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Auch nach dem Gipfeltreffen von US-Präsident Donald Trump und Nordkoreas Staatschef Kim Jong Un am 12. Juni 2018 in Singapur zählt die Krise um Nordkoreas Atom- und Massenvernichtungswaffenprogramm zu den gefährlichsten und komplexesten der Welt. Im Zentrum des Konflikts steht das ungeklärte, angespannte Verhältnis zwischen Nordkorea und den USA, fokussiert auf das Thema Atomwaffenbesitz. Darum gruppieren sich weitere Konfliktlagen, die durch gegenläufige Interessen Chinas, Japans, Nordkoreas, Russlands, Südkoreas und der USA gekennzeichnet sind. Zudem gibt es etwa zwischen Konfliktlagen in der Sicherheits-, Menschenrechts- und Wirtschaftspolitik vielfältige Wechselwirkungen. Für Deutschland und Europa ist eine friedliche Lösung des Konflikts - oder zumindest die Vermeidung einer militärischen Eskalation - von zentraler Bedeutung. Europa kann und sollte darauf hinwirken, dass Nordkorea als Herausforderung für die globalen Ordnungsstrukturen behandelt wird. Eine Bearbeitung der unter den Begriff "Nordkorea-Konflikt" subsumierten Problemlagen, die darauf zielt, einen Krieg zu vermeiden, die globalen Ordnungsstrukturen zu festigen und die Situation der Menschen in Nordkorea zu verbessern, erfordert einen langen Atem und wird nur schrittweise Erfolge zeitigen.

Inhaltsangabe: Academics, students, the media and the public have been increasingly drawn to China and India in recent years. Both countries were considered sleeping giants and are now turning into the motors of global economic growth. China and India are both ancient civilizations with a rich history and were among the largest economic powers until European colonization in the 19th century. After Indian independence in 1947 and the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949 both countries shared the view that economic development should be achieved through a self-sustaining economy led and controlled by the government. In the following decades the share of Chinese and Indian global trade decreased significantly. Economic reform in China and India in 1978 and 1991 respectively resulted in an increasing integration into global markets and triggered large economic growth. However China and India differ in many ways. On the one hand China started its reforms 13 years earlier than India. Due to early establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ), strong connections with oversea Chinese in Taiwan and the abundance of cheap labor China was able to position itself as the manufacturing center of the world. India on the other side still lacks the degree of integration in global markets, and the structure of labor and bankruptcy laws, red-tape and poor infrastructure are just some obstacles for further Indian development. In addition, India and China are built on different approaches of governance. India is a democracy which makes it more difficult to introduce pragmatic laws, yet easier to absorb exogenous shocks. China on the other side is solely ruled by the Communist Party of China. As a result it is easier to adopt new policies, but on the other side legitimization to govern is limited and connected to economic growth. A closer analysis of China reveals the existence of several influential interest groups and lobbyists which makes governing China a balancing act in itself yet this will not be subject of this study. China and India both face serious principal-agent problems when it comes to enforcing laws and due to large heterogeneous populations, governing each country is a complex challenge. Today, according to GDP in PPP data China and India rank 2nd and 4th respectively globally. Their share is likely to improve and they are expected to become the world's biggest energy importers and CO2 emitters. The rise of the two nations can be interpreted as a shift of power from the Western Hemisphere towards Asia resulting in major challenges for the international community but also in a regional Asian context. It is very important to note that although China and India are both rising at the same point of time, they are rising in a different pace. China outperforms India in almost every indicator of economic development. It is the key aim of this study to point out this asymmetry between China and India. Another question is, if India is capable of catching up with China in the future and its effects to Sino-Indian relations. In that context noting the mutual perception of India and China is important. To some extent, China dealt with India only as a regional issue, having delegates of provincial governments meet with Indian federal counterparts. On the other side India and China cooperated in international forums, most recently during the Copenhagen summit in 2009, which is an indicator for equal perception. On the other side signs for future tensions can be derived from military modernization programs and competition over natural resources. Analyzing the bilateral trade between China and India serves to increase the understanding of the nature of Sino-Indian relations. It is important to note that the economic structure of India and China differs significantly. Economic aspects are also just one facet of Sino-Indian relations. However heterogeneity is always a common element in every study and although abstraction leads to a loss of information it is a necessary tool to understand Sino-Indian relations. Analyzing bilateral commodity trade provides insight in the intensity of bilateral trade, and intra-industry indices and relative comparative advantage indices provide insight in the complementary and competitive element of bilateral trade relations. Another important aspect is the role of China and India in third markets. India and China are major trade nations, yet the latter outperforms the former significantly. Nevertheless third-market trade reveals possible areas of competition and cooperation. Matching trade baskets are indicators for competitive third-market trade. A dynamic analysis provides insight if the possibility of competition in third markets is increasing and predictions can be derived from it. However it is important to note that commodity trade data are imperfect and the presented results must be regarded critically since they are only an approximation of real international trade. The share of informal economic activities is very high, and differences between international databases are also remarkable. It is important to note that databases receive their information from the very country, and regarding India and China it is particularly in question if they are able or willing to generate and provide accurate data. In addition remittances and triangular trade is not captured by commodity trade databases which are particularly high in the case of India. Hongkong also appears as a separate unit in the trade data. Although it is legally part of China and serves as a major trade hub it will not be recognized in this study. Although China regards Taiwan as a Chinese province it will be analyzed as an independent country. Due to poor availability of bilateral service data, it will not be recognized to the extent as desired. The hypothesis of this study is that there exists a substantial asymmetric component in Sino-Indian relations favoring China. In the long run more symmetric relations are possible to emerge, and India is already catching up yet policy changes could increase this process significantly. Defining India and China as competitors or partners presupposes equality to a certain extend. The last section of this study discusses this question and provides a brief outlook of possible areas of competition and partnership. However it has to be kept in mind that Indian-Chinese relations are a complex matter and providing a simple yes or no answer is not aim of this study.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: I.Introduction II.Historical Overview II.Comparing India and China IV.Chinese-Indian Bilateral Trade Relations V.China and India in Third Markets VI.ConclusionTextprobe:Text Sample: Latin America: Chinese and Indian trade with Brazil reveals that Chinese exports were 6.8 times larger than India's in 2004. However the gap decreased to a ratio of 5.7:1 in 2008. Both countries have shown large growth rates in their exports in this time period accounting 49.2%(China) and 53.5%(India) respectively. Brazil is not a major import partner for India. Chinas imports from Brazil increased significantly faster than India's. In 2004 Chinese imports were 13 times larger than Indian but the ratio increased to 25.7 in 2008. Chinas average import growth rate (32.9%) also exceeded India's (10.2%). With respect to possible areas of competition, 28 (Metalliferous Ore, Scarp) and 67 (Iron and Steel) are both major import goods for the two countries.28 (Metalliferous Ore, Scarp) accounts for 47.7 % of Chinese and 20.1% of India's imports from Brazil. On the export side, India and China are likely to face competition in the area of 65 (Textile Yarn, Fabric,ect). However China was able sign major deals with Brazil in 2010 and is expected to continue its relative dominance in Brazil. India's main export good to Brazil is 33 (Petroleum, Petrol.Product) accounting 49.1% of total exports. Chinas main export good to Brazil is 76 (Telecomm. Sound Equip ect), accounting 16.7%. Chinas exports to Argentina exceeded India's by the factor 8.1 in 2004 and increased further to 13.2 in 2008. On the import side China also gained relatively to India, increasing the China-India ratio from 6.5 in 2004 to 15.8 in 2008. Regarding import trends it is noteworthy that India's imports from Argentina have been decreasing between 18-25% during 2006-2008 while Chinas imports increased ranging from 48% to 78%. Analyzing the trade baskets reveals that competition in 42 (Fixed Veg. Fats and Oils) and 61 (Leather, Leather Goods) is likely to occur regarding imports. On the export side 51 (Organic Chemicals), which is the main export article for both countries accounting 15.3% of Chinas exports and 16% of India's exports is a potential area of competition. Chinas exports to Chile were 16.1 times larger than India's in 2004 and 14.9 times larger in 2008. China's imports exceeded India's by the factor of 11.9 in 2004 and by 6.4 in 2008. Regarding imports, China increased its imports from Chile by 24% annually on average, while India's imports were quite volatile. Between 2005 and 2006 India's imports increased by 300%. This can be traced back to trade agreements between India and Chile, since imports stayed on the level. However growth rates slowed down to 22% the following year and decreased by 7% between 2007 and 2008. Analyzing the trade baskets of China and India reveals 68 (Non-Ferrous Metals), 28 (Metalliferous Ore, Scarp) and 52 (Inorganic Chemicals) as possible fields of import competition. On the export side, 84 (Clothing and Assessories) and 65 (Textile Yarn, Fabric,ect ) are possible areas of competition. Therefore in Latin America, there is also a large gap between the involvement of India and China. Only in Chile indicators reveal relative increases of Indian importance as a trade partner. On the other side several areas of possible competition can be identified including 28 (Metalliferous Ore, Scarp), 52 (Inorganic Chemicals), 67 (Iron and Steel), 68 (Non-Ferrous Metals), 74 (General Industl. Mach. Nes), 79 (Other Transport Equipment) and 87 (Scientific Equipment nes) on the import side and 51 (Organic Chemicals), 65 (Textile Yarn, Fabric,ect), 84 (Clothing and Assessories ) and 89 (Misc Manufactured Goods, nes ) on the export side . EU27: The European Union is the largest trade partner of China and also one of the largest partners of India.Chinas exports to EU27 were 7.9 times larger than India's in 2004. The gap increased slightly to 8.4 in 2008. Chinese imports outperformed India's by the factor of 2.8 in 2004 and decreased the factor 2.5 in 2008. Analyzing the trade baskets reveals that both countries list 74(General Industl. Mach. Nes), 77 (Elec Mch Appar,Parts, nes), 72(Special. Indust. Machinery) and 79 (Other Transport Equipment) as their major import goods from Europe. On the export side, 84 (Clothing and Assessories) is a possible area of competition, since it is India's first and China's third largest export commodity to Europe. Africa: Chinas exports to Nigeria exceeds India's by the factor of 3.18 in 2004 and by 4.9 in 2008. Regarding imports a major shift occurred during the time of analyzis. In 2004 Chinese imports exceeded India's by the factor 8.7. However since 2006 Indian imports started to surge (increased by 900% in one year, because of a major contract regarding oil drilling rights) and in 2008 Indian imports from Nigeria were 19.1 times larger than China's. The import trade baskets reveal that India and China import mostly 33 (Petroleum, Petrol. Product) from Nigeria. Petroleum and petroleum products account for 96.4% and 81.8% of exports respectively. However given the large demand of oil by China this indicates, that Nigeria is not a major supplier of 33 (Petroleum, Petrol. Product) to China. Regarding exports both countries are likely to engage in competition in 78 (Roads Vehicles). Regarding Sudan, the picture is quite different. In Sudan, Chinas exports exceeded India's by the factor 3.3 in 2004 and by 4.6 in 2008. Chinese imports from Sudan were 74,7 times larger than India's in 2004 and the ratio dropped to 11.6 in 2008. Both countries increased their exports to Sudan on a double digit percentage level while data from 2008 shows India's increase (31.1%) ahead of China's (20.5%). Regarding import growth, China's largest increase occurred in 2007. It is noteworthy that China is a major investor in order to obtain Sudanese oil. India's imports from Sudan increased significantly in 2006 (+253%).

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[spa] La relación médico paciente (RMP) es una relación interpersonal asimétrica que nace del encuentro entre médico y paciente, produce resultados y se desarrolla en tres dimensiones: individual, económica y social. El diagnóstico y el tratamiento son los resultados más considerados, pero no los únicos. Satisfacción, experiencia, adherencia y adhesión al tratamiento, continuidad, uso de los servicios de urgencia o acceso a los recursos sociales, son resultados que el paciente vive en términos de salud y de bienestar mientras que el financiador los traduce en términos de consumo de recursos. El financiador no considera estos productos de la RMP igual que aquellos, tiende a juzgarlos resultados tangenciales de la RMP y los desatiende por considerarlos indirectamente relacionados con ella, pese a que revelan la perspectiva del paciente. La complejidad de la atención contribuye a infravalorar dichos resultados al multiplicar los interlocutores del paciente y difuminar los resultados. Muchos promotores de la RMP piensan que potenciarla solo aporta beneficios marginales; aunque esa visión contradiga los hallazgos de los estudios sobre continuidad, coste de la atención a enfermedades crónicas o los obtenidos en términos de seguridad. Mediante su propia experiencia, el paciente protagoniza la RMP y la enriquece con valores cualitativos, como la necesidad de adecuarla a la situación propia, su voluntad y sus expectativas. La RMP se enmarca dentro de la actividad profesional del médico que se rige por obligaciones éticas, técnicas y por condicionantes económicos. La asimetría de poder en la RMP es debida al desequilibrio entre el estado de necesidad de la persona que busca ayuda sanitaria frente al profesional, poseedor de la autoridad y el poder conferidos por los conocimientos de la Medicina y el Estado. Para reducir esa asimetría se intenta contrapesar el poder del médico mediante disposiciones sociales, legales y personales. La confianza sustenta la RMP como manifiesta la custodia del cuerpo y de la información que surge por la intervención médica, sin embargo, aumenta la vulnerabilidad del paciente. Los conflictos de interés relacionados con los honorarios o con la promoción social o académica ponen en entredicho la confianza hacia el médico o hacia la profesión, al igual que el uso inadecuado de los conocimientos de la Medicina puede lesionar al paciente, al médico, a la profesión y a la sociedad. En el espacio de la RMP se toman decisiones que implican a la salud y a la vida del paciente, a la economía y la sociedad. Sobre los protagonistas se ejercen presiones, internas y externas, para que la RMP incorpore a terceros, con voz, voto y sin riesgos y puedan intervenir en la toma de decisiones, incluso en su propio beneficio en lugar del paciente. Estas presiones se ejercen directa e indirectamente mediante: los honorarios; la publicidad; las organizaciones gubernamentales; las leyes; los pacientes, sus asociaciones y las medidas que potencian su autonomía; la formación médica o los lobby. Todas ellas pueden lesionar al paciente, al médico, a la profesión, al conocimiento médico y a la sociedad, desembocando, además, en una práctica defensiva de la Medicina. ; [eng] The doctor-patient relationship (DPR) is an asymmetric interpersonal relationship that emerges when doctors and patients meet, produces outcomes and develops in three dimensions: individual, economic and social. Diagnosis and treatment are the outcomes most often considered but these are not the only ones. Satisfaction, experience, adherence and adhesion to treatment, continuity, the use of emergency services or access to social resources, are outcomes that patients live through in terms of health and well-being, while financial bodies analyze this factors in terms of resource consumption. The funder does not consider these second group of outcomes in the same way as diagnosis and treatment, tend to judge them as peripheral outcomes and neglect it because they are only considered indirectly related to DPR, and despite the fact that they reveal the patient's perspective. Health assistance complexity contributes to the undervaluing of these outcomes due to the proliferation of concerned partner and outcome blurring. Many promoters of DPR think that its enhancement brings only a minor benefits; although this point of view contradicts the findings of studies on continuity, cost of attention to chronic diseases and others studies related to safety. Through their own experience, the patient must own and lead the DPR and enrich it with qualitative values, such as the need to adapt to their own situation, wills and expectations. The DPR is framed within the professional activity of doctors that is ruled by ethical and technical obligations and by economic considerations. There is a power asymmetry due to imbalance caused by the needs of people looking for health care versus the professional, holder of the authority and power conferred by the knowledge of Medicine and the State. To reduce the asymmetry attempts are made to counterweigh the power of the doctor through social, legal and personal provisions. Trust underpins the DPR which is reflected in their responsibility for the care of the body and for the information that arises from medical intervention, nevertheless, the vulnerability of the patient increases. The conflicts of interest related to medical fees or to social or academic promotion raise doubts about the trust for the doctor or for the profession, as the improper use of medical knowledge can injure the patient, the doctor, the profession and the society. In the DPR's domain decisions are taken that involve the health and life of a patient, the economy and society. Pressures are exerted on the protagonists, both internal and external, so that DPR incorporates third-party voices, votes and without risks, can intervene in the decisions-making process, even to their own benefit in replacing the patient. These pressures are exerted directly and indirectly through: fees; advertising; governmental organizations; law; patients, their associations and measures to enhance patient autonomy; medical training or lobbies. All of them can injure the patient, the doctor, the profession, the medical knowledge attained and society, leading, additionally, to a defensive practice in Medicine. ; [cat] La relació metge-pacient (RMP) és una relació interpersonal asimètrica que neix de la trobada entre metge i pacient, produeix resultats i es desenvolupa en tres dimensions: individual, econòmica i social. El diagnòstic i tractament són els resultats més considerats, però no els únics. Satisfacció, experiència, adherència i adhesió al tractament, continuïtat, ús dels serveis d'urgència o accés als recursos socials, són resultats que el pacient viu en termes de salut i benestar mentre que el finançador els tradueix a termes de consum de recursos. El finançador no considera aquests productes de la RMP igual que aquells, tendeix a jutjar-los resultats tangencials de la RMP i els desatén perquè els considera només indirectament relacionats amb ella, tot i que revelen la perspectiva del pacient. La complexitat de l'atenció, que multiplica els interlocutors del pacient i difumina els resultats, contribueix a infravalorar aquests resultats. Molts promotors de la RMP pensen que potenciar-la només aporta beneficis marginals; malgrat que aquesta visió contradiu les troballes dels estudis sobre continuïtat, cost de l'atenció a les malalties cròniques o els obtinguts en termes de seguretat. Mitjançant la pròpia experiència, el pacient protagonitza la RMP i l'enriqueix amb valors qualitatius com la necessitat d'adequar-la a la situació pròpia, la seva voluntat o les seves expectatives. La RMP s'emmarca dins de les activitats professionals del metge que es regeix per obligacions ètiques, tècniques i per condicionants econòmics. L' asimetria de poder dins la RMP és deguda al desequilibri entre l'estat de necessitat de la persona que busca ajuda sanitària i, en front, el professional, posseïdor de l'autoritat i el poder que li confereixen els coneixements de la Medicina i l'Estat. Per reduir-ne l' asimetria s'intenta contrapesar el poder del metge mitjançant disposicions socials, legals i personals. La confiança sustenta la RMP i això es fa palès amb la custòdia del cos i de la informació que aporta la intervenció mèdica però augmenta la vulnerabilitat del pacient. Els conflictes d'interès, relacionats amb els honoraris o amb la promoció social o acadèmica, posen en perill la confiança amb el metge o amb la professió, a l'igual de l'ús inadequat dels coneixements de la Medicina que pot lesionar al pacient, al metge, a la professió i a la societat. Dins l'espai de la RMP es prenen decisions que impliquen a la salut i a la vida del pacient, a l'economia i a la societat. Sobre els protagonistes s'exerceixen pressions, internes i externes, perquè la RMP incorpori terceres persones, amb veu, vot i sense riscos i puguin intervenir a la presa de decisions, inclús en el seu propi benefici substituint al del pacient. Aquestes pressions s'exerceixen directament i indirecta mitjançant: els honoraris; la publicitat; les organitzacions governamentals; las lleis; els pacients, les seves associacions y les mesures que potencien la seva autonomia; la formació o els lobby. Totes elles poden lesionar al pacient, al metge, a la professió al coneixement mèdic i a la societat, desembocant, a més, en una pràctica defensiva de la Medicina.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's successful visit to Washington between 9 and 11 April testified to a deepening of the US-Japan alliance and important strategic shifts across the First Island Chain, which includes archipelagos stretching from the Kurils up in Northeast Asia down to the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippines, all the way south to the Malay peninsula in Southeast Asia.
This is part and parcel of a shift in favour of a "Strategy of Denial", as per the thinking of then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge Colby, a key policymaker under the Trump administration.[1] According to Colby, the US would double its efforts at balancing China, enlist US allies and partners across the First Island Chain to buttress deterrence capabilities towards the People's Republic – including in Taiwan – and avoid a potentially domino-like process of subordination to Beijing. These efforts revolve around Japan's ability to shoulder more security responsibilities, a strengthened and more seamless US-Japan alliance – including joint operational planning over a Taiwan crisis scenario and the restructuring of portions of the US military planning to Japan – and a set of geopolitical minilaterals, within which the US-Japan alliance plays a key role.US-Japan(-Philippines) cooperation in the security domain
Japan's three strategic documents from December 2022 and the joint statements by Japan and the US in 2023 suggest that the transpacific allies are indeed working in lockstep in the security domain, with deterrence and coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis China high in policymakers' minds. According to these documents, Japan is about to shoulder more security responsibilities as it militarises and embraces offensive strike capabilities. In the process, Japan would ease US fatigue and work side-by-side to buttress its military and diplomatic projection – an aspect emphasised by Kishida in his speech to a joint session of the US Congress. Interestingly, Kishida's visit coincided with a trilateral Japan-Philippines-US summit, which attested to the strategic outreaches of both Washington and Tokyo to interlock the US hub-and-spokes system across the First Island Chain.
Japan's minilateral diplomacy aimed at purposeful multi-layered security ententes, often on an ad hoc basis, has worked in concert with the US government's regional efforts. The aim has been to balance China militarily, counter its regional and global diplomatic and economic influence, and do so "by taking full advantage of comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defence, economic, technological, and intelligence/information capabilities", as per Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy.[2]
This whole-of-government grand strategy walked side-by-side with the US concept of an "integrated deterrence" that leveraged allies' capabilities, including basing rights and access for the aforementioned strategic objectives. The force posture and – to all effects – military doctrine changes in Japan have gone hand in hand with increases of US basing rights in both Japan and the Philippines and through enhanced bilateral military cooperation with Manila.Developments in the Taiwan Strait and the creation of the MLR
While underplayed by government actors, especially so now that US-China relations have (to some extent) stabilised and public reassurances are gaining more traction, the Taiwan-specific aspects of these strategic changes are worthy of note.
From a geopolitical standpoint, Japan and the US benefit from the preservation of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait because it bottles up China's advancement into the seas within the First Island Chain and facilitates the tracking of Chinese military assets venturing beyond it, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, ships and submarines. In fact, as mentioned, the Japanese government has been discreetly overhauling its security regime, military doctrine and force posture to preserve a modicum of military balance of power, even just asymmetrically, to deter Chinese aggression.
In parallel, the US government has been providing Taiwan with weapons, training and ways to bolster resilience along its newfound emphasis on asymmetric deterrence across the First Island Chain, while eliciting coalition-building with and among third parties, including NATO allies.
Japan's interlinkage of its own security with Taiwan's is evident in US-Japan alliance developments in 2023. On 11 January 2023, the Japan-US "2+2" meeting of foreign and defence ministers was held in Washington during which both governments announced that "the 12th Marine Regiment w[ould] be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025", a move aimed at "strengthen[ing] alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities".[3] This initiative dovetailed with the expansion of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement to allow for four new US bases in key spots across the First Island Chain, thus increasing from five to nine, with more possibly in store to allow for rotational deployments.
Effectively, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), made up of ca. 1,800-2,000 servicemen, will split into smaller teams of 50-100 soldiers to allow for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of Chinese activities across the East and South China Seas by deploying unmanned surface, underwater and aerial vehicles. Hence, in a contingency, these US amphibious teams in Japanese and the Philippines' territory may distribute maritime operations (that is, disperse lethal forces) through anti-ship missiles and low-altitude defence systems, all while theoretically hopping from island to island every 48 to 72 hours to avoid Chinese attacks, while continuing to conduct ISR and fight. These so-called "stand-in forces", which will have to rely on Japanese military and/or civilian facilities (and, potentially, on Japan's direct military involvement), may well disrupt a Chinese blockade or amphibious landing on Taiwan and facilitate logistical support to the self-governed island. Finally, and in connection to that, a Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement, which is currently under negotiation, would strengthen the Tokyo-Manila security side of the newly born trilateral.Enlisting the Republic of Korea
Aside from the US-Japan alliance preparations for a Taiwan contingency and coordination with the Philippines, minilateral alignments have gone through the enlisting of the Republic of Korea (RoK), better known as South Korea. The advent of the conservative Yoon Suk-Yeol presidency translated into a stronger RoK alignment with the US and its goals. In fact, an Indo-Pacific Strategy was announced in December 2022. Yoon Suk-Yeol specifically assigned its development to the North America Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggesting a desire to align with Washington. Aided by his forceful character as a former prosecutor, Yoon single-handedly abandoned his predecessor Moon Jae-in's engagement policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), aka North Korea, and aligned more fully with the United States on the China and Russia dossiers, so much so that it "indirectly" supplied more artillery shells to Ukraine than all European countries combined. Yoon's decision to tilt on one side of the conflict in Ukraine was not a foregone policy choice given the influence and leverage that Russia and China may exert over their North Korean neighbour, which constitutes Seoul's main foreign and security policy preoccupation. These developments cemented the idea of a progressive rift among competitive blocs, following Russia's 2022 war of aggression in Ukraine.
More importantly, and through active US intercession under the Biden administration, the South Korean government took the initiative in perhaps the hardest foreign policy call: reprising dialogue with Japan. This had soured over a negative spiral of disputes over the legacy of past colonial occupation and economic retaliation, especially in 2019. Kishida's mellower public persona and more conciliatory political background compared to his immediate predecessors in Japan's Prime Minister's Office, the late Abe Shinzō in particular, partly smoothened the road. But there were no meaningful concessions from the Japanese government's side, not least because of Kishida's unpopularity and, crucially, the weight of nationalists within his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Still, the stabilisation of Japan-RoK relations – two major US allies – ushered the way for the landmark trilateral US-Japan-RoK cooperation, as evidenced by the Camp David summit of 18 August 2023.[4] There too, minilateral cooperation expanded horizontally to include the diplomatic, educational and technological fields. But the key "integrated deterrence" outcomes were in security, through expanded intelligence sharing, missile defence and strengthened cybersecurity coordination. More importantly, the three documents released at the summit aimed at regularising security consultations, routinising trilateral meetings, both at the summit and working level, and diversifying and expanding their remit beyond North Korea to include food security, economic security and, importantly, China.The potential benefits of minilateralism
Through these arrangements, first and foremost, the US government aimed at an institutionalisation of US-RoK-Japan cooperation, thus inter-locking the region's most powerful, prosperous and technologically advanced US allies. It did so with an eye on binding South Korea and Japan into cooperation into the future, as successive governments in either country may not be as sympathetic to their counterpart across the sea as the current ones (especially Yoon's). The routinisation of trilateral cooperation and coordination also aimed at damage limitation in the event of a potential Trump comeback, who would prioritise his own interests at the expense of trilateral coordination.
Second, in the context of the RoK-Japan-US minilateral, regularised avenues for dialogue were deepened at multiple levels: from Director General level up to summit meetings, which will be held at least once a year.
Third and in connection to the above, the scope of trilateral cooperation expanded notably across agencies, given the multi-layered nature of the challenges and opportunities faced by the three countries. The inauguration of a Japan-US-RoK Indo-Pacific Dialogue and of a Trilateral Framework on scientific cooperation, including defence technology, testified to this logic, not unlike other minilaterals that the Biden administration promptly revitalised or gave birth to, such as the Quad with Australia, India and Japan, or AUKUS with Australia and the UK (soon to include, perhaps, Japan and Canada in one of their two pillars of cooperation). Japan-US-RoK cooperation, however, promised to go deeper with new dialogues or plans on common or coordinative frameworks aimed at combating North Korea's cyber activities, stifling disinformation and promoting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), as well as government financing across the Indo-Pacific (starting with the Pacific Islands), maritime, space and economic security, including the establishment of an early warning system on potential disruptions to supply chains.
Fourth, the most publicised development has been the strengthening of intelligence sharing, notably by allowing for a trilateral real-time system that linked the three countries radars tracking and evaluating missiles flying from North Korea, with potential implications also in a Taiwan contingency scenario. This may also well apply to the Philippines – although Manila was likely not as appealing as Seoul's capacity in this regard. Notably, reporting has suggested that Japan was quietly beefing up military and intelligence assistance to the self-governing island, if not directly, by triangulation through the United States, and potentially with some help from South Korea as well.[5]Looking ahead to November 2024 and beyond
While momentum has been clear, some of these mechanisms may be put to the test – especially the pledge to consult – by regional dynamics, as North Korea's bellicose behaviour toward its neighbour has been accompanied by DPRK leader Kim Jong-un's overtures towards Japan. Moreover, the Japanese government is still watchful about domestic political developments in South Korea, such as the progressive parties' electoral resounding win in the recent legislative elections (that is, a non-confidence vote against Yoon) and the South Korean Supreme Court's decision to uphold lower courts' orders for compensation by Japanese industries' responsible for wartime labour. Also for this reason, Tokyo is unlikely to allow South Korea into the G7 framework on a more regular basis, which is arguably also one of Washington's desiderata to buttress the rostrum of "like-minded partners". Similar hesitancies have been likely at play vis-à-vis Manila, where former President Rodrigo Duterte's daughter – the current Vice-President – may swift the pendulum away from this alignment of planets carefully engineered by the Biden administration.
Developments in US politics may affect the process too. With a second Trump presidency, the Japanese government would be again fearful of a reprise of US concessions to, and US summit diplomacy with, North Korea. This same logic may apply to the US-Japan-Philippines minilateral and other ententes that have been cajoled or blessed by Washington, such as NATO's outreach towards the Asia-Pacific, especially Japan, South Korea and Australia. A Trump redux may break apart NATO, but he might also rethink the merits of his mercenary and transactional tactics in the context of coercive diplomatic leverage towards China.
Thus, the bigger test of the "resilience" of minilateral alignments is the possible resurface of a disruptive and unilateral Trump presidency, whose transactional logic would thrive on US leverage at a bilateral level, and, perhaps, the incognita of China's staying power and of US-China strategic rivalry at large. As events unfold, the First Island Chain is and will be the place to watch to understand the geopolitics of US-China competition.Giulio Pugliese is Associate fellow (Asia-Pacific) at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Oxford and Part-time Professor on EU-Asia Studies at the European University Institute.
This commentary is an extract and re-adaptation from a forthcoming academic article: Giulio Pugliese and Marco Zappa, "Japan 2023: Still Walking on Abe Shinzō's Footsteps", in Asia Maior, Vol. XXXIV.[1] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial. American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2021.[2] The English language version of the strategy translates jōhō merely as "intelligence", but it is a broader concept that encompasses (and can be translated as) "information". In fact, the Japanese government has been particularly apt at leveraging information and intelligence to shape its strategic environment. Cfr. Japan Ministry of Defence, Kokka anzen hoshō senryaku [National Security Strategy], December 2022, p. 4, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf. For the English language version see: National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022, p. 3, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html.[3] US and Japan, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative e Committee ("2+2"), 11 January 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100444894.pdf.[4] Japan, RoK and US, The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states.[5] Kathrin Hille and Demetri Sevastopulo, "US to Link up with Taiwan and Japan Drone Fleets to Share Real-Time Data", in Financial Times, 8 June 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/bde0db76-a7f8-4ecd-b5d5-03de0b5a8659.

