seigniorage is a cost that I judge far below the benefit. Other countries dollarize, but agree with the US Fed to rebate them some money for the seigniorage. Indeed, if Argentina dollarizes and holds 10% of its GDP in non-interest-bearing US dollars, that's a nice little present to the US. A dollarization agreement with Argentina to give them back the seignorage would be the least we can do. But I don't think Argentina should hold off waiting for Jay Powell to answer the phone. The Fed has other fires to put out. If Argentina unilaterally dollarizes, they can work this sort of thing out later. Dollarization would obviously be a lot easier if it is worked out together with the US government and US banks. Getting cash sent to Argentina, getting banks to have easy payment systems in dollars and links to US banks would make it all easier. If Argentina gets rid of its central bank it still needs a payment system to settle claims in dollars. Accounts at, say, Chase could function as a central bank. But it would all be easier if the US cooperates. Updates:Some commenters point out that Argentina may be importing US monetary policy just as the US imports Argentine fiscal policy. That would lead to importing a big inflation. They suggest a Latin American Monetary Union, like the euro, or using a third country's currency. The Swiss franc is pretty good. Maybe the Swiss can set the world standard of value. Both are good theoretical ideas but a lot harder to achieve in the short run. Dollarization will be hard enough. Argentines have a lot of dollars already, most trade is invoiced in dollars so getting dollars via trade is relatively easy, the Swiss have not built out a banking infrastructure capable of being a global currency. The EMU lives on top of the EU, and has its own fiscal/monetary problems. Building a new currency before solving Argentina's problems sounds like a long road. The question asked was dollarization, so I stuck to that for now. I imagined here unilateral dollarization. But I didn't emphasize enough: The US should encourage dollarization! China has figured this out and desperately wants anyone to use its currency. Why should we not want more people to use our currency? Not just for the seigniorage revenue, but for the ease of trade and international linkages it promotes. The Treasury and Fed should have a "how to dollarize your economy" package ready to go for anyone who wants it. Full integration is not trivial, including access to currency, getting bank access to the Fed's clearing systems, instituting cyber and money laundering protocols, and so forth. Important update: Daniel Raisbeck and Gabriela Calderon de Burgos at CATO have a lovely essay on Argentinian dollarization, also debunking an earlier Economist article that proclaimed it impossible. They include facts and comparison with other dollarization experiences, not just theory as I did. (Thanks to the correspondent who pointed me to the essay.) Some quotes:At the end of 2022, Argentines held over $246 billion in foreign bank accounts, safe deposit boxes, and mostly undeclared cash, according to Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and Census. This amounts to over 50 percent of Argentina's GDP in current dollars for 2021 ($487 billion). Hence, the dollar scarcity pertains only to the Argentine state....The last two dollarization processes in Latin American countries prove that "purchasing" the entire monetary base with U.S. dollars from one moment to the next is not only impractical, but it is also unnecessary. In both Ecuador and El Salvador, which dollarized in 2000 and 2001 respectively, dollarization involved parallel processes. In both countries, the most straightforward process was the dollarization of all existing deposits, which can be converted into dollars at the determined exchange rate instantly.in both Ecuador and El Salvador, dollarization not only did not lead to bank runs; it led to a rapid and sharp increase in deposits, even amid economic and political turmoil in Ecuador's case....There is a general feature of ending hyperinflation: People hold more money. In this case, people hold more bank accounts once they know those accounts are safe. Short summary of the rest, all those dollar deposits (out of mattresses into the banking system) allowed the central bank to retire its local currency liabilities. Emilio Ocampo, the Argentine economist whom Milei has put in charge of plans for Argentina's dollarization should he win the presidency, summarizes Ecuador's experience thus:People exchanged their dollars through the banks and a large part of those dollars were deposited in the same banks. The central bank had virtually no need to disburse reserves. This was not by design but was a spontaneous result.In El Salvador also, Dollar deposits also increased spontaneously in El Salvador, a country that dollarized in 2001. By the end of 2022, the country's deposits amounted to 49.6 percent of GDP—in Panama, another dollarized peer, deposits stood at 117 percent of GDP.El Salvador's banking system was dollarized immediately, but the conversion of the circulating currency was voluntary, with citizens allowed to decide if and when to exchange their colones for dollars. Ocampo notes that, in both Ecuador and El Salvador, only 30 percent of the circulating currency had been exchanged for dollars four months after dollarization was announced so that both currencies circulated simultaneously. In the latter country, it took over two years for 90 percent of the monetary base to be dollar‐based.Cachanosky explains that, in an El Salvador‐type, voluntary dollarization scenario, the circulating national currency can be dollarized as it is deposited or used to pay taxes, in which case the sums are converted to dollars once they enter a state‐owned bank account. Hence, "there is no need for the central bank to buy the circulating currency" at a moment's notice.Dollarization starts with both currencies and a peg. As long as people trust that dollarization will happen at the peg, the conversion can take a while. You do not need dollars to soak up every peso on day 1. Dollarization is, above, a commitment that the peg will last for years, not a necessary commitment that the peg will last a day. I speculated about private borrowing at lower rates than the sovereign, once default rather than inflation is the only way out for the sovereign. This happened: ... as Manuel Hinds, a former finance minister in El Salvador, has explained, solvent Salvadorans in the private sector can borrow at rates of around 7 percent on their mortgages while international sovereign bond markets will only lend to the Salvadoran government at far higher rates. As Hinds writes, under dollarization, "the government cannot transfer its financial costs to the private sector by printing domestic money and devaluing it."A nice bottom line: Ask people in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama what they think:This is yet another lesson of dollarization's actual experience in Latin American countries. It is also a reason why the vast majority of the population in the dollarized nations has no desire for a return to a national currency. The monetary experiences of daily life have taught them that dollarization's palpable benefits far outweigh its theoretical drawbacks. Even more important update:From Nicolás Cachonosky How to Dollarize Argentina The central problem is non-money liabilities of the central bank. A detailed plan. Many other blog posts at the link. See his comment below. Tyler Cowen on dollarization in Bloomberg. Great quote: The question is not how to adopt a new currency, it is how to adopt a new currency and retain a reasonable value for the old one. Dollarization is easy. Hyperinflate the Peso to zero a la Zimbabwe. Repeat quote. Emilio Ocampo on dollarization as a commitment device. One of the main reasons to dollarize is to eliminate high, persistent, and volatile inflation. However, to be effective, dollarization must generate sufficient credibility, which in turn depends critically on whether its expected probability of reversal is low.... The evidence suggests that, in the long-run, the strongest insurance against reversal is the support of the electorate, but in the short-run, institutional design [dollarization] can play a critical role.Fifty years ago, in testimony to U.S. Congress, Milton Friedman argued that "the whole reason why it is an advantage for a developing country to tie to a major country is that, historically speaking, the internal policies of developing countries have been very bad. U.S. policy has been bad, but their policies have been far worse. ... (1973, p.127)."In this respect, not much has changed in Argentina since. Craig Richardson explains how dollarization failed in Zimbabwe, a wonderful cautionary tale. Deficits did not stop, the government issued "bonds" and forced banks to buy them, bank accounts became de linked from currency. Gresham's law prevailed, the government "bonds" circulating at half face value drove out cash dollars. With persistent government and trade deficits there was a "dollar shortage."
A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 1 International Law & the Cyber Domain: Assessing the Human Rights Concerns of Cyber Legislation GD520 International Law and the International System Dr. John Becker Norwich University College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Kathryn R. Lamphere 23 May 2020 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 2 Introduction A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. International Cyber Law Background The cyber domain is often presented as another realm, a world that exists outside of the mostly tidy borders the international community has used to separate themselves. Aligning with Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 3 this view is the notion that cyberspace cannot be regulated because it expands beyond the traditional idea of territorial sovereignty (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573). These ideas raise two concerns over the identification and prosecution of cybercrime. The first concern is the conflict between "cybercrime, which is global in scale, and police activities that are confined to national borders (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166)." The conflict arises in the very structure of the Internet, which "can be characterized as a multitude of individual, but interconnected, electronic communications networks (Zekos, 2008, p. 30)." This interconnectedness has created a grey area within the legal system, where no one entity has regulatory control over what happens in that area. The second concern is far more technical and highlights the transient nature of information and data (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166). The source of information can be easily masked to hide its actual location, and data "may be amended, moved, or altered in a few seconds (p. 166)." The speed in which data travels presents a significant hurdle to the legal and law enforcement mechanisms typically used to investigate crimes. As Cangemi notes, this creates "an appreciable risk that the evidence of cyber-offences will disappear" long before implementing the required resources (p. 166). Nevertheless, despite these concerns, "nation-states do strive to exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573)." The physical elements of cybercrime, such as the location of the people perpetrating the crimes or the location of the hardware used to execute the crimes, are used as a connecting link to allow governments "to address cyber conflicts involving both state and nonstate actors as matters to be resolved by sovereign powers under their respective legal systems (p. 1573)." When evidence moves beyond territorial borders, states seek to invoke bilateral or international action to further pursue the crime. This model follows the same formula that society developed over time, whether it be in stopping crimes such as international drug trafficking or heinous acts of terrorism. The international community is well-Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 4 versed in this cycle, and the "nature of the international legal system affords this sovereign-centric approach primacy under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter regime (p. 1573)." If the international community is content in continuing to use this cycle, then "international legislation and action are essential to combat the phenomenon" of cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, 27). The essential requirement of international involvement and negotiation has rung true in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as the international community takes steps to evolve international law to include cyber issues, specifically cybercrime. The 1980s introduced international consultation on cybercrime by multiple organizations. In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) commissioned a two-year study focusing "on the possibility of harmonizing and internationalizing national cybercrime laws (Brenner, 2012, p. 133)." OECD later published a report in 1986 summarizing the results of the study and recommending countries criminalize certain cybercrimes. In 1985, the Council of Europe convened its own study, which involved a four-year focus on "the legal issues raised by cybercrime (p. 133)." In 1997, the Council of Europe convened another study tasked with "the drafting of a cybercrime treaty that would harmonize national laws dealing with cybercrime offenses and investigations (p. 133). In 2001, the study's efforts came to fruition in the creation of the Convention of Cybercrime. Also referred to as the Budapest Convention, the international treaty entered into law in July 2004 with the principle objective of "pursuing a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation (Council of Europe, 2001, Preamble)." As of 2018, 29 states have ratified the treaty, but the rapid development of technology has resulted in the convention becoming outdated, leaving governments and organizations calling for a new treaty (Murphy, 2018, p. 549) (Shackelford, 2014, p. 312). Russia's 2019 United Nations resolution is the latest attempt to modernize international cyber Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 5 law and has received much adulation despite its vague, concerning language and human rights implications. The next section of this paper addresses human rights and provides an overview of states' obligations to this arena as members of the international community. Human Rights & the International Community Modern international human rights law begins with the first article of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which dictates that one of the purposes of the UN is to "achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 785)." While the Charter provided minimal specificity as to what "respect for human rights" entailed, this provision and others within the Charter catalyzed a new international perspective on human rights. In joining the United Nations, members inherently accepted "the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the concept of human rights (p. 787)." Furthermore, the Charter insinuated that "states were deemed to have assumed some international obligations relating to human rights (p. 787)." Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter cemented the beginnings of these obligations, requiring member states to "take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of purposes" such as promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56)." The specificity of human rights became more overt when the United Nations devoted the UN Commission on Human Rights to the task of drafting non-legally-binding human rights instrument. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Murphy, 2018, p. 402). Composed of thirty articles, the declaration instituted vital human rights and eventually "served as a template for numerous subsequent treaties on human rights (p. 404)." As a result, the Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 6 Universal Declaration on Human Rights "has come to be accepted as a normative instrument in its own right (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787)." Both documents uphold two pedestals of traditional international law as it pertains to human rights. The first pedestal retains responsibility for "the treatment by one state of another's nationals, an area known as state responsibility for injury to aliens (p. 389)." Although addressed at the state level, this notion asserts that individuals are afforded certain protections when in another state. The second pedestal, advanced by scholars such as Hugo Grotius, focuses on "the protection of persons against the acts of their own governments (p. 389)." It is this pedestal that introduces what is now known as humanitarian intervention, or the "idea of state intervening to protect the other state's nationals (p. 389)." Together, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration are "considered to spell out the general human rights obligations of all UN member states," of which there are now 193 (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787) (Murphy, 2018, p. 59). Each international legal instrument has lent itself to the creation of international institutions dedicated to monitoring "compliance by the states parties with the obligations imposed by these instruments (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 788)." Such institutions include entities like the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (p. 788). Together, the instruments and institutions "laid the normative foundation of the contemporary international human rights revolution" and "influenced, in part at least, the contents of the legal norms under which international criminal tribunals operate today (p. 791)." The criticality of these elements to the international system, particularly as it pertains to international law, is justification for using each as measuring tools with which to judge the new UN cyber-focused resolution objectively. The third section of this paper will assess the purpose of the resolution and explain the supporting argument for its contents. Supporting Arguments & Analysis of A/74/401 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 7 In order to truly understand the intent of international laws, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the stances actors take concerning the specific issues at hand. This understanding is of particular importance when discussing Resolution A/74/401 and the underlying views of cyberspace. Two opposing perspectives lie at the heart of debates surrounding the cyber domain and Internet governance and center around the notion of sovereignty. The first perspective is that "many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace in the same way as they do in physical domains (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111)." For these governments, the dominance of private sector institutions within cyberspace and "the unfettered internet access of their fellow citizens" are causes of concerns (p. 111). This sentiment is particularly true within the Russian government. Under its traditional views of governance, Russia "conceives of cyberspace as a territory with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders, and wishes to see the remit of international laws extended to the internet space (p. 112)." Furthermore, Russia's domestic fears of an open Internet fuel its international concerns. Russia sees the Internet as "politically disruptive because it enables citizens to circumvent government-controlled 'traditional media (p. 113).'" It aligns this perspective "with the inherently authoritarian nature of the Russian regime (p. 114)." Russia's negative perception of the Internet as it is today ultimately lends itself to Russia's ideal mechanism of perpetuating its belief that "global internet governance is envisioned as an issue of high politics in which states - and the interstate balance of power-play – play an essential role (p. 116, 117)." Under this mechanism, it is little wonder that Russia has led international legal initiatives to refine control over the Internet since the Council of Europe's enactment of its Convention on Cybercrime. In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release following the General Assembly's adoption of Resolution A/74/401, Russia proclaimed that the "resolution shows that the world community urgently needs to develop a universal, comprehensive, and open-ended convention Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 8 on countering cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." The adopted resolution's language appears to align with this projected intent from Russia. The resolution stresses "the need to enhance coordination and cooperation among States in combating the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" and notes "the importance of the international and regional instruments in the fight against cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." In order to fulfill these objectives, the resolution establishes an "intergovernmental committee of experts, representative of all regions" that will "elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019)." Remarks of supporting nations support this appearance of cohesion. The representative from Nicaragua indicated the resolution would address cybercrime "in a more representative, democratic and transparent manner, taking into account the individual circumstances of developing and developed countries (Third Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage)." China echoed this support, stating the resolution "is conducive to filling legal gaps in international cooperation (Third Committee)." At the same time, Belarus declared that "international cooperation is vital in investigating and combating cybercrime (Third Committee)." At face value, the resolution is a gesture of goodwill, a written contract to pursue options to disrupt cybercrime that will benefit all states. However, Russia's press release takes these notions a step further, realigning its message to its traditional view of international politics. It notes, "the resolution proposed by Russia essentially enhances states' digital sovereignty over their information space and ushers in a new page in the history of global efforts to counter cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." Furthermore, the press release dictates that the "convention must be based on the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (2019)." There are two Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 9 essential points within this statement that require further analysis. The first is the reassertion of the authoritarian construct with which Russia chooses to view cyberspace. In a press release initially dedicated to lauding the necessity of international cooperation, Russia simultaneously defaults to its traditional views of the international community and advocates for a "digital Westphalia (Nocetti, 2015, p. 117)." In recognizing sovereignty, Russia insinuates that the international community will successfully legislate mechanisms that will reduce cybercrime. A quick review of the supporting states in favor of the resolution upholds Russia's authoritarian views (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In addition to China, Nicaragua, and Belarus, countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are only some of the 88 Member States of the General Assembly who voted to adopt the resolution. Unsurprisingly, these states also abide by similar authoritarian perspectives on international law and sovereignty. China, for example, maintains a "comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and social use as well as legal domains (Liang & Lu, 2010, p. 105)." This system supports "Internet censorship" and "China's single-party political system and its heavy intervention in Internet development (p. 105)." Given the nature and history of these states' political systems and methods of governance, the sudden focus on international cooperation generates questions of the underlying goals that may hide behind the official demands of the resolution. The second point requiring acknowledgment is the additional re-emphasis of sovereignty while also emphasizing non-interventionist beliefs in discussing non-interference in internal affairs. The resolution itself makes no mention of sovereignty or internal affairs beyond assisting countries with improving "national legislation and frameworks and build the capacity of national authorities" to deal with cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Despite the lack of language on this topic, the leading state on this initiative, Russia, felt the need Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 10 to emphasize its sovereignty in a press release about the resolution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Once again, Russia gives the impression that there may be a hidden desire layered within the words of the resolution. Additionally, the concept of non-interference within the international system is not without exceptions. The most critical exception being suspicion of human rights violations. As previously stated, humanitarian intervention and protecting citizens from their own government is a staple of international human rights law (Murphy, 2018, p. 389). Therefore, while non-interference in domestic matters is undoubtedly an essential tenet of international law, the resolution cannot call for international cooperation to combat cybercrime and simultaneously ignore the international cooperation required to maintain peace and security (United Nations, 1945, Charter of the United Nations). The next section of this paper will address these obligations to cooperation as it pertains to human rights while also highlighting the opposing arguments against Resolution A/74/401. Opposing Arguments for A/74/401 & Analysis of Human Rights Concerns The first perspective at the heart of the cyber domain debates, as described previously, is modeled after authoritarian beliefs and government control. The second perspective, modeled after a more Western approach to governance, is the belief of a free and open Internet that should remain decentralized and that "the best regulatory system is one that develops organically (Shackelford, 2013, p. 53)." A free Internet is more firmly the belief of the United States. This idea introduces the initial context necessary to understand the United States' opposition to the Russian-led cybercrime resolution. Even before the rapid development of the Internet, American foreign policy internalized the notion of "free flow of information internationally as an important element of national security (McCarthy, 2011, p. 92)." Former Secretary of State George Schultz argued that the free flow of information "undermined the Soviet Union and authoritarianism (p. 92, 93)." At its earliest beginnings, the Internet was a product of American ingenuity and, as a Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 11 result, built with a bias for "American libertarianism (p. 93)." In the present, the West has developed this concept in the "context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security (Powers & Jablonski, 2015, p. 3)." As former Secretary of State Clinton asserted, the United States and other Western nations support the "freedom to connect" in opposition to efforts by states such as China, Iran, and Russia to create state-level information infrastructures designed for censorship (p. 3). The historical rivalry and disagreement between the two states on information, particularly as it pertains to cyberspace, only further roots the United States' opposition to the new United Nations cybercrime resolution. In its statement to the United Nations during the 49th & 50th meetings of the Third Committee, the United States expressed disappointment "with the decisions of the sponsors of this resolution to bring it to the Third Committee (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019)." Contrary to the resolution's focus on cooperation, the United States' proclaimed the resolution would "drive a wedge between Member States and undermine international cooperation to combat cybercrime at a time when enhanced coordination is essential (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Furthermore, the United States asserted Russia's actions in introducing the resolution essentially bypass the "expert-driven, consensus-based process and therefore is not in line with their precedent (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Other Western states appear to agree with the United States assertions, as states such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Republic of Korea, and Germany composed part of the 58 Member States who opposed the adoption of the resolution (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In a manner similar to the states in favor of the adoption, some opposed states made remarks in agreement with those of the United States during the Third Committee. Finland, on behalf of the European Union, remarked that "there is no consensus on the need for a new international instrument to fight cybercrime" and that the draft "represents a duplication of resources (Third Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 12 Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage). Canada and Australia presented similar sentiments, remarking that "the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is an important baseline for international cooperation" and that the new resolution "seeks to undercut consensus and will diminish existing global efforts that are already delivering results (Third Committee, 2019)." There is one remaining argument against the new cybercrime resolution: the potential that the document's vague language will create an environment where human rights will be more easily violated if left unchecked (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). In a letter to the United Nations General Assembly, 37 organizations and six individuals expressed their concern for human rights protections as they pertain to the cybercrime resolution (Association for Progressive Communications (APC), 2019, Open Letter, p. 4). The first concern is a lack of clarity surrounding the scope of the "use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (APC, p. 1)." If left undefined, the language in the resolution arguably "opens the door to criminalising ordinary online behaviour that is protected under international human rights law (APC, p. 1)." If steps to do so were taken as a result of the new resolution, they would be in direct violation of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights; who stated in 2011 that "human rights are equally valid online as offline (Shackelford, 2019, p. 168)." The second concern offered by non-government entities is the increasing trend in "criminalising ordinary online activities of individuals and organisations through the application of cybercrime laws (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 1, 2)." The letter even goes so far as to quote the UN Special Rapporteur over these concerns, that the "surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protestors in many countries around the world (APC, p. 2)." If used in such a manner, these initiatives, in addition to the UN cybercrime resolution, are in direct violation of the Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Within the Charter of the United Nations, efforts to Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 13 restrict or punish opposition elements such as activists or protestors violates Articles 55 and 56, which requires states to cooperate with the UN in achieving the organizations' purposes such as promoting human rights (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides more specific language with which to attribute potential violations. The open letter notes that legislation of this kind is used to "criminalise legitimate forms of online expression, association and assembly through vague and ill-defined terms that allow for arbitrary or discretionary application (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." Immediately, legislation that allows for criminalization of these elements is in direct violation of Articles 18, 19, and 20, which declare "all persons have a right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and assembly (Murphy, 2018, p. 402)." Furthermore, violations such as these also violate article two, which guarantees people "the right to life, liberty, and security" and dictates that "these rights are to be held without discrimination of any kind (Murphy, p. 402, 403)." Upholding these rights within cyberspace continues to fall in line with the Western perspective on the Internet. As McCarthy quotes, "the Internet is arguably the greatest facilitator for freedom of expression and innovation in the world today (McCarthy, 2011, p. 94)." The status of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as "legitimate norms within the international system" permits this interpretation and application of international law to future resolutions (p. 94). If states are signatories to the declaration, any future adoption of any resolution must adhere to the principles and freedoms guaranteed by it. Resolution A/74/401 does refer to human rights protections, "reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the use of information and communication technologies (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." However, the resolution's open language is in direct contradiction to this promise, if not clarified. As the open letter indicates, "simply reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights" is "insufficient to safeguard human rights while Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 14 countering cybercrime (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." The final section of this paper recommends additional actions that may further unify opposing entities on this resolution while simultaneously addressing all human rights concerns. Recommendations The Russian-led supporters of the resolution and the United States-led opposition are unified in one common element, at least in writing. The element is that consensus and international cooperation are vital in addressing cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019). This notion is in concert with the Council of Europe, who remains the only entity to successfully orchestrate an international cybercrime treaty (Council of Europe, 2004, Convention on Cybercrime). In 2001, the Council of Europe postulated that "solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international law, necessitating the adoption of adequate international legal instruments" that can "ensure the necessary efficiency" required to combat cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, p. 28). If the international community determines that another cybercrime treaty is required within the intergovernmental committee of experts authorized by Resolution A/74/401, then the new treaty should consider the aims of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In doing so, the United Nations should strive to create a "basic framework for the establishment by contracting states of domestic substantive and procedural laws" in a manner that allows states to "cooperate expeditiously with one another (Pocar, 2004, p. 30)." If successful, the United Nations will be able to "establish procedures for relevant international relations" and provide "forms of cooperation between national judicial authorities as many interact with each other both swiftly and efficiently (p. 31)." Furthermore, the necessity of these requirements is supported by the very nature of the "the world-wide dimension of the Internet," Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 15 which "implies that its illegal use and related offenses must prompt responses and concerted efforts from all relevant domestic and international authorities (p. 34)." The non-governmental organizations' open letter to the United Nations supports the need for cooperation but takes it one step further than the states themselves. In its current structure, the Internet is a public-private endeavor, with private entities dominating cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). The present language of the United Nations cybercrime resolution allows for an intergovernmental committee of experts. However, it does not expand on the actual composition of the committee (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Noting that Russia and other authoritarian regimes prefer non-government entities to use the government as a proxy for communication, it can be inferred that a Russia-led resolution intends the committee to be comprised of only government entities (p. 117). The open letter rightly points out that collaboration on cyber issues must expand beyond state cooperation. Addressing cybercrime is "necessarily a multi-stakeholder endeavour" that "requires government officials and experts, members of the technical community, civil society, the private sector, and scientific and research institutions (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 4)." An assessment of this viewpoint reveals that a committee dedicated to combatting cybercrime cannot rely on government expertise alone. In order to accurately reflect the composition and requirements of a private-public Internet, all discussions surrounding this resolution should involve both private and public entities. Therefore, the committee should be reformed to more accurately reflect the Internet's users. In doing so, the United Nations breaches the divide between authoritarian and more democratic governments, further increasing cooperation on this resolution. However, increased cooperation through a broader, inclusive committee and implementation of lessons learned from the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime will not ensure that the future convention successfully resolves the resolution's weaknesses. In Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 16 modern-day, the international system emphasizes international human rights more than ever before, as "this branch of international law has experienced phenomenal growth over the past one hundred years (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 807)." This growth has contributed to the "growing political impact of human rights on the conduct of international relations and the behavior of governments (p. 807)." If real success is desired within international governance, then the committee established under the "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" resolution must account for human rights protections when determining the requirements of the "comprehensive international convention (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." As the representative from Costa Rica during the 49th and 50th meetings of the Third Committee, "the international community must protect and observe fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy (Third Committee, 2019, Meeting Coverage)." Until there is consensus on "sensitive topics such as…State responsibility to prioritize and protect human rights," the future proposed convention will fall short of its goal of achieving complete international ratification (Third Committee). Conclusion As cyberspace expands in conjunction with the rapid advancement of technology, the fear of the unknown drives further division between already opposing states in the international system. Resolution A/74/401 is the latest testament to the evolution of politicization within Internet governance. In addressing a topic that impacts every Internet-accessible region of the world, the resolution simultaneously magnifies the opposing perspectives of states as it pertains to sovereignty within the cyber domain. Furthermore, it reignites the protracted debate over whether or not human rights obligations addressed in such documents as the Charter of the United Nations or Universal Declaration on Human Rights are legally binding. Preventing further polarization requires both an acknowledgment of a fracturing international system of Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 17 governance and a proposed solution to address the issue. While state-centric governance provides legitimacy and the potential for a higher allocation of resources dedicated to protecting the Internet, increased sovereignty also "risks sacrificing innovation, complicates the regulatory environment of cyberspace, and may threaten a positive vision of cyber peace (Shackelford, 2013, p. 50)." These risks are why an alternative method to an intergovernmental committee must develop in response to the resolution. This method should integrate a multi-stakeholder construct to more fully recognize the competing impacts of cybercrime and fairly address the allegations of human rights infringement. One such method is polycentric governance, a system composed of "diverse organizations and governments working at multiple levels" in order to "increase levels of voluntary cooperation or increase compliance with rules established by governmental authorities (p. 330)." Individually, each organization or type of government faces its own unique hurdles. Together, they "contribute to a governance regime that is multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope that could complement the top-down governance model increasingly favored" by states such as Russia or China (p. 331). Implementing polycentric governance to more equitably debate the appropriate response to international cybercrime will create an international community willing to consider the developing convention. In doing so, the environment will be better suited to determining whether or not the international system can leverage international law to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 18 References Association for Progressive Communications (APC). (2019). Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed international convention on cybercrime poses a threat to human rights online. Retrieved from https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_re_UNGA_cybercrime_resolution_0.pdf Brenner, S. (2012). Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes. Northeastern University Press. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/norwich/reader.action?docID=1085118&ppg=124 Buergenthal, T. (2006). The Evolving International Human Rights System. The American Journal of International Law, 100(4), 783-807. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/pdf/4126317.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae4ea9f31648cbd83f8f97bc7dae8e67a Cangemi, D. (2004). Procedural Law Provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 18(2), 165-171. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5272830680 Center for Strategic & International Studies & McAfee. (2018). Economic Impact of Cybercrime – No Slowing Down. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-cybercrime Council of Europe. (2004). Convention on Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 Hakmeh, J. & Peters, A. (2020). A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-un-cybercrime-treaty-way-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet Kanuck, S. (2010). Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law. Texas Law Review, 88, 1571-1597. Retrieved from https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Kanuck.pdf Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 19 Liang, B., & Lu, H. (2010). Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 26(1), 103–120. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5322181473 McCarthy, D. (2011). Open Networks and the Open Door: American Foreign Policy and the Narration of the Internet. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7(1), 89-111. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2019, December). Press Release on the UN General Assembly Vote on the Russian Draft Resolution on Countering Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3988579 Murphy, S. (2018). Principles of international law (3rd edition). West Academic Publishing. Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance. International Affairs, 91(1), 111-130. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5721220595 Pocar, F. (2004). New Challenges for International Rules Against Cyber-Crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 27-37. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5649374698 Powers, S. & Jablonski, M. (2015). The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom. University of Illinois Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/903245891 Shackelford, S. J. (2013). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace: Vol. Revised Edition. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/882104883 Shackelford, S. (2019). Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the "Shared Responsibility" of Cyber Peace. Stanford Journal of International Law, 55(2), 155–184. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/8185136062 United Nations General Assembly. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html United Nations General Assembly. (2019). Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/A/74/401 United Nations Third Committee. (2019, November). Meetings Coverage Seventy-Fourth Session, 49th & 50th Meetings. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gashc4284.doc.htm United States Mission to the United Nations. (2019, November). Statement on Agenda Item 107 'Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes.' Retrieved from https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-on-agenda-item-107-countering-the-use-of-information-and-communications-technologies-for-criminal-purposes/ Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 20 Zekos, G. (2008). Electronic State Sovereignty. The Icfai University Journal of Cyber Law, 7(4), 30-60.
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Alexander Dugin on Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and a Russian Theory of Multipolarity
IR has long been regarded as an Anglo-American social science. Recently, the discipline has started to look beyond America and England, to China (Theory Talk #51, Theory Talk #45), India (Theory Talk #63, Theory Talk #42), Africa (Theory Talk #57, Theory Talk #10) and elsewhere for non-Western perspectives on international affairs and IR theory. However, IR theorists have paid little attention to Russian perspectives on the discipline and practice of international relations. We offer an exciting peek into Russian geopolitical theory through an interview with the controversial Russian geopolitical thinker Alexander Dugin, founder of the International Eurasian Movement and allegedly an important influence on Putin's foreign policy. In this Talk, Dugin—among others—discusses his Theory of a Multipolar World, offers a staunch critique of western and liberal IR, and lays out Russia's unique contribution to the landscape of IR theory.
Print version of this Talk (pdf) Russian version
What, according to you, is the central challenge or principle debate within IR and what would be your position within this debate or towards that challenge?
The field of IR is extremely interesting and multidimensional. In general, the discipline is much more promising than many think. I think that there is a stereometry today in IR, in which we can distinguish a few axes right away.
The first, most traditional axis is realism – the English school – liberalism.
If the debates here are exhausted on an academic level, then on the level of politicians, the media, and journalists, all the arguments and methods appear new and unprecedented each time. Today, liberalism in IR dominates mass consciousness, and realist arguments, already partially forgotten on the level of mass discourse, could seem rather novel. On the other hand, the nuanced English school, researched thoroughly in academic circles, might look like a "revelation" to the general public. But for this to happen, a broad illumination of the symmetry between liberals and realists is needed for the English school to acquire significance and disclose its full potential. This is impossible under the radical domination of liberalism in IR. For that reason, I predict a new wave of realists and neorealists in this sphere, who, being pretty much forgotten and almost marginalized, can full well make themselves and their agenda known. This would, it seems to me, produce a vitalizing effect and diversify the palette of mass and social debates, which are today becoming monotone and auto-referential.
The second axis is bourgeois versions of IR (realism, the English school, and liberalism all together) vs. Marxism in IR. In popular and even academic discourse, this theme is entirely discarded, although the popularity of Wallerstein (Theory Talk #13) and other versions of world-systems theory shows a degree of interest in this critical version of classical, positivistic IR theories.
The third axis is post-positivism in all its varieties vs. positivism in all its varieties (including Marxism). IR scholars might have gotten the impression that postmodern attacks came to an end, having been successfully repelled by 'critical realism', but in my opinion it is not at all so. From moderate constructivism and normativism to extreme post-structuralism, post-positivistic theories carry a colossal deconstructive and correspondingly scientific potential, which has not yet even begun to be understood. It seemed to some that postmodernism is a cheerful game. It isn't. It is a new post-ontology, and it fundamentally affects the entire epistemological structure of IR. In my opinion, this axis remains very important and fundamental.
The fourth axis is the challenge of the sociology of international relations, which we can call 'Hobson's challenge'. In my opinion, in his critique of euro-centrism in IR, John M. Hobson laid the foundation for an entirely new approach to the whole problematic by proposing to consider the structural significance of the "euro-centric" factor as dominant and clarifying its racist element. Once we make euro-centrism a variable and move away from the universalistic racism of the West, on which all systems of IR are built, including the majority of post-positivistic systems (after all, postmodernity is an exclusively Western phenomenon!), we get, theoretically for now, an entirely different discipline—and not just one, it seems. If we take into account differences among cultures, there can be as many systems of IR as there are cultures. I consider this axis extremely important.
The fifth axis, outlined in less detail than the previous one, is the Theory of a Multipolar World vs. everything else. The Theory of a Multipolar World was developed in Russia, a country that no one ever took seriously during the entire establishment of IR as a discipline—hence the fully explainable skepticism toward the Theory of a Multipolar World.
The sixth axis is IR vs. geopolitics. Geopolitics is usually regarded as secondary in the context of IR. But gradually, the epistemological potential of geopolitics is becoming more and more obvious, despite or perhaps partially because of the criticism against it. We have only to ask ourselves about the structure of any geopolitical concept to discover the huge potential contained in its methodology, which takes us to the very complex and semantically saturated theme of the philosophy and ontology of space.
If we now superimpose these axes onto one another, we get an extremely complex and highly interesting theoretical field. At the same time, only one axis, the first one, is considered normative among the public, and that with the almost total and uni-dimensional dominance of IR liberalism. All the wealth, 'scientific democracy', and gnoseological pluralism of the other axes are inaccessible to the broad public, robbing and partly deceiving it. I call this domination of liberalism among the public the 'third totalitarianism', but that is a separate issue.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?
I began with Eurasianism, from which I came to geopolitics (the Eurasianist Petr Savitskii quoted the British geopolitician Halford Mackinder) and remained for a long time in that framework, developing the theme of the dualism of Land and Sea and applying it to the actual situation That is how the Eurasian school of geopolitics arose, which became not simply the dominant, but the only school in contemporary Russia. As a professor at Moscow State University, for six years I was head of the department of the Sociology of International Relations, which forced me to become professionally familiar with the classical theories of IR, the main authors, approaches, and schools. Because I have long been interested in postmodernism in philosophy (I wrote the book Post-philosophy on the subject), I paid special attention to post-positivism in IR. That is how I came to IR critical theory, neo-Gramscianism, and the sociology of IR (John Hobson, Steve Hobden, etc.). I came to the Theory of a Multipolar World, which I eventually developed myself, precisely through superimposing geopolitical dualism, Carl Schmitt's theory of the Grossraum, and John Hobson's critique of Western racism and the euro-centrism of IR.
In your opinion, what would a student need in order to become a specialist in IR?
In our interdisciplinary time, I think that what is most important is familiarity with philosophy and sociology, led by a paradigmatic method: the analysis of the types of societies, cultures, and structures of thought along the line Pre-Modernity – Modernity – Post-Modernity. If one learns to trace semantic shifts in these three epistemological and ontological domains, it will help one to become familiar with any popular theories of IR today. Barry Buzan's (Theory Talk #35) theory of international systems is an example of such a generalizing and very useful schematization. Today an IR specialist must certainly be familiar with deconstruction and use it at least in its elementary form. Otherwise, there is a great danger of overlooking what is most important.
Another very important competence is history and political science. Political science provides generalizing, simplifying material, and history puts schemas in their context. I would only put competence in the domain of economics and political economy in third place, although today no problem in IR can be considered without reference to the economic significance of processes and interactions. Finally, I would earnestly recommend to students of IR to become familiar, as a priority, with geopolitics and its methods. These methods are much simpler than theories of IR, but their significance is much deeper. At first, geopolitical simplifications produce an instantaneous effect: complex and entangled processes of world politics are rendered transparent and comprehensible in the blink of an eye. But to sort out how this effect is achieved, a long and serious study of geopolitics is required, exceeding by far the superficiality that limits critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail et. al.): they stand at the beginning of the decipherment of geopolitics and its full-fledged deconstruction, but they regard themselves as its champions. They do so prematurely.
What does it entail to think of global power relations through a spatial lens ('Myslit prostranstvom')?
This is the most important thing. The entire philosophical theme of Modernity is built on the dominance of time. Kant already puts time on the side of the subject (and space on the side of the body, continuing the ideas of Descartes and even Plato), while Husserl and Heidegger identify the subject with time altogether. Modernity thinks with time, with becoming. But since the past and future are rejected as ontological entities, thought of time is transformed into thought of the instant, of that which is here and now. This is the basis for the ephemeral understanding of being. To think spatially means to locate Being outside the present, to arrange it in space, to give space an ontological status. Whatever was impressed in space is preserved in it. Whatever will ripen in space is already contained in it. This is the basis for the political geography of Friedrich Ratzel and subsequent geopoliticians. Wagner's Parsifal ends with the words of Gurnemanz: 'now time has become space'. This is a proclamation of the triumph of geopolitics. To think spatially means to think in an entirely different way [topika]. I think that postmodernity has already partly arrived at this perspective, but has stopped at the threshold, whereas to cross the line it is necessary to break radically with the entire axiomatic of Modernity, to really step over Modernity, and not to imitate this passage while remaining in Modernity and its tempolatry. Russian people are spaces [Russkie lyudi prostranstva], which is why we have so much of it. The secret of Russian identity is concealed in space. To think spatially means to think 'Russian-ly', in Russian.
Geopolitics is argued to be very popular in Russia nowadays. Is geopolitics a new thing, from the post-Cold War period, or not? And if not, how does current geopolitical thinking differ from earlier Soviet (or even pre-soviet) geopolitics?
It is an entirely new form of political thought. I introduced geopolitics to Russia at the end of the 80s, and since then it has become extremely popular. I tried to find some traces of geopolitics in Russian history, but besides Vandam, Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, and a few short articles by Savitskii, there was nothing. In the USSR, any allusion to geopolitics was punished in the harshest way (see the 'affair of the geopoliticians' of the economic geographer Vladimir Eduardovich Den and his group). At the start of the 90s, my efforts and the efforts of my followers and associates in geopolitics (=Eurasianism) filled the worldview vacuum that formed after the end of Soviet ideology. At first, this was adopted without reserve by the military (The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia), especially under Igor Rodionov. Then, geopolitics began to penetrate into all social strata. Today, this discipline is taught in the majority of Russian universities. So, there was no Soviet or pre-Soviet geopolitics. There is only the contemporary Eurasian school, which took shape at the end of the 80s. Foundations of Geopolitics was the first programmatic text of this school, although I had published most of texts in that book earlier, and some of them were circulated as texts in government circles. Recently, in 2012, I released two new textbooks: Geopolitics and The Geopolitics of Russia, which together with The War of Continents are the results of work in this field, along four axes.
In your book International Relations, not yet published in English, you set out your Theory of a Multipolar World as a distinct IR theory. What are the basic components of the Theory of a Multipolar World—and how is it different from classical realism?
In order to be understood and not get into the details, I can say that the Theory of a Multipolar World seriously and axiomatically adopts Samuel Huntington's thesis about the plurality of civilizations. Russia has its own author, who claimed the same thing more than a hundred years ago: Nikolay Danilevsky, and then the Eurasianists. However, everything starts from precisely this point: civilization is not one, but many. Western civilization's pretension to universalism is a form of the will to domination and an authoritarian discourse. It can be taken into account but not believed. It is nothing other than a strategy of suppression and hegemony. The following point follows: we must move from thinking in terms of one civilization (the racism of euro-centric versions of IR) to a pluralism of subjects. However, unlike realists, who take as the subject of their theory nation-states, which are themselves products of the European, bourgeois, modern understanding of the Political, the Theory of a Multipolar World proposes to take civilizations as subjects. Not states, but civilizations. I call them 'large politeiai', or civilizations, corresponding to Carl Schmitt's 'large spaces'. As soon as we take these civilizations—'large politeiai'—as subjects, we can then apply to them the full system of premises of realism: anarchy in the international system, sovereignty, the rationality of egoistic behavior, etc. But within these 'politeiai', by contrast, a principle more resembling liberalism, with its pacifism and integration, operates, only with the difference that here we are not talking about a 'planetary' or 'global' world, but about an intra-civilizational one; not about global integration, but about regional integration, strictly within the context of civilizational borders. Post-positivism, in turn, helps here for the deconstruction of the authoritarian discourse of the West, which masks its private interests by 'universal values', and also for the reconstruction of civilizational identity, including with the help of technological means: civilizational elites, civilizational media, civilizational economic algorithms and corporations, etc. That is the general picture.
Your theory of multipolarity is directed against the intellectual, political, and social hegemony of the West. At the same time, while drawing on the tools of neo-Marxist analysis and critical theory, it does not oppose Western hegemony 'from the left', as those approaches do, but on the basis of traditionalism (Rene Guenon, Julius Evola), cultural anthropology, and Heideggerian phenomenology, or 'from the right'. Do you think that such an approach can appeal to Anglo-American IR practitioners, or is it designed to appeal mainly to non-Western theorists and practitioners? In short, what can IR theorists in the West learn from the theory of multipolarity?
According to Hobson's entirely correct analysis, the West is based on a fundamental sort of racism. There is no difference between Lewis Morgan's evolutionistic racism (with his model of savagery, barbarism, civilization) and Hitler's biological racism. Today the same racism is asserted without a link to race, but on the basis of the technological modes and degrees of modernization and progress of societies (as always, the criterion "like in the West" is the general measure). Western man is a complete racist down to his bones, generalizing his ethnocentrism to megalomaniacal proportions. Something tells me that he is impossible to change. Even radical critiques of Western hegemony are themselves deeply infected by the racist virus of universalism, as Edward Said showed with the example of 'orientalism', proving that the anticolonial struggle is a form of that very colonialism and euro-centrism. So the Theory of a Multipolar World will hardly find adherents in the Western world, unless perhaps among those scholars who are seriously able to carry out a deconstruction of Western identity, and such deconstruction assumes the rejection of both Right (nationalistic) and Left (universalistic and progressivist) clichés. The racism of the West always acquires diverse forms. Today its main form is liberalism, and anti-liberal theories (most on the Left) are plagued by the same universalism, while Right anti-liberalisms have been discredited. That is why I appeal not to the first political theory (liberalism), nor the second (communism, socialism), nor to the third (fascism, Nazism), but to something I call the Fourth Political Theory (or 4PT), based on a radical deconstruction of the subject of Modernity and the application of Martin Heidegger's existential analytic method.
