Suchergebnisse

Розглянуто суть екологізації суспільної свідомості в контексті духовного розвитку, збереження й удосконалення життя на Землі. Екологізацію суспільної свідомості розглядають як процес оптимізації життя на Землі, який враховує потреби земної цивілізації в ресурсах довкілля і можливостях навколишнього природного середовища їх задовольняти. Проаналізовано зв'язки між деградацією навколишнього природного середовища під впливом деструктивної господарської діяльності людини, воєнних конфліктів у межах гібридної війни та глобальними екологічними загрозами, що пов'язані з порушенням планетарних меж. Визначено найвагоміші вимоги до еволюційного розвитку земної цивілізації в XXI ст. в межах вісімнадцяти цілей. Розглянуто суть гібридної війни як війни символів і злочинних інтересів кланових угруповань, в яких нехтують міжнародними домовленостями, національним законодавством і традиціями. Зроблено висновок про те, що помилковою є думка щодо того, що гібридні війни – це протистояння, яке пов'язане головним чином з етичними і ціннісними інтересами, бо за ними, як звичайно, криється проімперська загарбницька війна. ; В XXI веке в связи с обострением глобальных экологических проблем и ростом деструктивной антропогенной нагрузки на экосистемы Земли, повышается общественное осознание значимости экологизации общественного сознания, которая развивается под влиянием науки и образования. Концепция экологизации общественного сознания рассматривается нами в рамках земной цивилизации. Она охватывает экономическую, экологическую, социальную и духовную сферы. С помощью инструментов экологической политики будет обеспечиваться экологизация науки, образования и средств массовой информации, что будет способствовать росту интеллекта людей на Земле и преодолению глобальных экологических угроз, нависших над земной цивилизацией в XXI веке. Проблемы охраны окружающей среды в общественном сознании завуалированы противостоянием, что происходит между крупными игроками на глобальном уровне. Целью исследования является определение концептуальных основ экологизации общественного сознания в условиях гибридной войны в контексте духовного развития земной цивилизации. Объектом исследования является экосистемы Земли, которые деградируют под влиянием антропогенных и природных факторов. Использован абстрактно-логический метод исследования – для раскрытия сути эколого-экономического инструмента экологизация общественного сознания во взаимосвязи с духовным развитием земной цивилизации и обоснование глобальных целей, которые нужно достичь земной цивилизации в процессе эволюционного развития в XXI веке с помощью экологически направленного общественного сознания. Экологизация общественного сознания в контексте духовного развития – это сложный политический процесс, у которого есть сегодня, и будет в будущем большая когорта оппонентов. Крупный капитал спонсирует большие деньги на дискредитацию идей, связанных с потеплением климата под влиянием парниковых газов. Экологическая сфера земной цивилизации страдает как под влиянием природных факторов, так и деструктивной антропогенной деятельности. В XXI веке их совокупное негативное влияние на человека настолько высоко, что угрожает сохранению жизни на Земле. В связи с этим экологическую сферу Земли нужно не только адаптировать к будущим климатическим условиям, но, вместе с тем, восстановить в полном объеме ее экологические и социальные функции. Поэтому и декабрьские Парижские соглашения (2015) в рамках климатического форума нужно выполнять, не прибегая к дискуссиям о потеплении или похолодании климата, которые с годами все менее отражают объективную реальность. Предложено ряд глобальных целей экологизации общественного развития, которые человечеству необходимо будет достигать в условиях гибридной войны, которая предусматривает замаскированное использование военными наемниками ряда военных средств среди гражданского населения. Гибридная война динамично прорывается в экономическую, образовательную и научную сферы. Средства гибридной войны используются лидерами крупнейших государств мира для достижения целей, которые в большинстве случаев идут вразрез с целями экологической политики, направленной на преодоление глобальных экологических угроз. ; The 21st century stand out by the elevation of the global consciousness about the importance of environmental awareness of society based on the advances of science and education as the result of the sharp rise of global ecological problems and increased destructive anthropogenic influence on the ecosystem of the planet Earth. The concept of environmental awareness of the society is looked at within the frame of our planet. It includes economic, environmental, social and spiritual spheres. Applying the instruments of the environmental policy we'll ensure the greening of the science, education and the media which will increase the intellectual potential of the population of our planet and solve global ecological threats that are hovering over it in the 21st century. The pressing issues of the environmental protection in the collective consciousness are obscured by the stand off between influential players on a global level. The goal of the research is to define conceptual premises of ecological evolution of collective consciousness under the condition of hybrid war in the context of spiritual development of our civilization. The subject of the research is Earth's ecosystem that is degrading under the influence of anthropogenic and natural processes. Abstract logical method of the research is used to uncover the essence of ecological and economic instruments of the ecological development in collective consciousness in congruence with spiritual development of the Earthly civilization, and the justification of the global goals that must be achieved by the humanity throughout the process of evolutionary development in the 21st century driven by ecologically oriented societal consciousness. Ecological evolution of humanity in the context of spiritual development is complex political process which nowadays has numerous cohorts of opponents and will have them in the future. Big business pours a huge amount of capital to discredit the ideas related to the global climate change due to the green house effect from the gas emissions. Ecological sphere of global community suffers under the influence of natural processes as well as from destructive anthropogenic activity. In the 21st century their cumulative negative effect on the environment is so impactful that it threatens the continuity of the life on Earth. As the result, the environment of Earth needs not only to adapt to the future climate conditions, but along with it - to completely renew it's ecological and social functions. That's why the Paris Agreement of December 2015 in the frame of the Climate Forum needs to be implemented without discussions about warming or cooling of the climate that less and less reflect the objective reality as the years pass. We propose the number of global goals to improve ecological evolution of the society which humanity must achieve and implement - especially under difficult conditions of hybrid wars, that provide the use of selective military methods that are masked and used by the concealed military recruits among civilians. The hybrid war dynamically breaks into economic, educational and scientific spheres. Methods of hybrid war are used by leaders of the most powerful nations to achieve the goals, that in most instances contradict the goals of environmental policy aimed at overcoming global ecological threats.

For over a year, Sudan has been engulfed in one of the world's most violent civil conflicts. The war has ravaged the country and now risks spreading beyond its borders, engulfing the wider region in a destabilizing, protracted conflict.Like most international players, the United States initially responded slowly to the war in Sudan, but President Biden appears to be taking the situation more seriously, having recently appointed former Virginia congressman Tom Perriello as U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan. Perriello — who previously served as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region during the Obama administration — will lead talks between warring factions and concerned regional parties with the goal of reaching a lasting peace agreement and paving a path for the creation of a civilian government.Since his appointment, Perriello has been pushing to restart the on-again, off-again peace talks that have been based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In an interview with Responsible Statecraft, he expressed hope that the formal peace talks would restart sometime this month. "We are eager to start them tomorrow," Perriello said. Delaying them further, he warned, risks making Sudan "look more like a failed state that could become a 10- to 20-year crisis like we've seen in Somalia, but in a country much larger and in a very strategic location."The risks of this conflict spreading arms and refugees throughout East Africa and the broader Gulf has attracted regional powers' attention to both sides of the conflict. The UAE has reportedly provided military support to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Egypt and Iran have reportedly supported the government's de facto military, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), including by providing drones. Alex de Waal, an expert on Sudan and East Africa and the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, told RS that the growing complexity of the conflict means that the African Union (AU) or other regional bodies like Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) can't solve it alone. Rather, according to de Waal, ending the conflict requires a widespread diplomatic effort involving all major actors across Africa, the Gulf, and important international bodies, like the U.N.Perriello shares this perspective, saying he and his team have "been working particularly with some of the neighboring countries and other key African leaders to help communicate to the world and to other key regional actors that this is headed to a truly disastrous situation of a more factionalized, ethnicized war that is more likely to bring in neighboring countries that have overlapping populations." "For those who focus just on the regional stability concerns," he added, "this has now crossed over into being a very serious strategic crisis."Perriello says African countries are sounding the alarm to other regional actors and beyond: "don't light this fire, don't pour fuel on this fire, this is something that could burn us all. We have got to rein this thing in before it becomes something that goes past the point of no return."Perriello also said any lasting peace deal "shouldn't be a … way for former corrupt officials or extremist elements to backdoor their way into power." "I don't think some sort of power-sharing arrangement between the two sides is in anyone's interest," he added.Ultimately, however, the United States may lack sufficient leverage to determine the makeup of a post-war Sudanese government largely due to the involvement of extra-regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia — where the formal peace talks will be held — as well as the UAE, Egypt, and Iran, all of which have provided military support, therefore implicating them in the war's outcome. As a result, Washington should expect these states to advocate strongly for their own interests during the peace process. This means that Washington may have to live with a compromise that satisfies at least some of the demands of key domestic and foreign actors.Perriello admitted that although regional and global actors are increasingly inclined to end the war, "the two fighting sides are negotiating primarily through guns" and lack strong political will to end the conflict. Indeed, the war has created one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters in years. More than 8 million people have been displaced and human rights groups have documented widespread human rights violations committed by both sides. Among these include forced enlistments, the burning of homes and other property, sexual violence, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians.With over 1.8 million Sudanese now refugees in neighboring states, the security situation is closely interlinked with the dire humanitarian crisis. De Waal says that the humanitarian system is "collapsing." In the past, he said, Sudanese refugees could expect to receive a "modicum of peace and security" in neighboring states. That's no longer the case, as those countries are now dealing with their own intense security and governance challenges, and are struggling to provide the resources needed to support the dramatic influx of recent migrants.Perriello expressed frustration that "there has just not been enough aid, enough food and medicine sent" to Sudan and the surrounding region. In response, many Sudanese have worked at a local level to increase access to humanitarian aid and deliver money through the creation and proliferation of digital cash apps to help transfer critical funds to support the purchasing power of those struggling to afford food and other necessities. The humanitarian sector is also struggling from a lack of funding. "Even in areas like Chad that have been quite welcoming of humanitarian organizations, [refugees] are not getting more than one meal a day," Perriello lamented.The need for humanitarian support seems to now resonate across the West. Just a couple weeks ago, major European governments met in Paris to discuss increasing the financial support for humanitarian aid in Sudan. They jointly announced that they had raised $2.1 billion to support the humanitarian response. Before Paris, the U.S. had provided more humanitarian aid than any other country, having provided $115 million in 2024 so far.Perriello spoke repeatedly of the importance of uplifting the voices of the Sudanese people, saying that "we think the most important thing is for the negotiation to be as centered on the Sudanese people as possible." Although this sentiment has value, the claim that the United States speaks for and represents the interests of the Sudanese people is not always a view shared by those in Africa.Tying the threads of this conflict together will prove to be a difficult task for Perriello and his colleagues. Yet, the United States deserves credit for engaging diplomatically with regional and domestic players in an attempt to end the war before it grows to an even greater scale.

The U.S. government is compromising democratic values for the sake of maintaining an expensive and ineffective drone base in the West African country of Niger — all while exploring new drone bases in three nearby coastal countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin.The rationale for both the existing base and the aspirational ones is to constrain jihadist insurgencies. The problem is, there's no publicly available evidence that the base in Niger has done any good. In fact, regional trends — in terms of political violence, but also in terms of overall political instability — suggest that expeditionary counterterrorism does more harm than good.The U.S. military's Air Base 201 is situated outside Agadez, northern Niger, and was built in the late 2010s at a cost of some $110 million or more (and upwards of $30 million per year to operate and maintain). Operations began at the site in 2019, involving "intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance" (ISR) drone flights. The New York Times calls it "vital" but it has yet to demonstrate its worth to the public.During the 2010s, Niger was considered the most reliable Sahelian country in the eyes of Washington, Paris, Berlin, and others. Ruled by an elected civilian, Mahamadou Issoufou (in office 2011-2021), Niger had seemed to be entering a new chapter, leaving behind the coups and rebellions that still plagued neighboring Mali. As crises grew in virtually all of Niger's neighbors — especially in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and soon Burkina Faso as well — Niger appeared to be more a victim of spillover violence than of its own homegrown insurgencies.By 2019, however, it should already have been clear that Niger was brittle — and that France's assertive counterterrorism operations in Mali were yielding only fleeting gains. In Niger, the 2016 election had been lopsided at best and farcical at worst, with Issoufou's main opponent, Hama Amadou, spending much of the campaign in detention on shaky charges connected to human trafficking. Niger was also beginning to produce its own militants — and its own spate of human rights abuses by the military. In Mali, France had killed many top jihadist leaders, but violence was only growing. If American airpower was meant to support the tracking of top targets, and if removing those targets did not fundamentally disrupt the insurgencies, then what good was all that surveillance capacity?Starting in 2020, coup after coup struck the countries of central Sahel. In Mali and soon after in Burkina Faso, coup-makers both channeled and stoked anti-French sentiment, eventually expelling French troops and other Western-backed security missions, such as the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali. French counterterrorism ran aground not just at the level of strategy, but also politically. The French failed to maintain the goodwill of populations who cared little if Abdelmalek Droukdel or Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi had been killed when that did nothing against the grassroots fighters, bandits, and ethnic militias that made ordinary people's lives hellish. Surveillance capacity, moreover, is even less effective when it comes to sorting out who is who at the level of ordinary fighters — just ask the French, who horrified Malians by striking a wedding party at the town of Bounti in January 2019, believing the targets were terrorists.Niger's government has been the most recent to fall to a coup, in July 2023. The combination of the coup and the U.S. military's assets triggered an awkward dance in Washington, as the administration sought — and continues to seek — an impossible balance. On the one hand, there is the imperative to uphold the plain meaning of legal restrictions on U.S. assistance to junta-run countries (a determination the U.S. finally reached in Niger's case in October). On the other hand, the administration seems to feel compelled to engage the junta with an eye to protecting the drone base. Administration officials have hinted to the junta that if it puts forward even a minimally credible transition plan, the administration will explore ways to restore military cooperation.The sunk costs of the Niger base appear to be one of the primary arguments in its favor, as well as the argument that the base is vital for counterterrorism success. Yet throwing good money after bad makes little sense, and the argument about counterterrorism is impossible to falsify, given classification practices — and even if all the data were out in the open, backers of unlimited counterterrorism budgets often make the equally unfalsifiable claim that things would be worse without those expenditures. Meanwhile, there is a circularity involved in the logic of the U.S. military presence in Niger as well. As the New York Times puts it, "The American military is still flying unarmed drone surveillance missions to protect its troops posted in Niamey and Agadez" — in other words, the drone base becomes its own justification.Meanwhile, the U.S. government appears to be simultaneously considering the possibility of maintaining the Niger base and the possibility of shifting resources elsewhere; namely, to Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin. The Wall Street Journal reports on "preliminary talks" about opening bases in those countries. The logic, in the Journal's own words, is as follows: "Drones would allow U.S. forces to conduct aerial surveillance of militant movements along the coast and provide over-the-shoulder tactical advice to local troops during combat operations."This logic should sound awfully familiar, as it was the same thinking that has now failed in Niger and beyond. None of the core problems have been solved: whether tracking and killing top leaders translates into wider gains; whether it is possible to distinguish insurgents from non-combatants at the level of rank-and-file fighters; and what the wider theory of change and success is.Nor has the fundamental political problem been solved or, it seems, even acknowledged: the reference to "over-the-shoulder tactical advice" is very telling. What might seem like a simple military matter is in fact a political one: again and again in the Sahel, it became evident that soldiers often dislike having someone else peering over their shoulder and telling them what to do. All that assistance and advice can also have unintended consequences, as occurred in Niger. It's not that establishing drone bases in coastal West African countries will inexorably lead to coups — but securitizing the relationship and militarizing those countries' response to insurgency will only hurt. Cote d'Ivoire has won some acclaim for its response to a nascent insurgency, for example, but more for its social programs than for its combat operations.And, finally, for U.S. forces, the temptation to do more than peer over the shoulder and whisper into the ear is always there. Best of all would be to wind down the base in Niger, avoid making the same mistakes elsewhere in the region, and keep the Sahel's juntas at arm's length.