La crescita incontrollata di dati prodotti da molte sorgenti, eterogenee e di- namiche, spinge molti possessori di tali dati a immagazzinarli su server nel cloud, anche al fine di condividerli con terze parti. La condivisione di dati su server (possibilmente) non fidati fonte di importanti e non banali questioni riguardanti sicurezza, privacy, confidenzialit e controllo degli accessi. Al fine di prevenire accessi incontrollati ai dati, una tipica soluzione consiste nel cifrare i dati stessi. Seguendo tale strada, la progettazione e la realizzazione di politiche di accesso ai dati cifrati da parte di terze parti (che possono avere differenti diritti sui dati stessi) un compito complesso, che impone la presenza di un controllore fidato delle politiche. Una possibile soluzione l'impiego di un meccanismo per il controllo degli accessi basato su schemi di cifratura attribute-base (ABE ), che permette al possessore dei dati di cifrare i dati in funzione delle politiche di accesso dei dati stessi. Di contro, l'adozione di tali meccanismi di controllo degli accessi presentano due problemi (i) privacy debole: le politiche di accesso sono pubbliche e (ii) inefficienza: le politiche di accesso sono statiche e una loro modifica richiede la ricifratura (o la cifratura multipla) di tutti i dati. Al fine di porre rimedio a tali problemi, il lavoro proposto in questa tesi prende in con- siderazione un particolare schema di cifratura attribute-based, chiamato inner product encryption (IPE, che gode della propriet attribute-hiding e pertanto riesce a proteggere la privatezza delle politiche di accesso) e lo combina con le tecniche di proxy re-encryption, che introducono una maggiore flessibilit ed efficienza. La prima parte di questa tesi discute l'adeguatezza dell'introduzione di un meccanismo di controllo degli accessi fondato su schema basato su inner product e proxy re-encryption (IPPRE ) al fine di garantire la condivisione sicura di dati immagazzinati su cloud server non fidati. Pi specificamente, proponiamo due proponiamo due versioni di IPE : in prima istanza, presentiamo una versione es- tesa con proxy re-encryption di un noto schema basato su inner product [1]. In seguito, usiamo tale schema in uno scenario in cui vengono raccolti e gestiti dati medici. In tale scenario, una volta che i dati sono stati raccolti, le politiche di ac- cesso possono variare al variare delle necessit dei diversi staff medici. Lo schema proposto delega il compito della ricifratura dei dati a un server proxy parzial- mente fidato, che pu trasformare la cifratura dei dati (che dipende da una polit- ica di accesso) in un'altra cifratura (che dipende da un'altra politica di accesso) senza per questo avere accesso ai dati in chiaro o alla chiave segreta utilizzata dal possessore dei dati. In tal modo, il possessore di una chiave di decifratura corrispondente alla seconda politica di accesso pu accedere ai dati senza intera- gire con il possessore dei dati (richiedendo cio una chiave di decifratura associata alla propria politica di accesso). Presentiamo un'analisi relativa alle prestazioni di tale schema implementato su curve ellittiche appartenenti alle classi SS, MNT e BN e otteniamo incoraggianti risultati sperimentali. Dimostriamo inoltre che lo schema proposto sicuro contro attacchi chosen plaintext sotto la nota ipotesi DLIN. In seconda istanza, presentiamo una versione ottimizzata dello schema proposto in precedenza (E-IPPRE ), basata su un ben noto schema basato suinner product, proposto da Kim [2]. Lo schema E-IPPRE proposto richiede un numero costante di operazioni di calcolo di pairing e ci garantisce che gli oggetti prodotti dall esecuzione dello schema (chiavi di decifratura, chiavi pubbliche e le cifrature stesse) sono di piccole rispetto ai parametri di sicurezza e sono efficientemente calcolabili. Testiamo sperimentalmente l'efficienza dello schema proposto e lo proviamo (selettivamente nei confronti degli attributi) sicuro nei confronti di attacchi chosen plaintext sotto la nota ipotesi BDH. In altri termini, lo schema proposto non rivela alcuna informazione riguardante le politiche di accesso. La seconda parte di questa tesi presenta uno schema crittografico per la condivisione sicura dei dati basato su crittografia attribute-based e adatto per scenari basati su IoT. Come noto, il problema principale in tale ambito riguarda le limitate risorse computazionali dei device IoT coinvolti. A tal proposito, proponiamo uno schema che combina la flessibilit di E-IPPRE con l'efficienza di uno schema di cifratura simmetrico quale AES, ottenendo uno schema di cifratura basato su inner product, proxy-based leggero (L-IPPRE ). I risultati sperimentali confermano l'adeguatezza di tale schema in scenari IoT.Riferimenti [1] Jong Hwan Park. Inner-product encryption under standard assumptions. Des. Codes Cryptography, 58(3):235–257, March 2011. [2] Intae Kim, Seong Oun Hwang, Jong Hwan Park, and Chanil Park. An effi- cient predicate encryption with constant pairing computations and minimum costs. IEEE Trans. Comput., 65(10):2947–2958, October 2016. ; With the ever-growing production of data coming from multiple, scattered, and highly dynamical sources, many providers are motivated to upload their data to the cloud servers and share them with other persons for different purposes. However, storing data on untrusted cloud servers imposes serious concerns in terms of security, privacy, data confidentiality, and access control. In order to prevent privacy and security breaches, it is vital that data is encrypted first before it is outsourced to the cloud. However, designing access control mod- els that enable different users to have various access rights to the shared data is the main challenge. To tackle this issue, a possible solution is to employ a cryptographic-based data access control mechanism such as attribute-based encryption (ABE ) scheme, which enables a data owner to take full control over data access. However, access control mechanisms based on ABE raise two chal- lenges: (i) weak privacy: they do not conceal the attributes associated with the ciphertexts, and therefore they do not satisfy attribute-hiding security, and (ii) inefficiency: they do not support efficient access policy change when data is required to be shared among multiple users with different access policies. To address these issues, this thesis studies and enhances inner-product encryption (IPE ), a type of public-key cryptosystem, which supports the attribute-hiding property as well as the flexible fine-grained access control based payload-hiding property, and combines it with an advanced cryptographic technique known as proxy re-encryption (PRE ). The first part of this thesis discusses the necessity of applying the inner- product proxy re-encryption (IPPRE ) scheme to guarantee secure data sharing on untrusted cloud servers. More specifically, we propose two extended schemes of IPE : in the first extended scheme, we propose an inner-product proxy re- encryption (IPPRE ) protocol derived from a well-known inner-product encryp- tion scheme [1]. We deploy this technique in the healthcare scenario where data, collected by medical devices according to some access policy, has to be changed afterwards for sharing with other medical staffs. The proposed scheme delegates the re-encryption capability to a semi-trusted proxy who can transform a dele- gator's ciphertext associated with an attribute vector to a new ciphertext associ- ated with delegatee's attribute vector set, without knowing the underlying data and private key. Our proposed policy updating scheme enables the delegatee to decrypt the shared data with its own key without requesting a new decryption key. We analyze the proposed protocol in terms of its performance on three dif- ferent types of elliptic curves such as the SS curve, the MNT curve, and the BN curve, respectively. Hereby, we achieve some encouraging experimental results. We show that our scheme is adaptive attribute-secure against chosen-plaintext under standard Decisional Linear (D-Linear ) assumption. To improve the per- formance of this scheme in terms of storage, communication, and computation costs, we propose an efficient inner-product proxy re-encryption (E-IPPRE ) scheme using the transformation of Kim's inner-product encryption method [2]. The proposed E-IPPRE scheme requires constant pairing operations for its al- gorithms and ensures a short size of the public key, private key, and ciphertext,making it the most efficient and practical compared to state of the art schemes in terms of computation and communication overhead. We experimentally as- sess the efficiency of our protocol and show that it is selective attribute-secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the standard model under Asymmetric De- cisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Specifically, our proposed schemes do not reveal any information about the data owner's access policy to not only the untrusted servers (e.g, cloud and proxy) but also to the other users. The second part of this thesis presents a new lightweight secure data sharing scheme based on attribute-based cryptography for a specific IoT -based health- care application. To achieve secure data sharing on IoT devices while preserving data confidentiality, the IoT devices encrypt data before it is outsourced to the cloud and authorized users, who have corresponding decryption keys, can ac- cess the data. The main challenge, in this case, is on the one hand that IoT devices are resource-constrained in terms of energy, CPU, and memory. On the other hand, the existing public-key encryption mechanisms (e.g., ABE ) require expensive computation. We address this issue by combining the flexibility and expressiveness of the proposed E-IPPRE scheme with the efficiency of symmet- ric key encryption technique (AES ) and propose a light inner-product proxy re-encryption (L-IPPRE ) scheme to guarantee secure data sharing between dif- ferent entities in the IoT environment. The experimental results confirm that the proposed L-IPPRE scheme is suitable for resource-constrained IoT scenar- ios.References [1] Jong Hwan Park. Inner-product encryption under standard assumptions. Des. Codes Cryptography, 58(3):235–257, March 2011. [2] Intae Kim, Seong Oun Hwang, Jong Hwan Park, and Chanil Park. An effi- cient predicate encryption with constant pairing computations and minimum costs. IEEE Trans. Comput., 65(10):2947–2958, October 2016.

1. IntroductionOver the last decade, increased attention has been paid to terrorism, particularly to the new wave of terrorist groups, fundamentalist movements, and extremist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda. September 11 marked the beginning of a turbulent phase in which states face a new kind of threat made up of a complex network of insidious revolutionary and nationalist forces. Such transformations have given rise to an unprecedented number of publications. However, both political violence and terrorism remain sources of endless disputes and controversies because of their political implications. At the same time, in the scientific community, terrorism studies lack conceptual and methodological uniformity. In his article, Domenico Tosini synthesises and discusses some major findings from this research. Courses using such a review will be confronted with the four major topics that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of the consequences of counterterrorism policies.2. Literature recommendations Bjørgo, Tore (ed.) 2005. Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, based on the analysis of numerous case studies (e.g. Palestinian armed groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, right‐wing extremists, state terrorism and state‐sponsored terrorism), experts in political violence examine the preconditions for the emergence of different types of terrorist organisations and the main factors that sustain terrorist campaigns. Cole, David 2003. Enemy Aliens: Double Standard and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York, NY: The New Press.Thanks to its analysis and evaluation of the consequences of counter‐terrorism measures, David Cole's Enemy Aliens is one of the most rigorous discussions of how states (like the United States since 2001) often combat terrorism by adopting emergency powers (such as the special detention at Guantanamo Bay), which, in turn, risk undermining civil liberties. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Based on empirical research that compares the origins and development of left‐wing terrorism in Italy and Germany between the 1960s and the 1990s, della Porta offers a middle‐range theory of political violence that combines an analysis of the political opportunities and ideological frames exploited by armed groups, a profile of their organisational structures, and an investigation of the typical patterns underlying their recruitment processes. Gambetta, Diego (ed.) 2006. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.In this book, a number of distinguished social scientists, while examining the use of suicide missions by political and religious groups (such as the Japanese Kamikaze, the Tamil Tigers, Palestinian organisations, and Al‐Qaeda), specify and discuss the most important methodological questions associated with definitions, data collection, and explanations concerning this form of political struggle. Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Colombia University Press.The book introduces the most important issues of terrorism studies: the controversial problem of the definition of terrorism; a history of terrorism, from anti‐colonial struggles to international terrorism; an examination and explanation of the most recent waves of religious extremists and suicide terrorism; an analysis of the ways terrorist groups exploit old and new media such as the Internet; and, finally, an overview of the strategies, tactics, and organisational aspects of modern and contemporary terrorism. Horgan, John 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge.Horgan presents a critical analysis of our understanding of terrorist psychology; many shortcomings emerge, particularly the limitations of personality theories in attempting to explain militancy. Based on interviews with terrorists, the book considers the most relevant psychological and social factors underlying involvement and engagement in political violence, and the process of leaving terrorist organisations. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Scholars generally distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence against civilians – tactics of guerrilla warfare or insurgency in civil wars, for example. However, this work makes a relevant contribution to terrorism studies. Kalyvas clarifies the rationality and micro‐processes of interactions during armed conflicts that account for indiscriminate and selective uses of violence against civilian populations by political actors. Kushner, Harvey W. 2003. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. London, UK: Sage.One of the most accurate and exhaustive dictionaries focusing on terrorism, with more than 300 entries concerning terrorist groups, key events, people, terms, and statistics, as well as biographical, historical, and geographical information. Free access is available at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/eBooks.asp). Laqueur, Walter 2002. A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers.Along with Laqueur's Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), this constitutes a pioneering history of armed organisations, from nineteenth century Europe, to the anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s, to the left‐wing clashes during the 20th century, and up to the most recent terrorist groups. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House.Over the last decade, suicide terrorism has become an alarming political threat and a crucial challenge for social scientists. In his work, which compares a number of organisations responsible for suicide attacks, Pape rejects the explanation of suicide terrorism based on religious fundamentalism. He argues for a correlation between the use of this tactic and specific kinds of groups engaged in separatist campaigns or in struggles for liberation from foreign occupiers. Ranstorp, Magnus (ed.) 2007. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, distinguished scholars of terrorism studies discuss state‐of‐the‐art field research. In exploring new trends in this area – the most important questions about the explanation of recent terrorist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda, and about counterterrorism – these essays shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of our current knowledge of political violence. Reich, Walter (ed.) 1998. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.This is another seminal work on terrorism, bringing together some of the most well known experts in political violence. The variety of approaches used in the explanations of terrorist organisations and in the analysis of counterterrorism paves the way for a real interdisciplinary setting, which is absolutely crucial once the multi‐faceted nature of terrorism is clear. Sageman, Marc 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.Based on the analysis of biographical data for nearly 200 members of global Islamist extremism (of which Al‐Qaeda is a part), Sageman accounts for the origins and developments of this movement and specifies the crucial role played by social networks in the recruitment of individuals as Islamist militants. Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.Wilkinson examines major trends in international terrorism and liberal democratic responses. On the one hand, the book introduces the specificity of terrorism and offers a classification and explanation of the most important types of armed groups. On the other, in approaching how states deal with terrorist threats, this work discusses forms of counterterrorism, by taking into account their impact on the rule of law and on the protection of civil liberties.3. Online materials Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) (Agency for Internal Information and Security)(http://www.aisi.gov.it)The Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) is the branch of Italian Intelligence tasked with collecting and analysing information about any criminal and terrorist threat to security. Among other activities, the AISI distributes its own periodical, Gnosis, online, where a chronology of international as well as domestic terrorist attacks since 2004 (currently updated through 2007) is available.
Counterterrorism Blog
(http://counterterrorismblog.org)The Counterterrorism Blog is a multi‐expert blog devoted to providing a one‐stop gateway to the counterterrorism community. It offers, among other things, overnight and breaking news, with real time commentary by experts; reports on terrorist organisations; discussions of long‐term trends in counterterrorism; and summaries of and discussions about US and international law.
Center for Constitutional Rights

(CCR) (http://ccrjustice.org)Founded in 1966 by attorneys who represented civil rights organisations, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) is a non‐profit legal and educational organisation dedicated to protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also offers information about important issues related to counterterrorism (e.g., the prolonged battle in defence of civil liberties associated with the special detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
Global Terrorism Database
(GTD)(http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd)The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open‐source database on terrorist incidents around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). It includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist attacks. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the attack, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and (when possible) the identity of the perpetrator. Another important database, the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.mipt.org/TKB.asp), has recently ceased operations and elements of the system have been merged with the GTD. Information on terrorist groups is now available at the Terrorist Organization Profiles (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops).
Human Security Report Project

(HSRP) (http://www.hsrgroup.org)The HSRP conducts research on global and regional trends in political violence, exploring their causes and consequences, and then making this research accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators, and the interested public. The HSRP's publications include the Human Security Report, the Human Security Brief series, and the Human Security Gateway. The recent Human Security Brief 2007, online, makes a relevant contribution in discussing the methodological issues associated with collecting data on terrorism and offers a comprehensive overview of terrorist incidents in the last decade.
Middle East Media Research Institute

(MEMRI) (http://www.memri.org)The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region's media with respect to a variety of topics including terrorism. MEMRI provides translations of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish media, as well as analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious tendencies in the Middle East. A new section, the MEMRI's Islamist Websites Monitor Project, was launched in 2006 as part of the Jihad & Terrorism Studies project. Its aim is to keep Western audiences informed about the phenomenon of jihadist sites on the Internet, which are used by terrorist groups and their sympathisers to spread their extremist messages, to raise funds, and to recruit activists.
Uppsala Conflict Data Project

(UCDP) (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP)The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) collects data on armed conflicts around the world. A global conflict database is now available online. Data are useful for systematic studies of conflict origins, dynamics, and resolution.
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
(WITS)(http://wits.nctc.gov)The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. NCTC serves as the primary organisation in the United States government for integrating and analysing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and, at the same time, as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information. Based on WITS, the NCTC provides an annual report and statistical information about terrorist incidents.
Additional Online Resources
Scores of additional organisations and centres (too many to list) conduct and disseminate research on issues related to armed conflicts, terrorism, terrorist groups, security, and counterterrorism. What follows is a list of some other key organisations and centres, with links to their websites:Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)(http://www.aspi.org.au)Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)(http://www.fhs.se/en/Research/Centers‐and‐Research‐Programmes/CATS)Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)(http://www.csis.org)Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)(http://www.st‐andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv)IntelCenter(http://intelcenter.com)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)(http://www.pvtr.org)International Crisis Group (ICG)(http://www.crisisgroup.org)International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(http://www.iiss.org)International Policy Institute for Counter‐Terrorism (ICT)(http://www.ict.org.il)Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)(http://www.mipt.org)Saban Center at the Brookings Institution(http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx)Senlis Council(http://www.senliscouncil.net)Southern Poverty Law Center(http://www.splcenter.org)Terrorism and Homeland Security at RAND Corporation(http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism)Terrorism Research Center (TRC)(http://www.terrorism.org)Transnational Radical Islamism Project at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment(http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis_Division/_TERRA)United States Institute of Peace(http://www.usip.org/index.html)4. Sample syllabus Course Title: A Sociological Analysis of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Course Description In this course, we will explore the most relevant issues around terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Although we will largely approach this topic from a sociological perspective, this study is quite interdisciplinary. Consequently, we will be reading works from other academic disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, and economics. There are four major areas that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of consequences related to counterterrorism. After an introduction to terrorism research (part 1), we will discuss the controversies related to the definition of terrorism (part 2) and to data collection (part 3), both necessary for an understanding of tendencies concerning terrorist incidents. A historical overview (part 4) will give us some preliminary information about the variety of terrorist campaigns – information that prepares us for the next exercise (part 5): grouping terrorist organisations by different types. Looking in more depth at the evolution of terrorism in the last decade, we will examine the case of Al‐Qaeda (part 6), and how this and other organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet (part 7). The next chapter will be the explanation of terrorism, that is, the specification of the main psychological, political, cultural, and religious factors underlying the emergence of a terrorist organisation and the unfolding of a terrorist campaign. Suicide terrorism will be used as a case study. More specifically, we will approach terrorism by examining the motivations and rationality of terrorist organisations (part 8), of the communities that support them (part 9), and of those who join them (part 10). We end the course by focusing on both the legal (part 11) and strategic (part 12) implications of counterterrorism measures adopted since 2001. Course outline and reading assignments Part 1. Terrorism Research An overview of the most important approaches to the study of terrorism and of the strengths and weaknesses of available analyses. Bjørgo, Tore 2005. 'Introduction' (pp. 1–15) and 'Conclusions' (pp. 256–264) in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Crenshaw, Martha 2000. 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.'Political Psychology 21 (2): 405–420 (Doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00195). Ranstorp, Magnus 2007. 'Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research – Challenges and Priorities.' Pp. 1–28 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Silke, Andrew 2004. 'An Introduction to Terrorism Research.' Pp. 1–29 in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, edited by Andrew Silke. London, UK: Frank Cass. Sinai, Joshua 2007. 'New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses.' Pp. 31–50 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Turk, Austin T. 2004. 'Sociology of Terrorism.'Annual Review of Sociology 30: 271–286 (Doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110510). Wilkinson, Paul 2007. 'Research into Terrorism Studies: Achievements and Failures.' Pp. 316–328 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Part 2. What is Terrorism? A discussion of one of the most controversial issues, the definition of terrorism, focusing on its political and methodological implications. Aly, Waleed 2008. 'The Axiom of Evil.'The Guardian, 8 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/08/nelsonmandela.terrorism (last accessed: 8 July 2008). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–42). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. della Porta, Donatella 2004. 'Terror Against the State.' Pp. 208–16 in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Schmid, Alexander P. 2004. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.'Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2): 197–221 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550490483134). Tilly, Charles 2004. 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist.'Sociological Theory 22 (1): 5–16 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00200.x). Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–19). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 3. Collecting Data on Terrorism Incidents An introduction to the challenges and solutions to the collection of terrorism data, a preliminary and crucial aspect of any scientific analysis. Buchalter, Alice R. and Glenn E. Curtis 2003. Inventory and Assessment of Databases Relevant for Social Science Research on Terrorism. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/frd (last accessed 10 June 2008). Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler 2006. Chapter 3 (pp. 52–83). The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lafree, Gary 2007. 'Introducing the Global Terrorism Database.'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2): 181–204 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701246817). HSP 2008. Human Security Brief 2007. Dying to Lose: Explaining the Decline in Global Terrorism. Simon Fraser University, Canada: Human Security Report Project, http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf (last accessed 15 June 2008). Part 4. Waves of Terror: The Evolution of Terrorism A look at terrorism from a historical perspective in an attempt to identify continuities and discontinuities in the use of political violence. Abrahms, Max 2006. 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work.'International Security 31 (2): 42–78 (Doi: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.42). Duyvesteyn, Isabelle 2004. 'How New Is the New Terrorism?'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (5): 439–454 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100490483750). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 2–4 (pp. 43–130). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, Brian 1975. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. Research Paper n. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Kaplan, Jeffrey 2007. 'The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (4): 545–570 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701606564). Laqueur, Walter 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 3–78). A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Münkler, Herfried 2005. Chapter 5 (pp. 99–116). The New Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Rapoport, David C. 2004. 'Modern Terror: The Four Waves.' Pp. 46–73 in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Great Strategy, edited by Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Reed, Donald J. 2008. 'Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (8): 684–722 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100802206533). Part 5. Typologies of Terrorist Movements An overview of the complex task of classifying terrorist organisations on the basis of characteristics such as political objectives, ideological frames, and the cleavages between them and their enemies. Goodwin, Jeff 2006. 'A Theory of the Categorical Terrorism.'Social Forces 84 (4): 2027–2046. Gunaratna, Rohan and Graeme C. S. Steven 2004. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–98). Counterterrorism. Santa Barbara, CA: Abc Clio. Schmid, Alexander P. and Albert J. Jongman 1988. Chapter 2 (in collaboration with M. Stohl and P. A. Fleming, pp. 39–60). Political Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat.'Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 20–38). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 6. Al‐Qaeda and its Affiliates: Ideologies, Strategies, Structures A sociological look at the ideological, strategic, and organisational aspects of Al‐Qaeda's terrorism from the 1980s to its most recent campaign in Iraq. Al‐Zayyat, Montasser 2004. The Road to Al‐Qaeda. London, UK: Pluto Press. Gunaratna, Rohan 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 21–126). Inside Al‐Qaeda. New York, NY: Berkley Books. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 7 (pp. 102–125). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 1‐2 (pp. 1‐60). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hafez, Mohammed M. 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 35–162). Suicide Bombers in Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 7. Terrorism and the Media An exploration of the ways that terrorist organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet, as communicative channels (for staging their attacks, threats, demands, and propaganda) and as instrumental tools (for fund raising, coordination, and recruitment). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 173–228). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ICG 2006. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No 50, 15 February, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1 (last accessed 5 February 2008). Rogan, Hanna 2006. Jihadism Online: A Study of How Al‐Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups Use Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: FFI/RAPPORT‐2006/00915, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2008). Sageman, Marc 2008. Chapter 6 (pp. 109–123). Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Weimann, Gabriel 2006. Chapters 3–4 (pp. 49–145). Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 8. Terrorist Organisations and Their Logic An examination of the political objectives and ideologies of terrorist organisations and an overview of the rationality and strategies underlying their decision‐making in relation to the political opportunities and military events shaping their environment. Boyns, David and James David Ballard 2004. 'Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical Understanding of Terrorism.'American Sociologist 35 (2): 5–26 (Doi: 10.1007/BF02692394). Crenshaw, Martha 1998. 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice.' Pp. 7–24 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Gambetta, Diego 2006. 'Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?' Pp. 259–299 in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hafez, Mohammed and Quintan Wiktorowicz 2004. 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement.' Pp. 61–88 in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited Quintan Wiktorowicz. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 147–208). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kramer, Martin 1998. 'The Moral Logic of Hezbollah.' Pp. 131–157 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 3–5 (pp. 27–60). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Tosini, Domenico 2009. 'A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks.'Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). Part 9. Mechanisms of Social Support A discussion of the economic, cultural, and political conditions which make possible the support for, and collaboration with, terrorist organisations by members of certain communities. Cook, David and Olivia Allison 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 1–85). Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Chernick, Marc 2007. 'FARC‐EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post‐Cold War Insurgency.' Pp. 51–120 in Terror, Insurgency, and the State, edited by Marianne Heiberg et al. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 59–124). Insurgency and Counter‐Insurgency in Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapter 4 (pp. 87–110). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Merari, Ariel 2005. 'Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism.' Pp. 70–86 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 6–8 (pp. 79–167). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Part 10. Social Networks and Recruitment An analysis of the motivations behind the process of joining terrorist organisations and of the role played by group dynamics and social networks. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Chapter 7 (pp. 165–186). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 4–5 (pp. 99–173). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Horgan, John 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 47–79). The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge. Khosrokhavar, Fahad 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 149–224). Suicide Bombers. London, UK: Pluto Press. Pedahzur, Ami 2005. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 118–181). Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Stern, Jessica 2003. Chapter 9 (pp. 237–280). Terror in the Name of God. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher. Wintrobe, Ronald 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 108–157). Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Part 11. Counterterrorism I: Legal Implications An overview of the emergency powers of antiterrorism legislations and 'special measures', and an analysis of their legal impact on the protection of human rights. Cole, David 2003. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 17–82). Enemy Aliens. New York, NY: The Free Press. Haubrich, Dirk 2003. 'September 11, Anti‐Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared.'Government and Opposition 38 (1): 3–29 (Doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.00002). Parker, Tom 2005. 'Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom.' Pp. 119–148 in Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror, edited by Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Part 12. Counterterrorism II: Strategic Limitations An examination of the most important counterterrorism policies adopted since 2001, with special reference to the occupation of Iraq, and an assessment of their advantages and risks for combating and preventing terrorism. Nesser, Peter 2006. 'Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (4): 323–342 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100600641899). Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 12 (pp. 237–250). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Silke, Andrew 2005. 'Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to Be Done.' Pp. 241–255 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Smelser, Neil J. 2007. Chapter 6 (pp. 160–199). The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 61–102). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.5. Films and videos Al‐Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/1186.htm)Excerpts from a message from 2005 London bomber Shehzad Tanweer and statements by Al‐Qaeda leaders Ayman Al‐Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, posted on http://www.tajdeed.net.tc on 8 July 2006. A typical example of the communicative use of the Internet by Islamists in their attempt to frame terrorist attacks as legitimate acts of martyrdom, committed by courageous Muslims in defence of their brothers and sisters in occupied Muslim lands (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine). Al‐Qaeda Leader in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi's First Televised Interview. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/344/1118.htm)A video posted by the Islamist web forum http://www.alsaha.com on 25 April 2006, in which the Al‐Qaeda commander in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi (killed by an airstrike on 7 June 2006) outlines all the typical condemnations (by Islamist extremists) of the Iraq occupation by the US‐led coalition, and calls for a jihad against its forces and allies. Propagandising the military capabilities of Al‐Qaeda, the video culminates in footage of Al‐Zarqawi with masked fighters, firing an automatic weapon, and 'new missiles' developed by 'the brothers'. Al‐Arabiya TV Special on the Culture of Martyrdom and Suicide Bombers. 2005 (7 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/807.htm)Excerpts from a show about the culture of martyrdom, aired on Al‐Arabiya TV on 22 July 2005. The documentary investigates some of the most relevant religious and political justifications and symbolic representations among Islamist extremists in favour of suicide attacks. In particular, it looks at the Palestinian organisations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and at the Lebanese Hezbollah. The film includes an interview with Maha Ghandour, the wife of Salah Ghandour, who was responsible for a suicide attack carried out in 1995 on behalf of Hezbollah against an Israeli military convoy. Battle For Haditha. 2007 (93 min)(http://www.nickbroomfield.com/haditha.html)In this film, the director Nick Broomfield looks at the dramatic events surrounding an incident that occurred in Haditha, Iraq, when 24 Iraqis were allegedly massacred by US Marines, following the death of a Marine in a bombing perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents. The harsh reality of the war is viewed from three perspectives: that of the US troops, the insurgents who committed the attacks, and a civilian Iraqi family. Iranian Animated Film for Children Promotes Suicide Bombings. 2005 (10 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/906.htm)Including excerpts from an Iranian animated movie for children, aired on IRIB 3 TV on 28 October 2005, this film is an example of the mechanisms of de‐humanization of the enemy (the Israelis), based on a tale of the ferocious murder of innocent people by Israeli soldiers. This incident is followed by a bomb attack framed as an act of martyrdom by young militants in revenge of the previous assassination. Paradise Now. 2005 (91 min)In his film, the director Hany Abu‐Assad focuses on the final days of two Palestinian militants as they prepare to carry out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. Once childhood friends Said (Kais Nashef) and Khaled (Ali Suliman) are offered such an attack, they feel a sense of purpose in serving their people's cause, whereas a young Palestinian woman, after learning of their plan, tries to dissuade them from carrying out their missions. Paradise Now has been viewed as a controversial attempt to examine the motivations of suicide bombers. The Reach of War: Sectarian War in Iraq. 2006 (7 min)(http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/12/28/world/20061228_SECTARIAN_FEATURE.html)The New York Times journalist Marc Santora reports on some of the most violent and bloody effects of the sectarian violence perpetrated in Iraq during the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which has followed the occupation by the US‐led coalition. The Road to Guantanamo. 2006 (92 min)(http://www.roadtoguantanamomovie.com)Directed by Michael Winterbottom, the film tells the story of four friends beginning a holiday in Pakistan. Through a series of interviews and news footage, the film shows how they end up in Afghanistan, where are then captured by American forces and kept in harsh conditions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over 2 years. The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Iraqi Jihad. 2006 (9 min)(http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia‐original.html)In this video, NEFA Foundation expert Evan Kohlmann documents the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Iraq and their role within the Sunni insurgency. The video includes footage of senior figures from Abu Musab al‐Zarqawi's terrorist group (including Lebanese, Saudi, and Kuwaiti nationals) and scenes from Al‐Qaida training camps in Iraq. The Suicide Bomber. 2005 (12 min)(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july‐dec05/bombers_11‐14.html)In this debate aired on PBS on 14 November 2005, three experts (Mia Bloom, Mohammed M. Hafez, and Robert A. Pape) discuss what motivates suicide bombers and their terrorist organisations, with special reference to the 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, where a female militant joining these attacks was found alive after her bomb failed to detonate. The Terrorist Propaganda (three videos):
Indexing Al‐Qaeda Online.
2005 (6 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/custom/2005/08/05/CU2005080501141.html?whichDay=1)
Without the Video, It's Just an Attack.
2007 (5 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/video/2007/09/28/VI2007092800608.html)
Al‐Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive.
2008 (14 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/23/AR2008062302135.html)Over the last decade, terrorist propaganda on the Internet has increased dramatically. In these videos, experts discuss how insurgent groups, in particular Islamist extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, are using new media to spread their messages worldwide, to chronicle their operations (including the assembly and emplacement of roadside bombs targeting US forces), to recruit, and to raise money.6. Focus questions