Traditionalists are brought in for the profound critique of Western Modernity, for establishing the plurality of civilizations, and for rehabilitating non-Western (pre-modern) cultures. In Russia and Asian countries, the Theory of a Multipolar World is grasped easily and naturally; in the West, it encounters a fully understandable and fully expected hostility, an unwillingness to study it carefully, and coarse slander. But there are always exceptions.
What is the Fourth Political Theory (4PT) and how is it related to the Theory of a Multipolar World and to your criticism of the prevailing theoretical approaches in the field of IR?
I spoke a little about this in the response to the previous question. The Fourth Political Theory is important for getting away from the strict dominance of modernity in the sphere of the Political, for the relativization of the West and its re-regionalization. The West measures the entire history of Modernity in terms of the struggle of three political ideologies for supremacy (liberalism, socialism, and nationalism). But since the West does not even for a moment call into question the fact that it thinks for all humanity, it evaluates other cultures and civilizations in the same way, without considering that in the best case the parallels to these three ideologies are pure simulacra, while most often there simply are no parallels. If liberalism won the competition of the three ideologies in the West at the end of the 20th century, that does not yet mean that this ideology is really universal on a world scale. It isn't at all. This episode of the Western political history of modernity may be the fate of the West, but not the fate of the world. So other principles of the political are needed, beyond liberalism, which claims global domination (=the third totalitarianism), and its failed alternatives (communism and fascism), which are historically just as Western and modern as liberalism. This explains the necessity of introducing a Fourth Political Theory as a political frame for the correct basis of a Theory of a Multipolar World. The Fourth Political Theory is the direct and necessary correlate of the Theory of a Multipolar World in the domain of political theory.
Is IR an American social science? Is Russian IR as an academic field a reproduction of IR as an American academic field? If not, how is IR in Russia specifically Russian?
IR is a Western scientific discipline, and as such it has a prescriptive, normative vector. It not only studies the West's dominance, it also produces, secures, defends, and propagandizes it. IR is undoubtedly an imperious authoritarian discourse of Western civilization, in relation to itself and all other areas of the planet. Today the US is the core of the West, so naturally in the 20th century IR became more and more American as the US moved toward that status (it began as an English science). It is the same with geopolitics, which migrated from London to Washington and New York together with the function of a global naval Empire. As with all other sciences, IR is a form of imperious violence, embodying the will to power in the will to knowledge (as Michel Foucault explained). IR in Russia remains purely Western, with one detail: in the USSR, IR as such was not studied. Marxism in IR did not correspond to Soviet reality, where after Stalin a practical form of realism (not grounded theoretically and never acknowledged) played a big role—only external observers, like the classical realist E.H. Carr, understood the realist essence of Stalinism in IR. So IR was altogether blocked. The first textbooks started to appear only in the 90s and in the fashion of the day they were all liberal. That is how it has remained until now. The peculiarity of IR in Russia today lies in the fact that there is no longer anything Russian there; liberalism dominates entirely, a correct account of realism is lacking, and post-positivism is almost entirely disregarded. The result is a truncated, aggressively liberal and extremely antiquated version of IR as a discipline. I try to fight that. I recently released an IR textbook with balanced (I hope) proportions, but it is too early to judge the result.
Stephen Walt argued in a September article in Foreign Policy that Russia 'is nowhere near as threatening as the old Soviet Union', in part because Russia 'no longer boasts an ideology that can rally supporters worldwide'. Do you agree with Walt's assessment?
There is something to that. Today, Russia thinks of itself as a nation-state. Putin is a realist; nothing more. Walt is right about that. But the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, as well as Eurasianism, are outlines of a much broader and large-scale ideology, directed against Western hegemony and challenging liberalism, globalization, and American strategic dominance. Of course, Russia as a nation-state is no competition for the West. But as the bridgehead of the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, it changes its significance. Russian policies in the post-Soviet space and Russia's courage in forming non-Western alliances are indicators. For now, Putin is testing this conceptual potential very gingerly. But the toughening of relations with the West and most likely the internal crises of globalization will at some point force a more careful and serious turn toward the creation of global alternative alliances. Nevertheless, we already observe such unions: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the Eurasian Union—and they require a new ideology. Not one like Marxism, any universalism is excluded, but also not simple realist maneuvers of regional hegemons. Liberalism is a global challenge. The response to it should also be global. Does Putin understand this? Honestly, I don't know. Sometimes it seems he does, and sometimes it seems he doesn't.
Vladimir Putin recently characterized the contemporary world order as follows: 'We have entered a period of differing interpretations and deliberate silences in world politics. International law has been forced to retreat over and over by the onslaught of legal nihilism. Objectivity and justice have been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Arbitrary interpretations and biased assessments have replaced legal norms. At the same time, total control of the global mass media has made it possible when desired to portray white as black and black as white'. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what is required as a response to this international situation?
These are true, but rather naïve words. Putin is just indignant that the West establishes rules in its own interests, changes them when necessary, and interprets allegedly 'universal norms' in its own favor. But the issue is that this is the structure of the will to power and the very organization of logo-phallo-phono-centric discourse. Objectivity and justice are not possible so long as speech is a monologue. The West does not know and does not recognize the other. But this means that everything will continue until this other wins back the right to recognition. And that is a long road. The point of the Theory of a Multipolar World is that there are no rules established by some one player. Rules must be established by centers of real power. The state today is too small for that; hence the conclusion that civilizations should be these centers. Let there be an Atlantic objectivity and Western justice. A Eurasian objectivity and Russian justice will counter them. And the Chinese world or Pax Sinica [world/peace: same word in Russian] will look different than the Islamic one. Black and white are not objective evaluations. They depend on the structure of the world order: what is black and what is white is determined by one who has enough power to determine it.
How does your approach help us understand Russia's actions on the world stage better than other IR approaches do? What are IR analyses of Russia missing that do not operate with the conceptual apparatus of multipolarity?
Interesting question. Russia's behavior internationally is determined today by the following factors:
First, historical inertia, accumulating the power of precedents (the Theory of a Multipolar World thinks that the past exists as a structure; consequently, this factor is taken into account from many sides and in detail, while the 'tempocentrism' (Steve Hobden, John Hobson) of classical IR theories drops this from sight. We have to pay attention to this especially taking into consideration the fact that Russia is in many ways still a traditional society and belongs to the 'imperial system' of IR.) There are, besides, Soviet inertia and stable motives ('Stalinism in IR');
Second, the projective logic of opposition to the West, stemming from the most practical, pragmatic, and realist motivations (in the spirit of Caesarism, analyzed by neo-Gramscians) will necessarily lead Russia (even despite the will of its leaders) to a systemic confrontation with American hegemony and globalization, and then the Theory of a Multipolar World will really be needed (classical IR models, paying no attention to the Theory of a Multipolar World, drop from sight the possible future; i.e., they rob themselves of predictive potential because of purely ideological prejudices and self-imposed fears).
But if an opponent underestimates you, you have more chances to land an unexpected blow. So I am not too disturbed by the underestimation of the Theory of a Multipolar World among IR theorists.
In the western world, the divide between academia and policy is often either lamented ('ivory tower') or, in light of the ideal of academic independence, deemed absent. This concerns a broader debate regarding the relations between power, knowledge and geopolitics. How are academic-policy relations in Russia with regards to IR and is this the ideal picture according to you?
I think that in our case both positions have been taken to their extreme. On one hand, today's authorities in Russia do not pay the slightest attention to scholars, dispatching them to an airless and sterile space. On the other hand, Soviet habits became the basis for servility and conformism, preserved in a situation when the authorities for the first time demand nothing from intellectuals, except for one thing: that they not meddle in socio-political processes. So the situation with science is both comical and sorrowful. Conformist scholars follow the authorities, but the authorities don't need this, since they do not so much go anywhere in particular as react to facts that carry themselves out.
If your IR theory isn't based on politically and philosophically liberal principles, and if it criticizes those principles not from the left but from the right, using the language of large spaces or Grossraum, is it a fascist theory of international relations? Are scholars who characterize your thought as 'neo-fascism', like Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovstov, partially correct? If not, why is that characterization misleading?
Accusations of fascism are simply a figure of speech in the coarse political propaganda peculiar to contemporary liberalism as the third totalitarianism. Karl Popper laid the basis for this in his book The Open Society and its Enemies, where he reduced the critique of liberalism from the right to fascism, Hitler, and Auschwitz, and the criticism of liberalism from the left to Stalin and the GULAG. The reality is somewhat more complex, but George Soros, who finances Umland and Shekhovstov and is an ardent follower of Popper, is content with reduced versions of politics. If I were a fascist, I would say so. But I am a representative of Eurasianism and the author of the Fourth Political Theory. At the same time, I am a consistent and radical anti-racist and opponent of the nation-state project (i.e. an anti-nationalist). Eurasianism has no relation to fascism. And the Fourth Political Theory emphasizes that while it is anti-liberal, it is simultaneously anti-communist and anti-fascist. I think it isn't possible to be clearer, but the propaganda army of the 'third totalitarianism' disagrees and no arguments will convince it. 1984 should be sought today not where many think: not in the USSR, not in the Third Reich, but in the Soros Fund and the 'Brave New World'. Incidentally, Huxley proved to be more correct than Orwell. I cannot forbid others from calling me a fascist, although I am not one, though ultimately this reflects badly not so much on me as on the accusers themselves: fighting an imaginary threat, the accuser misses a real one. The more stupid, mendacious, and straightforward a liberal is, the simpler it is to fight with him.
Does technological change in warfare and in civil government challenge the geopolitical premises of classical divisions between spaces (Mackinder's view or Spykman's) heartland-rimland-offshore continents)? And, more broadly perhaps, does history have a linear or a cyclical pattern, according to you?
Technological development does not at all abolish the principles of classical geopolitics, simply because Land and Sea are not substances, but concepts. Land is a centripetal model of order, with a clearly expressed and constant axis. Sea is a field, without a hard center, of processuality, atomism, and the possibility of numerous bifurcations. In a certain sense, air (and hence also aviation) is aeronautics. And even the word astronaut contains in itself the root 'nautos', from the Greek word for ship. Water, air, outer space—these are all versions of increasingly diffused Sea. Land in this situation remains unchanged. Sea strategy is diversified; land strategy remains on the whole constant. It is possible that this is the reason for the victory of Land over Sea in the last decade; after all, capitalism and technical progress are typical attributes of Sea. But taking into consideration the fundamental character of the balance between Leviathan and Behemoth, the proportions can switch at any moment; the soaring Titan can be thrown down into the abyss, like Atlantis, while the reason for the victory of thalassocracy becomes the source of its downfall. Land remains unchanged as the geographic axis of history. There is Land and Sea even on the internet and in the virtual world: they are axes and algorithms of thematization, association and separation, groupings of resources and protocols. The Chinese internet is terrestrial; the Western one, nautical.
You have translated a great number of foreign philosophical and geopolitical works into Russian. How important is knowledge transaction for the formation of your ideas?
I recently completed the first release of my book Noomachy, which is entirely devoted precisely to the Logoi of various civilizations, and hence to the circulation of ideas. I am convinced that each civilization has its own particular Logos. To grasp it and to find parallels, analogies, and dissonances in one's own Logos is utterly fascinating and interesting. That is why I am sincerely interested in the most varied cultures, from North American to Australian, Arabic to Latin American, Polynesian to Scandinavian. All the Logoi are different and it is not possible to establish a hierarchy among them. So it remains for us only to become familiar with them. Henry Corbin, the French philosopher and Protestant who studied Iranian Shiism his entire life, said of himself 'We are Shiites'. He wasn't a Shiite in the religious sense, but without feeling himself a Shiite, he would not be able to penetrate into the depths of the Iranian Logos. That is how I felt, working on Noomachy or translating philosophical texts or poetry from other languages: in particular, while learning Pierce and James, Emerson and Thoreau, Poe and Pound I experienced myself as 'we are Americans'. And in the volume devoted to China and Japan, as 'we are Buddhists'. That is the greatest wealth of the Logos of various cultures: both those like ours and those entirely unlike ours. And these Logoi are at war; hence, Noomachy, the war of the intellect. It is not linear and not primitive. It is a great war. It creates that which we call the 'human', the entire depth and complexity of which we most often underestimate.
Final question. You call yourself the 'last philosopher of empire'. What is Eurasanism and how does it relate to the global pivot of power distributions?
Eurasianism is a developed worldview, to which I dedicated a few books and a countless number of articles and interviews. In principle, it lies at the basis of the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, combined with geopolitics, and it resonates with Traditionalism. Eurasianism's main thought is plural anthropology, the rejection of universalism. The meaning of Empire for me is that there exists not one Empire, but at minimum two, and even more. In the same way, civilization is never singular; there is always some other civilization that determines its borders. Schmitt called this the Pluriverse and considered it the main characteristic of the Political. The Eurasian Empire is the political and strategic unification of Turan, a geographic axis of history in opposition to the civilization of the Sea or the Atlanticist Empire. Today, the USA is this Atlanticist Empire. Kenneth Waltz, in the context of neorealism in IR, conceptualized the balance of two poles. The analysis is very accurate, although he erred about the stability of a bipolar world and the duration of the USSR. But on the whole he is right: there is a global balance of Empires in the world, not nation-States, the majority of which cannot claim sovereignty, which remains nominal (Stephen Krasner's (Theory Talk #21) 'global hypocrisy'). For precisely that reason, I am a philosopher of Empire, as is almost every American intellectual, whether he knows it or not. The difference is only that he thinks of himself as a philosopher of the only Empire, while I think of myself as the philosopher of one of the Empires, the Eurasian one. I am more humble and more democratic. That is the whole difference.
Alexander Dugin is a Russian philosopher, the author of over thirty books on topics including the sociology of the imagination, structural sociology, ethnosociology, geopolitical theory, international relations theory, and political theory, including four books on the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. His most recent books, only available in Russian at the moment, are Ukraine: My War and the multi-volume Noomachia: Wars of the Intellect. Books translated into English include The Fourth Political Theory, Putin vs. Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed From the Right, and Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning.
Related links
Who is Alexander Dugin? Interview with Theory Talks editor Michael Millerman (YouTube) TheFourth Political Theory website (English): Evrazia.tv (Russian) Evrazia.tv (English) Geopolitics.ru (English version) InternationalEurasian Movement (English version) Centerfor Conservative Studies (Russian)
Interview with Irene Beaudoin of Leominster, Massachusetts. Her husband Bill was also present. Topics include: Irene's father came to Leominster, MA from New Brunswick, Canada in 1894, when he was sixteen years old. Her mother's family was from Canada, but her mother was born in West Boylston, MA. Her father's work history, how he eventually ended up in the insurance business. Her parents met and were married in Leominster, MA. Her parents' involvement with Saint Cecelia's parish in Leominster, MA. Where Irene and Bill went to school as children. Rumors surrounding a fire that burnt the original parish school. Irene went on to Leominster High school, Becker College, beauty school in Worcester, and then worked as a hairdresser until she was married. Her father's work in real estate and as the director of the Leominster Home Federal Bank. Her father's work on the Selective Service Board. Organizations her father belonged to and his work to help Franco-Americans become citizens. Bill and ; 1 SPEAKER 1: Where, where were you born, Irene? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Right here in Leominster. SPEAKER 1: Right here in Leominster? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. SPEAKER 1: And your maiden name? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Uh, Lejier. SPEAKER 1: Lejier. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. SPEAKER 1: Um, your parents, where did they come from? IRENE BEAUDOIN: My father came from New Brunswick, and my mother was born right here in the United States in West Boylston. SPEAKER 1: Uh, about when did your father come to the United States? IRENE BEAUDOIN: In 1894. SPEAKER 1: How old was he then? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Sixteen. SPEAKER 1: Why did he come here? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, I guess he just heard so much about the U.S. he decided he, you know, wanted to come out here and he had 50 cents in his pocket when he came out. SPEAKER 1: And when you say 'when he came out' where is that? Uh, did he arrive here Worcester or Leominster or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, he came to Leominster and from what I can remember he was waiting for a train to take him to Rhode Island, [unintelligible - 0:00:55] Rhode Island, but evidently he didn't like and came back to Leominster and found work. And then a short while after he was here, he found work at the woodshop in – back on [unintelligible - 0:01:12]. I can't remember. BILL BEAUDOIN: Bartlett. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Bartlett. And he finally became superintendent of the manufacturing company but had to leave because he was getting 2 wood sawdust in the lung and the doctor told him either he had to leave or he would die within a year, which he did leave. SPEAKER 1: So, what did he do after that? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well he had to take a year's absence [unintelligible - 0:01:46] and went back to his home in New Brunswick and stayed there for six months until he felt better and came back here. And then he started a grocery business, and then from that, he went into the insurance company. SPEAKER 1: Where was his grocery business? IRENE BEAUDOIN: On 6th Street going down the hill. SPEAKER 1: On 6th Street? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mechanic. BILL BEAUDOIN: [Unintelligible - 0:02:13]. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, [unintelligible - 0:02:16]. SPEAKER 1: Oh is that right? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. Oh, they had a store there. How long was he in business there? IRENE BEAUDOIN: That I don't know. I couldn't tell you how long he was in the grocery. I really have no idea. He was in a few years, but how long, I don't know. SPEAKER 1: Right. About when was that, what year approximately? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Perhaps '96,'97. SPEAKER 1: I see. So, your father was a very [unintelligible - 0:02:50] businessman in the French community. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. You see for a while he worked for a Mr. [Wingman] who owned a grocery store, and from there, this is how he got started in the grocery business. SPEAKER 1: So, did he cater mostly to the Franco-Americans? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh yes. He – I remember him telling me. So, he used to deliver, you know, the [unintelligible - 0:03:17] and he used to do this at 3 night many times and he used to carry these heavy bags of flour and sugar. SPEAKER 1: The location is right on the edge of what's called French Hill and then when you get down below there are many Italians. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Do you know if… IRENE BEAUDOIN: There were Italians at the time, yes. SPEAKER 1: There were Italians there at the time. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes. SPEAKER 1: And do you know if they bought from the store also? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, yes. There were, you know, neighbors around that area that would come to the store to buy that were Italian. SPEAKER 1: In that case, did he have a language difficulty or did he have enough knowledge of English to carry him through or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: I think my mother helped him a lot in that area because I do believe he spoke French. I don't believe he knew too much English at the time but… SPEAKER 1: Well, you mentioned that your mother spoke English then. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Where did she learn the English? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, she had to go to public school. There were no parochial schools where she came from. SPEAKER 1: Was your mother born in the United States? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, she was born in West Boylston. SPEAKER 1: She was born in West Boylston, and what was her name? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Gonville. SPEAKER 1: Gonville. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: Was that related to the Gonvilles that lived on 7th Street when they were here? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Sure.4 SPEAKER 1: Oh, it was. IRENE BEAUDOIN: The father was my mother's brother. SPEAKER 2: [Unintelligible - 0:04:55]. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Of course. They lived right near you. SPEAKER 1: Yes, now I remember. I remember my folks mentioning it, yeah. Well, you mentioned they were born here? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Now who are you talking about, my mother? SPEAKER 1: Your mother, I'm sorry, your mother. IRENE BEAUDOIN: In West Boylston. SPEAKER 1: In West Boylston, I see. So, what brought her here? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Because they took the town over to make a reservoir and that's the reason why she came up here. SPEAKER 1: I see. Well, have your grandparents on your mother's side lived in the United States for a while? Did they come from Canada? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, they've been here for a long time, yes. SPEAKER 1: They had been here for a while? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: I see. You don't recall anyone mentioning when… IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, no. Evidently they've been here for a long time because my grandfather owned the grocery store and the fish market in West Boylston. SPEAKER 1: In the area as a reservoir? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes, yeah. SPEAKER 1: I see. IRENE BEAUDOIN: In fact, it was their home, and the store evidently was very close to the church that still remains there but just collapsed. SPEAKER 1: Oh, is that right? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: Oh, I see. So, your mother went to the public schools of West Boylston, picked up her English, and somewhere she met your father. Was that Leominster or in West Boylston?5 IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, when she came out here to look for work after the –you know, preparing to make the reservoir. SPEAKER 1: Oh I see. She came here to look for work. And where did she go for work? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Clewett's. SPEAKER 1: At Clewett. IRENE BEAUDOIN: And then she did work in a dry goods store downtown. SPEAKER 1: Do you recall the dry goods store? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, but it would be in the vicinity of the Metropolitan Theater, in that area. SPEAKER 1: Do you ever recall your mother talking about wages and working conditions at Clewett's at the time? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, I remember them saying how, you know, the wages were like perhaps $7 a week is what they earned. SPEAKER 1: Did they consider that good or was she satisfied or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, evidently that was about what everyone earned in shops at that time. SPEAKER 1: Do you remember if your mother ever mentioned the people that worked at Clewett's, whether or not they were Franco-Americans largely or a great number of them or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, there were several French people working there, but I think the majority were American and Irish, I think, more than French. SPEAKER 1: I see. And that would be approximately what year or what time? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Probably around, you know, 18… SPEAKER 1: '96? IRENE BEAUDOIN: '96, '97, '98, around. SPEAKER 1: Right around there. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, around that, yeah. SPEAKER 1: All right. So then your parents met in Leominster. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm, and were married here in Leominster.6 SPEAKER 1: And were married here in Leominster. Where were they married? IRENE BEAUDOIN: At Saint Cecilia's. SPEAKER 1: At Saint Cecilia's. So by the time they met, the Saint Cecilia's had been established as a parish? IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right. It was a very small church but it was already established, but they helped the parish grow. I believe they were married by Father Balthasard. SPEAKER 1: -Which was the first pastor. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. Yeah, they were married by Farther Balthasard. SPEAKER 1: Your parents were married, your mother worked at Clewett's, and your father had his grocery store. Now, you say he remained in business three or four years, what did you say? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, possibly longer because he started in the insurance business in 1919. SPEAKER 1: Oh I see, so from just prior to 1900 until 1919, he was in the grocery business. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Right. SPEAKER 1: Where did he start his insurance business and how? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He started from this own home. SPEAKER 1: Up on 6th Street? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, on Mechanic Street. SPEAKER 1: On Mechanic at this point. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm, and from there he had his office across the street from the church. I believe there's a hairdressing parlor there. [Unintelligible - 0:09:50] was on one side and my father's office was on the opposite side. I don't know who's in there now, but then he moved from there to the present location, which is at the corner of Walker and Mechanic. SPEAKER 1: I see. What kind of businesses? You mentioned insurance business. What did he do, sell insurance or…?7 IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. He started with life insurance and then into all types of insurance: general insurance, car, fire insurance and automobile insurance. SPEAKER 1: So, he became an agent for various insurances. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Right. SPEAKER 1: How long was he in that insurance business? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, when he left, it was 50 years. He retired two years after they saw the 50th anniversary. SPEAKER 1: He left the business. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: He sold that business. IRENE BEAUDOIN: He sold it, right. SPEAKER 1: When he first started, did he make it a habit or did he try to cater specifically to Franco-Americans or did he…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes, he did. SPEAKER 1: He did. IRENE BEAUDOIN: He did but he had all types, all nationalities that came to the office for insurance. He was liked, very well-liked by all, yeah, and he helped a lot of people. Grandma said that he did help a lot of people, but no one else knew about it. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. Was he associated in any way with a Mr. Gordon who was also in the insurance business? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No. He was always alone in business. No one that I – I know he worked in the insurance [unintelligible - 0:11:52]. SPEAKER 1: So, he was a very early parishioner at Saint Cecilia's, one of the founders of the parish. I presume that he became an active member of the parish? IRENE BEAUDOIN: They both were very active, raising funds to someday build the church that we now have. SPEAKER 1: Were they involved in preparing for the original school? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, yes, they worked very hard for that.8 SPEAKER 1: Did you go to that school? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes, I sure did. I graduated from there. BILL BEAUDOIN: We were going to school there when the fire… IRENE BEAUDOIN: The fire broke out. BILL BEAUDOIN: When the school burned down and we went to class in various houses around. IRENE BEAUDOIN: I went in [Lamont's]. BILL BEAUDOIN: I went to [Holme's] house which was where the school yard is now. SPEAKER 1: Oh yeah. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. BILL BEAUDOIN: There was an old house there. That's where I went to school. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, and I went in Lamont's Hall which is… SPEAKER 1: It's across the street. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. BILL BEAUDOIN: It was in the old town square. That's where I went to school. She went to… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, something's now. SPEAKER 1: There was approximately a thousand students in the school at the time. Where did they all go? IRENE BEAUDOIN: In homes. BILL BEAUDOIN: All over third… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Third and fourth. Different people offered their homes and converted a room or two into classrooms. And then there were several classes in Lamont's Hall. They divided that up into, you know, several classes. I don't remember how many. BILL BEAUDOIN: Then we got the old church, the old church, the old white church which is where the [back lot], where the present school is – or the present church. SPEAKER 1: When they built the school, the first brick school, did they have the church in there?9 IRENE BEAUDOIN: No. They still had the… SPEAKER 1: They still had the white… IRENE BEAUDOIN: White church across the street. And they had a school house there, next to the church. BILL BEAUDOIN: They had the eighth and ninth grades there. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Right, right. SPEAKER 1: Yes, I think I remember the same pictures – IRENE BEAUDOIN: I remember it, but we didn't go to school there ourselves; in fact, my cousin, Sister [Elinya] who was a convent girl taught there. And I remember, you know, having to go there with my mother to visit her, but I never attended school in that building. SPEAKER 1: Where is your cousin now, the nun? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, she passed away quite a few years ago. SPEAKER 1: Quite a few years ago. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: All right. Now, the first time I asked this question, I've heard stories told about the fire at the school. Does anyone know to this day what actually happened, how the fire got started? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, I've always heard it had been set, but whether that was so or not, I don't know. SPEAKER 1: Wasn't there rumors that the Ku Klux Klan was involved or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: I heard that, I don't know. BILL BEAUDOIN: The Ku Klux Klan was very active in those days, because I remember, you know, we would see from where I lived, we always see the crosses burning on Prospect Hill. SPEAKER 1: And where was that where you lived? BILL BEAUDOIN: On 6th Street, right where the fire was. We could see right across Whitney Field and up into Prospect Hill, and one of the police officers saw it. He was an officer in the police department, Mr. [Karl] lived next door to us. We would always see him go into 10 the room, and if the crosses were burning they would be out chasing these guys around. I'll never forget that. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, it must have been around town, you know, around the hill, because I remember my folks talking. I wasn't supposed to be hearing this, I guess, but I would overhear different things. And I'm sure they used to go up Mechanic Street. BILL BEAUDOIN: They attacked his home one time on Sixth Street, Mr. Karl. They tried to burn that. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Of course, I remember them talking about the white sheets that they put over their clothing and, you know, crosses. SPEAKER 1: So they actually did this in Leominster? BILL BEAUDOIN: Oh, yes, we testified – IRENE BEAUDOIN: I was petrified of them that whenever they spoke of them, I was very petrified. SPEAKER 1: But it was never – the fire was never actually shown to… IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, it was never proven that it was set by anyone. That was a rumor, I suppose. SPEAKER 1: I always heard another rumor that one of the local parishioners had done it, someone's family had trouble with. I don't remember. IRENE BEAUDOIN: I never heard that one. SPEAKER 1: I heard that one a few times. BILL BEAUDOIN: I don't remember how it happened. I just remember very vividly the day it happened and [unintelligible - 0:16:58] was running over, wanting to see the fire. SPEAKER 1: Oh, it was a terrible night. It was all ice. And, of course, living not too far away from the convent, we really could see it well because my father went, but my mother and I naturally didn't go because it was such a bad night out. But, it really hit, you know, the parishioners because they really had worked to have the 11 school and then to have somebody let that happen, it meant starting all over again. SPEAKER 1: Who was the pastor at the time? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh Father [Shiquin]. SPEAKER 1: Father Shiquin. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes. SPEAKER 1: How many years was Father Shiquin in Leominster? Was it forty? SPEAKER 1: I don't know. I know he celebrated his 50th anniversary as a priest here but… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, he came from Worcester here, which would have been – what, Bill? BILL BEAUDOIN: Oh, when Father came here, he'd been … IRENE BEAUDOIN: It was 1919? BILL BEAUDOIN: Yeah. He's been here, I think, five or six years then. SPEAKER 1: And so then the parishioners had to begin all over again? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. They used to have fairs and minstrels. SPEAKER 1: Minstrels? IRENE BEAUDOIN: They had one or two a year. And then recitals from the different students that took piano. In the music department, they used to have recitals and I guess they sold tickets for that because we used to hold it at the Realtor. I know I used to perform as a piano student, and then, of course, the minstrels was a variety affair. I remember as a little kid, I perhaps was seven or eight years old, dancing on the stage for different little skits they had. SPEAKER 1: Do you recall if the parish received any outside help to rebuild the school or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, I don't know about that, but I'm – perhaps from the Diocese of Worcester or… BILL BEAUDOIN: No. The only thing I ever heard about it as I recall is a gift from Mr. [Doyle].12 IRENE BEAUDOIN: Because we were in the Boston diocese at the time, weren't we? BILL BEAUDOIN: Springfield. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Springfield, that's right. Whether they got help from the bishop at the time, I don't know. SPEAKER 1: All right. So, you, Irene, graduated from Saint Cecilia's, and from there, where did you go? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Leominster High. SPEAKER 1: You went to Leominster High. And did you graduate from Leominster High also? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: What did you do after graduation? IRENE BEAUDOIN: I went to Becker College and then I went into hairdressing. SPEAKER 1: You went to Becker's and then you went to hairdressing. What did you take up in Becker's, what course? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Business course. SPEAKER 1: Business – one or two years? IRENE BEAUDOIN: One year. SPEAKER 1: One year, and then off to hairdressing. That's a switch, isn't it? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. BILL BEAUDOIN: She went to hairdressing school in Worcester. IRENE BEAUDOIN: I went to hairdressing school in Worcester also, yeah. SPEAKER 1: Was that at girls' trade? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, no, no. It was beauty school. SPEAKER 1: And did you go into business for yourself or did you work for someone? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No. I worked as a beautician in two different beauty shops, and then I got married and that was the end of my working days. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] These beauty shops were they located on French Hill or were they in town? IRENE BEAUDOIN: I worked for Olivia who was on Washington Street. SPEAKER 1: On Washington.13 IRENE BEAUDOIN: She has passed away, and I also worked in Fitchburg and she has passed away also. SPEAKER 1: So that… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, I worked at [Selligs] also. I must say that. I worked at [Selligs] as a biller. SPEAKER 1: Is this right after Becker's then? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, after hairdressing. I went back to the business world. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] So Sellig's must have been new at the time. IRENE BEAUDOIN: They had just come in. BILL BEAUDOIN: Her father was instrumental at bringing Sellig's] here. In fact, he did bring Sellig's here. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Oh, is that right? BILL BEAUDOIN: Her father had that building. SPEAKER 1: Which building is that, the one on Green Street? IRENE BEAUDOIN: On Green Street, right. SPEAKER 1: And when you say your father had that… BILL BEAUDOIN: Well, he was a realtor. SPEAKER 1: Oh. As time went by with his insurance business, he had realty as part of the business. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, he had realty, right. He went into realty and… SPEAKER 1: And he had the place on Green Street. Do you recall how he managed to get Sellig's in here, where they came from or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: There's a lot of concessions [unintelligible - 0:22:38]. SPEAKER 1: Well, it was through – he was also, you see, director of the bank. SPEAKER 1: Which bank was that? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, it's Monument Federal now. It was Leominster Home Federal at the time. SPEAKER 1: Oh, I see. BILL BEAUDOIN: Leominster Home loan. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Home loan.14 SPEAKER 1: Home Loan, which is now Monument, I see, and he was a…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Director. He was a director since, I believe, 1919 or 1920. Right after he got into the insurance business, I think he became a director. He was for many, many years. SPEAKER 1: I see. And it's through that, his position as director and in the real estate business that he was able to bring Sellig's into Leominster. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right, that's right. SPEAKER 1: Where were they from? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Gardner. SPEAKER 1: Oh they were in Gardner. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: That was their home base then? IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right. And he formed a committee with different businessmen in Leominster, and Mr. Buckley was one of the other gentlemen that [unintelligible - 0:23:55]. SPEAKER 1: Which Mr. Buckley? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Cornelius. SPEAKER 1: Cornelius? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: The father of the present Cornelius Buckley? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Right, right. SPEAKER 1: I see. IRENE BEAUDOIN: And the two of them, I remember, worked very hard to get this like concern into Leominster. SPEAKER 1: Now who owned the building at the time, do you recall? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, I don't know… BILL BEAUDOIN: There was a trust [unintelligible - 0:24:21] formed and it was purchased by the group. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, right. BILL BEAUDOIN: Anybody could be a shareholder if they wanted to.15 SPEAKER 1: This was in what years, in what year did this occur, the Depression years? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, no. It was 1937. I would say '38, '37, '38. SPEAKER 1: So, we're still a little in the Depression. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, just about at the end of it, yeah. SPEAKER 1: This was a rather brave attempt then… IRENE BEAUDOIN: And it helped; it did help, yeah. SPEAKER 1: I gather then they must have had to deal with the city officials at the time? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, yes. That's right. SPEAKER 1: The city officials were receptive of bringing them in, I take it? BILL BEAUDOIN: Yes. IRENE BEAUDOIN: It was – Pete Lapierre, I think, was mayor at the time, wasn't he? I think he was. SPEAKER 1: Mayor Lapierre. How did the Depression affect your father's business, or did it affect it at all? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, it did affect it, as far as people being able to pay for the insurance. It was quite head-on at the time, but he managed to hold on to all his customers by paying a lot of premiums himself. And he also was appointed to appraise property at that time, which was a big help. SPEAKER 1: Did he ever hold any position in city government? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. During World War II, he was appointed to be on the Selective Board and was chairman… SPEAKER 1: Selective Service Board? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Service Board, yeah. He was chairman of that board for a number of years. SPEAKER 1: Do you recall any other people that were on the board at the time? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes. Mr. Harris was one of them. BILL BEAUDOIN: Paul Holman.16 IRENE BEAUDOIN: Paul Holman. BILL BEAUDOIN: Are we talking about the carriage company that Paul Holman owned – was one of the owners of… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Of the Whitney Carriage. BILL BEAUDOIN: Mr. [Hart]. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh Mr. Hart, right. BILL BEAUDOIN: Who was the president of [unintelligible - 0:27:04]. Those were the Selective Service Board. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Now another thing, I don't know if I mentioned this, though, where my father was on the board of directors for a bank. SPEAKER 1: Yes, you did. IRENE BEAUDOIN: I mentioned this before, didn't I? He did a lot of appraisals for the bank also on property. SPEAKER 1: Apparently your father was the only Franco-American on the Selective Service Board for quite some time. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right, that's right. Then later on in years, of course, Mr. [Golden] was on the board also. SPEAKER 1: Henry Golden later on joined the… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes, Henry Golden was on. SPEAKER 1: Did your father ever work for the state of Massachusetts? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, just – no, I don't really think he ever had been. No, no, he didn't. SPEAKER 1: When he was an appraiser, was he an appraiser for the banks or was he an appraiser for the city of… IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, that was for the state. That was for the state. SPEAKER 1: For the state, I see. IRENE BEAUDOIN: He was appointed by the governor. SPEAKER 1: He was appointed. Who was the governor then? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Dever, Governor Dever. SPEAKER 1: I see. Now, as far as the city is concerned, besides the Selective Service, did he ever serve on any other, any commissions? Or 17 did he ever run for – was he ever elected to office or anything of that kind? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, no. SPEAKER 1: Was he interested in politics or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, he enjoyed politics but he never really cared to run for an office. SPEAKER 1: Did he ever work to help Franco-Americans become citizens? Was he ever involved in that? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He certainly was. In fact, he sponsored many people that came from Canada here. SPEAKER 1: In that sense, did he belong to – was it Club [Nordier]? It seems to me that they were active, politically active in the city. BILL BEAUDOIN: [Unintelligible - 0:29:33]. SPEAKER 1: He belonged to [unintelligible - 0:29:36]? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, yeah, he belonged to that. SPEAKER 1: And was he ever a member of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, yeah, yes. SPEAKER 1: Any other organizations that you remember that he might have been in? BILL BEAUDOIN: [Unintelligible - 0:29:47]. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, [Jasons], the Elks. BILL BEAUDOIN: [Unintelligible - 0:29:53]. SPEAKER 1: In that case, Irene, your father must have become acquainted with Bill's father? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Oh, he knew Bill's dad and mother for – well ever since his father and mother came here from Worcester. SPEAKER 1: Was that through your… IRENE BEAUDOIN: They were friends for many, many years. SPEAKER 1: I see. Do you think that – how many children did you and Bill have? IRENE BEAUDOIN: We have three boys.18 SPEAKER 1: You have three boys. And were they all educated locally or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, they all went to high school here. BILL BEAUDOIN: Saint Cecilia's. IRENE BEAUDOIN: They went to Saint Cecilia's first naturally, and then two of them went to Notre Dame and one went to Leominster High. SPEAKER 1: And what are they doing now? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, the oldest boy is in Connecticut and he's a doctor. The second boy is in Connecticut and is working with addicts. He… SPEAKER 1: Drug addicts? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He took up psychology. BILL BEAUDOIN: He's an assistant to a psychologist there, a doctor. IRENE BEAUDOIN: And works with drug addicts. SPEAKER 1: Is he working out of the university or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, right in a hospital. SPEAKER 1: In a hospital, I see. IRENE BEAUDOIN: And the youngest is in business with his father. SPEAKER 1: Oh I see. That's the solder business? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Right. SPEAKER 1: You said, when I asked you where they went to school, you said Saint Cecilia's naturally. Why did you say 'naturally'? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Because that's the school we went to as youngsters and it seems to be the school that you sent your children to. SPEAKER 1: So, they teach as much French when your children went through as when you went through. IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, no. SPEAKER 1: How much French did they teach when your children went through? IRENE BEAUDOIN: I believe they only had like 15 minutes or a half hour and, it's all they have; very, very little French. SPEAKER 1: And those were lessons in the language then?19 IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right, that's right. And you could – they could choose catechism, either having a French catechism or an English catechism. SPEAKER 1: I see. And what year did they go through? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Let's see. It would be 1954. BILL BEAUDOIN: What – at Saint Cecilia's? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He went in '54. BILL BEAUDOIN: I don't remember the date that well. SPEAKER 1: They were in school at Saint Cecilia's in the 50s then, the three of them. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yes. SPEAKER 1: So that by the 1950s… IRENE BEAUDOIN: Not the three of them. SPEAKER 1: So, that by the mid-50s and into the 60s, the French had just about disappeared from the school except for… IRENE BEAUDOIN: I would say so, yes. SPEAKER 1: Except for that 20 minutes a day of lessons in language. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Exactly. SPEAKER 1: Quite a change from the time that you were there. IRENE BEAUDOIN: We were there, right, because our afternoon was complete French from catechism to Bible to your French language and so on, which took all your afternoon in French. SPEAKER 1: So, coming back to your father now, it seemed to me from having asked you a number of questions that from relatively early in his insurance and real estate business, he was run outside of the French community quite early. Would that be correct? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Mm-hmm. SPEAKER 1: In other words, he did a lot of business with many other people in the community, other than French Canadians from almost the beginning?20 IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right, that's right, but the majority of his business was done with the French Canadian but he had many other people, you know, different nationalities: Italian, American, Irish… SPEAKER 1: Yeah. What kind of an education did your father receive? He went to… IRENE BEAUDOIN: He had no education whatsoever. He was a self-made man really. SPEAKER 1: He didn't get through the eighth grade or anything like that? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No, no. He had to go work on the farm. I… SPEAKER 1: While in Canada, he worked on the farm? IRENE BEAUDOIN: While in Canada, they lived on a farm and he worked on the farm, and if I remember correctly now… BILL BEAUDOIN: He worked in a coal mine. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, he worked in a coal mine also. SPEAKER 1: In New Brunswick? IRENE BEAUDOIN: New Brunswick. Springhill, was it? BILL BEAUDOIN: Springhill, the one they had all the very serious collapses there [unintelligible - 0:35:13]. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, yeah, Springhill mine, in New Brunswick. BILL BEAUDOIN: Yeah. And this happened – oh, God, I remember there was that shack and, you know, he can remember the track to the shack. He remembered that shack because he worked there. SPEAKER 1: And he came to the United States at 16; then he was rather young when he was working in the mine. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right, because in those days you went to work at any age. BILL BEAUDOIN: If you could do any kind of work in the pit. IRENE BEAUDOIN: If you could carry a shovel and a pick. But I think he went as far as the fourth grade and I don't believe he went any further than that. BILL BEAUDOIN: And that was in New Brunswick.21 IRENE BEAUDOIN: In New Brunswick. And, of course, they lived so many miles away from a school or a church. It was very… SPEAKER 1: Then when he came to the United States, his intention was to go to Rhode Island, was that it? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: And this was for work. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Where did they plan on working when he went to Rhode Island and do you recall…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: They had nothing in mind. They were just looking for work. SPEAKER 1: Do you recall where they went in Rhode Island? Was it Woonsocket or…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Woonsocket. SPEAKER 1: It was Woonsocket. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, Woonsocket, Rhode Island. SPEAKER 1: And he came back here to Leominster. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Why did he stop in Leominster? This puzzles me. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, evidently they had to change trains or something. I don't know just what it was, but he was downtown. I remember him saying he was down town, waiting for another train, and all he had was 50 cents in his pockets. SPEAKER 1: Did he meet relatives when he went to Rhode Island? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He had no relatives out here whatsoever. He came on Canada with another friend of his, and they were both 16. SPEAKER 1: And both of them had intentions of going to work in Rhode Island? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. SPEAKER 1: Did his friend stay in Rhode Island? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah. The friend stayed in Rhode Island; he came back here alone.22 SPEAKER 1: And now your great grandparents on your – well, your grandparents on your father's side remained in Canada? IRENE BEAUDOIN: His mother came. His father died, then he went back to get his mother and his sister and they lived in Fitchburg in Cleghorn. He found them an apartment in Cleghorn. Why Cleghorn, I don't know now. I couldn't tell you why they lived there. Why not Leominster, I don't know. SPEAKER 1: There were many French Canadians in Cleghorn probably. IRENE BEAUDOIN: And my grandmother died in Cleghorn, and my aunt died in Worcester, and his sister, his only sister who was in a home there in Worcester… I'm trying to think of the name of that place. SPEAKER 1: You mentioned that your father delivered groceries by horse and buggy. When did he eventually get a car? IRENE BEAUDOIN: I believe it was around – in the 20s, early 20s. It was a turn car; he called it a turn car, which he just loved. And I can remember so many times, well, I guess, I was five or six years old when there was a rainstorm or thunderstorm that came up in the summertime, how he would stop the car and put up the side pieces and then the windshield wipers were on the inside. They had to this by hand. SPEAKER 1: They had to work the manual windshield. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, or the windshield wipers were on the outside but I guess you had to work it from the inside. SPEAKER 1: Exactly, a little handle. IRENE BEAUDOIN: That's right, yeah. SPEAKER 1: And so he got his first car after he went into the insurance business? IRENE BEAUDOIN: Well, I'm sure it must have been at that time, yes. SPEAKER 1: And how long did he drive? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He was almost 91 when he retired from driving. We mentioned several times, you know, "How I wish – why don't you give 23 up?" I didn't ask him to give up. I would say, "If you want to give up, I can take you wherever you want to go." And he'd just reply, "What's the matter with you? I can drive as well as you can." So, that was that. SPEAKER 1: Though your father was not active in politics, holding office or anything like that, was he involved in politics in any other way or no? IRENE BEAUDOIN: No. SPEAKER 1: I found that many of the Franco-Americans voted or tended to vote Republican until about the 1930s. Was your father a Republican or was he a Democrat? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He was a Republican and changed when Bill's father ran. BILL BEAUDOIN: And always went back to Republican. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Went back to Republican but to give his father that vote, he had to change – BILL BEAUDOIN: Her father did run for the city council once. IRENE BEAUDOIN: Yeah, that's right. BILL BEAUDOIN: But he was defeated and only because he was a Republican, no other reason. SPEAKER 1: Oh your father did run for…? IRENE BEAUDOIN: He did run. That's correct. BILL BEAUDOIN: Republicans were non-existent at the time – or close to it. /AT/cw/ee
n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting
Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. As the United States built its presence in the international realm over the following century, and the need for maintaining partnerships with allied nations continued to increase, the precedent set by the AEF in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation would be essential. 152 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004; New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 303. Bailes 39 Bibliography Secondary Sources Adas, Michael. "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I." Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 700-712, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism." The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. Bruce, Robert B. A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003. Bruce, Robert B. "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917." Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066. Clements, Kendrick A. "Woodrow Wilson and World War I." Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 62-82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. Coffman, Edward M. The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968. Egerton, George W. "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920." The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. Esposito, David M. "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF." Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-140, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. Faulkner, Richard S. Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. Gamble, Richard M. In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmaking of an American Myth. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012. ———. The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation. Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003. Bailes 40 Glaser, Elisabeth. "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918." Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 389-407. Gregory, Ross. 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First published 1980 by Oxford University Press (New York). Kennedy, Ross A. "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security." Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. First published 1992 by Oxford University Press (Oxford). Link, Arthur S. "Entry into World War I." Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, edited by Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970: 108-148. Lowry, Bullitt. "Pershing and the Armistice." The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. McGerr, Michael. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Millett, Allan R. "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918." Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, edited by Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts. Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986: 235-256. Bailes 41 Neiberg, Michael S. "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917." Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 801-812. https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. ———. The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pestritto, Ronald J. Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. Stevenson, David. "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918." The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004. Reprinted with a new introduction. New York: Penguin Group, 2013. Page references are to the 2013 edition. Trask, David F. The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993. Weigley, Russell F. "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition." Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 327-345. Widenor, William C. "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement." Modern American Diplomacy, edited by John M. Carroll and George C. Herring. Lanham: SR Books, 1996: 41-60. Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959. Reprinted for Fiftieth Anniversary with a foreword by Lloyd C. Gardner and afterword by Andrew J. Bacevich. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. Page references are to the 2009 edition. Winton, Harold R. "Toward an American Philosophy of Command." The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1035-1060. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. Woodford, David R. Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993. Yockelson, Mitchell A. Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. Zieger, Robert H. America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. Bailes 42 Primary Sources Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section. The Genesis of the American First Army. Army War College, 1928. Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library Coppell, TX, 2020. Baker, Newton D. Why We Went to War. New York: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, 1936. Balch, Emily Greene. "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 28-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643. Bliss, Tasker H. "The Evolution of the Unified Command." Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. Croly, Herbert. Progressive Democracy. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Second printing in 2006 of new material edition with an introduction by Sidney A. Pearson, Jr. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. Page references are to the 2006 edition. Dawson, Miles M. "The Significance of Our Mission in This War." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. Dutton, Samuel T. "The United States and the War." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 13-19. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps Who Fought in France. Edited by Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin. New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919. Evans, Martin Marix, ed. American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents 1917-1920. New York: Routledge, 2013. Kindle. Kirchwey, George W. "Pax Americana." The Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 40-48. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. Lippmann, Walter. "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 1-10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. Lloyd, Newson. How We Went to War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Pershing, John J. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces.Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. ———. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931. Bailes 43 Wilson, Woodrow. Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President. Edited by Mario R. DiNunzio. New York: NYU Press, 2006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.1-18. ———. The New Freedom: A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People. New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913. www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf.