With the world's eyes understandably focused on the carnage in the Gaza Strip, violent manifestations of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in the Israeli-occupied West Bank have been getting even less attention than they normally get, and less than they deserve. Amid concerns about possible spreading of the current war in Gaza, spreading already has begun in the West Bank, with the potential there of stimulating still more spread.Casualties have spiked in the West Bank since the Hamas attack on October 7. More than 100 Palestinians, including civilians, have been killed there.Most of the casualties have been incurred as part of accelerated operations in the West Bank by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), in the form of raids, mass arrests, and crackdowns on protests. The stepped-up Israeli use of force has even included an airstrike on a mosque in a refugee camp in the city of Jenin — a rarity in the West Bank, where the Israelis usually rely on ground forces.Additional violence has come at the hands of Israeli settlers — some of the 670,000 Israelis whose residence in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem is widely recognized as a violation of international law. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded in just the first two weeks of the current crisis 100 attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian residents. The U.N. office noted that this represented an average of almost eight such incidents per day, up from a daily average of three incidents since the beginning of this year.The connection between this settler violence and the events this month in southern Israel and the Gaza Strip has two aspects. One is that Israeli anger over the Hamas attack and the blurring of such emotion into a general hatred of Palestinian Arabs has made the current moment even more of an open season on Palestinians than it was before. The second is that the current focus of attention on Gaza among the press, foreign governments, and the world generally has represented an opportunity for settlers to conduct violent and illegal business in the West Bank while drawing little notice. Mairav Zonszein, an Israel-based analyst with the International Crisis Group, notes that a difference between now and before is that the settler violence is occurring "without almost any media attention being paid to it."These developments are a continuation, in intensified form, of longer trends in the physical suffering of West Bank Palestinians. Many of the nearly 1,600 deaths of Palestinians at the hands of Israelis between 2015 (that is, since the last big Israeli attack on Gaza in 2014) and August of this year were in the West Bank. The violence accelerated in 2023, even before October 7. This year was already on pace to be the deadliest year for residents of the West Bank since the United Nations began keeping such records in 2005.The upsurge in Israeli violence in the West Bank clearly is related to the coming to power at the beginning of this year of an extreme right-wing Israeli government. Far from policing or discouraging the settler violence, the de facto Israeli response often has been to permit or condone it, with IDF soldiers standing aside or even participating in some of the violence. One of the most prominent of the extremists currently in power, minister of national security Itamar Ben-Gvir — himself a West Bank settler — promised to distribute as many as 10,000 free rifles to Israeli citizens, including West Bank settlers.All this is part of a longer-term process of one people, defined in ethnic and religious terms, subjugating another people similarly defined, and of the determination of successive Israeli governments to maintain Jewish Israeli supremacy over all the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Part of the formula for doing this has been to cordon off some two million of the Arab residents into the Gaza Strip and to rely on blockades, periodic "mowing the grass " with military force, and an occasional misery-alleviating sop to keep those Arabs from interfering with Israeli ambitions. The Hamas attack, of course, shattered some of the assumptions underlying that strategy.The other part of the formula has been the piecemeal displacement of West Bank Palestinians from their land. Although much of the settler violence manifests simple hatred and bigotry, much of it is a more calculated effort to make life for Palestinian neighbors so miserable — or so uneconomic, given settler tactics such as vandalism of olive groves or denial of water and pastures needed by herded livestock — that those neighbors will give up and move. The accelerated anti-Palestinian settler activity this month has included much of this kind of intimidation. The Israeli human rights watchdog organization B'Tselem reported earlier this month that in the previous week, eight entire West Bank communities, numbering 472 people, had abandoned their homes out of fear for their lives and livelihoods.The current war, replete with Israeli orders for millions of Gaza residents to evacuate what the Israeli military has turned into a free-fire zone, has raised fears throughout the region of a new Nakba or catastrophe — another installment of the war in the 1940s that caused the mass displacement of longtime Palestinian residents from what became the state of Israel. The fears gained credibility from the leak of an Israeli government planning document that calls for forcibly transferring the population of the Gaza Strip to the Sinai. Perhaps the only thing preventing Israel from trying to implement such a plan is that the Egyptian government has multiple reasons to refuse to participate in any such scheme.That scheme was about Gaza, but West Bankers probably have the most to fear from any new mass displacements or ethnic cleansing. Gaza is the open-air prison, but the West Bank, with East Jerusalem, is the prize — the land that Israeli hardliners want for, and only for, their own people.The other dynamic that has made the West Bank increasingly become a powder keg since October 7 is the unsurprising increase in anger and resentment among the Palestinians who live there. Fear of a new Nakba is part of it. The casualties from increased settler violence and IDF use of military force are part of it. And so are the miseries in everyday life that have come from roadblocks and other obstructions to movement that the IDF has increased this month.Another big part of it is anger over the death and devastation that the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip has imposed on the Palestinian brethren who live there. This is not a matter of support for Hamas. It is a matter of feeling the pain of co-nationals and of general outrage over the infliction of mass suffering.The chance of a new intifada, or popular uprising, in the West Bank, was already significant before this month and is now even higher. In the current atmosphere, a new intifada would likely be at least as violent as the last one. It would by itself represent a significant spread of the war in Gaza. And by making the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict that much larger, it would increase the chance of further spread, such as by drawing in Lebanese Hezbollah.

Britain's counter-terrorism policies do not work. They do not work for the British people, who wish to live free of terrorism. They do not work for the various communities in the UK whose experience of counter-terrorism has been one of stigmatisation and criminalisation. And they do not work for the people of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, whose human rights have been systematically violated in the War on Terror. Just over two decades ago, the Irish and UK governments signed the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of a negotiated peace process involving Republican and Loyalist armed groups in Northern Ireland. Principles of human rights, community consent and peace were key to achieving a dramatic reduction in lives lost to political violence. Indeed, by that measure, the Good Friday Agreement was the most successful instrument of counter-terrorism policy-making in recent history. But the lessons of this success were not registered. The year after the Agreement was signed, Tony Blair's government introduced the first of the fifteen new Terrorism Acts that have been passed since then in what has become a near-annual parliamentary ritual. Each Act ratcheted up the powers available to the police and intelligence agencies, creating a shadow criminal justice system in which legal principles applicable in other spheres were dispensed with. Alongside this legislative agenda, norms shifted in other ways: the use of surveillance and propaganda was expanded and deepened; military force and extra-judicial killing as counter-terrorist methods became routine; and complicity with torturers was normalised. Intelligence agencies, police forces and the military doubled or tripled their counter-terrorism budgets and held onto this funding even as other sectors were ravaged by austerity measures. The logic of counter-terrorism was spread into every sphere of public life in Britain as workers across government services were expected to become the eyes and ears of national security surveillance. The definition of the threat was itself transformed: no longer simply a matter of individual acts of violence but a much broader danger, understood in terms of clashes of culture, ideology and values, and informed by the Islamophobic principle that Muslim political organisation and dissent should be cast as forms of extremism. Concerns for human rights, for avoiding the stigmatising and criminalising of communities, or for basing policy on clear statements of goals and evidence of effectiveness were ignored. The number of civilian lives lost in ostenisbly fighting "jihadist" terrorism were many times greater than those that have ever been lost or could have been lost due to "jihadist" terrorism itself. Even on the narrowest measure of success – the reduction of terrorism – the record of UK counter- terrorism over the last twenty years is a poor one. The relentless expansion and proliferation of this War on Terror apparatus was underpinned by a consensus across the political class from the late 1990s. Central to that consensus were the claims that the UK faced an exceptional threat from "jihadist" terrorism, that this threat was the expression of an ideological rejection of British values among a generation of young Muslims and that, in response, the normal principles of domestic and international law should be suspended. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's Chatham House speech on the War on Terror in the 2017 general election campaign was the first sign of a crack in that consensus. In the days after the killing of twenty-two concert-goers at the Manchester Arena, Corbyn argued that "the war on terror is simply not working" and opinion polls suggested a majority agreed.1 This report offers an account of the failures of current counter-terrorism policies, an analysis of the reasons why they do not work and an outline of a progressive alternative that we hope will be the basis for a future Labour government's approach. We recognise the difficulty and complexity of the issue of terrorism and the various barriers that stand in the way of a different approach. But we believe the time is right to critically assess the legacy of the last twenty years and change course. At the heart of our argument is a question of democracy. Counter-terrorism policy-making has failed because its development is unmoored from any substantial process of democratic accountability. Instead, the aims and means of current counter-terrorism policy have been set by a security establishment according to its own interests and values. This security establishment has not sought to provide a consistent and precise definition of terrorism or to seek to counter terrorism in an evidence-based way, based on academic studies of how terrorism comes into existence. It has not sought to ground security policy in the actual problems of political violence that communities in the UK face. And it has repeatedly placed loyalty to elite interests above the need to uphold human rights, especially with respect to Muslim populations, both within the UK and abroad. The Labour Party has a particular responsibility to address the harms resulting from counter- terrorism as it was the Labour government led by Tony Blair that incorporated the War on Terror into British policy-making and his successor Gordon Brown who continued and extended the paradigm. Labour's 2017 manifesto already contained policies that align with our argument and can be built upon, such as the call to review Prevent, to address civil liberties concerns with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and to hold public inquiries on past injustices. However, counter-terrorism policy has been one of the least discussed topics within the Labour Party, despite its deep impact on the lives of the over two million Muslims in the UK. We hope this report will help to initiate a more vigorous discussion. Clearly, any left-wing Labour government will be attacked by its opponents as weak on national security. The temptation will be to not rock the boat and allow counter-terrorism policy to remain unchanged, the better to secure political victories in the core economic policy areas Labour Party supporters are more focused on. We believe this would be a mistake. It would mean a Labour government failing to uphold principles of human rights and racial and religious equality. But as a political strategy, it would also likely be counter-productive. Conceding ground on security policy will not minimise the attacks from right-wing media organisations or Conservative politicians; and a Labour government would be left defending itself reactively and inconsistently within a policy framework not of its own choosing. In this way, a failure to develop a progressive approach to security could end up undermining the credibility of a Labour government's broader policy agenda. A better strategy, we believe, is to adopt from the outset a coherent, explicitly stated, progressive policy that can be defended consistently and confidently.