What challenges do researchers interested in terrorism studies face and why? What are the most important theoretical and methodological weaknesses in current terrorism research?
How can we define terrorism? What political controversies affect the definition of terrorism? When comparing different terrorism data sets, what kinds of diagnoses can we make on the tendencies of terrorist incidents in the last decade?
How has terrorism changed in history? Based on the literature concerning Al‐Qaeda's ideology, strategies, and structures, what continuities and discontinuities can we identify with respect to previous forms of terrorism?
When dealing with the explanation of terrorism, what are the most significant factors to be taken into account? How can we learn from the current literature on suicide terrorism in order to build a comprehensive model for its explanation?
Given the legislative and military responses to September 11 and subsequent attacks (e.g. the 2005 London bombings), what have been the legal consequences affecting our societies and the strategic implications for combating and preventing terrorist violence?

7. SeminarsParticipants will be divided into small groups of about three persons. Each group will be asked to make a contribution to a sociological analysis (either written or presented) of a specific armed organisation, such as:Al‐Gama'a Al‐IslamiyyaAl‐QaedaAl‐Qaeda in IraqAl‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)Ansar Al‐SunnahAnsar Al‐IslamArmed Islamic Groups (GIA)Army of GodAum ShinrikyoChechen separatistsEgyptian Islamic JihadEuskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)HamasHezbollahIrgun Zvai LeumiIrish Republican Army (IRA)Islamic Movement of UzbekistanJemaah IslamiyahKashmiri separatistsKu Klux Klan (KKK)Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar‐e‐JhangviLibyan Islamic Fighting GroupPalestinian Islamic JihadPalestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)Red Army Faction (RAF)Red Brigades (BR)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Taliban.For each armed organisation, each group will examine the following aspects:

data on its attacks – including information that justifies the label of 'terrorist organisation';
a historical account of its origins and developments;
an analysis of the strategy underlying its terrorist campaigns;
a clarification of its social support and collaboration (if any);
a profile of its militants and patterns of recruitment;
a discussion of the counterterrorism policies adopted by states and their impact on the terrorist organisation.

Note
* Correspondence address: Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Research, Piazza Venezia 41 – 38100 Trento, Italy, +39 0461 881324; +39 0461 881348 (fax); +39 347 2329219 (mobile); Email: domenico.tosini@soc.unitn.it http://portale.unitn.it/dpt/dsrs/docenti/tosini.htm

Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Editoriale Performative Thinking in Humanities Un Quaderno periodico Editoriale in cui si spiega che il Quaderno Think Tank PTH – Performative Thinking in Humanities diventerà una pubblicazione annuale dedicata alla disseminazione dei saperi filosofici e umanistici attraverso le arti audiovisive e musicali. Filosofia, Musica, Teatro, Impegno, Politica Fabrizio Masucci Museo Cappella Sansevero fabriziomasucci@museosansevero.it Un melologo filosofico per Raimondo di Sangro principe di Sansevero Prefazione del Presidente del Museo Cappella Sansevero al libretto e alla partitura del melologo. Velo, Cristo velato, Museo Cappella Sansevero, Teatro della Filosofia, Disseminazione Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Il pensiero velato Una meditazione notturna del principe di Sansevero melologo in quattro quadri per voce recitante, voci registrate e percussioni libretto Basato sulle opere di Raimondo di Sangro e su altri testi dell'epoca concepiti nella cerchia dei cosiddetti Liberi pensatori, il libretto mette a fuoco la personalità del principe di Sansevero nel momento in cui scrive la Supplica (1753) da inviare a Benedetto XIV per chiedergli di derubricare la sua Lettera apologetica (1751) dall'Index librorum prohibitorum. Raimondo di Sangro viene presentato come un ostinato difensore della libertà di pensiero e della tolleranza. Il suo interesse per il sistema di segni del popolo peruviano (quipu) denuncia in lui un'attenzione per la scrittura, intesa come l'unico strumento concesso all'uomo per lasciare traccia di sé e guadagnare quindi una immortalità (non personale) nella fama. Pensiero critico, Tolleranza, Censura, Scrittura, Sperimentazione Rosalba Quindici Hochschule der Künste Bern rosalbaquindici@yahoo.it Il pensiero velato Una meditazione notturna del principe di Sansevero melologo in quattro quadri per voce recitante, voci registrate e percussioni score Partitura musicale del melologo. Musica contemporanea, Ricerca timbrica, Percussioni, Scrittura, Sperimentazione Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Pandemia 2020 / scena deserta Breve storia di un progetto nato e mutato dall'emergenza sanitaria Il breve saggio racconta le fasi di lavorazione necessarie a produrre il video Pandemia 2020 / scena deserta, che evoca il tema dei teatri chiusi per la l'epidemia di Covid-19 ed è dedicato ad attori e musicisti in difficoltà perché rimasti senza lavoro. L'esplodere dell'emergenza sanitaria ha costretto i partecipanti a modificare il progetto mentre era in corso di svolgimento. Teatro, Video, Scenografia, Musica, Sceneggiatura Nera Prota Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli nera.prota@yahoo.com Pensare con le mani nell'era digitale Manualità tra Information Technologies (IT) e creatività umana Nelle Accademie di Belle Arti, sempre più spesso l'information technology è proposta come un sostituto o un surrogato dello sviluppo individuale della manualità. Coloro i quali, per qualsiasi motivo, si sentono a disagio nell'usare la loro manualità, possono trovare un'apparente via di uscita nell'uso dei software. Tuttavia, questo trend rinforza la perdita di manualità impedendo alle persone di costruire un loro personale linguaggio artistico. L'aiuto delle macchine nella produzione artistica incontra un'esigenza di mercato, consolidando l'idea fittizia che la creatività umana possa essere espressa attraverso processi standardizzati. Certamente, ciò è funzionale all'interesse del mercato. Per esempio, uno dei software più usati in ambito artistico progettuale è il CAD (Computer-aided design). Il nome del software immediatamente svela la relazione asimmetrica con l'utente. In molti casi, software come il CAD possono interagire direttamente con altre macchine complesse (ossia macchine a controllo numerico) per intraprendere attività di larga scala ed estrema precisione. In questo saggio, l'autrice ricerca il confine tra la produzione industriale e la creatività umana in ambito artistico, sfatando in questo modo alcune ambiguità sul ruolo che la tecnologia ricopre nella società. Design, Virtuale, Arte, Tecnologia, Didattica Benedetta Tramontano Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli bene_98@hotmail.it Ricerca stilistica e scelte personali Tecla: un'evocazione visuale in tre bozzetti di una città invisibile di Italo Calvino Nel contributo si descrivono le modalità seguite nel dare una raffigurazione fantastica – dunque soggettivo-prospettica – di una delle città invisibili di Italo Calvino: Tecla, la metropoli-cantiere. L'Autrice ha deliberatamente scelto il disegno e la colorazione a mano libera, rifiutandosi di utilizzare software di disegno digitale. Acquerello, china, bozzetto, colore, disegno digitale Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.it Giancarlo Turaccio Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Salerno "Antonio Martucci" giancarlo.turaccio@gmail.com Un ascolto iniziatico Conversazione tra un filosofo e un compositore sulla musica acusmatica Un ricercatore di filosofia e un docente di composizione dialogano sulla musica acusmatica, ossia quella proposta (anche in concerto) in assenza della sua fonte sonora. La discussione ricostruisce brevemente la storia del concetto e mette in evidenza l'importanza dell'ascolto "puro", fondato sulla relazione diretta fra l'orecchio e l'oggetto sonoro. Pitagorici, Pierre Schaeffer, Walter Benjamin, Oggetto sonoro, Spazializzazione del suono Gianvincenzo Cresta Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Avellino "Domenico Cimarosa" gianvincenzo.cresta@conservatoriocimarosa.org Ricordo di Bruno Maderna (1920-1973) a cento anni dalla nascita Del canto immobile Qualche riflessione su Per Caterina di Bruno Maderna per violino e pianoforte Spesso nell'indagine storico analitica su un compositore si cerca una sintesi e ci si focalizza su alcune opere ritenendole maggiormente rappresentative. È una via possibile che però delimita l'identità del compositore, piegandolo a una narrazione semplificata, mentre invece il cammino creativo di un artista è un complesso caleidoscopio. Per Caterina di Bruno Maderna è un breve brano per violino e pianoforte composto nel 1963, il cui esito, pur ponendosi in rottura rispetto ad altre sue opere e agli stilemi stilistici degli anni '50 e '60, si colloca con naturalezza nell'arco creativo dell'autore. È un brano emblematico del suo modo di vivere la musica come fenomeno unitario, senza steccati stilistici e categorizzazioni. La retorica è per Maderna un mezzo e non un'estetica e la musica un'esperienza complessa che mescola al sonoro il percettivo, il motorio e l'emozionale. Afferma Maderna: «la musica non può essere che un fatto espressivo, un suono suscita reazioni e i suoni non sono che mezzi». Identità, Canto, Antico, Modernità, Libertà Tommaso Rossi Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Benevento "Nicola Sala" info@tommasorossi.it Una grande Aulodìa Flauto e oboe nella "melodia arcaica" di Bruno Maderna Nella variegata e copiosa produzione musicale di Bruno Maderna la scelta di dedicare una particolare attenzione al flauto e all'oboe – i due più acuti rappresentanti della famiglia dei "legni" – sembra andare oltre il pur comprensibile interesse del compositore per l'indagine timbrica di due affascinanti strumenti, ma è legato a ragioni più profonde, che risiedono in aspetti fondanti della poetica musicale del compositore. Il flauto e l'oboe sono "gli" strumenti della mitologia classica, e il loro suono particolare rimanda immediatamente alla Grecia antica, alla civiltà che il popolo greco ha creato e al culto della bellezza che ne è scaturito, influenzando il corso della storia dell'Occidente. Maderna guarda, attraverso il suono di questi strumenti, a questo mondo – oggi perduto – con il preciso desiderio di riproporre utopicamente, in una modernità segnata dalla violenza delle macchine e nel contesto di una società disumanizzata, un ideale superiore ma irraggiungibile di armonia. Attraverso l'analisi di molti dei lavori scritti da Maderna, che hanno per protagonisti il flauto e l'oboe, l'autore ricostruisce alcuni aspetti dell'estetica maderniana. Hyperion, Musica su due dimensioni, Grande Aulodia, Don Perlimplìn, Terzo concerto per oboe Rossella Gaglione Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II rossellagaglione@hotmail.com Discorsi tra Eco e Narciso A proposito di un recente libro di Dario Giugliano Che rapporto c'è tra ίδιοςe κοινός? E come possono la filosofia (nello specifico la metafisica) e la letteratura coniugare questi due termini? Quanto è difficile, e allo stesso tempo necessario, comunicare con l'Altro, cioè trasferire la propria voce singolare all'interno del sistema segnico condiviso affinché possa essere compresa? Che cos'è l'esperienza? Cosa si intende per idiotismo? Com'è possibile leggere il mito di Eco e Narciso? Questi e altri interrogativi sono alla base del testo di Giugliano che – grazie anche al confronto con vari pensatori (tra cui Platone, Novalis e Nietzsche) – offre numerosi e interessanti spunti di riflessione. Idiotismo, comunicazione, esperienza, Filosofia, linguaggio ; Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Editorial Performative Thinking in Humanities A Periodical Book Editorial explaining that the Book Think Tank PTH – Performing Thinking in Humanities will become an annual publication dedicated to the dissemination of philosophical and humanistic knowledge through the visual and musical arts. Philosophy, Music, Theater, Commitment, Politics Fabrizio Masucci Museo Cappella Sansevero fabriziomasucci@museosansevero.it A Philosophical Melologue for Raimondo di Sangro principe di Sansevero Preface by the President of the Sansevero Chapel Museum to the libretto and score of the melologue. Veil, Veiled Christ, Sansevero Chapel Museum, Philosophy Theater, Dissemination Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com The Veiled Thought A Nocturnal Meditation by the Prince of Sansevero melologue in four scenes for narrating voice, recorded voices and percussion libretto Based on the works of Raimondo di Sangro and on other texts of the circle of the Free Thinkers, the libretto focuses on the personality of the Prince of Sansevero when he writes the Supplica (1753) for Benedict XIV. In it he ask him to delete his Lettera apologetica (1751) from the Index librorum prohibitorum. Raimondo di Sangro is presented as an obstinate defender of freedom of free thought and tolerance. His interest in the system of signs of the Peruvian people (quipu) denounces in him an attention to writing, which – understood as a trace of an existence – can guarantee immortality in fame. Critical Thinking, Tolerance, Censorship, Writing, Experimentation Rosalba Quindici Hochschule der Künste Bern rosalbaquindici@yahoo.it The Veiled Thought A Nocturnal Meditation by the Prince of Sansevero melologue in four scenes for narrating voice, recorded voices and percussion partitura musicale Score of the melologue. Contemporary music, Timbric Research, Percussion, Writing, Experimentation Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Pandemic 2020 / Deserted Scene A Brief History of a Project that the Pandemic has changed The short essay describes the processing steps to produce the video Pandemic 2020 / deserted scene, which evokes the theme of closed theaters because of the Covid-19 epidemic and is dedicated to actors and musicians in difficulty, because without work. The explosion of the health emergency forced the participants to modify the project while it was in progress. Theater, Video, Scenography, Music, Screenplay Nera Prota Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli nera.prota@yahoo.com Thinking with Hands in the Digital Age Crafting Art Amidst Information Technology (IT) and Human Creativity In Art Academies, IT is increasingly proposed as a substitute or a surrogate to developing individual crafting abilities. Those that, for any reasons, feel uncomfortable using their hands can easily find in computer applications an apparent way-out. However, this trend reinforces hands disability preventing individuals to build their own personal artistic language. Machine support in art crafting meets a growing market demand ushering in the fictitious idea that human creativity can be achieved through standardized processes. This is of course functional to market interests. For example, one of the most popular software is used in art design is CAD (Computer-Aided Design). The name itself highlights the asymmetric relation with the user. In many cases software like CAD can directly interact with other complex machines (i.e., numeric control machines) to undertake large-scale, precision tasks. In this essay, the Author will search the boundary between industrial production and human creativity, thus debunking some ambiguity about the role of technology in society. Design, Virtual, Art, Technology, Didactics Benedetta Tramontano Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli bene_98@hotmail.it Stylistic Research and Personal Choices Tecla: A Visual Evocation in Three Sketches of an Invisible City by Italo Calvino The contribution describes the methods followed in giving a fantastic – therefore subjective-perspective – representation of one of Italo Calvino's invisible cities: Tecla, the building site-city. The Author has deliberately chosen freehand drawing and coloring, refusing to use digital drawing software. Watercolor, Ink, Sketch, Color, Digital Drawing Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.it Giancarlo Turaccio Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Salerno "Antonio Martucci" giancarlo.turaccio@gmail.com An Initiatory Listening Conversation between a Philosopher and a Composer about Acousmatic Music A philosophy researcher and a professor of composition talk about acousmatic music, which is proposed (even live) in the absence of her sound source. The discussion briefly reconstructs the history of the concept and highlights the importance of "pure" listening, which is based on the direct relationship between the ear and the sound object. Pythagoreans, Pierre Schaeffer, Walter Benjamin, Sound Object, Spatialization of Sound Gianvincenzo Cresta Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Avellino "Domenico Cimarosa" gianvincenzo.cresta@conservatoriocimarosa.org Memory of Bruno Maderna (1920-1973) One Hundred Years After his Birth On Steady Song Some Reflections on Per Caterina by Bruno Maderna for Violin and Piano In the analytic historical survey of a composer we usually look for a synthesis and we focus on some works that are considered more representative. It is a possible way but that can restrict the identity of the composer, bending it to a simplified narrative whereas the creative journey of an artist is a complex kaleidoscope. Per Caterina by Bruno Maderna is a short piece for violin and piano composed in 1963, and despite being in contrast with his other works and stylistic styles of the '50s and '60s, it is naturally placed in the creative arc of the author. It is an emblematic piece of his way of experiencing music as a unitary event, without stylistic fences and categorizations. Rhetoric is for Maderna a means and not an aesthetic and music is a complex experience that mixes sound with the perception, the motor and the emotional. Maderna says: «Music can only be an expressive fact, a sound that elicits reactions and sounds are only a means». Identity, Song, Ancient, Modernity, Freedom Tommaso Rossi Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Benevento "Nicola Sala" info@tommasorossi.it Una grande Aulodìa The Flute and the Oboe in Bruno Maderna's "Arcaic Melody" In Bruno Maderna's varied and copious musical production, the choice to devote particular attention to the flute and the oboe – the two highest pitched members of the "woodwind" family – seems to go beyond the composer's understandable interest in the timbre investigation of two fascinating instruments, but it is linked to deeper reasons, which reside in fundamental aspects of the composer's musical poetics. The flute and the oboe are "the" instruments of classical mythology. Their particular sound immediately recalls ancient Greece, the civilization that the Greeks founded, with its inherent cult of beauty, which influenced the whole history of Western civilization. Through the sound of these instruments, Maderna looks at this world – now lost ­­– with the precise desire to re-propose utopically–in a modernity marked by the violence of machines and in the context of a dehumanized society–a superior but unattainable ideal of harmony. Through the analysis of many of his works, which feature the flute and the oboe, the author reconstructs some aspects of Maderna's aesthetics. Hyperion, Musica su due dimensioni, Grande Aulodia, Don Perlimplìn, Terzo concerto per oboe Rossella Gaglione Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II rossellagaglione@hotmail.com Talkbetween Echo and Narcissus About a Recent Book by Dario Giugliano What is the relationship between ίδιος and κοινός? And how can philosophy (specifically metaphysics) and literature combine these two terms? How difficult is, and at the same time necessary, communicate with Other, that is to transfer one's singular voice in the shared sign system for this voice can be understood? What is experience? What is idiotism? What about the myth of Echo and Narcissus? These questions and other ones are the basis of Giugliano's text which – thanks also to the comparison with various thinkers (including Plato, Novalis and Nietzsche) – offers numerous interesting food for thought. Idiotism, Communication, Experience, Philosophy, Language

Trumpai apžvelgus UNESCO apibrėžtas skirtingas paveldo tipologijas, dėmesys skiriamas įvairioms kul- tūros vertybėms, kurios, nors ir nepriskiriamos "pagrindinėms" paveldo kategorijoms, simbolizuoja reikšmingą paveldo turtą, siūlantį, be savo įprastos paskirties, daugybę galimybių, kaip jį būtų galima pritaikyti "netradi- cinėms" pridėtinę vertę kuriančioms paslaugoms. Įžanginiame skyriuje pateikiami pavyzdžiai, iliustruojantys netradicinį kultūros paveldą: istorinis maršrutas "Rytų ekspresas", mėlynasis tramvajus Tramvia Blau ar funi- kulierius Tibidabo Funicular Barselonoje; parkai, sodai ir žaliosios erdvės kaip išskirtinių renginių vietos; ypa- tingos ar nykstančios augalijos ir gyvūnijos buveinės; istoriniai piligrimų keliai Via Francigena, El Camino de Santiago de Compostela ir Camí de Cel de Barcelona; Italijos asociacijos Italian Alpine Club (CAI) organizuo- jami Dolomitų kelias ir kalnų žygiai; kruizai, istoriškai reikšmingi komerciniai ir kariniai maršrutai, pavyzdžiui, Viduržemio jūros ir Baltijos jūros turai, maršrutai į Indiją; tradiciniai šou, koncertai, operos, muzikos / šokių renginiai ir ritualai; sausumos ir jūros augalija bei gyvūnija, kuriai gresia išnykimo pavojus; pajūrio ir pakrančių paveldas, pavyzdžiui, švyturiai, istoriniai uostai ir pan. Daugelyje Europos šalių "kultūros paveldui" gali būti priskiriami ir artefaktai, žmonių atrasti daugiau nei prieš 50 metų. Taigi į paveldo apsaugą gali pretenduoti daug įvairių objektų – nuo pirmojo bakelitinio radijo imtuvo ir pokarinių automobilių iki elektroninės kompiuterių įrangos ir dizaino kūrinių. Jeigu etno- gra nės kolekcijos, daug kartų žiūrėtos kino juostos ir TV įrašai taip pat vertinami kaip papildomi elemen- tai (saugomi jau beveik 60 metų), tuomet visa tai sudaro nepakeičiamą ir saugotiną informacijos "šaltinį", kurį dera perduoti ateinančioms kartoms. Be materialiojo paveldo, derėtų saugoti ir nematerialųjį paveldą, pavyzdžiui, muziką, šokius, ritualus, pasakas ir pan., taip pat naujausią, bet ne mažiau svarbų "ateities" pa- veldą. Apsidairius aplink XXI a. ateities muziejus kuratoriaus akimis, gali iškilti pagrįstas klausimas: "Ar ateities kartos, net ir artimos ateities kartos, sugebės suprasti dabartinės kartos kuriamą turinį?" Trumpai panagrinėjus milžiniškus ir įvairialypius paveldo klodus galima užduoti vieną svarbiausių klausimų: "Kaip užtikrinti tinkamą paveldo naudojimą, valorizaciją ir valdymą?" Nepakanka vien tik vadovautis esamu scenarijumi. Būtina pasirengti susitikti su ateities paveldu, galinčiu tapti tikru iššūkiu būsimiems kolekcio- nieriams ar kuratoriams. Paveldas turi daugybę funkcijų ir daugybę vertybių, tad verta gerai ištyrinėti šiuos daugiamačius ir turtingus klodus, kad būtų galima pasinaudoti visais jų teikiamais privalumais. Šiai už- duočiai veiksmingai ir kokybiškai atlikti yra būtina metodologija. "Verčių" požiūrio taikymas analizuojant paveldą galėtų prisidėti sprendžiant problemas ir užtikrintai pagrįsti paveldo išsaugojimo, apsaugos ir val- dymo strategijos apibrėžimą. Šis straipsnis supažindina su logišku požiūriu, nustatant ir grupuojant platų paveldui priskiriamų vertybių spektrą. Nuodugniai išanalizavus vertybes (pradedant nuo akivaizdžiausių), nustatomos naujos vertybės, kurios yra (tiesiogiai) susijusios su inovacijomis ir technologijomis. Vertybių, kurias galima priskirti kultūros paveldui, kiekis didėja, daugėjant suinteresuotųjų šalių, kurios laikomos paveldo naudojimo, konservavimo ir valdymo proceso dalyvėmis. Priimant su paveldu susijusius spren- dimus ir reaguojant į skirtingų suinteresuotųjų šalių poreikius, šių vertybių apibrėžimas yra lemiamas iš esmės dėl to, kad šios vertybės padeda nustatyti konkrečios teritorijos patrauklumo lygį. Kultūros paveldo samprata remiasi įvairialype paklausa, kurią būtina atpažinti visose sudėtinėse kultūros paveldo dalyse, norint nuodugniai ištyrinėti vertybių klodus, kuriuos (kaip bus pristatoma toliau) riboja skirtingi diferen- cijuotos paklausos poreikiai. Norint pasiekti šį tikslą reikia apibrėžti įrankius bei metodus, padėsiančius nustatyti ir vertinti kultūros paveldą atsižvelgiant į skirtingas jam priskiriamų vertybių perspektyvas. Kie- kviena konkreti vertybė išsamiai aprašoma, kad būtų lengviau atlikti atskiro atvejo analizę. Nepaisant visų nukrypimų, plačiąja prasme aiškinama Europos kultūros paveldo idėja perteikia šias vertybes: istorines, atminties, pilietybės, civilizacijos, pripažinimo, tradicijų, meno, mokslo, konservavimo ir technologines. Suvokti vertybių ir kitų skirtingų dalių esmę yra įmanoma pripažįstant ir veiksmingai naudojant mūsų palikimą, vertinant jį kaip sistemą sąveikų tarp įvairių aspektų: paveldo tipologijos (gamtinės, kultūrinės, . nematerialios, . ateities); daugybės "verčių" (ekonominių, investicijų grąžos, socialinių, kultūrinių, išskirtinumo / unikalu- mo ir pan.); geogra nių ypatumų (vertingumo vietinių požiūriu, nacionalinių, regioninių, globalinių, daugiau- sia nevietinių ir pan.); potencialių naudotojų / galutinių naudotojų (ekspertų, specialistų, kolekcionierių, verslininkų, miesto gyventojų, tyrėjų, bendruomenės narių ir pan.). Didžioji dalis šių vertybių yra "potencialios"; kartais nėra galimybių ar poreikio nustatyti jų piniginę išraišką. Daugeliu atvejų išlaidas dengiantis subjektas nėra tas, kuris daug uždirba iš kultūros paveldo "naudojimo", čia susiduriama su savotišku asimetrinės rinkos modeliu. Visuomenės reikmėms skirto kul- tūros paveldo atveju "verčių" "rezultatais" dalijasi skirtingi vertybių grandinės dalyviai, o kultūros paveldą prižiūrinti valstybinė institucija tarp jų būna ne visada. Kartais visas vertybių spektras neatrodo akivaizdus (bent jau) vadovams arba nemanoma, kad būtų tinkama ar "išmintinga" šiomis vertybėmis pasinaudoti. Tokių vertybių naudojimas nebūtinai turi kelti pavojų mūsų paveldui – kultūros vertybės nesivaržo tar- pusavyje, išmintingai jas naudojant, jos nebus "suvartotos". Netgi priešingai, aiškiai apibrėžus vertybių "vertę", jas būtų lengviau atpažinti ir apsaugoti, suformuluojant bazines sąlygas jų tinkamam naudojimui užtikrinti. Toks scenarijus atrodo kaip visiems naudingas susitarimas: miesto gyventojai gali pasinaudoti visais efektyvaus paveldo naudojimo teikiamais privalumais, o suinteresuotosios šalys – džiaugtis didesniu matomu ir išaugusiomis pajamomis. Sėkmingai įdiegtoje sistemoje būtų numatytas struktūrinis vertinimo procesas, atsižvelgiantis ir į speci nes vertinimo procedūras bei rodiklius, ir į ekspertus, prisidedančius prie šios blokinės schemos kūrimo. Daugeliu atvejų šios vertybės iliustruoja, kaip įgyvendinami lankytojų ir naudotojų lūkesčiai. Raktiniai žodžiai: kultūros paveldas, ateities paveldas, išmanusis paveldas, netradicinės kultūros vertybės, paveldo vertinimas, paveldo valdymas. ; Starting from a quick overview of the di erent typologies of heritage as de ned by UNESCO, the focus is made on a wide range of cultural assets that, even not classi ed the 'main' heritage families, represent, however, a relevant heritage asset that apart from the typical use o ers great opportunities to be suitable for 'unconventional' added value services. The introduction provides a selection of examples concerning unconventional cultural assets such as the historical trans- portation means Orient Express, Tramvia Blau or the Tibidabo Funicular in Barcelona; parks, gardens and green areas as scenarios of particular events or peculiar or extinct habitats of ora and fauna; historic itineraries such as via Francigena, El Camino de Santiago de Compostela and the Camí de Cel de Barcelona; the Dolomites and mountain hiking trails of the Italian Alpine Club (CAI); cruises, commercial and military routes important in history such as Mediterranean and Baltic routes, routes to India; traditional shows, concerts, opera, music/dances and rituals; land and marine ora and fauna considered to be at risk of extinction; maritime-coastal heritage such as lighthouses, historical harbours, etc. In many European countries, artefacts realised by human beings more than fty years ago are also considered potential 'Cultural Heritage'. Therefore, a variety of objects might be enlis- ted for protection such as the rst bakelite radio-set, post-war period cars, the early electronic computer equipment and design products. Furthermore, if ethnographic collections, many times movies and TV recordings are considered the complement pictures (that have already been pro- tected for almost sixty years), all of them constitute an irreplaceable 'source' of information to be protected and handed down to posterity. In addition to the tangible heritage, the intangible heritage such as music, dances, rituals, tales, etc. and last but not least the 'future' heritage should be preserved. If we look around in the shoes of a curator of a future museum of the 21st c., it is reasonable to ask ourselves 'Will future generations, even those of the near future, be able to access the content produced by this generation?' Having brie y explored the vast and heteroge- neous universe of heritage, one of the key questions posed to ourselves is 'How can we ensure a proper use, valorisation and management of it?' Along with the current scenario, we should be ready to deal with the future heritage that may represent a real challenge for future collectors or curators. As the heritage represents a multi-function and multi-value domain, there is a need to explore this multidimensional space in order to fully bene t from its richness. Thus, a metho- 129 130 dology enabling to complete the task in an e cient and productive way is required. Application of the 'value' approach in analysing heritage may contribute to solving the problem and provide a valid support in de ning a strategy to preserve, promote and manage it. The present paper outlines the logical approach for identi cation and clustering of the broad range of the values associated with the heritage. The in-depth analysis of values, starting from the more evident ones, leads to identi cation of a set of new values due to or directly connected with innovation and technologies. The plurality of values that can be associated with a cultural asset widens with the variety of stakeholders considered to participate in the process of heritage use, conservation and management. Establishing the values upon making decisions about the heritage and there- fore meeting the needs of di erent stakeholders is crucial, mainly due to the reason that such values contribute to identi cation of the degree of attractiveness of a given territory. The cultural heritage should be considered a system based on the heterogeneous demand to be recognised in its many components in order to investigate the value space throughout its extension that, as it will be outlined later, is delimited by di erent needs of the di erentiated demand; in order to do this, we need to identify and de ne tools and methods of measuring and evaluating the cultural heritage in the di erent perspectives of the value attributable to it. Each speci c value is outlined in detail to facilitate the implementation of the approach to a single case study. The concept of the European cultural heritage, interpreted in the broad sense and with all its declinations, is the bearer of a multitude of values: historical value, testimony, citizenship, civilization, recognition, traditions, artistic, scienti c, conservation and technology. The matter of values and the other di erent elements actively contributing to the overall appreciation and fruitful exploitation of our legacy might be considered a complex of interactions among the following di erent aspects: • Heritage typology (natural, cultural,. intangible,. future) • Wide set of 'values' (economic value, return of investment, social, cultural, exceptionality/uniquely, etc.) • Geographic range (valuable for locals, national, regional, global, non-local mainly, etc.) • Potential users/end users (experts, specialists, collectors, businessmen, citizens, researchers, community members, etc.) Major parts of these values are 'potential'; sometimes there is no chance or need to monetize them. It happens frequently that the one who covers the expenses is not the one who earns much money from the 'use' of the cultural asset, i.e. a kind of asymmetric market model is observed. In case of public cul- tural assets, the 'e ects' of the 'values' are shared among di erent actors in the value-chain, sometimes not including the public body looking after the cultural assets at all. Moreover, sometimes the full set of values is not evident at least to the managers or it is not considered proper or 'wise' to take advantage of them. The exploitation of such values will not necessarily jeopardize our heritage, cultural assets are not rivalling and a wise exploitation will not 'consume' them. On the contrary, a clear identi cation of their 'values' will help to identify and protect them developing the basic conditions to ensure a proper exploitation. Such a scenario looks like a win-win agreement: citizens may bene t from the fruitful exploitation of their own heritage, whereas stakeholders may bene t from enhanced visibility and inco- mes. The full implementation of the system foresees a structured evaluation process taking into account both speci c evaluation procedures, metrics and a network of experts providing their contribution in a kind of block chain architecture. In most cases, these values represent the ful lment of the present expectations of visitors and users. Keywords: Cultural heritage, future heritage, smart heritage, unconventional cultural assets, heritage valorisation, heritage management.