Article by Morris Arnold on the Arkansas Legal System during the Colonial Period. ; THE ARKANSAS COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 1686-1766 Morris S. Arnold* Except for the silence of its final letter, there is nowadays nothing very French about Arkansas. Yet before the American takeover in 1804 the great majority of the European inhabitants of the area presently occupied by the state were of French origin. There is s9me visible proof of this in the names, many now mangled beyond e:asy recognition, which eighteenth-century voyageurs and coureurs de bois gave to a good many Arkansas places and streams; 1 and there are, as well, a number of Arkansas townships which bear the names of their early French habitants .2 While these faint traces of a remote European past survive, absolutely nothing remains of the laws and customs which the ancient residents of Arkansas observed. This is no accident. It was a favorite object of Jefferson to introduce the common law of England into the vast Louisiana Territory as quickly as he could. In the lower territory he waited too late. New Orleans had had a large French population and a somewhat professionalized legal system for some time, and the civilian opposition, given time to congeal, proved to * Ben J. Altheimer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. B.S.E.E. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University of Arkansas; LL.M. 1969, S.J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School. This article is the first chapter of Professor Arnold's book, UNEQUAL LAWS UNTO A SAVAGE RACE: EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADITIONS IN ARKANSAS, 1686-1836, which will be published later this year. l. See generally Branner, Some Old French Place Names in the State of Arkansas, 19 ARK. HIST. Q. 191 (1960). The etymology of some of these names is difficult and interesting. Who would guess very quickly, for instance, that Smackover in Union County is Chemin Couvert (covered road) in disguise? Id. at 206. Tchemanihaut Creek (pronounced 'Shamanahaw") in Ashley County is a good deal easier: Chemin a haut (high road) must have been its original name. Its initial letter, one local historian has plausibly suggested, is probably attributable to "a misguided attempt to derive the name from the Indian language." Y. ETHERIDGE, HISTORY OF ASHLEY COUNTY, ARKANSAS 17, 18 (1959). Other names should on sight be instantly intelligible to a modern Parisian, though their current pronunciation might cause him consternation: Examples are the Terre Rouge (red earth) and Terre Noire (black earth) Creeks in Clark County, the L 'Angui!le (eel) River in northeast Arkansas, and La Grue (crane) township in Arkansas county. 2. Vaugine and Bogy Townships in Jefferson County, Darysaw (Desruisseaux) Township in Grant County, and Fourche La Fave (Lefevre) Township in Perry County are good examples. 391 392 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 have sufficient muscle to win a partial victory.3 As a result, as to substantive civil matters the state of Louisiana is today a thoroughly civilian jurisdiction. In the upper territory, however, by a piecemeal process beginning in 1804, the English common law was insinuated into the legal system, until, in 1816, it was at last adopted virtually wholesale by the General Assembly of the Missouri Territory.4 The purpose of this article is to explain why civilian legal institutions proved so weak in Upper Louisiana and especially in Arkansas. It turns out that the smallness and character of the European population in Arkansas was the main cause for the vulnerability of European legal norms there. The reception of the common law in Arkansas was simply one element in a more general exchange of cultures which occurred following the Louisiana Purchase. I At ten o'clock on the morning of March 12, 1682, Robert Cavalier, sieur de la Salle, having been commissioned four years earlier by Louis XIV of France to explore and take possession of the Mississippi and its tributaries, drew near the Quapaw Village of Kappa. The village was located on the right bank of the Mississippi River about twenty miles north of the mouth of the Arkansas. From the war chants emanating from the Indian town, La Salle judged that he was in for a hostile reception; so he hastily constructed a "fort" on an island opposite the village and awaited developments. Soon, however, the Quapaw chief sent the calumet of peace, and La Salle and his men went to Kappa where they were received with every possible demonstration of affection both public and private. Asked by the Quapaws for help against their enemies, La Salle promised that they could thenceforth look for protection to the greatest prince of the world, in whose behalf he had come to them and to all the other nations who lived along and around the river. In return, La Salle said, the Quapaws had to consent expressly to the erection in their village of a column on which His Majesty's arms were to be painted, symbolizing their recognition that he was the master of their lands. The Indians agreed and Henry de Tonti, La Salle's lieutenant 3. See generally G. DARGO, JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975). 4. 1 LAWS OF A PUBLIC AND GENERAL NATURE, OF THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, OF THE TERRITORY OF MISSOURI, AND OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, UP TO THE YEAR 1824, ch. 154 (1842). 1983) COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393 and commandant of one of the two brigades in the company, immediately caused the column to be fashioned. On it was painted a cross and the arms of France, and it bore these words: Louis the Great, King of France and of Navarre, rules. 13th of March, 1682. Tonti then conducted the column with all the French men-at-arms to the plaza of the village, and, La Salle taking up a position at the head of his brigade and Tonti at the head of his, the Reverend Father Zeno be Membre sang the hymn 0 crux, ave, spes unica. The company then went three times around the plaza, each time singing the psalm Exaudiat te Dominus and shouting vive le roy to the discharge of their muskets. They then planted the column while repeating the cries of vive le roy, and La Salle, standing near the column and holding the king's commission in his hand, spoke in a loud voice the following words in French: On behalf of the very high, very invincible, and victorious prince Louis the Great, by the grace of God, King of France and of Navarre, the fourteenth of this name, today, the 13th of March, 1682, with the consent of the nation of the Arkansas assembled at the village of Kappa and present at this place, in the name of the king and his allies, I, by virtue of the commission of His Majesty of which I am bearer and which I hold presently in my hand . , have taken possession in the name of His ffi.ajesty, his heirs, and the successors to his crown, of the country of Louisiana and of all the nations, mines, minerals, ports, harbors, seas, straits, and roadsteads, and of everything contained within the same . . . . After more musket-firing and the giving of presents the Indians celebrated their new alliance throughout the night, pressing their hands to the column and then rubbing their bodies in testimony to the joy which they felt in having made so advantageous a connection. Thus did France gain sovereignty over and ownership of Arkansas. The reason that we know all these details and more about La Salle's activities in Arkansas is that he had requested, and received, from Jacques de la Metairie, the notary who was in his company, a lengthy proces-verbal describing the events at Kappa and officially attesting their occurrence.5 This was Arkansas's first exposure to civilian legal processes. It would be almost 150 years before the influence of the civil law ceased to make itself felt there. 5. 2 P. MARGRY, DECOUVERTES ET ETABLISSEMENT DES FRAN<;:AIS DANS L'0UEST ET DANS LE SUD DE L'AMERIQUE SEPTENTRIONALE, 1614-1754 (1881). 394 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 II Arkansas Post was the first European establishment in the lower Mississippi valley. It was first located about twenty-seven miles by river from the mouth of the Arkansas on the edge of Little Prairie at what is now called the Menard Site. (See Figure 2). Settled in 1686 by six tenants of Henry de Tonti to whom La Salle in 1682 had granted the lower Arkansas as a seignory, 6 it was to serve as an Indian trading post and as an intermediate station between the Illinois country and the Gulf of Mexico.7 Tonti's plans for the place had been large indeed. In 1689 he promised the Jesuits to build a house and chapel at the Arkansas and to grant a resident priest a sizeable amount of land; while there, Tonti confidently asserted, the priest could "come and say mass in the French quarter near our fort."8 No priest in fact established himself during Tonti's ownership of the Arkansas and his French quarter and fort never materialized. When in an undated grant of land to Jacques Cardinal, one of his men at the Post, Tonti styled himself seigneur de ville de Tonti (lord of the town of Tonti),9 he was in the grips of an excessive enthusiasm. There is no evidence that the European population of the place ever exceeded six. In fact, when Joutel arrived there in 1687 there were only two Frenchmen remaining in residence; 10 and the single log house he descpbed is apparently the only structure ever erected at Tonti's Post. Joutel remarked of Tonti's two traders that "if I was joyous to find them, they participated in the joy since we left them the wherewithal to maintain themselves for some time." Indeed, he said, "they were almost as much in need of our help as we of theirs." He ridiculed the whole idea of a post at that location. "The said house," Joutel noted sarcastically, "was to serve as an 6. See Faye, The Arkansas Post ef Louisiana: French Domination, ;26 LA. HIST. Q. 633, 635-36 ( 1943). 7. Such was the view of Father Douay, a Jesuit who described Tonti's post in 1687. See M. THOMAS, THE ARKANSAS POST OF LOUISIANA, 1682-1783 (M.A. Thesis, University of California, 1948). 8. Tonti's grant to the Jesuits is quoted in 1 M. GIRAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH LOUISIANA 8 (J. Lambert trans., 1974). 9. The grant is translated in THE FRENCH FOUNDATIONS 396 (T. Pease & R. Werner eds., 1934). 10. Faye, supra note 6, at 735. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM Henry de Tonti, lieutenant of La Salle. He founded Arkansas Post in 1686 and in the late seventeenth century styled himself seigneur de ville de Tonti. He was the first European to possess judicial authority in Arkansas. (Courtesy of the Museum of the History of Mobile). 395 396 UALR LAW JOURNAL · [Vol. 6:391 entrepot [way-station] for the French who travelled in these parts, but we were the only ones whom it so served." 11 Short of supplies and virtually inaccessible, the tiny outpost never prospered. The war with the Iroquois closed the route to Canada and made trade to and from Arkansas impossible much of the time until 1693.12 By 1696, Jean Couture, Tonti's lieutenant and commandant at the Post, had deserted to the English, 13 and in 1699 Jesuit missionaries to the Quapaws found no trace of a French settlement. 14 By then the French had evidently abandoned the Arkansas, though there may have remained behind a "few white savages thereabouts as wild as red savages." 15 However grandiose and ambitious had been the schemes of Tonti, they would soon come to seem tame. In 1717 the Mercure de France, a Paris newspaper, began advertising the riches of Louisiana to its readers: Gold and silver could be mined there "with almost no labor." The mountains situated on the Arkansas River would be explored, and there, one correspondent exuded, "we shall gather, believe me, specimens from silver mines, since others already have gathered such there without trouble." When Cadillac sensibly protested that "the mines of the Arkansas were a dream" he was promptly committed to the Bastille "on suspicion of having spoken with scant propriety against the Government of France."16 The man behind the propaganda campaign was John Law, a Scot, who owned a bank in Paris and who had in 1717 succeeded in securing for his Compagnie d'Occident a monopoly on Louisiana trade. Law's company recruited thousands of colonists to settle in Louisiana and the king granted it authority to grant land from the 11. Joutel Remarques sur /'Ouvrage de Tonti Re/at(( a la Louisiane ( 1703), Archives Service Hydrographique (Paris), vol. 115-9, no. 12 (Typescript in Little Rock Public Library). The translation in the text is mine. 12. Faye, supra note 6, at 638. 13. IBERVILLE'S GULF JouRNALS 144 at n.98 (R. McWilliams ed. 1950). 14. 18 COLLECTIONS OF THE WISCONSIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY 427, at n.37 (1908). 15. Faye, supra note 6, at 646. See also I M. GIRAUD, supra note 8, at 8: "When d'Iberville reached the Mississippi [i.e., in 1699] the post had been abandoned." Some writers are reluctant to say that the Arkansas was completely devoid of Europeans at this time. See, e.g., P. HOLDER, ARCHAEOLOGICAL FIELD RESEARCH ON THE PROBLEM OF THE LOCATIONS OF ARKANSAS POST ARKANSAS 4 (1957): "The French occupation of the general area along the lower courses of the Arkansas and White Rivers was virtually continuous from the 1680's onward." The truth is that the sources simply fail to mention any Europeans in Arkansas, except Jesuit missionaries, between 1699 and 1721. It is, however, hard to resist believing that a few hunters and trappers ventured from time to time into the area and established temporary camps there. Almost certainly no real settlement existed however. 16. Faye, supra note 6, at 653. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 397 Royal domain. Proprietors of the company's land grants (concessionaires) were given considerable latitude in choosing the spots for their settlements, since the interior of Louisiana was not well known; and they therefore exercised much discretion in locating their colonists on arrival. 17 However, the company early on had recognized the Arkansas River as an important spot, since it was thought that it might well be the best route to the Spanish mines of Mexico. Thus the company specifically directed where the Arkansas concession should be located and ordered that it be the first occupied. 18 It granted this concession to Law himself. In August of 1721, a group of Law's French engages (perhaps as many as eighty) took possession of land on Little Prairie at or near the site of Tonti's abandoned trading post. 19 (See Figure 2). Although Law was by then bankrupt and had fled France, the news did not reach Louisiana until after Jacques Levens, Law's director in Louisiana, had caused the Arkansas colony to be established under the command of some of his subordinates.20 By December of that year Bertrand Dufresne, sieur du Demaine, replaced Levens as director for Arkansas, and in March of 1722 he took possession of the concession and began an inventory of its effects and papers.21 On his arrival he found only twenty cabins and three arpents (about 2.5 acres) of cleared ground. He reported a total of about fifty men and women resident,22 tristes debris, Father Charlevoix called them,23 of Mr. Law's concession. They had produced only an insignificant harvest. Lieutenant la Boulaye was nearby with a military detachment of seventeen men.24 (See Figure 1). Despite the existence of a company store at the Arkansas concession, both the colony and the military establishment were in considerable difficulty.25 Dufresne therefore immediately released twenty of the engages from service and gave them lots to cultivate in the hopes that a better harvest of corn and wheat would be realized in 1722. In February of the following year there were only forty-one colonists remaining, divided now into two small farming communi- 17. 4 M. GIRAUD, H!STOJRE DE LA LOUISIANE FRANc_;;AISE 198 (1974). 18. Id. 19. Id. 20. Id. at 199. 21. Id. at 271. 22. Id. at 272. 23. 6 P. CHARLEVOIX, JOURNAL D'UN VOYAGE FAIT PAR ORDRE DU Roi DANS L'AMERIQUE SEPTENTRIONNALE 164 (1744). 24. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 273. 25. The following paragraph is based on Id. at 273-74. 398 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 ties: Fourteen men and one woman at Law's concession under Dufresne, and sixteen men, some with families, two leagues down the river with the troops. Among this latter group there lived six black slaves. 26 Benard la Harpe, while exploring the river in 1721, had predicted, or at least hoped for, a turn in the fortunes of the struggling colony, but that hope proved false and in 1727 Father Paul du Poisson, the Jesuit missionary to the Arkansas, reported that only about thirty Frenchmen remained behind.27 The military post had been abandoned two years previous. 28 Village des Arcan~as ---N Poste francais commande par le S. la Boulaie 0 - - - -, ·: ·Concession de M. Law I I L. --- ' MISSISSIPPI Figure 1 Sketch of the location of Law's colony by Dumont de Montigny,Archives Nationales, Paris, 6 JJ-75, Piece 254. All this seemed worth recounting in some detail because for generations historians of Arkansas have believed that a colony of Germans once occupied their river. Law did recruit many Germans for settlement in Louisiana, and they were destined for the Arkansas, but as soon as the news of Law's bankruptcy reached the colony 26. Recensement General des Habitans Estab!ys,,.SoteJouy Arkansas et d~s Ouvrier~ ~e la Concession cy devant Apartenant a M. Law, 18 February, 1723. (Transcnpt at Lomsiana History Center, Louisiana State Museum, New Orleans). 27. Du Poisson to Father___, translated in Falconer, Arkansas and the Jesuits in 1727-A Translation, 4 PUBLICATIONS OF THE ARKANSAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 352, at 375 (1917). 28. Faye, supra note 6, at 670. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 399 in June of 1721, the Compagnie des Indies took over the direction of his concession;29 and when the time arrived to transport the German immigrants to Arkansas, the company, in an economy move, decided instead to send them to Delaire's grant in Lower Louisiana.30 In short, none of Law's Germans ever reached Arkansas. This is a pity, as the prospect of discussing, or at least imagining, a group of German immigrants living under French law on the Arkansas River was an intriguing one--one of which the facts have now unfortu-nately deprived us. · III Before 1712, the colony of Louisiana, with a population of only a few hundred, had been entirely under military rule and regular civil regulation was altogether lacking. On September 19, 1712, the Crown granted a trade monopoly to Antoine Crozat but he was given no governmental authority: As Henry Dart noted, the charter was "only an operating contract with the duties of government retained in the Crown."31 However, the charter did adopt as law for the colony "nos Edits, Ordonnances Et Coutumes Et !es usages de la Prevoste Et Vitf/omte de Paris--our edicts, ordinances, and customs, and the usages of the Provostry and Viscounty of Paris."32 The Coutume, despite its name, was actually a small code of some 362 titles first reduced to writing in 1510,33 and treating both substantive and adjective law. It was itself terse, indeed epigrammatic; but the commentary on it by the time of its adoption in Louisiana was voluminous. 34 Annotated versions of the Coutume were therefore very popular in France and in time they found their way to Louisiana.35 Also in 1712, by a separate instrument, a new and important institution was created for the colony, the Superior Council of Louisiana. 36 Modelled on the governmental arrangements already in 29. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 216. 30. Id. at 248. 31. Dart, The Legal Institutions of Louisiana, 3 SOUTHERN LAW Q. 247 (1918). This article also appears in 2 LA. HIST. Q. 72 (1919). 32. The charter is printed in 4 PUBLICATIONS LA. HIST. Soc. 13, at 17 (1909). 33. For a precis of its provisions, title by title, see Schmidt, History ef the Jurisprudence of Louisiana, l LA. L. J., no. l, l (1841). 34. The most useful eighteenth-century commentary is C. FERRIERE, CoMMENTAIRE SUR LA CouTUME DE LA PREVOTE ET VICOMTE DE p ARIS. It is available in several editions. 35. Dart, The Law Library ef a Louisiana Lawyer in the 18th Century, 25 REPORTS OF THE LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION 12, at 22 et seq. (1924). 36. See Dart, supra note 31, at 249 et seq. See also, for some discussion of the work of this body, Hardy, The Superior Council in Colonial Louisiana, in FRENCHMEN AND FRENCH 400 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 place in other French colonies, the Council had original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes arising anywhere in Louisiana. It consisted of the Lieutenant General of New France; the Intendant of the same; the Governor of Louisiana; a first councilor of the king; two other councilors; the attorney general; and a clerk. Judgments in civil cases required the concurrence of at least three members and in criminal cases at least five. The Council was originally created to exist for three years, but on September 7, 1716, it became by virtue of a Royal Edict a permanent institution.37 In 1717 a fundamental change occurred in the government of Louisiana. In that year Crozat, having lost an enormous sum under his operating charter, surrendered it, and John Law's Compagnie d'Occident was given a monopoly over trade in the colony. In addition, unlike Crozat's company, the Compagnie d'Occident was granted extensive governmental authority: It had the power to appoint the Superior Council, to name governors and military commandants, and to appoint and remove all judges. The charter also provided that "Seront tous !es juges Etbalis en tous !es d. Lieux tenus de juger suivant !es Loix Et ordonnances du Royaume Et se Con-former a la Coutume de la prevoste Et Vicomte de Paris. . . ."; that is, that "all the judges established in all the said places shall be bound to judge according to the laws and ordinances of the realm, and [shall also be bound] to conform to the customs of the Prevostry and Viscounty of Paris."38 This portion of the charter obviously provided for the reception of general French legislation and the Custom of Paris. In addition, it has been shown that subsequent French legislation, as soon as it was registered in the colony, and the legislation of the Superior Council itself, formed part of the body of colonial Louisiana law.39 The subsequent French legislation was of three distinct sorts: (a) general legislation; (b) special colonial legislation; ( c) colonial legislation passed specifically for Louisiana. 40 Two years later we hear for the first time about inferior courts for outlying portions of the colony. On September 12, 1719, the king noted the need to appoint persons to act as judges "to facilitate w A YS IN THE MISSISSIPPI v ALLEY 87 (J. McDemott ed., 1969); Micelle, From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis of the Superior Council of French Louisiana, 9 LA. HIST. 85 (1968). 37. The edict is printed in 4 PUBLICATIONS LA. HIST. Soc. 21-23 (19CS). 38. Id. at 48. 39. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in "Notarial" Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978). 40. Id. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 401 the administration of justice in places distant from the place where the Superior Council holds it sessions."41 The "heads or directors" of concessions along with "other of our subjects, capable and of probity" were to "exercise both civil and criminal justice." The edict went on to provide that, even in these inferior courts, "three judges shall sit in civil matters and in criminal matters five judges . " The plan, evidently, was to have a kind of provincial council at each settlement. The king further provided that an appeal from these local tribunals would lie in all cases to the Superior Council.42 All this was being done, of course, to make ready the way for Law's colonizing schemes. In 1720 or 1721 Louisiana was for the first time divided into districts (or counties). Arkansas was one of the nine districts originally created, and a local commandant and a judge was assigned to each "to put justice with greater ease in reach of the colonists."43 Presumably, and understandably, the plan to establish local councils outside New Orleans was abandoned at this time. The sources simply fail us on the question of whether more than one person was expected to sit on local courts, but it could not have proved workable in remote places like Arkansas to assemble a multi-member judicial body. In May of 1722 the Regent issued an order creating a provincial council for Illinois, the jurisdiction of which supposedly extended from "all places on and above and Arkansas River . . . to the boundaries of the Wabash River." The commandant of the Illinois, Lieutenant de Boisbriant, was to serve as "chief and judge" of this so-called council, which in fact had only one other member.44 It thus seems to have been the plan to abolish the Arkansas district and annex its territory to its nearest northern neighbor; and the Illinois provincial council was directed "to hold its sessions at the places where the principal factories of the company shall be estab- 41. The edict is printed in 4 PUBLICATIONS LA. HIST. Soc. 63 (1908). 42. The translation in the text is mine. The entire edict is translated and discussed in Dart, supra note 31, at 261 et seq. Further discussion of this edict can be found in Dart, The Colonial Legal Systems of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, 27 REPORTS OF THE LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION 43 at 52 (1926). 43. Id. at 267. The other districts were New Orleans, Biloxi, Mobile, Alibamous, Natchez, Yazoo, N atchitotches, and the Illinois. 44. Translated extracts from this order appear in 2 J. WHITE, A NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS, AND LOCAL ORDINANCES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND SPAIN, RELATING TO THE CONCESSION OF LAND IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COLONIES . 439-40 (1837). 402 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 lished."45 This language could have been construed to require the Illinois council to sit at the Arkansas. It is, however, very much to be doubted that such a session was ever held, and certainly it is not believeable that anyone would repair from Arkansas to Illinois to settle a grievance in 1722. It seems probable, then, that whatever judicial functions were exercised at the Arkansas were entrusted to its resident directors even after the supposed creation of the council of the Illinois. The only resident director that the Arkansas ever had was, as we saw, Bertrand Dufresne, sieur du Demaine, who arrived at the Post March 22, 1722, and he was evidently the judge from that point on. Prior to that, Jacques Levens had been director, but as he never took up residence in Arkansas we have to presume that if judicial functions were undertaken by anyone, it was by one or more of the three subordinates to whom Levens had entrusted the management of the struggling colony: Jean-Baptiste, Menard, Martin Merrick, and Labro.46 When Dufresne left the Arkansas around 1726 we can hardly guess the means resorted to for the settlement of disputes. Probably Father Paul du Poisson, the Jesuit missionary resident from 1727 to 1729, used his good offices to maintain order among the approximately thirty Frenchmen who had remained behind.47 It seems probable, therefore, that Arkansas's first sustained exposure to European legal proceedings and principles occurred in the period during which Law's Company held sway in Louisiana. Tonti's seventeenth-century feudal seignory no doubt carried with it the right to render justice. Though his charter from La Salle has not as yet come to light,48 other conveyances of La Salle's are extant; and in them he gave his grantees judicial power over small cases ("low justice" this is called) while specifically reserving important cases ("high justice") to himself. (Cases of the latter type he directed to be heard by the judge "who shall be established at Fort St. 45. Id. at 440. 46. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 272. Menard left the Arkansas in 1722 (jd., 275) and was in New Orleans in 1720. Index to the Records efthe Superior Council of Louisiana, 4 LA. HIST. Q. 349 (1921). 47. Dufresne appears in the Arkansas census of January !, 1726; but on October 21, 1726, he is described as a "settler in Arkansas, but now domiciled with Mr. Traguidy [in New Orleans]." Index to the Records of Superior Council of New Orleans, 3 LA. HIST. Q. 420 (1920). In 1727 there was no director at the Arkansas, as Father Du Poisson tells us that he took up evidence in "the India Company's house, which is also that of the commandants when there are any here . " See Falconer, supra note 27, at 371. 48. For a charter from Tonti to Jacques Cardinal, one of his men at the Arkansas, see THE FRENCH FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9, at 396. 'Fhla is tlae Olll)' grant gf Tgati's eKtastF 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 403 Louis.")49 We do not know whether Tonti's charter contained identical provisions but it certainly would have contained similar ones. But during the fifteen years or so that Tonti held the right to dispose of certain cases arising in his seignory, it hardly seems credible that he or his deputies ever held anything resembling a court, or even executed many instruments or documents.50 IV In 1731 the Compagnie d'Occident surrendered its charter to Louis XV, and for the rest of the period of French dominion Louisiana was a Crown Colony. Late that same year a military garrison was re-established in Arkansas; it consisted of twelve men commanded by First Ensign de Coulange and was located again on the edge of Little Prairie. 51 (See Figure 2). It was apparently during the reorganization of the colony in 1731 that civil and military authority at the outposts of Louisiana were combined in the commandant of the garrison-an arrangement that would survive into the Spanish period and even for a short time during the American regime. Part of a post commandant's civil authority was to act as notary and judge. The exact scope of his judicial jurisdiction during the French period is obscure, there being no document of which I am aware which describes it specifically. Parkman, writing of conditions in the Illinois in 1764, says that the "military commandant whose station was at Fort Chartres on the Mississippi, ruled the Colony with a sway as absolute as that of the Pasha of Egypt, and judged civil and criminal cases without right of appeal."52 Captain Phillip Pittman, an English engineer and Mississippi explorer who was writing at almost exactly the same time, gives a slightly different version. According to him, the Illinois commandant "was absolute 49. Concession in fee by La Salle to Pierre Prudhomme, in id. at 32. 50. When Tonti petitioned for confirmation of his charter, he was evidently refused. The petition is printed in E. MURPHEY, HENRY DE TONTI, FUR TRADER OF THE MISSISSIPPI 119 (1941). It is possible that La Salle did not have the power to make permanent grants and that may be the reason that Tonti needed confirmation. The Letters Patent of May 12, 1678, giving La Salle the right to explore "the western part of New France" in the king's behalf, gave him the power to build forts wherever he deemed them necessary; and he was "to hold them on the same tern1s and conditions as Fort Frontenac." See T. FALCONER, ON THE DISCOVERY OF THE MISSISSIPPI 19 (1844). La Salle said expressly in 1683 that this allowed him to "divide with the French and the Indians both the lands and the commerce of said country until it may please his majesty to command otherwise . " See THE FRENCH FoUNDATio~;upra note 9, at 43. The language is ambiguous, but on one permissible reading it indicates a specifically reserved power in the king to revoke grants made by La Salle. 51. Faye, supra note 6, at 673. 52. Quoted in Dart, supra note 31, at 249. 404 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 in authority, except in matters of life and death; capital offences were tried by the council at New Orleans."53 Of course, the Arkansas commandant's judicial jurisdiction was not necessarily as extensive as that possessed by the commandant of the Illinois. He may very well have been subordinate to the Illinois commandant during most of the French period. Some fitful light is thrown on the judicial authority of the Arkansas commandant by an interesting proceeding which took place at the Post in 1743.54 In October of that year, Anne Catherine Chenalenne, the widow of Jean Francois Lepine, petitioned Lieutenant Jean-Francois Tisserant de Montcharvaux, whom she styled "Commandant for the King at the Fort of Arkansas," asking him to cause an inventory and appraisal to be made of the community property in her possession. The object in view was to make a distribution to the petitioner's son-in-law and daughter who had the previous May lost all their goods when attacked by Chickasaws on the Mississippi not far below the mouth of the Arkansas. They had narrowly escaped with their lives.55 Widow Lepine had decided to make a distribution to "her poor children, at least to those who have run so much risk among the savages." She was preparing to marry Charles Lincto, a well-to-do resident of the Post, and she wished to dissolve the old community which by custom had continued after her husband's death in her and their children. The commandant informed Madame Lepine that on 26 October, 1743, he would inventory the "real and personal property derived from the marital community" and would bring with him two persons to look after the widow's interest and two to represent the children. The idea was that each party in interest should have independent appraisers present to insure the impartiality of the inventory and evaluation. De Montcharvaux in the presence of these and other witnesses caused the inventory to be made on the appointed day. The estate was fairly sizeable, being valued at 14,530 /ivres and 10 sols. It contained a great deal of personalty, including four slaves, a number of animals, 1600 pounds of tobacco, and notes and accounts receivable; the realty noted was "an old house" with three small outbuildings. Interestingly, no land was mentioned. There are two possible explanations for the absence of land in S3. P. PITTMAN, THE PRESENT STATE OF THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT ON THE M1ss1sSIPPI S3 (1770) (Reprinted with intro. by R. Rea 1973). S4. The relevant documents are translated in Core, Arkansas through the Looking Glass ef 1743 Documents, 22 GRAND PRAIRIE HISTORICAL SOCIETY BULLETIN 16 (1979). SS. This incident is reported and discussed in Faye, supra note 6, at 677-78. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 405 the inventory. One is that land may not have been actually granted to Arkansas settlers but only given over temporarily to their use. The other possibility is that the land on which the house was built had belonged to Lepine before the marriage and had remained his separate property under his marriage contract or under the general provisions of the Coutume de Paris. The Coutume, which, as we have seen, was in force in French Louisiana, provided that all movables (personalty), belonging to a husband or wife, whenever acquired, became part of the community; but only certain immovables (realty) acquired after the marriage were so treated.56 This rule could be altered by contract, but in Louisiana, as in France, the Coutume was often specifically incorporated into marriage contracts by future spouses in defining the regime that would rule their property; 57 and if there was no contract provision creating a property regime, the Coutume of course automatically applied. The inventory is said to have been made "Pardevant nous Jean Francois Tisserant Ecuyer Sieur Demoncharvaus Commandant pour le Roy au Fort des Arkansas." The formulapardevant nous ("before us") is Parisian notarial boiler-plate and indicates that the commandant was acting in his surrogate notarial capacity. To an American common lawyer, the notary is not a member of the legal profession, not even a paralegal. But in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France he enjoyed a much more elevated status, as indeed he still does in that country. Originally an official of the medieval European ecclesiastical courts, the notary developed into a noncontentious secular legal professional in France. In England, partly because the canon and secular laws were not on speaking terms, "the notarial system never took deep root."58 For one thing, an important aspect of the notary's duties, his authority to "authenticate" documents, was of little use to the English. The whole notion of a state-sanctioned authenticator of private acts was entirely foreign to the common law: Whereas in France we see notaries "making" and "passing" contracts, the common law left that to the parties. The state was very much in the background in England, and was called upon only to enforce obligations that arose by force of nature. The other aspect of the French notary's duties, the drafting of instruments, conveyancing, and the giving of legal advice, was per- 56. See Baade, supra note 39, at 7, 8. 57. Id. at 25. 58. l F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (2d ed., reissued with intro. by S. Milsom 1968). 406 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 formed by the regular legal profession in England. It is true that there was a scriveners' company organized in London in the sixteenth century which was granted a charter in the reign of James l.59 Members were empowered to draft legal documents, especially obligations (or bonds), and they gave a certain amount of low-level legal advice particularly in commercial and banking matters. 60 The few secular notaries who practiced in London at that time concerned themselves mainly with drafting documents relevant to international trade, and they were members of this company.61 But in the eighteenth century the company lost its effort to keep commonlaw attorneys from competing, and in 1804 parliament made conveyancing the monopoly of the regular legal profession.62 In contrast, the French notary's duties by the eighteenth century had come to include not only the familiar ones of administering oaths, taking acknowledgements, and giving "authenticity" to "acts" of private persons by attesting them officially, but they also ran generally to the drafting of documents, conveyancing, and the giving of practical legal advice.63 It is not surprising, therefore, that notaries would 59. See 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 70 (1938). See generally on the notary in England, Gutteridge, The Origin and Development ef the Profession of Notaries Public in England, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 12 (1926). 60. 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at id. 61. 5 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 115 (3d ed. 1945). 62. 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 71-72; T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 227-28 (5th ed. 1956). 63. As draftman of wills, marriage contracts, and conveyances, Mons. le Notaire has survived in France as a much respected person, especially in the country villages. He is a general non-forensic legal practitioner, his part in the legal scheme "being confined to voluntary as distinct from contentious jurisdiction." Brown, The office of Notary in France, 2 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 60, at 64 (1953). Indeed, the French notary is close to the equivalent of the English solicitor, except for the latter's participation in litigation. Thus one modern-day commentator opined that "a solicitor would feel much at home in the etude of the French notary, though he would be surprised, and perhaps disappointed, by the cordiality of the morning post." Id. at 71. Today in Louisiana as well the notary enjoys considerable powers. See Burke & Fox, The Notaire in North America: A Short Study of the Adaptation of a Civil Law Institution, 50 TUL. L. REV. 318, at 328-32 (1975); Brosman, Louisiana-An Accidental Experiment in Fusrim, 24 TUL. L. REV. 95, 98-99 (1949). The Louisiana notary has the power "to make inventories, appraisements, and petitions; to receive wills, make protests, matrimonial contracts, conveyances, and generally, all contracts and instruments of writing; to hold family meetings and meetings of creditors; . to affix the seals upon the effects of deceased persons and to raise the same." LA. STAT. ANN.§ 35:2 (1964). When the Louisiana legislature defined the practice of law, and prohibited all but licensed attorneys from engaging in it, it therefore remembered to except acts performed by the notary which were "necessary or incidental to the exercise of the powers and functions of (his] office." LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:212(B) (1974). A walk through modern-day New Orleans will reveal a number of signs proclaiming the existence of "Law and Notarial Offices", a combination having an odd ring in the ears of an American common lawyer. The Louisiana notary is simply "a different and 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 407 make an appearance in eighteenth-century Louisiana. In New Orleans, of course, there was much work for them, but there were also provincial notaries operating in Biloxi, Mobile, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, and Kaskaskia.64 Since De Montcharvaux acted as notary for the Lepine inventory, it is reasonably clear that there was no provincial notary resident at the Arkansas at that time. This comes as no surprise since in 1746 there were at the Post only twelve habitant families, ten slaves, and twenty men in the garrison, 65 hardly a sufficient European population to require or attract a law-trained scrivener. When it was time to have their marriage contract made, the widow Chenalenne and her future spouse executed it in New Orleans. No doubt there was available there legal advice on which they might more comfortably rely.66 Besides, there was at that time no resident priest at the Post to perform the marriage. v On May 10, 1749, an event occurred that considerably reduced the European population of Arkansas and also made it difficult to attract settlers there for some time. On that day, the Post was attacked by a group of about 150 Chicaksaw and Abeka warriors. Their coming was undetected67 and thus they caught the small habitant population altogether unaware. They burned the settlement, killed six male settlers, and took eight women and children as slaves.68 The census taken later that year shows, not surprisingly, that the population had decreased since the previous census. Seven more important official person than is the notary public in other jurisdictions of the United States." Brosman, supra at 98. 64. See Baade, supra note 39, at 12. 65. Memoire sur /'Eta! de la Colonie de la Louisiane en 1746. Archives des Colonies, Archives Nationales, Paris [hereinafter cited as ANC], Cl3A, 30:242-281, at 249, (Typescript of original document available at Little Rock Public Library). As the average family size in Arkansas in the middle of the eighteenth century was about four, this would put the number of habitant whites at the Post at about forty-eight. 66. For an abstract of this marriage contract, see Records o.f the Superior Council o.f Louisiana, 13 LA. HlsT. Q. 129 (1944). 67. However, the habitants may have had a warning that something was afoot, for on May l, Francois Sarrazin had written from Arkansas that "two savages have killed a man and a woman and burnt a man in the frame." Records efthe Superior Court o.f Louisiana, 20 LA. HlsT. Q. 505 (1937). This incident may have been connected with the attack nine days later. 68. Vaudreuil to Rouille, September 22, 1749, calendared in THE VAUDREUIL PAPERS 59-60 (B. Barron ed., 1975). See also Faye, supra note 6, at 684 et seq. W. BAIRD, THE QUAPAW INDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE DOWNSTREAM PEOPLE 34 (1980), gives the number taken as slaves as thirteen. 408 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 men, eight women, eight boys, and eight girls remained, a total of only thirty-one white habitants at the Poste des Akansa .69 Nor did all this mark an end to serious trouble. When in June of 1751 First Ensign Louis-Xavier-Martin de Lino de Chalmette, the commandant of the Post, went uninvited to New Orleans to consult with the governor, his entire garrison of six men took the opportunity to desert. 70 Things were obviously at a critical juncture. When later in 17 51 Lieutenant Paul Augustin le Pelletier de la Houssaye took command at Arkansas he found there a post recently rebuilt by its habitants and _voyagij,tfrs and probably already relocated to a spot ten or twelve miles upriver at the edge of the Grand Prairie. (See Figure 2). It is clear that Governor Vaudreuil had determined to hold the Arkansas even if the cost proved high, for he assigned to De La Houssaye a large company of forty-five men.71 The lieutenant was also authorized to build a new fort; government funds being lacking, he undertook the construction at his own expense in return for a five-year Indian trade monopoly.72 This new beginning could, in the nature of things, have given only a slight lift to the prospects for sustained settlement in the Arkansas country. Late in 1752 Governor Vaudreuil was informed that the Osages had attempted an attack on Arkansas Post but had failed. 73 While this indicates a stability of sorts for the l?ost, thanks no doubt to the size of the new garrison, still the perceived danger must have been so high as to discourage all but the most intrepid from taking up residence at the Arkansas. Mentions of Arkansas in the legal records tend to emphasize the dangerousness of the place. For instance, a couple from Pointe Coupee, on the verge of leaving for a hunting trip to the White River country, thought it best to deed their property to a relative, with the stipulation that the deed was to be void if they returned.74 It is not surprising, therefore, that even as late as 1766, the last year of French dominion, only eight habitant families, consisting in all of forty white persons, were resident at Arkansas Post.75 69. Arkansas Post Census, 1749, Loudon Papers 200, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. There were also fourteen slaves resident at the post and sixteen voyageurs who had returned after their winter's work. There were five hunters on the White River and four on the St. Francis. Thirty-five hunters had failed to return from the Arkansas River. 70. Faye, supra note 6, at 708. 71. Id. at 211. 72. Id. 73. THE VAUDREUIL PAPERS, supra note 68, at 136. 74. Index to the Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 24 LA. HlsT. Q. 75 (1941). 75. See Din, Arkansas Post in the American Revolution, 40 ARK. HIST. Q. 3, at 4 (1981). 