Сегодня в Украине сложилась крайне нестабильная ситуация в сфере химической, ядерной и радиационной безопасности. Авторами проведен анализ системы медицинской защиты военнослужащих в условиях радиационно-ядерных и химических угроз и терроризма. Изучена система мониторинга потенциально опасных ситуаций, который осуществляется передвижными санитарно-эпидемиологическими группами Службы превентивной медицины Министерства обороны Украины в зоне АТО. Проводится оценка и прогнозирование влияния угроз на объекты критической инфраструктуры, экспертиза продовольствия, питьевой воды, источников водоснабжения и других объектов внешней среды на загрязнение радиоактивными, ядовитыми и опасными химическими веществами; осуществляются организация и контроль проведения дезактивации, дегазации. Однако остаются проблемные вопросы: устаревшая материально-техническая база (автомобильная техника, лабораторное оборудование, нехватка приборов для обследования факторов окружающей среды и т.д.); отсутствие производства в Украине отдельных средств медицинской защиты военнослужащих при воздействии опасных радиационных и химических факторов для профилактики поражения и уменьшения вредного воздействия. За предыдущие годы снизилась численность специалистов Службы превентивной медицины Министерства обороны Украины по военной токсикологии, радиологии и медицинской защите. В этих условиях особую актуальность приобретает специальная подготовка военных врачей по вопросам военной токсикологии, радиологии и медицинской защиты. ; Сьогодні в Україні склалася вкрай нестабільна ситуація в сфері хімічної, ядерної та радіаційної безпеки. Авторами проведено аналіз стану справ у системі медичного захисту військово­службовців Збройних сил України в умовах радіаційно-ядерних і хімічних загроз, тероризму. Проведено аналіз системи моніторингу потенційно небезпечних ситуацій, що здійснюється пересувними санітарно-епідеміологічними групами Служби превентивної медицини Міністерства оборони України в зоні АТО. Проводиться оцінка та прогнозування впливу загроз критичної інфраструктури, експертиза продовольства, питної води, джерел водопостачання та інших об'єктів зовнішнього середовища на забруднення радіоактивними, отруйними та небезпечними хімічними речовинами; здійснюються організація та контроль проведення дезактивації, дегазації. Однак залишаються проблемні питання: застаріла матеріально-технічна база (автомобільна техніка, лабораторне обладнання, брак приладів для обстеження факторів навколишнього середовища тощо); відсутність виробництва в Україні окремих засобів медичного захисту військовослужбовців при дії небезпечних радіаційних і хімічних факторів для профілактики ураження та зменшення вражаючої дії. За попередні роки знизилась чисельність фахівців Служби превентивної медицини Міністерства оборони України з військової токсикології, радіології та медичного захисту. В цих умовах особливої актуальності набуває спеціальна підготовка військових лікарів з питань військової токсикології, радіології та медичного захисту. ; Background. Today, situation in the field of chemical, nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine is an extremely unstable. In such conditions, there in an increase in the role of the Preventive Medicine Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (PMS MDU), which provides medical protection in the conditions of radiation-nuclear and chemical threats. The purpose of the research: analysis of the state of the system of medical protection of service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the conditions of radiation, nuclear and chemical threats and terrorism. Materials and methods. The analysis of publications concerning the peculiarities of chemical and radiation safety of the state over the past 20 years has been carried out. Data on the state of nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine were considered according to the annual reports of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU). Results. Today, Ukraine lacks nuclear and chemical weapons, however, the existence of terrorist threats and the possible consequences of natural, man-made, military and social emergencies, especially in connection with the marked aggravation of the domestic political situation in the country and the interference of the Russian Federation in the internal affairs of Ukraine, creates extremely a threatening situation in terms of nuclear and chemical threats. According to the SESU, 1004 industrial objects are registered in the territory of Ukraine, in which more than 219.6 thousand tons of hazardous chemical compounds are stored or used in the process of production, about 13 million people live in ­areas of probable pollution. Terrorist sabotage on hazardous sites can lead to anthropogenic and military emergencies, the extent of which can be compared to the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction. In these conditions, the role of military experts in toxicology, radiology and medical protection is substantially increasing. Today, the tasks of the PMS MDU are: prevention of harmful effects of environmental factors, control over the observance of hygienic requirements in the work of personnel with sources of ionizing radiation, aggressive liquids, electromagnetic fields and other harmful factors and the provision of their individual protective equipment; control over elimination of causes and conditions of occupational diseases, poisonings, radiation damage, organization and control over decontamination and degassing. Monitoring of potentially dangerous situations is carried out by the mobile sanitary and epidemiological teams (MSET) of the PMS MDU in the ATO zone. The assessment and prognosis of the impact of critical infrastructure threats is constantly assessed. In addition, the mobile units conduct expert examination of food, drinking water, sources of water supply and other objects of the environment for contamination with radioactive, toxic and hazardous che­micals, and organization and control of decontamination and degassing. The MSET of the PMS MDU is deployed with medical mobile laboratory based on ZIL-131 car with a lowdown trailer, which can perform chemo-toxicological studies — 15 per day, radiometric (dosimetry) studies — 90–100 per day. The forces and regular means of constant readiness of MSET of the PMS MDU able to conduct sanitary treatment of man/hour — 144 in the summer, 96 in the winter, chamber disinfection (disinfection), decontamination: 180 man/hours in summer, 120 — in winter. There are topical issues: the outdated material and technical base of the PMS MDU (automotive equipment, laboratory equipment, lack of devices, environmental factors survey, etc.); the absence of production in Ukraine of certain means for medical protection of military personnel under the influence of dangerous radiation and chemical factors in order to prevent damage and to reduce the striking effect. In addition, in previous years, there was a decrease in the number of specialists of the PMS MDU for military toxicology, radiology and medical protection. In these circumstances, the training of military doctors on military toxicology, radiology and medical protection, one of the scientific and practical branches that provides separate components of national security, becomes relevant. The issue of improving the level of postgraduate training of military doctors by updating the basic educational material on military toxicology, radiology and medical protection is very topical, taking into account current knowledge, practical experience and NATO standards. Conclusions. The current state of the system of medical protection of service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in conditions of radiation-nuclear, chemical threats and terrorism cannot guarantee the necessary level of safety for personnel and population. Improvement of the situation in the system of medical protection can be accomplished by strengthening the material and technical support of specialized units of the Preventive Medicine Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; introduction of modern technologies and standards; introduction of new forms of training and improvement of existing curricula in order to meet the needs of a wide range of military and civilian specialists in the areas of military toxicology, radiology, chemical, radiation safety, modern anti-chemical and anti-radiation protection of troops in emergency situations, man-made disasters and in a special period.

"The guidance in this report is for evaluation and treatment of patients with complications from smallpox vaccination in the preoutbreak setting. Information is also included related to reporting adverse events and seeking specialized consultation and therapies for these events. The frequencies of smallpox vaccine-associated adverse events were identified in studies of the 1960s. Because of the unknown prevalence of risk factors among today's population, precise predictions of adverse reaction rates after smallpox vaccination are unavailable. The majority of adverse events are minor, but the less-frequent serious adverse reactions require immediate evaluation for diagnosis and treatment. Agents for treatment of certain vaccine-associated severe adverse reactions are vaccinia immune globulin (VIG), the first-line therapy, and cidofovir, the second-line therapy. These agents will be available under Investigational New Drug (IND) protocols from CDC and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Smallpox vaccination in the preoutbreak setting is contraindicated for persons who have the following conditions or have a close contact with the following conditions: 1) a history of atopic dermatitis (commonly referred to as eczema), irrespective of disease severity or activity; 2) active acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions that disrupt the epidermis; 3) pregnant women or women who desire to become pregnant in the 28 days after vaccination; and 4) persons who are immunocompromised as a result of human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, autoimmune conditions, cancer, radiation treatment, immunosuppressive medications, or other immunodeficiencies. Additional contraindications that apply only to vaccination candidates but do not include their close contacts are persons with smallpox vaccine-component allergies, women who are breastfeeding, those taking topical ocular steroid medications, those with moderate-to-severe intercurrent illness, and persons aged or = 60% alcohol immediately after they touch their vaccination site or change their vaccination site bandages. Used bandages should be placed in sealed plastic bags and can be disposed of in household trash. Smallpox vaccine adverse reactions are diagnosed on the basis of clinical examination and history, and certain reactions can be managed by observation and supportive care. Adverse reactions that are usually self-limited include fever, headache, fatigue, myalgia, chills, local skin reactions, nonspecific rashes, erythema multiforme, lymphadenopathy, and pain at the vaccination site. Other reactions are most often diagnosed through a complete history and physical and might require additional therapies (e.g., VIG, a first-line therapy and cidofovir, a second-line therapy). Adverse reactions that might require further evaluation or therapy include inadvertent inoculation, generalized vaccinia (GV), eczema vaccinatum (EV), progressive vaccinia (PV), postvaccinial central nervous system disease, and fetal vaccinia. Inadvertent inoculation occurs when vaccinia virus is transferred from a vaccination site to a second location on the vaccinee or to a close contact. Usually, this condition is self-limited and no additional care is needed. Inoculations of the eye and eyelid require evaluation by an ophthalmologist and might require therapy with topical antiviral or antibacterial medications, VIG, or topical steroids. GV is characterized by a disseminated maculopapular or vesicular rash, frequently on an erythematous base, which usually occurs 6-9 days after first-time vaccination. This condition is usually self-limited and benign, although treatment with VIG might be required when the patient is systemically ill or found to have an underlying immunocompromising condition. Infection-control precautions should be used to prevent secondary transmission and nosocomial infection. EV occurs among persons with a history of atopic dermatitis (eczema), irrespective of disease severity or activity, and is a localized or generalized papular, vesicular, or pustular rash, which can occur anywhere on the body, with a predilection for areas of previous atopic dermatitis lesions. Patients with EV are often systemically ill and usually require VIG. Infection-control precautions should be used to prevent secondary transmission and nosocomial infection. PV is a rare, severe, and often fatal complication among persons with immunodeficiencies, characterized by painless progressive necrosis at the vaccination site with or without metastases to distant sites (e.g., skin, bones, and other viscera). This disease carries a high mortality rate, and management of PV should include aggressive therapy with VIG, intensive monitoring, and tertiary-level supportive care. Anecdotal experience suggests that, despite treatment with VIG, persons with cell-mediated immune deficits have a poorer prognosis than those with humoral deficits. Infection-control precautions should be used to prevent secondary transmission and nosocomial infection. Central nervous system disease, which includes postvaccinial encephalopathy (PVE) and postvaccinial encephalomyelitis (or encephalitis) (PVEM), occur after smallpox vaccination. PVE is most common among infants aged < 12 months. Clinical symptoms of central nervous system disease indicate cerebral or cerebellar dysfunction with headache, fever, vomiting, altered mental status, lethargy, seizures, and coma. PVE and PVEM are not believed to be a result of replicating vaccinia virus and are diagnoses of exclusion. Although no specific therapy exists for PVE or PVEM, supportive care, anticonvulsants, and intensive care might be required. Fetal vaccinia, resulting from vaccinial transmission from mother to fetus, is a rare, but serious, complication of smallpox vaccination during pregnancy or shortly before conception. It is manifested by skin lesions and organ involvement, and often results in fetal or neonatal death. No known reliable intrauterine diagnostic test is available to confirm fetal infection. Given the rarity of congenital vaccinia among live-born infants, vaccination during pregnancy should not ordinarily be a reason to consider termination of pregnancy. No known indication exists for routine, prophylactic use of VIG in an unintentionally vaccinated pregnant woman; however, VIG should not be withheld if a pregnant woman develops a condition where VIG is needed. Other less-common adverse events after smallpox vaccination have been reported to occur in temporal association with smallpox vaccination, but causality has not been established. Prophylactic treatment with VIG is not recommended for persons or close contacts with contraindications to smallpox vaccination who are inadvertently inoculated or exposed. These persons should be followed closely for early recognition of adverse reactions that might develop, and clinicians are encouraged to enroll these persons in the CDC registry by calling the Clinician Information Line at 877-554-4625. To request clinical consultation and IND therapies for vaccinia-related adverse reactions for civilians, contact your state health department or CDC's Clinician Information Line (877-554-4625). Clinical evaluation tools are available at http.//www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/clineval. Clinical specimen-collection guidance is available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/vaccinia-specimen-collection.asp. Physicians at military medical facilities can request VIG or cidofovir by calling the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at 301-619-2257 or 888-USA-RIID." p. 1 ; prepared by Joanne Cono, Christine G. Casey, David M. Bell. ; "February 21, 2003." ; "The material in this report originated in the National Center for Infectious Diseases, James M. Hughes, M.D., Director, and the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program, Charles Schable, M.S., Acting Director; and the National Immunization Program, Walter A. Orenstein, M.D., Director, and the Epidemiology and Surveillance Division, Melinda Wharton, M.D., Director. " - p. 1 ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 26-28).

The twice-extended "humanitarian pause" in the Gaza Strip has ended, and the bombs are dropping again.

The Israeli assault on the territory has been a tragedy on multiple grounds, with the tragedy only likely to deepen as the attack resumes.
The most obvious tragedy is the extreme suffering of the people who live in the Strip, with resumption of the assault adding to a death toll that the destruction itself makes hard to estimate but already is well into five figures. Additional suffering includes many maimed or injured persons, deprivation of food, water, and fuel, the displacement of well over a million residents from the northern part of the Strip, and little left for the displaced persons ever to return to other than rubble. Even for anyone who cares only about the lives and welfare of Israelis and cares nothing about Palestinians, implications of a continued war in Gaza are bad. The violent operation is the latest lethal chapter of an Israeli policy — of clinging to land captured in a previous war and never resolving Israel's conflict with the Palestinians — which, as long as that policy continues, means that Israelis will always live by the sword and will never know true peace. The myth underlying the declared Israeli objective of "destroying Hamas" is that there is some clearly delineated hostile capability that can be destroyed and elimination of which will end violence emanating from Gaza. The myth disregards how even if whatever capability in Gaza Hamas used in its attack on October 7 were to disappear, Hamas has long used other lethal capabilities, such as individual suicide bombers, to strike Israel. It disregards how the added suffering that Israel has been inflicting on Gaza increases the pool of recruits who are enraged at Israel and willing to replace whatever capability the Israeli Defense Forces manage to destroy.Most fundamentally, it disregards how Hamas is but one manifestation of anger and resentment that will take other forms as long as occupation and denial of self-determination — and now, more devastation at the hands of the IDF — continue.
To the extent that Americans care about suffering of either Israelis or Palestinians, all this bad news associated with continued warfare in Gaza is a setback for U.S. interests. The perpetuation, with no end in sight, of the blood-stained Israeli-Palestinian conflict harms U.S. interests in multiple other ways, ranging from the conflict being a major distraction of policymaking time and attention away from other pressing matters, to the recurrent danger of the United States being dragged more directly into the conflict.