Collected data and research material presented in the monograph are a result of financing of the Polish science budget in the years 2011−14; the research project was financed by the National Science Centre according to decision no. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. The project that resulted in this monograph was financed from public funds for education for 2011 − 2014, the National Science Center under Contract No. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. ; Value-Based Working Capital Management analyzes the causes and effects of improper cash flow management between entrepreneurial organizations with varying levels of risk. This work looks at the motives and criteria for decision-making by entrepreneurs in their efforts to protect the financial security of their businesses and manage financial liquidity. Michalski argues that businesses exposed to greater risk need a different approach to managing liquidity levels. The scientific aim of this monograph is to present the essence of financial liquidity management under specific conditions faced by enterprises with risk and uncertainty. Enterprises differ from one another in risk sensitivity. This difference affects the area of taking decisions by the managers of those enterprises. The result of interactions between levels of liquidity and sensitivity to risk affects the managers of such enterprises (Altman 1984; Tobin 1958; Back 2001; Tobin 1969). In this monograph the research hypothesis is the claim that enterprises with a higher sensitivity to risk are very different from enterprises with a lower sensitivity to risk, resulting in a different approach to managing their working capital. Enterprise managing teams react to risk, and this reaction is adjusted by an enterprise's sensitivity to risk. Because of its subject area, the book will address the issues of corporate finance. The monograph discusses the behavior of enterprises and the relationships between them and other factors in the market occurring in the management process under the conditions of limited resources. As a result of these interactions with the market and the environment in which individuals who manage enterprises operate, there is an interaction between money and real processes that in the end are the cornerstone of wealth building. This chapter discusses the objectives and nature of enterprises in the context of their risk sensitivity, as well as the relationships between the objectives of enterprises and the characteristic features of their businesses. Enterprises operate in various business environments, but generally speaking, they all have one main aim: wealth creation for their owners. The realization of that aim depends on an idea of business in which the enterprise is an instrument to collect money from clients of the enterprise's services and products. Business environment is crucial not only for future enterprise cash inflows from the market but also for risk and uncertainty (Asch, and Kaye 1997; Copeland, and Weston 1988; Fazzari, and Petersen 1993). According to the author, it is necessary to include an understanding of that risk and uncertainty of future in the rate that reduces the net size of free cash flows for the enterprise owners, beneficiaries, or more generally stakeholders. Enterprise value creation is the main financial aim of the firm in relation to working capital components (Graber 1948; Jensen, and Meckling 1976; Lazaridis, and Trifonidis 2006). Working capital management is a part of a general enterprise strategy to its value maximization (Laffer 1970; Kieschnick, Laplante, and Moussawi 2009; Lyland, and Pyle 1977). This chapter presents a definition of financial liquidity and liquidity-level measurements. This chapter contains four subchapters that address the specific role of short-term financial decisions, a classification of definitions of financial liquidity, sources of information about liquidity level, and liquidity-level measurements (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 2006; Long, Malitz, and Ravid 1993; Kieschnick, Laplante, and Moussawi 2009). Financial liquidity definition and liquidity-level measurements Here we have an opportunity to present the author's opinion on what assets should be financed with short-term funds and what the level of liquidity is in an enterprise (Michalski 2012a). The discussion also pertains to the issue of the dividing line between long-term and short-term decisions, with greater emphasis on the durability of their effects, rather than the decision-making speed. This section also attempts to answer the question: What are the short-term effects of operations under conditions of uncertainty and risk? The reason for the considerations in this section is the need to characterize the decisions that affect the level of enterprise liquidity. The research hypothesis of this monograph assumes that differences between more risk sensitive and less risk sensitive enterprises are seen in liquidity management. Simply because the enterprises, during financial liquidity management, take into account the differences in their risk sensitivity. This chapter discusses the relationship between firm value and business risk sensitivity. The chapter starts with a presentation of intrinsic liquidity value and firm reactions to market liquidity value. This is the basis for target liquidity level in the enterprise. Liquid assets are the main part of working capital assets, so the next part of the chapter focuses on working capital investment strategies and strategies of financing such investments in working capital in the context of firm value creation. The chapter concludes that, from a firm-value-creation point of view, more risk-sensitive entities should use flexible-conservative strategies, while less risk-sensitive entities have the freedom to use restrictive-aggressive strategies. In the context of a crisis, this is the clear answer and explanation for higher levels of working capital investments observed empirically during and after a crisis. The determinants of intrinsic value of liquidity are attributed to liquidity by enterprise management. Enterprises in which financial liquidity has a high internal value will have a tendency to maintain reasonable liquid resource assets at a higher level. The levels of stocks of funds maintained by enterprises are also the result of the relationship between the liquidity market value and the intrinsic value of liquidity. It demonstrates how to approach the estimation of liquidity and presents the market value of liquidity. Having connected this information with the knowledge of manifestations of the internal liquidity, we can offer an explanation as to why the target (and also probably the optimal) level of liquidity for enterprises with higher-than-average risk sensitivity is at a higher level than the corresponding target (optimal) level for enterprises with a lower level of risk sensitivity. Working capital value-based management models In this part of the monograph we discuss the items contained within the cost of maintaining inventory. Using this approach, a model of managing inventories is presented. Theoretically, the value-maximizing optimal level of inventory is determined to be the modified EOQ model, presented as VBEOQ model. We also present an outline of issues associated with the risk of inventory management and its impact on the value of the enterprise for its owner. We also discuss the principle of the optimal batch production model and how the size of the production batch affects the value of the enterprise for its owner. Here also is demonstrated a modification of the POQ model: VBPOQ. The proposed modification takes into account the rate of the cost of capital financing and the measures involved in inventory when determining the optimal batch production. When managing the commitment of the inventory, it is crucial to take into account the impact of such decisions on the long-term effectiveness of the enterprise. This chapter also discusses the relationships between the management of accounts receivables and the value of a business. A modified (considering the value of a business) model of incremental analysis of receivables is presented, as is a discussion of the importance of capacity utilization by an enterprise for making management decisions pertaining to accounts receivables. Issues related to the management of working capital and enterprise liquidity are and will be an area of research. The analysis in this study focused primarily on working capital and liquidity management; understanding its specifics will facilitate the management of liquidity in any type of organization. Working capital as a specific buffer against risk has its special role during a crisis and can serve as a good forecasting indicator about future economic problems in the economy if a whole business environment notices higher levels of working capital and its components, like cash, inventories, and accounts receivables. The scientific value of the issues discussed in the book is associated with the issue of working capital and liquidity management in enterprises. It is also a result of the exploration and definition of the main financial objective of businesses and the relationship between the objective and the management of working capital and enterprise liquidity. The choice of topic and the contents of research resulted also from empirical observation. Empirical data on enterprises that operate in countries touched by the last crisis document higher-than-average levels of working capital before, during, and after the crisis in these enterprises. These conditions provided the means for a "natural experiment" of sorts. From that point, working capital management theory faced a necessity of even wider development. ; Collected data and research material presented in the monograph are a result of financing of the Polish science budget in the years 2011−14; the research project was financed by the National Science Centre according to decision no. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. The project that resulted in this monograph was financed from public funds for education for 2011 − 2014, the National Science Center under Contract No. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. ; How to Cite this Book Harvard Grzegorz Michalski . (April 2014). Value-Based Working Capital Management . [Online] Available at: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137391834. (Accessed: 28 May 2014). APA Grzegorz Michalski . (April 2014). Value-Based Working Capital Management . Retrieved from http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137391834 MLA Grzegorz Michalski . Value-Based Working Capital Management . (April 2014) Palgrave Macmillan. 28 May 2014. Vancouver Grzegorz Michalski . Value-Based Working Capital Management [internet]. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; April 2014. [cited 2014 May 28]. Available from: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137391834 OSCOLA Grzegorz Michalski , Value-Based Working Capital Management , Palgrave Macmillan April 2014 ; Author Biography Grzegorz Michalski is Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance at the Wroclaw University of Economics, Poland. His main areas of research are Business Finance and Financial Liquidity Management. He is currently studying the liquidity decisions made by organizations. He is the author or co-author of over 80 papers and 10 books, and sits on the editorial board of international conferences and journals. Reviews 'Due to the recent financial crisis, interest in the topic of working capital has grown significantly to both theory and practice. The research results presented by Grzegorz Michalski contribute to the development of a comprehensive theory of liquidity management and the creation of an integrated working capital and liquidity for different types of business model. The job is processed on a high quality level." -Marek Panfil, Ph.D, Director of Business Valuation Department Warsaw School of Economics 'The book of Grzegorz Michalski is a very good publication that has found the right balance between theory and practical aspects of financial liquidity management. It is extremely timely and valuable, and should be required reading for all corporate finance practitioners, academicians, and students of finance. Value-Based Working Capital Management is comprehensive, highly readable publication, and replete with useful practical examples. It has also enabled corporate leaders to make better-informed decisions in their efforts to protect the financial security of their businesses and manage financial liquidity.' -Petr Polak, Author of Centralization of Treasury Management, and Associate Professor of Finance, University of Brunei Darussalam ; REFERENCES Introduction Adner, R., and D. A. Levinthal (2004). "What Is Not a Real Option: Considering Boundaries for the Application of Real Options to Business Strategy." Academy of Management Review 29(1). Altman, E. (1984). "A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question." Journal of Finance 39. Back, P. (2001). "Testing Liquidity Measures as Bankruptcy Prediction Variables." 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All authors: Wielgus, Maciek; Akiyama, Kazunori; Blackburn, Lindy; Chan, Chi-kwan; Dexter, Jason; Doeleman, Sheperd S.; Fish, Vincent L.; Issaoun, Sara; Johnson, Michael D.; Krichbaum, Thomas P.; Lu, Ru-Sen; Pesce, Dominic W.; Wong, George N.; Bower, Geoffrey C.; Broderick, Avery E.; Chael, Andrew; Chatterjee, Koushik; Gammie, Charles F.; Georgiev, Boris; Hada, Kazuhiro Loinard, Laurent; Markoff, Sera; Marrone, Daniel P.; Plambeck, Richard; Weintroub, Jonathan; Dexter, Matthew; MacMahon, David H. E.; Wright, Melvyn; Alberdi, Antxon; Alef, Walter; Asada, Keiichi; Azulay, Rebecca; Baczko, Anne-Kathrin; Ball, David; Baloković, Mislav; Barausse, Enrico; Barrett, John; Bintley, Dan; Boland, Wilfred; Bouman, Katherine L.; Bremer, Michael; Brinkerink, Christiaan D.; Brissenden, Roger; Britzen, Silke; Broguiere, Dominique; Bronzwaer, Thomas; Byun, Do-Young; Carlstrom, John E.; Chatterjee, Shami; Chen, Ming-Tang; Chen, Yongjun; Cho, Ilje; Christian, Pierre; Conway, John E.; Cordes, James M.; Crew, Geoffrey B.; Cui, Yuzhu; Davelaar, Jordy; Laurentis, Mariafelicia De; Deane, Roger; Dempsey, Jessica; Desvignes, Gregory; Dzib, Sergio A.; Eatough, Ralph P.; Falcke, Heino; Fomalont, Ed; Fraga-Encinas, Raquel; Friberg, Per; Fromm, Christian M.; Galison, Peter; García, Roberto; Gentaz, Olivier; Goddi, Ciriaco; Gold, Roman; Gómez, José L.; Gómez-Ruiz, Arturo I.; Gu, Minfeng; Gurwell, Mark; Hecht, Michael H.; Hesper, Ronald; Ho, Luis C.; Ho, Paul; Honma, Mareki; Huang, Chih-Wei L.; Huang, Lei; Hughes, David H.; Inoue, Makoto; James, David J.; Jannuzi, Buell T.; Janssen, Michael; Jeter, Britton; Jiang, Wu; Jimenez-Rosales, Alejandra; Jorstad, Svetlana; Jung, Taehyun; Karami, Mansour; Karuppusamy, Ramesh; Kawashima, Tomohisa; Keating, Garrett K.; Kettenis, Mark; Kim, Jae-Young; Kim, Junhan; Kim, Jongsoo; Kino, Motoki; Koay, Jun Yi; Koch, Patrick M.; Koyama, Shoko; Kramer, Michael; Kramer, Carsten; Kuo, Cheng-Yu; Lauer, Tod R.; Lee, Sang-Sung; Li, Yan-Rong; Li, Zhiyuan; Lindqvist, Michael; Lico, Rocco; Liu, Kuo; Liuzzo, Elisabetta; Lo, Wen-Ping; Lobanov, Andrei P.; Lonsdale, Colin; MacDonald, Nicholas R.; Mao, Jirong; Marchili, Nicola; Marscher, Alan P.; Martí-Vidal, Iván; Matsushita, Satoki; Matthews, Lynn D.; Medeiros, Lia; Menten, Karl M.; Mizuno, Yosuke; Mizuno, Izumi; Moran, James M.; Moriyama, Kotaro; Moscibrodzka, Monika; Müller, Cornelia; Musoke, Gibwa; Nagai, Hiroshi; Nagar, Neil M.; Nakamura, Masanori; Narayan, Ramesh; Narayanan, Gopal; Natarajan, Iniyan; Nathanail, Antonios; Neri, Roberto; Ni, Chunchong; Noutsos, Aristeidis; Okino, Hiroki; Olivares, Héctor; Ortiz-León, Gisela N.; Oyama, Tomoaki; Özel, Feryal; Palumbo, Daniel C. M.; Park, Jongho; Patel, Nimesh; Pen, Ue-Li; Piétu, Vincent; PopStefanija, Aleksandar; Porth, Oliver; Prather, Ben; Preciado-López, Jorge A.; Psaltis, Dimitrios; Pu, Hung-Yi; Ramakrishnan, Venkatessh; Rao, Ramprasad; Rawlings, Mark G.; Raymond, Alexander W.; Rezzolla, Luciano; Ripperda, Bart; Roelofs, Freek; Rogers, Alan; Ros, Eduardo; Rose, Mel; Roshanineshat, Arash; Rottmann, Helge; Roy, Alan L.; Ruszczyk, Chet; Ryan, Benjamin R.; Rygl, Kazi L. J.; Sánchez, Salvador; Sánchez-Arguelles, David; Sasada, Mahito; Savolainen, Tuomas; Schloerb, F. Peter; Schuster, Karl-Friedrich; Shao, Lijing; Shen, Zhiqiang; Small, Des; Sohn, Bong Won; SooHoo, Jason; Tazaki, Fumie; Tiede, Paul; Tilanus, Remo P. J.; Titus, Michael; Toma, Kenji; Torne, Pablo; Trent, Tyler; Traianou, Efthalia; Trippe, Sascha; Tsuda, Shuichiro; Bemmel, Ilse van; van Langevelde, Huib Jan; van Rossum, Daniel R.; Wagner, Jan; Wardle, John; Ward-Thompson, Derek; Wex, Norbert; Wharton, Robert; Wu, Qingwen; Yoon, Doosoo; Young, André; Young, Ken; Younsi, Ziri; Yuan, Feng; Yuan, Ye-Fei; Zensus, J. Anton; Zhao, Guangyao; Zhao, Shan-Shan; Zhu, Ziyan.-- Original content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI. ; The Event Horizon Telescope (EHT) has recently delivered the first resolved images of M87*, the supermassive black hole in the center of the M87 galaxy. These images were produced using 230 GHz observations performed in 2017 April. Additional observations are required to investigate the persistence of the primary image feature- A ring with azimuthal brightness asymmetry- A nd to quantify the image variability on event horizon scales. To address this need, we analyze M87* data collected with prototype EHT arrays in 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013. While these observations do not contain enough information to produce images, they are sufficient to constrain simple geometric models. We develop a modeling approach based on the framework utilized for the 2017 EHT data analysis and validate our procedures using synthetic data. Applying the same approach to the observational data sets, we find the M87* morphology in 2009-2017 to be consistent with a persistent asymmetric ring of ∼40 μas diameter. The position angle of the peak intensity varies in time. In particular, we find a significant difference between the position angle measured in 2013 and 2017. These variations are in broad agreement with predictions of a subset of general relativistic magnetohydrodynamic simulations. We show that quantifying the variability across multiple observational epochs has the potential to constrain the physical properties of the source, such as the accretion state or the black hole spin. © 2020 The Author(s). Published by the American Astronomical Society. ; The authors of the present paper thank the following organizations and programs: the Academy of Finland (projects 274477, 284495, 312496); the Advanced European Network of E-infrastructures for Astronomy with the SKA (AENEAS) project, supported by the European Commission Framework Programme Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation action under grant agreement 731016; the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung; the Black Hole Initiative at Harvard University, through a grant (60477) from the John Templeton Foundation; the China Scholarship Council; Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT, Chile, via PIA ACT172033, Fondecyt projects 1171506 and 3190878, BASAL AFB-170002, ALMA-conicyt 31140007); Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT, Mexico, projects 104497, 275201, 279006, 281692); the Delaney Family via the Delaney Family John A. Wheeler Chair at Perimeter Institute; Direccion General de Asuntos del Personal Academico-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (DGAPA-UNAM, project IN112417); the European Research Council Synergy Grant "BlackHoleCam: Imaging the Event Horizon of Black Holes" (grant 610058); the Generalitat Valenciana postdoctoral grant APOSTD/2018/177 and GenT Program (project CIDEGENT/2018/021); the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (grants GBMF-3561, GBMF-5278); the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN) sezione di Napoli, iniziative specifiche TEONGRAV; the International Max Planck Research School for Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne; the Jansky Fellowship program of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO); the Japanese Government (Monbukagakusho: MEXT) Scholarship; the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellowship (JP17J08829); the Key Research Program of Frontier Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS, grants QYZDJ-SSW-SLH057, QYZDJ-SSW-SYS008, ZDBS-LY-SLH011); the Leverhulme Trust Early Career Research Fellowship; the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPG); the Max Planck Partner Group of the MPG and the CAS; the MEXT/JSPS KAKENHI (grants 18KK0090, JP18K13594, JP18K03656, JP18H03721, 18K03709, 18H01245, 25120007); the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) Funds; the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of Taiwan (105-2112-M-001-025-MY3, 106-2112-M-001-011, 106-2119-M-001-027, 107-2119-M-001-017, 107-2119-M-001-020, and 107-2119-M-110-005); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA, Fermi Guest Investigator grant 80NSSC17K0649 and Hubble Fellowship grant HST-HF2-51431.001-A awarded by the Space Telescope Science Institute, which is operated by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc. , for NASA, under contract NAS5-26555); the National Institute of Natural Sciences (NINS) of Japan; the National Key Research and Development Program of China (grant 2016YFA0400704, 2016YFA0400702); the National Science Foundation (NSF, grants AST-0096454, AST-0352953, AST-0521233, AST-0705062, AST-0905844, AST-0922984, AST-1126433, AST-1140030, DGE-1144085, AST-1207704, AST-1207730, AST-1207752, MRI-1228509, OPP-1248097, AST-1310896, AST-1312651, AST-1337663, AST-1440254, AST-1555365, AST-1715061, AST-1615796, AST-1716327, OISE-1743747, AST-1816420); the Natural Science Foundation of China (grants 11573051, 11633006, 11650110427, 10625314, 11721303, 11725312, 11933007); the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC, including a Discovery Grant and the NSERC Alexander Graham Bell Canada Graduate Scholarships-Doctoral Program); the National Youth Thousand Talents Program of China; the National Research Foundation of Korea (the Global PhD Fellowship Grant: grants NRF-2015H1A2A1033752, 2015-R1D1A1A01056807, the Korea Research Fellowship Program: NRF-2015H1D3A1066561); the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) VICI award (grant 639.043.513) and Spinoza Prize SPI 78-409; the New Scientific Frontiers with Precision Radio Interferometry Fellowship awarded by the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO), which is a facility of the National Research Foundation (NRF), an agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DST) of South Africa; the Onsala Space Observatory (OSO) national infrastructure, for the provisioning of its facilities/observational support (OSO receives funding through the Swedish Research Council under grant 2017-00648) the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics (research at Perimeter Institute is supported by the Government of Canada through the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development and by the Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Science); the Russian Science Foundation (grant 17-12-01029); the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (grants PGC2018-098915-B-C21, AYA2016-80889-P); the State Agency for Research of the Spanish MCIU through the "Center of Excellence Severo Ochoa" award for the Instituto de Astrofisica de Andalucia (SEV-2017-0709); the Toray Science Foundation; the US Department of Energy (USDOE) through the Los Alamos National Laboratory (operated by Triad National Security, LLC, for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the USDOE (contract 89233218CNA000001)); the Italian Ministero dell'Istruzione Universita e Ricerca through the grant Progetti Premiali 2012-iALMA (CUP C52I13000140001); the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 730562 RadioNet; ALMA North America Development Fund; the Academia Sinica; Chandra TM6-17006X; the GenT Program (Generalitat Valenciana) Project CIDEGENT/2018/021. This work used the Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE), supported by NSF grant ACI-1548562, and CyVerse, supported by NSF grants DBI-0735191, DBI-1265383, and DBI-1743442. XSEDE Stampede2 resource at TACC was allocated through TG-AST170024 and TG-AST080026N. XSEDE JetStream resource at PTI and TACC was allocated through AST170028. The simulations were performed in part on the SuperMUC cluster at the LRZ in Garching, on the LOEWE cluster in CSC in Frankfurt, and on the HazelHen cluster at the HLRS in Stuttgart. This research was enabled in part by support provided by Compute Ontario (http://computeontario. ca), Calcul Quebec (http://www.calculquebec.ca), and Compute Canada (http://www.computecanada.ca). We thank the staff at the participating observatories, correlation centers, and institutions for their enthusiastic support. This paper makes use of the following ALMA data: ADS/JAO.ALMA#2016.1.01154.V. ALMA is a partnership of the European Southern Observatory (ESO; Europe, representing its member states), NSF, and National Institutes of Natural Sciences of Japan, together with the National Research Council (Canada), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST; Taiwan), Academia Sinica Institute of Astronomy and Astrophysics (ASIAA; Taiwan), and Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI; Republic of Korea), in cooperation with the Republic of Chile. The Joint ALMA Observatory is operated by ESO, Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI)/NRAO, and the National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ). The NRAO is a facility of the NSF operated under cooperative agreement by AUI. APEX is a collaboration between the Max-Planck-Institut fur Radioastronomie (Germany), ESO, and the Onsala Space Observatory (Sweden). The SMA is a joint project between the SAO and ASIAA and is funded by the Smithsonian Institution and the Academia Sinica. The JCMT is operated by the East Asian Observatory on behalf of the NAOJ, ASIAA, and KASI, as well as the Ministry of Finance of China, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the National Key R&D Program (No. 2017YFA0402700) of China. Additional funding support for the JCMT is provided by the Science and Technologies Facility Council (UK) and participating universities in the UK and Canada. The LMT is a project operated by the Instituto Nacional de Astrofisica, ptica, y Electronica (Mexico), and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (USA). The IRAM 30 m telescope on Pico Veleta, Spain is operated by IRAM and supported by CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France), MPG (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Germany), and IGN (Instituto Geografico Nacional, Spain). The SMT is operated by the Arizona Radio Observatory, a part of the Steward Observatory of the University of Arizona, with financial support of operations from the State of Arizona and financial support for instrumentation development from the NSF. The SPT is supported by the National Science Foundation through grant PLR- 1248097. Partial support is also provided by the NSF Physics Frontier Center grant PHY-1125897 to the Kavli Institute of Cosmological Physics at the University of Chicago, the Kavli Foundation, and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation grant GBMF 947. The SPT hydrogen maser was provided on loan from the GLT, courtesy of ASIAA. The EHTC has received generous donations of FPGA chips from Xilinx Inc., under the Xilinx University Program. The EHTC has benefited from technology shared under an open-source license by the Collaboration for Astronomy Signal Processing and Electronics Research (CASPER). The EHT project is grateful to T4Science and Microsemi for their assistance with hydrogen masers. This research has made use of NASA's Astrophysics Data System. We gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the extended staff of the ALMA, both from the inception of the ALMA Phasing Project through the observational campaigns of 2017 and 2018. We would like to thank A. Deller and W. Brisken for EHT-specific support with the use of DiFX. We acknowledge the significance that Maunakea, where the SMA and JCMT EHT stations are located, has for the indigenous Hawaiian people.