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 409 All of these difficulties, and others, made for a place in which it might be regarded as too polite to expect the presence of much which corresponds to a legal system. In addition, political exigencies sometimes interfered to such an extent that the application of even-handed legal principle became inexpedient and thus entirely impracticable. For instance, the continued existence of the Arkansas settlement depended heavily on the loyalty of the Quapaws and their wishes were therefore relevant to any important decision made there. Their influence could extend even to the operation of the legal system as the following incident demonstrates. On 12 September, 1756, a meeting was held in the Government House in New Orleans to hear an extraordinary request from Guedetonguay, the Medal Chief of the Quapaws.76 His tribe had captured four deserters from the Arkansas garrison and had returned them; but the chief had come on behalf of his nation to ask Governor Kerlerac to pardon the soldiers. One of those captured, Jean Baptiste Bernard, in addition to having deserted, had killed his corporal Jean Nicolet within the precincts of the fort. The chief, obviously a great orator, said that he had come a long distance to plead for the soldiers' lives despite the heat and the demands of the harvest; and in his peroration he said that his head hung low, hi~ eyes were fixed to the ground, and his heart wept for these men. He knew, he explained, that if he had not come they would have been executed, and this was intolerable to him because he regarded them as his own children. He recited many friendly acts of the Qua paws to prove the fidelity of his people to the French. Among them was the release of six slaves (perhaps Chicaksaws captured by the Quapaws) "who would have been burned" otherwise, and the recent capture of five Choctaws and two trespassing Englishmen. He himself, he noted, had recently lost one son and had had another wounded in the war against the Chickasaws; and he . counted this "a mark of affection for the French." In recompense he asked for the pardon of the soldiers. The chief added that this was the only such pardon his nation had thus far requested, and he promised never to ask again. He did not doubt that Kerlerac, "the great chief of the French father of the red men," charged to govern them on behalf of "the great chief of all the French who lived in the 76. What follows is based on a memorandum entitled "Harangues faites dans /'assemb/ee tenue a /'hotel du gouvernment cejourdhui, 20 Juin 1756," found in ANC, Cl3A, 39:177-180 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). The translations are mine. 410 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 great town on the other side of the great lake," would listen and do the just thing. Guedetonguay left his best argument for last. He maintained vigorously that, under his law, any criminal who managed to reach the refuge of the Cabanne de Valeur where the Quapaws practiced their religious rites was regarded as having been absolved of his crime. It was their custom everywhere that the chief of the Cabanne de Valeur "would sooner lose his life than suffer the refugee to undergo punishment for his crime." Evidently the soldiers were claiming this right; and Ouyayonsas, the chief of the Cabanne de Valeur, was there to back them up. This last argument was an excellent one because it called upon the French to recognize an established Indian usage not dissimilar from the European custom of sanctuary. And the argument carried with it a threat of violent reaction if the custom were not allowed. Kerlerac answered the chief that he was not unmindful of the past services of the Quapaws, nor was he ungrateful for them. "But," he said, "I cannot change the words declared by the great chief of all the French against such crimes, and . . . it would be a great abuse for the future" to pardon the soldiers. So, he continued, "despite all the friendship that the French have for you and your nation, these men deserve death." The great chief stood for a long time with his head down and finally answered ominously that he could not be responsible for the revolutions which the chief of the privileged house might stir up-revolutions which he said ''would not fail to occur." The argument continued and the governor offered to grant the chief "anything else except these four pardons." But Guedetonguay stubbornly maintained that "the sole purpose of his journey was to obtain the pardon of the four men." In the end the Governor extracted from the Quapaw chiefs "publicly and formally their word . . . that they would in the future deliver up all deserting soldiers as malefactors or other guilty persons without any restriction or condition whatsoever, and that . pardons would be accorded at the sole discretion of the French." No immediate decision was reached by the Governor, but later that day some of his advisors, having reflected on what they had heard, reckoned "that a refusal of the obstinate demands of these chiefs . . . the faithful allies of the French would only involve the colony in troublesome upheavals on the part of the said nations who have otherwise up to the present served very faithfully." They con- 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 411 eluded that "saving a better idea by Monsieur le Gouverneur it would be dangerous, under all the present circumstances, not to satisfy the Indians with the pardons which they demanded." The governor took the advice but evidently did not write to Berryet, the French Minister of the Marine, for some time to tell him about it. From the comfort of Versailles it was easy for Berryet to pick at Kerlerac's decision.77 In responding to Kerlerac, Berryet first made the point that Bernard's case was different from that of the other captured soldiers since he was accused of homicide in addition to desertion. Then, too, the minister had a lot of questions. Could not the difference in Bernard's case have been urged on the Arkansas chiefs to get them to relent in his case? Where was the record of the legal proceedings which should have been conducted relative to the killing? If this was a wilfull murder the pardon had been conceded too easily. "It would be dangerous," the minister warned, ''to leave such a subject in the colony, not only because he would be an example of impunity but also because of new crimes that he might commit." (The arguments of general and specific deterrence are not very recent inventions.) Finally, the governor was sternly admonished "not to surrender easily to demands of this sort on the part of the savages . If on the one hand it is necessary, considering all the present circumstances, to humor the savages, it is also necessary to be careful of letting them set a tone that accords neither with the king's authority nor the good of the colony." Nevertheless, the minister talked to the king and he ratified the governor's decision. Writs of pardon were therefore issued under the king's name for each of the Arkansas soldiers. Because the homicide committed by Bernard was not a military crime and was cognizable therefore by the Superior Council of Louisiana, his pardon was directed to the Council. Interestingly, though Berryet admitted knowing nothing of the circumstances surrounding the killing, the pardon recited that a quarrel had arisen between Bernard and Nicolet, that they had beaten each other, that Bernard : "had had the misfortune to kill the said Nicolet," and that the death "had occurred without premeditated murder."78 Thus Louis XV pardoned Jean Baptiste Bernard for killing by mischance when there was no evidence adduced as to the facts resulting in Nicolet's 77. What follows is based in Berryet's letter to Kerlerac and Bobe Descloseaux dated July 14, 1769. ANC, B, 109:487-88 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). The translation is mine. 78. The pardon (brevet de grtJce) was enclosed in the letter and is ANC, B, 109:489 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). The translation is mine. 412 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 death. The decision was generated simply by a desire to accommodate an important ally. Faithful adherence to legal principle sometimes had to take a back seat to the more compelling demands of politics. VI Father Louis Carette, the Jesuit missionary who came to the Post of Arkansas in 1750, nevertheless attempted to bring some order to the legal affairs of the place. As he noted in a procuration (power of attorney) dated at Arkansas in 1753, he was "authorized by the king to make in every post where there is not a Notary Royal all contracts and acts . "79 There is no evidence that he had any formal legal training, but he was a Jesuit, and thus a learned man, one of a handful of such who would make their residence in eighteenth- century Arkansas. The 1753 procuration is itself of some interest, as it sheds light on how litigants whose cases were technically beyond the jurisdiction exercised by the Arkansas commandant (whatever that was) might have had their cases heard if they wanted to resort to regular methods of dispute settlement. As incredible as it seems, it is probable that the only court of general jurisdiction in the entire colony was the Superior Council of Louisiana. Now, in 1763 La Harpe said that it was a two-week boat trip from the Arkansas to New Orleans, and six to eight weeks back.80 Obviously, the procuration was an important device for people in remote posts like Arkansas, for it enabled them through their attorneys, in the language of the document under discussion, "to act . . . as though they were personally present."81 Convoys or individual vessels travelled down the Mississippi frequently enough to make this means of tending to legal affairs more tolerable than it might otherwise have been. In this case, the attorney chosen was Commandant de la Houssaye, and he was deputed to act in a probate matter at Pointe Coupee for Etienne de Vaugine de Nuysement and his wife Antoinette Pelagie Petit de Divilliers. An interesting feature of procurations which increased their utility and flexibility was that they were assignable. This feature came in handy in this instance since De La Houssaye, having 79. Index to the Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 22 LA. H!sT. Q. 255 (1939). 80. La Harpe to Chosseul, August 8, 1763, ANC, Ci3B, 1 (Typescript in Little Rock Public Library). 81. Records, supra note 79, at id. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 413 been detained at the Arkansas due to illness, simply transferred the power of attorney to a member of the Superior Council "to act in my place as myself."82 Perhaps one of the reasons that Carette had acted as notary in this instance was that the only other person in the little community authorized so to act, the commandant, was a party to the instrument. But in the French period priests were given general notarial powers and could act even in the absence of circumstances disabling the commandant. For instance, Carette acted as notary, and thus probably draftsman, for a marriage contract in which the commandant was not interested. This was the marriage contract of Francois Sarrazin and Francoise Lepine, executed at Arkansas Post on January 6, 1752. Marriage contracts have no exact parallel in common-law practice, and it thus seems worthwhile, before discussing the particulars of the Sarrazin-Lepine contract, to devote some time to their explanation and description. In a recent seminal study, Professor Hans Baade has outlined the provisions which one typically finds in marriage contracts executed in accordance with eighteenth-century Parisian notarial practice.83 The first and invariable undertaking by the future spouses was a promise to celebrate their marriage in facie ecc! esiae. The parties would then choose the regime which would govern their property during the marriage. Next would come a declaration that the ante-nuptial debts of the parties were to remain their separate obligations; this was followed by a disclosure of the parties' assets, a requirement for the validity of the previous provision. The dowry brought to the marriage by the wife was next recited; and delineating preciput, the right of the spouse to specific property in the event of dissolution of the community, frequently followed. Finally came the donation clause, usually a reciprocal grant of all or part of the predeceasing spouse's estate. In Louisiana, this donation, in order to be valid, had to be registered with the Superior Council in New Orleans. An inspection of the Sarrazin-Lepine marriage contract reveals that it very clearly drew on these French notarial precedents, and it reflects, moreover, an awareness of the practical requirements of the Louisiana registration provisions. It contained a promise to celebrate the marriage in regular fashion, the creation of a community property regime, a clause stating the amount of the wife's dowry, a 82. Id. 83. What follows is taken from Baade, supra note 39, at 15-18. 414 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 mutual donation to the survivor of all property owned at death, and an undertaking to have the contract registered in New Orleans.84 While there was no clause dealing with ante-nuptial debts and no mention of preciput, it is quite obvious that the good Jesuit knew more than a little about French notarial practice, and may well have had at his disposal a form book on which he could draw. He was, for all practical purposes, for a time the "lawyer" of the post as well as its cure. Before we leave this interesting document there is an aspect of it which bears detailed attention. The property regime chosen by the parties included in the community "all property, movable and immovable"85-as common lawyers would say, all property, both personal and real. In this respect the contract departs from the Custom of Paris which included in the community all movables but only certain immovables (conquets) acquired after marriage. 86 Parties were allowed in Louisiana to contract almost any property arrangement they wanted, 87 and Sarrazin and Lepine had elected a somewhat unusual variety of community. Curiously, however, the contract reckoned that this regime was "in accordance with the custom received in the colony of Louisiana." A few months after the execution of this contract Commandant de la Houssaye wrote to the governor to say that Monsieur Etienne V augine, a French officer, was of a mind to marry Madame de Gouyon, the commandant's sister-in-law, and he sent along "the proposed conditions for the contract of marriage."88 This was a draft of the contract, as De La Houssaye asked the governor to pass "/'exemplair du contra!" along to the New Orleans notary Chantaloux if the governor decided to give his permission for the marriage. Chantaloux was "to make it as it should be."89 Three weeks later the governor wrote to say that the contract would be sent back soon and that Chantaloux had left it intact except for one reasonably minor alteration.90 In 1758 Father Carette, dismayed by the irreligious inclination of his flock, left the Arkansas and no replacement was sent. In 17 64, 84. Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 25 LA. HlsT. Q. 856-57 (1942). 85. Id. at 856. 86. Baade, supra note 39, at 15. 87. Id. 88. La Houssaye to Vaudreuil, Dec. l, 1752, LO 410, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. 89. Id. 90. THE v AUDREUIL PAPERS, supra note 68, at 152. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 415 Captain Pierre Marie Cabaret Detrepi, commandant at the Arkansas, after Madame Sarrazin had found herself widowed, passed a second marriage contract for her which was extremely unsophisticated and rudimentary.91 It contained only a promise to marry regularly and a mutual donation. Perhaps the good widow had by this time tired of long-winded formalities. Just as likely, the Post was feeling the absence of Carette's drafting skills. VII As tiny, remote, and inconsequential as the Arkansas settlement was, then, it is nevertheless clear that at least some of its people were part of the time adherents to French legal culture. Of course almost everyone who lived at the Post during the period of French domination was either a native of France or French Canadian; and by the end of the French period a substantial number of native Louisianans were there. It is most interesting to find the survival of civilian legal form in so remote an outpost of empire. Obviously, not all of Arkansas's residents lapsed into a kind of legal barbarism. There were, however, circumstances at work which would make it impossible for some time to establish a community which could be expected to value the observance of legal niceties very highly. As we have already seen, the Post could not have been very attractive to the more civilized settler owing to its dangerous location. Arkansas Post, moreover, over the years experienced an extreme physical instability since it was necessary to relocate it several times due partly to flooding. (See Figure 2). The Arkansas River was in the eighteenth century "a turbulent, silt-laden stream, subject to frequent floods which were disastrous along its lower course."92 This proved to be a considerable disincentive to settlement. Add to that the enormous expanse occupied by the alluvial plain of the Mississippi and the difficulty becomes plain enough. Almost any site within thirty miles of the mouth of the Arkansas carried with it a considerable risk of floods. Law's colony, on the Arkansas twenty-seven miles or so from its mouth, was said in 1721 to be "in a fertile sector but subject to floods."93 The success of the attack by the Chickasaws in 1749, when the Post was at the same 91. Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, Feb. 11, 1764, Louisiana History Center, Louisiana State Museum, New Orleans. 92. P. HOI.DER, supra note 15, at 152. 93. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 273 (1974). 416 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 location, was made possible by the absence from the neighborhood of the Quapaws: Because of recent floods they had abandoned their old fields for a more promising place upstream.94 This place, called Ecores Rouges (Red Bluffs) by the French, was about thirty-six miles from the mouth of the Arkansas and was at the present location of the Arkansas Post Memorial.95 After the attack, the Post was moved to join the Indians at Ecores Rouges so as to provide for mutual protection.96 The new spot was free from floods but proved unsatisfactory from a strategic standpoint because of its distance from the Mississippi. The location delayed convoys and Governor Vaudreuil expressed the view that "a post on the Mississippi would be more practical."97 Therefore in 1756 the Post was moved back downriver to about ten miles above the mouth. But the inevitable soon occurred. In 1758 heavy flooding, graphically described in a letter of Etienne Maurafet Layssard the garde magasin (storekeeper) of the Post, caused heavy damage, almost undoing the work of builders and architects who had been at work for the better part of a year. The houses were saved by virtue of being raised on stakes against such a day as this; but the habitants' fields, everything but Layssard's garden for which he had providently provided a levee, were entirely inundated.98 It was in fact a small enough loss. From the beginning, and understandably, the attempt to make a stable agricultural community of the Arkansas had failed miserably. There is no doubt that the European population of Arkansas during the French period consisted almost entirely of hunters and Indian traders. In 1726 the reporter of the Louisiana census remarked of the Arkansas that "all the habitants were poor and lived only from the hunting of the Indians." 99 A 1746 report said of the twelve Arkansas habitant families 94. Faye, supra note 6, at 717-19. 95. See figure 2. 96. For details, see Appendix II to my forthcoming book, UNEQUAL LAWS UNTO A SAVAGE RACE; EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADlTIONS IN ARKANSAS, 1686-1836. 97. THE VAUDREUIL PAPERS, supra note 68, at 118. 98. Faye, supra note 6, at 718-19. A detailed description of the repairs made in the summer of 1758, evidently necessitated by these floods, is in ANC, CBA, 40:349-50 (Typescript in Little Rock Public Library). In addition to making repairs, the builders constructed a house 26 feet long and 19 wide just outside the fort for the Indians who came there on business. It was of poteaux en terre construction, was covered with shingles, and was enclosed with stakes. The report describing the renovation and construction work of 1758 is signed by Denis Nicol~s Foucault, chief engineer of the Province of Louisiana. 99. ANC, GI, 464 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM • DeWitt ARKANSAS COUNTY • Dumas I I I 0 1. 1686-1699; 1721-1749 N 1 DESHA COUNTY T I I 4 I 8 mi Figure 2 Locations of Arkansas Post, 1686-1983 2. 1749-1756; 1779-1983 3. 1756-1779 JB Based on a map drawn by John Baldwin which appeared in Arnold, The Relocation of Arkansas Post to Ecores Rouges in 1779, 42 ARK. HIST. Q. 317 (1983). Used with permission of the Arkansas Historical Association. 417 418 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 that "their principal occupation is hunting, curing meat, and commerce in tallow and bear oil." As for cultivating the soil, the same source reported that the habitants grew "some tobacco for their own use and for that of the savages and voyageurs." 100 In 1765 Captain Phillip Pittman, an Englishman, said that there were eight families living outside the fort who had cleared the land about nine hundred yards in depth. But, according to him "on account of the sandiness of the soil, and the lowness of the situation, which makes it subject to be overflowed," their harvest was not enough even to supply them with their necessary provisions. Pittman noted that "when the Mississippi is at its utmost height the Lands are overflow' d upwards of five feet; for this reason all the buildings are rais'd six feet from the ground." Thus the residents of the Arkansas, he said, subsisted mainly by hunting and every season sent to New Orleans "great quantities of bear's oil, tallow, salted buffalo meat, and a few skins." 101 Both Layssard102 and Father Watrin103 hint that the discouragement produced by the frequent flooding contributed to Father Carette's decision to leave. However that may be, it must be clear that during the period of French dominion the Post did not provide fertile soil for either crops or religion. Would regular bourgeois legal procedures have generally been afforded a more cordial acceptance? Even absent direct evidence, this would in the abstract seem most unlikely. Unsafe, unstable, and uncomfortable, the Arkansas Post of Louisiana during the period of French dominion must surely also have been largely unmindful of bourgeois legal values. It is true, as we have seen, that some of the Post's residents tried to maintain a connection between their remote outpost and European legal culture. But the few legal records that chance has allowed to come down to us from the French period are remarkable not only for their small number but also for the social and economic characteristics they reveal of the people who figured in them. They were an elite, related by marriage and blood, struggling under the difficult circumstances of their situation to participate in regular le- 100. Memoire, supra note 65 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). 101. P. PITTMAN, supra note 53, at xliv, 40-41. 10+. See ANC, Cl3A, 40:357 (Transcript in Little Rock Public Library). Layssard there remarks that the inhabitants at Arkansas were too poor to build a levee, and that "the Father would rather leave than go to such an expense. He is very poor." 103. See J. DELANGLEZ, THE FRENCH JESUITS IN LOWER LOUISIANA 444, where Watrin is quoted as saying that, despite there being little hope for conversion of the Quapaws, Father Carette "nevertheless followed both the French and the savages in their various changes of place, occasioned by the overflowing of the Mississippi near which the post is situated." 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 419 gal processes. The probate proceeding of 1743 was instituted by one of the most well-to-do residents of Arkansas in the person of Anne Catherine Chenalenne, widow of Jean Francois Lepine. The community property inventoried included four slaves. 104 Her future husband Charles Lincto became the most substantial civilian resident of the Post. The 17 49 census, if one excludes from it for the moment the commandant and his household, reveals that Lincto's household accounted for eight of the twenty-nine white habitants and seven of the eleven slaves at the Arkansas. 105 Etienne de Vaugine de Nuysement who executed the procuration of 1753 was a member of one of the most distinguished French families of Louisiana; 106 and he granted the power to Commandant de la Houssaye who would soon become a Major of New Orleans and a Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis. 107 Vaugine and De la Houssaye married sisters. The marriage contract executed at the Arkansas in 1752 was entered into by the Post's garde magasin and Francoise Lepine, a daughter of Anne Catherine Chenalenne the petitioner in the probate proceeding of 1743; and the bride's dowry had resulted from the dissolution of the community which had been the aim of that proceeding. Finally, Francoise Lepine's second marriage contract, passed by Detrepi in 1764, was prelude to her marriage to Jean Baptiste Tisserant de Montcharvaux, officer and interpreter at the Post and son of the commandant who executed the 1743 inventory. We are dealing with a propertied and interconnected gentry here, a tiny portion of what was anyway a very small population. How the other, the major part of the Arkansas populace regulated their lives during the French period will, in the nature of things, be difficult to document. But there is some evidence on this point and it indicates that there was a good deal of lawlessness on the Arkansas. According to Athanase de Mezieres, the Lieutenant Governor at Natchitoches, the Arkansas River above the Post was inhabited largely by outlaws. "Most of those who live there," he claimed, "have either deserted from the troops and ships of the most Christian King and have committed robberies, rape, or homicide, 104. For a translation of this inventory, see Core, supra note 54, at 22. 105. Resancement General des Habitants, Voyageurs, Femmes. En.fans, Esclaves, Clzevaus, Beufs, Vaclzes, Coclzons du Foste des Akansas, 1749. Lo. 200, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. 106. On the Arkansas Vaugines, see Core, T!ze Vaugine Arkansas Connection, 20 GRAND PRAIRIE HISTORICAL SOCIETY BULLETIN 6 (1978). 107. Faye, supra note 6, at 709. 420 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 that river being the asylum of the most wicked persons, without doubt, in all the Indies." 108 On another occasion, De Mezieres singled out as a particularly heinous offender an Arkansas denizen nicknamed Brindamur, a man "of gigantic frame and extraordinary strength." Brindamur, De Mezieres complained, "has made himself a petty king over those brigands and highwaymen, who, with contempt for law and subordination with equal insult to Christians, and the shame of the very heathen, up to now have maintained themselves on that river." 109 He had been resident on the Arkansas for a long time, as his name appears in the census of 1749. Interestingly, it is placed at the very head of a considerable list of "the voyageurs who have remained up the rivers despite the orders given them." 110 All persons hunting on the rivers were supposed to return every year as passports were not issued for longer periods. But there were large numbers of hunters who lived for twenty years or more in their camps without ever reporting to the Post. They constituted a large proportion, indeed sometimes a majority, of the European population in Arkansas during the French period. The 17 49 census, for instance, lists a habitant population of only thirty-one, including the commandant and his wife. But there were forty hunters on the Arkansas River whose passports had expired, and nine on the White and St. Francis Rivers. Sixteen hunters were said to be at the Post being outfitted to return to the hunt. Brindamur, the bandit King, was murdered by one of his men after the end of the French period, "though tardily" De Mezieres reckoned, and "by divine justice."111 In the Spanish period an effort was made to rid the river of these malefactors. VII Since no records of litigation initiated at the Arkansas during the French period have survived, if indeed any were ever kept, very little can be said directly on how lawsuits were conducted there. However, in 1747 Francois Jahan initiated a suit in the Superior Council in New Orleans against one Clermont, a resident of Arkansas Post, claiming damages for the conversion of a cask of rum at Arkansas. 112 The Superior Council, as we have shown, had jurisdic- 108. 1 ATHANASE DE MEZIERES AND THE LOUISIANA-TEXAS FRONTIER, 1768-1780 166 (H. Bolton ed., 1914). 109. Id. at 168-69. 110. Resancement, supra note 105. 111. t\. BOLTON, supra note 108, at 167. 112. Index lo the Records of the Superior Court of Louisiana, 17 LA. HIST. Q. 569 (1934). 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 421 tion throughout Louisiana, and this case reveals how it was exercised against a defendant in the hinterlands. The summons was served on the Attorney General of Louisiana; thus, as Henry Dart pointed out, "it would seem . . . that a resident of the Post of Arkansas could be sued in New Orleans by serving the citation on the Procureur [Attorney] General."113 How the case would have, in the ordinary instance, proceeded from there is difficult to say. Probably the Arkansas commandant would have been asked to act as a master to gather facts and to report to the Superior Council. But it seems that the commandant had already ruled independently on the matter. Commandant de Monbharvaux's statement on this case, which is entered in the record a'few days after the suit was initiated, indicates that he had held a hearing on the matter at the Arkansas, had taken testimony as to the rum, and had "sentenced Clermont to pay for it."114 Apparently he had kept no record of the proceeding, as none was offered: The good lieutenant bore his own record. It is interesting to note, however, that this case was evidently not brought to enforce the commandant's judgment but was an independent action. How did the justice provided by the Post commandant during the French period measure up? In the absence of litigation records, this is the hardest kind of question to answer. We know, however, that whatever jurisdiction was exerciseable by the commandant, he acted alone, without official advisors and without, of course, a jury. To say that rule is autocratic is not to say
Overview and introduction "Which organizational forms produce science? Expansion, diversity, and cooperation in Germany's higher education and science system embedded within the global context, 1900-2010". Already the title of my dissertation manifests an approach that examines the topic of the development of scientific productivity in the German higher education and science landscape from different perspectives: levels, dimensions, and an extensive timeframe. Deriving from and contributing to the international research project "Science Productivity, Higher Education, Research and Development, and the Knowledge Society" (SPHERE), my research focuses on the investigation of the influence of higher education development and science capacity-building on scientific knowledge production, globally, comparatively, and considerable depth for Germany, a key science producer for well over a century. Focusing mainly on the different structures and institutional settings of the German higher education and science system, the dissertations shows how these affected and contributed to the long-term development of scientific productivity worldwide. The historical, comparative, and in-depth analyses are especially important in light of advancing globalization and internationalization of science, stronger networks of scientists worldwide, and the emergence of the "knowledge society". The research design combines macro- and meso-level analyses: the institutionalized and organizational settings in which science is produced. Since information about single authors was limited in availability, extensive micro-level analyses were not possible here, yet the research articles analyzed were all written and published by individuals working in organizations, which are in the center of analysis here. By reference to the dimensions expansion, diversity, and cooperation, I elaborated the frame of my investigation, and sorted my research questions, including country, organizational field and form, and organizational levels. The structure of this work (see outline) addresses these themes and the observed timeframe spans the years from 1900 to 2010 – more than a century (see section 1.2). My main goal was to investigate how and why scientists publish their research results in peer-reviewed journal articles. The point is to emphasize the importance of scientific findings/discoveries, because non-published results are non-existent for the scientific community. From the ways and in which formats scientists publish their work, we can deduce how science is organized (within and across disciplines). My dissertation analyzes publications in peer-reviewed journals, because they are the most important format – alongside patents in applied fields – to disseminate new knowledge in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and health (hereafter STEM+ fields). Articles not only record new knowledge, but also contribute to the reputation of researchers and their organizations. Journal publications in reputable journals with peer-review have become the "gold standard" measure of scientific productivity. Within the last several decades, the scientization of many dimensions of societal life proceeded, and the generation of new knowledge increasingly became the focus of political, economic, and social interests – and research policymaking. Therefore, it is important to identify the institutionalized settings (organizations/organizational forms) in which science can best be produced. Here, the diverse types of organizations that produce science – mainly universities, research institutes, companies, government agencies and hospitals – were identified and differences and similarities of these organizational forms were analyzed on the basis of their character, goals, tasks, and the kinds of research their members produce. In a first step, I show why I structured my work at the interface of higher education research, science studies, and bibliometrics (see chapters 2 and 5). Analyzing publications is still the key task of bibliometrics, but the results are used by many other actors as well: higher education managers, politicians, and scientists themselves to make claims about the quality of science, to compare each other, or to influence the structure, organization, and output of the higher education and science system. While it is difficult to make direct statements about the quality of research on the basis of simply counting the number of research articles a scientist publishes, the quality of journals is used as a proxy to compare across disciplines. To measure quality, other parameters are necessary. Thus, here statements focus on the quantity of science produced, not on the intrinsic quality of the analyzed research articles, the specific research achievements of individual scholars, organizations or organizational forms, or even countries. Nevertheless, output indicators elaborated here definitely show the huge expansion of scientific production and productivity, the stability of the research university over time as the most important science producer in Germany, but also rising differentiation and diversification of the organizational forms contributing to overall scientific output. Furthermore, the start of a considerable and on-going rise in national and international collaborations can be dated to the early 1990s. The chapter about the multidisciplinary context (see chapter 2) discusses the relationship between higher education research and science studies in Germany as well as the special position of scientific knowledge in comparison to other forms of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is generated, distributed, and consumed by the scientific community. To get an overview about the most important studies in the field, and to contextualize my work within the already existing empirical studies, I describe the current state of research in chapter 3. Research questions Section 1.2 provides a detailed description of my research questions: Which organizational forms produce science? 1. How has worldwide and European scientific productivity developed between 1900 and 2010 in comparison? 2. How has the German higher education and science system been embedded in the global developments of higher education and science over time? 3. How has scientific productivity in Germany developed between 1900 and 2010? 4. Among all science-producing organizational forms, what do the key organizational forms contribute to scientific productivity? 5. Which organizational forms provide the best conditions for scientific productivity? 6. Which single organizations produce the most research in Germany? 7. What is the impact of increasing internationalization of research on national and international cooperation, measured in publications in scientific journals? Theoretical framework Theoretically (see chapter 4), I apply a neo-institutional (NI) framework to explore and explain both the tremendous expansion of higher education and science across the world and considerable differences across time and space in the institutional settings, organizational forms, and organizations that produce scientific research in Germany. Sociological NI focuses on understanding institutions as important in guiding social action and shaping processes of social development. Such an approach emphasizes the development, functioning, and principles of institutions. Milestones in NI describe the nexus of organization and society supposing that organizational structures express myths and reflect ideals institutionalized in their environment. While capturing, copying, and asserting these, structural similarity (institutional isomorphism) between organizations in society will be established. The concept of "organizational field" emphasizes relationships between organizations within an environment. Organizational fields (communities) consist of all relevant organizations. In section 4.1.2 I discuss the differences between institutions and organizations and the difficulty of a distinction of the terms, especially in German-speaking sociology, which does not distinguish clearly between these terms. Fundamentally, NI approaches differ in the dimensions or pillars and levels of analysis they privilege (see figure 5, p. 80), but they share fundamental principles and the theoretical framework. Thus NI is particularly suitable for a multi-level analysis of scientific productivity across time and space. The historical development of the German higher education and science system must analyzed considering also global developments, because on the one hand it had an enormous impact on the development of other systems worldwide, and, on the other hand, global trends affect the on-going institutionalization and organization(s) of science in Germany. Intersectoral and international cooperation is growing and becoming increasingly important, leading to diverse networks within and between higher education and science systems worldwide. The classical, national case study is hardly longer possible, because macro units like countries are highly interdependent, embedded in global, regional and local relationships, such that borders between the global and the national dimension are increasingly blurred. Nevertheless, countries are units with clearly defined boundaries and structures, thus they can be handled as units to compare. The theoretical perspectives and different levels of analysis addressed here are displayed in Figure 5. I apply the "world polity" approach as a broader lense with which to make sense of the truly global arena of higher education and science (macro level). The focus of this perspective is on global and international structures and processes, which developed over time. Through this perspective, I explore global diffusion and formal structures of formal principles and practical applications. Combining historical and sociological institutionalism helps to focus on developments and processes over time on the meso level, to explain how institutions have developed and change(d). The concepts of "critical junctures" and path dependencies are useful to explain these processes over time. To describe the transformation of knowledge production over the entire twentieth century, and to analyze different organizational forms that produce science in Germany, two prevalent theoretical concepts are discussed: Mode 1 versus Mode 2 science, and the Triple-Helix model to describe the relationship between science, industry and state. In "The New Production of Knowledge" Michael Gibbons and his colleagues describe the transformation of knowledge from an academic, disciplinary, and autonomous – "traditional" – organization of science (Mode 1) with a focus on universities as the key organizational form, to a more applied, transdisciplinary, diverse, and reflexive organization of science (Mode 2) that features a more diverse organization of science, relying on a broader set of organizations producing knowledge. Within the literature, debates center on whether this new model has replaced the old, and which of these models best describes the contemporary organization of science (here: the STEM+ fields). In turn, the Triple-Helix model preserves the historical importance of the universities. This approach assumes that future innovations emerge from a relationship between universities (production of new knowledge), industry (generation of wealth), and state (control). Data and methods In these analyses, only peer reviewed journal publications were used – as the best indicator for measuring the most legitimated, authoritative produced science. This focus enabled an investigation of publications in-depth and over a 110 year timeframe. Research articles in the most reputable, peer-reviewed, and internationally reputable journals are the gold standard of scientific output in STEM+. The data I used is based on a stratified representative sample of published research articles in journals in STEM+-fields. My measure relies on the key global source for such data, the raw data from Thomson Reuters' Web of Science Science Citation Index Expanded (SCIE) (the other global database is Elsevier's Scopus, which also indexes tens of thousands of journals), which was extensively recoded. Methodologically, my approach is based on a combination of comparative institutional analysis across selected countries and historically of the German higher education and science system, and the systematic global evaluation of bibliometric publication data (see chapter 6). The SCIE includes more than 90 million entries (all types of research), mainly from STEM+-fields. I focus on original research articles, because this type of publication contains certified new knowledge. The SPHERE dataset covers published research articles from 1900 to 2010. From 1900 to 1970, we selected data in 5-year-steps in the form of a stratified representative sample. From 1975 onwards full data is available for every year. Depending on the research question, either five or ten-year steps were analyzed. A detailed description of the sampling and weighting of the data can be found in chapter 6. In consideration of the criteria above, I analyzed 17,568 different journals (42,963 journals were included into the database if we count the same journals in different years), and a total of 5,089,233 research articles. To prepare the data for this research, it had to be extensively cleaned and coded. Very often our international research team found missing information on the country level and/or on the level of organizations/organizational forms. From June 2013 to December 2015, research in the archives of university libraries was necessary to manually add missing information, particularly organization location and author affiliations. In the field of bibliometrics, we find different methods to count publications. In this work, I mainly apply the "whole count" approach (see table 1, p. 126). This decision is based on the assumption that every author, organization, or country contributed equally to a publication. An overestimation of publications can't be precluded, because research articles are counted multiple times, if a paper is produced in co-authorship, which has been rising worldwide over the past several decades. The absolute number of publications (worldwide, Europe, Germany) is based on a simple counting of research articles (without duplicates, in cases of co-authored articles). Summary of the most important results The empirical part of my work is divided into three parts. In the following sections, I will present the most important findings. The global picture – higher education and science systems in comparison The central question of my research project was "which organizational forms produce science"? For a better understanding and classification of the results of my case study, I embedded the German higher education and science system into the European and global context. I answered the questions "how did the worldwide and European scientific productivity developed between 1900 and 2010 in comparison", and "how was/is the German higher education and science system embedded in global developments of higher education and science over time" as follows: First, I show that the worldwide scientific growth followed a pure exponential curve between 1900 and 2010 (see figures 3 and 10; pp. 50, 147) – and we can assume that this strong upward trend continues today. The massive expansion of scientific production had and still has a tremendous influence on societal developments, beyond simply economic and technical developments, but rather transforming society. I show that higher education and science systems worldwide exhibit communalities, which have led to similar developments and expansion of scientific productivity. The comparison of important European countries (Germany in comparison with Great Britain, France, Belgium and Luxembourg) uncovered the contribution of the development and spread of modern research universities and the extraordinary and continued rise in publication output (see section 7.2; Powell, Dusdal 2016, 2017a, 2017b in press). Within the global field of science, three geographical centers of scientific productivity have emerged over the twentieth century: Europe, North America, and Asia. Their relative importance fluctuates over time, but today all three centers continue to be the key regions in the production of scientific research in STEM+ journals. Especially in Asia, the growth rates have risen massively in recent years (Powell et al. 2017 in press). Second, I investigated that all countries worldwide invest more into research and development (R&D) (figure 9, p. 140). These investments have a clear impact on the scientific productivity of nations, yet there are important differences between countries in absolute production and productivity rates. Alongside direct investments in R&D or the application of