Despite talk about how the current war can and should be a turning point leading toward a resolution of the conflict, continuation of the assault makes such resolution less, not more, likely. It further enflames the already high mutual hatred. It provides further recruits for extremists seeking to subvert any progress toward peace. It physically destroys homes and livelihoods of Palestinians who would be expected to live contently next to Israelis. It moves the Israeli government ever farther down the road of brute force, rather than a road toward peaceful resolution, in dealing with its Palestinian problem.

The damage to U.S. strategic interests from the continued assault in Gaza centers on how the United States is widely seen, with good reason, as sharing responsibility for one of the biggest manmade humanitarian catastrophes since World War II. Like so much else regarding the current conflict, the relevant history did not start on October 7. The longstanding U.S. provision of diplomatic cover for Israeli policies of blockade and occupation, including through vetoes at the United Nations Security Council, is part of that history. So is the provision of voluminous no-strings-attached aid to Israel, which adjusted for inflation has totaled well over $300 billion.

Now amid the current war, the Biden administration is requesting an additional $14.3 billion to be given to Israel on top of the usual annual largesse. With a continued war, relatively little of that aid would go to what can legitimately be called defense. Most of it would go toward wreaking more destruction on the Gaza Strip.

The administration's increasing talk about the need for Israel to exercise restraint — after the administration's initial post-October 7 theme of going all-in with Israel — cannot be expected to carry much weight in the eyes of foreigners and foreign governments. Apart from the recent pause in the fighting, whatever pro-restraint urging the administration has voiced to Israel has had little effect. Observers can correctly interpret the relationship as one in which potential leverage never gets translated into usable leverage as long as the United States stays committed to being Israel's bankroller and diplomatic patron.

U.S. credibility suffers from all this, especially regarding matters of war and peace. U.S. invocations of a "rules-based international order" are disdained and dismissed when the world sees the U.S. facilitating blatant and lethal Israeli disregard for the laws of war and other international law.

The credibility deficit has been especially acute regarding the other ongoing war in which President Biden has taken a strong interest — the one in Ukraine. The president himself has linked the two wars, if only as a device to get aid for both Israel and Ukraine through a divided Congress. Foreign observers can see that in one of theses conflicts the United States is supporting resistance to an armed occupation (by Russia of Ukrainian territory) while in the other it is supporting the occupier.

Biden's own linkage of the wars also encourages comparisons of the scale of death and destruction, such as how the number of women and children killed in seven weeks of Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip is more than twice the number killed in nearly two years of Russian attacks in Ukraine.

Perpetuation of the assault on Gaza makes foreign observers more conscious than ever of how much the dominant U.S. role in decades of a Middle East "peace process," — in which the United States often functioned as Israel's lawyer — has been a failure, a point that Russian president Vladimir Putin is exploiting. That means less foreign willingness to look to the United States for leadership in handling not just this international conflict but also other ones. It means an opening for rival powers to play a greater role as peacemakers. China had already begun doing that in the Middle East and is now using the Gaza war to expand its regional role further.

This development contributes to a decline in U.S. influence in the region, and probably elsewhere, relative to that of China.

The damage to U.S. interests is a matter not only of credibility but also of the resentment and hatred that the U.S. backing of the Israeli assault — with the United States in a minority internationally by not supporting a permanent cease-fire — has engendered. That resentment is most apparent in the Middle East but not limited to that region, with many perceiving a double standard in how the United States reacts to civilian suffering from the use of force.

Even if regimes try to filter out emotion from their own decision-making and have little sympathy for the Palestinians, they — including authoritarian regimes — must take account of strong sentiment among their populations. The effects on regime policies of importance to the United States are impossible to predict in detail but can be substantial, ranging from denial of access rights for U.S. military forces to lessened support for the United States in international organizations.

Enraged populations can inflict damage on U.S. interests regardless of the policies of their government. Boycotts in the Middle East of the products and services of U.S. companies are already under way.

More worrisome is that the anger over the assault on Gaza will stimulate anti-U.S. terrorism. One of the most consistent themes in the propaganda and confessions of terrorists who have attacked U.S. interests in the past is that they were striking back against U.S. support for Israel's subjugation of Palestinians. As recent calls to arms by al-Qaida and Islamic State suggest, the stepped-up anger resulting from the assault on Gaza may stimulate new terrorism against not only Israel but also its U.S. patron.

The ingredients are present for a repeat of the perverse relationship between terrorism and the ill-fated U.S. war in Iraq. Although that war was misleadingly sold as part of a "war on terror," one of its effects was to increase terrorism, especially by giving birth to the group that became Islamic State. Today, the habit of labeling Hamas as nothing more than a "terrorist group" — when in fact it is a nationalist movement focused on political power in Palestine, whose only U.S. victims have been collateral casualties in attacks on Israel — obscures the potential for current U.S. policy toward the Gaza war to lead to new anti-U.S. terrorism.

These major costs to U.S. interests can be diminished if the United States calls strongly and clearly for a permanent cease-fire in Gaza and uses its leverage to move Israel in that direction. In so far failing to do so, the Biden administration has been in a minority not only internationally — with the United States becoming more isolated as a result — but also within American opinion.

The current crisis has underscored some of the major longstanding differences between U.S. and Israeli interests. But regarding the Israeli interest that ought to matter most — the long-term security of Israeli citizens — the administration can honestly tell Israelis that a quick end to the slaughter in Gaza and a turn to political means for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are far more likely to assure that security than a continuation of living by the sword.