Ziele und Befunde der Arbeit Das durchgeführte Forschungsvorhaben zeigt durch einen holistischen, gleichzeitig politikwissenschaftlichen wie auch historischen Ansatz Folgendes: Nämlich, warum und wie das liberale, regelbasierte Weltordnungssystem im Untersuchungsraum der US-Präsidentschaften von Clinton bis Obama kontinuierlich durch ein System der realistischen, kurzfristig wirkenden Durchsetzung vitaler Interessen mittels militärischer Instrumentenpräferenz unter fortlaufender militärischer Optimierung ergänzt bzw. ersetzt wird. Dies erklärt auch, warum die "transaktionale Führung Trumps"(1), die nach dem Untersuchungsraum von 1993 bis 2017 mit Außenwirkung die Reduktion idealistischer "Grand Strategy"-Elemente bzw. wohlwollender Ordnungsmacht unter Kostenabwälzung und Vorteilsverringerung europäischer Nato-Verbündeter vornimmt, in Kontinuität zur ausgeübten Führungsmacht der Amtsvorgänger steht. Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation wie die sich ab 1993 immer nachdrücklicher abzeichnende Auflösung der multilateralen Grundordnung legen damit nahe, Trumps bisherige Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik als deutlich spürbares Krisensymptom und nicht als Ursache dieses Abbaus der nach 1945 eingerichteten Weltordnung einzustufen. Diese Auflösung ist mit einer Erosion des letztlich transatlantisch angestoßenen bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" gleichzusetzen. Die Implementierung dieses Systems erfolgte als "Lernstunde zweier Weltkriege" auf Basis der mit der Aufklärung und den amerikanischen Gründungskennziffern eingeleiteten neuzeitlichen Ordnungskonzeptionen: Daher ist diese Auflösung auch ein Indikator für das Scheitern neuzeitlicher Ordnungskennziffern, die sich im "American way of life" entfalten konnten. Als ursächlich für die geschilderte Entwicklung wird eine von Clinton bis Obama konstant ansteigende Gesamtbedrohung nachgewiesen, mit der die konsequente Schwächung amerikanischer Vormacht verknüpft ist. Diese fußt u.a. auf der Basis von seit 1979 postulierten Klimawandeleffekten als Bedrohungsverstärker bei erreichter amerikanischer Förderspitze in fossilen Rohstoffen und ansteigendem Ressourcenbedarf im Kontext schrumpfender Rohstoffvorkommen. Weiter sind für den Untersuchungsraum die zunehmende Einwirkung der in den 1980er Jahren begonnenen "US-Konservativen Revolution" auf die Ausübung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Einflusszugewinn von Konzernen und Lobbygruppen auf beispielsweise policy-Implementierung sowie die neuen Rahmenbedingungen zu addieren. Darunter fallen die sich ausformende Digitalisierung, die hohen Ressourcenverbrauch mit sich bringt, und die ansteigende Weltbevölkerung unter spezifischen demographischen Vorzeichen. Darüber hinaus sind beispielsweise die Beibehaltung des bipolar angewachsenen Rüstungssektors als ökonomische Basis militärischer Vormacht und das langsame Abbröckeln der Dollar-Hegemonie seit etwa 1973 zu berücksichtigen. Durch komplexes Zusammenspiel von "Grand Strategy"-Umsetzung gemäß der Prämisse amerikanischen Führungsmachtausbaus unter neokonservativem bzw. christlich-rechtem Einfluss mit asymmetrischen sowie reaktivierten konventionellen Bedrohungsgegenständen, Bedrohungsverstärkern und neuen Rahmenbedingungen wird der lineare Verlauf der Gesamtbedrohung im Zeitraum von 1993 bis 2017 verständlich: Im Kontext der "Grand Strategy"-Ausführungen erklären insbesondere das Bedrohungsabwehr-, Bedrohungsverstärker- und Marktwirtschaftsverständnis der US-Far Right in komplexer Wechselwirkung mit erstarkenden transnationalen Konzernen, Lobbygruppen, Individuen(2), informellen Netzwerken und staatlichen Akteuren in Bezug auf Bedrohungsgegenstände sowie Bedrohungsverstärker(3) im Zusammenhang mit der post-bipolaren, globalen Verankerung amerikanischer Wirtschafts- und Konsummuster das Folgende: Nämlich die Anpassung der amerikanischen Bedrohungsabwehr - unter Aufbau der "imperial presidency"(4) bzw. Einhegung des Systems von "checks and balances" - samt deren Implikationen auf das bipolare liberale Ordnungssystem. Sodann wird die notwendige Weiterführung in der Nato durch amerikanisch aufgeworfenen Nato-Umbau zur entsprechenden Umsetzung transformierter amerikanischer Bedrohungsabwehr bzw. Legitimierung der systemischen Anpassung begreifbar. Genauso wird nachvollziehbar, dass die so eingerichtete Bedrohungsabwehr nur kurzfristig abwehrt: Stattdessen verstärkt sie asymmetrische und konventionelle Bedrohung wie auch Bedrohungsverstärker - unter Einleitung von Rüstungsspiralen bzw. Demontierung der Rüstungskontrolle - und damit die Gesamtbedrohung. Dies lässt einen Konfliktausbruch jenseits des bisher Vorstellbaren konstant näher rücken. Gleichzeitig ist der dringende Bedarf an Mobilisierung der transatlantischen Zusammenarbeit im Hinblick auf Förderung der globalen Kooperation staatlicher, aber auch nichtstaatlicher Akteure hinsichtlich der Bedrohungswurzeln samt der sich verschlechternden Voraussetzungen illustriert: Denn mit jedem Anstieg der Gesamtbedrohung ist durch die eingeleitete amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Anpassung und deren Weiterführung in der Nato ein Abbau der regelbasierten Basiskennziffern im Untersuchungsraum verknüpft. Dies reduziert in fortlaufender Konsequenz die Grundlage für oben genannte, konstant zentraler werdende Zusammenarbeit, um eine sukzessive Erosion des bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" unter künftigen Dystopien zu verhindern bzw. zumindest zu begrenzen. Durch die Forschungsergebnisse wird der bisherige Forschungsstand auf den Kopf gestellt, da so beispielsweise gezeigt werden kann, dass mittels der Transformation der Nato keine gleichberechtigte transatlantische Lastenteilung oder eine Weiterentwicklung der Nato gemäß der Nato-Gründungskennziffern erzeugt wird. Dies gilt auch für den europäischen Widerstand gegenüber der tatsächlichen Verankerung der Natotransformationspositionen(5), der auf die Erosion des bipolaren liberalen Ordnungssystems bzw. der US-Vorteilsgewährung sowie so begünstigter Partikularinteressensicherung abhebt. Außerdem wird deutlich, dass eine Kontinuitätslinie in der Bedrohungsabwehr von Clinton bis Obama unter unterschiedlicher Außenwirkung und dem Grundmuster "Battleship America" vorliegt - und eben nicht eine multilateral ausgerichtete Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Clinton, die als Folge von 9/11 in einen unilateralen Pendelausschlag unter G. W. Bush 43 mündet, der durch die Obama-Administration wieder zurückgenommen wird. Die Arbeit basiert auf einer umfassenden Fülle an Literatur, die das aufwendige Literaturverzeichnis widerspiegelt: Darunter fallen vielfältige amerikanische und europäische Publikationen, Monographien und entsprechende Sekundärliteratur, wie Biographien, Veröffentlichungen unterschiedlichster Natur wichtiger Vertreter der transatlantischen Forschungselite, Akteure der entsprechenden Politikplanung und -ausführung und wissenschaftliche Artikel aus Fachzeitschriften zu allen Forschungsbereichen bzw. politikwissenschaftlicher Methodik und Theorie. Weiter wurden u.a. Veröffentlichungen bzw. relevante Dokumente von Regierungen, Außenministerien, Verteidigungsministerien, Regierungsorganen, Denkfabriken, universitären Forschungszentren sowie der Nato verwendet. Struktur der Arbeit Konkret ist die vorliegende Dissertation in zwei Bände sowie einen Anhangsband unterteilt: Band 1 umfasst Schwerpunkt 1, eine Prozessanalyse unter offensiver neorealistischer Verortung, Band 2 den darauf aufbauenden Schwerpunkt 2, einen Vergleich ("structured focussed comparison") unter defensiver neorealistischer Verortung. Im Anhangsband finden sich ergänzende Ausführungen zu Kapitel 1, Band 1 in Bezug auf den Forschungsstand, Literatur und Quellenlage, theoretische Verortung sowie Wahl des Untersuchungsraumes bzw. ausgewählter europäischer Nato-Partner. Weiter sind ein historisches Kapitel als Voraussetzung zum "process-tracing" in Kapitel 2, Band 1 und ein Abbildungs- und Abkürzungsverzeichnis wie auch ein Literaturverzeichnis enthalten. Insgesamt ermitteln die beiden aufeinander aufbauenden Schwerpunkte mittels qualitativer Methoden das Folgende: Nämlich die übergeordnete amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Reaktion auf eine neue Gesamtbedrohung sowie deren Weiterführung und Legitimierungschance in der Nato im Untersuchungsraum von Clinton bis Obama. Auf Basis des ersten Teils der Hypothese wird in Schwerpunkt 1, Band 1 ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Beibehaltung des bipolaren "US-Grand Strategy"-Ziels amerikanischer Führungs- und Ordnungsmacht sowie bipolarer außenpolitischer "Grand Strategy"-Kennziffern bzw. einer sich komplex entwickelnden neuen Gesamtbedrohung, amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung und der notwendigen Weiterführung in der Nato durch Natotransformation mittels amerikanisch aufgeworfener Natotransformationspositionen hergestellt. In Schwerpunkt 2, Band 2 wird auf Basis des zweiten Teils der Hypothese der transatlantische Aushandlungsprozess zur Etablierung der amerikanisch vorgeschlagenen Natotransformationspositionen in Augenschein genommen: Vor diesem Hintergrund wird überprüft, ob diese tatsächliche Verankerung bzw. Konkretisierung des Ausbaus amerikanischen Vormacht am Widerstand der ausgewählten europäischen Nato-Bündnispartner Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien scheitert. Im Gesamtergebnis zeigt sich, dass aufgrund einer sich entwickelnden komplexen, linear ansteigenden Gesamtbedrohung die Chance zum Ausbau amerikanischer Führungsmacht konstant abnimmt. Dies muss mittels amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung kompensiert werden. Die daher erfolgende amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Neuausrichtung auf Basis der eingeleiteten "Revolution im Militärwesen" modifiziert wiederum die Kennziffern bipolarer kollektiver Sicherheitsgewährleistung. Alles wird mittels tatsächlicher Verankerung der amerikanischen Natotransformationspositionen ermöglicht bzw. legitimiert. Das tatsächliche Erreichen der - die sicherheitspolitische amerikanische Anpassung konsequent weiterführenden - Transformation der Nato ermöglicht eine missionsorientierte, reaktionsbeschleunigende, flexible und globale Sicherheitsprojektion. Außerdem ist die Voraussetzung für "alliances of choice" innerhalb der Nato geschaffen. Weiter zementiert die Modifikation der "bipolaren Nato" die mittels sicherheitspolitischer amerikanischer Anpassung eingeleitete Erosion zentraler zivilisatorischer Errungenschaften bzw. Aufgaben bipolarer kollektiver Sicherheitsgewährleistung unter Vorteilsverringerung europäischer Nato-Bündnispartner. Die tatsächliche Verankerung der Natotransformationspositionen erfolgt mittels der Reaktivierung konventioneller Bedrohung im Kontext der Ukraine-Krise von 2014 und der Erweiterung der Nato-Partnerschaftsringe auf globaler Ebene, ohne diesen den Status eines Nato-Mitgliedsstaates zu gewähren. Damit wird der Bündnisfall nicht globalisiert. Der ausgeübte deutsch-französische Widerstand wird besonders intensiv durch den Einbezug der europäischen Gründungsstaaten befördert, dagegen unterbleibt die Ausbildung einer europäischen Führungstroika durch Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien. Darüber hinaus zeigt insbesondere die entsprechende Ursachenermittlung, dass trotz konstanter, aufeinander aufbauender amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Reaktion unter unterschiedlicher Außenwirkung sowie tatsächlicher Weiterführung in der Nato die Gesamtbedrohung nicht langfristig abgebremst wird: Dies führt zu einem konstanten Anstieg der Gesamtbedrohung unter fortlaufendem Einflussverlust staatlicher Akteure bzw. Machtdiffusion und -konzentration samt einer sukzessiven Chancenerhöhung reaktivierter konventioneller, nuklearer, Cyber- und ökologischer Zerstörungsszenarien. Auf dieser Basis entsteht die Konsequenz einer immer umfassenderen und die Reaktion beschleunigende Präzisionsabwehr unter ansteigender Versicherheitlichung, um die kontinuierliche Einengung amerikanischer Vormacht auszugleichen. Dies erzeugt im Fortlauf einen konstanten Abbau der Strahlungs- und Schlagkraft des liberalen, regelbasierten, bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" sowie der Etablierung "idealistischer, liberaler" "Grand Strategy"-Elemente. Weiter ist damit - auf der Grundlage der aufeinander aufbauenden Natotransformationspositionen sowie Obamas "smart power"(6) im Untersuchungsraum - eine zunehmende Vorteilsverringerung der europäischen Nato-Verbündeten bzw. ein ansteigender Bedarf an US-Kostendämpfung verquickt. Zudem entwickelt sich eine immer geringer werdende Chance zur Entfaltung des postbipolar als "nicht verhandelbar" postulierten und global ausgebreiteten amerikanischen Lebensentwurfes in individueller, innerstaatlicher Ausprägung: Deren Artikulation erfolgt beispielsweise mittels zunehmendem Rechtspopulismus, Wahl von Außenseiterkandidaten, Zerfall traditioneller Parteiensysteme, isolationistischen Tendenzen unter ethnischer, regionaler Erstarkung, und Ablehnung von Supranationalität oder religiösem Fundamentalismus. Gleichzeitig ist die fortlaufende Erosion der globalen öffentlichen Güter identifizierbar. Damit ebnet all das oben Genannte den Boden für die Begrenzung amerikanischer wohlwollender Ordnungsmacht bzw. der Handlungsspielräume staatlicher Akteure - und für die Rückkehr zu klassischer Machtpolitik im Kontext entstandener Machtdiffusion bzw. -konzentration. Dies erschwert angesichts der Dringlichkeit einer langfristigen Eindämmung asymmetrischer bzw. konventioneller Sicherheitsbedrohungsgegenstände, -verstärker, -cluster und globalen Rahmenbedingungen folgende Chance: Nämlich die zu transatlantischer Zusammenarbeit in der Nato unter Wiederbelebung der politischen Organisation derselben sowie Erweiterung auf zusätzliche Ebenen und Akteure im Sinne von Vorbeugung bzw. vernetzter Sicherheit zur Erreichung entsprechender globaler Kooperation in Bezug auf Einhegen der Bedrohungswurzeln. Insgesamt wird durch diese Forschungsarbeit transparent, wie und warum die für den Untersuchungsraum von 1993 bis 2017 antizipierte "Friedensdividende" und das durch Präsident Clinton postulierte "age of hope" kaum spürbar wurden. Fußnoten (1) Vgl. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Vgl. National Intelligence Council (Hrsg.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, letzter Zugriff: 12.04.19. Vgl. dazu auch das "international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos" bei McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) Vgl. zu Bedrohungsverstärkern beispielsweise Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. 1990 wurde bereits in Bezug auf den Bedrohungsverstärker Klimawandel für die entstehenden asymmetrischen bzw. konventionellen Bedrohungsgegenstände komplexe Cluster konstatiert: "Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too lang to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict - on a scale not as yet seen by man". Vgl. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, letzter Zugriff: 30.03.19. Dies lässt Hinweise auf die sich entwickelnde, konstant ansteigende Gesamtbedrohung im Untersuchungsraum von 1993-2017 zu. (4) Vgl. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) Die amerikanisch vorgeschlagenen Positionen zur Anpassung der Nato, die Nato Response Force sowie die Global Partnership Initiative, werden als "Natotransformationspositionen" bezeichnet: Mit deren tatsächlicher Etablierung war eine Transformation der Nato in konsequenter Weiterführung amerikanisch erfolgter sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung verknüpft. (6) Smart power geht auf Suzanne Nossel, Mitarbeiterin des UN-Botschafters Holbrooke während der Clinton-Administration, zurück: Vgl. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, letzter Zugriff: 26.08.17. Weiter wird er Joseph Nye im Jahre 2003 als Reaktion auf die unilaterale Konzentration auf das militärische Instrument der G.W. Bush–Ära zugeschrieben. Vgl. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York bzw. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München. Vgl. Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24. ; Aims and findings of the dissertation The completed research uses holistic, politological and historical approaches to present how, during the studied period of the administrations of Clinton to Obama, the liberal, rule-based world order system is gradually supplemented and replaced by a system of realist imposition of vital interests that have short-term effects, preferring military means combined with continuous military optimisation. This also explains a continuity between the leading-power policy of administrations in this study (1993-2017) and the subsequent period of the "transactional leadership of Trump"(1), with its recognizable, far-reaching effects of aiming to reduce idealistic Grand Strategy elements and measures of a benevolent order by passing on costs to and reducing the benefits of European NATO allies. The results of this dissertation, such as the increasingly evident dissolution of a multilateral fundamental order, therefore indicate that Trump's foreign and security policy to date should be regarded as a clearly noticeable crisis symptom, rather than the cause of a decline in the world order established after 1945. This decline is synonymous with the erosion of the transatlantically initiated bipolar "American system". Its implementation was the result of the "lesson of two world wars", based on modern concepts of order introduced by the Enlightenment and the founding criteria of the United States: thus its dissolution is also an indicator of the failure of contemporary criteria of order that thrive in the "American way of life". The cause of the described development is shown to be a constantly exacerbating overall threat, from Clinton to Obama, which is connected to the consistent erosion of US supremacy. Among other aspects, this is based on climate change effects postulated in 1979, which multiply the threat while coinciding with American peak production of fossil fuels and increased demand on resources in the context of dwindling raw material resources. Furthermore, during the period of this study, the "US conservative revolution", which began in the 1980s, increasingly affected foreign and security policy, combining with a consolidation in the influence of corporations and lobby groups in fields such as policy implementation and new underlying conditions. They include the onset of digitisation, entailing a high consumption of resources, and a growing world population faced with specific demographic indicators. Additionally, the maintenance of the armaments sector, originally a result of bipolar development, as the economic basis of military supremacy and the slow decline of the Dollar hegemony since around 1973, should also be taken into account. Complex interaction between Grand Strategy implementation according to the premise of expanding US-American dominance under neoconservative and Christian Right-wing influences, as well as asymmetrical and reactivated conventional security threats and threat multipliers clearly indicate the linear development of the overall threat in the period between 1993 and 2017: in the context of Grand Strategy statements, above all the understanding of defence against this threat, of the latter's multiplying factors and the market economy explains the following with respect to the US far-right in a complex interaction with the growth of transnational corporations, lobby groups, individuals(2), informal networks and state actors with respect to objects of threat and threat multipliers(3) in connection with the post-bipolar, global anchoring of US economic and consumer patterns: US adaptation of its reaction to this threat – while consolidating imperial presidency(4) and weakening the system of checks and balances – including its implications of a bipolar liberal order. In this way, the necessary continued leadership within NATO through the US-proposed NATO reform can be seen as an appropriate implementation of transformed threat-reaction measures and the legitimisation of systemic adaptation. It equally becomes clear that the established threat reaction measures only provide a short-term defence: instead, they enhance the asymmetric and conventional threat, as well as threat multipliers – by introducing arms races and breaking down arms control – thereby heightening the overall threat. The consequence is the consistently growing likelihood of a conflict of hitherto unimaginable proportions. At the same time, the urgent need to mobilise transatlantic cooperation with respect to supporting global cooperation between state and non-government actors is illustrated with respect to the roots of the threat and its deteriorating underlying conditions: each increase in the overall threat, the adapted US security policy and its continuation in NATO is connected to an erosion of rule-based underlying criteria during the studied period. This continuously and consistently undermines the basis of the above-stated, ever-increasingly important cooperation, to prevent or at least limit the successive erosion of the bipolar "American system" under future dystopias. The research results completely overturn the state of research to date, since for instance it is possible to show that, by means of NATO transformation findings, no transatlantic sharing of burdens on an equal footing and no NATO reform in accordance with its founding principles can be achieved. The same also applies to European opposition to the actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions(5), which is based on the erosion of the bipolar liberal order system and the maintenance of US advantages as well as the consolidation of particular interests they facilitate. Furthermore, it is apparent that a line of continuity in the threat-reaction measures from Clinton to Obama exists with varying external effects, along with an underlying pattern of "Battleship America" – as opposed to a multilaterally orientated foreign and security policy under Clinton, which merged into a unilateral, radical swing under G. W. Bush 43 following 9/11, but was reverted by the Obama administration. A comprehensive wealth of literature was used of the doctoral thesis, as reflected by the extensive bibliography: they firstly include diverse American and European publications, monographs and relevant secondary literature, including biographies, publications of various kinds of important political planning and implementation, as well as collected volumes and research articles from specialist journals on all fields of research and politological methodology and theory. The same applies to publications by leading European and American institutions, research centres and think tanks. Furthermore, this author used publications and documents by governments, foreign ministries, defence ministries, other government bodies and Nato. Dissertation structure This dissertation is divided into two volumes and one Appendix: Volume 1 discusses Focus 1, namely a process-tracing in the context of offensive neorealist positioning. Volume 2 presents Focus 2, which is based on the preceding focus in making a structured, focussed comparison in the context of defensive neorealist positioning. The Appendix volume contains further discussion of Chapter 1, Volume 1 with respect to the state of research, literature and sources, theoretical positioning and the choice of the region of study and selected European NATO partners. Furthermore, a historical chapter provides underlying information for process-tracing in Chapter 2, Volume 1, an index of images and abbreviations, and a bibliography. The entire dissertation uses qualitative methods to focus on these two mutually supporting, building on each other, themes to investigate the following from a US-perspective: firstly the overriding US security-policy reaction to a new overall threat and secondly, its continuation combined with the opportunity of for enabling and legitimising it within and through NATO during the studied period from Clinton to Obama. Based on the first part of this hypothesis, Focus 1 (Volume 1) establishes a connection between, on the one hand, maintaining the bipolar Grand Strategy target of consolidating the USA as a leading, regulating power, bipolar foreign-policy Grand Strategy indicators and a new overall threat that is developing in a complex way, and, on the other, the necessity of its continued leadership within NATO and the required NATO transformation according to US-proposed NATO transformation positions. Focus 2 (Volume 2) is based on the second part of the hypothesis, investigating the transatlantic negotiation process to establish these US-proposed NATO transformation positions: in this context, Volume 2 investigates whether the attempt to actually secure and consolidate such US supremacy was unsuccessful in the face of resistance from selected European NATO partners, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The overall result shows that due to a complex, developing, linear increase in the overall threat, the chance for the USA to consolidate its status as a leading power is steadily diminishing. This must be compensated by adapting US security policy. The resulting American security-policy realignment based on the initiated "revolution in military affairs" in turn modifies the indicators of bipolar collective security guarantees. Everything is enabled and legitimised by means of actually securing US NATO-transformation positions. The actual implementation of such NATO transformation – representing the consistent adaptation of US security policy – enables a mission-orientated, rapid response, flexible, global security projection. It also creates conditions for "alliances of choice" within NATO. Furthermore, the modification of a "bipolar NATO" exacerbates the erosion of key achievements of civilisation as a result of adapted US security policy, as well as undermining the tasks of bipolar collective security guarantees through diminished benefits to European NATO partners. The actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions is achieved by reactivating the conventional threat in the context of the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the extension of NATO partnership rings on a global level, without providing them with NATO membership status, thus avoiding globalisation in a mutual defence case. The German and French resistance is particularly intensive through the involvement of European founder states, while the formation of a European leadership triumvirate consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom does not take place. Moreover, a relevant investigation of causes particularly shows that despite constant mutually supporting US security reaction measures with varying international effects and actual continued leadership within NATO, the overall threat is not receding: this leads to a constant increase in the overall threat, a loss of influence of state actors, the diffusion and concentration of power and the increased probability of reactive conventional, nuclear, cyber and ecological destruction scenarios. On this basis, the consequence is an increasingly comprehensive and rapidly responding precision defence combined with growing securitization to compensate for the ongoing containment of US supremacy. This developing process steadily diminishes the reach and power of a liberal, rule-based, bipolar "American system" and the establishment of "idealistic, liberal" elements of US-Grand Strategy. This entails a further reduction in benefits for European NATO allies and increasing US cost-cutting demands – based on the successive NATO transformation positions that build on each other and Obama's "smart power"(6) during the period studied in this dissertation. Thus the chance is receding of developing the post-bipolar, globally adopted American way of life with individual national character, which is regarded as "non-negotiable": for instance its articulation is expressed through increasing right-wing populism, the election of outsider-candidates, the dissolution of traditional party systems, isolationist tendencies combined with burgeoning ethnic, regional movements, the rejection of supranationalism, and religious fundamentalism. At the same time, the ongoing erosion of global public goods is apparent. This all paves the way to limiting the benevolent American regulating power and state actors' leverage – and therefore to a return to classic power politics in the context of a resulting diffusion and concentration of power. In view of the urgency of a long-term containment of asymmetrical or conventional threats to security, or aspects that exacerbate such threats or clusters thereof, as well as underlying global conditions, this undermines the ability to achieve the following: to achieve transatlantic cooperation by broadening the range of levels and actors in the spirit of proactive and expanded, networked security to achieve according global cooperation with respect to containing the root causes of threats. Overall, this research work reveals how and why the anticipated "peace dividend" and the notion of an "age of hope", as postulated by President Clinton, were hardly perceptible during the period of study between 1993 and 2017. Notes (1) Cf. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Cf. National Intelligence Council (Ed.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, last accessed: 12.04.19. See also the "international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos" cit. McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) In 1990, the threat-enhancing nature of climate change was already postulated with respect to asymmetric objects of threat as well as conventional and complex clusters: "Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too long to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict – on a scale not as yet seen by man". Cf. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, last accessed: 30.03.19. Cf. Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. This supports the thesis of a developing, constant overall threat during the period between 1993 and 2017. (4) Cf. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) In this dissertation, the proposed US positions on NATO adaptation, the NATO Response Force and the Global Partnership Initiative are described as "NATO transformation positions": Their actual establishment was connected to a NATO transformation with the consistent continuation of adapted US security policy. (6) Cf. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, last accessed: 26.08.17, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München, Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24.