patents in STEM+-fields that influence the expansion of science, the capacity for producing more knowledge fundamentally depends on rising student enrolments, a growing number of researchers, the widening of research activities into various arenas of society, the development of products, and the (re-)foundation of universities (Powell, Baker, Fernandez 2017 in press). As part of the higher education expansion and massification during the 1960s and 70s, the numbers of researchers and students rose tremendously. The growth of scientific publications thus results from the on-going institutionalization of higher education and science systems worldwide. The growth of publications is also explained by the steady growth in the number of researchers working within these growing – and increasingly interconnected – systems. Third, I could reject the argument of Derek J. de Solla Price that the pure exponential growth of scientific literature has to flatten or would slow-down several decades after the advent of "big science" (see paragraph 2.4; figure 4 and 10; p. 53, 147). Although radical historical, political, economical, and technical events (see figure 11, p. 150) led to punctual short-term decreases in publication outputs, the long-term development of universities and other organizational forms producing science led to sustained growth of scientific publications, with the numbers of publications rising unchecked over the long twentieth century. In 2010, the worldwide scientific productivity in leading STEM+ journals was about one million articles annually. Fourth, I could show that the absolute numbers have to be put into perspective and standardized in relation to the investments in R&D, the size of the higher education and science systems, the number of inhabitants (see figure 12, p. 159), and the number of researchers (table 3, p. 162; figure 13, p. 164). The initial expansion of scientific publications in STEM+-fields is based on a general growth of higher education and science systems. The different institutional settings and organizational forms that produce science have an impact on scientific productivity. The selected country case studies – Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Luxembourg – demonstrate that systems with strong research universities are highly productive; they seem to provide conditions necessary for science. As a result, not only the number and quality of researchers is important, but also the institutional and organizational settings in which they are employed. Fifth, in international comparison, Germany continues to contribute significantly to scientific productivity in STEM+ fields. With an annual growth rate of 3.35%, Germany follows the United States and Japan. In 2014, German governments invested €84.5 billion in R&D – 2.9% of overall GDP. The EU-target of 3% by 2020 was barely missed. In 2010, Germany produced 55,009 research articles (see table A5). In comparison to Great Britain, France, Belgium and Luxemburg, Germany still leads in scientific output in Europe –comparing just the absolute numbers. The size of the country itself and the institutionalization of the higher education and science systems influence publication outputs, of course, with these absolute numbers in relation to other key indicators showing a different picture. Standardized by the number of inhabitants, Germany published less articles per capita than Belgium and Great Britain. The number of researchers amounted to 327,997 (FTE) in 2010. The ratio of inhabitants to scientists was 1,000:4. Among these countries studied in-depth, Luxembourg and Great Britain had more researchers per capita than did Germany. The interplay of the organizational forms of science in Germany between 1900 and 2010 On the basis of the analysis of the global and European contexts, and development of worldwide scientific productivity over time in chapter 7, I started the in-depth case study of Germany. Bridging this overview and the following in-depth analyses is a chapter on the institutionalization of the German higher education and science system (see chapter 8). Here, I described the most important institutions and organizations and the organizational field – universities, extra-university research institutes and universities of applied sciences. Furthermore, I discussed the differences between West and East Germany during their division (1945–1990). Summarizing the most important results shows that the development of publications in Germany follows global and European trends (on a lower scale) (see figure 16, p. 208). Over time, Germany experienced pure exponential growth of scientific publications and a rising diversity of organizational forms that contribute to scientific productivity (see sections 9.1 and 9.3). I answered the following three research questions: "how has the scientific productivity in Germany developed between 1900 and 2010", "among all science producing organizational forms, what do the key organizational forms contribute to scientific productivity", "which organizational forms provide the best conditions for scientific productivity", and "which single organizations are the most research intense in Germany"? First, the growth curve of scientific publications in Germany turns out as expected – it shows pure exponential graph, comparable with the worldwide and European development of scientific productivity between 1900 and 2010. Here, too, cataclysmic events such as the two world wars and the Great Depression as well as reunification had only short-term (negative) impact (figure 11, p. 150) on scientific productivity, without even a medium-term slow-down or flattening of the curve. By 2010, the total number of publications in STEM+ fields by researchers in German organizations topped 55,000 in one year alone. Second, a detailed examination and comparison of the development of scientific productivity in West Germany and East Germany between 1950 and 1990 showed that the growth rate of Germany (altogether) was based mainly on steady growth of scientific publications in West Germany (see figure 17, p. 211). The growth curve of the former GDR was quite flat and proceeded on a very low level. As a result, I conclude that the GDR's higher education and science system, based on its academy model, did not provide conditions for scientific productivity as optimally as did the BRD. Third, a detailed analysis of the "key classical" organizational forms of science – universities and extra-university research institutes – show that universities were and are the main producers of scientific publications in STEM+ from 1975 to 2010 (see figure 18, p. 217). On average, university-based researchers produced 60% of all articles and defended their status against other organizational forms, which leads to the rejection of the Mode 2 hypothesis. Non-university publications reached an average of 40%. But that does not mean that other organizational forms were not producing science as well. The percentage share of articles is ultrastable and shows only marginal variations. The thesis that the proportion of university publications should decrease over time can be rejected for the period from 1975 to 2010. This suggests that scientific productivity of universities is actually rising, since despite decreasing financial support (R&D) in favor of extra-university research institutes, the universities produced more research articles with less resources over time. Fourth, although not only scientists within universities and research institutes publish their research in scientific journals, jointly these organizational forms have produced more than three-quarters of all research articles since 1980. Already in the earlier years, they produced a large number of scientific articles. Other organizational forms also generate scientific knowledge (for an extensive description of the organizational form matrix, see table 4, pp. 222f.). Especially scientists in firms, government agencies, and hospitals publish articles in peer-reviewed journals in STEM+ (see figures 19 and 20; pp. 220, 246). Indeed, the universities have been the driving force of scientific productivity for more than a century. With their specific orientation to basic research and their linkage of research and teaching, they provide conditions that facilitate the production of science. Universities are among the oldest institutions with a high degree of institutionalization. All other organizational forms (academies, associations, infrastructures, laboratories, military, museums and non-university education) were identified in the dataset played only a minor role and were summarized in the category "further types". Fifth, the analysis of the ten most research-intensive single organizations in Germany in the year 2010 confirmed the results. Only universities and institutes were part of this group. A summary of publications of single institutes under their umbrella organizations shows that the institutes of the Max Planck Society and of the Helmholtz Association are the leading science producers in Germany, outpacing the scientific productivity of universities, but only when aggregating the contributions of dozens of individual institutes (see table 5, p. 259f). An analysis of single institutes shows that these research institutes cannot compete with universities, because of their size and the number of researchers. The Charite – Universitätsmedizin Berlin, a hybrid organization, is another leading science producer in Germany. National and international cooperation of scientific research Finally, increasing internationalization of research has impacted on national and international cooperation. leading to collaboratively-written publications in scientific journals. Through advancing globalization, national and international scientific cooperation increased in volume and importance. International cooperation in STEM+ is facilitated by the reputation of the research organization and of the co-authors, higher visibility within the scientific community and more possibilities for interdisciplinary research as well as better or more specialized facilities. Today, more than a third of all research articles worldwide are produced in scientific collaboration; only around a quarter are single-authored articles. In contrast to Humboldt's principle "in Einsamkeit und Freiheit" (in loneliness and freedom), research is no longer done by one scientist, but is much more likely the result of collaboration. Research networks are increasingly important, and researchers share their common interests on a research question, publishing their results in joint publications. Researchers, organizations, and indeed countries differ in the ways they organize their research and thus how they enable research and collaboration. This depends on location, size, higher education and science system, the organizational field and organizations. Here, varying patterns of scientific cooperation were presented, showing a massive increase in scientific collaboration in (inter)national co-authorships over time. Until the 1990s, researchers in all investigated countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, USA, Japan, China, Belgium, Luxembourg) published their research articles mainly as single-authored papers. Only since the 1990s have co- and multi-authored publications risen (considerably): In 2000, only a third of all publications were published by one author. In 2010, the proportion reached its lowest level with only one-fifth of all papers single-authored (see table 6, pp. 279f). Countries differ considerably in their amount of collaboratively-written research articles. References Powell, J. J. W. & Dusdal, J. (2016). Europe's Center of Science: Science Productivity in Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg. EuropeNow, 1(1). http://www.europenowjournal.org/2016/11/30/europes-center-of-science-science-productivity-in-belgium-france-germany-and-luxembourg/. Last access: 13.12.2016. Powell, J. J. W. & Dusdal, J. (2017a): Measuring Research Organizations' Contributions to Science Productivity in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math in Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Minerva, (). Online first. DOI:10.1007/s11024-017-9327-z. Powell, J. J. W. & Dusdal, J. (2017b in press). The European Center of Science Productivity: Research Universities and Institutes in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. IN Powell, J. J. W., Baker, D. P. & Fernandez, F. (Hg.) The Century of Science: The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing. Powell, J. J. W., Baker, D. P. & Fernandez, F. (2017 in press). The Century of Science: The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing. Powell, J. J. W., Fernandez, F., Crist, J. T., Dusdal, J., Zhang, L. & Baker, D. P. (2017 in press). The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University and Globalizing Science. IN Powell, J. W., Baker, D. P. & Fernandez, F. (Hg.) The Century of Science: The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing. ; Überblick und Einleitung Bereits der Titel meiner Dissertation "Welche Organisationsformen produzieren Wissenschaft? Expansion, Vielfalt und Kooperation im deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem im globalen Kontext, 1900-2010" verspricht, dass sich dem Thema der Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Produktivität in Deutschland aus verschiedenen Perspektiven (Analyseebenen, Dimensionen und Zeitrahmen) genähert werden soll. Eingebettet in das international vergleichende Forschungsprojekt Science Productivity, Higher Education, Research and Development, and the Knowledge Society (SPHERE) rückt meine Dissertation die Analyse des Einflusses der Hochschulentwicklung und der wissenschaftlichen Kapazitätsbildung auf die wissenschaftliche Wissensproduktion in den Vordergrund. Es interessiert mich, wie die im deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem vorherrschenden Strukturen und institutionellen Settings die langfristige Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Produktivität beeinflusst und verändert haben. Besonders vor dem Hintergrund einer voranschreitenden Globalisierung und Internationalisierung der Wissenschaft, einer weltweiten Vernetzung von Wissenschaftlern und der Herausbildung einer Wissensgesellschaft. Die Annäherung an den Forschungsgegentand erfolgt auf der Makro- und Mesoebene: den institutionalisierten und organisationalen Settings, in denen Wissenschaft produziert wurde und wird. Da Informationen zu einzelnen Autoren nicht zur Verfügung standen, können keine Aussagen auf der Mikroebene getroffen werden, wenngleich Publikationen natürlich immer von Individuen verfasst werden und nicht von den hier untersuchten Ländern oder Organisationsformen und Einzelorganisationen. Anhand der Dimensionen Expansion, Vielfalt und Kooperation wird der Untersuchungsrahmen abgesteckt und eine Ordnung der Fragestellung vorgenommen, an denen die Struktur der Arbeit ausgerichtet ist. Der Zeitrahmen der Arbeit umfasst die Jahre 1900 bis 2010, also mehr als ein Jahrhundert (siehe Abschnitt 1.2). Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es darzulegen, warum Wissenschaftler ihre Ergebnisse in Form von Zeitschriftenartikeln publizieren. Es geht unter anderem darum, die Wichtigkeit wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse hervorzuheben, da nicht publizierte Ergebnisse für die Wissenschaft nicht existieren und sich aus der Art und Weise, wie publiziert wird, die Organisation der Forschung innerhalb und übergreifend einer Disziplin oder eines Fachs ableiten lässt. In den in dieser Arbeit untersuchten Fächergruppen Mathematik, Ingenieur-, Natur- und Technikwissenschaften sowie Medizin (im Folgenden angelehnt an die englische Abkürzung STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) plus Medicine als STEM+ bezeichnet) spielen Publikationen in peer reviewed Zeitschriften eine wichtige Rolle – neben Patenten in den angewandteren Fächergruppen sind sie heutzutage das wichtigste Publikationsformat. Sie dienen nicht nur der Dokumentation generierten Wissens, sondern sind auch ein Anzeiger für die Reputation eines Forschers und dienen der Messung wissenschaftlicher Produktivität. Zeitschriftenpublikationen in hochklassigen Zeitschriften, die einem peer review Verfahren unterliegen, können als gold standard zur Messung wissenschaftlicher Produktivität herangezogen werden. In den letzten Jahrzehnten kam es zu einer zunehmenden Verwissenschaftlichung vieler gesellschaftlichen Teilbereiche und die Generierung wissenschaftlichen Wissens rückte immer weiter ins Zentrum des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interesses, unabhängig davon, wo es produziert wurde. Aus diesem Grund werden die Orte und institutionellen Settings (Organisationen, Organisationsformen) wissenschaftlicher Produktivität (hauptsächlich Universitäten, außeruniversitäre Forschungsinstitute, Unternehmen, Behörden und Ressortforschungseinrichtungen und Krankenhäuser) identifiziert und voneinander abgegrenzt. Indem ihre Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede anhand ihrer Aufgaben und Ziele sowie der Art der Forschung diskutiert werden. In einem ersten Schritt lege ich dar, warum ich diese Arbeit an der Schnittstelle zwischen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsforschung und der Bibliometrie angelegt habe (siehe Kapitel 2 und 5). Publikationsanalysen werden zwar immer noch als Hauptaufgabe der Bibliometrie gesehen, aber ihre Ergebnisse werden auch von anderen Akteuren wie Hochschulmanagern, Politikern und Wissenschaftlern genutzt, um einerseits Aussagen über die Qualität der Wissenschaft zu treffen, aber auch um sich miteinander zu vergleichen oder steuernd in die Struktur und Organisation einzugreifen und Aussagen über den Output des Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems zu treffen. Direkte Aussagen über die Qualität der Forschung auf Basis der Anzahl an Zeitschriftenartikeln, die ein Wissenschaftler publiziert, können nicht getroffen werden, es kann aber über die Qualität einer Zeitschrift (Impactfactor) ein Proxi gebildet werden, mit dessen Hilfe Vergleiche zwischen Disziplinen getroffen werden können. Um wissenschaftliche Produktivität zu messen, müssten ergänzende Parameter hinzugezogen werden. Aus diesem Grund werden in dieser Arbeit lediglich Aussagen über die Quantität wissenschaftlicher Produktivität getroffen, nicht aber über die Qualität der untersuchten Zeitschriftenartikel, die Forschungsleistung einzelner Wissenschaftler, Organisationen oder Organisationsformen und einzelner Länder. Nichtdestotrotz zeigen Indikatoren zur Messung wissenschaftlichen Outputs eine große Expansion wissenschaftlicher Produktivität, eine Stabilität der Universitäten im Zeitverlauf und die Wichtigkeit Deutschlands als Wissensschaftsproduzent sowie eine steigende Differenzierung und Diversifizierung der Organisationsformen. Zudem können die 1990er Jahre als Startpunkt steigender nationaler und internationaler Kooperationen gesehen werden. In Kapitel 2 zum multidisziplinären Kontext der Arbeit zeige ich, in welcher Beziehung sich die Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsforschung in Deutschland zueinander befinden. Wissenschaftliches Wissen nimmt eine Sonderstellung im Vergleich zu anderen Wissensformen ein, da es unter bestimmten Bedingungen, die von der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft selbst bestimmt werden, generiert und verbreitet wird. Um einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Studien innerhalb meines Feldes zu bekommen, und um meine Arbeit in den empirischen Kontext zu rücken, beschreibe ich in Kapitel 3 dieser Arbeit den aktuellen Forschungsstand. Forschungsfragen Abschnitt 1.2 stellt einen detaillierten Überblick über die dieser Arbeit zugrunde liegenden Forschungsfragen bereit: Welche Organisationsformen produzieren Wissenschaft? 1. Wie hat sich die wissenschaftliche Produktivität weltweit und im europäischen Vergleich zwischen 1900 und 2010 entwickelt? 2. Wie war/ist das deutsche Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem in die globalen Entwicklungen der Hochschulbildung und Wissenschaft im Zeitverlauf eingebettet? 3. Wie hat sich die wissenschaftliche Produktivität in Deutschland zwischen 1900 und 2010 entwickelt? 4. Unter allen Wissenschaft produzierenden Organisationsformen, was tragen die "klassischen" Formen zur wissenschaftlichen Produktivität bei? 5. Welche Organisationsformen stellen die besten Bedingungen für wissenschaftliche Produktivität bereit? 6. Welche Einzelorganisationen gehören zu den forschungsstärksten in Deutschland? 7. Welchen Einfluss hat die zunehmende Internationalisierung der Forschung auf nationale und internationale Kooperationen in Form von Publikationen in Zeitschriftenartikeln? Theoretischer Rahmen Theoretisch (siehe Kapitel 4) basiert meine Arbeit auf einem neu-institutionellen (NI) Ansatz zur Untersuchung und Erklärung der Expansion des Hochschulwesens und der Wissenschaft weltweit. Trotz des allgemeinen Wachstums wissenschaftlicher Produktivität bestehen beträchtliche Unterschiede zwischen den institutionellen Settings, Organisationsformen und einzelner Organisationen, die maßgeblich zur wissenschaftlichen Produktivität beitragen. Der soziologische NI konzentriert sich auf das Verständnis von Institutionen und Organisationen. Institutionen sind ein wichtiger Baustein, um soziales Handeln und Prozesse der Gesellschaftsentwicklung zu verstehen. Organisationen und Institutionen stehen in einer wechselseitigen Beziehung zueinander. Die zentralen Annahmen des NI wurden von Walter Powell, Paul DiMaggio und Richard Scott formuliert. Meilensteine: der Zusammenhang von Organisation und Gesellschaft und die Annahme, dass formale Organisationsstrukturen Mythen zum Ausdruck bringen, die in ihrer gesellschaftlichen Umwelt institutionalisiert sind. Indem Organisationen diese Mythen erfassen, kopieren und zeremoniell zur Geltung bringen, werden Strukturähnlichkeiten (Isomorphien) zwischen Organisationen und der Gesellschaft hergestellt. Das Konzept der "organisationalen Felder" dient der Beschreibung der Beziehung zwischen verschiedenen Organisationen und beinhaltet alle relevanten Organisationen, die sich mit ihrer gesellschaftlichen Umwelt auseinander setzen. In Abschnitt 4.1.2 werden die Unterschiede zwischen den Begriffen Institutionen und Organisationen diskutiert, da diese besonders in der deutschsprachigen Soziologie nicht trennscharf genutzt werden. Grundsätzlich unterscheiden sich Ansätze institutioneller Theorie in ihrer Anwendungsebene, sie sind aber durch ihren Überbau miteinander verschränkt. Folglich ist der NI als theoretische Basis besonders gut geeignet, um eine Mehrebenenanalyse der wissenschaftlichen Produktivität zeit- und ortsübergreifend durchzuführen. Die historische Entwicklung des deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems kann nicht ohne eine Berücksichtigung der globalen Entwicklungen durchgeführt werden, da es einerseits einen enormen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung anderer Systeme weltweit hatte/hat und andererseits globale Entwicklungen die Institutionalisierung und Organisation der Wissenschaft in Deutschland beeinflussen. Intersektorale und internationale Kooperationen sind im Zeitverlauf angewachsen, werden immer wichtiger und führen zu ausgeprägten Netzwerken innerhalb und zwischen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystemen weltweit. Aufgrund einer zunehmenden Verzahnung einzelner Länder und den damit einhergehenden Wechselwirkungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Analyseebenen (makro, meso, mikro) ist eine klassische, nationalstaatliche Analyse nicht mehr zielführend. Nichtsdestotrotz können Länder als vergleichbare Einheiten gesehen werden, da sie über klar definierte Grenzen und Strukturen verfügen. Die unterschiedlichen theoretischen Perspektiven und Analyseebenen werden in Abbildung 5 genauer beschrieben. Der theoretische Ansatz der "Weltkultur" bietet eine breitere Linse des soziologischen NI auf die globale Arena. Der Fokus liegt auf globalen und internationalen Strukturen und Prozessen, die sich über lange Zeit entwickelt haben. Mit Hilfe dieser Perspektive können globale Diffusion und formale Strukturen der Entkopplung von formalen Grundsätzen und praktischer Anwendung erklärt werden. Zusammen nehmen der historische und soziologische Institutionalismus zeitliche Entwicklungen und Prozesse in den Blick, die erklären, wie Institutionen entstehen und sich verändern. Die Konzepte critical junctures und Pfadabhängigkeit sollen helfen diese Prozesse auf der Mesoebene zu verstehen. Um die Transformation der Wissensproduktion im Zeitverlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts zu verstehen und um zu analysieren, welche Organisationsformen an der Produktion wissenschaftlichen Wissens beteiligt waren, werden zwei theoretische Konzepte herangezogen: Modus 1 versus Modus 2 Wissenschaft und das Triple-Helix Modell zur Beschreibung der Beziehung zwischen Wissenschaft, Industrie und Staat. In The New Production of Knowledge beschreiben Michael Gibbons und seine Kollegen den Wandel der Wissenschaft von einer akademischen, disziplinären und autonomen, traditionellen, Organisation der Wissenschaft (Modus 1) mit einem Schwerpunkt auf Universitäten als wichtigste Organisationsform, hin zu einer anwendungsorientierteren, transdisziplinären, diversen und reflexiven Organisation der Wissenschaft (Modus 2), die eine diversere Organisation der Wissenschaft unterstützt und auf einem breiteren organisationalen Setting der Wissensproduktion beruht. Innerhalb der Literatur wird diskutiert, ob das neue Modell das alte ersetzen soll und welches der Modelle die gegenwärtige Organisation der Wissenschaft am besten beschreibt. Im Gegensatz hierzu bleibt beim Triple-Helix Modell die historische Rolle der Universitäten erhalten. Der Ansatz geht davon aus, dass zukünftige Innovationen aus einer Beziehung von Universitäten (Wissensproduktion), Industrie (Generierung von Wohlstand) und dem Staat (Kontrolle) resultieren. Daten und Methoden In dieser Arbeit werden ausschließlich Publikationen in peer reviewed Zeitschriften als Kennzeichen wissenschaftlicher Produktivität herangezogen. Dieser Schwerpunkt ermöglicht mir eine tiefgreifende Analyse von Publikationen über einen Zeitraum von mehr als einem Jahrhundert. Zeitschriftenartikel in hochklassigen und möglichst internationalen Journalen bilden den gold standard wissenschaftlichen Outputs in den hier untersuchten Mathematik, Ingenieur-, Natur- und Technikwissenschaften sowie der Medizin (STEM+). Meine Daten basieren auf einem stratifizierten, repräsentativen Sample (siehe ausführlich Kapitel 6) publizierter Zeitschriften, die als Rohdaten aus Thomson Reuters Web of Science Science Citation Index Expanded (SCIE) zur Analyse zur Verfügung stehen (eine vergleichbare Datenbank stellt Elseviers Scopus bereit). Methodologisch wird eine Kombination aus einer vergleichenden institutionelle Analyse ausgewählter Länder, eine historische Untersuchung des deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems und eine systematische, globale Auswertung bibliometrischer Publikationsdaten angestrebt. Der SCIE umfasst mehr als 90 Millionen Einträge (gespeichert werden nahezu alle Typen wissenschaftlichen Outputs), hauptsächlich aus den oben genannten Fächergruppen. Diese Arbeit beschränkt sich auf originale Zeitschriftenartikel (Originalmitteilungen), da lediglich dieser Publikationstyp zertifiziertes und neues Wissen enthält. Der SPHERE Datensatz umfasst publizierte Zeitschriftenartikel aus den Jahren 1900 bis 2010. Von 1900 bis 1970 wurden die Daten in 5-Jahres-Schritten mittels einer geschichteten Zufallsstichprobe ausgewählt. Ab 1975 stehen die Daten vollständig und ab 1980 in Jahresschritten zur Verfügung. Abhängig von der untersuchten Fragestellung werden die Daten in 5-Jahres- oder 10-Jahres-Schritten analysiert. Eine detaillierte Beschreibung des Samplings und der Gewichtung der Daten kann den Abschnitten 6.2.2 und 6.8 entnommen werden. Unter Berücksichtigung dieser Kriterien werden 17.568 unterschiedliche Zeitschriften (42.963 Zeitschriften, wenn dieselbe Zeitschrift in unterschiedlichen Jahren mehrfach berücksichtigt wird) und 5.089.233 Forschungsartikel untersucht. Um die Daten für die Analyse aufzubereiten muss eine intensive Vorarbeit geleistet werden. Sie werden umfassend (nach-)kodiert und bereinigt. Besonders häufig sind Fehler oder fehlende Informationen auf Ebene der Länder und/oder der Organisationen/Organisationsformen, in denen die Forschung betrieben wurde. Im Zeitraum von Juni 2013 bis Dezember 2015 habe ich die Originalzeitschriften und -artikel in Online-Zeitschriftendatenbanken oder Archiven verschiedener Universitätsbibliotheken eingesehen, begutachtet und mit Hilfe einer Excel-Tabelle katalogisiert und fehlende Informationen, wenn vorhanden, ergänzt. In der Bibliometrie werden verschiedene Vorgehensweisen diskutiert, wie Publikationen gezählt werden können. Die Analysen dieser Arbeit basieren hauptsächlich auf der whole count Methode (siehe Tabelle 1). Die Entscheidung basiert auf der Annahme, dass jeder Autor, jede Organisation, oder jedes Land gleichermaßen zu einer Publikation beigetragen hat. Folglich kann es zu einer Verzerrung bzw. Überschätzung der Ergebnisse kommen, da Zeitschriftenartikel mehrfach gezählt werden, wenn sie in Form von Forschungskooperationen publiziert wurden. Um die absolute Anzahl an Publikationen (weltweit, Europa, Deutschland) zu ermitteln, wird die Gesamtzahl an Artikeln pro Jahr (ohne Duplikate) berechnet. Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse Der empirische Teil meiner Arbeit ist in drei Teile untergliedert. Die folgenden Abschnitte fassen die jeweils wichtigsten Ergebnisse zusammen. The Global Picture – Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssysteme im Vergleich Im Mittelpunkt meiner Dissertation steht die Frage, welche Organisationsformen Wissenschaft produzieren. Um die Ergebnisse der detaillierten Fallstudie einordnen und bewerten zu können, erfolgt zunächst eine Einbettung in den globalen und europäischen Kontext. Die forschungsleitenden Fragen, wie hat sich die wissenschaftliche Produktivität weltweit und im europäischen Vergleich zwischen 1900 und 2010 entwickelt und wie war/ist das deutsche Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem in die globalen Entwicklungen der Hochschulbildung und Wissenschaft im zeitverlauf eingebettet, wird folgendermaßen beantwortet: In einem ersten Schritt wird gezeigt, dass das weltweite wissenschaftliche Wachstum zwischen 1900 und 2010 exponentiell verlief und dieser Trend vermutlich bis heute anhält (siehe Abbildungen 3 und 10, S. 50, 147). Die massive Ausdehnung wissenschaftlichen Wissens hatte und hat auch heute noch einen großen Einfluss auf gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen, die nicht auf den wirtschaftlichen und technischen Fortschritt beschränkt sind. Ich werde darstellen, dass Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssysteme weltweite Gemeinsamkeiten aufweisen, die zu einer ähnlichen Entwicklung und Ausweitung wissenschaftlicher Produktivität geführt haben. Im Vergleich wichtiger europäischer Länder (Deutschland im Vergleich mit Großbritannien, Frankreich, Belgien und Luxemburg), kann gezeigt werden, dass zwischen der weltweiten Ausweitung der Wissenschaft, dem Anstieg an Publikationen und der Expansion von modernen Forschungsuniversitäten ein Zusammenhang besteht (siehe Abschnitt 7.2; Powell, Dusdal 2016, 2017a; 2017b im Druck). So wurde ein globales Feld der Wissenschaft aufgespannt, das als übergeordneter Rahmen fungiert. Drei geografische Zentren wissenschaftlicher Produktivität werden im Zeitverlauf identifiziert: Europa, Nordamerika und Asien. Sie haben zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten an Bedeutung gewonnen oder verloren, doch zum heutigen Zeitpunkt tragen sie alle zur wissenschaftlichen Produktivität in den untersuchten Fächergruppen bei. Allerdings sind besonders in Asien die Wachstumsraten massiv angestiegen (Powell et al 2017 im Druck). Zweitens investieren alle Länder weltweit in Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) (siehe Abbildung 9, S. 140). Diese Investitionen haben einen Einfluss auf ihre wissenschaftliche Produktivität. Zwischen einzelnen Ländern sind zum Teil große Unterschiede in der absoluten Publikationszahl und der relativen wissenschaftlichen Produktivität feststellbar. Nicht nur Investitionen in FuE tragen zur Expansion der Wissenschaft bei, sondern auch die Anmeldung von Patenten, höhere Studierendenzahlen, eine gestiegene Anzahl an Forschern, die Ausweitung von Forschungsaktivitäten in viele gesellschaftliche Teilbereiche, die Entwicklung von Forschungsprodukten und Neugründungen von Universitäten (Powell, Baker, Fernandez 2017 im Druck). Im Zuge der Hochschulexpansion und der Massifizierung der Hochschulbildung in den 1960er und 70er Jahren sind besonders die Studierendenzahlen und die Anzahl der Wissenschaftler extrem angestiegen. Es kam also zur Ausweitung des kompletten Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems und nicht nur zu einer Erhöhung der Anzahl an Publikationen. Im Umkehrschluss kann ein Teil des Anstiegs wissenschaftlicher Publikationen auf eine steigende Anzahl an Wissenschaftlern zurückgeführt werden. Drittens kann die von Derek J. de Solla Price aufgestellte These, dass das exponentielle Wachstum wissenschaftlicher Literatur irgendwann abflachen müsse, wiederlegt werden (siehe Abschnitt 2.4; Abbildungen 4 und 10, S. 53, 147). Obwohl einschneidende historische, politische, wirtschaftliche und technologische Ereignisse sowie Ereignisse bezogen auf die Hochschulen und Wissenschaft (siehe Abbildung 11, S. 150) kurzfristig zu einer Verringerung der Publikationszahlen geführt haben, wurde die Wachstumskurve nicht nachhaltig beeinflusst. Im Jahr 2010 wurden weltweit fast eine Million Zeitschriftenartikel in den Natur- und Technikwissenschaften sowie der Medizin publiziert. In Abschnitt 7.2.2 zeige ich, dass die Anzahl der publizierten Zeitschriftenartikel im Verhältnis zu den Ausgaben für FuE, der Größe der Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssysteme und der Anzahl der Einwohner (siehe Abbildung 12, S. 159) und Wissenschaftler (siehe Tabelle 3, S. 162; Abbildung 13, S. 164) relativiert werden müssen. Die anfängliche extreme Expansion der wissenschaftlichen Publikationen in den Mathematik, Ingenieur-, Natur- und Technikwissenschaften sowie der Medizin basiert auf einem allgemeinen Wachstum der Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssysteme (siehe oben). Unterschiedliche institutionelle Settings und Organisationsformen, in denen Wissenschaft produziert wird, haben einen Einfluss auf die wissenschaftliche Produktivität. Anhand der ausgewählten Fallbeispiele (Deutschland, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Belgien und Luxemburg) werde ich darlegen, dass Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssysteme, die über forschungsstarke Universitäten verfügen, höchst produktiv sind. Es kommt also nicht nur darauf an, wie viele Wissenschaftler innerhalb eines Systems beschäftigt werden, sondern auch darauf, in welchen institutionellen Settings sie arbeiten. Fünftens, im internationalen Vergleich trägt Deutschland immer noch erheblich zur wissenschaftlichen Produktivität in den untersuchten Fächern bei. Mit einer Wachstumsrate von 3,35% Prozent folgt Deutschland den USA und Japan. Im Jahr 2014 wurden in Deutschland 84,5 Mrd./€ für FuE von der Regierung bereitgestellt. Dies entspricht einem Anteil von 2,9 Prozent des BIP. Somit wurde der EU-Richtwert von 2020 von 3 Prozent lediglich knapp verfehlt. Im Jahr 2010 wurden in Deutschland insgesamt 55.009 Zeitschriftenartikel in den STEM+-Fächern publiziert (siehe Tabelle A5 im Anhang). Im Vergleich der absoluten Zahlen mit Großbritannien, Frankreich, Belgien und Luxemburg nimmt das Land die Spitzenposition ein. Die Größe des Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems hat somit einen Einfluss auf die Publikationsleistung. Werden die Zahlen in einem nächsten Schritt mit anderen Schlüsselindikatoren in Beziehung gesetzt, verändert sich die Leistung der miteinander verglichenen Systeme zum Teil erheblich. Gemessen an der Einwohnerzahl werden in Deutschland weniger Zeitschriftenartikel publiziert als in Belgien oder Großbritannien. Die Anzahl der beschäftigten Wissenschaftler betrug in Deutschland im selben Jahr 1000:4. Nur in Luxemburg und Großbritannien ist das Verhältnis von Wissenschaftlern zur Einwohnerzahl größer. Das Zusammenspiel der Organisationsformen der Wissenschaft in Deutschland von 1900 bis 2010 Auf Basis der Analysen zum globalen und europäischen Kontext der Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Produktivität im Zeitverlauf (siehe Kapitel 7) folgt eine tiefgreifende, institutionelle Analyse des deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems (siehe Kapitel 8). Sie dient als Ein- und Überleitung zur detaillierten empirischen Auswertung der Daten zum deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem. Hier werden die wichtigsten Institutionen und Organisationen sowie das organisationale Feld der Wissenschaft (Universitäten, Fachhochschulen, außeruniversitäre Forschungseinrichtungen) vorgestellt. Zudem diskutiere ich die Unterschiede zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland zur Zeit des geteilten Deutschlands (1945-1990). Eine Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse zeigt, dass die Entwicklung der Publikationszahlen in Deutschland dem weltweiten und europäischen Trend (im kleineren Umfang) folgt (siehe Abbildung 16, S. 208). Es kam sowohl zu einer Expansion des wissenschaftlichen Wissens in Form eines exponentiellen Anstiegs an Publikationen, als auch zu einer Erhöhung der Vielfalt wissenschaftlicher Produktivität im Zeitverlauf (siehe Abschnitte 9.1 und 9.3). Die folgenden vier Forschungsfragen werden beantwortet: Wie hat sich die wissenschaftliche Produktivität in Deutschland zwischen 1900 und 2010 entwickelt? Unter allen Wissenschaft produzierenden Organisationsformen, was tragen die "klassischen" Formen zur wissenschaftlichen Produktivität bei? Welche Organisationsformen stellen die besten Bedingungen für wissenschaftliche Produktivität bereit? Welche Einzelorganisationen gehören zu den forschungsstärksten in Deutschland? Wie oben beschrieben, verläuft das Wachstum wissenschaftlicher Produktivität in Deutschland zwischen den Jahren 1900 und 2010 exponentiell. Die Kurve ist vergleichbar mit der weltweiten und europäischen Entwicklung, wenn auch in kleinerem Umfang. Zwar hatten auch hier verschiedene Ereignisse, wie der Zweite Weltkrieg, die Weltwirtschaftskrise oder die Wiedervereinigung, einen kurzfristigen Einfluss, allerdings kam es zu keiner Verlangsamung oder Abflachung des Wachstums (siehe Abbildung 11, S. 150). Bis ins Jahr 2010 wuchs die Anzahl der publizierten Zeitschriftenartikel in Deutschland auf 55.009 an. Zweitens, zeigt eine detaillierte Betrachtung der wissenschaftlichen Produktivität Westdeutschlands im Vergleich zu Ostdeutschland, dass der Anstieg der gesamtdeutschen Publikationszahlen auf einem Anstieg der Zahlen in Westdeutschland basiert (siehe Abbildung 17, S. 211). Zwischen 1950 und 1990 verlief die Kurve der wissenschaftlichen Produktivität in der DDR flach und auf einem niedrigen Niveau. Hieraus kann geschlossen werden, dass das Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem der DDR, aufbauend auf seinem Akademiemodell, keine guten Bedingungen für wissenschaftliche Forschung bereitgestellt hat. Drittens, zeigt die detaillierte Analyse der "klassischen" Organisationsformen der Wissenschaft, Universitäten und außeruniversitäre Forschungsinstitute, dass Universitäten im Zeitraum von 1975 bis 2010 in den STEM+-Fächern die Hauptproduzenten wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftenartikel waren und sind (siehe Abbildung 18, S. 217). Im Untersuchungszeitraum beträgt der prozentuale Anteil der universitätsbasierten Forschung im Mittel 60 Prozent. Somit verteidigen sie ihren Status als wichtigste Organisationsform gegenüber anderen. Die Modus 2 Hypothese, dass es im Zeitverlauf zu einem Absinken des prozentualen Anteils der Universitäten kommen muss, wird verworfen. Der Anteil der Nicht-Universitäten liegt hingegen im Durchschnitt bei 40 Prozent. Obwohl die Richtigkeit der folgenden Aussage nicht empirisch überprüft werden kann, wird davon ausgegangen, dass es sich tatsächlich sogar um einen Anstieg wissenschaftlicher Produktivität der Universitäten im Zeitverlauf handelt. Unter Berücksichtigung einer Verschiebung der zur Verfügung stehenden finanziellen Mittel für FuE zugunsten der außeruniversitären Forschungsinstitute haben die Universitäten im Zeitverlauf mit weniger Forschungsgeldern immer mehr wissenschaftliche Zeitschriftenartikel publiziert. Viertens, obwohl nicht nur Wissenschaftler innerhalb von Universitäten und Forschungsinstituten Zeitschriftenartikel veröffentlichen, haben diese beiden Organisationsformen zusammen mehr als drei Viertel aller Publikationen seit den 1980er Jahren verfasst. Aber auch schon in den Jahren zuvor ist ihr gemeinsamer Anteil sehr hoch. Zu den wichtigsten Wissenschaftsproduzenten gehören neben ihnen die (Industrie-)Unternehmen, Behörden und Ressortforschungseinrichtungen und Krankenhäuser (für eine ausführliche Beschreibung der Matrix der Organisationsformen siehe Tabelle 4, S. 222f und Abbildungen 19 und 20, S. 220, 246). Dennoch sind die Universitäten die treibende Kraft wissenschaftlicher Produktivität seit mehr als einem Jahrhundert. Mit ihrer speziellen Ausrichtung auf Grundlagenforschung stellen sie die besten Bedingungen für wissenschaftliche Forschung bereit und gehören zu den ältesten Institutionen mit einem hohen Institutionalisierungsgrad. Universitäten sind widerstandsfähig gegenüber Veränderungen und critical junctures haben keinen negativen Einfluss auf ihre wissenschaftliche Produktivität. Alle anderen im Datensatz gefundenen oder aus der Theorie abgeleiteten Organisationsformen (Akademien, Vereine/Gesellschaften, wissenschaftliche Infrastrukturen, Laboratorien, Militär, Museen und nichtuniversitäre Bildungseinrichtungen) spielen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle und wurden in der Gruppe "sonstige" Organisationsformen zusammengefasst. Fünftens, eine Auswertung der zehn forschungsstärksten Einzelorganisationen Deutschlands im Jahr 2010 bestätigt die oben beschriebenen Ergebnisse, da lediglich Universitäten und außeruniversitäre Forschungsinstitute dieser Spitzengruppe zugehören. Eine Zusammenfassung der Publikationen der Institute unter ihrer Dachorganisation zeigt, dass die Institute der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft und der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft maßgeblich zur Produktion wissenschaftlichen Wissens in Deutschland beitragen. Sie übertreffen zusammengezählt die Publikationstätigkeit einzelner Universitäten bei weitem (siehe Tabelle 5, S. 259f). Eine Einzelauswertung der Institute zeigt aber auch, dass sie allgemein genommen, aufgrund ihrer Größe und der Anzahl der Wissenschaftler, nicht mit den Universitäten konkurrieren können. Zudem gehört die hybride Organisation, die Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin zu den führenden zehn Wissenschaftsproduzenten im deutschen Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystem. Nationale und internationale Kooperationen wissenschaftlicher Forschung Im letzten empirischen Kapitel der Arbeit wird auf der Makroebene die Frage beantwortet, welchen Einfluss die zunehmende Internationalisierung der Forschung auf nationale und internationale Kooperationen in Form von Publikationen in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften hat. Durch die voranschreitende Globalisierung und Internationalisierung haben nationale und internationale Kooperationen stark zugenommen. Zu den wichtigsten Gründen für (internationale) Kooperationen in den Mathematik, Ingenieur-, Natur- und Technikwissenschaften sowie der Medizin zählen unter anderen die Reputation der Forschungsorganisation und der Mitautoren, eine höhere Sichtbarkeit innerhalb der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft, mehr Möglichkeiten für interdisziplinäre Forschung oder auch eine bessere Ausstattung der Labore. Heute sind bereits ein Drittel aller Forschungsartikel weltweit das Ergebnis wissenschaftlicher Kooperationen und lediglich ein Viertel wird von einem Autoren verfasst. Übertragen auf die Organisation der Forschung bedeutet der von Humboldt geprägte Leitsatz "in Einsamkeit und Freiheit", dass wissenschaftliche Forschung nicht mehr in alleiniger Verantwortung eines Wissenschaftlers durchgeführt wird, sondern das Ergebnis von Kooperationen ist. Netzwerke werden immer wichtiger, um gemeinsame Interessen zu teilen, an einer Fragestellung zu arbeiten sowie die aus der Forschung gewonnenen Erkenntnisse gemeinsam zu publizieren. Wissenschaftler, Organisationen und Länder unterscheiden sich dahingehend, wie sie ihre Forschung organisieren und folglich auch darin, wie sie ihre wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit gestalten. Diese Wege sind abhängig von der geografischen Lage und Größe des Hochschul- und Wissenschaftssystems, dem organisationalen Feld und den Einzelorganisationen. In dieser Arbeit werden unterschiedliche Muster wissenschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit präsentiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen massiven Anstieg wissenschaftlicher Kooperationen in Form von gemeinsamen Publikationen im Zeitverlauf. Bis in die 1990er Jahre hinein publizierten die Wissenschaftler in den hier untersuchten Länder (Frankreich, Deutschland, Großbritannien, USA, Japan, China, Belgien und Luxemburg) hauptsächlich in Alleinautorenschaft. Erst danach kam es zu einem Anstieg an Kooperationen: Im Jahr 2000 wurden lediglich 37 Prozent aller Artikel von einem Autor verfasst. Im Jahr 2010 erreichte der Anteil einen Tiefststand von lediglich einem Fünftel Alleinautorenschaften (siehe Tabelle 6, S. 279f). Allerdings unterschieden sich die Länder hinsichtlich ihres Anteils an Ko-Autorenschaften zum Teil deutlich voneinander. Literatur Powell, J. J. W. & Dusdal, J. (2016). Europe's Center of Science: Science Productivity in Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg. EuropeNow, 1(1). http://www.europenowjournal.org/2016/11/30/europes-center-of-science-science-productivity-in-belgium-france-germany-and-luxembourg/. Zugriff: 13.12.2016. Powell, J. J. W. & Dusdal, J. (2017a): Measuring Research Organizations' Contributions to Science Productivity in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math in Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Minerva, (). Online first. DOI:10.1007/s11024-017-9327-z. Powell, J. J. W. & Dusdal, J. (2017b im Druck). The European Center of Science Productivity: Research Universities and Institutes in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. IN Powell, J. J. W., Baker, D. P. & Fernandez, F. (Hg.) The Century of Science: The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing. Powell, J. J. W., Baker, D. P. & Fernandez, F. (2017, im Druck). The Century of Science: The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing. Powell, J. J. W., Fernandez, F., Crist, J. T., Dusdal, J., Zhang, L. & Baker, D. P. (2017, im Druck). The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University and Globalizing Science. IN Powell, J. W., Baker, D. P. & Fernandez, F. (Hg.) The Century of Science: The Worldwide Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing.
Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: società, politica, istituzioni (XIX - XX secolo) ; La ricerca realizzata ha inteso studiare, in un'ottica di lungo periodo e in una prospettiva complessiva, ciò che ha rappresentato l'esperienza del fascismo in un contesto territoriale periferico e non omogeneo, di cui è espressione quel segmento dell'Umbria meridionale costituito in provincia nel gennaio 1927. Tale area si è rivelata un case study esemplare, in grado di offrire interessanti spunti interpretativi. In effetti, all'unico grande polo industriale della provincia, compreso nel territorio della conca ternana, si contrappone la restante parte del territorio provinciale, comprendente città come Orvieto e Amelia, contrassegnate da consolidate relazioni con le regioni limitrofe, espressione di un'Umbria verde, agricola e mezzadrile, ma anche francescana, terra d'arte, di misticismo, ritenuta dalla pubblicistica di regime "cuore" dell'Italia fascista. A partire da ciò, si è creduto opportuno impostare la ricerca attorno a tre questioni principali, ritenute essenziali per cogliere aspetti e dinamiche della società locale nel ventennio mussoliniano. Per fare questo è stata definita una griglia interpretativa funzionale a verificare il ruolo del Pnf nel quadro del rapporto centro-periferia, continuità-rottura. Si è così puntato a esaminare come il fascismo abbia influito sui processi di formazione e consolidamento dei ceti dirigenti locali, verificandone la capacità di rapportarsi con le vecchie élites, di promuoverne di nuove o, magari, di fare coesistere entrambe. Si è poi cercato di approfondire il ruolo che il partito ha svolto in ambito locale, la sua capacità di inserirsi nelle diverse dinamiche territoriali, di creare e controllare reti clientelari e, soprattutto, di rapportarsi con le due realtà che rimangono fuori dal suo controllo, il grande gruppo polisettoriale rappresentato dalla "Terni" polisettoriale di Bocciardo e la Chiesa locale, il tutto al fine di conseguire i propri obiettivi totalitari. Infine, si è affrontata la questione del consenso. In questo senso, è stato preso in considerazione non soltanto il ruolo della violenza attuata dal fascismo per conquistare il potere e la stessa azione repressiva dispiegatasi negli anni del regime, che si dimostra concreta e reale come è normale in una situazione di dittatura, ma si è provato a fare luce sul dissenso e sulle aree di rassegnazione o di consenso tiepido che sembrano persistere nella società locale. Nel procedere si è poi cercato di coniugare la storia politicoistituzionale con quella sociale e in parte economica, attraverso un costante lavoro di analisi e incrocio delle fonti studiate, scelta ritenuta utile per conseguire gli obiettivi prefissati. Certamente, la riflessione sulle origini, l'affermazione, il consolidamento del fascismo in provincia di Terni, offre sostanziali conferme a quanto una parte della storiografia aveva proposto. Nell'Umbria meridionale il fascismo, nei suoi vertici, sorge e si afferma come punto d'incontro dei ceti dominanti tradizionali. Esso si afferma in quanto strumento della reazione agraria e dei gruppi industriali monopolistici di 2 fronte alla conflittualità contadina e operaia e al dilagare del socialismo. La sconfitta delle élites politiche tradizionali alle elezioni politiche del 1919 e a quelle amministrative del 1920, che seguiva l'effervescenza sociale del biennio rosso; la stipula del patto colonico del 1920 sfavorevole per gli agrari; la stessa esperienza, sebbene breve e contraddittoria, dell'occupazione delle fabbriche, sullo sfondo di una situazione economica difficile, ne determina la reazione, che si concretizza per l'appunto nell'adesione al fascismo. Dapprima nella versione squadrista, capace di sconfiggere sul piano militare gli oppositori, anche grazie al diffuso sostegno degli apparati di sicurezza dello Stato, quindi come blocco elettorale e nuova struttura politica in grado di conquistare il potere, il fascismo si configura come una sorta di union sacrée contro il "bolscevismo", in cui confluiscono conservatorismo agrario ma anche impulsi industrialisti e modernizzatori. Più concretamente, esso viene accorpando tutte quelle correnti politiche, contrapposte tra loro nel primo quindicennio del secolo, che avevano costituito il frastagliato universo giolittiano. In questo senso, come l'analisi dei vertici del Pnf provinciale e degli amministratori locali ha permesso di verificare, sino al 1927 a essere protagonisti sulla scena politica locale sono le forze che tradizionalmente facevano parte del blocco agrario. In primo luogo i proprietari terrieri, molti dei quali appartenenti alla nobiltà, a cui si affiancano esponenti della borghesia delle professioni, le cui proprietà erano cresciute a cavallo tra Ottocento e Novecento, nonché alcuni settori espressione diretta del mondo rurale, come gli agenti di campagna, i fattori, ma anche quei contadini che nei primi anni venti erano riusciti ad accedere alla proprietà della terra. In provincia di Terni quindi, dalla conquista fascista sino all'introduzione della riforma podestarile ma, in gran parte, anche dopo, la presenza ai vertici delle amministrazioni municipali e di quella provinciale di esponenti del notabilato locale, essenzialmente aristocratici, proprietari terrieri, professionisti, si rivela dato costante che permette di accomunare la provincia di Terni a realtà come la Toscana, l'Emilia-Romagna e, anche, a parte dell'Italia meridionale. L'attuazione della riforma podestarile, con le prerogative concesse al prefetto nella nomina dei vertici delle amministrazioni comunali, non sembra variare di molto la situazione, almeno nella prima fase di attuazione della riforma. Come è emerso nei comuni della provincia di Terni, il criterio seguito dai prefetti per l'individuazione dei podestà era connesso con la rilevanza sociale ed economica riconosciuta in una comunità ai candidati alla carica che, senza dubbio, un titolo nobiliare e una professione adeguata erano in grado di assicurare, anche magari a scapito della mancanza di qualche requisito previsto dalla legge istitutiva della riforma podestarile. In questo senso, sembra dunque perpetuarsi un modello burocratico e ottimatizio insieme, grazie al quale il fascismo intendeva presentarsi alle comunità locali con un volto rassicurante, al fine di accattivarsi il favore della popolazione. L'analisi prosopografica dei profili relativi a presidi, consultori provinciali, podestà, membri delle consulte municipali, per il periodo 1926-1943, ha reso possibile definire un quadro che vede sostanzialmente confermata l'analisi fatta in una prospettiva nazionale da Luca Baldissara ormai più di una decina di anni 3 fa1. E' cosi emerso il carattere di classe della rappresentanza politico-amministrativa fascista in questi anni, sebbene con alcune differenze effetto delle specificità socioeconomiche caratterizzanti l'area esaminata. Nello specifico, l'esame condotto sul corpus di 147 amministratori (78 podestà e 69 commissari prefettizi) che si succedono nei Comuni della provincia nell'arco di tempo considerato, ha permesso di tracciare l'identikit di un funzionario con un'età compresa tra i quaranta e i cinquanta anni; in possesso di un titolo di studio elevato (laurea o diploma di scuola superiore); in cui la proprietà della terra riveste un ruolo essenziale, coerentemente al tessuto socio-economico prevalente in provincia, e in cui dal punto di vista della professione esercitata appare predominante la figura del libero professionista (in genere avvocato e notaio). Forte è poi il legame dei podestà con il Pnf, più della metà del campione individuato risulta nel partito dal biennio 1920-1922; al tempo stesso, la maggioranza delle designazioni effettuate dai prefetti avviene in accordo con la federazione provinciale fascista. Sembra quindi delinearsi un quadro d'assieme che nel corso degli anni trenta, in gran parte della provincia, vede la predominanza delle gerarchie notabilari nella gestione del potere locale. Da tale situazione si discosta in parte l'area industriale compresa tra Terni e Narni, in cui come avviene in altri contesti urbani o regionali, attraverso il Pnf si assiste all'ascesa di personalità espressione della media e piccola borghesia urbana, per i quali l'istituto podestarile diventa uno strumento di promozione sociale e di affermazione nella gerarchia del potere locale. L'immagine del governo locale che si profila non è però statica, appare invece dinamica e contrassegnata da una forte conflittualità che, a vari livelli, si dimostra uno dei tratti comuni percepibili sotto l'apparente pacificazione realizzata dal fascismo. La forte instabilità presente nelle amministrazioni comunali della provincia di Terni, attestata dall'elevato numero di commissari prefettizi e di podestà retribuiti che si succedono, è testimonianza non solo delle difficoltà incontrate dai prefetti nella selezione di un ceto dirigente adeguato ma, soprattutto, del tentativo delle élites tradizionali, attraversate da interessi diversi e relazioni clientelari e familiari molteplici, di resistere all'azione omologatrice del regime. Indubbiamente, lo Stato fascista, attraverso la promozione di un modello di podestà fondato su competenza, capacità di agire, allineamento alle direttive dei vertici, in nome della proclamata modernizzazione puntava a ricondurre le periferie sotto il controllo del centro. Ecco allora che la ricerca di una concreta azione di governo delle amministrazioni locali, frequentemente sollecitata dal prefetto, da perseguire, ad esempio, attraverso la realizzazione di opere pubbliche funzionali alla mobilitazione di settori diversi della società, diventava il riferimento attraverso cui misurare l'efficienza e, soprattutto, "l'operosità" degli amministratori locali. L'elevato turnover dei podestà rappresenta pertanto una spia che si presta a misurare significativamente le difficoltà incontrate dal regime nell'affermare la propria azione in periferia. Non di rado tuttavia l'intervento del prefetto sui podestà si rendeva necessario per stroncare le lotte intestine e di fazione che si scatenavano all'interno delle élites locali per la gestione del potere. Le modalità attraverso cui tali scontri si manifestano sembrano esprimere dinamiche del conflitto omogenee a quanto accertato da altri studi 1 Luca Baldissara, Tecnica e politica nell'amministrazione. Saggio sulle culture amministrative e di governo municipale fra anni Trenta e Cinquanta, Il Mulino, Bologna 1998. 4 riguardanti realtà comunali, provinciali e regionali diverse. Esse assumono la forma di lettere, esposti, denunzie anonime, che divengono lo strumento di lotta principale tra le fazioni in una dimensione comunale ma, come è stato accertato in chiave provinciale, anche tra i rappresentanti dei diversi poteri locali, oltre che all'interno degli stessi vertici della federazione fascista ternana. A partire dal 1927, con la nascita della Provincia e l'insediamento di istituzioni politiche e amministrative nella città capoluogo, anche per il fascismo locale inizia una fase nuova, l'esame della quale ha permesso di meglio comprendere come in questa realtà si viene definendo il rapporto con il centro. La genesi della nuova entità territoriale è frutto di una serie di variabili legate, da un lato, alle esigenze politiche amministrative dello Stato fascista divenuto regime; a cui si sovrappongono le dinamiche conflittuali interne al fascismo regionale, che portano alla pacificazione dello stesso e alla nascita della federazione provinciale del Pnf. Infine, un ruolo determinante lo ha l'affermazione della "Terni" polisettoriale, vero e proprio potere forte nella nuova provincia, in grado di dare vita a un originale sistema di fabbrica a metà strada tra paternalismo assistenziale e truck-system. Con essa il regime dialoga direttamente, baypassando la neonata federazione provinciale del Pnf e, se necessario, intervenendo per normalizzarla, come dimostra esemplarmente la vicenda politica e personale di Elia Rossi Passavanti, primo federale e podestà di Terni. In questo senso, la ricostruzione dei percorsi personali e professionali dei vertici dell'amministrazione statale (prefetti e questori), degli organi politici (federali, vicefederali, segretari amministrativi, componenti del Direttorio della federazione fascista) ed economici (membri del consiglio provinciale dell'economia, di quello delle corporazioni e del principale istituto bancario del capoluogo), è stata preziosa per le riflessioni che permette di realizzare rispetto al ruolo avuto dal Pnf in provincia e, specialmente, alle dinamiche politiche che si innescano nei rapporti che il partito instaura con le altre autorità, a cominciare da quella prefettizia. Proprio con riferimento ai prefetti, si è potuto osservare che sui nove che si succedono in provincia di Terni nel periodo considerato, ben sei provengono dal Pnf. Tale fatto non sottende necessariamente un'automatica collaborazione con la federazione fascista, quanto piuttosto sembra rispondere all'esigenza del centro di superare i contrasti esistenti tra la federazione fascista e la prefettura che, invece, è situazione ricorrente in provincia. Nel contempo, il succedersi di dodici federali alla guida del partito è prova di una significativa instabilità, dato peraltro ulteriormente confermato dalla netta prevalenza di personalità estranee all'ambiente locale, ben nove. Questo fatto non esprime solo una certa debolezza del fascismo locale, incapace di fornire un ceto dirigente adeguato, ma dimostra la stessa evoluzione che subisce la figura del segretario federale, nei termini di una spiccata professionalizzazione inquadrabile nel più generale contesto di crescente burocratizzazione del Pnf funzionale a consolidarne il ruolo di mediazione e di intervento nell'amministrazione dello Stato, che si rivela uno dei tratti tipici del Pnf staraciano. In questo senso, le guerre che si scatenano tra prefetto e federale nel corso degli anni trenta, ad esempio per la questione delle nomine dei podestà, in cui ruolo determinante lo acquista ancora una volta l'arma dell'esposto e della lettera anonima, attestano il tentativo portato avanti dal partito di far sentire il proprio peso al fine se non di sovrapporsi, quanto meno di affiancare lo Stato in periferia. Affiora così quella di5 mensione policratica che si configura come uno degli elementi caratterizzanti la politica in periferia negli anni del regime. Nonostante i contrasti che si scatenano tra i poteri, le lotte intestine all'interno del Pnf, la cronica debolezza dimostrata dai ceti dirigenti, la federazione provinciale fascista nel corso degli anni trenta riesce comunque a essere vitale e in grado di esercitare il proprio ruolo ai fini della fascistizzazione della società locale. D'altra parte, ai vertici del partito se si escludono i federali e i loro più stretti collaboratori, le restanti cariche continuano a essere gestite in larga parte dal medesimo nucleo originario fascista, fatto di appartenenti al ceto agrario e alla borghesia delle professioni provenienti, per la maggior parte, dall'area ternana. Ciò attesta lo scarso ricambio generazionale esistente all'interno della federazione, ma anche il peso politico ed economico ricoperto dal capoluogo rispetto all'intera provincia. Questi dirigenti fanno parte dei diversi Direttori federali che si succedono e, talvolta, ricoprono contemporaneamente, laddove la legislazione lo consente, incarichi in organismi quali il Consiglio provinciale dell'economia o, anche, alla guida della principale banca locale. Ai vertici del partito il peso degli appartenenti a settori della piccola borghesia e del ceto operaio è invece minore. Soltanto con l'approssimarsi del secondo conflitto mondiale, si fanno strada figure espressione del ceto impiegatizio, ma anche tecnici e qualche sindacalista con alle spalle una carriera nell'apparato burocratico della federazione provinciale, i quali assumono incarichi di un certo peso, come quello di segretario amministrativo o di componente del Direttorio. In questo modo sembra prefigurarsi, sebbene in maniera timida e non paragonabile a quanto accade in altre province, l'affermazione «dal basso e dalle periferie [di] una nuova classe dirigente del regime totalitario»2. Nel corso degli anni trenta dunque, sebbene tra molteplici difficoltà di natura anche economica, il Pnf riesce a dare vita in provincia a una struttura organizzativa in grado di penetrare e inquadrare la società locale. Peraltro, l'afflusso costante di contributi concessi da enti pubblici diversi (amministrazioni provinciali, comunali, Consiglio provinciale dell'economia) e soggetti privati (la Società "Terni" in primo luogo, ma anche altre aziende) a un partito alla continua ricerca di risorse, che la documentazione amministrativa della federazione ternana ha permesso di verificare, rappresenta testimonianza esemplare degli sforzi profusi dal regime per rendere il Pnf un volano di sviluppo del peculiare welfare funzionale alla fascistizzazione della società locale. In questa prospettiva, il rapporto con la Società "Terni" si è rivelato una chiave di lettura che non è possibile trascurare se si vuole comprendere la natura dell'esperienza fascista in provincia di Terni. Si è visto che la stessa nascita della nuova Provincia è connessa alla questione del controllo delle acque del sistema Nera-Velino, presupposto essenziale per la creazione dell'impresa polisettoriale; così come la stipula della convenzione tra il Comune di Terni e la società guidata da Bocciardo, sanziona di fatto in maniera prepotente la forza non solo della grande azienda, ma l'affermazione dello stesso "centro" sulla "periferia". Da quel momento e anche dopo l'inserimento della "Terni" nel sistema delle partecipazioni statali attra- 2 Marco Palla, Il partito e le classi dirigenti, in Renato Camurri, Stefano Cavazza, Id. (a cura di), Fascismi locali, "Ricerche di Storia politica", a. X, nuova serie, dicembre 2010, 3/10, p. 296. 6 verso l'Iri, operazione che garantì allo Stato il controllo pubblico sull'azienda e sul suo assetto produttivo, la grande impresa per il fascismo ma, più in generale, per la stessa società locale diventa emblematicamente una madre-matrigna. Essa viene percepita come un complesso capitalistico che invade la città e, con i suoi vertici, in grado di dialogare con il centro e, anche, direttamente con il duce, si pone rispetto al Pnf locale in una situazione super partes. Non è così casuale che i federali presentino come risultato della loro azione politica i buoni rapporti che riescono a intrattenere con i vertici aziendali, i quali peraltro si dimostrano costantemente impermeabili all'influenza della federazione fascista. D'altra parte, a partire dalla stipula della convenzione del 1927 e per tutto il decennio successivo la "Terni", insieme al partito, appare senza alcun dubbio uno dei pilastri del regime in provincia. Non soltanto sostiene la federazione provinciale con contributi costanti, essenziali per assicurargli la possibilità di svolgere la propria azione sul territorio; ma, più in generale, con tutto il suo peso di grande gruppo polisettoriale sposa in pieno le politiche economiche, sindacali, sociali del regime, garantendo allo stesso le condizioni per affermare «un sistema di aggregazione/costruzione del consenso/controllo sociale e politico che si adegua al modello del regime reazionario di massa»3. In queste dinamiche si inserisce anche, per quanto è stato possibile accertare in relazione alle fonti disponibili, l'atteggiamento tenuto dalla Chiesa cattolica locale nei riguardi del fascismo. L'analisi condotta con riferimento specifico alla diocesi di Terni-Narni e al vescovo Cesare Boccoleri che la guida nel Ventennio fascista, ha permesso di accertare che, come succede in altre diocesi italiane e coerentemente con le scelte fatte dai vertici vaticani, la Chiesa ternana sembra tenere una posizione di sostanziale appoggio al fascismo e di collaborazione con il Pnf. Ciò emerge in maniera evidente in alcuni momenti: ad esempio, in occasione delle campagne promosse dal regime sul terreno economico e sociale, come per la Battaglia del grano e, soprattutto, dopo la stipula del Concordato, o nel corso della guerra d'Etiopia e di Spagna. Al tempo stesso, anche quando si hanno tensioni nei rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa (per effetto della crisi del 1931 sulle prerogative dell'Azione cattolica o in occasione dell'introduzione delle leggi razziali), le conseguenze concrete per la Chiesa locale sono di scarso rilievo e, comunque, tali da non incidere sostanzialmente sulla natura dei rapporti esistenti con la federazione fascista. Anche la Chiesa locale quindi, sebbene con l'obiettivo di preservare e, per quanto possibile, incrementare la presenza cattolica nella società locale, contribuisce nella sostanza a consolidare e, anche, ampliare il consenso al regime. In particolare, essa si dimostra attiva nel favorire, specialmente nelle aree rurali, quell'azione di «modernizzazione politica» di natura reazionaria, conseguenza del tentativo di organizzazione della società italiana secondo criteri gerarchici e accentratori, che il fascismo è impegnato a portare avanti in periferia. Certamente, un ruolo essenziale ai fini della creazione e, soprattutto, del mantenimento del consenso lo esercita anche la costante opera di vigilanza e repressione di ogni forma di dissenso organizzato e di attività politica di opposizione, che si attua in provincia per opera degli apparati di sicurezza dello Stato fascista. Tale azione si rivela particolarmente efficace se negli anni del regime solo i comunisti, essenzial- 3 Renato Covino, L'invenzione di una regione, Quattroemme, Perugia 1995, p. 58. 7 mente nell'area industriale ternana, riescono a mantenere in vita, per quanto a fatica e in misura ridotta, una forma di opposizione organizzata. E tuttavia, il fatto che continuamente le autorità, sebbene nell'ambito del riconoscimento di quanto fatto dalle diverse organizzazioni del partito a favore del ceto operaio, lamentassero l'inadeguato grado di "comprensione fascista", quando non la scarsa fascistizzazione dei lavoratori delle industrie ternane e la loro "pericolosità" politica, sembra essere la conferma implicita di come in provincia, non solo non scompare l'insofferenza e il dissenso, anche politicamente organizzato, ma, più in generale, sotto la camicia nera, a prescindere dalla propaganda e dall'attività delle differenti istituzioni del regime, non vengono meno nemmeno gli interessi molteplici che contrassegnano la società locale e le diverse realtà presenti sul territorio. In ultima analisi, il fascismo locale appare in grado di esercitare un ruolo attivo nel disegno di fascistizzazione della società, coerentemente con l'accelerazione nel processo di creazione dello Stato totalitario di cui è strumento il Pnf staraciano. Il partito si rivela dunque un vero e proprio centro di potere, espressione di un regime autoritario e tendenzialmente totalitario, con cui, inevitabilmente, tutti i cittadini si trovano a confrontarsi per le necessità della vita quotidiana: in altre parole, a dover essere, almeno una volta nella vita, fascisti. ; This research project is an in-depth study, in a comprehensive and long-term perspective, of what Fascism represented at a local level in a peripheral and non-homogeneous context, as in the case of the Southern Umbria areas, established as an administrative province in 1927. This specific geographical district flagged-up all the prerequisites for an exemplary case study, featuring several significant explanatory points. To this unique large provincial administrative industrial hub located within the Terni basin, other districts, part of the same province, remained juxtaposed. Within their respective areas, these districts included towns such as Orvieto and Amelia, which had strong links with the neighbouring communities, representing the rural, agricultural and mezzadrile aspects of Umbria, land of Saint Francis of Assisi, rich in art and religious meanings, which the Fascist Regime came to proclaim officially as the "heart" of Fascist Italy. On the basis of these introductory remarks, the study focuses its scope of research on three main points, all but essential to understand fully the aspects and dynamics of the local society during the Fascist period, also referred to as the ventennio mussoliniano. An interpretative functional grid has been designed with a view to describe the role of the National Fascist Party (Nfp) within the centre-periphery and continuity-innovation relationships with the previous regime. The study seeks to investigate how Fascism exerted its influence on the establishment and process of strengthening of the local ruling ranks, attesting its ability to relate with the old dominant élites, or promote the emerging of new ones or, in addition, facilitate and support the coexistence of both. Furthermore, the research focuses on the role exerted by the Nfp at a local level, its capability to affect the various localised dynamics of power, to create and control networks of affiliates and, above all, to relate with the two main subjects which remained independent from its control, the important industrial group represented by "Terni" of Bocciardo and the local Catholic Church, with an overarching aim to achieve its totalitarian objectives. Finally, the question of popular consent has also been scrutinised. At one level, the study analyses the 2 role of fascist violence deployed to obtain power and the repressive actions carried out under the Regime, which were highly effective, as one might expect under a dictatorship. At another level, it investigates the popular dissent and the grey areas of passive acceptance and weak consent which were common among strata of the local population. Additionally, in a broader perspective, political and institutional historical analysis has been coupled with social and economic investigation, through a systematic scrutiny and cross-examination of the main sources, as a methodological approach needful to the achievement of the final outcomes of the research. Findings on the origins, development, and strengthening of Fascism within the Terni province appear to concur with the conclusions reached by previous historical research. In the Southern areas of Umbria, Fascism, at its highest level, was brought into power and successfully established by the traditional ruling classes. The establishment of Fascism was supported and facilitated by the agrarian reaction and the monopolistic industrial groups threatened by the discontent of the rural and working classes and the rapid advancement of Socialism. The political defeat of the traditional ruling élites at the 1919 general election and the 1920 local elections, which followed the social turmoil of the so-called red biennium; the agreement of the 1920 patto colonico, disadvantageous to landowners; the occupation of factories, though a brief and contradictory experience, against a background of economic difficulty, caused their reaction and prompted their acceptance and support for Fascism. Firstly, Fascism, in the form of Fascist action squads and their capability of defeating its opponents militarily, with the extensive assistance of the State security services, then as an electoral block and political force capable to achieve power, presented itself as a sort of union sacrée against the threat of Bolshevism into which various groups appear to converge: the agrarian conservatism but also industrial and more modern forces. Undoubtedly, Fascism drew together different political forces, which during the first decade of the twentieth-century had been mutually antagonistic, and segments of the complex and divided political establishment of the Giolitti era. The scrutiny of the highest levels of the local Nfp and civil servants has revealed that, at least till 1927, the main political figures belonged to those forces already part of the agrarian block. Firstly, the landowners, many of whom belonged to the local nobility, supported by members of the professional bourgeoisie, whose estates and wealth had augmented during the nineteenth- and twentieth-century, and other sectors which were the direct expression of the rural milieus, such as the rural agents, farmers, but also those peasants whom, during the first two decades of the twentieth-century, had succeeded in becoming landowners themselves. Therefore in the Terni province, from the establishment of the Fascist regime to the introduction of the office of podestà and, for some time even after, 3 the highest offices of the municipal and provincial administration were held by members of the local nobility, primarily aristocrats, landowners and professionals. This is an invariable characteristic which put the Terni province in alignment with similar situations in Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and other areas of Southern Italy. The administrative reform and the establishment of the podestà authority, together with the prerogatives of the prefectures in appointing members of the highest offices within the municipal administrations, did not radically change, at least during the early phases of the reform, established practice. A survey of the municipalities located within the Terni province, shows that the prefects in the selection process to appoint the podestà took greatly into account the candidates' social and economic status of and, without doubt, a honorific title and tenure of highly considered profession were often sufficient criteria for a candidate to be nominated even when lacking some of the prescribed requisites as outlined by the administrative reform. The Fascist regime therefore, in perpetuating a bureaucratic and grandees system, showed an intention to reassure the existing ruling élites and obtain the support of the local population. A prosopographical analysis of the biographical profiles of headmasters, members of the provincial advice bureaus, podestà, members of the municipal advisory councils, during the 1926-1943 period, has made it possible to outline a summary framework which strongly corroborates the analysis carried out at a national level by Luca Baldissarra over a decade ago.1 What has emerged from this analysis is the class-based character of the Fascist political and administrative representation during those years, though presenting various differences linked to the social and economic specificity of the area scrutinised. In more depth, the study carried out on a corpus of 147 civil servants (78 podestà and 69 prefectural officers) employed by the municipalities of the province during the examined period, made it possible to draw up a profile of the typical officer: between forty and fifty years of age; highly educated (having achieved a high-school or university degree); often a landowner, a characteristic consistent with the social and economic structure prevailing throughout the province, and among whom the status of self-employed (generally lawyer or public notary) represented the most frequent professional position held. Relations between the podestà and the Nfp appear to have been particularly close, over half of the sample identified is composed by individuals who had joined the Fascist Party at an early stage, during 1920-1922; additionally, the majority of the appointments made by the prefects were agreed in advance with the Provincial Fascist Federation. It would therefore appear that during the 1930s, in 1 Luca Baldissara, Tecnica e politica nell'amministrazione. Saggio sulle culture amministrative e di governo municipale fra anni Trenta e Cinquanta, Il Mulino, Bologna 1998. 4 large areas of the province, the highest hierarchies of grandees were the prominent figures holding local high office. The industrial area comprised within the administrative territories of the two municipalities of Terni and Narni, however, appears to contrast with other districts of the province. In this area, as for similar cases in other municipalities or other regional administrations, the Nfp supported the emergence of members of the small and medium local urban bourgeoisie, as the office of podestà became a vehicle of social advancement and an opportunity to climb up the local hierarchy of power. Despite the apparent pacification established forcibly by the Fascist regime, the dynamics of power within the local government remained characterised by extreme unrest and strong conflict at various levels. The sizeable number of prefectural commissioners and remunerated podestà who succeeded in office, often in rapid succession, bears witness to the instability which marred almost all the municipal administrations of Terni province. This is evidence of the obstacles encountered by the prefects during the selection process of a qualified managerial class but, above all, of the resistance put up by the traditional élites of power, motivated by divergent interests and loyalty to various networks of familial and personal relations, to the process of homologation pursued by the Fascist regime. Undoubtedly, the Fascist regime, in implementing a model of podestà based on competence, on the energetic ability to act, on its alignment to official directives, and in order to achieve a modernisation of the administrative system, aimed at placing the local authorities under the prescriptive control of a centralised State. The actual administrative actions implemented by the local administrative offices, frequently under the guidance and pressure of the Prefects, as for example in the case of the accomplishment of public works functional to the civil mobilisation of various segments of the local community, became a measure of their efficiency and, above all, a measurement of how industrious the local administrators should be. The high turn-over of podestà is a clear indication of how difficult it was for the Fascist regime to implement its plans of action in peripheral areas. Additionally, direct intervention by the Prefects was often necessary to put an end to rivalries and internal power struggles which frequently broke out among local élites. These clashes and their manifestations appear to be similar in their dynamics, as pointed out by previous studies, to other cases occurred in different municipalities, provinces and regions. Resorting to anonymous letters, official complaints, accusations, came to represent the instrument to attack and weaken the opposite factions at a local level, within the municipalities, but also within the provincial administration, among the various representatives of the local administration and even the highest offices of the Terni Fascist Federation. From 1927, following the establishment of the 5 Province and the set up of political and administrative authorities in Terni, now seat of local government, a new phase emerged for the local Fascist Party too. The study of this new province has facilitated the understanding of its relations with central authorities. The establishment of this new local administration was the result of various circumstances linked to the political requirements of the Fascist State following the transition to a totalitarian regime. Additionally, the internal conflict dynamics of the regional Fascist Party played an important role. These led to the inner pacification of the Party and the set up of a Nfp Provincial Federation. Finally, the establishment of "Terni" had a pivotal role too. "Società Terni" (also referred to as "La Terni") came to represent the real "strong power" of the province, capable of imposing a factory regimen based partially on paternalistic assistance and partially on a truck-system model. The Fascist regime dealt directly with "Terni", bypassing the newly-established Nfp Provincial Federation and, where necessary, intervened to impose its authority, as the political and personal vicissitudes of Elia Rossi Passavanti, the first Federal secretary and podestà of Terni, exemplified. In this perspective, drawing together personal and professional career paths of the highest officers (prefects and police commissioners), of both political (federals, deputy federals, administrative secretaries, members of the Fascist Federation Federal Bureau) and economic authorities (members of the Provincial Economic Council, members of the Provincial Corporations Council and of the main bank) has represented an invaluable study, conducive to the understanding of the Nfp's role within the province and, in addition, of the political dynamics at play among the Fascist Party and other authorities, such as the prefectures. With specific reference to the prefects, it is worth noticing that of the nine prefects in office in the Terni province during the period under scrutiny, as many as six were Nfp members. This situation, however, did not necessarily imply a spontaneous collaboration between the prefectures and the Fascist Federation, but it would appear to have been a response to the need of overcoming the conflictual antinomy between the two authorities, which was a recurrent event throughout the Terni province. In addition, the succession of twelve Federals as leaders of the Fascist Party bears witness to a pervasive instability, a fact which is also confirmed by the noticeable preference given to individuals, as many as nine, unconnected with the local milieu. This is certainly a clear manifestation of the local Fascist Party's weakness - which appeared unable to express and produce capable managerial ranks - and of the evolution of the Federal Secretary's role, becoming more and more a professional one, in the context of the remarkable bureaucratisation of the Nfp, aimed at strengthening its mediatory and interventional role on the local administration, one of the main characteristics of the Nfp 6 under the leadership of Starace. Within this framework, the contrast between the prefects and the Fascist Federal secretaries during the 1930s, with regard, as a case in point, to the appointments of the podestà, and the crucial utilisation of official complaints and anonymous letters, bears witness to the Party's attempt to impose its decisions or, at least, to influence the administration at a local level. This, in turn, resulted in a situation of polycracy, which was one of the factors denoting local politics during the Fascist regime. During the 1930s, despite deep rooted conflict among the authorities, the internal power struggles within the Nfp and the endemic ineptitudes of the ruling class, the Fascist Provincial Federation was successful in exerting and promoting the fascistisation of the local community. It is manifest that the highest authorities within the National Fascist Party, with the exception of the Federals and their closest advisors, remained the domain of the original Fascist core, composed by members of the rural class and the bourgeoisie originating primarily from the Terni area. This explains the inadequate generational change within the Fascist Federation and, in addition, the political and economic importance of the Terni area in comparison to the entire province. These political figures were part of the various Federal Bureau and, in some cases at the same time, if the law permitted, held additional offices in different institutional bodies, such as the Economic Provincial Council or were in charge of the main local bank. On the contrary, the influence exerted on the high levels of the National Fascist Party by the small bourgeoisie or by members of the working class remained negligible. It was only with the approach of the Second World War that members of the clerical class, but also technicians and a few tradeunionists already employed within the bureaucratic structure of the Provincial Federation, acquired an enhanced importance and gained access to higher office, such as administrative secretaries or members of the Federal Bureau. The Terni area too, though in a more limited way, which bears not comparison with other provinces, saw the rising «from the bottom and the periphery of a new ruling class within the totalitarian regime»2. During the 1930s therefore, despite various difficulties, including economic issues, the Nfp was successful in creating at a provincial level an organisational structure capable of influencing and organising the local community. Additionally, the regular flow of financial contributions bestowed by various public authorities (provincial administrations, municipalities, Provincial Economic Council) and private companies ("La Terni", first of all, but other businesses too) to a political party constantly seeking financial backing, as thoroughly documented by records of the Terni Fascist Federation, bears witness to the outstanding efforts the Regime made to 2 Marco Palla, Il partito e le classi dirigenti, in Renato Camurri, Stefano Cavazza, Id. (a cura di), Fascismi locali, "Ricerche di Storia politica", a. X, nuova serie, dicembre 2010, 3/10, p. 296. 7 successfully present the Nfp as a conducive mean to the development of this specific welfare model, with a view to promote the fascistisation of the local community. In this perspective, the Nfp's relation with the "Società Terni" is key to understanding the nature of the Fascist Regime and its role within the Terni province. The establishment of a Province was connected to the control of the water-system of the two rivers Nera-Velino, essential to create an industrial hub; similar reasons were behind the agreement stipulated between the Terni municipality and the Bocciardo Company, which came to sanction resolutely the importance of the Company and, additionally, the supremacy of the "centre" over the "periphery". It was from this period and following the inclusion of "Società Terni" within the system of state-controlled industries through the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction, a transaction which secured State control over the Company and its productive branches, that "La Terni" became firmly linked to Fascism and, more in general, to the local community, though in a controversial and ambivalent mutual relation. The Company was perceived as a capitalistic enterprise which took over the city, its directors being able to negotiate with the central Government directly and with the Duce himself, taking a super partes position in relation to the local Nfp. It was not a fortuitous occurrence that the Federal secretaries gauged their political influence against the effectiveness and strength of the relations they were able to maintain with the executive directors of "Società Terni", whom, on their part, appeared to be impenetrable to any influence exerted by the local Fascist Federation. Additionally, following the 1927 agreement and during the ensuing decade, "La Terni", in conjunction with the Fascist Party, appeared to become, without doubt, one of the main pillars of the province. At one level, it supported the Fascist Provincial Federation through a constant flow of financial contributions, vital to bankroll the Federation's activities within the province; but, at a more general level, asserting its influence as a large industrial group, it was capable of shaping the economic, trade-union and social policies of the Fascist regime, creating those conditions to establish «a system of aggregation/disaggregation of the social and political consensus/control conforming to the mass reactionary regime model»3. Within this dynamic interactions, and on the basis of documents available, the local Catholic Church played a significant role in relation to the Fascist Party. With reference to the specific case of the Terni-Narni dioceses and bishop Cesare Boccoleri, the Church's main leader during the Fascist ventennio, this research has showed that, as in the case of other Italian 3 Renato Covino, L'invenzione di una regione, Quattroemme, Perugia 1995, p. 58. 8 dioceses and in alignment with the decisions taken by the Vatican, the Church authorities in Terni supported the Fascist apparatus and adhered to a policy of collaboration with the Nfp. This was particularly manifest on specific occasions: for example during the economic and social campaigns promoted by the Regime, as a case in point the so-called "Battle of the wheat" and, above all, following the 1929 Concordat with the Catholic Church, or during the Ethiopian and Spanish conflicts. At the same time, even when tensions arose and marred the relations between the Fascist regime and the Catholic Church (following the 1931 crisis caused by the limitations imposed on the prerogatives of Azione Cattolica or the adoption of the 1938 racial laws), the consequences for the local Church were negligible and did not appear to affect the on-going relations with the local Fascist Federation. The local Church therefore in pursuing the aim of preserving and, wherever possible, augmenting the Church's influence on the local community, contributed to reinforce and widen consensus for the Fascist regime. More specifically, the Church's actions were particularly effective in encouraging, especially in rural areas, that precise process of "political modernisation", though reactionary at its core, based on organising the entire Italian society on hierarchical and centralising criteria, which Fascism was promoting particularly at a local level. Additionally, and without doubt, the important function to create and, above all, to maintain a high level of consensus was exerted by the pervasive surveillance and repression of any form of dissent and political opposition, enforced within the province by the Fascist security services. A repressive action which was extremely effective and, during the dictatorship, only the Communist Party, despite being hemmed in to the Terni industrial area, was able to maintain, albeit with great difficulty and in a limited way, a form of organised resistance. The fact that the Fascist authorities continuously, though recognising what had been achieved by the Party's multifarious organisations to favour and support the working classes, lamented the feeble "fascistisation" of the Terni industrial workforce and their being "politically dangerous", would appear to confirm implicitly that throughout the province the opposition and political dissent had not completely ceased. More in general, under the "black shirts", despite the propaganda and the activities of various Fascist authorities and institutions, it remained evident that the diversified interests which characterised the local society and the different realities rooted at local level persisted. Ultimately, the local Fascist Party appeared capable of exerting an active role in the "fascistisation" process of society, in alignment with the creation and implementation of a totalitarian state, being the main objective of the National Fascist Party under the leadership of Starace. The Nfp was therefore a real centre of power, expression of an authoritarian 9 regime leaning toward totalitarianism. A regime against which all citizens had to relate for their everyday life needs: that is to say, all citizens had to act, at least outwardly, as fascists.