The present study documents a language educator's reflection on two transitions that mirror current curricular changes in undergraduate language programs in the United States. The first chronicles her personal pedagogical transformation from a general-purposes Spanish language professor and her adjustment to teaching as a visiting professor in a Spanish for Specific Purposes (SSP) language-learning environment at the United States Air Force Academy. The second reports the evolution over several decades of the Spanish language program at University of Alabama at Birmingham from a traditional general Spanish-language program to a multipurpose program. The study suggests that SSP and liberal arts values are not mutually exclusive, and it explores what Spanish for General Purposes (SGP) can learn from SSP. Spanish programs that find common ground and hybridize to respond to multiple demands of today's Spanish learners are likely to be the most successful in the future. ; To cite the digital version, add its Reference URL (found by following the link in the header above the digital file). ; A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 88 The Unexpected Spanish for Specific Purposes Professor: A Tale of Two Institutions Sheri Spaine Long United States Air Force Academy University of Alabama at Birmingham Abstract: The present study documents a language educator's reflection on two transitions that mirror current curricular changes in undergraduate language programs in the United States. The first chronicles her personal pedagogical transformation from a general-purposes Spanish language professor and her adjustment to teaching as a visiting professor in a Spanish for Specific Purposes (SSP) language-learning environment at the United States Air Force Academy. The second reports the evolution over several decades of the Spanish language program at University of Alabama at Birmingham from a traditional general Spanish-language program to a multipurpose program. The study suggests that SSP and liberal arts values are not mutually exclusive, and it explores what Spanish for General Purposes (SGP) can learn from SSP. Spanish programs that find common ground and hybridize to respond to multiple demands of today's Spanish learners are likely to be the most successful in the future. Keywords: language learning curriculum, liberal arts, medical Spanish, military language learning, Spanish for General Purposes (SGP), Spanish instruction, Spanish for Specific Purposes (SSP), United States Air Force Academy, University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) Introduction This academic year, I dubbed myself the unexpected Spanish for Specific Purposes (SSP) professor because specialized career-focused instruction became part of my pedagogical repertoire. Working in a SSP language-learning environment has made me take stock of what mainstream language educators can gain from exposure to the philosophy and instructional techniques of languages for specific purposes. I am serving currently as Distinguished Visiting Professor of Spanish at the United States Air Force Academy. I am a permanent Professor of Spanish at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB). In this reflective paper, I chronicle two transitions. First, I share observations about my transition from general purposes language instruction to the more focused language-learning setting at the United States Air Force Academy. Language learning at the United States Air Force Academy exemplifies the definition of a Spanish for Specific Purposes (SSP) program because it is dedicated to the goal of educating future Air Force officer-leaders with a global perspective. Secondly, I narrate from an administrative/ administrator's point of view UAB's evolution from a traditional Spanish curriculum to a dual-purpose program that includes a SSP certificate. I conclude that both the United States Air Force Academy and UAB Spanish language programs provide unique insights into the curricular changes and challenges in language teaching that have emerged during the last several decades in higher education. My experiences in these respective undergraduate Spanish programs show that signature language curricula have been and can be developed to serve diverse missions of learners and institutions and that intellectual and practical needs simultaneously helped mold these A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 89 programs. The United States Air Force Academy and UAB Spanish language programs are traditional and nontraditional at the same time. I posit they will resemble our future hybridized Spanish language programs. For purposes of this paper, I understand hybridized to mean multipurpose programs that have SSP components and a liberal arts foundation. The subfield of SSP can be defined as a practice that gives language learners access to the Spanish that they need to accomplish their own academic or occupational goals (Sánchez-López, 2013). It is necessary to locate SSP within the domain of Second Language Acquisition (SLA) in order to recognize that SSP is not a departure from current theory or practices in foreign language education. The counterpoint to SSP is Spanish for General Purposes (SGP). SGP is a broad descriptor for the teaching and learning of Spanish in ways that can be exploratory in nature. It is language teaching and learning that is likely not to have a singular career focus. Along with the concept of language learning for cultural breadth, traditionally SGP has been ensconced within the notion of liberal arts education. After almost 20 years of teaching principally undergraduate SGP at UAB, I relocated to Colorado Springs to experience anew the teaching and learning of Spanish in a different context. The learning environment that I envisioned at the service academy would be focused on the specific Air Force mission within undergraduate higher education. By contrast, I am the product of a liberal arts education that was not singularly focused on a specific career. For the last several decades, I have taught students with a variety of goals, both professional and personal. The teaching and learning environment with which I am the most familiar is rooted in the model of a liberal education that has historically framed SGP programs across the United States over the last 75 years. Goals of the liberal arts education include such attributes as thinking critically, possessing broad analytical skills, learning how to learn, thinking independently, seeing all sides of an issue, communicating clearly (orally and in writing), exercising self-control for the sake of broader loyalties, showing self-assurance in leadership ability, and participating in and enjoying (cross-)cultural experience (Blaich, Bost, Chan, & Lynch, 2010). By reviewing some attributes commonly found in definitions of a liberal arts education, I highlight the cornerstone of numerous undergraduate programs in higher education. My goal is not to produce a comprehensive list of its characteristics. In fact, one finds variations in the definition of the liberal arts education tailored to suit institutional realities and needs. The elements that I emphasize in the present discussion are particular characteristics, such as analytical and critical thinking, leadership development, civic responsibility and cultural breadth, which are especially relevant to how these two Spanish language programs evolved at both the United States Air Force Academy and UAB. Although critical thinking may not be one of the characteristics that spring to mind within military education given the realities of obedience, discipline and hierarchy, critical thinking is an essential characteristic of military officers that must make decisions in complex situations. The teaching/learning of the ability to analyze critically is key in military service academies and in civilian institutions, such as UAB. UAB and arrived at the United States Air Force Academy in summer 2011. Because of the courses that I had been asked to design and teach, I knew that the United States Air Force Academy's curriculum was not about technical instruction as in Spanish for Military Purposes. In fact, my fall courses had mainstream course titles that one might find in any Spanish program: Literature and Film of Spain and Latin American Civilization and Culture. My military supervisors told me that I was invited here to bring a different perspective and pedagogy into the classroom. As my first semester unfolded, I set out to learn from diverse A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 90 pupils and faculty members and to absorb and adapt to the differences before me. The United States Air Force Academy's mission fits neatly on a sign that everyone reads upon entering the military installation: "Developing Leaders of Character." The United States Air Force Academy (2011) is an undergraduate institution, awarding the BS degree as part of its mission to inspire and develop officers with knowledge, character and discipline. Undergraduates are referred to as cadets, and this underscores both the military and academic focus of the learners. After a few weeks at the United States Air Force Academy, I realized that I had landed in a one-of-a-kind educational setting. The institution subscribes to and emphasizes many of the key core values that I associate with a liberal arts education while additionally providing technical training. As Pennington (2012) pointed out in her recent commentary in The Chronicle of Higher Education, we need to acknowledge that preparing for work and pursuing a liberal arts education are not mutually exclusive. Considering liberal arts principles and professional training as polar opposites is a deeply ingrained notion by many individuals in higher education and in society at large. This belief needs to change because of the type of complex preparation that today's students will need to flourish in the future. Below is the complete list of shared outcomes of the Unites States Air Force Academy. Even with a cursory examination, one finds intertwined traditional liberals arts concepts and elements associated with technical education for engineers, scientists and warriors: Shared United States Air Force Academy Outcomes (2011) Commission leaders of character who embody the Air Force core values. . . . . .committed to Societal, Professional, and Individual Responsibilities  Ethical Reasoning and Action  Respect for Human Dignity  Service to the Nation  Lifelong Development and Contributions  Intercultural Competence and Involvement . . .empowered by integrated Intellectual and Warrior Skills  Quantitative and Information Literacy  Oral and Written Communication  Critical Thinking  Decision Making  Stamina  Courage  Discipline  Teamwork . . .grounded in essential Knowledge of the Profession of Arms and the Human & Physical Worlds  Heritage and Application of Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power  National Security and Full Spectrum of Joint and Coalition Warfare A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 91  Civic, Cultural and International Environments  Ethics and the Foundations of Character  Principles of Science and the Scientific Method  Principles of Engineering and the Application of Technology Source: http://www.usafa.edu/df/usafaoutcomes.cfm?catname=Dean%20of%20Faculty Values such as critical thinking, ethics and ethical reasoning, respect for human dignity, lifelong development and contributions, intercultural competence, and oral and written communication are integral to a liberal arts education and are the foundation of cadet education. The first phrase that frames the entire list—"Commission leaders of character who embody the Air Force core values. . ."—is key to my contention that the United States Air Force Academy's type of SSP is the teaching and learning of languages in the broader context of leadership education. The direct relationship between what one associates with well-informed leaders and liberal arts values emphasizes the importance of nurturing future leaders (whether cadets or college students) that are civically and globally astute. Leadership development clearly underpins both liberal arts values and those of the United States Air Force Academy. Like many undergraduate institutions in the United States, Spanish is widely taught at the United States Air Force Academy. According to Diane K. Johnson, an institutional statistician, there are a total of more than 500 cadets (out of a total cadet enrollment of over 4,000) that are in Spanish classes (introductory through advanced) in spring semester 2012. There are also cadets enrolled in 7 other languages that are labeled strategic or enduring. Notably, there is no language major at the United States Air Force Academy. However, there is a Foreign Area Studies major. Also, cadets can declare a minor in a language. There were 327 cadets with minor in languages at the time of this spring semester 2012 snapshot. The specific mission statement of the United States Air Force Academy's Department of Foreign Languages is: "To develop leaders of character with a global perspective through world-class language and culture education." Language and culture are embedded in the concept of the kind of global perspective that a 21st-century leader must possess. From Washington DC to Wall Street, there is agreement that future leaders internationally—both military and civilian—need to be multilingual and culturally adept to be able to navigate and lead in the 21st century (Education for global leadership, 2006). According to Lt. Col. Western (2011), it is imperative that our military comprehend that maintaining world leadership and security requires a broad understanding of other languages, cultures and thought processes. Although the Department of Defense's report (2012) on "Sustaining United States Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" does not directly address language and cultural expertise, many of theses priorities rely on knowledge from military leaders with considerable language and cultural acumen. Historically, the language department has always had a dual purpose that has consisted of SSP focusing on developing future Air Force officers, while providing many elements of a liberal arts education. From the following list, you will see a sampling of the generic course titles. They are not a departure from what one might find at other institutions: Basic Spanish I & Basic Spanish II (Spanish 131–132), Intermediate Spanish A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 92 I & Intermediate Spanish II (Spanish 221–222), Advanced Spanish I & Advanced Spanish II (Spanish 321–322), Civilization and Culture (Spanish 365), Current Events in the Spanish-Speaking World (Spanish 371), Introduction to Peninsular Literature (Spanish 376), Introduction to Latin American Literature (Spanish 377), Advanced Spanish Readings (Spanish 491), and Special Topics (Spanish 495). The course titles do not offer clues as to how these classes might differ from the average civilian college or university classes with similar names. In my experience teaching and/or observing these classes, differences do stand out because language learners at the United States Air Force Academy focus on application of language as a skill combined with cultural and historical knowledge. The cadets also seek intellectual breadth through the analysis of multiple perspectives particularly found in intermediate- to upper-level Spanish language classes. In the first six months in residence at the United States Air Force Academy, I observed that cadets are more intellectually broad than I assumed at the outset. Cadets read about literature and culture, analyzed film, and even wrote poetry in Spanish with gusto. They do perform in the classroom with a defined career in mind. The focus on the military profession and leadership changes the daily routine in the language classroom. By emphasizing deliberate leadership and language teaching and/or learning opportunities, crosspollination enhances the classroom exper-ience and improves institutional learning outcomes. Form cannot be divorced from function in language learning, so the synthesis of leadership development and language/cultural learning occurs. Recent studies from interdisciplinary research with the neurosciences and education show that fusion between disciplines can provide effective pathways to learning (Coyle, Hood, & Marsh, 2010). Teaching Spanish at the United States Air Force Academy altered my preparations and delivery. Because of SSP, I adapted to differences that are administrative, operational, pedagogical, experiential and conceptual. First, I experienced the surface-level administrative transformations from SGP to the special brand of SSP at this institution. I learned about:  Classroom rituals that include military protocols, such as calling the class to attention in Spanish, inspecting students' regulation dress and upholding other classroom standards in the target language;  References to Air Force traditions and military rank in the target language;  And, lock down, active shooter and natural disaster drills that might happen during class time in the target language. Additionally, there were different details in course design that reshaped my pedagogical filter. During an examination of all Spanish language course syllabi at the United States Air Force Academy, I noticed that the communities standard from the 5Cs in the Standards for Foreign Language Learning (1999) is often replaced with a different C that stands for Careers. The focus on the professional use of Spanish is starkly emphasized through this substitution. On an operational level in the classroom, staying abreast of current events in the Spanish-speaking world and being able to interpret them—such as changes in government officials, political and economic transitions in the target culture—take on greater importance while teaching at the United States Air Force Academy. For example, when A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 93 learners know that they might be assigned to carry out tasks in any Latin American country in the future, the learners understandably pay more attention to geographical details, how economic conditions impact political situations, how longstanding historical realities affect the current mood, and so on. The language-learning environment carries with it a cachet of practical information, and it also supplies complex situations and problem-solving scenarios on which future Air Force decision makers can cut their teeth. Language practice includes creating a number of hypothetical SSP situations in which cadets participate in order to foreshadow their leadership roles, such as role-play opportunities that are relevant to Air Force operations. For example, cadets might be asked what they would do and say as a United States Air Attaché or an intelligence officer stationed in Latin America. On the conceptual level, I am currently organizing and creating a seminar that is titled War in the Arts, Literature and Film in Spain and Latin America. It is a themed-humanities seminar that offers a rich lexical environment and an opportunity to focus on the profession of war, ethics, conflict and peacekeeping in the context of film, art and print texts of the Spanish-speaking world. Considering, for example, the representation of the warrior in a literary work provides an opportunity to discuss ethics and strategies and to analyze the representation of leaders across cultures. At