Full list of authors: Akiyama, Kazunori; Algaba, Juan Carlos; Alberdi, Antxon; Alef, Walter; Anantua, Richard; Asada, Keiichi; Azulay, Rebecca; Baczko, Anne-Kathrin; Ball, David; Baloković, Mislav; Barrett, John; Benson, Bradford A.; Bintley, Dan; Blackburn, Lindy; Blundell, Raymond; Boland, Wilfred; Bouman, Katherine L.; Bower, Geoffrey C.; Boyce, Hope Bremer, Michael; Brinkerink, Christiaan D.; Brissenden, Roger; Britzen, Silke; Broderick, Avery E.; Broguiere, Dominique; Bronzwaer, Thomas; Byun, Do-Young; Carlstrom, John E.; Chael, Andrew; Chan, Chi-kwan; Chatterjee, Shami; Chatterjee, Koushik; Chen, Ming-Tang; Chen, Yongjun; Chesler, Paul M.; Cho, Ilje; Christian, Pierre; Conway, John E.; Cordes, James M.; Crawford, Thomas M.; Crew, Geoffrey B.; Cruz-Osorio, Alejandro; Cui, Yuzhu; Davelaar, Jordy; De Laurentis, Mariafelicia; Deane, Roger; Dempsey, Jessica; Desvignes, Gregory; Dexter, Jason; Doeleman, Sheperd S.; Eatough, Ralph P.; Falcke, Heino; Farah, Joseph; Fish, Vincent L.; Fomalont, Ed; Ford, H. Alyson; Fraga-Encinas, Raquel; Freeman, William T.; Friberg, Per; Fromm, Christian M.; Fuentes, Antonio; Galison, Peter; Gammie, Charles F.; García, Roberto; Gentaz, Olivier; Georgiev, Boris; Goddi, Ciriaco; Gold, Roman; Gómez, José L.; Gómez-Ruiz, Arturo I.; Gu, Minfeng; Gurwell, Mark; Hada, Kazuhiro; Haggard, Daryl; Hecht, Michael H.; Hesper, Ronald; Ho, Luis C.; Ho, Paul; Honma, Mareki; Huang, Chih-Wei L.; Huang, Lei; Hughes, David H.; Ikeda, Shiro; Inoue, Makoto; Issaoun, Sara; James, David J.; Jannuzi, Buell T.; Janssen, Michael; Jeter, Britton; Jiang, Wu; Jimenez-Rosales, Alejandra; Johnson, Michael D.; Jorstad, Svetlana; Jung, Taehyun; Karami, Mansour; Karuppusamy, Ramesh; Kawashima, Tomohisa; Keating, Garrett K.; Kettenis, Mark; Kim, Dong-Jin; Kim, Jae-Young; Kim, Jongsoo; Kim, Junhan; Kino, Motoki; Koay, Jun Yi; Kofuji, Yutaro; Koch, Patrick M.; Koyama, Shoko; Kramer, Michael; Kramer, Carsten; Krichbaum, Thomas P.; Kuo, Cheng-Yu; Lauer, Tod R.; Lee, Sang-Sung; Levis, Aviad; Li, Yan-Rong; Li, Zhiyuan; Lindqvist, Michael; Lico, Rocco; Lindahl, Greg; Liu, Jun; Liu, Kuo; Liuzzo, Elisabetta; Lo, Wen-Ping; Lobanov, Andrei P.; Loinard, Laurent; Lonsdale, Colin; Lu, Ru-Sen; MacDonald, Nicholas R.; Mao, Jirong; Marchili, Nicola; Markoff, Sera; Marrone, Daniel P.; Marscher, Alan P.; Martí-Vidal, Iván; Matsushita, Satoki; Matthews, Lynn D.; Medeiros, Lia; Menten, Karl M.; Mizuno, Izumi; Mizuno, Yosuke; Moran, James M.; Moriyama, Kotaro; Moscibrodzka, Monika; Müller, Cornelia; Musoke, Gibwa; Mejías, Alejandro Mus; Michalik, Daniel; Nadolski, Andrew; Nagai, Hiroshi; Nagar, Neil M.; Nakamura, Masanori; Narayan, Ramesh; Narayanan, Gopal; Natarajan, Iniyan; Nathanail, Antonios; Neilsen, Joey; Neri, Roberto; Ni, Chunchong; Noutsos, Aristeidis; Nowak, Michael A.; Okino, Hiroki; Olivares, Héctor; Ortiz-León, Gisela N.; Oyama, Tomoaki; Özel, Feryal; Palumbo, Daniel C. M.; Park, Jongho; Patel, Nimesh; Pen, Ue-Li; Pesce, Dominic W.; Piétu, Vincent; Plambeck, Richard; PopStefanija, Aleksandar; Porth, Oliver; Pötzl, Felix M.; Prather, Ben; Preciado-López, Jorge A.; Psaltis, Dimitrios; Pu, Hung-Yi; Ramakrishnan, Venkatessh; Rao, Ramprasad; Rawlings, Mark G.; Raymond, Alexander W.; Rezzolla, Luciano; Ricarte, Angelo; Ripperda, Bart; Roelofs, Freek; Rogers, Alan; Ros, Eduardo; Rose, Mel; Roshanineshat, Arash; Rottmann, Helge; Roy, Alan L.; Ruszczyk, Chet; Rygl, Kazi L. J.; Sánchez, Salvador; Sánchez-Arguelles, David; Sasada, Mahito; Savolainen, Tuomas; Schloerb, F. Peter; Schuster, Karl-Friedrich; Shao, Lijing; Shen, Zhiqiang; Small, Des; Sohn, Bong Won; SooHoo, Jason; Sun, He; Tazaki, Fumie; Tetarenko, Alexandra J.; Tiede, Paul; Tilanus, Remo P. J.; Titus, Michael; Toma, Kenji; Torne, Pablo; Trent, Tyler; Traianou, Efthalia; Trippe, Sascha; van Bemmel, Ilse; van Langevelde, Huib Jan; van Rossum, Daniel R.; Wagner, Jan; Ward-Thompson, Derek; Wardle, John; Weintroub, Jonathan; Wex, Norbert; Wharton, Robert; Wielgus, Maciek; Wong, George N.; Wu, Qingwen; Yoon, Doosoo; Young, André; Young, Ken; Younsi, Ziri; Yuan, Feng; Yuan, Ye-Fei; Zensus, J. Anton; Zhao, Guang-Yao; Zhao, Shan-Shan; Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration.--Original content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI. ; In 2017 April, the Event Horizon Telescope (EHT) observed the near-horizon region around the supermassive black hole at the core of the M87 galaxy. These 1.3 mm wavelength observations revealed a compact asymmetric ring-like source morphology. This structure originates from synchrotron emission produced by relativistic plasma located in the immediate vicinity of the black hole. Here we present the corresponding linear-polarimetric EHT images of the center of M87. We find that only a part of the ring is significantly polarized. The resolved fractional linear polarization has a maximum located in the southwest part of the ring, where it rises to the level of ∼15%. The polarization position angles are arranged in a nearly azimuthal pattern. We perform quantitative measurements of relevant polarimetric properties of the compact emission and find evidence for the temporal evolution of the polarized source structure over one week of EHT observations. The details of the polarimetric data reduction and calibration methodology are provided. We carry out the data analysis using multiple independent imaging and modeling techniques, each of which is validated against a suite of synthetic data sets. The gross polarimetric structure and its apparent evolution with time are insensitive to the method used to reconstruct the image. These polarimetric images carry information about the structure of the magnetic fields responsible for the synchrotron emission. Their physical interpretation is discussed in an accompanying publication. © 2021. The Author(s). Published by the American Astronomical Society. ; The authors of the present Letter thank the following organizations and programs: the Academy of Finland (projects 274477, 284495, 312496, 315721); the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung; Agencia Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo (ANID), Chile via NCN19_058 (TITANs), and Fondecyt 3190878; an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship; Allegro, the European ALMA Regional Centre node in the Netherlands, the NL astronomy research network NOVA and the astronomy institutes of the University of Amsterdam, Leiden University and Radboud University; the black hole Initiative at Harvard University, through a grant (60477) from the John Templeton Foundation; the China Scholarship Council; Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT, Mexico, projects U0004-246083, U0004-259839, F0003-272050, M0037-279006, F0003-281692, 104497, 275201, 263356); the Delaney Family via the Delaney Family John A. Wheeler Chair at Perimeter Institute; Direccion General de Asuntos del Personal Academico-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (DGAPA-UNAM, projects IN112417 and IN112820); the EACOA Fellowship of the East Asia Core Observatories Association; the European Research Council Synergy Grant "BlackHoleCam: Imaging the Event Horizon of Black Holes" (grant 610058); the Generalitat Valenciana postdoctoral grant APOSTD/2018/177 and GenT Program (project CIDEGENT/2018/021); MICINN Research Project PID2019-108995GB-C22; the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (grants GBMF-3561, GBMF-5278); the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN) sezione di Napoli, iniziative specifiche TEONGRAV; the International Max Planck Research School for Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne; Joint Princeton/Flatiron and Joint Columbia/Flatiron Postdoctoral Fellowships, research at the Flatiron Institute is supported by the Simons Foundation; the Japanese Government (Monbukagakusho: MEXT) Scholarship; the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellowship (JP17J08829); the Key Research Program of Frontier Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS, grants QYZDJ-SSW-SLH057, QYZDJSSW-SYS008, ZDBS-LY-SLH011); the Leverhulme Trust Early Career Research Fellowship; the Max-PlanckGesellschaft (MPG); the Max Planck Partner Group of the MPG and the CAS; the MEXT/JSPS KAKENHI (grants 18KK0090, JP18K13594, JP18K03656, JP18H03721, 18K03709, 18H01245, 25120007); the Malaysian Fundamental Research Grant Scheme (FRGS) FRGS/1/2019/STG02/UM/02/6; the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) Funds; the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of Taiwan (105-2112-M-001025-MY3, 106-2112-M-001-011, 106-2119-M-001-027, 1072119-M-001-017, 107-2119-M-001-020, 107-2119-M-110-005, 108-2112-M-001-048, and 109-2124-M-001-005); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA, Fermi Guest Investigator grant 80NSSC20K1567 and 80NSSC20K1567, NASA Astrophysics Theory Program grant 80NSSC20K0527, NASA NuSTAR award 80NSSC20K0645, NASA grant NNX17AL82G, and Hubble Fellowship grant HST-HF251431.001-A awarded by the Space Telescope Science Institute, which is operated by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc. , for NASA, under contract NAS5-26555); the National Institute of Natural Sciences (NINS) of Japan; the National Key Research and Development Program of China (grant 2016YFA0400704, 2016YFA0400702); the National Science Foundation (NSF, grants AST-0096454, AST-0352953, AST0521233, AST-0705062, AST-0905844, AST-0922984, AST1126433, AST-1140030, DGE-1144085, AST-1207704, AST1207730, AST-1207752, MRI-1228509, OPP-1248097, AST1310896, AST-1337663, AST-1440254, AST-1555365, AST1615796, AST-1715061, AST-1716327, AST-1716536, OISE1743747, AST-1816420, AST-1903847, AST-1935980, AST2034306); the Natural Science Foundation of China (grants 11573051, 11633006, 11650110427, 10625314, 11721303, 11725312, 11933007, 11991052, 11991053); a fellowship of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2020M671266); the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC, including a Discovery Grant and the NSERC Alexander Graham Bell Canada Graduate Scholarships-Doctoral Program); the National Research Foundation of Korea (the Global PhD Fellowship Grant: grants 2014H1A2A1018695, NRF2015H1A2A1033752, 2015-R1D1A1A01056807, the Korea Research Fellowship Program: NRF-2015H1D3A1066561, Basic Research Support grant 2019R1F1A1059721); the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) VICI award (grant 639.043.513) and Spinoza Prize SPI 78-409; the New Scientific Frontiers with Precision Radio Interferometry Fellowship awarded by the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO), which is a facility of the National Research Foundation (NRF), an agency of the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) of South Africa; the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of Science and Innovation and National Research Foundation; the Onsala Space Observatory (OSO) national infrastructure, for the provisioning of its facilities/observational support (OSO receives funding through the Swedish Research Council under grant 2017-00648) the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics (research at Perimeter Institute is supported by the Government of Canada through the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development and by the Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Science); the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion (grants PGC2018-098915-B-C21, AYA2016-80889-P; PID2019108995GB-C21, PGC2018-098915-B-C21); the State Agency for Research of the Spanish MCIU through the "Center of Excellence Severo Ochoa" award for the Instituto de Astrofisica de Andalucia (SEV-2017-0709); the State Agency for Research of the Spanish MCIU through the "Center of Excellence Severo Ochoa" award for the Instituto de Astrofisica de Andalucia (SEV-2017-0709); the Toray Science Foundation; the Consejeria de Economia, Conocimiento, Empresas y Universidad of the Junta de Andalucia (grant P18-FR-1769), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (grant 2019AEP112); the US Department of Energy (USDOE) through the Los Alamos National Laboratory (operated by Triad National Security, LLC, for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the USDOE (Contract 89233218CNA000001); the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 730562 RadioNet; ALMA North America Development Fund; the Academia Sinica; Chandra TM6-17006X; Chandra award DD7-18089X. This work used the Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE), supported by NSF grant ACI-1548562, and CyVerse, supported by NSF grants DBI-0735191, DBI-1265383, and DBI1743442. XSEDE Stampede2 resource at TACC was allocated through TG-AST170024 and TG-AST080026N. XSEDE JetStream resource at PTI and TACC was allocated through AST170028. The simulations were performed in part on the SuperMUC cluster at the LRZ in Garching, on the LOEWE cluster in CSC in Frankfurt, and on the HazelHen cluster at the HLRS in Stuttgart. This research was enabled in part by support provided by Compute Ontario (http://computeontario.ca), Calcul Quebec (http://www.calculquebec.ca) and Compute Canada (http://www.computecanada.ca).We thank the staff at the participating observatories, correlation centers, and institutions for their enthusiastic support. This paper makes use of the following ALMA data: ADS/JAO.ALMA#2016.1.01154.V. ALMA is a partnership of the European Southern Observatory (ESO; Europe, representing its member states), NSF, and National Institutes of Natural Sciences of Japan, together with National Research Council (Canada), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST; Taiwan), Academia Sinica Institute of Astronomy and Astrophysics (ASIAA; Taiwan), and Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI; Republic of Korea), in cooperation with the Republic of Chile. The Joint ALMA Observatory is operated by ESO, Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI)/NRAO, and the National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ). The NRAO is a facility of the NSF operated under cooperative agreement by AUI. This paper has made use of the following APEX data: Project ID T-091.F-0006-2013. APEX is a collaboration between the Max-Planck-Institut fur Radioastronomie (Germany), ESO, and the Onsala Space Observatory (Sweden). The SMA is a joint project between the SAO and ASIAA and is funded by the Smithsonian Institution and the Academia Sinica. The JCMT is operated by the East Asian Observatory on behalf of the NAOJ, ASIAA, and KASI, as well as the Ministry of Finance of China, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the National Key R&D Program (No. 2017YFA0402700) of China. Additional funding support for the JCMT is provided by the Science and Technologies Facility Council (UK) and participating universities in the UK and Canada. The LMT is a project operated by the Instituto Nacional de Astrofisica, Optica, y Electronica (Mexico) and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (USA), with financial support from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia and the National Science Foundation. The IRAM 30-m telescope on Pico Veleta, Spain is operated by IRAM and supported by CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France), MPG (MaxPlanck-Gesellschaft, Germany) and IGN (Instituto Geografico Nacional, Spain). The SMT is operated by the Arizona Radio Observatory, a part of the Steward Observatory of the University of Arizona, with financial support of operations from the State of Arizona and financial support for instrumentation development from the NSF. The SPT is supported by the National Science Foundation through grant PLR-1248097. Partial support is also provided by the NSF Physics Frontier Center grant PHY-1125897 to the Kavli Institute of Cosmological Physics at the University of Chicago, the Kavli Foundation and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation grant GBMF 947. The SPT hydrogen maser was provided on loan from the GLT, courtesy of ASIAA. The EHTC has received generous donations of FPGA chips from Xilinx Inc., under the Xilinx University Program. The EHTC has benefited from technology shared under open-source license by the Collaboration for Astronomy Signal Processing and Electronics Research (CASPER). The EHT project is grateful to T4Science and Microsemi for their assistance with Hydrogen Masers. This research has made use of NASA's Astrophysics Data System. We gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the extended staff of the ALMA, both from the inception of the ALMA Phasing Project through the observational campaigns of 2017 and 2018. We would like to thank A. Deller and W. Brisken for EHT-specific support with the use of DiFX. We acknowledge the significance that Maunakea, where the SMA and JCMT EHT stations are located, has for the indigenous Hawaiian people. ; Peer reviewed

From the introduction: Ongoing globalization leads to the metamorphosis of social and economic structures and changes the scope of national governmental and non-governmental institutions. Not at least, it changes the aspect of national mentality. The creation of the European Union in 1957 is only one example for the fusion of economic and political domains. In fact, financial and capital markets liberalize, the number of global player rise, and the establishment of international non-governmental organizations increased from 1956 to 1997 by 1,600 % from 985 to 15,965. On the whole, the opportunities for business´ to take influence on the global level are higher and probably more necessary than ever before in history. Economic interrelations and dependencies, international scarcity of non-renewable energy resources and the global climate disaster lead to the necessity of introducing international institutions that act not only in national interest, but serve for the global stabilization of the world economy and its sustainability. A new aspect or logic consequence of globalization arises: Global Governance (in the following abbreviated as GG). GG is one major concomitant phenomenon in the ideology in the disparity in national interests of sovereign states. This difference in the interests of individual items compared to the interests of the entire society exists as long as human beings. Literature calls it the 'moral hazard phenomenon'. There might be common, as well as divergent interests on an efficient solution of various problems, for example in the areas of shelter for refugees and asylum seeker, the problem arising from weapons of mass destruction and the regulations of CO2 emissions. With ongoing globalization there arises a complex multidimensional competition framework. Not only global commercial companies, but also national entities start to compete in terms of production factors, fiscal and political environment and legal frameworks with each another. Figure 1 illustrates the global competition framework by showing up the interrelation among country A and country B. The countries are illustrated including first, their official political entity (government) and secondly, to the Trans-National Companies (in the following abbreviated with TNCs) operating within the country. The third party illustrated is 'the employment'. National government, TNCs and the employment of civil society are interrelated with each another within one country in two directions. Firstly, the TNCs affect the employment and therefore as a result, the government. The higher the action of TNCs within the country, the higher is the employment rate of the civil society (the lower the unemployment). The lower the unemployment rate, the more satisfied the civil society is, and therefore the more powerful the government becomes (because of higher chances to be re-elected). Secondly, the government has impact on the benefits and competitive advantage of TNCs. The better the education policy, the more valuable becomes the human capital. The better the human capital, the more efficient and thus the higher the productivity of TNCs becomes. On a whole, national government can create benefit for TNCs and the other way around. Figure 1 also illustrates the competitive relationship among country A and country B. Both countries compete in terms of providing attractiveness to the TNCs. Attractiveness can be reached by the creation of valuable factors (such as skilled labour et al.). However, this skilled labour also needs to be attracted. As the model introduces a second country, skilled labour can easily move to a place with better factors for the society (better living conditions, better security system, better employment chances, better environmental care, and much more). Though, governments do not only compete for TNCs, but in addition to that for civil society and as a result, finally for voters and power. To sum up, TNCs compete with each other in terms of production. Governments compete with each other in terms of factors. Both, TNCs and the national government, depend from each another and can therefore form an alliance in order to gain in competitive advantage and Global Power (abbreviated in the following as GP). From the aim driven point of view (as explained further in section 1.3.2), GG aims to face and to deal with global challenges in order to balance the markets, to maximize overall welfare and aspire an equal distribution of resources and wealth all over the world. At the same time, GG can be used as a strategic measure and a tool for regulating markets and gaining in competitive advantage and GP. This thesis is going to deal with GG as business strategy based on the neo-realistic approach. The increased presence of TNCs in local economies as a strategy to ensure market control has been labelled 'glocalization'. Research Question: At least after WW II, global society started to realize the ongoing trend for economic trade-off, liberalization of markets and the principle of the invisible hand; not only on a national stage, but on the global layer. National boarders melt, since the action of trade, the economic power, now shifts from the national level to a global degree. International acting companies gain in power and influence with, for instance, direct investments, rising turnover, increased cash flows, and not at least with their bargaining power (in the following abbreviated with BP). The increase in BP is often linked to (global) political activities. Global player, such as TNCs, serve often as a tie between several nations and economies. Though, there are still national governments, and national interests that are not to bring in line with the interests of the global society as a whole. There sometimes might be also dissensions among governments and the TNCs operating in the same arena. The crucial factor then is the BP of the actor. It is not always the case, that government and TNC are equal in having BP. Often there arises an asymmetric dependency, which causes a drop of BP for one of the parties. That disparity and the management of different parties' interests in general, is what Global Governance is all about. During the last 50 years, companies used their BP in order to implement national lobbying as an instrument for gaining in Global Power (in the following abbreviated as GP). Now, as national levels are detached from global platforms and by the GG framework, there arises one important question: Is Global Governance a useful strategy tool for the business sector? In most literature, Global Governance is defined to be an aim driven, goal oriented approach in order to solve problems resulting by the globalization process. But there is only little research in order to find an explanation of how exactly GG is organized. The first essential question to answer now is: What are the factors that influence GG? The second question is: How do these factors influence GG? Third question is: Is there a relation between GG and GP? Last question: Can GG be used as a business strategy in order to increase GP? If yes, how? Research Methods: The thesis´ objective is it to figure out the relationship of involvement into Global Governance and the business´ Global Power. It is pre-assumed that an increase in Global Power leads to an increase in a business market dominating power. Thereby it will be found out, what particular can be done to gain in Global Governance involvement. Several strategies are imaginable. This thesis will work out a new strategy approach by combining 1) Porter's 5 Forces model with 2) Hirschman's model of 'voice and exit" strategies. Further the framework of Global Governance will be transferred to the traditional 5 forces model in order to detect the location of Trans-National Companies in their competitive environment. Further an additional sixth force is going to be introduced. After analyzing the competitive environment of Trans-National Companies and the impact of governmental institutions on the industry, several strategies for gaining in Global Power will be developed, using the new hybrid strategy approach as a tool. In the section of definitions (1.3), the thesis and their basic components are going to be analyzed and explained. Within the theory framework (2.1-2.4), the thesis will be set up theoretically. The case study of Gazprom as Trans-National Company will transfer the theoretical model to a practical example. Thus, Russian influence on the world market (for energy) rises, and the situation concerned Europe directly, the example chosen is very relevant and of actuality. In the end the findings will be evaluated. The unit of analysis used in the theory framework is based on the global level. That is rationale because Global Actors in general are going to form the basis of the framework. However, the topic itself implies choosing the global level as unit of analysis. The case study will concentrate on a specific firm. Here it will be switched to the firma level as unit of analysis. That makes sense, because there are only little volumes of industries that do globalize. On the other hand on the global level there is already everything globalized. Only the smallest unit of analysis fits here, because on the firm level there can be made a decision if to go global or not. Further the unit of the other player is scaled in the same small way.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: 1.Introduction7 1.1Research Question10 1.2Research Methods11 1.3Terms and Definitions13 1.3.1Globalization13 1.3.2Global Governance15 1.3.3Power20 1.3.4Strategy27 2.Theory Framework30 2.1Global Actors in Global Governance's Competitive Environment30 2.1.1The Role of Civil Society in Global Governance30 2.1.2The Role of International Organizations in Global Governance32 2.1.3The Role of the State in Global Governance33 2.1.4The Role of TNC in the Global Governance36 2.2Porters 5 Forces Industry Analysis of TNCs37 2.2.1Rivalry37 2.2.2Threat of Substitutes41 2.2.3Threat of New Entrants42 2.2.4Bargaining Power of Buyer and Supplier43 2.3The Government and International Organizations as Sixth Force45 2.4Elaboration of TNCs´ BP Rising Strategies52 2.4.1Self Regulatory Institutions (SRIs)54 2.4.2Privatization of the Public Sector54 2.4.3Quasi-Regulation55 2.4.4Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)55 2.5Conclusion of Theory Framework57 3.Case Study: Gazprom61 3.1History Background of Russians Policy61 3.2Economy Background63 3.3Strategy framework64 3.3.1Gazprom and Russia64 3.3.2Gazprom and NGO´s65 3.3.3Gazprom and Europe66 4.Conclusion69 Bibliography70 Appendix72Textprobe:Textprobe: Chapter 2.2, Porters 5 Forces Industry Analysis of TNCs: Figure 11 sums up the transformation of GAs to the Porter's model. It illustrates the factors that influence the competitive environment in GG in terms of Global Power of TNCs. In the following it will be provided an analysis of the relevant forces and the competitive environment of TNCs on the GG layer in terms of GP. That analysis serves the purpose to detect the best fitting strategy for TNCs in order to increase the industry's BP. 2.2.1, Rivalry: Strong competition among rival firms decreases profits and makes the industry less attractive. However, competition is not always perfect and firms are not only price takers, but strive for a competitive advantage over their rivals, too. The intensity of rivalry is influenced by a set industry characteristics. The traditional aspects are the volume of competitors, the market growth, the aspect of the entrance cost and exit costs, the switching costs and the level of product differentiation. Rivalry will be increased by a larger number of firms, because more firms must compete for the same purpose. Rivalry even intensifies, if the firms have similar market volume and impact. When looking at the TNCs as firms, who compete for GP, there is a large number of such. In comparison, there are a lot of global player coming from different countries, representing different intentions, but only less alternatives to influence a global decision making process, or a national decision making process, that affects the world globally (demand). In fact, there are in total sum 44,000 TNCs in the world, with 280,000 subsidiaries and an annual turnover of US$ 7,000 billion. Two-thirds of world trade results from TNC production networks. The share of world GDP controlled by TNCs has grown from 17 percent in the mid-60s to 24 percent in 1984 and almost 33 percent in 1995 (UNCTAD). 51 of the world's largest economies are in fact TNCs. Continuous mergers and take-overs have created a situation in which almost every sector of the global economy is controlled by a handful of TNCs. On a whole the total volume of TNCs is rather high; however there is only little Global Power available. Due to that aspect, rivalry is high. If there is a growing market, firms are able to increase revenues simply because of the economic growth itself. A slow market growth causes firms to combat for market share and rivalry grows. Here we are talking about the market of GP in GG. The market size is only hard to measure. However it will be assumed that ongoing globalization is the factor that results in a growth in the market for assessing GP in GG. According to that argument, rivalry will be decreased within the industry of TNCs. When the majority of costs are fixed, the firm must produce near capacity to attain the lowest unit costs. Since the firm must sell a larger quantity of the product in order to benefit from economies of scale, high levels of production lead to a fight for market share and results in increased rivalry. In this case the 'product' TNCs produce is too abstract, to link it anyhow to fix or variable costs. What TNCs 'sell' is not their actual product (e.g. General Motors sells cars), but the influence they have in economy. As a result, it can be said that the more BP a TNC already has, the more influence it has, the lower costs every additional unit added. So the theory of economies of scale can be covered. However, there are no other fixed costs than the fixed costs of running the business anyhow. To sum up, it can be said that the fixed costs in the TNC´s industry are indifferent. However, there can be detected an economies of scale effect. Thus, rivalry in the existing market becomes higher. When a customer can freely switch from one product to another there is a greater struggle to capture customers. Low switching costs increase rivalry. The customer in our case is the national government (or International Organization) as GA who uses the BP of a TNC as product in order to benefit from it in terms of increasing its own GP. Switching costs may arrive when asking which TNC in detail to support. There might be done distinctions from TNCs operation industry (such as energy sector, security sector or media business). This notion leads to the argument of diversification of the product, which will be explained further. In addition here plays the linkage of the TNC an essential role; If the TNC is somehow linked to activities with other GAs. Thought, switching costs in general are assumed to be high, not at least of the lack in trust, experience, information and transparency. Therefore rivalry rises. Low levels of product differentiation leads to higher levels of rivalry. The product itself is defined to be the GB. That influence can be differentiated first in the sense of the actual product offered. Textile producer may have an other channel of influence than companies in the energy sector. It can be detected that most of the TNCs are operating in the industry of petroleum exploiter, processor and distributor (see appendix 1 and 2). What exact relationship there exists is not part of this thesis, however it will be assumed that there must be 'better preferred' industriey. The second and probably related influence measure tool is the 3 dimensions of power approach. Each industry and each TNC concentrates on a different mixture of the power dimensions in providing power. On a whole there is a high level of product differentiation, and therefore a higher level of rivalry. High exit barriers place a high cost on abandoning the product. The firm is forced to compete. High exit barriers cause a firm to remain in an industry, even when the venture is not profitable. A common exit barrier is asset specificity. When a TNC wants to exit the industry, the barriers are low. Far from it! Other competitors or GAs would pay a high price in order to take over the business. That argument leads to a slightly decrease in rivalry. To sum up, rivalry in the TNC industry is relatively high, due to the large number of competitors, scale effects, and high level of product differentiation. There also exists an approach to make rivalry measurable by indicators of industry concentration. One instrument is the Concentration Ratio (further abbreviated as CR). The CR indicates the percent of market share held by the largest (4 - 50) firms within the industry. A high CR means less competition, whereby a low CR indicates a high competitive pressure. The industry is concentrated, when a high volume of market share is held by the (4 - 50) largest firms; then the CR is high. With only a few firms holding a large market share, the competitive landscape is less competitive because it is closer to an oligopoly or to a monopoly. If the industry is characterized by many rivals from whom none of them has a significant market share, we see a low concentration ratio. Fragmented markets are more likely to be highly competitive.

Documents CIDOB: 16Antoni Sastre Bel, Independent consultant specializing in peace mediation, conflict resolution, EU foreign policy, and EU-Africa relations. sastrebel.antoni@alumni.eui.euWinner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.