0 ORGANIZZAZIONE DEL PROGETTO: "Analisi degli ambiti prioritari di domanda e offerta di tecnologie per la "Fabbrica Intelligente"" 0.1 Cenni Teorici sull'attività di Project Management La parola "Progetto" è utilizzata per indicare compiti e attività in apparenza molto diverse tra loro, basti pensare ad un progetto di ricerca e ad un progetto di costruzione di un edificio: due attività assai diverse e formalmente senza punti in comune. Al fine di approfondire i concetti legati al progetto in esame, sarebbe utile definire in maniera più precisa cosa si intende con la parola "progetto". Sin dai primi studi di Taylor e Gantt ad inizio del 1900 si è cercato di dare una definizione chiara del termine, arrivando a definirlo come: "Un insieme di persone e di altre risorse temporaneamente riunite per raggiungere uno specifico obiettivo, di solito con un budget determinato ed entro un periodo stabilito" (Graham, 1990) "Uno sforzo complesso, comportante compiti interrelati eseguiti da varie organizzazioni, con obiettivi, schedulazioni e budget ben definiti" (Russel D. Archibald, 1994) "Un insieme di sforzi coordinati nel tempo" (Kerzner, 1995) "Uno sforzo temporaneo intrapreso per creare un prodotto o un servizio univoco" (PMI – Project Management Institute, 1996) "Un insieme di attività complesse e interrelate, aventi come fine un obiettivo ben definito, raggiungibile attraverso sforzi sinergici e coordinati, entro un tempo predeterminato e con un preciso ammontare di risorse umane e finanziarie a disposizione." (Tonchia, 2007) È da notare che, a prescindere dall'organizzazione e dal settore di riferimento, un progetto è caratterizzato da alcuni elementi distintivi: • un obiettivo da raggiungere con determinate specifiche; • un insieme di attività tra loro coordinate in modo complesso; • tempi di inizio e fine stabiliti; • risorse normalmente limitate (umane, strumentali e finanziare); • carattere pluridisciplinare o multifunzionale rispetto alla struttura organizzativa. La specificità dell'obiettivo determina l'eccezionalità del progetto rispetto alle attività ordinarie e quindi l'assenza di esperienze precedenti. Le organizzazioni, siano esse imprese, enti pubblici o Università, svolgono appunto due tipologie di attività con caratteristiche distinte: 1. funzioni operative; 2. progetti. Talvolta le due categorie presentano aree comuni e condividono alcune caratteristiche: • sono eseguiti da persone; • sono vincolati da risorse limitate; • sono soggetti a pianificazione, esecuzione e controllo. Nonostante queste caratteristiche comuni, progetti e funzioni operative hanno obiettivi diversi tra loro: il progetto infatti è di natura temporanea e ha lo scopo di raggiungere il proprio obiettivo e quindi concludersi, la funzione operativa invece è di natura ripetitiva e fornisce un'azione di supporto continuativo all'azienda. Un progetto indipendentemente dal settore e dall'organizzazione nel quale si sviluppa, ha 3 vincoli fondamentali tra loro in competizione: • qualità o prestazioni; • tempo; • costo. Per di più se il progetto è commissionato da un cliente esterno sarà presente un quarto vincolo, ovvero le buone relazioni tra l'organizzazione e il cliente, è chiaro infatti che è tecnicamente possibile gestire un progetto rispettando i primi tre vincoli senza coinvolgere il cliente, ma così vengono pregiudicati i futuri business. Le principali caratteristiche di un progetto sono: 1. Temporaneità: Ogni progetto infatti ha come detto una data di inizio e di fine definite, e quest'ultima viene raggiunta quando: a. gli obiettivi del progetto sono stati raggiunti; b. è impossibile raggiungere gli obiettivi; c. il progetto non è più necessario e viene chiuso. Temporaneità non significa che un progetto ha breve durata, i progetti infatti possono durare anche diversi anni, l'importante è comprendere che la durata di un progetto è definita con l'obiettivo di creare risultati duraturi. La natura temporanea dei progetti può essere applicata anche ad altri aspetti: - l'opportunità o finestra di mercato è generalmente temporanea; - come unità lavorativa, raramente il gruppo di progetto sopravvive dopo il progetto, il gruppo infatti realizzerà il progetto e alla conclusione di questo verrà sciolto, riassegnando il personale ad altri progetti. 2. Prodotti, servizi o risultati unici: Un progetto crea prodotti, servizi o risultati unici. I progetti solitamente creano: - un prodotto finale o un componente di un prodotto; - un servizio; - un risultato, come degli esiti, dei documenti e report. L'unicità è un'importante caratteristica degli output di un progetto. 3. Elaborazione progressiva: con questa espressione si intende lo sviluppo in fasi, organizzate attraverso una successione incrementale per tutto il ciclo di vita del progetto, infatti man mano che un Project Team (Gruppo di Progetto) approfondisce la conoscenza del progetto è anche in grado di gestirlo ad un maggiore livello di dettaglio e sarà in grado di arricchirlo di maggiori dettagli via via che il Team sviluppa delle conoscenze sul settore. L'attività di Gestione del Progetto o Project Management è l'applicazione di conoscenze, abilità, strumenti e tecniche alle attività di progetto al fine di soddisfarne i requisiti, dove il Project Manager (PM) è la persona incaricata del raggiungimento degli obiettivi di progetto. La gestione di progetto include: • identificare i requisiti; • fissare obiettivi chiari e raggiungibili; • adattare specifiche di prodotto, piani e approccio alle diverse aree di interesse e alle diverse aspettative dei vari stakeholder. • individuare il giusto equilibrio tra le esigenze di qualità, ambito, tempo e costi, che sono in competenza tra di loro. Nella gestione dei progetti infatti, è costante lo sforzo atto a bilanciare i tre vincoli (qualità e prestazioni, tempi e costi), poiché i progetti di successo sono quelli che consegnano il prodotto, il servizio o il risultato richiesti nell'ambito stabilito, entro il tempo fissato e rimanendo entro i limiti del budget definito, infatti la variazione anche di uno solo dei tre vincoli implica che almeno un altro ne risulta influenzato. Il PM si occupa inoltre di gestire i progetti tenendo conto dei rischi intrinseci di un progetto, ossia eventi o condizioni incerte che, se si verificano, hanno un effetto o positivo o negativo su almeno uno degli obiettivi di progetto. Una Gestione dei Progetti efficace ma allo stesso tempo efficiente, può essere definita quindi come il raggiungimento degli obiettivi del progetto al livello di prestazioni o qualità desiderate, mantenendosi nei tempi e nei costi previsti e utilizzando senza sprechi le risorse disponibili. Tutto ciò è fondamentale che sia conforme al desiderio del cliente, infatti nei casi in cui un progetto è commissionato da un cliente esterno, le relazioni con quest'ultimo diventano un ulteriore vincolo di progetto e quindi Il successo di un progetto si raggiunge con quanto detto sopra e con l'accettazione da parte del cliente. Raramente i progetti vengono completati rispettando l'obiettivo originale, spesso infatti con l'avanzamento del progetto alcune modifiche sono inevitabili, e se non gestite in maniera opportuna possono anche affossare il progetto e il morale di chi ci lavora. Perciò è necessario un accordo reciproco tra PM e cliente relativo ai cambiamenti degli obiettivi, che comunque devono essere minimi e sempre approvati. È da ricordare infine che i PM devono gestire i progetti in base alle linee guida dell'azienda a cui fanno riferimento, rispettando procedure, regole e direttive dell'organizzazione, altrimenti si rischia che il PM venga considerato come un imprenditore autonomo, finalizzato esclusivamente al raggiungimento dei suoi obiettivi, rischiando così di modificare il flusso di lavoro principale dell'organizzazione. 0.2 Scopo del Progetto Sotto il suggerimento della Commissione Europea, tutte le Regioni degli Stati membri dell'UE, sono state invitate a stilare un documento nel quale si definisca la propria Smart Specialisation Strategy SSS , al fine di favorire lo sviluppo delle politiche di coesione delle regioni e degli stati membri, da finanziare con i Fondi Strutturali per il periodo 2014-2020. Il concetto indica Strategie d'innovazione concepite a livello regionale ma valutate e messe a sistema a livello nazionale con l'obiettivo di: • evitare la frammentazione degli interventi e mettere a sistema le politiche di ricerca e innovazione; • sviluppare strategie d'innovazione regionali che valorizzino gli ambiti produttivi di eccellenza tenendo conto del posizionamento strategico territoriale e delle prospettive di sviluppo in un quadro economico globale. In linea con le direttive comunitarie e in coerenza con quanto indicato nella SSS della Regione Toscana, IRPET Regione Toscana ha incaricato quindi il Consorzio QUINN a redigere un report denominato "Analisi degli ambiti prioritari di domanda e offerta di tecnologie per la "Fabbrica Intelligente"", affinché venga delineato il panorama delle imprese regionali che fanno uso di queste tecnologie, al fine di erogare in una seconda fase dei finanziamenti per la ricerca e lo sviluppo, in particolare quelli gestiti nell'ambito dei fondi strutturali che svolgono un ruolo rilevante come promotori dell'innovazione tecnologica. La "Fabbrica Intelligente" infatti rappresenta una delle 9 aree tecnologiche individuate dal Bando «Cluster Tecnologici Nazionali» presentato dal MIUR il 30 maggio 2012, e definita come strategica per la competitività del Paese. Nella SSS regionale, l'ambito prioritario legato alle tecnologie per la Fabbrica Intelligente si rivolge alle tecnologie dell'automazione, della meccatronica e della robotica. Ai fini degli obiettivi della SSS queste tre discipline concorrono in maniera integrata a sviluppare soluzioni tecnologiche funzionali all'automazione dei processi produttivi, in termini di velocizzazione, sicurezza e controllo, della sostenibilità ed economicità degli stessi, nonché dell'estensione della capacità di azione. Per un più semplice inquadramento definitorio, le tecnologie di questi tre settori vengono di seguito approfonditi e descritti in maniera distinta. 1. AUTOMAZIONE : Per "automazione" si intende lo sviluppo di sistemi, strumentazioni, processi ed applicativi che consentono la riduzione dell'intervento dell'uomo sui processi produttivi. L'automazione in tal senso si realizza mediante soluzioni di problemi tecnici legati all'esecuzione di azioni in maniera ripetuta, nella semplificazioni di operazione complesse, nell'effettuazione di operazioni complesse in contesti incerti e dinamici con elevato livello di precisione. Il concetto di automazione assume un carattere estensivo di integrazione di tecnologie e di ambiti applicativi (dal laboratorio, alla fabbrica intelligente), mantenendo il focus sul controllo automatico dei processi. 2. MECCATRONICA : La "meccatronica" è una branca dell'ingegneria che coniuga sinergicamente più discipline quali la Meccanica, l'elettronica, ed i sistemi di controllo intelligenti, allo scopo di realizzare un sistema integrato detto anche sistema tecnico. Inizialmente la meccatronica è nata dalla necessità di fondere insieme la meccanica e l'elettronica, da cui il nome. Successivamente l'esigenza di realizzare sistemi tecnici sempre più complessi ha portato alla necessità di integrare anche le altre discipline per applicazioni industriali robotiche e di azionamento elettrico. 3. ROBOTICA : Come ramo della cibernetica rivolto alle tecniche di costruzione (ed i possibili ambiti di applicazioni) dei robot, la robotica è la disciplina dell'ingegneria che studia e sviluppa metodi che permettano a un robot di eseguire dei compiti specifici riproducendo il lavoro umano. La robotica moderna si è sviluppata perseguendo principalmente: a) l'autonomia delle macchine; b) la capacità di interazione/immedesimazione con l'uomo e i suoi comportamenti. 0.3 Stakeholder del Progetto La definizione stakeholder o portatori di interesse fu elaborata nel 1963 al Research Institute dell'Università di Stanford da Edward Freeman, definendoli come i soggetti senza il cui supporto l'impresa non è in grado di sopravvivere. Gli stakeholder di un progetto sono persone o strutture organizzative coinvolte attivamente nel progetto o i cui interessi possono subire effetti dell'esecuzione o dal completamento del progetto, possono quindi avere influenza sugli obiettivi e sui risultati del progetto. Ignorare gli stakeholder può portare a conseguenze negative sui risultati del progetto, il loro ruolo infatti può avere sia un impatto negativo che positivo sul progetto: gli stakeholder positivi sono quelli che traggono vantaggi dalla buona riuscita del progetto, è quindi vantaggioso supportarne gli interessi, mentre i negativi sono quelli che vedono risultati sfavorevoli dalla buona riuscita del progetto, gli interessi di questi ultimi avrebbero la meglio con un aumento dei vincoli sull'avanzamento del progetto. Solitamente gli stakeholder principali in un progetto sono rappresentati da: • Project Manager: persona responsabile della gestione del progetto; • Cliente/utente: persona o struttura organizzativa che utilizzerà il prodotto del progetto; • Membri del Team di progetto: membri del gruppo incaricati all'esecuzione del progetto; • Sponsor: persona o gruppo che fornisce le risorse necessarie al progetto; • Soggetti influenti: persone o gruppi che sono non direttamente collegati con l'acquisto o l'uso del prodotto ma che, a causa della posizione ricoperta nella struttura organizzativa del cliente, possono influire positivamente o negativamente sul corso del progetto. Il compito di gestire le aspettative degli stakeholder va al Project Manager, spesso ciò non è semplice a causa dei differenti e contrastanti obiettivi degli stakeholder. Nel presente progetto gli stakeholder coinvolti nelle varie attività possono quindi essere ricondotti a quattro soggetti o gruppi: • Ente Committente: IRPET; • Ente Incaricato: Consorzio QUINN; • Team di Progetto; • Regione Toscana. 0.3.1 IRPET: ISTITUTO REGIONALE PER LA PROGRAMMAZIONE ECONOMICA DELLA TOSCANA L'IRPET, nato nel 1968 come organo tecnico-scientifico del CRPET (Comitato regionale per la programmazione economica della Toscana) con la finalità di compiere gli studi preliminari all'istituzione dell'ente Regione, è diventato Ente pubblico con legge della Regione Toscana nel 1974. L'Istituto è ente di consulenza sia per la Giunta che per il Consiglio regionale per lo svolgimento di compiti di studio e ricerca in materia di programmazione. Sono compiti dell'Istituto, in particolare: a) lo studio della struttura socio economica regionale e delle sue trasformazioni, degli andamenti congiunturali e dei relativi strumenti analitici; b) lo studio della struttura territoriale regionale e delle sue trasformazioni e dei relativi strumenti analitici; c) lo studio delle metodologie di programmazione, di valutazione e di verifica delle politiche; d) gli studi preparatori per gli atti della programmazione regionale e per il piano di indirizzo territoriale regionale in ordine ai problemi economici, territoriali e sociali; d bis) elaborazione dei documenti o rapporti di valutazione dei programmi nazionali e dell'Unione europea gestiti dalla Regione Toscana, di cui agli articoli 10, comma 5, e 12 della legge regionale 2 agosto 2013, n. 44 (Disposizioni in materia di programmazione regionale). e) la circolazione delle conoscenze e dei risultati di cui alle lettere a) b) e c). L'Istituto, nell'ambito delle medesime materie, può altresì svolgere altre attività di studio, ricerca e consulenza su committenza di soggetti pubblici e privati diversi dalla Regione, e inoltre: • stabilisce relazioni con enti di ricerca, anche esteri, istituti specializzati, dipartimenti universitari; • assume iniziative di formazione specialistica nelle discipline oggetto dell'attività dell'Istituto. 0.3.2 QUINN: CONSORZIO UNIVERSITARIO IN INGEGNERIA PER LA QUALITÀ E L'INNOVAZIONE Istituito nel 1989 su iniziativa dell'Università di Pisa con l'adesione di numerose grandi imprese italiane e riconosciuto dal MURST (oggi MIUR) con Decreto del 1991, l'attuale QUINN: Consorzio Universitario in Ingegneria per la Qualità e l'Innovazione viene costituito inizialmente con il nome "Qualital" allo scopo di far collaborare un gruppo di grandi imprese nella ricerca applicata e nella formazione manageriale in una disciplina in forte crescita, il Total Quality Management ed in particolare l'ingegneria dei processi aziendali. Nel 2005 alla missione originaria se ne affianca un'altra: l'innovazione. Cambia il nome: Quinn, Consorzio Universitario in Ingegneria per la Qualità e l'Innovazione, ma resta l'approccio rigoroso: sviluppare metodologie e strumenti di supporto ai processi innovativi derivanti dalla migliore ricerca e dalle esperienze più avanzate a livello internazionale. Il Consorzio con sede a Pisa, non ha fine di lucro; esso mira a creare sinergie tra le competenze del suo staff e dei partner accademici e le capacità operative delle Imprese industriali, delle Organizzazioni pubbliche e private operanti nella produzione di beni e servizi, allo scopo di promuovere e svolgere: • ricerca applicata e sperimentazione on field di metodologie e strumenti per il miglioramento della qualità di prodotti e servizi; • progetti di rilievo nazionale ed internazionale finalizzati allo sviluppo scientifico e tecnologico dell'ingegneria della qualità e dell'innovazione. Per quanto concerne la ricerca applicata le linee strategiche seguite riguardano: • Metodiche, strumenti per l'innovazione, la qualità, il miglioramento delle performance aziendali; • Gestione per Processi sviluppata in contesti diversificati; • Sistemi Integrati Qualità, Ambiente, Sicurezza, Sostenibilità. Il Consorzio QUINN è una struttura professionale con al vertice un rappresentante della componente accademica dell'Università di Pisa (discipline ingegneristiche) e gestito dal Direttore operativo con comprovata esperienza manageriale. QUINN opera quindi con un pool di professionisti che, con background multidisciplinare e approccio per «commessa», presidiano i principali ambiti di intervento: • il recupero di efficienza dei processi organizzativi; • la capitalizzazione dell'ascolto dei clienti e delle lessons learned; • il miglioramento continuo delle performance di unità operative e key people; • l'evoluzione dei sistemi di gestione Qualità, Ambiente e Sicurezza verso la sostenibilità. I componenti del pool, oltre ad operare personalmente sul campo, attivano collaborazioni con esperti del mondo della ricerca e delle professioni, per portare a termine progetti e ricerche che creino valore tangibile per i Committenti. Gli incarichi di QUINN si caratterizzano per la relativa non convenzionalità degli obiettivi assegnati, dei metodi di lavoro utilizzati e per l'interdisciplinarietà delle competenze richieste; costante è la flessibilità di approccio per rispondere ad esigenze che evolvono anche durante l'iter progettuale e l'attenzione a coinvolgere le risorse del Cliente che possono contribuire al risultato finale. Tra le linee di intervento a supporto dell'Innovazione attivate da QUINN negli ultimi 15 anni evidenziamo i "Servizi di supporto alle Policy pubbliche", che per la realizzazione di interventi di supporto alle policy regionali toscane (2010-2014) per l'innovazione delle imprese si sono articolate in: • Organizzazione e gestione di un percorso d'incontri per i centri servizi e di trasferimento tecnologico aderenti alla Tecnorete della Regione Toscana; • Revisione catalogo dei servizi avanzati e qualificati, sua estensione all'internazionalizzazione; • Analisi del concetto e di esperienze di Dimostratore Tecnologico; • Linee guida per la Divulgazione Tecnologica nel Trasferimento Tecnologico; • Linee guida per la valutazione della performance dei laboratori di ricerca e trasferimento tecnologico e laboratori di prova/analisi; • Linee guida alle attività di Business-Matching / Matchmaking; • Studio di fattibilità per una società di seed capital per Toscana Life Sciences e collaborazione con le attività di incubazione di Siena (2006); • Studi di fattibilità per le policy di sostegno alla nascita di nuove imprese innovative - CCIAA Lodi, ARTI/Regione Puglia (2007- 2008); • Indagine sul sistema dei Parchi Scientifici e Tecnologici Italiani (2010); • Studio di fattibilità dell'incubatore universitario di Sesto Fiorentino (2009); • Progettazione condivisa con gli attori territoriali del progetto Innovation Building a Prato (2009); • Ricerca sulla nuova imprenditorialità e attrazione di investimenti nel distretto della nautica della Spezia (2007-2008); • Attività di supporto all'Incubatore tecnologico di Firenze finalizzate alla ricerca e accoglimento di nuove imprese (2007); • Analisi di opportunità di nuove imprese innovative derivanti dalla costruzione di un nuovo ospedale (2006-2007). 0.4 Fasi del Progetto La Pianificazione del Progetto, nell'ottica di un'efficace Project Management, è stata svolta suddividendo il progetto in fasi al fine di poter effettuare un miglior controllo. I passaggi da una fase all'altra del progetto, che rappresentano il ciclo di vita del progetto, comportano generalmente una forma di trasferimento tecnico o comunque un passaggio di consegne, dove gli output ottenuti da una fase a monte, prima di essere approvati per procedere alla fase a valle vengono analizzati per verificarne completezza e accuratezza. Quando si ritiene che i possibili rischi sono accettabili, può essere che una fase venga iniziata prima dell'approvazione dei deliverable della fase precedente. Per fasi si intendono sequenze identificabili di eventi composti da attività coerenti che producono risultati definiti e che costituiscono l'input per la fase successiva. Le fasi standard identificabili nella maggior parte dei progetti sono: • Concezione e Avvio del Progetto; • Pianificazione; • Esecuzione e Controllo; • Chiusura. In sostanza il ciclo di vita del progetto definisce quale lavoro tecnico deve essere svolto in ciascuna fase, quando devono essere prodotti i deliverable in ciascuna fase e come ciascun deliverable deve essere analizzato, verificato e convalidato, chi è coinvolto in ciascuna fase e come controllare e approvare ciascuna fase. Le fasi che hanno portato alla redazione del report, nel quale le informazioni raccolte sul campo sono state organizzate in modo tale da consentire l'inquadramento del fenomeno della Fabbrica Intelligente in Toscana, sono così individuabili: • FASE 0: Fase Preliminare Dopo aver ricevuto l'incarico da parte di IRPET per la redazione del report, il QUINN ha analizzato la fattibilità del progetto, in modo da prevenire un rischio di insuccesso e dare concretezza all'idea progettuale, e una volta verificata ha redatto la propria Offerta Tecnica. Dopo l'accettazione dell'Offerta da parte dell'Ente Committente, QUINN ha costituito il Team di Progetto incaricato a svolgere le attività progettuali, assegnando a ciascun componente le proprie responsabilità e mansioni. Grazie all'utilizzo di tecniche efficaci per la pianificazione, sono state programmate nel dettaglio tutte le attività da svolgere, al fine di completare il report entro il termine fissato. • FASE 1: Comprensione del Contesto di riferimento In questa fase l'obiettivo centrale era rappresentato dalla comprensione del contesto del progetto, il Team di Progetto rispetto al contesto imprenditoriale italiano ha svolto un'analisi interna e una esterna, che hanno permesso di inquadrare il tema della "Fabbrica Intelligente". Partendo dalle origini prettamente letterarie del concetto, è stata illustrata l'evoluzione industriale che ha preceduto questo fenomeno, successivamente sono stati analizzati i macro trend socio-economici che hanno maggiore impatto sull'industria che stanno caratterizzando l'attuale scenario industriale, concludendo infine con la presentazione delle varie iniziative comunitarie e nazionali a sostegno della ripresa manifatturiera attraverso la "Fabbrica Intelligente". • FASE 2: Esplorazione del Concetto nel Panorama Internazionale Durante questa fase, svolta quasi in parallelo con la precedente, sono state analizzate le varie declinazioni al concetto di Fabbrica Intelligente e congiuntamente ricercati i trend e le tecnologie abilitanti. Attraverso un esercizio di Forecasting Tecnologico, osservando molteplici studi condotti da un altrettanto numero di esperti, sono stati identificati i trend attuali e quelli emergenti connessi alla Fabbrica Intelligente, con i conseguenti impatti sulle aziende e sulla forza lavoro. Alla fine sono stati ricercati alcuni casi di Fabbrica Intelligente, o di Industria 4.0 che dir si voglia, sviluppati da diverse aziende nel mondo. • FASE 3: Studio dell'Applicazione del Modello nella Regione Toscana Nello svolgimento di questa fase, si è passati allo studio degli ambiti prioritari della domanda e dell'offerta di tecnologie per la Fabbrica Intelligente nella Regione Toscana, per come identificata all'interno della SSS, focalizzandoci sulle tecnologie connesse all'automazione, alla meccatronica e alla robotica. Successivamente si è passati ad individuare possibili legami tra gli ambiti tecnologici analizzati e lo sviluppo di soluzioni tecnologiche funzionali ai processi produttivi, "in termini di velocizzazione sicurezza e controllo dei processi, della sostenibilità ed economicità degli stessi, nonché dell'estensione della capacità di azione". Si è arrivati infine a delineare il panorama della diffusione del modello della Fabbrica intelligente nelle imprese del sistema produttivo toscano, grazie all'analisi della diffusione fra le aziende produttrici e utilizzatrici delle tecnologie correlate, attraverso il merging di due DB di imprese Toscane stilati da enti qualificati, interviste in profondità e telefoniche, e infine attraverso l'organizzazione di due Focus Group. • FASE 4: Realizzazione Conclusiva del Report La quarta e ultima fase ha portato alla redazione finale del report, nel quale le informazioni sia di carattere quantitativo, ma soprattutto qualitativo raccolte sul campo sono state elaborate in maniera tale da evidenziare la diffusione del fenomeno nel tessuto produttivo toscano. I risultati conseguenti all'elaborazione di tali informazioni risultano essere: - la descrizione di casi studio sia di utilizzatori che di sviluppatori, con la presentazione delle peculiarità di adozione delle tecnologie che prefigurano possibili modelli di adozione alla Fabbrica intelligente; - la mappatura della diffusione delle tecnologie abilitanti della Fabbrica intelligente in Toscana con riferimento alle imprese utilizzatrici; - inquadramento del livello di maturità dei diversi settori produttivi toscani rispetto alle tecnologie target identificate dal Cluster Fabbrica Intelligente; - raccomandazioni di policy. 0.5 Strumenti e Tecniche utilizzate nell'ambito del Progetto Per una più facile comprensione dei contenuti, in questo paragrafo vengono descritti in forma teorica gli strumenti e le tecniche gestionali, che il Team di Progetto ha utilizzato per lo svolgimento delle attività progettuali, elencandoli in funzione dell'impiego nelle diverse fasi del progetto. Nel proseguo del lavoro, dove verranno presentati i contenuti del report, saranno illustrate le modalità operative realmente avviate nell'applicazione dei vari strumenti. 0.5.1 FASE 0: FASE PRELIMINARE In questa fase preliminare il PM detiene la responsabilità della pianificazione, integrazione ed esecuzione dei piani. La pianificazione, ovvero il P nella logica PDCA, è fondamentale a causa della breve durata del progetto e per l'assegnazione delle risorse. L'integrazione risulta altrettanto importante, altrimenti ogni soggetto sviluppa la propria pianificazione senza tener conto degli altri. La pianificazione è la definizione di cosa fare, quando va fatto e da chi; è destinata in linea teorica a: • "acquisire" gli obiettivi del processo; • individuare le fasi o meglio processi, diretti ed indiretti, che consentono di raggiungere gli obiettivi prefissati ovvero stesura della "mappa" di processi e delle interazioni; • scegliere metodi per il do, il check e l'act, il personale, i materiali e/o le informazioni, le macchine/tecnologie e/o attrezzature per ogni processo operativo aggredibile; • provare, sperimentare, verificare là dove non si sa; • emettere specifiche, standard; • occuparsi delle eventuali attività di comunicazione e addestramento. Per un PM è fondamentale utilizzare tecniche di pianificazione efficaci, e di seguito sono descritte quelle utilizzate durante tutte le fasi del progetto: • Work Breakdown Structure (WBS); • Matrice RACI; • Diagramma di Gantt; • Flow Chart (FC). 0.5.1.1 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) La WBS (Work Breakdown Structure) è una forma di scomposizione (o disaggregazione secondo una struttura ad albero) strutturata e gerarchica del progetto che si sviluppa tramite l'individuazione di sotto-obiettivi e attività definite ad un livello di dettaglio sempre maggiore. Scopo della WBS è di identificare e collocare all'ultimo livello gerarchico pacchetti di lavoro (Work Package) chiaramente gestibili e attribuibili a un unico responsabile, affinché possano essere programmati, schedulati, controllati e valutati. La WBS è uno strumento di fondamentale importanza nel Project Management, infatti fornisce le basi per sviluppare una matrice delle responsabilità e successivamente effettuare lo scheduling . Attraverso la suddivisione dei deliverable in componenti più piccoli definiti "work package" si semplifica la gestione del progetto. Il work package infatti rappresenta il gradino più basso della gerarchia WBS ed è tramite questo che si possono definire in maniera più affidabile schedulazione dei tempi e costi. La suddivisione per livello procede riducendo ampiezza e complessità fino a quando non perviene a una descrizione adeguata e inequivocabile della voce finale. La Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), ha permesso di individuare, ai vari livelli, tutte le attività di sviluppo del progetto. La logica di scomposizione utilizzata è stata quella del processo di lavoro, questa logica consiste nel suddividere il progetto in relazione alla sequenza logica delle attività realizzative che verranno messe in opera, e ci ha permesso di individuare, per ogni pacchetto di lavoro: • scopo del lavoro con obiettivi e vincoli; • il processo di lavoro e le sue interfacce; • le risorse assegnabili e assegnate; • i limiti di tempo. 0.5.1.2 Matrice RACI La Matrice RACI è uno strumento che viene utilizzato per l'individuazione delle responsabilità all'interno di un progetto. Essa indica alle risorse umane coinvolte le mansioni e il grado di responsabilità all'interno del progetto, inoltre fornisce indicazioni specifiche su come comportarsi nel gestire le relazioni e responsabilità di altre persone coinvolte, rappresentando un forte elemento di motivazione per le stesse. La matrice di responsabilità nella sua intersezione indica il tipo di persona a cui è delegata una persona o un'unità organizzativa. Generalmente vengono utilizzate delle sigle che esprimono le responsabilità, le più utilizzate sono quelle corrispondenti all'acronimo RACI: • R: "Responsabile": è il ruolo di colui che è chiamato ad eseguire operativamente il task (per ogni task è possibile avere più Responsabili); • A: "Approva": è aziendalmente il ruolo a cui riporta il Responsabile o che comunque dovrà svolgere un ruolo di supervisione del lavoro del/dei Responsabili(ci può essere un solo A per ogni attività); • C: "Coordinamento": è il ruolo di chi dovrà supportare il/i Responsabile nello svolgimento del task fornendogli informazioni utili al completamento del lavoro o a migliorare la qualità del lavoro stesso • I: "Informato": è il ruolo di chi dovrà essere informato in merito al lavoro del/dei Responsabile e che dovrà prendere decisioni sulla base delle informazioni avute. 0.5.1.3 Diagramma di Gantt La complessità sempre maggiore di molti progetti, la gestione di grandi quantità di dati e le scadenze rigide incentivano le organizzazioni verso l'utilizzo di metodi per la pianificazione delle attività su scala temporale. Le tecniche di scheduling più comuni sono: • Diagrammi a barre o di Gantt; • Tecniche reticolari: - PDM (Precedence Diagram Method); - ADM (Arrow Diagram Method); - PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique); - CPM (Critical Path Method). • Approccio della Catena Critica CCPM (Critical Chain Project Management). La tipologia di rappresentazione utilizzata nel presente report, è il diagramma a barre (di Gantt), un mezzo molto semplice e intuitivo per visualizzare le attività o gli eventi tracciati in relazione al tempo, come nel nostro caso, o al denaro. La rappresentazione utilizzata riguarda l'evoluzione del progetto su scala temporale, dove ogni barra rappresenta un'attività la cui lunghezza è proporzionale alla durata dell'attività stessa, la quale è collocata sulla scala temporale. Il diagramma di Gantt permette perciò di definire cosa fare in una determinata quantità di tempo, e stabilisce inoltre eventi o date chiave (milestone) di progetto e un riferimento per il controllo dell'avanzamento. Il vantaggio che ha apportato sta nell'ottimizzazione delle risorse, attraverso una contemporanea visualizzazione delle attività, delle tempistiche e dei soggetti coinvolti. Ha comunque tre limitazioni principali, infatti non illustra: • le interdipendenze tra le attività; • risultati di un inizio anticipato o tardivo nelle attività; • l'incertezza inclusa nell'esecuzione dell'attività. 0.5.1.4 Flow Chart (FC) o Diagramma di Flusso Il Diagramma di Flusso, detto anche Flow Chart, rappresenta una modellazione grafica per rappresentare il flusso di controllo ed esecuzione di algoritmi, procedure o istruzioni operative. Esso consente di descrivere in modo schematico ovvero grafico: • le operazioni da compiere, rappresentate mediante forme convenzionali (ad esempio : rettangoli, rombi, esagoni, parallelogrammi, .), ciascuna con un preciso significato logico e all'interno delle quali un'indicazione testuale descrive tipicamente l'attività da svolgere; • la sequenza nella quale devono essere compiute, rappresentate con frecce di collegamento. Tale strumento permette pertanto di visualizzare tutto o parte del processo e di capire il collegamento delle sequenze necessarie a svolgere una funzione. In particolare permette di individuare i punti del processo in cui si verifica l'effetto che si vuole analizzare e di risalire il flusso fino alle origini delle cause potenziali. 0.5.2 FASE 1: COMPRENSIONE DEL CONTESTO DI RIFERIMENTO Tutti i progetti si interfacciano con il mondo reale, quindi occorre considerare i diversi contesti in cui il progetto converge. Alla luce di questo il PM ha incaricato i componenti del Team di Progetto di effettuare, un'analisi del contesto di riferimento, svolgendo un esercizio di Forecasting Tecnologico, attraverso la Ricerca sul Web, allo scopo di realizzare: • un'Analisi Interna; • un'Analisi Esterna; • l'Analisi SWOT. 0.5.2.1 Ricerca sul Web Lo strumento che normalmente viene utilizzato per effettuare una ricerca sul web è il cosiddetto motore di ricerca, il quale è basato sull'inserimento di una o più parole-chiave le cui occorrenze vengono cercate all'interno dei vari documenti presenti in rete. Bisogna dire che il processo di ricerca e di selezione delle informazioni è molto più complesso di quanto si possa pensare, per l'appunto possiamo differenziare la ricerca delle fonti in due modi: • Fonti Istituzionali (es. Regolamenti Comunitari, EUROSTAT, ISTAT, etc.); • Fonti Pubbliche (es. Unioncamere); • Enti di natura scientifica (es. società di consulenza). La conoscenza precedente dell'argomento influenza e da maggiori garanzie di successo nella ricerca, in questo modo l'utente è in possesso di termini specifici che può utilizzare direttamente come keywords. Gli elementi per impostare una soddisfacente ricerca sul web possono essere riassunti in: • chiarezza dell'oggetto, quesito o obiettivo della ricerca; • tempo e capacità dell'utente che effettua la ricerca; • qualità delle risposte in termini di: - adeguatezza, completezza ed esaustività; - affidabilità e autorevolezza della fonte; - grado di aggiornamento. 0.5.2.2 Forecasting Tecnologico Il Forecasting Tecnologico è un settore dei Technology Future Studies che racchiude varie strumenti volti ad anticipare e a capire la direzione potenziale, le caratteristiche e gli effetti del cambiamento tecnologico. Sono identificabili 9 cluster: 0.5.2.2.1 Expert Opinion Questa famiglia comprende tecniche basate sull'opinione di esperti, e include la previsione o la comprensione dello sviluppo tecnologico attraverso intense consultazioni tra vari esperti in materia. Uno dei metodi più diffusi è sicuramente il Metodo Delphi. Questo metodo combina richiesta di pareri riguardanti la probabilità di realizzare la tecnologia proposta e pareri di esperti in materia dei tempi di sviluppo. Gli esperti si confrontano e si scambiano pareri in base alle proprie previsioni tecnologiche, in modo da arrivare a una linea comune. 0.5.2.2.2 Trend Analysis L'Analisi del Trend comporta la previsione attraverso la proiezione dei dati storici quantitativi nel futuro. Questa analisi comprende modelli sia di previsione economica che tecnologica. Una tecnologia di solito ha un ciclo di vita composto di varie distinti fasi. Le tappe includono tipicamente • una fase di adozione • una fase di crescita • una fase di sviluppo • una fase di declino. L'analisi cerca di identificare e prevedere il ciclo della innovazione tecnologica oggetto dello studio. 0.5.2.2.3 Monitoring and Intelligence Methods Questa famiglia di metodi (Monitoring e le sue variazioni: Environmental Scanning and Technology Watch) ha lo scopo di fare acquisire consapevolezza dei cambiamenti all'orizzonte che potrebbero avere impatto sulla penetrazione o ricezione delle tecnologie nel mercato. 0.5.2.2.4 Statistical Methods Fra i metodi statistici, i più diffusi sono l'Analisi di Correlazione e l'Analisi Bibliometrica. • L'Analisi di Correlazione anticipa i modelli di sviluppo di una nuova tecnologia correlandola ad altri, quando lo stesso modello è simile ad altre tecnologie esistenti. • L'Analisi Bibliometrica si concentra sullo studio della produzione scientifica (pubblicazioni, etc.) presente in letteratura. In particolare risulta utile al fine di: - sviluppare conoscenza esaustiva del tema oggetto di studio; - analizzare i database da usare, da cui trarre informazioni e dati; - acquisire conoscenza sulle informazioni dei brevetti, fonte importante per acquisire informazioni uniche dal momento che spesso i dati e le informazioni rintracciabili nei brevetti non sono pubblicati altrove; - definire la strategia di ricerca; - utilizzare gli strumenti di analisi, attraverso software di data e text mining efficienti; - analizzare i risultati, grazie alle informazioni di vario tipo da cui gli esperti possono estrarre informazioni strategiche. 0.5.2.2.5 Modelling and Simulation Per "modello" si intende una rappresentazione semplificata delle dinamiche strutturali di una certa parte del mondo "reale". Questi modelli possono mostrare il comportamento futuro dei sistemi complessi semplicemente isolando gli aspetti essenziali di un sistema da quelli non essenziali. Tra i principali metodi: • Agent Modeling, tecnica che simula l'interazione dei diversi fattori in gioco; • System Simulation, tecniche che simulano la configurazione di un sistema a fronte dell'azione di possibili variabili aggiuntive. 0.5.2.2.6 Scenarios Costituiscono rappresentazioni alternative delle tecnologie future, sulla base di considerazioni e condizioni ulteriori a seguito di possibili cambiamenti delle condizioni al contorno inizialmente ipotizzate. 0.5.2.2.7 Valuing/Decision/Economic Methods Tra i metodi il più popolare è il "Relevance Tree Approach": le finalità e gli obiettivi di una tecnologia proposta sono suddivisi tra: • obiettivi prioritari; • obiettivi di basso livello. Grazie ad una struttura ad albero è possibile identificare la struttura gerarchica dello sviluppo tecnologico. In base ad esso viene eseguita la stima delle probabilità di raggiungere gli obiettivi ai vari livelli di sviluppo tecnologico. 0.5.2.2.8 Descriptive and Matrices Methods In crescente affermazione in questa famiglia di metodi è la definizione di Roadmap dello sviluppo di tecnologie, che consiste nel proiettare i principali elementi tecnologici di progettazione e produzione insieme alle strategie per il raggiungimento di traguardi desiderabili in modo efficiente Nel suo contesto più ampio, una Roadmap tecnologica fornisce una "vista di consenso o visione del futuro" della scienza e della tecnologia a disposizione dei decisori. 0.5.2.3 Analisi SWOT L'analisi SWOT è uno strumento di pianificazione strategica semplice ed efficace che serve ad evidenziare le caratteristiche di un progetto o di un programma, di un'organizzazione e le conseguenti relazioni con l'ambiente operativo nel quale si colloca, offrendo un quadro di riferimento per la definizione di strategie finalizzate al raggiungimento di un obiettivo. La SWOT Analysis si costruisce tramite una matrice divisa in quattro campi nei quali si hanno: • Punti di Forza (Strengths); • Punti di Debolezza (Weaknesses); • Opportunità (Opportunities); • Minacce (Threats). L'Analisi SWOT consente di distinguere fattori esogeni ed endogeni, dove punti di forza e debolezza sono da considerarsi fattori endogeni mentre minacce e opportunità fattori esogeni. I fattori endogeni sono tutte quelle variabili che fanno parte integrante del sistema sulle quali è possibile intervenire, i fattori esogeni invece sono quelle variabili esterne al sistema che possono però condizionarlo, su di esse non è possibile intervenire direttamente ma è necessario tenerle sotto controllo in modo da sfruttare gli eventi positivi e prevenire quelli negativi, che rischiano di compromettere il raggiungimento degli obiettivi prefissati. I vantaggi di una analisi di questo tipo si possono sintetizzare in 3 punti: • la profonda analisi del contesto in cui si agisce, resa possibile dalla preliminare osservazione e raccolta dei dati e da una loro abile interpretazione si traduce in una puntuale delineazione delle strategie; • il raffronto continuo tra le necessità dell'organizzazione e le strategie adottate porta ad un potenziamento della efficacia raggiunta; • consente di raggiungere un maggiore consenso sulle strategie se partecipano all'analisi tutte le parti coinvolte dall'intervento. 0.5.3 FASE 2: ESPLORAZIONE DEL CONCETTO NEL PANORAMA INTERNAZIONALE Anche in questa fase, dove l'obiettivo era quello di ricercare nella letteratura le varie declinazioni al concetto di "Fabbrica Intelligente" e le tecnologie attuali ed emergenti connesse ad essa, è stata svolta un'analisi degli organismi specializzati nel Foresight Tecnologico e di profondi conoscitori del settore dell'automazione industriale, per studiare le tendenze tecnologiche per i prossimi anni. 0.5.4 FASE 3: STUDIO DELL'APPLICAZIONE DEL MODELLO NELLA REGIONE TOSCANA Durante lo svolgimento di questa fase, si è intrapreso un percorso di raccolta delle informazioni legate al tema della "Fabbrica Intelligente" nel tessuto produttivo toscano, che è stato strutturato in 3 diverse attività: • Mappatura della Diffusione delle Tecnologie in Toscana attraverso il merging dei DB "Osservatorio sulle imprese high-tech della Toscana" e delle "Aziende eccellenti" dell'IRPET con l'estrapolazione dei dati da Fonti Aziendali: questa attività verrà discussa nel dettaglio nel proseguo del lavoro; • Interviste in Profondità e Interviste Telefoniche; • Focus Group. 0.5.4.1 Intervista L'intervista semi-strutturata è l'equivalente del questionario, con domande predefinite dal ricercatore in fase di preparazione dello strumento; a differenziare i due metodi è il modo di presentazione, orale nel caso dell'intervista, scritto nel caso del questionario, che assicura maggiore capacità di adattamento all'interlocutore e di valorizzazione di tutte le opportunità di raccolta d'informazioni "non strutturate". L'intervista ha quindi il vantaggio di essere un metodo versatile, che è possibile utilizzare in ogni stadio della progettazione, dalla fase di esplorazione a quella di validazione ex post delle informazioni. A differenza dei questionari, la presenza del ricercatore allontana l'eventualità che il soggetto interpreti in maniera errata le domande o che si trovi in imbarazzo perché non comprende quanto gli viene richiesto; inoltre, nel caso di una risposta non attinente, il ricercatore può riformulare la domanda. Il vantaggio maggiore rispetto al questionario consiste nel fatto che l'intervista non registra la stessa alta percentuale di mancati recapiti da parte dei soggetti contattati; di conseguenza, i dati raccolti godono di maggiore validità . A differenza dell'intervista personale, l'intervista telefonica appare concepibile nell'ambito di un sondaggio, offrendo vantaggi legati soprattutto al costo e al tempo di esecuzione, nonostante la mancanza di un'interazione faccia a faccia limita la "competenza comunicativa" () dell'intervistatore e dell'intervistato. Durante l'intervista telefonica l'intervistato non può prendere visione diretta del questionario, come accade nel sondaggio tramite intervista personale, e non consente all'intervistatore il ricorso a tecniche che comportano strumenti da sottoporre visivamente all'intervistato, come forme di gadgets o scale auto-ancoranti. Dal punto di vista dell'intervistatore, si dispone di meno informazioni per valutare se l'intervistato ha capito davvero la domanda; di conseguenza tenderà a ridurre gli interventi opportuni per chiarire il testo. Non è possibile integrare il resoconto dell'intervista con informazioni relative all'ambiente fisico in cui essa ha luogo e al comportamento non verbale dell'intervistato. 0.5.4.2 Focus Group Interviste rivolte a un gruppo omogeneo di 7/12 persone, la cui attenzione è focalizzata su di un argomento specifico, che viene scandagliato in profondità. Un moderatore (spesso definito: 'facilitatore') indirizza e dirige la discussione fra i partecipanti e ne facilita l'interazione, anche attraverso la predisposizione di un "sceneggiatura" finalizzata a fare emergere le peculiari conoscenze ed esperienze, nonché finalizzata a favorire il confronto "creativo". Ogni partecipante ha l'opportunità di esprimere liberamente la propria opinione rispetto all'argomento trattato ma nel rispetto di alcune "regole del gioco" introdotte dal facilitatore; la comunicazione nel gruppo è impostata in modo aperto e partecipato, con un'alta propensione all'ascolto. Il contraddittorio positivo che ne consegue consente di far emergere i reali punti di vista, giudizi, pre-giudizi, opinioni, percezioni e aspettative del pubblico di interesse in modo più approfondito di quanto non consentano altre tecniche di indagine . Nella tabella seguente, sono riportati i metodi di Forecasting Tecnologico , suddivisi nei 9 cluster definiti dal "MIT- Massachusetts Institute of Technology", indicando quali sono stati impiegati nelle attività progettuali e in che fase. 0.5.5 FASE 4: REALIZZAZIONE CONCLUSIVA DEL REPORT Durante la fase conclusiva di redazione finale del report, il Team di Progetto si è concentrato nell'elaborazione dei dati raccolti durante le fasi precedenti attraverso strumenti grafici che hanno facilitato l'attività di capitolazione delle informazioni, tra cui: • Istogrammi; • Diagramma a Torta; • Mappatura con metrica a "semaforo" : questa tecnica di rappresentazione è stata ideata dal Team di Progetto. Le sue peculiarità saranno illustrate più nel dettaglio successivamente. • Modello di Maturità (Maturity Model). 0.5.5.1 Istogramma L'istogramma è la rappresentazione grafica di una distribuzione in classi di un carattere continuo. Un istogramma consente di rappresentare i dati attraverso rettangoli di uguale base ed altezza differente a seconda dei dati stessi, ed in un solo colpo d'occhio permette di capire se una "quantità" è maggiore, minore o uguale di un'altra semplicemente guardando l'altezza dei rettangoli. 0.5.5.2 Diagramma a Torta Un Diagramma a Torta è una tecnica di rappresentazione che in un modo semplice e diretto è evidenzia il peso delle varie componenti di una grandezza. In questo modo la grandezza in questione viene rappresentata sottoforma di cerchio i cui spicchi hanno un angolo e di conseguenza, un arco, proporzionale alle varie componenti. 0.5.5.3 Modello di Maturità Tale modello definisce il livello di maturità di un'entità. L'aspetto caratteristico di tale rappresentazione è il fatto di essere organizzato per livelli. Il modello definisce diversi profili di maturità crescente, indicando implicitamente anche una strategia molto generale di miglioramento che si basa sull'introduzione di quelle pratiche che permettono solitamente ad un'azienda, di muoversi da un livello di maturità al successivo.