the United States Air Force Academy, I have participated in preparing cadets to go on semester-long exchanges to foreign military academies. Some of this is done through wayside teaching at our Spanish conversation table, emphasizing the type of current and relevant social, linguistic, and cultural information that a cadet might need to function abroad in a variety of contexts and represent the United States. One way to prepare for going abroad has been to encourage and mentor cadets to volunteer for selection to host visiting military dignitaries, such as ranking delegations from the Colombian and Mexican Air Force. To prepare cadets, instructors share with them tips about how to interact appropriately and to display leadership through social intelligence and knowledge of protocol in the target language and culture. As a follow up, debriefing after these events is essential to discuss perceptions and observations and to develop cross-cultural competence. Much like teaching and interacting with SGP students, there are immediate needs, and then, there is the important long-range goal of encouraging life-long learning in Spanish. In the context of the United States Air Force, there are programs that make this objective more concrete than what is generally experienced by students in civilian colleges and universities. To take advantage of what the Air Force has to offer, I have also learned about LEAP (Language Enabled Airman Program), which provides for structured life-long language learning for specific purposes in the Air Force. According to the Air Force Culture and Language Center ("Air force culture," 2012), LEAP is designed to sustain, enhance and utilize the existing language skills and talents of Airmen in the program. The stated goal of LEAP is to develop a core group of Airmen across specialties and careers possessing the capability to communicate in one or more foreign languages. To become a participant in LEAP, Airmen must already possess moderate to high levels of proficiency in a foreign language. Individuals that apply and are accepted into the LEAP program receive regular training both face to face and online in the target language as well as have immersion opportunities at intervals during their careers. Working to encourage and help cadets apply for LEAP is another SSP goal at the United States Air Force. A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 94 These are an overview of my unexpected SSP experiences at the Air Force Academy. My transformation from SGP to SSP started with learning and applying new vocabulary that focuses on cadets' professional needs. Later, I began to think of my learners as future leaders that will need to perform and apply knowledge to make judgments about the Spanish-speaking individuals and groups. This motivated me to reorganize courses and reconceive of them with a keener eye toward performance and to explore ways to get cadets to think beyond their immediate milieu. With the overlay of leadership development and military culture, this teaching experience has driven me to operate in a more interdisciplinary fashion than before. I experienced first hand a teaching and learning climate that offers a unique hybrid of liberal arts and technical education in a military context. Perhaps the best lesson that SSP teaches is to constantly question the relevance of what you are doing in the classroom: to whom is it relevant and for what purpose? Within the Department of Foreign Languages at the United States Air Force Academy, the SSP focus on career preparation in language instruction and the liberal arts connection with leadership evolved simultaneously. This dual focus of the curriculum contrasts the reality in most civilian language departments where there was one general focus and departments are being (or have been retrofitted) to include new curricula and/or tracks. Many civilian language departments are currently transitioning from SGP programs and integrating more SSP language options. In the late 1980s and on into the 1990s, Spanish for Business and Medical Spanish courses appeared. The integration of professional courses happened in response to societal needs (Doyle, 2010). The Department of Foreign Languages at the United States Air Force Academy offers a rare, fully integrated model of the curricular common ground of career-focused language learning with an underpinning of liberal arts breadth. Conversely, civilian language programs have transitioned to dual-purpose or multipurpose programs for different reasons. In many cases, motives for transitioning programs have been to maintain relevance and enrollments. The latter was clearly the case with the Spanish language program at UAB in the 1990s. This two-fold reality raises the palpable issue of how best to organize these dual-purpose programs from both a curricular and an administrative point of view. Undergraduate language departments and programs have to meet the needs of both their general and specific constituencies. There is a general consensus in the language discipline that multiple paths to the language major, as advocated by the Modern Language Association in the report "Foreign Languages and Higher Education: New Structures for a Changed World" (2007), will be a necessity for the future survival of undergraduate language programs. With curricular reform underway, how do traditional language programs best transition from general purposes programs to hybridized programs that also house languages for specific purposes? Another obvious driver of dual-purpose Spanish language programs is the limited support for language teaching and learning. As programs transform, we need to be mindful of the realities that face most undergraduate language programs: 1) limited financial resources to support language programs, 2) staffing limitations because of faculty back-ground and adaptability, 3) reward systems that favor faculty members who work in the more established subdisciplines in the language field, and 4) multifoci and/or shifting interests of undergraduate students. Because of these conditions, exploring ways that resources can be shared intentionally and constructively will be essential to benefit general A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 95 and specific purposes language programs at the same time. The UAB Spanish language program learned to share resources and evolved into a multipurpose program. The UAB Spanish language program transitioned from SGP to include SSP gradually over several decades. This transformation aligns the department with the institution's vision and mission, which is outlined below: The UAB Vision UAB's vision is to be an internationally renowned research university—a first choice for education and health care. The UAB Mission UAB's mission is to be a research university and academic health center that dis- covers, teaches and applies knowledge for the intellectual, cultural, social and eco- nomic benefit of Birmingham, the state and beyond. Source: http://www.uab.edu/plan/ Reflecting the mission and vision at UAB, these statements clearly present the dual role of the institution: it is both medical and educational. When I joined the faculty 20 years ago, we spoke of the medical side and the academic side of campus in a way that implied a scant relationship between the two. Therefore, the undergraduate curriculum in the language department in the early years of my appointment had no relationship with the health sciences. This separation slowly eroded over the years. When I was hired in 1992, the curriculum for the UAB undergraduate language major would best be described as traditional: language and literature. UAB students studied languages for a variety of reasons, ranging from enrichment to the fulfillment of the compulsory language requirement. We had a multiquarter language requirement that was rescinded in the mid-1990s as a result of the politics between the state's community colleges and the universities. Currently, UAB has no foreign language requirement. Almost 650 students were enrolled in Spanish in spring 2012 out of an undergraduate population of close to 12,000 students ("UAB student profile," 2011). Ironically, the lack of a language requirement in the undergraduate curriculum set the department on a path toward popularizing SSP. At that time, the UAB Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures began to turn its attention to providing courses that the students demanded. As a result in the mid-1990s, UAB offered its first medical Spanish classes for undergraduate students. From that time on, I became interested increasingly in SSP for reasons that had to do with the institution's human capital both faculty and student. Also from 2002–2009, I served as chairperson of the UAB Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures. I took an administrator's interest in growing and integrating a SSP program into the existing general Spanish program. The medical Spanish courses were a good match for the interests of our student body. Approximately 40% of the freshmen that enroll at UAB declare that they are on the premedicine track. Many students are attracted to our campus because UAB houses an internationally known School of Medicine, although many freshmen abandon the premedicine track for other health-related fields. A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 96 Student interest grew in professionally focused language courses and key faculty members invested in SSP as well. In 2001, our first applied linguist in Spanish was hired in the language department. She shared her vision of starting a SSP program by offering a few courses to appeal to pre-professionals. She became the director of the nascent SSP program. Over the years, the SSP program became so popular that it evolved into a more defined and elaborate SSP certificate program ("UAB Spanish for specific purposes program," 2012) that had 62 students enrolled in the program in spring 2012. It was the first undergraduate certificate program on the UAB campus. As the program grew, the SSP Director was successful in convincing existing junior faculty to take professional development seminars in SSP and develop additional SSP courses, such as Intermediate Spanish for the Professions, Advanced Business Spanish and Advanced Spanish for Health Professionals. In 2007, we hired a Spanish instructor to develop and expand the medical Spanish courses in the undergraduate curriculum under the umbrella of SSP. She began to collaborate with the Schools of Nursing, Medicine, and Dentistry to provide short courses to their graduate students. Over time, signs of curricular integration increased between the medical and academic sides of campus. Also, there was a confluence of external events in the state of Alabama and internal events on the UAB campus that occurred in the late 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century that promoted the success of the SSP program. Prior to the 2007 recession, a rapidly growing Spanish-speaking population in Alabama had health professionals in a reactive mode because they were not prepared to handle patients that spoke limited English ("Demographic profile of Hispanics in Alabama," 2012). In 2005, UAB hosted campus-wide events around its first freshmen discussion book The Spirit Catches you and you Fall Down: A Hmong Child, her American Doctors and the Collision of two Cultures by Ann Fadiman (1997). The book was widely read across campus, especially in the School of Medicine. Fadiman's volume chronicled Hmong (not Spanish) speakers. Nevertheless, the book captured the timely problem of the critical need for communication with the foreign born in the health professions. From that year on, the importance of cross-cultural communication became part of the UAB campus dialogue. Also around this time, UAB's prominent, grant-funded Minority Health and Research Center unofficially broadened its definition of minority to include Latinos. Meanwhile, within the UAB Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures we were able to offer our first scholarship award for a Spanish major on the premedicine track in 2003. Beginning in 2003, I recall anecdotally receiving periodic inquiries from ranking individuals in the School of Medicine that wanted to collaborate. Typically, they requested the assistance of Spanish-speaking faculty with informed-consent forms. There were repeated requests for help with interpretation until the UAB clinics developed protocols to deal with Spanish-language only patients. In January 2010, we piloted a short course in Spanish (Davidson & Long, 2012) that was offered as part of the medical school elective curriculum. In 2002, the staff of the language department informally observed a trend in the increase of undergraduate students who declared a double major in Spanish and Biology/Chemistry. I procured a modest donation from a local physician for the aforementioned scholarship. All of these events fueled the popularity of the UAB SSP program and clearly defined the need for it. The current SSP program and certificate houses a number of preprofessional courses that are not limited exclusively to SSP students. The full program description can A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 97 be viewed at http://www.uab.edu/languages/languages-programs/ssp. The number of general versus pre-professional students varies from course to course, but courses such as Spanish Translation and Interpretation tend to enroll students from both cohorts, whereas Spanish for the Health Professionals enrolls few general-purposes students. Of course, the faculty members have noticed over time that our student clientele had slowly changed: two very different types of students were sitting in the same classroom. Professionally focused Spanish students and general Spanish students enrolled in the some of the same courses. This presented new pedagogical challenges for our faculty members and raised the issue: how does one meet the needs of both groups (SSP and SGP) in the context of our institution's student body? To date, this matter has not been systematically dealt with in the UAB Spanish Division. Individual professors have developed strategies, like individualizing projects, and yet, other faculty members teach to one group to the exclusion of the other. The curricular changes discussed by the Modern Language Association have come about in many language departments, and they have been welcomed by some faculty members but not by all. Embracing the notion that the traditional liberal arts language learner can cohabitate with the interdisciplinary and/or career-focused language learner (as demonstrated at the United States Air Force Academy) is key. Highlighting the philo-sophical common ground rooted in a liberal arts education is what may be perceived by some individuals as strictly technical training may help ease the transition. The next phase will be to articulate relevant practices for educators and administrators, as well as shared values and outcomes, and to provide models that show transitional programs how to achieve what I would like to call 'constructive hybridity.' I define constructive hybridity as a positive and collective effort to sort out and integrate the best of traditional Spanish language programs with different SSP practices evidencing more focused professional goals. The next task is to define the 'shared canon' between the various tracks in any given Spanish program. Obviously, this is not a one-size-fits-all charge due to different student, societal and institutional needs, but there is foundational work to be done in order to come up with more consensuses. Given my administrative experiences as a faculty member at UAB and my teaching experience at the United States Air Force Academy, I have come to realize that both general and specific missions in Spanish-language learning are not mutually exclusive. In June 2011, I marched off to Colorado to teach and to learn. I have learned that there is a place for time-tested liberal arts values within SSP programs and that hybridized programs (liberal arts and SSP) can be successful and beneficial to the learner. As suggested by the United States Air Force Academy and UAB programs, future programs in Spanish-language instruction will need to focus on our common ground to serve multiple purposes. Thus, I return to the concept that I mentioned at the outset: it is time to think hybrid. Our future undergraduate language programs will have multiple tracks/purposes. This hybridization can be as positive and enriching for both faculty members and language learners as it has been for me during this phase of my career as a language educator. Returning to my own narrative as a committed, career Spanish professor, I have no doubt that, in the future, my newfound SSP instructional acumen and orientation will inform my future general purposes classes and improve them. A TALE OF TWO INSTITUTIONS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 98 Disclaimer The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Air Force, The Depart-ment of Defense or the United States Government. References Air force culture and language center. (2012, May). Retrieved from http://www.culture.af.mil/leap/index.aspx Blaich, C., Bost, A., Chan, E., & Lynch, R. (2010). Defining liberal arts education. Retrieved from http://www.liberalarts.wabash.edu/storage Coyle, D., Hood, P., & Marsh, D. (2010). Content and language integrated learning (p. 25). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davidson, L., & Long, S. S. (2012). Medical Spanish for US medical students: A pilot case study. Dimension, 1–13. Retrieved from http://scolt.webnode.com/ Demographic profile of Hispanics in Alabama. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.pewhispanic.org/states/state/al/ Doyle, M. S. (2010). A responsive, integrative Spanish curriculum at UNC Charlotte. Hispania, 93(1), 80–84. Education for global leadership: The importance of international studies and foreign language education for US economic and national security. (2006). Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development. Fadiman, A. (1997). The spirit catches you and you fall down: A Hmong child, her American doctors, and the collision of two cultures. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Foreign languages and higher education: new structures for a changed world. (2007) MLA ad hoc committee on foreign languages. Profession published by the Modern Language Association, 2007 (May), 1–11. Pennington, H. (2012, April 13). For student success, stop debating and start improving. The Chronicle of Higher Education, pp. A33–A34. Sánchez-López, L. (2013). Spanish for specific purposes. In C. Chapelle (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Standards for foreign language learning in the 21st century. (1999) Lawrence, KS: National Standards in Foreign Language Education Project, Allen Press. Sustaining US global leadership: Priorities for 21st century defense. (2012) Washington DC: Department of Defense. UAB Spanish for specific purposes program. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.uab.edu/languages/ssp UAB Student profile. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.uab.edu/home/about/student-profile-accomplishments United States Air Force Academy curriculum handbook 2011–2012. (2011). USAF Academy, CO: Academy Board. Western, D. J. (2011). How to say 'national security' in 1,100 languages. Air & Space Power Journal, 48–61. Retrieved from http://www.airpower.au.af.mil