This paper examines EU engagement in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically in Ethiopia's Tigray war and the conflict in Sudan. It uses the analytical framework of "multi-mediation" to map, classify and analyse the mediation-related initiatives carried out by the EU. The ultimate goal is to defend the use of peace mediation as a cost-efficient and less coercive foreign policy tool, well-suited to safeguarding the EU's peace and security interests in the African continent. The conclusion presents three main points: a) the EU is well-equipped to engage in mediation and be considered a "multi-mediator"; b) the EU has structural limitations which prevent it from fully mobilising these capacities and from leading mediation efforts; c) the EU is uniquely well-placed to leverage its resources and support mediation through a nuanced normative approach that can positively impact peace processes.Key words: EU, Ethiopia, Tigray, Sudan, mediation, normative approach, foreign policy INTRODUCTION"For us, the European Union, you are more than just a neighbour. Both our unions are built on a dream – a dream of peace."Six days after assuming her new post, Ursula von der Leyen uttered this phrase at the headquarters of the African Union (AU), in what it was her first official trip as President of the European Commission (EC) (Herszenhorn, 2019). Two weeks earlier, on November 27th, 2019, when presenting her College of Commissioners at the European Parliament, she had outlined her vision to implement what she called the "geopolitical Commission" (European Commission, 2019). With it she expressed her ambition to consolidate the EU as an international, assertive and pragmatic actor operating in the "high politics" domain to advance its strategic interests in the world (Blockmans, 2020). Within this agenda, EU-Africa relations occupy a central place. This was illustrated by Von der Leyen's first trip abroad or by the Mission Letter given to Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), in which the first objective was to design a new "comprehensive strategy with Africa" (Von der Leyen, 2019: 4). This request was later met with the Comprehensive Strategy presented by the EC and the High Representative (HRVP) in March 2020. This document underlined peace and security as one of the top five cooperation areas (European Commission, 2020a). Peace and security have been a major priority of EU-AU relations since the partnership was enshrined in 2007 with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2007: 5). The reason for this is the EU perception that to safeguard its internal security it is necessary to stabilise its neighbours and avoid damaging spillover effects. While the EU tool to ensure peace on its eastern borders has been the enlargement process, the EU-Africa partnership was the framework to address the security concerns (among others) in the EU's southern neighbourhood and its surroundings. Furthermore, the conflict management aspect has gained importance within the EU approach to Africa as it is seen as a prerequisite for achieving its other interests there, such as migration reduction or trade and economic relations. For this reason, it is no surprise that the new commission, which has a clear geopolitical ambition, considers the African continent and its security as a strategic priority for the EU.Since 2007, the EU has been investing heavily in stabilisation efforts in the African continent. Nevertheless, until now most of the resources have been concentrated in police, military and defence initiatives, such as the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations or the support for Peace and Support Operations (PSOs) led by the AU and the subsequent Regional Mechanisms.1 This is concerning, taking into account that this approach is financially very costly, politically risky and, considering its results, ineffective in achieving stability (Tull, 2022; Van der Lijn et al., 2022; Herrberg, 2021). As a result, other conflict prevention and resolution instruments which could be useful have been overlooked. Among them, peace mediation is a cost-effective, less coercive and less interventionist tool which seems to be underexploited (International Crisis Group, 2021: 2). This unequal balance raises questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU approach to peace and security in the African continent, and questions whether the EU is fully leveraging the potential of its tools and institutions.To address this conundrum, this research will investigate and analyse EU engagement in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa during the last Von der Leyen commission. The goal is to comprehend if and how the EU, under this new "geopolitical Commission", has been turning to conflict mediation by looking into the nature, level and magnitude of the EU's engagement, and to identify its strengths, weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. More widely, this research aims to better understand if the EU exploits mediation's full potential to advance its peace and security interests in the African continent. For this purpose, the research question is: How has the EU engaged in conflict mediation in sub-Saharan Africa during the Von der Leyen commission? To empirically address this question, this research uses two case studies: the Ethiopia-Tigray war (2020-2022) and the current conflict in Sudan (April 2023-present). These cases have been selected because: they occur within the selected time frame; happen in a geographical area of strategic significance for the EU; are categorised by their high intensity in terms of violence and humanitarian impact; and have involved multiple foreign actors and mediation processes. The data on the EU engagement in peace mediation in these two case studies has been collected through two qualitative methods. Document analysis has been used to identify the multiple EU engagements and to capture the public and official EU position. To complement the gaps in the publicly available information and to obtain deeper analysis about the EU's actions, 11 semi-structured interviews with experts and decision-makers have been conducted. There is a wide literature on EU security and peace efforts in the African continent, which generally depicts the EU as an actor focused on conflict management and stabilisation through the provision of security assistance (Lavallée & Volkel, 2015; Olsen, 2009; Gegout, 2009; Raineri & Strazzari 2019; Venturi, 2017). Nonetheless, the literature on EU foreign policy has not extensively covered the EU's role in mediation (Bergmann et al., 2018: 6-7), and EU mediation in sub-Saharan Africa specifically has received little attention. While EU meditation in the neighbourhood has received wider attention (International Negotiation, 2018; Bergmann, 2020a; Vukovic, 2020), only two papers on EU mediation in sub-Saharan Africa have been published (Müller & Bergmann, 2020; Davis, 2018). Given this, this paper provides three main contributions. First, it adds analysis to the scarce literature on EU mediation and specifically on the implementation of this practice in the African continent. This is done by comparing EU engagement in both case studies. Second, it delves into the institutional architecture of EU mediation and its capacities and makes two conclusions: one, the EU has the capacities to be considered a multi-mediator, meaning an actor capable of operating on different tracks, levels and stages of peace mediation processes; and two, the EU has structural limitations that prevent it from fully mobilising these capacities and leading mediation. Third, the article will also touch on the practical implications that normativity can have on the role of the EU as a mediator, which is a very novel topic in the literature (Vukovic, 2020; Nouwen, 2022; Caruso & Akamo, 2024). EU FOREIGN POLICY AND MEDIATIONThis section will briefly explain EU foreign policy, concentrating on the role of mediation. When the Maastricht Treaty was adopted in 1992, one of the preambular clauses announced the intention of creating a "common foreign and security policy… in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the World" (Treaty on European Union, 1992: 1). With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU expressed its ambitions to be an actor with a strong foreign policy capable of advancing its interests outside Europe, including among others peace and security. This aspiration would later be consolidated with the approval of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty that proclaimed in Article 2 "to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007: 11). As such, from the 1990s the EU started to develop multiple institutions and strategies intended to realise this key foreign policy objective of promoting peace and security.One of the ways to achieve this foreign policy goal is through mediation. There are multiple definitions of mediation, but the 2009 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities describes it as "a way of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts with the support of an acceptable third party" (Council of the European Union 2009: 2). The first time that the term "mediation" was explicitly mentioned as a possible tool to be used in EU foreign policy was in the Implementation Report of the ESS approved by the council in 2008. The report issued a call "toexpand dialogue and mediation capacities" and regarded them as instruments to advance the EU strategic objective of conflict prevention (Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council, 2009: 21). Even though "mediation" was not included in official EU strategic documents until 2008, several scholars have emphasised that this tool had begun to be used earlier, in the late 1990s, under the lead of High Representative Javier Solana. As Herrberg explains, Solana set the precedent of EU mediation capacity when, among others, he helped to negotiate the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 and mediated between Serbia and Montenegro in 2002 (Herrberg, 2021:135). After years of practice and in the context of an ambitious foreign policy, in November 2009 the council adopted the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. The aim of the concept was to provide a "systematic approach" to mediation which is recognised as an "effective and cost-efficient instrument for conflict prevention, transformation and resolution" (Council of the European Union, 2009: 3). This document is important for three reasons. First, because it institutionalised the EU's ambition to use mediation as a foreign policy tool (Bergmann et al.,2018). Second, because it provided a much broader definition of mediation than the average definitions available in the literature on mediation (Bergmann et al., 2018; Haastrup et al., 2014). Haastrup et al. (2014: 3) believe that this was a deliberate choice with which the EU aimed to present a wide number of actions that could be conducted under the banner of "mediation". This point is substantiated by the fact that the concept introduced five different types of mediation (lead or co-mediator, promoting, leveraging, supporting and funding) among which just one (to lead or co-mediate) implies being directly engaged in the process, while the others are about mediation support (Council of the European Union, 2009: 6). Third, because the EU justified its interests in mediating and capability to mediate by presenting itself as a normative actor2 (Davis, 2014: 69; Nouwen, 2022), and established five guiding principles, which included acting in accordance with human rights and international humanitarian law (Council of the European Union, 2009: 6-8). In June 2016, the council approved the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) that replaced the 2003 ESS as the new security and foreign policy guiding document. The EUGS advocated for a stronger foreign policy as it interlinked internal and external EU security. To this end, it introduced the Integrated Approach, which consisted of harmonising the use of all EU foreign policy instruments under the purpose of advancing its strategic interests. Mediation was presented as a tool to be used throughout the conflict cycle (from prevention to resolution) in conjunction with the whole foreign policy toolkit (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 29-31). The Integrated Approach encouraged the use of mediation (Bergmann & Friesen, 2021) and provided it with further leverage, as under its implementation the EU could offer a wide range of instruments to incentivise peace agreements (development and economic aid), support them (capacity building provision) and sustain them (CSDP missions for post-conflict stabilisation).As a result of the Integrated Approach and the lessons learnt since 2009, in December 2020 the council approved the new Concept on EU Peace Mediation, which cemented the conception of mediation as a strategic and foreign policy tool. The 2020 concept also fulfilled the EU's normative commitment by declaring itself to be a "value-based" actor aiming to promote its "foundational values" (Panchulidze & Bergmann, 2021: 2) and by including new "guiding principles" for its mediation efforts, such as inclusivity or promotion of gender equality. The 2020 concept proposed implementing a multi-track approach in conjunction with other actors such as partners or mediation NGOs (Herrberg, 2021) and introduced new actions that could be considered mediation, including: facilitating, accompanying, coordinating and supporting process outcome (Council of the European Union, 2020a:10-11). EU mediation actorsOne strength of the EU as a mediator is that it has multiple institutions and actors capable of undertaking complementary action. The front-line institutions in mediation are the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) (Interview I.11). According to their mandate, their tasks can include "negotiation… mediation and/or support to mediation" (Council of the European Union, 2009: 5). Other key actors are EU Delegations, Special Envoys (nominated for ad hoc cases and can include politicians from member states), HRVPs and even the member states (MSs) themselves after being delegated by the council (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Furthermore, in some circumstances, the CSDP missions or the EC can also be involved in mediation on very specific issues such as security arrangements (Davis, 2014). At the coordination level there is the European External Action Service and its Mediation Support Unit that provides mediation capacity building to EU institutions, member states and even external partners (Interview I.11; Herrberg, 2021). Another category of relevant actors are the mediation NGOs, which receive funding from the EU and on several occasions have acted in coordination with it. (Interview I.1, I.8 and I.11; Herrberg, 2021). THE EU AS A MEDIATOR In this section I will briefly explain how the literature has been perceiving, portraying and approaching the EU as a mediator. One of the first papers on the topic was from Susanne Gentz, who in 2007 illustrated that before the Concepts were developed, the EU addressed conflict prevention and resolution through the use of political dialogue and exercised leverage through the conditionality implied in its financial and development programmes. Since then, academics and mediation NGOs have conducted further research on the topic. Still, some authors argue that there has been insufficient study of the possible modalities and impacts of EU mediation (Bergmann et al., 2018; Herrberg, 2021).An important part of the literature has evaluated the impact and effectiveness of EU mediation. Herrberg (Herrberg, 2018) and Bergmann have developed the two main analytical frameworks. They devised two separate frameworks for mediation (Bergmann, 2020b) and mediation support (Müller & Bergmann, 2020). Another aspect that has been addressed by the literature, and which I will investigate with this article, concerns the type of engagement that characterises EU mediation. A point shared by multiple authors is that EU mediation can take multiple forms, or as Herrberg put it, can be "at the table" (leading, co-leading or mediating), "around the table" (mediation support) and/or "beyond the table" (sustaining the process) (2021: 139). Laura Davis in her 2014 book was a forerunner of the concept of "multi-mediator" (2014: 196). She used the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo to demonstrate the EU's ability to operate via a multi-layered, multi-dynamic, multilateral and multi-track approach (2014). Sheriff and Hauck presented an analytical compilation of multiple EU mediation cases in which they illustrated that their success depended on the EU's capacity to exploit and leverage its specific comparative advantages in every conflict (2013). Another angle is the normativity of EU mediation. Nouwen explains that the normative character of the 2009 and 2020 concepts, together with the Eurocentrism and lack of self-reflexion ingrained in them, represent a baggage that can prevent the EU from understanding and exploiting its real added value and leverage (2022). Some scholars argue that the normative agenda can limit EU mediation's reach (Haastrup et al. 2014; Peral, 2012), and Caruso and Akamo illustrate how this dilemma materialised in the Ethiopia-Tigray war (2024). Against these points, Davies expounded that the EU's capacity to put forward a normative agenda depends on establishing clear and commonly agreed guidelines and limits on it (2014), and in this vein Bergmann and Friesen proposed a "strategic framework of overarching normative principles" (2021: 6). Finally, another often overlooked component is the interaction between the EU and independent mediation NGOs. Several scholars have highlighted how the EU has frequently used mediation NGOs to expand its reach (Haastrup et al., 2014), and how these organisations have granted it access to the grassroots (Davis, 2014) and contexts in which the EU is not institutionally welcomed (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Herrberg went further and endorsed NGOs as an answer to the EU's recurrent lack of flexibility and continuity, internal divisions, complex decision-making and bureaucratic constraints (2012). THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIPThis section provides the context for the case studies and introduces EU-Africa relations and the EU approach to the Horn. EU interests in the African continent are longstanding and peace and security comprise one of the major priorities. The 2016 EUGS is a good reflection of this, as it directly links EU security to stability in the African continent, and calls for diplomacy, CSDP and development funds to step up conflict prevention and resolution in the continent (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 36). From the end of the Second World War until the 2000s, relations between the EU and the African countries were characterised by their asymmetry and consisted of economic cooperation based on the EU-African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries format. This dynamic started to change with the Lomé IV Convention in 1995 which included new areas of engagement such as democracy and good governance (Haastrup et al., 2021), and more widely with the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 which for the first time established peace as a policy priority, and even underlined the need for "mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts" (European Commission, 2014: 26). In 2001 the African countries created the African Union, which entered into force in 2002 (Haastrup et al., 2021). That same year, the AU created the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which would operate as its "collective mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution" and involved the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), two Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and other subsequent institutions (Mabera, 2020: 2). The EU backed the creation of the AU and the APSA, and to support them in 2004 it created the African Peace Facility (APF) in response to the request made at the July 2003 AU Summit in Maputo (Mabera, 2020).In 2007, the EU and AU signed the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership – A Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which placed a strong focus on peace and security and laid the foundations of the current EU contribution and approach to African peace and security. This document recognised the APSA as the main framework with which to cooperate, and its institutions as the actors responsible for peace and security in the continent and, therefore, the first responders to crisis. Under this scheme, the JAES states that the EU will consistently support the APSA through capacity building, training and funding, and that both institutions will strengthen cooperation and coordination in "conflict prevention and … conflict resolution" (Council of the European Union, 2007: 5). Since 2007, this cooperation modus operandi has been maintained and reinforced through multiple strategic documents and summits to date3 . The support for the APSA can be considered the backbone of EU foreign and security policy towards Africa (Interview I.11). Mediation and mediation support have been provided for in the EU-Africa partnership as instruments for conflict prevention and resolution. Since 2007, the EU has been providing training, capacity building and funding to APSA institutions that are directly or indirectly involved in mediation, such as the Panel of the Wise, the AU PSC and all the corresponding mediation units of the RMs and RECs (European Parliament, 2014). By way of examples, in 2016 the EU helped the AU to create its Mediation Support Unit (MSU); in 2019 it provided support to the IGAD MSU (Bustamante & Carvalho, 2020); and in the 2018 EU-AU Memorandum of Understanding both organisations championed the use of mediation and recommended incrementing their experts' capacity building in this field (Council of the European Union, 2018a). Nevertheless, despite these multiple commitments, one of the most common criticisms of the EU-Africa partnership is that most of the resources are allocated to Peace and Support Operations (PSOs), and therefore to military and police support, rather than to conflict prevention, resolution and mediation (Yohannes & Dessa, 2021; Bergmann, 2023). This is clearly illustrated with the case of the APF.The APF has been the main source of funding for the APSA, largely coming from the EU, and it financed three components: the PSOs, APSA capacity building (including the mediation institutions mentioned above) and the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). The ERM was aimed at funding the APSA's fast-track and preventive efforts at the early stages of conflict, such as "mediation, shuttle diplomacy, the deployment of human rights observers or fact-finding missions" (International Crisis Group, 2021a: 4). It has provided significant support to multiple mediation initiatives that resulted in peace agreements, such as in South Sudan (Müller & Bergmann, 2020) or Kenya (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Nonetheless, from 2004 until 2019 the EU provided around €2.9bn through the APF, and from this total 93% was for PSOs, while 6% went to APSA's capacity building and 1% to the ERM (International Crisis Group, 2021a: 2). This demonstrates the prioritisation of securitisation over mediation and conflict prevention support. In 2021, the APF was replaced by the European Peace Facility (EPF), which funds PSOs, and by the NDICI-Global Europe programme, which covers the APSA's capacity building and the ERM. This change has been identified as an example of the EU's pragmatic turn in its peace and security policy towards the African continent, because of the following implications. First, in contrast to the APF, the EPF for the first time will allow the EU and its member states to provide lethal equipment and bilateral military capacity building to partner countries, signalling the EU's interest in taking a much more defence-focused and militaristic approach (Bergmann, 2023). Second, while with the APF the AU oversaw and administered the funds received from the EU, with the EPF the EU will directly channel the funding to specific countries or ad hoc organisations without needing to consult with the AU. Some experts consider that sidelining the AU will diminish the APSA as a whole, as it breaks the subsidiarity rule and delegitimises the continental multilateral system (Woldemichael, 2022; Bergmann, 2023; Hauck & Tadesse, 2021). Third, unlike the APF, the EPF and the NDICI are two platforms with a global scope and consequently without clear earmarked funds for Africa. This complicates the financial planning of the AU PSOs that were dependent on the APF, and it risks dissipating the support provided to Africa in the event that new priorities (such as Ukraine) appear on the European agenda (International Crisis Group, 2021a; Hauck & Tadesse, 2021). The EU has conceived the EPF as a platform to guarantee tighter control over the peace and security funding that it provides abroad (Woldemichael, 2022) and as a vehicle to fulfil its geopolitical aspirations (Bergmann, 2023; Hauck & Tadesse, 2021). Nevertheless, it has also raised concern about it being a tool for potential increased interventionism in the African continent without African states' consent (Woldemichael, 2022). Additionally, the EU's pragmatic and geopolitical turn may increase with the new 2024 commission, which has clearly indicated that it will focus on the EU's immediate neighbourhood, enlargement and Russia (Louw-Vaudran, 2024). Besides the EPF, the EU's peace and security approach to the African continent has not been exempt from criticism. Over the last few years specifically the African elites and the population have displayed an increasing scepticism towards Europe (Hauck & Tadesse, 2021; Carbone, 2023; Tadesse & Di Commo, 2023). Some authors point at the asymmetric relationship of financial dependency between the AU and the EU (Yohannes & Dessa, 2021), which has also implied dynamics of "norms-setter versus norm taker" and "carrot and stick approaches" (Tadesse & Di Commo, 2023: 5), as a reason for the African states' pushback on the current partnership. Another argument widely shared within the scholar community is that EU support for the African continent has largely been securitised to advance its own migration and security agenda, rather than being based on reciprocity and development policies, as claimed (Pye, 2024; Lavallée & Volkel, 2015; Venturi, 2017; Raineri & Strazzari, 2019). A third school of thought approaches EU-Africa relations from a structural perspective and argues that the EU rationale guiding its actions in the African continent follows a deeper hierarchy with colonial roots that neglects African agency in the partnership (Carbone, 2023; Hoijtink et al., 2023) and makes cynical use of the continent to cast the EU as a strong foreign policy and security actor (Gegout, 2009; Olsen, 2009; Haastrup et al., 2021; Pye, 2024). If these concerns are not examined by EU policymakers and a true relationship of equals is not pursued, the resentment towards Europe may well increase, rendering its peace and security policies ineffective. As a concluding point, even though peace and security are a key pillar of EU-Africa relations, in practice peace mediation appears to play a minor role within the EU strategy towards the continent. Furthermore, the new signals sent out with the creation of the EPF or the new commission's priorities indicate that this role will probably become even smaller.EU and the Horn The Horn of Africa is located in the north-eastern corner of the continent and comprises the following countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. These countries are part of the AU and are also all the members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Council of the European Union, 2011). In November 2011, the council adopted the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa and in 2015, the Regional Action Plan: Horn of Africa 2015-2020. Both documents were justified referencing the geostrategic positioning of the region (on the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden) and the importance of its stability for the EU. Their priorities were peacebuilding, good governance and prevention of instability. The 2015 Action Plan included migration and the Red Sea. Both documents uphold regional ownership and action as the only solution to these challenges, and consequently call for supporting the IGAD and AU. Furthermore, they defended the use of mediation as a crisis prevention and management tool, and vowed to back local, regional and international mediation initiatives (Council of the European Union, 2011; 2015). The 2016 EUGS also pointed to the Horn as a priority area and proposed to address its regional challenges by developing "triangular relationships" of diplomacy between the Horn, North Africa and the Gulf (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 35). In May 2021, the council endorsed a new strategy for the Horn, which built on the 2011 Strategic Framework, placed new emphasis on inclusivity and human rights and reiterated the need to support African-owned dialogue and mediation mechanisms (Council of the European Union, 2021c). The 2011 Strategic Framework approved the appointment of the EUSR for the Horn, who would lead the diplomatic approach to the region (established by their corresponding mandate) and harmonise the different EU instruments and programmes (Council of the European Union, 2011). During the period of our two case studies, two consecutive mandates instructed the EUSR for the Horn to advance peace, security and stability within the region and to cooperate with multiple actors ranging from civil society to the Gulf countries and Egypt. Additionally, the documents incorporated normative commitments such as promoting EU human rights policy, IHL and humanitarian access (Council of the European Union, 2018; Council of the European Union, 2021d). The 2021 mandate specifically included the need to support political transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan and commanded the EUSR to "initiate/steer, support and promote" Africa-owned dialogue, negotiation and mediation for conflict prevention and resolution (Council of the European Union, 2021d: 2). ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK To respond to the research question, I will conduct a comprehensive mapping of the different mediation-related actions undertaken by the EU in the two selected case studies (the 2020-2022 Ethiopia-Tigray war and the ongoing conflict in Sudan) and analyse them according to the "multi-mediator" framework developed by Davies. This framework is based on the concept of "multi-mediator", which denotes a mediator capable of operating through multiple mediation tracks, engaging at multiple layers (from the local to the international), acting at multiple conflict phases (from prevention to implementation of peace agreements) and being multilateral (acting in concert with other actors). I have chosen this framework because it is accurate and well aligned with the results that I have obtained in the data analysis, in the sense that it illustrates that the EU is not a mediator with a sole modus operandi but a polyhedral actor with capacity to operate at different levels, through different institutions, with different tools and throughout the conflict cycle. To illustrate this, I will employ Davies' 2018 analytical framework with some specific modifications. The analytical framework uses the three-track model developed by Lederach, and in every track it categorises the actions according to three capabilities. In his 1997 book, Lederach divided conflict-affected societies into three different "tracks" that can engage in mediation. Track I includes the "top leadership", Track II the "middle-range leadership" which encompasses civil society organisations (CSOs), religious authorities, influential figures or mid-level politicians, and Track III comprises grassroots leadership and local communities (Lederach, 1997).The capabilities are:Capability to engage, which considers the interactions with the warring parties by employing EU "policies, institutional set-up and instruments" (Davies, 2018: 183). This includes the initiatives taken by the EUSRs, delegations or others and the exertion of leverage through incentives and punitive measures. This engagement can be either to directly mediate or to support third party mediation. Capability to fund, which refers to the use of EU instruments to fund mediation support processes. Capability to coordinate and cooperate, which covers two aspects. The first is the capacity to create internal cohesion both between EU institutions and between the EU and member states. The second is engagement with external actors that are not the warring parties (such as international and regional organisations, foreign governments, local authorities or CSOs) to back the mediation process. As the external coordination and cooperation activities are mostly used to gather and garner support for third parties' initiatives (Davies, 2018), in this aspect I also include the capacity to endorse which is defined as giving support to present "a third party as competent and legitimate" (Müller & Bergmann, 2020: 153). Additionally, the EU has presented itself in both mediation concepts as a values-based and hence normative actor. Therefore, observations on this point will be made using specific examples in the Analysis section, while a wider evaluation of the consequences and limits of this normative approach will follow in the Discussion.METHODOLOGYI used qualitative methods document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data was then categorised and analysed according to the analytical framework. Additionally, some secondary sources have been consulted to enrich the analysis.Time frame and case study selectionTo illustrate the extent of EU mediation during the first Von der Leyen commission (2019-2024), this research uses two case studies: the 2020-2022 Ethiopia-Tigray war and the ongoing conflict (since April 15th, 2023) in Sudan. These two case studies were chosen for the following reasons. First, both conflicts happen in a geographical area of strategic significance for the EU (Council of the European Union, 2021c), so the EU would be expected to have a strong interest in finding a solution to end the violence. Second, they are two fully-fledged wars with profound humanitarian impacts and feature widespread human rights abuses. Given that the EU portrays itself as an actor aiming to "promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the World" (Treaty on European Union, 1992: 1) and the fact that the EU is the major provider of humanitarian aid to the African continent, it would be logical to assert that both wars are of concern to the EU. Third, both cases happen in a context where multiple foreign actors became involved and there were various peace mediation initiatives,4 hence given the geopolitical aspirations of this new commission it is worth exploring how the EU copes in this context.One challenge that arises from the selection of these two case studies is the fact that the Sudan conflict is still ongoing. As a result, the analysis of the Sudan case study has been limited to the period from April 2023 (when hostilities began) to April 30th, 2024.5Data-collection methodsDocument analysis has been used to review the public statements and documents of the EU to understand its positions, the support announced to third parties and to identify the main actions and processes implemented in the two case studies. The data gathered for this method were the council conclusions adopted by the Council of the EU, the statements and declarations released by the EEAS, the HRVP, the EUSR for the Horn and other related institutions or actors, and the brief statements published on the social network X, by the EUSR for the Horn. The data gathered was coded into two tables, one for each case study,6 and organised chronologically. The variables in the table are Type of Engagement (including statements/council conclusions, visits, trips, meetings, calls, sanctions, provision of aid and conferences), Date, EU institution (indicating which EU actor conducted the specific action) and Description. While this method is very useful to understand the official stance of the EU, and to identify a wide variety of engagements, it has limitations related to the secrecy that characterises the mediation field and consequently I acknowledge that I am missing a lot of information that is not publicly available or announced.Semi-structured interviews were used to address the information gaps in the public information reviewed through document analysis, and to provide a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of the processes that underpin EU mediation in the two case studies. I interviewed 11 experts via phone or video call: scholars, EU officials, officers from independent mediation organisations, members of Sudanese and Ethiopian civil society and a Tigrayan mediator. I interviewed professionals with a wide range of expertise and stakes to gain an understanding of the topic from many angles. The content of the interviews varied according to the specialisation of the interviewee and concentrated on the EU mediation capabilities in general or specifically in the case studies. Out of the 11 interviewees, six are Europeans and five are Africans, from Ethiopia and Sudan. This geographical composition was chosen purposely to integrate opinions and perceptions from both sides of the EU-Africa partnership and therefore to spot what is missing or unnecessary. All the interviews have been anonymised, numbered and included in the references. LimitationsThis research identified the following limitations. First, it was difficult to find the financial information on the support provided to the African Union, IGAD or other mediation support initiatives. This is probably because this information will only be released years after the interventions are completed. For this reason, the data used in the capability to fund section is generic and has come from the interviews and the document analysis. Second, the mediation field is traditionally based on secrecy, therefore it was difficult to obtain specific information on all the actions conducted by the EU. This was present in the interviews, as on several occasions the interviewees expressed their desire not to comment on information that was deemed confidential. Equally, at the time the research was conducted, the European Commission term had not finished so there was not enough reflection on its impact. The issue of secrecy is aggravated by the fact that the civil war in Sudan is still ongoing and this is also a reason why there is less information available. Finally, using a case study methodology implies a significant limitation in extrapolating the results of this article to EU engagement in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. In essence, EU mediation depends on multiple factors that must not be oversimplified. The historical and present context of each country and of every conflict is unique, so peace mediation practices will always have to be adapted to the specific context. Specifically, the two case studies are both from the Horn of Africa, and therefore their characteristics differ from other regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, these case studies reveal trends and