ABSTRACTCharacteristics of the border region is often described as the outermost regions are isolated, backward, and so forth. With the myriad of issues concerning the welfare of society in general were below the poverty line with low levels of education. But life does not always belong to border communities in naming above, Miangas for example, the community has its own traditions how to survive in conditions of isolation and backwardness, have skills in producting seafood, farming and other skills. Long before the existence of state power, the unit from Miangas sides of residence lives bound by customs and a sense of shared identity. Results from this research show that, due to the presence of markers of the state's power infrastructure in this locations, many facilities built by the government in Miangas impressed as empty and wasteful projects that looks abandoned. As well as the presence of power by government intervention ultimately weaken the social institutions in lives of indigenous people, and tends to make people more spoiled and more pragmatic, and left the local wisdom and traditional values that have been practiced for generations by their ancestors and was bequeathed to offspring. Conclusion of this study, the Miangas known as hard working people, many skills are acted by people in meeting their needs, such as reliable in making boats, intelligent processing of marine products such as making wooden fish (smoked fish) and salted fish being traded to the island- Talaud large island in the district. But when the excessive government interference in the end there is a change in society itself and shift traditional values. Neglect of traditional values by society, increasingly indicates that the presence of state power in Miangas, indicating the government has failed in maintaining traditional values, language and traditions into local wisdom as mandated in the constitution of this country, which is poured into 1945. Should society and government both have important roles in maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia to maintain local knowledge as part of the national defense. PENDAHULUANKarakteristik wilayah perbatasan bagi sebagian orang seringkali digambarkan sebagai wilayah terluar yang terisolir, terbelakang, halaman belakang, pagar belakang, penuh dengan segudang permasalahan menyangkut tingkat kesejahteraan masyarakat yang pada umumnya berada di bawah garis kemiskinan dengan tingkat pendidikan yang rendah.Namun dalam penamaan ini yang seringkalidilupakan oleh sebagian orang bahwa kehidupan masyarakat di wilayah perbatasan tidak selamanya tergolong apa yang disebutkan diatas, disetiap wilayah masyarakat memiliki budaya dan tradisi berbeda bagaimana bertahan hidup dalam kondisi keterisolasian dan ketebelakangan. Seperti yang di ungkapkan oleh Ralp Linton dimana kegiatan-kegiatan kebudayaan atau culture activity di bagi ke dalam trait complex, misalnya sebagai contoh masyarakat memiliki ketrampilan dalam proses pencaharian hidup dan ekonomi, dengan mengandalkan hasil alam seperti melaut, bercocok tanam dan peternakan (Ralp Linton, 1936: 397). Apabila dicermati hal ini merupakan kearifan lokal.Demikian halnya jauh sebelum adanya program pembangunan di wilayah perbatasan, masyarakat yang oleh Koentjraningrat disebut sebagaii suatu kesatuan hidup manusia yang bersifat mantap dan terikat oleh satuan adat istiadat dan rasa identitas bersama(Koentjraningrat, 2009:120). Wilayah perbatasan sebagai garis pangkal penentu kedaulatanNKRI, perlu adanya perhatian khusus baik dari segi pembangunan infrastruktur dansuprastruktur, pembangunan kualitas sumber daya manusia, sampai pada pembangunan pusat penyelenggara kekuasaan negara yang memberi pelayanan terhadap masyarakat. Namun persoalan yang dihadapi sekarang wilayah perbatasan yang diwacanakan sebagai "beranda depan" ternyata masih jauh dari harapan dan tinggallah sebuah wacana.Dengan adanya kehadiran kekuasaan negara bukan memoles wilayah perbatasan menjadi wilayah terdepan, malah cenderung membuat masyarakat untuk terus bergantung kepada pemerintah dan meninggalkan tradisi-tradisi yang dulu terpelihara, seperti nilai-nilai atau norma-norma adat-istiadat dan keterikatan oleh suatu rasa identitas komunitas (Maciver dan Page dalam Koenjtraningrat, 2009:119). Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Burhan Bugin kajian tentang masyarakat sipil atau civil society penting di kaji setelah dominasi kekuasaan negara begitu kuat. Selain menjadikan masyarakat sipil tidak berdaya, dominasi kekuasaan negara dapat menunjukan fakta bahwa seakan-akan pembangunan yang dilakukan oleh Negara ditunjukan bagi kepentingan rakyat (Burhan Bugin, 1993: 6), namun kenyataannya malah kekuasaan Negara yang pada umumnya terlalu dominan lebih cederung memberikan efek negatif terhadap kearifan lokal masyarakat adat di Miangas, di sisi lain masyarakat sendiri tidak mampu untuk mempertahankan kearifan lokal yang ada.Rumusan Masalah1. Bagaimana kekuasaan negara terhadap struktur adat masyarakat Miangas?2. Mengapa terjadi perubahan atau pergeseran nilai adat ketika pemerintah melakukan intervensi kekuasaan di Miangas?Manfaat dan Tujuan Penelitian.a. Adapun tujuan dari penelitian ini, adalah:1. Untuk mengetahui sejauh mana kekuasaan negara terhadap struktur adat masyarakat Miangas!2. Untuk mengetahui Sejauhmana terjadinya perubahan atau pergeseran nilai-nilai adat ketika pemerintah melakukan intervensi kekuasaan di Miangas!b. Manfaat Ilmiah, bahwasannya penelitian ini kiranya dapat memberikan kontribusi berarti untuk pengembangan ilmu pengetahuan bagi Jurusan Ilmu Pemerintahan terlebih khusus bagi Program Studi Ilmu politik.Manfaat praktis,diharapkan hasil penelitian ini dapat memberikan kontribusi bagi terselenggaranya program pemerintahpusat dan daerah dalam pembangunan kawasan perbatasan yang sesuai dengan karakteristik wilayah perbatasan, agar ke depan program pembangunan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah pusat dan daerah tepat dan berguna bagi masyarakat perbatasan, guna untuk menjaga tetap tegaknya keutuhan dan kesatuan NKRI.KERANGKA KONSEPTUALKonsep Kekuasaan1. Menurut Robert M. Mac Iver,kekuasaanadalah kemampuan untuk mengendalikan tingkah laku orang lain, baik secara langsung dengan jalan memberi perintah, maupun secara tidak langsung dengan mempergunakan segala alat dan cara yang tersedia (Robert M. Mac Iver, 1961:87).2. Menurut Negel, kekuasaan adalah suatu hubungan kausal nyata atau potensial antara yang disukai oleh yang berbuat sehubungan dengan hasil dan hasil itu sendiri (Negel dalam Robert Dahl "Analisis Politik Modern, 1980; 169).3. Menurut Selo Soemardjan dan Soelaeman Soemardi, kekuasaan adalah hubungan antara yang berkuasa dan yang di kuasai, atau dengan kata lain antara pihak yang memiliki kemampuan untuk melancarkan pengaruh dan pihak lain yang menerima pengaruh ini, dengan rela atau karena terpaksa (Selo Soemardjan dan Soelaeman Soemardi, 1964:337).4. Menurut Soerjono Soekanto, kekuasaan adalah suatu kemampuan memerintah (agar yang diperintah patuh) dan juga memberikan keputusan-keputusan yang secara langsung maupun tidak langsung mempengaruhi tindakan-tindakan pihak-pihak lainnya (Soerjono Soekanto, 1981:163)5. Menurut Max Weber, kukuasaan adalah kesempatan dari seseorang atau sekelompok orang-orang untuk menyadarkan masyarakat akan kemauan-kemauannya sendiri, dengan sekaligus menterapkannya terhadap tindakan-tindakan dari orang-orang atau golongan-golongan tertentu (Max Weber (Max Weber, Essay in Sociology, translated and edited by H-H Gerth and C. Wright Mills. 1946: 180).6. Gilbert W. Fairholm mendefinisikan kekuasaan sebagai "kemampuan individu untuk mencapai tujuannya saat berhubungan dengan orang lain, bahkan ketika dihadapkan pada penolakan mereka" (Gilbert W. Fairholm, Organizational Power Politics: Tactics in Organizational Leadership, 2009:5).7. Stephen P. Robbins mendefinisikan kekuasaan sebagai ". kapasitas bahwa A harus mempengaruhi perilaku B sehingga B bertindak sesuai dengan apa yang diharapkan oleh A. Definisi Robbins menyebut suatu "potensi" sehingga kekuasaan bisa jadi ada tetapi tidak dipergunakan. Sebab itu, kekuasaan disebut sebagai "kapasitas" atau "potensi" (Stephen P. Robbins, 2009:15).8. Menurut Harold D Laswell dan Abraham Kaplan mendefinisikan kekuasaan adalahsustu hubungan di mana seseorang atau kelompok orang dapat menentukan tindakanseseorang atau kelompok orang dapat menentukan tindakan seseorang ataukelompoklain agar sesuai dengan tujuan dari pihak pertama.(Harold D Laswell dan Abraham Kaplan dalam Leo Agustino, 2007:72).Unsur-Unsur dan Saluran-Saluran Kekuasaan Kekuasaan dapat di jumpai dalam hubungan sosial di antara manusia maupun antar kelompok, adapun menurut (Soerjono Soekanto 1981:164-166) membaginya sebagai berikut:1. Rasa takut2. Rasa cinta3. Kepercayaan4. PemujaanSelain dari keempat unsur diatas, di dalam masyarakat Soerjono Soekanto membagi serta membatasinya ke dalam beberapa saluran-saluran, antara lain sebagai berikut;1. Saluran Militer2. Saluran Ekonomi3. Saluran Politik4. Saluran Tradisi5. Saluran Ideologi6. Saluran-saluran lainnyaBentuk Pelapisan-pelapisan Kekuasaan Adapun menurut Soekanto sosiolog dari Indonesia, memandang bentuk kekuasaan pada satu pola umum dari sekian banyak pola dalam masyarakat.Yaitu, bahwa dalam bentuk dan sistem kekuasaan selalu menyesuaikan dirinya pada masyarakat dengan adat-istiadat perikelakuannya (Soerjono Soekanto, 1981:169).Adapun bentuk pelapisan-pelapisan kekuasaan sebagai berikut: Wewenang Menurut Soerjono Soekanto, wewenang adalah hak yang telah ditetapkan dalam suatu tata tertib untuk menetapkan kebijaksanaa, menentukan keputusan-keputusan mengenai masalah-masalah yang penting dan untuk menyelesaikan pertetangan-pertentangan ( Soerjono Soekanto, 198:172).1. Wewenang kharismatis, tradisionil dan rasionil (legal).2. Wewenang resmi dan tidak resmi3. Wewenang pribadi dan territorial4. Wewenang terbatas dan menyeluruhKonsep NegaraHakekat pengertian tentang Negara pada dasarnya merujuk pada konsep kebangsaaan, dimana dari kata dasar "Bangsa".Dalam Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia edisi kedua, Depdikbud halalam 89, bahwa bangsa adalah orang-orang yang memiliki kesamaan asal keturunan, adat, bahasa dan sejarah serta berpemerintahan sendiri(Sumarsono, dkk. "Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan", 2005:8).Menurut Parangtopo (1993) kebangsaan adalah sebagai tindak-tanduk kesadaran dan sikap yang memandang dirinya sebagai suatu kelompok bangsa yang sama dengan keterikatan Sosiokultural yang disepakati bersama untuk hidup bersama membentuk organisasi yang disebut negara (Idup Suhady dan A.M. Sinaga, 2009:4).Adapun beberapa konsep negara sebagai organisasi kekuasaan politik menurut para ahli sebagai berikut:1. George Jellinek, Negara adalah organisasi kekuasaan dari sekelompok manusia yang telah berkediaman diwilayah tertentu (George Jellenik dan Efriza, 2008:43).2. Menurut Miriam Budiardjo, negara adalah bagian dari integrasi kekuasaan politik dan merupakan oraganisasi kekuasaan politik, yang merupakan alat (agency) dari masyarakat yang mempunyai kekuasaan untuk mengatur hubungan-hubungan manusia dalam masyarakat dan menertibkan gejala-gejala kekuasaan dalam masyarakat (Miriam Budiardjo, 2006; 38).3. Menurut R. Djokosoetono, negara adalah suatu organisasi manusia atau kumpulan manusia yang berada dibawah suatu pemerintahan yang sama (R. Djokosoetono dalam Indup Suhady dan A. M. Sinaga, 2009:6).4. Menurut Harold J. Laski, negara adalah suatu masyarakat yang diintegrasikan karena mempunyai wewenang yang bersifat memaksa dan secara sah lebih agung daripada individu atau kelompok yang merupakan bagian dari masyaraka(Harold J. Laski dalam Miriam Budiardjo,2006: 39).5. Menurut Epicurus, negara adalah merupakan hasil daripada perbuatan manusia, yang diciptakan untuk menyelenggarakan kepentingan anggota-anggotanya (Epicurus dalam Soehino, 1986:31).6. Menurut Norberto Bobbio, negara adalah dimana kekuasaan public diatur oleh norma-norma umum (yang fundamental maupun konstitusional) dan ia harus dijalankan dalam pengaturan undang-undang, di mana warga Negara mempunyai hak perlindungan dari jalan-jalan lain untuk menuju kepada satu pengadilan yang mandiri dalam upaya meneggakan aturan main dan berjaga dari penyalahgunaan atau tindakan berlebihan dari kekuasaan (Norberto Bobbio dalam Ali Sugihardjanto,dkk. 2003; 154).7. Menurut Thomas Aquinas berangkat dari pemikiran klasiknya, negara adalah lembaga sosial manusia yang paling tinggi dan luas yang berfungsi menjamin manusia memenuhi kebutuhan-kebutuhan fisiknya yang melampaui kemampuan lingkungan sosial lebih kecil, seperti desa dan kota (Thomas Aquinas Efriza, 2008:43).8. C.F. Strong seorang pemikir modern, dimana dalam perumusannya negara merupakan masyarakat yang terorganisir secara politik, negara sebagai suatu masyarakat teritorial yang dibagi menjadi yang memerintah dan di perintah (C.F. Strong, 2004; 5-7).Menurut Ahli berkebangsaan Inggris L. Oppenheim, sebuah negara berdiri bila suatu bangsa telah menetap di suatu negeri dibawah pemerintahannya sendiri", defenisi ini mencakup 4 unsur yang sangat jelas, rakyat, wilayah, pemerintahan dan sifat kedaulatannya (Oppenheim dalam J. Frankel, 1991: 9-13), adapun penjelasan unsur-unsur negara menurut Oppenheim sebagai berikut:1. Rakyat2. Wilayah3. Pemerintahannya4. KedaulatanSelain apa yang disebutkan diatas, negara memiliki tujuan dan fungsi negara. Adapun tujuan negara sebagai berikut;1. Menurut Miriam Budiardjo negara dipandang sebagai asosiasi manusia yang hidup dan bekerjasama, dimana tujuan akhir negara adalah menciptakan kebahagiaan bagi rakyatnya (Miriam Budiardjo, 2006:45).2. Negara sebagai organisasi kekuasaan teori ini dianut oleh H.A.Logemann dalam bukunya Over De Theorie van Eeen Stelling Staatsrecht. Dikatakan bahwa keberadaan negara bertujuan untuk mengatur serta menyelenggarakan masyarakat yang dilengkapi dengan kekuasaan tertinggi (H. A. Logemann, 1948).3. Menurut Roger H. Soltau, tujuan negara ialah memungkinkan rakyatnya "berkembang" serta menyelenggarakan daya ciptanya sebebas mungkin" (R. H. Soltau dalam Miriam Budiardjo,2006:45).Selain daripada tujuan dan fungsi diatas, Negara yang oleh Soekanto pada umumnya memiliki kekuasaan yang secara formil negara mempunyai hak untuk melaksanakan kekuasaan tertinggi, kalau perlu dengan paksaan; juga negaralah yang membagi-bagikan kekuasaan yang lebih rendah derajatnya (Soerjono Soekanto, 1981:164). Konsep MasyarakatDalam bahasa Inggris masyarakat adalah society berasal dari bahasa latin, societas, yang berarti hubungan persahabatan dengan yang lain. Societas diturunkan dari kata socius yang berarti teman (Konjtraningrat,2009:16).1. Menurut Koentjaraningrat, pengertian masyarakat adalah kesatuan hidup manusia yang berinteraksi menurut suatu sistem adat-istiadat tertentu yang bersifat kontinu dan yang terikat oleh suatu rasa identitas tertentu (Koenjtraningrat, 2009;118).2. Menurut Mac Iver dan Page, masyarakat adalah suatu sistem dari kebiasaantata-cara, dari wewenang dan kerjasama antara berbagai kelompok dan penggolongan, dari pengawasan tingkah laku serta kebebasan-kebebasan manusia, keseluruhan yang selalu berubah ini kita namakan masyarakat. Masyarakat merupakan jalinan hubungan sosial, dan masyakat selalu berubah (R. M. Mac Iver and Charles H. Page, 1961: 5).3. Menurut S. R. Steinmetz, masyarakat adalah sebagai kelompok manusia yang tebesar dan yang meliputi pengelompokkan yang lebih kecil, yanng mempunyai hubungan erat dan teratur (S. R. Steinmetz dalam Harsojo, 1967: 145).4. Menurut Miriam Budiardjo, masyarakat adalah suatu kelompok manusia yang hidup dan bekerjasama untuk mencapai terkabulnya keinginan-keinginan mereka bersama (Miriam Budiardjo, 2006;39).5. Menurut Warner,masyarakat adalah "suatu kelompok perorangan yang berinteraksi timbal balik(Warner dalam Pokok-pokok Antropologi Budaya. Editor , T.O Ihromi, 1996;107).6. J. L.Gillin dan J. P. Gillin dalam buku mereka Cultural Sociology (1954:139), bahwa masyarakat atau society adalah "the largest grouping in which common customs, traditions, attitudes and feelings of unity are operative". (J. L. Gillin dan J.P. Gillin dalam Koenjtraningrat, 2009; 118).Organisasi Sosial atau Struktur Masyarakat Melville J. Herskovits,antropolog berkebangsaan Amerika, mengemukakan bahwa organisasi sosial atau struktur masyarakat dapat dilihat dari pranata-pranata yang menentukan kedudukan lelaki dan perempuan dalam masyarakat, dan dengan demikian menyalurkan hubungan pribadi mereka (Melville J. Herskovits dalam Ihromi, 1996;82). Melvillemembagi lagi pranata-pranata dalam dua kategori yaitu, pranata yang tumbuh dari hubungan kekerabatan dan pranata dari hasil ikatan antara individu berdasarkan keinginan sendiri.Pranata Sosial Atau Lembaga Kemasyarakatan Menurut Koenjtraningrat, pranata adalah suatu sistem norma khusus menata suatu rangkaian tindakan berpola mantap guna memenuhi suatu keperluan pola khusus dari manusia dalam kehidupan masyarakat (Koenjtraningrat, 2009:133). Dari semua hal mengenai apa yang telah dijabarkan oleh Koenjtraningrat diatas, kesemuanya itu dapat tercapai karena adanya interaksi sosial antarindividu dan kelompok dalam kehidupan masyarakat.Menurut Soerjono Soekanto, dikatakan bahwa unsur-unsur pokok dalam struktur sosial adalah interaksi sosial dan lapisan-lapisan sosial (Soerjono Soekanto, 1981:192).Adapun ciri-ciri umum lembaga kemasyarakatan atau pranata sosial menurut (Gillin and Gillin dalam Soerjono Soekanto, 1981:84), sebagai berikut:1. Suatu lembaga kemasyarakatan adalah suatu organisasi daripada pola-pola perikelakuan yang terwujud melalui aktivitas kemasyarakatan dan hasil-hasilnya.2. Suatu tingkat kekekalan tertentu merupakan ciri dari semua lembaga kemasyarakatan.3. Lembaga kemasyarakatan mempunyai satu atau beberapa tujuan tertentu.4. Lembaga kemasyarakatan mempunyai alat-alat perlengkapan yang akan digunakan untuk mencapai tujuan dari lembaga yang bersangkutan.5. Adanya lambang-lambang biasanya juga merupakan ciri khas dari lembaga kemasyarakatan.6. Suatu lembaga kemasyarakatan, mempunyai suatu tradisi yang tertulis ataupun yang tidak tertulis, yang merumuskan tujuannya, tata-tertib yang berlaku dan lain-lain.Selain daripada ciri-ciri lembaga kemasyarakatan diatas, Gillin dan Gillin mengklasifikasikan beberapa tipe lembaga kemasyarakatan dari berbagai sudut pandang, sebagai berikut:1. Crescive institutions dan enacted institutions yang merupakan klasifikasi dari sudut perkembangannya.2. Dari sudut sistem nilai-nilai yang diterima masyarakat, timbul klasifikasi atas Basic institutions dan subdiary institutions.3. Dari sudut penerimaaan masyarakat dapat dibedakan aaproved atau social sanctioned-institutions dan unsanctioned institutions.4. Perbedaan antara general istitutions dengan restricted institutions, timbul apabila klasifikasi timbul didasarkan pada faktor penyebarannya.5. Akhirnya dari sudut fungsinya, terdapat perbedaan operative institutions dan regulaitve institutions.Intervensi Politik (Negara) dalam Struktur Masyarakat Adat Di Indonesia Dalam konteks NKRI, di zaman orde baru (Soeharto) negara dijalankan dengan skema totaliter berbasis militer, hal ini telah memberikan pengaruh besar pada penciptaan tatanan kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara. Di era reformasi ada pergesaran serta adanya dekadensi terhadap nilai-nilai adat dalam komunitas masyarakat, hal ini diakibatkan adanya campur tangan (intervensi) negara yang berlebihan terhadap pranata sosial didalam masyarakat. Menurut Adumiharja Kusnaka, bahwa selama ini para perencana pembagunan nasional di Indonesia menganggap nilai budaya masyarakat sebagaisimbol keterbelakangan. Dengan adanya UU No 72 Tahun 2005 tentang perubahan atas UU No 15 Tahun 1999 "Tentang Pemerintahan Desa", adalah "puncak" dari kebijakan intervensi Negara sejak masa kolonial hingga nasional sekarang yang melumpuhkan kekuatan modal sosial, dan sekaligus merampas hak-hak komunal yang melekat pada ulayat (wilayah kehidupan) dari entitas sosial yang disebut "masyarakat hukum adat" di Negara ini (Zakaria, 2000).Menurut Imam Soetiknya, akibat pemerintah menyalahgunakan UUPA No. 5 Tahun 1960, maka yang terjadi adalah suku-suku bangsa dan masyarakat adat yang tidak mandiri lagi, tetapi sudah merupakan bagian dari satu bangsa Indonesia di wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, yang wewenangnya berdasarkan hak rakyat yang berhubungan dengan hak-hak atas tanah, yang dahulu mutlak berada di tangan kepala suku atau masyarakat hukum adat sebagai penguasa tertinggi dalam wilayahnya, dengan sendirinya beralih kepada pemerintah pusat sebagai penguasa tertinggi, pemegang hak menguasai tanah ulayat wilayah Negara (Imam, Soetiknya, 1990; 20). Di dalam UUD 1945 Amandemen IV, pasal 28I ayat 3, pasal 32 ayat 1 dan ayat 2, serta UU Nomor 32 Tahun 2004. Dimana negara menghormati dan menghargai serta memelihara bahasa, budaya masyarakat tradisional sebagai budaya nasional yang selaras dengan perkembangan zaman. Masyarakat Adat dan Kelembagaan Adat Konsep Masyarakat Adat Istilah masyarakat adat mulai mendapat perhatian dunia setelah pada tahun 1950-an sebuah badan dunia di PBB bernama ILO (International Labour Organization) mempopulerkan isu tentang "Indigenous peoples" dimana istilah ini digunakan ILO untuk sebutan terhadap entitas "penduduk asli" (ILO dalam Keraf, 2010). Keraf menyebutkan beberapa ciri yang membedakan masyarakat adat dari kelompok lainnya (Keraf, 2010:362), adapun ciri-cirinya sebagai berikut:1. Mereka mendiami tanah-tanah milik nenek moyangnya, baik seluruhnya atau sebagian.2. Mereka mempunyai garis keturunan yang sama, berasal dari penduduk asli daerah tersebut.3. Mereka mempunyai budaya yang khas, yang menyangkut agama, sistem suku, pakaian tarian, cara hidup, peralatan hidup, termasuk untuk mencari nafkah.4. Mereka memiliki bahasa sendiri.5. Biasanya hidup terpisah dari kelompok lain dan menolak atau bersikap hati-hati terhadap hal-hal baru yang berasal dari luar komunitasnya.Masyarakat dengan pola orientasi kehidupan tradisional, yang tinggal dan hidup di desa. Menurut Suhandi ada beberapa sifat umum yang dimiliki masyarakat tradisional (Suhandi dalam Ningrat, 2004:4):1. Hubungan atau ikatan masyarakat desa dengan tanah sangat erat.2. Sikap hidup tingkah laku sangat magis religius.3. Adanya kehidupan gotong-royong.4. Memegang tradisi dengan kuat.5. Menghormati para sesepuh.6. Kepercayaan pada pemimpin loka dan tradisional.7. Organisasi yang relatif statis.8. Tingginya nilai-nilai sosial.Lembaga Adat Ratu mbanua dan Inangngu wanuaDi Zaman dahulu pemerintahan desa dilaksanakan secara adat oleh Ratumbanua dan Inangnguwanua, mereka dianggap oleh sebagian masyarakat Talaud dan Miangas khususnya sebagai kepala yang membawahi beberapa suku atau klan, dan dianggap sebagai pemimpin dari beberapa kepala suku.Istilah pemerintah desa adat tersebut disesuaikan dengan kemauan penguasa pada saat itu, dan setelah adanya perkembangan pembagian wilayah Zending, maka terjadilah keputusan Residen Manado pada tanggal 1April 1902 yang mencantumkan pengakuan terhadap wilayah ke-jogugu-andi kepulauan Talaud maka saat itu juga di mulai pemerintahan desa.1. Ratuntampa adalah seseorang yang memegang tampuk pimpinan adat yang membawahi pimpinan adat, (Ratunbanua dan Inangnguwanua dari beberapa desa/kampung).2. Inangngu tampa sama dengan ratuntampa hanya di bedakan tugas dan fungsinya.3. Ratu mbanua adalah seseorang yang memegang tampuk pimpinan adat bersama-sama Inangngu wanua di suatu desa/kampung.4. Inangngu wanua adalah seseorang yang memegang pimpinan adat bersama Ratu mbanua di kampung, dia sebagai wakilnya Ratu mbanua.5. Timade ruanga/Inangngu ruanga adalah seseorang yang memimpin rumpun keluarga yang disebut suku.Adapun istilah ruanga dalam istilah Indonesia adalah panguyuban, rukun, atau suku (Hoetagaol dkk, 2012:19). Ratu mbanua dan Inangngu wanua dalam Struktrur Pemerintahan Desa Pada era demokrartisasi sebagaimana tengah berjalan di desa, masyarakat memiliki peran cukup sentral untuk menentukan pilihan kebijakan sesuai dengan kebutuhan dan aspirasinya. Masyarakat memiliki kedaulatan yang cukup luas untuk menentukan orientasi dan arah kebijakan pembangunan yang dikehendaki (Setiawan, 2009).Desa sebagai kesatuan masyarakat hukum terkecil yang memiliki batas-batas wilayah yang berwenang untuk mengatur dan mengurus kepentingan masyarakatnya berdasarkan asal-usul dan adat istiadat setempat yang diakui dan dihormati oleh negara. Masuknya ratu mbanua sebagai pemangku adat dalam keanggotaan BPD memperjelas peranan ratumbanua dalam penetapan peraturan desa bersama Kepala desa, termasuk menampung dan menyalurkan aspirasi masyarakatnya.Selain posisi ratu mbanua dalam keanggotaan BPD, ada beberapa kelembagaan desa dimana Ratumbanua serta perangkatnya berperan di dalamnya yang sudah dikenal dalam rangka pembangunan daerah pedesaan adalah Lembaga Ketahanan Desa (LKMD) dan Koperasi Unit Desa.Hubungan ratu mbanua sebagai lembaga adat dalam lembaga kemasyarakatan secara hukum nasional Indonesia maka kedudukan tugas dan fungsi Lembaga adat ratu mbanuasebagai mitra pemerintahan desa.METODE PENELITIANJenis Penelitian Penelitian ini tergolong dalam jenis penelitian deskriptif kualitatif, yang artinya "masalah" yang dibawa dalam penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengobservasi, dan memahami suatu situasi sosial, peristiwa, peran, interaksi dalam kelompok masyarakat. Dalam penelitian ini juga masih bersifat holistik, belum jelas, kompleks, dinamis dan penuh makna serta bersifat alamiah (Sugiyono, 2011:9). Metode pendekatan yang dipakai adalah pendekatan Antropologi politik dimana kajian ini memusatkan perhatiannya pada"Hubungan antara struktur dan masyarakat dengan struktur dan tebaran kekuasaan dalam masyarakat tersebut (Koentjaraningrat " Sejarah Teori Antropologi, hal 196-226).Instrumen Penelitian Dalam penelitian kualitatif-naturalistik peneliti akan lebih banyak menjadi instrumen, karena dalam penelitian kualitatif peneliti merupakan key isnstruments (Sugiyono, 2011;92). Lokasi Penelitian Sesuai dengan judul penelitian ini dan yang mengacu pada fokus masalah yang terjadi di Miangas, maka penelitian ini berlokasi di Desa Miangas Kecamatan Khusus Miangas Kabupaten Kepulauan Talaud. Fokus Penelitian Pada penelitian ini, dengan berbagai pertimbangan antara lain, faktor jarak yang ditempuh, tenaga, waktu, dan dana, maka peneliti memfokuskan penelitian hanya di Kecamatan Khusus Miangas, Desa Miangas, Dimana fokus kajianya adalah melihat fenomena dari kekuasaan negara dalam struktur adat masyarakat Miangas dan mengapa terjadi perubahan atau pergeseran nilai adat ketika pemerintah melakukan intervensi kekuasaan di Miangas. Jenis Data Pada penelitian ini, data yang digunakan terdiri dari data primer dan data sekunder. Menurut Sugiyono di dalam pengumpulan data ada dua sumber data, pertama sumber primer adalah sumber data yang langsung memberikan data kepada pengumpul data, dan sumber sekunder merupakan sumber yang tidak langsung memberikan data kepada pengumpul data, misalnya lewat orang lain atau dokumen, hasil yang diperoleh dari hasil studi kepustakaan (Sugiyono; 224). Informan Penelitian Menurut Sugiyono (2011), dalam penelitian kualitatif tidak menggunakan populasi, karena penelitian berangkat dari kasus tertentu yang ada pada situasi sosial tertentu dan hasil kajiannya tidak akan diberlakukan ke populasi (Sugiyono, 2011:216).Mengutip juga pendapat Spradley dalam penelitian kualitatif, tidak menggunakan istilah populasi, tetapi oleh Spradley dinamakan "social situation" atau situasi sosial yang terdiri atas tiga elemen yaitu: tempat (place), pelaku (actors), dan aktivitas (activity) (Spradley dalam Sugiyono, 2011:215).Dimana penulis sendiri sebagai instrumen dalam penelitian ini, penulis turun langsung ke tempat dimana menjadi fokus penelitian, mewawancarai nara sumber, partisipan, informan yang dianggap tahu dengan situasi dan kondisi Miangas, atau yang lebih berkompeten dan memiliki pengaruh di tempat itu. Serta mengamati secara langsung aktivitas warga masyarakat yang ada di Miangas. Penentuan sumber data orang-orang yang diwawancarai yaitu dipilih dengan pertimbangan tertentu, dan masih bersifat sementara. Informan dalam hal ini kepala desa, ketua BPD, Ratumbanua dan Inangnguwanua, tokoh masyarakat dan tokoh adat. Teknik pengumpulan data Dalam penelitian ini yang digunakan dalam pengumpulan data adalah teknik observasi, wawancara dan dokumentasi.Prosedur Analisis Data Menurut Sugiyono, analisis data adalah proses mencari dan menyusun secara sistematis data yang diperoleh dari hasil wawancara, catatan lapangan dan dokumentasi. Dalam proses analisis data pada penelitian kualitatif dilakukan sejak sebelum memasuki lapangan, selama di lapangan, dan setelah selesai di lapangan. Analisis data kualitatif bersifat induktif, yaitu suatu anilisis berdasarkan data yang diperoleh (Sugiyono, 2011; 245).HASIL PENELITIAN DAN PEMBAHASANFenomena Pembangunan Di Miangas Pengalaman pahit Indonesia kalah dari Malaysia dalam memperebutkan Sipadan dan Ligitan di Mahkamah Internasional (Ulaen, dkk. 2012;164), membuat pemerintah ekstra hati-hati dalam menjaga wilayah teritorialnya.Pasca Soeharto, adanya pergeseran pencitraan atas Miangas dan pulau perbatasan lainnya, kalau dulu Miangas dianggap sebagai wilayah terluar, dan pos pintu keluar-masuk para pelintas-batas, maka sekarang dalam setiap program pembangunan diwacanakan sebagai "beranda depan" benteng Pancasila. Begitu banyak fasilitas yang dibangun oleh pemerintah di wilayah paling utara Sulawesi utara ini. Namun banyak fasilitas-fasilitas aparatur sipil yang dibangun untuk menunjang pelayanan terhadap masyarakat hanya terbengkalai dan dibiarkan kosong akibatnya rusak dan terkesan hanyalah proyek mubazir. Selain hal diatas ada beberapa bangunan yang disediakan pemerintah sebagai tempat penampungan kebutuhan pokok masyarakat seperti, depot logistik, 4 buah tangki BBM. Sejak dibangun pada tahun 2007 sampai sekarang terbengkalai dan hanya menjadi tempat penyimpanan karung semen dan menjadi tempat bagi rayap dan kepiting laut. Perhatian pemerintah terhadap pulau Miangas yang jumlah penduduknya sebanyak 209 KK, yang didalamnya berjumlah 762 jiwa, dengan disediakannya berbagai fasilitas oleh pemerintah, apabila dilihat sepintas memang terkesan negara dan orang-orang yang bernaung didalamnya begitu serius dalam menangani persoalan di wilayah perbatasan. Namun dari segi lain malah terlihat berlebihan, jika dibandingkan dengan pulau-pulau yang berdekatan dengan Miangas yang dulunnya merupakan satu kesatuan administratif dari kecamatan Nanusa, seperti pulau Marampit dan kecamatan Nanusa sendiri yang juga sebagai pulau terluar. Para Pelaut Handal Dari Utara NKRIGenerasi tua di Miangas merupakan generasi terakhir pendukung "tradisi bahari", mereka merupakan para pelaut-pelaut handal tanpa harus menggunakan layar disaat tidak berangin untuk mencapai pulau-pulau terdekat, seperti pulau-pulau yang ada di selatan daratan Filipina (Mindanao). Dimana tujuan mereka adalah menjajakan hasil olahan tangkapan mereka dilaut dan hasil lain dari masyarakat Miangas seperti tikar-pandan, kopra (Ulaen,dkk. 2012;67-68). Tradisi bahari yang sejak dulu ada dikalangan generasi tua di Miangas, sekarang mulai kehilangan identitas sebagai pelaut handal, pembuat perahu, dan ulet dalam pekerjaan khususnya sebagai seorang nelayan yang mahir dalam membaca perbintangan. Masyarakat lebih memilih menjadi buruh di pelabuhan disaat ada kapal yang masuk, dengan gaji seadanya asalkan dapat memenuhi kebutuhan hari ini, di sisi lain Miangas yang kaya akan sumberdaya kelautan tidak dimanfaatkan secara optimal. Tradisi yang dilakoni oleh generasi tua kini tidak lagi dipraktekkan oleh paragenerasi muda Miangas yang ada hanyalah kenangan manis yang tersirat dan tidak pernah tertuliskan. Tradisi Mamancari Sebagai Strategi Bertahan Hidup Masyarakat Miangas. Pada zaman dulu hingga pertengahan abad ke 20, masyarakat Miangas sama seperti halnya masyarakat yang ada di bagian bumi manapun pada umumnya, manusia memiliki strategi atau cara bagaimana harus bertahan hidup. Masyarakat Miangas pada umumnya di zaman dulu mengandalkan hasil laut, pertanian dan hasil kerajinan tangan yang dijual baik di pulau-pulau Talaud maupun di pulau-pulau daratan Mindanao, namun sekarang tradisi melaut mulai hilang sejak adanya bantuan pemerintah berupa sembilan bahan pokok di Miangas, kalaupun ada yang melaut itu hanya untuk keperluan makanan. Sedangkan hasil seperti keterampilan membuat ikan kayu (ikan asap) yang mereka dapat disaat mereka bekerja di perusahan ikan Jepang yang ada di Filipina, dan kerajinan tangan seperti tikar serta topi anyaman dari daun pandan tidak lagi ditemukan. Masyarakat lebih memilih membuka warung untuk berjualan, sementara tempat bertumbuhnya kelapa sebagai sumber mata pencaharian dan laluga atau puraha sebagai bahanmakanan yang mereka andalkan disaat kehabisan bantuan, sekarang menjadi tempat landasan pacu pesawat dimana proyek pemerintah cukup menelan biaya besar. Kelembagaan Adat (Ratu mbanua Dan Inangngu wanua) Di Miangas Politik tidak lepas dari persoalan kekuasaan, wewenang, kebijaksanaan dan pembagian yang pada umumnya berada pada negara, sejauh negara merupakan organisasi kekuasaan. Namun tidak bisa dipungkiri ada gejala-gejala kekuasaan yang sifat dan tujuannya sewaktu-waktu dapat mempengaruhi negara. Sifat dan tujuan dari gejala kekuasaan yang nonnegara dalam hal ini salah satunya adalah lembaga adat. Pranata sosial atau lembaga masyarakat inilah yang membentuk negara sebagai organisasi kekuasaan. Struktur Pemerintahan Desa Dan Struktur Kepemimpinan Adat Di Miangas Miangas di zaman keresidenan Manado, merupakan satuan wilayah adaministratif ke-jogugu-an Nanusa, semenjak adanya keputusan pemerintah pusat (Surat Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 5/1/69 tertanggal 29 April 1969), pemukiman warga Miangas dinamakan desa dan dipimpin oleh kapitelaut atau sehari-harinya disebut apitaᶅau ditemani jurutulis. Secara politis kapitenlaut ini pada umumnya dipilih berdasarkan keputusan dari 12 suku yang ada di Miangas dan tidak melalui proses dan mekanisme kerajaan yang pemimpinnya berdasarkan garis keturunan. Selain struktur kepemimpinan formal dalam hal ini pemerintah desa, ada juga struktur kepemimpinan tradisional. Kepemimpinan tradisional di Talaud pada umumnya dan Miangas khususnya di warisi secara turun-temurun dan oleh warga di sebut "kepemimpinan adat" di Miangas seperti yang telah dijelaskan diatas terdapat 12 (suku), Ratumbanua dan Inangnguwanua merupakan yang membawahi 12 suku, dan setiap kelompok suku dipimpin oleh tetua yang disapa Timaddu ruangnga/ kepala suku, atau pemangku adat. Peran Ratu mbanua dan Inangngu wanua Dalam Struktur Pemerintahan Desa di MiangasDalam struktur adat di Miangas ratu mbanua dan inangngu wanua, sebelum adanya struktur pemerintahan desa dan struktur keagamaan, sangat dihargai dan dihormati, serta memiliki perannya masing-masing. masalah pertahanan dan pemerintahan dalam wilayahitulah tugas dari ratumbanua, kalau inangguwanua tugas dan perannya adalah membantu ratumbanua dalam menjalankan roda-roda pemerintahan adat, dimana tugas dan perannya adalah menyangkut masalah kesejahtraan masyarakatnya, menjembatani konflik dalam keluarga serta mencari jalan keluar dari masalah kedua belah pihak yang berkonflik, dimana bukan pada persoalan mencari letak kesalahan atau mencari siapa yang menyebabkan konflik untuk diberikan sanksi (hukum adat). Melainkan baik ratumbanua dan inangnguwanua merupakan mediator dalam mengumpulkan tetua adat serta masyarakatnya untuk menyelesaikan persoalan diatas dengan cara kekeluargaan. Dengan adanya struktur pemerintahan desa, lembaga adat yang ada di Miangas mulai dilebur menjadi bagian dari struktur kelembagaan desa. Peran ratumbanua dan inangnguwanua hanya sekedar simbolisasi dalam mengisi acara seremonial. Seperti upacara adat, kunjungan pejabat, dan acara perkawinan. Dari amatan peneliti serta hasil wawancara dengan narasumber, bahwa kelembagaan adat serta peran ratu mbanua dan inangngu wanua sebagai primus inter pares. Tidak lagi seperti dulu, dimana peran ratumbanua dan inangnguwanua serta kelembagaan adat pada umunya menjadi lemah dengan hadirnya beberapa struktur kelembagaan kekuasaan di dalam negara, sehingga apa yang disebut sebagai "kearifan lokal" tidak terpelihara malah dari hari-kehari semakin terkikis. Didalam UUD 1945 Amandemen IV, pasal 28I ayat 3 dan pasal 32 ayat 1 dan Ayat 2. Serta UU No 32 Tahun 2004 "Tentang Pemerintah Daerah" Bab I pasal 2 ayat 9. Negara Indonesia dengan kemajemukannya memiliki kewajiban untuk mengakui, menghormati, menjamin dan memelihara serta memajukan identitas budaya dan masyarakat tradisional yang didalam terdapat nilai-nilai budaya seperti, hukum adat, bahasa daerah yang selaras dengan perkembangan zaman, sejauh nilai-nilai budaya itu hidup dan sesuai dengan prinsip NKRI. Di Miangas Misalnya, dalam penamaan ratu mbanua dan inangngu wanua mereka alih bahasakan kedalam istilah jawa yaitu, mangkubumi I dan Mangkubumi II, sepintas istilah mangkubumi terkesan enak di dengar, namun apabila peneliti meninjau kembali baik dari UUD 1945 dan UU No. 32 Tahun 2004, penamaan mangkubumi yang dipakai oleh para pejabat yang berkunjung atau para penyelenggara kekuasaan negara di Miangas dalam menyapa ratu mbanua dan inangnguwanua, tentunya menyalahi apa yang menjadi aturan perundang-undangan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia diatas.PENUTUPKesimpulan1. Sebagai "beranda depan" ataupun penamaan lain yang teralamatkan, seperti "benteng Pancasila", "garda terdepan", sampai didirikannya 4 buah tugu sebagai penanda supremasi pertahanan bangsa oleh pemerintah, hanyalah sebatas membangkitkan phobia nasionalisme semata, dan sekedar wacana dari pemerintah untuk mengisi lembar halaman dalam media cetak maupun online.2. Program pembangunan yang telah diagendakan oleh pemerintah baik pusat maupun daerah, secara kasat mata memberi kemudahan bagi masyarakat di Miangas. Fasilitas yang telah disediakan oleh pemerintah, hanya fasilitas yang menunjang kerjasama antar kedua negaralah yang sampai sekarang selalu siap ditempat. Sedangkan fasilitas-fasilitas yang dibangun untuk pelayanan akan kebutuhan masyarakat hanyalah proyek mubazir, kosong dan hanya menjadi tempat rayap dan kepiting laut,selain itu Keterbatasan akan kebutuhan pendidikan dengan minimnya tenaga pengajar tidak menjadi perhatian serius dari pemerintah.3. Dengan adanya penempatan beberapa personil aparatur sipil dan aparatur pertahanan keamanan di Miangas dari luar daerah, mempengaruhi struktur sosial masyarakat Miangas, contohnya penamaan Ratu mbanua dan Inangngu wanua dialih bahaskan ke dalam istilah Jawa "Mangkubumi I dan Mangkubumi II semakin mengambarkan adanya dominasi kekusaan negara. dimana wilayah yang kecil tidak berimbang dengan adanya penempatan beberapa personil aparatur negara. Hal ini merupakan pelemaham terhadap nilai-nilai bahasa daerah sebagai budaya nasional.4. Pengabaian terhadap nilai-nilai adat oleh masyarakat, menandakan pemerintah gagal didalam memelihara nilai-nilai adat, bahasa dan tradisi yang menjadi kearifan lokal seperti yang diamanatkan di dalam konstitusi negara ini, yang dituangkan ke dalam UUD 1945. Seyogyanya masyarakat dan pemerintah sama-sama mempunyai peran penting dalam menjaga keutuhan dan kedaulatan NKRI dengan memelihara kearifan lokal sebagai bagian dari ketahanan nasional.5. Masyarakat cenderung pragmatis dan bersikap selalu bergantung dan berharap kepada pemerintah, sehingga terjadi pergeseran nilai-nila kearifan lokal yang dulu dilakoni oleh para generasi sebelumnya tidak ditemukan lagi.6. Dengan adanya pembangunan infrastruktur dan struktur kelembagaan desa, peran lembaga adat (ratu mbanua dan inangngu wanua) mulai direduksi dalam struktur kekuasaan negara dan terkesan hanyalah simbolisasi dalam mengisi acara-acara seremonial.7. Dengan hadirnya kekuasaan negara di Miangas, bukan memudahkan pelayanan kepada masyarakat. Malah oknum-oknum penyelenggara kekuasaan negara dengan mengatasnamakan negara untuk kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.8. Ditengah-tengah keterisolasian dan keterbelakangan dengan faktor ekonomi yang rendah dan minimnya sumberdaya manusia, serta jauh dari pusat perekonomian yang tidak ditunjang dengan sarana transportasi yang memadai, tidak adanya ketersediaan BBM untuk melaut, serta ketidaktersediaanya infrastruktur yang memadai membuat perekonomian masyarakat terlihat stagnan. Sehingga dengan adanya pengaruh budaya materialisme dan pemanjaan oleh pemerintah pusat dan daerah mengakibatkan terjadi pergeseran nilai-nilai kearifan lokal masyarakat Miangas.Saran1. bahwa dengan harapan ke depan hasil karya ilmiah ini dapat menjadi referensi, serta panduan bagi para peneliti yang akan mengembangkan studi tentang wilayah perbatasan.2. Pemerintah seharusnya lebih mengutamakan pembangunan sumber daya manusia dengan melaksanakan program-program yang tepat guna, membekali masyarakat dengan berbagai keterampilan sesuai dengan karakteristik wilayah, sehingga masyarakat lebih diorientasikan pada pembangunan ekonominya.3. Lebih memperhatikan masalah yang menyangkut kebutuhan dasar masyarakat, seperti penyediaan BBM bagi para nelayan agar mereka dapat melaut, menyediakan tempat penampungan sementara dari hasil tangkapan, seperti gudang es (cool store). Menyediakan fasilitas air bersih bagi masyarakat, memperlancar sistem komunikasi dan transportasi ke Miangas, agar kedepan masyarakat semakin diberdayakan.4. Pemerintah seharusnya menggali kembali keterampilan yang ada di dalam masyarakat berupa hasil-hasil kerajinan tangan, seperti topi dan tikar anyaman dari pandan. Hasil-hasil ini kemudian menjadi tambahan pendapatan bagimasyarakat dan menjadikan masyarakat lebih mandiri, dan tidak selamanya bergantung pada pemerintah.5. Pemerintah seyogyanya menjaga dan menghormati lembaga adat sebagai mitra pemerintah sesuai dengan yang diatur oleh perundangan-undangan. Menghargai nilai-nilai budaya serta memelihara kearifan lokal yang tumbuh berkembang di dalam masyarakat, perlu adanya penguatan kembali terhadap pranata sosial serta membangkitkan kembali identitas sosial untuk menjaga keutuhan dan kedaulatan NKRI.6. Diharapkan masyarakat lebih menjaga tradisi yang ada, seperti upacara adat, hukum adat, dan bahkan tradisi mancari atau mamancari untuk bertahan hidup. Agar tidak selamanya harus bergantung kepada pemerintah.7. Harapan terakhir peneliti agar para penyelenggara kekuasaan negara di Miangas, diharapkan menjalankan tugas sesuai dengan peraturan yang sudah dibuat dan tidak memanfaatkan atau mengatasnamakan negara hanya untuk sekedar kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.DAFTAR PUSTAKAAbubakar, Mustafa Menata Pulau-pulau Kecil di Perbatasan. Belajar dari Kasus Sipadan, Ligitan dan Sebatik. 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