With a whirlwind of dramatic events gripping the world's attention, it can be easy to forget that we are now less than one year away from the 2024 presidential election.Despite their expected focus on domestic issues, candidates will have a lot to answer for this cycle when it comes to foreign policy as the war in Ukraine drags on and U.S.-China relations continue to deteriorate.The Democratic Party has chosen not to hold debates despite growing concerns about President Joe Biden's chances next year. With only a couple of months to go before the primaries start, the Quincy Institute decided that it would be useful to survey Biden's challengers from the left on how they would handle a range of foreign policy issues if elected.The candidates' responses show interesting differences on a range of questions, from a potential Israeli-Saudi normalization deal to the possibility of using military force to fight the cartels in Mexico. The questionnaire went out before the October 7 Hamas attacks against Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, but we pulled together candidates' reactions to the events where possible.We received responses from Democratic candidate Marianne Williamson as well as independent candidates Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Cornel West. Biden's campaign declined to participate, so we have aggregated relevant quotes and information about the president's stances where possible. We did the same for Rep. Dean Phillips (D-Minn.), who entered the race in late October and has not responded to our requests. We will update this page if we receive further responses.Biggest challenges to U.S. security; how to avoid war with China; potential negotiations to end the war in Ukraine; U.S. role in Saudi-Israeli normalization; withdrawing troops from Middle East; military force and the Mexican cartels; Israel-Hamas warWhat, in your view, are the three most pressing challenges to U.S. national security?Joe Biden (D)While President Biden has not directly addressed this question, his national security adviser said the following about the White House's 2022 National Security Strategy: "Our strategy proceeds from the premise that the two strategic challenges — geopolitical competition and shared transnational threats — are intertwined. We cannot build the broad coalitions we need to out-compete our rivals, if we sideline the issues that most directly impact the lives of billions of people." He further argued that "this is a decisive decade for shaping the terms of competition, especially with the PRC [China]. This is a decisive decade for getting ahead of the great global challenges — from climate to disease to emerging technology."Marianne Williamson (D)"The three most pressing challenges to U.S. national security are the nuclear threat, climate change, and our inability to go beyond the adversarial positioning in which countries view each other. We are closer to nuclear war than we've been in a long time. We must move towards a nuclear-free world, and we must begin by adopting a no first use policy. Once we adopt this policy, it will be much easier for us to get other nuclear-armed countries to do the same. There is no threat I am more concerned about than climate change. We are living through the last few years where we have a chance to save humanity. We must immediately undergo a just transition from a dirty fossil fueled economy to a clean renewable economy, and create millions of good jobs in the process. The time for incrementalism on climate is over. If we only view other countries through an adversarial lens, in terms of how they can harm or serve our interests, then we cannot deal with these crucial issues that challenge the security of all of us. We must work together with the international community for the common interest so that we can begin to deal with climate change, nuclear weapons, pandemics, and other threats."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"The most pressing challenges are the ones we have created ourselves. First is the risk of nuclear war, which belligerent and provocative U.S. policy has elevated to levels not seen since the Cold War.The second is the bankrupting of America's wealth, the result of decades of elevated military spending. The trillions spent on armaments could have gone toward building modern infrastructure, feeding and housing people, tackling chronic disease, and nourishing a thriving domestic economy.A third threat to national security is the epidemic of violence in our streets and in our homes. When we wage endless wars abroad, their mirror image afflicts us at home. Realistically, our nation is not threatened by an armed invasion by a foreign power. We have to broaden what we mean by 'national security' to include the things that actually make Americans feel insecure."Cornel West (I)"Climate Change: Climate change is not an endpoint that awaits us in the distant future, it is among us right now and impacting lives across the country and the entire world, especially the most vulnerable and most disadvantaged populations here in the U.S. — Black, Brown, Indigenous, and the poor. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), climate change-related damages cost the United States an estimated $165 Billion in 2022, Hurricane Ida, a Category 4 storm that massacred communities in Florida, including the loss of 150 lives, cost taxpayers approximately $112.9 Billion alone. Moreover, NOAA estimates that in the last 40 years, 341 storms exacerbated by climate change have cost the nation more than $2.5 Trillion. To put that into perspective, that's $80 Billion more than the national deficit of approximately $1.7 Trillion, thus far, for Fiscal Year 2023, and 1.5 percent of the national debt that stands at $161.7 trillion and counting. A nation already in massive debt, coupled with the astronomical costs of a growing climate crisis is the direct antithesis of national security. It's undeniable that more calamities associated with the climate crisis, including more powerful weather incidents that induce extreme flooding, extreme heat, and other environmental stressors, are inevitable. These events will have profound impacts on myriad systems and institutions that are necessary to maintain a livable society including, but not limited to, the production of food, access to clean water sources, the quality and availability of housing, transportation, education, and healthcare. The collapse of these systems could reasonably engender massive social unrest that would result in the massive displacement and forced migration of people as we are already witnessing with the United Houma Nation, Pointe-au Chien Indian Tribe, and Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw of present-day Louisiana, who are the first federally recognized climate migrants, whose land is literally sinking due to oil and gas extraction in the Gulf of Mexico, which has rendered their land susceptible to the impacts of climate change. In fact, the United Nations Office of the High Commissions for Refugees has predicted that more than 200 million people, globally, will be forced to relocate due to climate change, including 40% of United Statesians who currently reside in coastal areas. From the atrocities of Hurricane Katrina to the current situation at the United States border with Mexico, we have already witnessed the consequences of climate-related breakdowns of social, economic, and other systems necessary to maintain quality of life and life itself breakdown all coupled with mass migration of innocent people seeking refuge.Increased Militarism: The United States is the single biggest military spender in the world with an annual budget roughly the size of the next seven largest military budgets combined. According to records kept by the National Priorities Project at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), in any given year, military spending accounts for over half of the federal government's annual discretionary budget. The U.S. military's bloated budget is utilized to build weapons and warcraft, which are in turn utilized to threaten other nations and demand their cooperation with the perceived U.S. military hegemony or offered to cooperative nations as part of military alliances. In FY 2023 alone, out of a $1.8 trillion federal discretionary budget, $1.1 trillion – or 62 percent – was for militarized programs. On top of war and weapons for the Pentagon, these expenditures include domestic militarism for police departments across the country and mass incarceration, as well as increased detentions and deportation, which represent direct threats to the security of Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor people in the United States. As we are witnessing right now, the current administration is complicit in thousands of civilian deaths by giving Israel military aid at $3.8 billion this year, half of which goes to Israel's missile system. They are now requesting a combined supplemental aid package at $106 billion for Israel along with Ukraine, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region, and US immigration enforcement at the US-Mexico southern border. To put this in perspective, combined with the estimated $113 billion in military aid the US has already sent to Ukraine, should the Congress grant President Biden's additional $105 billion package to Ukraine and Israel, this would represent almost 60% of the initially estimated $379 billion in climate change expenditures over 10 years included as part of the so-called Inflation Reduction Act. Further, the $105 billion military aid package to Israel and Ukraine is one hundred times the paltry $1 billion that the US pledged to the Green Climate Fund earlier this year, to fund climate mitigation and adaptation in the formerly colonized countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific. Our friends at IPS also indicate that the U.S. could safely redirect at least $350 billion from the Pentagon's current spending per year and achieve true security by ending wars, reducing our aggressive posture overseas, and reining in military contracts that drain public coffers for private gain - all measures that would actually increase national security, while making resources available for critical domestic needs including, but not limited to, increased access to healthcare, improving the nation's broken education system - including an iniquitous student loan debt crisis, and real action to address the climate crisis. With the largest military in the world, the US is the single largest greenhouse gas emitting institution and consumer of fossil fuels on the entire planet, with a carbon footprint bigger than 140 other countries. The environmental and climate impacts of global militarism and war are staggering. Militarization continues to increase greenhouse gas emissions and pollute and poison land, water and air through weapons production, storage, and use, which is ironic Defense Secretary, Lloyd Austin, himself recently declared, 'There is little about what the Defense Department does to defend the American people that is not affected by climate change. It is a national security issue, and we must treat it as such.'Rising White Supremacy and Nationalism: We have already observed how the interlinked crises of the calamities associated with climate change, which push those disproportionately impacted further to the margins and thereby increasing the militarization of the southern border, urban areas, and throughout the world to address associated entropy of social systems and infrastructure tends to increase sentiments that beguile far too many U.S. residents to embrace elements of white supremacy ideology, thereby increasing instances of violence and acceptance of authoritarian and fascist paradigms that represent clear and present dangers to national security – no one knows this better than the U.S. Department of Justice. In 2001, Attorney General, Merrick Garland admonished the Senate Appropriations Committee stating, in part, "Domestic violent extremists pose an elevated threat in 2021 and in the FBI's view, the top domestic violent extremist threat we face comes from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the white race." This salient issue has the potential to literally tear our nation asunder. A nation this divided is itself a national security risk that can be taken advantage of by nations hostile to the U.S. due to imperialist and interventionist past and present foreign policies of our country and their lasting impacts to [a] marked number of nations across the globe. Dismantling growing white supremacy and nationalism will require a multifaceted and intersectional approach that seeks to deracinate the root causes of this epidemic that prevents the U.S. from living up to its best self while also remaining a seemingly indelible threat. This will require tying requisite economic relief from an oligarchic approach to wealth accumulation and redistribution that exacerbates the white supremacy ideology ensconced in the fabric of this nation in such a way that has been negatively radicalizing poor white folk who may not even realize how the capitalist domination system upheld by the political duopoly extract from them as much as non-white people they are bamboozled to hate and stigmatize. I am confident that my Economic Justice prescriptions that include establishing a federal Universal Basic Income commission, wealth tax on all billionaire holdings and transaction, ending all tax loopholes for the oligarchy, and establishing a national $27 minimum wage, with special considerations for specific geographies where $27/hour would not be a family-sustaining wage, will be key steps in eviscerating the rise of white supremacy and nationalism in our nation that hurts the people perpetrated against as much as the people doing the perpetrating."As president, what would you do to avoid a direct military confrontation with China?Joe Biden (D)Biden has not directly addressed this question since becoming president, but a White House readout from his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping last year gives a good summary of his administration's stated approach to relations with China. "President Biden explained that the United States will continue to compete vigorously with the PRC, including by investing in sources of strength at home and aligning efforts with allies and partners around the world. He reiterated that this competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication. The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further. President Biden underscored that the United States and China must work together to address transnational challenges – such as climate change, global macroeconomic stability including debt relief, health security, and global food security – because that is what the international community expects."Marianne Williamson (D)"We absolutely cannot have a direct military confrontation with China, which would be one step away from World War III and nuclear Armageddon. The U.S. must accept that we are in a multipolar world. While I am deeply concerned about China's authoritarianism and serious violations of human rights, I do not think that China is interested in invading the U.S. or in starting a war with us. While we should do what we can through peaceful diplomacy to lessen Chinese human rights violations, we cannot start World War III between two nuclear-armed countries. Our military must stop trying to encircle China in the South China Sea. Instead, we must talk to China and seek peaceful coexistence."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"We believe that China has no desire for military confrontation. We will therefore ratchet down the tensions and cease the provocations in the South China Sea and elsewhere. We will adopt a posture that does not see China as an 'adversary,' and begin to negotiate arms control treaties in good faith so that both countries can reduce military spending to better the lives of their citizens."Cornel West (I)"We all know where a direct military confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) will lead — irreparable nuclear holocaust that will lead to the loss and alteration of hundreds of millions of innocent lives over a conflict engendered by two so-called superpowers. We need to be honest with the people of the world, the U.S. and PRC are currently in a cold war that must be thawed to save lives and a global economy both hanging in the balance. The first step in thawing the current cold war will require a cessation to the myriad proxy wars that use nations like Ukraine, Taiwan, and numerous global south nations from Africa to Southeast Asia, to Latin America as pawns in an arms and resource extraction race. As president I will cease the saber rattling and chest beating that are doing nothing but instigating the PRC with military war games in waterways of Southeast Asia such as the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and others. I am confident this will open pathways for diplomacy that leads to cooperation in lieu of competition with the PRC. I agree with the Quincy Institute's assessment that the current administration's rhetoric of competition with the PRC is a feckless attempt to marginalize and exclude the nation from the global community, which in turn pushes them to form alliances with nations the U.S. also finds itself in a contemporary cold war with including, but not limited to, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia. One area where I believe we should especially be cooperating rather than competing with the PRC is the climate crisis. While it's true that the PRC is the largest emitter in the world, the U.S. remains the largest historic emitter despite only representing five percent of the world's population. Planetary survival literally requires less finger pointing at who is most responsible for the climate crisis and more finger pointing towards mutual and cooperative solutions. And rather than compete with the PRC for requisite critical resources to develop the infrastructure for renewable energy and regenerative economies, we must cooperate with them such that we don't render the need to address the climate crisis into a rationalization for casus belli over possession critical resources that will also drag global south nations into proxy wars they want no part of. The PRC, the U.S., and the entire world has a collective interest in protecting lives and the planet from the impacts of climate change. As president, my first step in avoiding a military confrontation with the PRC would be to invite and work with them to be a leading partner in addressing the climate crisis by exchanging ideas, resources, and technologies that can rapidly emancipate both nations from reliance on fossil fuels, which will improve relations, cooperation, and the habitability of the planet at once, while also preventing a military confrontation that will take more lives than the climate crisis."Is it in the U.S. national interest for the president to convene negotiations in an effort to end the war in Ukraine?Joe Biden (D)Biden generally emphasizes that Ukraine should be the driving force behind any peace negotiations and has argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not shown signs that he is ready to negotiate. He has, however, helped to convene several international conferences to discuss a diplomatic path forward, one of which reportedly included discussions about concessions that Ukraine may make in exchange for peace. (The administration denied these reports.)Marianne Williamson (D)"Firstly, this question is framed in terms of the 'U.S. national interest,' but I think it's time we start concerning ourselves more with the interests of humanity as a whole than the interests of the American government or American corporations, which is usually what is meant by 'U.S. national interest.'Yes, I think the U.S. should convene negotiations with Russia and Ukraine. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a despicable crime, and we should support Ukraine and their autonomy. However, we need to do what we can to bring about a just but realistic peace. It seems extremely unlikely that either side in this conflict will have a complete victory over the other anytime soon, so if we don't want to let this draw out for two decades like our war in Afghanistan, then we should press for negotiations. I think that the withdrawn letter by progressive Congress members from last year that urged negotiations was a good and reasonable letter, and they should not have buckled to pressure and withdrawn it."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"Yes. Current U.S. strategic thinking is that the war serves the national interest by weakening Russia. That thinking is faulty on two counts. First, it is not weakening Russia. Second, a weak and unstable Russia would make us much less secure, not more secure. The United States and the world will be best served when Russia knows that we are not out to destroy her."Cornel West (I)"The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is not going to be ameliorated by military means. With $113 billion of taxpayer dollars already sent to Ukraine leading to no more than an endless war of attrition, as well as poll numbers indicating dithering support for a series of blank checks to continue it, it's clear the people of the United States have had enough. It's not just in the national interest for a diplomatic solution to this conflict, it's the duty of the President of the United States to lead this process with our global partners in Europe, Asia, and Africa. As president, I will give Ukraine no other choice but to enter a diplomatic process as part of my commitment to cease all war funding and weapons to Ukraine and instead invest in peacemaking."If Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize relations with Israel but requested a guarantee from the United States to defend the Kingdom militarily in exchange, would you seek to ratify a treaty making that commitment?Joe Biden (D)President Biden has not directly commented on this proposal, but his administration has led the initiative to negotiate a defense commitment in exchange for normalization.Rep. Dean Phillips (D)Phillips has endorsed the Biden administration's approach. "Never did we imagine it possible in our lifetimes to see the possible normalization of relations between the Saudis and Israelis. It's an extraordinary and historic opportunity not just for these two countries, but for the entire world," he told NPR. "The United States plays a significant role relative to a defense pact with the Saudis equipment and materiel relative to their military and potentially a civilian nuclear program as well. If those things can be met and also meeting some of the needs of the Palestinians, this could be an extraordinary legacy at a time the world surely needs it." Marianne Williamson (D)"No. The U.S. cannot get involved in another war in the Middle East – especially not in order to defend Saudi Arabia, arguably the worst human rights violator in the region. It is time the U.S. stops aiding Saudi Arabia and Israel in their egregious human rights violations."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"We think the premise of this question to be unlikely. Saudi Arabia is armed to the teeth and has no need of such a guarantee. As it has good relations with most other nations, its [only] plausible national security threat is Iran. However, much of the Sunni-Shiite conflict in the past arose from U.S. geopolitical maneuvering that elevated tensions throughout the region."Cornel West (I)"I wouldn't even qualify this request as a treaty as it would be more of a death sentence for innocent civilians in the region and more service members, too many who have already been lost due to U.S. empire building in the Middle East, mainly to protect oil profits of fossil fuel cartels both domestically and globally. We need less iron domes and a more iron-clad diplomatic process that leads to lasting peace and mutual dignity for all people in the Middle East. To this end, as president I would insist that any normalization of relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Israel include immediate steps to liberate Palestinian people from occupation and a wanton cycle of violence that's killing precious Palestinian and Israeli lives alike."As Commander-in-Chief, would you bring home the U.S. troops currently stationed in Iraq and Syria?Joe Biden (D)While Biden has not directly addressed this question, a senior Pentagon official recently said the U.S. "has no intent to withdraw in the near future" from Syria.Marianne Williamson (D)"Yes I would, but in Syria, I would first negotiate an agreement that ensures the Kurds will not be harmed before withdrawing the troops that are protecting them."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"Yes. Those nations do not want our troops there. I will instigate bold peace initiatives in places where there are still military tensions, in some cases replacing troops with international peacekeepers."Cornel West (I)"As indicated in my Policy Pillars Rooted in a Movement of Truth, Justice, and Love, as president I would immediately embark on a responsible and expeditious closure of global U.S. military bases as part of a larger initiative to cease and desist U.S. empire building and maintenance and slash the bloated military budget, including the disbanding of NATO, such that we can reinvest those funds in myriad social and economic justice programs domestically. As tensions in the Middle East associated with the crisis in Palestine/Israel grow, the U.S. presence is only exacerbating an already incendiary situation while putting brave service people in harm's way for no other reason than to maintain U.S. empire and a military hegemony in a region that needs less bullets and rockets and more diplomacy. To this end, as president, I would bring those troops home immediately, honor them for their service and ensure a Just Transition so that they can use the skills they gained in the military and put them to use for beneficial services to the people of the U.S."If elected, would you request an authorization from Congress to use military force against drug cartels in Mexico?Joe Biden (D)Biden has not commented directly on calls to authorize military force against the cartels, but a National Security Council spokesperson said in April that the administration "is not considering military action in Mexico.""Designating these cartels as foreign terrorist organizations would not grant us any additional authorities that we don't already have," the spokesperson added.Marianne Williamson (D)"No. The U.S. has invaded and militarily intervened in Latin America time after time, and it has only brought violence and misery and fueled the immigration that we now complain about. It is time we reject the imperialist Monroe Doctrine, which declared Latin America our backyard. It is time we respect our neighbors to the south and stop invading their countries."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"Absolutely not. The Mexicans have the power to overcome the drug cartels themselves. We can aid them by sharing intelligence, by shutting down the illegal weapons trade, by cracking down on money laundering activities of US banks, and by prosecuting the cartels' collaborators in this country."Cornel West (I)"Absolutely not. To be clear, asking the Congress for authorization to use military force in Mexico would essentially be asking Congress to approve a military invasion through a declaration of war against Mexico. The so-called war against drugs in the United States has been and continues to be an abject failure. This 50-year war has been used as a rationalization for crimes against humanity, especially those most marginalized by failed drug policies - Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor people, who have been subjected to a racialized and classist mass incarceration pogrom that has needlessly locked up over 400,000 people for non-violent drug-related crimes between 1980 and 1997 alone. A failed domestic drug war should not be an impetus to start a foreign drug war in the sovereign territory of one of our North American partners. It should instead be an impetus to enact efficacious policies that treat addiction as a national threat to public health. Instead of increasing militarism and launching a foreign war, we should declare war against the lack of access to healthcare and the lack of economic opportunities that contribute to drug use. Reducing and decriminalizing drug use in the United States will directly reduce the amount of drugs that are smuggled across the border, thereby reducing revenues for drug cartels in Mexico. This is less an issue of militarism and more an issue of addiction driven by supply and demand."Reactions to Israel-Hamas warJoe Biden (D)In a speech on Oct. 20, Biden said: "In Israel, we must make sure that they have what they need to protect their people today and always.The security package I'm sending to Congress and asking Congress to do is an unprecedented commitment to Israel's security that will sharpen Israel's qualitative military edge, which we've committed to — the qualitative military edge.We're going to make sure Iron Dome continues to guard the skies over Israel. We're going to make sure other hostile actors in the region know that Israel is stronger than ever and prevent this conflict from spreading.Look, at the same time, [Prime Minister] Netanyahu and I discussed again yesterday the critical need for Israel to operate by the laws of war. That means protecting civilians in combat as best as they can. The people of Gaza urgently need food, water, and medicine."Rep. Dean Phillips (D)In a long tweet, Phillips said, "The destruction of Hamas is necessary, but the military campaign must follow international law and conventions of civilized nations. [...]I support a pause in hostilities and the immediate safe passage of civilians from Gaza into temporary shelters in Egypt and/or Jordan and the largest humanitarian relief effort in world history.I am pro-Israeli and anti the Netanyahu government — and [its] enabling of settlements on Palestinian land. [...]Israel has a right to exist, defend itself, and ensure the terror and butchering of Oct 7 never happens again.Palestinians have a right to a nation of their own, and that begins with a free and fair election for the first time since 2006 in which a choice can be made; peace or war.Israelis must also be afforded the same right to choose peace or war."Marianne Williamson (D)Williamson tweeted: "For Israel to prosecute an all out war on Gaza is already a catastrophe for the people of Gaza. It can easily become a catastrophe for the people of Israel as well. There's no end game there, for them or for the rest of the world, that doesn't multiply the horror. The United States should join an international consortium — Egypt, Jordan and others — in efforts to secure release of the hostages and cessation of the bombing."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)On Oct. 7, Kennedy said the following in a statement: "This ignominious, unprovoked, and barbaric attack on Israel must be met with world condemnation and unequivocal support for the Jewish state's right to self-defense. We must provide Israel with whatever it needs to defend itself — now. As President, I'll make sure that our policy is unambiguous so that the enemies of Israel will think long and hard before attempting aggression of any kind.I applaud the strong statements of support from the Biden White House for Israel in her hour of need. However, the scale of these attacks means it is likely that Israel will need to wage a sustained military campaign to protect its citizens. Statements of support are fine, but we must follow through with unwavering, resolute, and practical action. America must stand by our ally throughout this operation and beyond as it exercises its sovereign right to self-defense."Kennedy later warned against using the attacks and subsequent war as a justification for war with Iran. "It didn't take long for the neocons in Washington to spin the Hamas terror attacks to advance their agenda of war against Iran," he tweeted on Oct. 27. "If President Biden doesn't resist them, they might get their wish."Cornel West (I)