concerns which are of relevance for the field. ANALYSISThe Ethiopia-Tigray war (November 2020- November 2022)BackgroundAfter several months of internal disputes over political and constitution issues, on November 4th, 2020, fighting erupted in Ethiopia's northern region of Tigray between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). The conflict ended on November 2nd, 2022, with the Pretoria Agreement. The war had different stages with many offensives and counter-offensives between the two sides and spread throughout the northern part of the country, almost reaching the capital Addis Ababa (International Crisis Group, 2022). During the war, the ENDF received military support from Eritrean troops and regional paramilitary forces. The war resulted in at least 307,568 fatalities (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2023), forced the displacement of more than 4.2 million people (International Organization for Migration, 2022) and there were multiple reports of widespread war crimes and human rights violations committed by both sides (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022).Despite initial mediation attempts by the IGAD, the main peace agreement was mediated by the African Union envoy, Olusegun Obasanjo, supported by the former Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and South Africa's former deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The AU efforts were strongly supported by the US, and to a certain extent by the EU. Besides Eritrea, which was a direct warring faction, both sides received different degrees of support from foreign actors such as Sudan, Egypt, the UAE, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran (Abate, 2023; Caruso & Akamo, 2024). Capabilities Track ICapability to engage The whole EU engagement in the mediation process was focused not on directly mediating but on supporting the mediation efforts led by the AU (Interviews I.3; I.8). Together with mediation support, the two other pillars of the EU approach were normative and consisted of calling for humanitarian aid provision to Tigray and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). The EU engagement was conducted through the Special Envoy, the EUSR for the Horn and in some instances through the higher authorities. This last category includes some specific meetings such as the one held by HRVP Josep Borrell with the Ethiopian foreign affairs minister in December 2020 (European External Action Service, 2020b), or the three phone conversations that President of the European Council Charles Michel held with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2021 and 2022 (Council of the European Union, 2021a; 2021e; 2022c). More than having an impact, these surgical interventions served to clearly lay out the aforementioned three pillars of the EU position.The EU stepped up its engagement in late January 2021 when Borrell appointed Pekka Haavisto, the then Finnish minister of foreign affairs, as his Special Envoy to Ethiopia (Finland in EU, 2021). Haavisto made two trips to the Horn, in February and April 2021, together with EUSR for the Horn Alexander Rondos, in which he held multiple meetings with Ethiopian senior officials, including Abiy and President Sahle Work-Zewde (Pekka Haavisto, 2021a; 2021b; 2021g; 2021h; 2021i). The purpose was to engage with the Ethiopian authorities and regional partners, to pressure for dialogue and a ceasefire, humanitarian access to Tigray and compliance with IHL. Nevertheless, his role as special envoy ended in June 2021 after he revealed to the European Parliament the plausibility that the federal government was committing ethnic cleansing (Interview I.9; Cara, 2021). In the interviews, Haavisto's appointment was perceived as a clear example of the EU's readiness to step up mediation resources (Interview I.8) and despite the limitations his engagements were recognised as positive (Interviews I.2; I.9). The most active EU actor in mediation engagement was the EUSR for the Horn. When the conflict started, the EUSR was Alexander Rondos, but in July 2021 he was replaced by Annette Weber. According to publicly available data, Weber met in Addis Ababa with Ethiopian senior officials more than nine times (on some occasions with other EU officials)7, in which she constantly compelled them to join the AU mediation efforts and tied it to the normalisation of Ethiopia-EU relations (Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, 2021; 2022; Roland Kobia 2021; 2022; Jutta Urpilainen 2021; Annette Weber 2021; 2022a; 2022b; 2022e). Concerning Rondos, in the interviews it was confirmed that from the outset he was also strongly engaged with both sides (Interviews I.8; I.9). Two differences in approach between them that were noted in the interviews were: first, Weber's position was perceived as firmly pragmatic, while Rondos balanced pragmatism with strong normative principles (Interviews I.8; I.9), and second, Rondos engaged more with the TPLF than Weber (who kept strong contact mainly with the federal government) (Interview I.9). Overall, it seems clear that both EUSRs were actively involved to support and advocate for AU mediation as the preferential solution to the conflict (Interviews I.2; I.3; I.8; I.9; I.10; I.11). Despite these efforts, almost all the interviewees agreed that the EU engagement in mediation was not meaningful enough to consider the EU an essential actor in the peace process that led to the Pretoria Agreement (Interviews I.1; I.2; I.8; I.9). In fact, the EU was rejected by the federal government as a potential observing member of the latter. The reasons identified were twofold. First, Abiy's government was resentful of the EU's tough normative position taken during the first months of the conflict, through which it accused Ethiopia of blocking humanitarian aid and committing war crimes and human rights violations. (Interviews I.1; I.2; I.8; I.9). Second, the EU lacked the leverage to bring the parties to the table, but this will be explained in the Discussion section.Capability to fundPart of the support provided to the AU, was in the form of funding channelled into sustaining the efforts of Obasanjo's team (Interview I.8). Nevertheless, the exact amounts provided were not found.Capability to coordinate and cooperateInternal divisions and lack of cohesion were identified by the majority of interviewees as one of the main causes of the lack of consistent EU engagement in the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict (Interview I.1; I.8; I.9; I.10). The strong normative position taken by Borrell, the EEAS, EUSR Rondos, DG ECHO and DG INTPA contrasted with the behaviour and interests of some member states (MSs). This played out in two ways. One was through incoherence between EU and MS policies. After the EU suspended the Budget Support Programme with Ethiopia in January 2021, some MSs such as Germany, France or Italy maintained their bilateral aid to Ethiopia and consequently diminished the EU leverage (Interview I.1). The second was imposed from the council, when the March 2021 Council Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2021b) shifted the EU normative stance to a more pragmatic one and eased the tone against Abiy's government (Interview I.1) There could be various reasons for this turn, but the most plausible seem to be political affinity and economic interests (Interview I.9), and fear that being too harsh with a strategic partner could end up pushing it towards geopolitical competitors (Interview I.8).On the subject of external coordination, this case study is a good example of how, in line with the ethos of the EU-Africa Partnership, the EU invested in coordinating and gathering support behind the AU mediation efforts (Interview I.1; I.2; I.3). This was well illustrated by the actions of the Special Envoy, the EUSR and the multiple statements of the EU. In his second mission, Haavisto visited Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt in order to harmonise positions and coordinate actions (Pekka Haavisto, 2021d; 2021e). Additionally, he also held in-person meetings and phone calls with high-ranking officials of the League of Arab States (LAS) and with UN Secretary-General António Guterres (Pekka Haavisto 2021c; 2021f; 2021j). A similar pattern was followed by the EUSR, who made several trips to the Gulf and Egypt (Egypt MFA Spokesperson, 2021; Foreign Ministry, 2021) and held meetings with Turkish and Chinese representatives (Interview I.8). Both the EUSR and Haavisto strongly engaged and coordinated with the AU (Interview I.3; I.8; Amb. Smail Chergui, 2021; Pekka Haavisto, 2021k; Amb. Bankole Adeoye, 2021; Annette Weber, 2022d; 2022f). This backing also took the form of endorsement of the AU mediation initiative, as demonstrated in the statements published by the EEAS and the Council of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2020b; 2022d; European External Action Service, 2020a; 2021a; 2022b; 2022c; 2022d), the 2021 Council Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2021b) or in the social media accounts of EU officials (Josep Borrell Fontelles, 2021; Annette Weber, 2022b; 2022d). Additionally, the EU also worked in tandem with the US to align agendas and coordinate efforts on mediation support (Interview I.1; I.2). This cooperation materialised in joint shuttle diplomacy carried out by the EUSR and the US special envoy, in August 2022, when they approached the TPLF in Mekelle (European External Action Service, 2022b). Finally, it is worth mentioning that the EU also tried to expand its coordination efforts by engaging Eritrea in June 2022 (European External Action Service, 2022a). Nonetheless, this had little impact due to the isolationist and anti-Western character of the regime in Asmara (Interview I.8). Capabilities Track II and IIICapability to fundThis research has attempted to better understand if there was EU funding for mediation NGOs working in Track 2 and 3, but it failed to obtain clear responses. The interviewees with insider knowledge of the Ethiopian peace process said that there had been no involvement of such organisations funded by the EU, and that there was no engagement at grassroots level (Interview I.8; I.9). Nevertheless, a January 2021 International Crisis Group report explained that the EU had been funding such activities (International Crisis Group, 2021b). The Sudan conflict (April 2023- present)BackgroundOn April 15th, 2023, the conflict in Sudan began between the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Hemedti and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Al-Burhan. The immediate causes were disagreements over security sector reform and specifically over how the RSF would be integrated into the SAF, as part of a long-term plan to restore civilian rule. The fighting started in Khartoum but quickly escalated and spread throughout the whole country (International Crisis Group, 2024a). On the sidelines, there is a wide amalgam of civil society groups and political parties that were part of the previous transitional process and which are key to build a political future for the country (International Crisis Group, 2024a). To May 2024, the war provoked the largest displacement crisis in the world, with 9 million internally displaced people, and a deep humanitarian catastrophe, with approximately 28 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (International Organization for Migration, 2024).The mediation context in Sudan has been characterised by its fragmentation and diversity of initiatives. The first and most prominent was the Jeddah talks led by Saudi Arabia and the US, which focused on a ceasefire and humanitarian access. The second, led by the IGAD, tried to find a political solution to the conflict. Despite its initial success this option ultimately stalled. The third, led by Egypt, involved the neighbouring countries and concentrated on humanitarian access and the regional implications of the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2023b). Until May 15th, it seemed that the AU was the institution trying to coordinate and mainstream the different processes under the same umbrella and to integrate the political solution (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2023). The last news showed that the AU aimed to do this by scaling up the Jeddah platform (Interview I.4). Due to the lack of success in this task, in March 2024 the AU created the High-Level Panel to steer efforts (Kinkoh, 2024). At the same time, in Sudan there were several actors from outside the Horn involved in supporting the two belligerents, such as Chad, UAE, Russia or Egypt, which further complicated the mediation process (Campbell-James, 2024). Capabilities Track ICapability to engageIn this case, the EU has not attempted to mediate but it is clearly supporting the African Union-led and IGAD mediation efforts, and specifically the political process rather than the military one (Interview I.4; I.7; I.11). Four interviewees said that EUSR Weber conducted intensive shuttle diplomacy between influential regional powers and on some occasions with both sides (Interview I.6; I.7; I.10; I.11; International Crisis Group, 2024b). Weber was even present in some of the IGAD mediation initiatives, such as in January 2024 in Uganda (Interview I.4; I.7), where she had a meeting with Hemedti that went public (Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, 2024). Nevertheless, it seems that these actions have been aimed at strengthening the political process and understanding the different positions rather than at directly mediating (Interview I.7). Despite this, in January 2024 the EU used its leverage to support the AU and IGAD mediation by approving sanctions against arms-supplying entities related to the SAF and the RSF aimed at pressuring the belligerents to sit down at the negotiating table (Council of the European Union, 2023e). The different reasons put forward for the EU reticence to try to mediate have been a lack of weight and willingness to deal with the military (Interview I.2; I.6), a strong focus in the democratic transition and mediation support (Interview I.3; I.7; I.11) and even the fact that both belligerents have strong ties with geopolitical adversaries such as Russia, China or Wagner (Interview I.1). Capability to fundThe EU has been providing considerable funding to the AU mediation initiative, and specifically to the AU Core Group (in which the EU is a member) and the High-Level Panel on Sudan (Interview I.4; I.7). Nevertheless, one of the interviewees outlined that the EU funding and support is insufficient or not sufficiently well allocated, arguing that the AU is not suitable yet to be a legitimate and impartial mediator, and that it requires further technical support and capacity building (Interview I.6). Capability to coordinate and cooperateConcerning internal coordination, the EU seemed to achieve more internal cohesion with the member states than in the case of Ethiopia, and France and Germany actively teamed up with the EU to address the Sudan conflict. Weber met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in May 2023 in Nairobi to coordinate efforts on Sudan and multiple times with Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock in both Nairobi and Germany (Annette Weber, 2023b; 2023h; 2024a; 2024h). Baerbock specifically travelled to Nairobi with Weber in January 2024 to engage with Kenyan President Ruto and members of Sudanese civil society (Annette Weber, 2024a). In December 2023, both countries arranged a workshop on Sudan in New York with Weber and regional and international partners (Annette Weber, 2023l). On April 15th, 2024, the France-Germany-EU trio organised the International Humanitarian Conference for Sudan in Paris, which gathered a large donor community, and on the sidelines it convened a joint seminar for Sudanese civil society organisations (Annette Weber, 2024e; French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2024). Furthermore, since the crisis started Weber has been routinely informing the EU Political and Security Committee (Annette Weber, 2023c; 2024c; 2024g). One pillar of the EU mediation strategy has been to support any consistent mediation effort led by the AU or the IGAD, in order to ensure that African institutions own the process (Interview I.3; I.4; I.7; I.11). Since April 2023, the EU has been an active member of the Extended Mechanism led by the AU Commission, which aims to coordinate the different mediation initiatives "to avoid fragmentation" (African Union, 2023a). In addition, it is working in close contact with the AU High-Level Panel and is part of the AU Core Group (Birgitte Markussen, 2023; Annette Weber 2023a; 2023l; 2024d; 2024i) in charge of offering guidance on engagement and "if needed develop Mediation and Facilitation processes" (African Union, 2023b: 4). Moreover, the EUSR has been attending most of the IGAD meetings (Interview I.4; I.7; I.10) and frequently exchanging views with its executive secretary, Workneh Gebeyeh (Hon. Aden Duale, 2023; Laranjinha EU, 2023; Annette Weber, 2023e; 2023k; 2024b; 2024f). The backing for the AU and IGAD has also taken the shape of direct endorsement through multiple EU official statements (Council of the European Union, 2023a; 2023b; 2023c; 2023d; 2024). To underpin the AU and IGAD mediation efforts, the EU has conducted extensive external coordination through shuttle diplomacy between the different relevant foreign actors. The EUSR made several trips to Egypt and the Gulf (UAE and Saudi Arabia) to engage with representatives of these countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the LAS in order to convene, understand positions and facilitate communications and processes (Interview I.7; I.11; EU in the GCC, 2023; Gulf Cooperation Council, 2024; Josep Borrell Fontelles, 2023b; Annette Weber, 2023d; 2023f; 2023g; 2023j; 2024f). There has been prominent engagement with the Arab countries, as they have strong influence over the belligerents. Shortly after the war began, on April 17th, 2023, President of the Council Charles Michel called the UAE's de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed, to discuss the need to deescalate and prioritise a ceasefire (Charles Michel, 2023). In June 2023, Borrell travelled with Weber to Cairo to visit President Al-Sisi and raise the issue of Sudan (Josep Borrell Fontelles, 2023b; 2023c), and in October 2023, the EU organised a joint Ministerial Meeting with the GCC to support the AU, LAS and IGAD political mediation track (Council of the European Union, 2023c). The EU's other key partner has been the Troika contact group (UK, US and Norway) which has been operating in the region since the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (European External Action Service, 2023a; 2023b; Norwegian Government, 2024). Nevertheless, in contrast to Ethiopia, the US has acted more independently from the EU (Interview I.6). Capabilities Track IICapability to engageThe other main pillar of the EU approach has been based on its normative principles and consisted in supporting the integration of an inclusive political track into the main mediation process, to resume the transition to civilian power interrupted by the start of the war. For this purpose, the EU has been strongly supporting Sudanese civil society organisations and political platforms and seeking the inclusion of women (Interview I.1; I.7; I.11). Part of it consisted of facilitating Track II mediation among these different organisations to create a united front. For instance, on April 15th the EU organised informal meetings on the sidelines of the Paris Humanitarian Conference to foster dialogue between the multiple civilian platforms with opposing views. This was considered groundbreaking as it was the first time that all these groups with conflicting interests (including supporters of the SAF, RSF, civilian transition, etc) had been gathered together (Interview I.7). The EUSR has been very active in this framework, consulting, supporting and facilitating communication between the various groups involved, including the Taqaddum platform led by the former transitional prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok (Interview I.6; I.7; Annette Weber, 2023i). One positive note on the EU engagement with the CSOs has been that while the member states used the "silver bullet approach", trying to gather all the groups under Taqaddum, the EU engaged in a more constructive and neutral manner, respecting the autonomy and local ownership of the process (Interview I.4). One criticism has been that the EU has failed to really identify and involve all the main CSOs and has ended up supporting the political elites that hijack the process (Interview I.6). Capability to fundThe EU has funded the different civilian political platforms and CSOs participating in the political track in order to strengthen their operational capabilities (Interview I.7). Additionally, the EU has also been funding some European mediation NGOS that have provided capacity building to the groups involved in the civilian track and facilitated dialogue between them (International Crisis Group, 2024b). Capability to cooperate and coordinateThe EU has entrusted to the AU the task of integrating the civilian track (Track II) into the core mediation process, which is the Jeddah Platform (Track I). This outsourcing initiative constitutes an EU effort to build inter-track linkages and to enhance AU ownership of the process. To this end, the EU facilitated Jeddah back-up talks in Bahrain (Interview I.4). Nevertheless, one common criticism of this approach has been that the AU has proved incapable of properly assimilating and incorporating the civilian platforms and CSOs into the process, and in the end it only cooperated with the elites. The reason for this failure has been the EU's inability to implement oversight mechanisms in the mediation support provided to the AU and its neglect of the corruption, subjectivity and bad practices rooted in this organisation (Interview I.4; I.6). Capabilities Track III Capability to fundThe main involvement in Track III has consisted of funding European mediation NGOs that have organised dialogue programmes at the grassroots level to identify points of consensus, conflict and other relevant issues. These initiatives are key to inform the main mediation processes (happening at Track I) and to open opportunities and communication channels (Interview I.7). Moreover, one interviewee explained that the EU's strong engagement with civil society has been possible thanks to the past democracy support projects (on human rights, democracy promotion, CSOs, etc.) that the EU and its member states have been funding since the times of Al-Bashir. The connections established through those projects provided support networks that the EU mobilised to build entry points for the political process and mediation (Interview I.4). DISCUSSIONThis section will explore the overall factors affecting EU engagement and involvement in peace mediation by presenting a strength, a weakness and an opportunity for improvement that have been identified after analysing the cases and relating them to the bigger picture of EU mediation. Strength: multi-mediator capacitiesFirst the strength. The two case studies have illustrated that thanks to its own capabilities, instruments and nature the EU can be considered a "multi-mediator". This is because it can operate in the following dimensions:Multi-track: As largely demonstrated with the Sudan case and to a lesser extent in Ethiopia, the EU can engage in the three mediation tracks and even create links between them. Even though it is not that well-suited to directly mediate in Track I (for reasons that will be explained later), it can be a useful coordinator aiming to support Track I efforts launched by others. In Track II the EU proved to be effective in the three capabilities, and in Track III the EU can be prominent due to its strong will and capacity to finance European mediation NGOs and local third-party initiatives.Multi-layered: As the cases displayed, mediation contexts today involve multiple levels of actors, from international and regional actors involved as sponsors or spoilers of the peace process, to local communities and non-state armed groups. The EU has a good capacity to approach these different layers because it also has a multi-level institutional toolbox that it can mobilise, from the president of the council and the HRVP for high-level contacts to the EUSR for long-term partnerships and flexible engagements, or the EU delegations and mediation NGOs for the grassroots level and CSOs. Additionally, if the member states are aligned with the same policy goals as the EU, they can provide wider diplomatic clout and complement, support or even replicate EU mediation efforts by exerting pressure or opening parallel communication channels (Interview I.5; I.8; I.10).Multilateral: The two case studies demonstrated that the EU does not act alone, but rather in concert with other actors, and generally it seeks to ensure compliance with common norms or standards. Specifically, the EU's strongest asset is its capability to steer mediation support, facilitate communication and coordinate and cooperate with other institutional actors (IGAD, AU, UN, GCC and LAS) or with states (US, Gulf countries, Troika). Multi-dynamic: The EU has capacity to engage in the different stages of the conflict cycle and to combine long- and short-term perspectives, which if well implemented can have a positive impact on the mediation process. For instance, the EU was well positioned to mobilise the CSO networks in Sudan because it had supported them previously. In Ethiopia, even though the EU was not part of the Pretoria Agreement, subsequently it is proving to be a key actor in its follow-up, in the sense that it has made the normalisation of EU-Ethiopia relations conditional on the three pillars of the initial approach (ceasefire, accountability of IHL and human rights violations and humanitarian access) (Interview I.8; I.11; Council of the European Union, 2022e). On a similar note, the EU's insistence on supporting the mediation of the AU (in Ethiopia and Sudan) and IGAD (in Sudan) is part of a wider, long-term strategy to enhance the regional stability of the Horn by strengthening its regional cooperation institutions and dialogue platforms (Interview I.3; I.7; Council of the European Union, 2021c).Weakness: structural constraintsSecond, the weakness. Even though the EU has the capacity to mobilise multiple instruments through different avenues, the two case studies have shown that it cannot lead mediation, not at least outside its neighbourhood. To put it plainly, the EU is not the decisive actor that brings the parties to the table to sign the deal. To understand this, the Ethiopia case is very illustrative. As mentioned in the analysis, together with rejection of the EU normative position, lack of leverage goes a long way to explaining why the EU was not in the Pretoria Agreement, and the three reasons for it were lack of appropriate authority, mandate and tools. Concerning authority, even though the EUSRs were very active, as one interviewee mentioned, the EUSR position does not seem authoritative enough as there is no direct power backing it (Interview I.2). Another interviewee identified the same problem in Sudan (Interview I.6). One good instrument to overcome this is the figure of the Special Envoy. As one interviewee stated, Haavisto had considerable legitimacy in the eyes of the two warring parties and the regional actors, for the simple fact that he was the foreign minister of a country (Interview I.8). Nevertheless, Haavisto failed because of the two other reasons. In contrast to the US special envoy, who was specifically sent to solve that conflict and had full flexibility and wider boundaries, Haavisto's mandate was short, part-time and unclear (it lacked parameters set by the member states) and he was considered too critical by the government (Interview I.2; I.8; I.9). The other reason is the tools. While the EU seems to have instruments to punish or to incentivise action, the main impediment is that to mobilise them it needs consensus among the 27 member states (Interview I.1; I.2; I.3; I.8; I.10). In Ethiopia, the only measure that the EU used to leverage its position was the postponement in January 2021 of the €88m from the Budget Support Programme (European External Action Service, 2021a). Nevertheless, when Borrell proposed – at least twice (Council of the European Union, 2021b) – to impose sanctions on the federal government, EU internal divisions prevented them from materialising.Building on this, the case of Ethiopia demonstrated that the lack of authoritative figures for mediation can be easily overcome by using the special envoys, or by directly mobilising the HRVP as in the Balkans, or the president of the council as in Georgia 2008 (Herrberg, 2021; Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Nevertheless, the issue of the mediator's mandate and the tools are two problems linked to the structural characteristics and constraints of the EU, meaning the EU can only give flexible and comprehensive mandates to its mediators if the 27 member states agree to do so. The same applies to the tools, such as sanctions or development packages, which can only be employed if there is consensus in the council. The fact that the EU is an institution dependent on the 27 member states' consent has been identified by most of the interviewees as the main impediment to exercising leverage and, consequently, to successfully leading mediation (Interview I.1; I.2; I.3; I.4; I.5; I.8; I.9; I.10). Additionally, the complex and robust procedures of its financial assistance and aid further reduce the flexibility to activate its leverage (Interview I.2). Added to this is the fact that in an increasingly fragmented world with growing competition among powers, this leverage will be further weakened by the existence of new players (such as China, Russia or the Gulf countries) which are willing to provide incentives without as many conditions as the EU (Interview I.1; I.4; I.6; I.8; I.10). Bearing this in mind, it seems that the EU can only be a strong actor "at the table"8 if all its member states agree, or if there is a lack of interest and therefore they have no objections (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the EU should not engage in mediation, rather that it needs to reframe its approach. Considering that the EU has multiple instruments and institutions that allow it to be a "multi-mediator", it seems that the areas where it really can make an impact are "above the table" (through mediation support) or "beyond the table" (by sustaining agreements).9 Indeed, in their work, Sheriff and Hauk illustrate that outside Europe the cases in which the EU has positively advanced mediation have been the ones in which it has been operating in these domains rather than leading (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Opportunity: normative approachIn this context, normativity appears to be the potential comparative that the EU has when operating "above the table" and "beyond the table", and consequently this is the opportunity to improve. Some scholars thought that the "normative character" of the EU could be an impediment rather than an advantage (Haastrup et al., 2014; Peral, 2012; Nouwen, 2022). In a sense, this point is backed by the Ethiopian case as the federal government rejected the EU due to its normative positioning (Interview I.1; I.2; I.8; I.9). At the same time, one of the interviewed experts in Ethiopia said that even despite this rebuff, the EU's constant pressure together with its coordination and cooperation capabilities had a positive effect, as the three boundaries set from the start of the war were later used by the AU and the US to formulate the content of the Pretoria Agreement (Interview I.8). This point is amplified in the Sudan case study. The three interviewees with expertise on Sudan coincided in affirming that the EU has been perceived as the main actor promoting inclusivity, leading the support for civil society and political platforms and advocating for their integration into the mediation process (Interview I.4; I.6; I.7). Thus, the cases show that thanks to its normative approach, the EU has been successful to a certain degree in setting the agenda in Ethiopia and in structuring part of the mediation process in Sudan. A normative approach is understood as the pursuit of its strategy based on norms and principles that the EU considers foundational, such as the rule of law, democracy and inclusivity. Additionally, it must be mentioned that in both cases the interviewees perceived the impacts of this normative approach as positive because the principles promoted can be considered enablers of sustainable peace (Interview I.4; I.6; I.7; I.8). Going forward, this normative approach makes sense if it is considered within the general framework of EU mediation. As explained, the EU has structural constraints that prevent it from being an impactful leading mediator in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, as the EU is a multilateral mediator, it already cooperates with other actors that are better positioned to lead mediation – either because they have clearer authority and more flexible leverage (such as the US, the EU member states or the Gulf countries) or more legitimacy and knowledge of the local context (such as the AU and IGAD). Therefore, it makes more sense for the EU to support mediation rather than to lead it. In this position of "mediation supporter", the EU is less tied to the process and therefore has more flexibility and room for manoeuvre to put forward a normative approach that can positively complement the main mediation process by introducing components that make the resulting peace more sustainable (such as rule of law, accountability, inclusivity of women and youth, etc.). Sudan is an example of how the normative approach can work. The EU has supported other actors better positioned than itself to lead mediation (the US, Saudi Arabia and the AU) and meanwhile it has concentrated on advancing matters on which it has more expertise (due to its history), which is regional integration, political dialogue and civil transition. In this regard, the normative approach is an opportunity for improvement because it would be a way of aligning the EU multiple tools and instruments with its unique comparative advantage, which are its norms and values, in order advance sustainable peace. In return, this normative approach would also serve the geopolitical ambitions of the EU, as it could be a way of projecting its unique "soft power" and, at the same time, consolidating its main interests in the EU-Africa partnership, which are advancing peace and security.Nevertheless, this normative approach can be jeopardised by two main factors. The first factor is internal divergences. This can take the form of either a lack of agreement among the 27 member states on the normative principles that should be put forward, or as was demonstrated in Ethiopia, a clash between the EU's normative ambitions and the interests-based behaviour of some member states (Interview I.1; I.5; I.8; I.9; I.10). One potential option to address this challenge could be the "strategic framework of overarching normative principles" proposed by Bergmann and Friesen. This would consist of a pre-established blueprint of basic norms and standards, agreed by all 27 MSs, to be put forward in every peace intervention in which EU actors engage (2021: 6), and from which mediators could build with more norms according to the context. This blueprint would clarify the actions of EU mediators, prevent disagreements between MSs on which position to take in every peace process and could also be presented as a distinctive EU model or "pedigree" to be brought to peace processes. Nonetheless, to be effective this blueprint should not be overly ambitious, as the normative approach could only work if it is conflict-sensitive and tailored to the local context. This means that it should be implemented with humility and most importantly by embedding the norms in the local context and letting the counterparts involved transform them into locally owned policy options (European Union State of the Union Discussion Panel, 2021).The second factor is the lack of consistency and double standards in EU foreign policy. Several interviewees confirmed that the fact that the EU advocates for some specific norms and standards (such as human rights) in some conflicts but at the same time it endorses other states that fail to comply with them is a decisive element that has damaged EU credibility in general and, more specifically, its capacity to exert a normative approach in mediation (Interview I.1; I.6; I.10). By way of example, three interviewees stated that the EU positions in the 2023 Gaza war or the prioritisation of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war over other conflicts have been signalled as elements that decisively induced African leaders' reluctance to comply with the EU mediation initiatives in conflicts such as Sudan (Interview I.1; I.6; I.10). This problem is related to the geopolitical and pragmatic turn (exemplified by the creation of the EPF) that the EU has taken since the start of the Von der Leyen commission. Under this new doctrine, EU foreign policy is guided by the pursuit of its perceived "strategic interests" even if this means undermining the norms and values that it promotes and is therefore guilty of double standards. As a result, the EU risks losing credibility as a values-based actor, which would make it impossible to implement the normative approach to mediation. Given this conundrum, this article has shown that being a values-based actor can also have positive effects on the pursuit of strategic interests as this would mean mobilising the EU's "soft power". Therefore, rather than it being a matter of impossibility to maintain strategic interests and values together, it is more about Europe having a clear strategy on what image it wants to project and being ready to commit to it. CONCLUSIONThis research has examined how the EU engages in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa in order to understand the role that this conflict prevention and resolution instrument plays in advancing EU interests in stability and security in the continent. To that end, the research has analysed the case studies of the Ethiopia-Tigray war and the current conflict in Sudan. The analytical framework of "multi-mediation" has been used in order to map and categorise the different mediation-related initiatives implemented by the EU in both cases. After analysing the cases and contrasting the results, there are three main concluding points. First, the EU is well equipped to be a "multi-mediator", which means being an actor capable of engaging in multi-track, multi-layered, multilateral and multi-dynamic mediation. This capacity offers the EU the potential to realise its ambition, codified in its foundational treaties, of being a force for peace. Second, despite its multiple advantages, the EU faces some structural limitations that prevent it from having the leverage and agility needed to be a lead mediator. This challenge shows that the EU needs to recalibrate its ambitions and concentrate its efforts and tools, acting not "at the table", but beyond and above the table as an assertive mediation supporter. Third, in this exact position of mediation supporter, the EU has the opportunity to transform its normative approach to mediation, illustrated in the 2009 and 2020 concepts, into a unique comparative advantage. 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