In a recent statement, West said, "US taxpayers want no part in funding the Israeli war machine that is committing genocidal war crimes in Gaza. We need stronger, clearer headed representation like this within our highest levels of government." He has also said, "We want a ceasefire. We want an end of the siege. We want an end of occupation. We want equal rights, equal dignity, and equal access for Palestinians and Jews."

Favors that one country gives to another imply leverage that the former can exert on the latter. Withholding, or even threatening to withhold, such largesse, focuses minds within the recipient country's government and can influence its policies.The favors that the United States has given to Israel have been enormous, as reflected in $318 billion, adjusted for inflation, in foreign aid through 2022 — far more than the United States has given to any other country since World War II. Thus, the leverage the United States has available to use on Israel is large. But it has used almost none of it.Even when Israeli policies fly in the face of U.S. preferences, the result is nothing more than a verbal slap on the wrist. Examples include the countless times that construction of more Israeli settlements in occupied territory are followed by timid official U.S. statements but no action — such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying last month that he was "disappointed" by Israel's latest announcement of new settlement construction in the West Bank.When the subject of employing the leverage is raised, voices in response usually say something similar to what retired general David Petraeus said recently, which was that the United States is "committed" to Israeli security, that we tend to "overestimate the leverage," and that Israel is currently in a "life and death situation."In fact, the days of Israel being a beleaguered, vulnerable state surrounded by strong, hostile neighbors are long gone. Israel has the most potent military in the Middle East — even just at the conventional level, let alone when considering nuclear weapons. Israel's military offsets any numerical inferiority in raw numbers of troops with advanced technology that far surpasses what any other state in the region enjoys. Despite frequently heard rhetoric that attributes to some regime or group a supposed dedication to "destroying" Israel, no enemy of Israel has anything close to the capability of doing so.One might argue that this secure Israeli position is thanks in part to all that U.S. assistance, and thus is a reason to continue the aid. But Israel is a wealthy country. It is in the richest 20 percent or even 10 percent of nations in the world, depending on how one measures GDP per capita. Israel can pay by itself for that potent military. The voluminous U.S. aid is a subsidy by American taxpayers to Israeli taxpayers.Therefore, reduction or termination of the aid would not endanger Israeli security, no matter how much the United States considers itself committed to that security. Israel would spend what it must to meet its own conception of security. But interruption of the voluminous no-strings-attached American subsidy would certainly get the attention of Israeli politicians and thus can have considerable influence on Israeli policy.In many respects, spending on, and use of, the Israel Defense Forces does not enhance Israeli security and may even detract from it. In recent years, the IDF has been largely occupied with keeping down a subjugated and thus discontented Palestinian population in the occupied territories and protecting Israeli settlements there. This is not a matter of securing Israel but instead of incurring the costs of choosing to cling to conquered territory and sustaining an illegal occupation.The full range of costs of this use of the IDF was underscored by the lethal Hamas attack on southern Israel last October. One reason Hamas was able to perpetrate its atrocity so easily was that Israel had moved forces from the area in question to the West Bank.Today, any munitions that the United States provides to Israel or finances are most likely to be used in further devastation of the Gaza Strip. That raises important issues, in addition to questions of leverage and influence, about possible U.S. complicity in war crimes. But for present purposes, one point to note is that because the Israeli assault has gone far beyond what can be construed as defense, any U.S. curtailment of the means for continuing the assault would be reducing devastation in Gaza, not Israeli security.In fact, continuation of the assault, and any logistical or financial facilitation of the assault, is likely to decrease rather than increase the future security of Israelis. The suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza is breeding an entire angry generation that will be determined to strike back against Israel, including with terrorist violence. As journalist Peter Beinart observes, even if Israel could achieve the probably unachievable objective of "destroying Hamas," we should expect that "Palestinians will create another organization based on trying to fight back, indeed using violence, given the extreme unimaginable violence that Palestinians have now suffered."Another relevant point about the current carnage in Gaza is that the U.S. has leverage that can curb the worst aspects of Israeli policies not only by influencing Israeli policymakers but also by directly inhibiting the execution of those policies. Although Israel will eventually make or obtain elsewhere the munitions it wants to use, at least in the short run the fewer bombs the U.S. provides that can flatten civilian neighborhoods, the fewer neighborhoods are likely to be flattened.U.S. largesse toward Israel and the leverage that goes along with it extend far beyond military aid. The diplomatic cover that the United States has routinely provided Israel, shielding it from consequences of Israel's own actions, are unquestionably of high importance to Israeli policymakers. Of the 89 vetoes the United States has cast in the history of the United Nations Security Council, more than half have been on resolutions criticizing Israel, mostly for its occupation of Palestinian territory and treatment of the Palestinians. The Biden administration has continued this pattern, vetoing multiple resolutions calling for a cease-fire in Gaza.Even just abstentions on such resolutions would jolt Israeli decisionmakers into having to think more seriously about changing their most damaging policies. Votes in favor would have even more of an effect, underscoring for Israel that it could no longer count on its superpower patron standing in the way of worldwide outrage over Israeli actions.The Biden administration could take other non-military measures to exercise its considerable political and diplomatic leverage with Israel. It could reverse some of the all-in-with-Israel actions of the Trump administration, such as by re-establishing the consulate in East Jerusalem that had served as a principal channel of communications with the Palestinians. It could even join the 139 nations that have formally recognized the State of Palestine.None of these diplomatic measures would jeopardize in the slightest the security of Israel or any U.S. commitment to that security. Nor would they entail international political or diplomatic costs to the United States. To the contrary, they would improve the U.S. global standing by making the United States less of an outlier from an international consensus.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu projects, at least as much as other Israeli leaders, the image of someone determined to go his own way regardless of what the United States wants or says. But that self-assurance is based on the now decades-old pattern of the United States not using its leverage with Israel. "I know what America is," Netanyahu once said. "America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction. They won't get in the way."If America were to stop being moved so easily and started getting in the way of objectionable Israeli conduct, Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders would change their tune.The default U.S. policy toward Israel through multiple administrations has been to lavish unqualified support and hope that the United States can gain some influence through the very closeness of the relationship. The Biden administration has continued this approach with its influence-through-hugging notion. Clearly, the approach has not worked. It is past time to exercise the leverage the United States has had all along.

A recent essay from Israeli writer Gadi Taub in Tablet makes clear that Israel's war in Gaza is not its last. Israel is going "to shed its defensive strategy and go on the offensive." That means taking out Hezbollah and then taking on "a multifaceted struggle against Iran over its drive for regional hegemony and its nuclear weapons program."Taub, whose hawkish views in many ways reflect the vital center of Israel opinion, sees the Biden administration as following a longstanding Democratic policy of appeasing Iran. In sharp contrast to Henry Kissinger, whose 1970s diplomacy he lauds, Taub finds Secretary of State Antony Blinken's policy to be a disaster. "By empowering the Iranians, Blinken's policy will inevitably also further the penetration of the region by Iran's patrons, the Russians and the Chinese, at America's expense. Kissinger's policy was focused on pushing America's great power rivals out. American policy today is inviting them in."The Dream Palace of the IsraelisThe most extraordinary feature of Taub's essay is its unreal portrait of the regional forces arrayed for and against Israel. Iran, Taub writes, "is at war with the old American regional alliance system — which includes Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But Secretary Blinken and President Biden are appeasing the new radicals, not containing them."In this imaginary tableau, shared by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel is in an unspoken but deep alliance with the Sunni Arab states, who want to see Hamas crushed and Iran and its proxies relentlessly attacked. What these rulers say in public, so the story goes, is miles apart from what they say in private. In public, of course, Arab leaders are breathing fire about Israel's mad amplification of the Dahiya Doctrine in Gaza. In private, these Arab leaders are reportedly telling U.S. and Israeli insiders (but seemingly no one else) that they heartily approve Israeli's operations. This Israeli view of Arab leaders is delusional. Yes, Arab leaders have big issues with Hamas. But they also think, as do their people, that Israel's extreme violence in Gaza may open the gates of hell, as the 2003 Iraq War once did. They don't think it's possible to pulverize Hamas into oblivion, because new defiant leaders will inevitably emerge. Israel, in their view, is not solving anything, but rather magnifying insecurity in the region. The (feeble) attempt by Blinken to put restraints on Israel's conduct of the war in Gaza is said by Taub to invite Russia and China into the region, but in fact it is Israel's policy that does so. That policy pushes Iran and America's traditional Arab coalition into one another's arms, making them realize that they have congruent interests in opposing Israeli plans. These interests, in turn, are likewise simpatico with those of Russia and China right now. Taub believes that Israel's coming offensives would break the new relations between the Saudis and the Sino-Russian bloc. No, these relations would be strengthened. This Islamic consensus — which joins Arabs, Iranians, and Turks and is supported by Russia and China — would be given further impetus if Israeli ambitions in the West Bank are fully realized. Another Nakba in Gaza and in the West Bank is anathema to America's Arab friends. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of the Palestinian Authority just as harshly as Hamas or Hezbollah. He has rejected U.S. proposals to bring the PA into Gaza after the war. Netanyahu maintains within his coalition powerful ministers (National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich) who have big plans for the West Bank and Temple Mount. In this regard there appears to be a fourth security front in the West Bank and Jerusalem, distinct from Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. Washington as Enabler and RestrainerTaub hangs his essay on a comparison between Henry Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy in the 1970s and Antony Blinken's policy today. Kissinger, Taub relates, taught a masterclass in diplomacy. Arab leaders, Kissinger saw, "would understand that only the U.S. could deliver Israeli concessions, and that the price–peace with Israel and breaking with the Soviet orbit–would be worth it. It worked."Fast forward to today. If the United States cannot or will not deliver Israeli concessions, surely its leverage with the Arab states is sharply diminished. Israel is totally dependent on U.S. arms for the conduct of its current and projected operations. "The Israelis are playing with house money," as one U.S. official puts it. As of December 1, transfers loaded on to U.S. cargo planes included 15,000 bombs and 57,000 artillery shells. More is on the way. The Biden administration has lots of leverage over Israel. They are just unwilling to use it. The Biden administration has rightly warned Israel against a big offensive operation in Lebanon. Hezbollah is in a use-it-or-lose-it situation with respect to its offensive systems, with Hezbollah reportedly having 100,000 to 150,000 missiles and rockets, far superior to Hamas's force. The evacuation after October 7 of some 80,000 Israelis from communities bordering Lebanon is undoubtedly an unacceptable outcome for Israel, but Israel cannot seek to eliminate Hezbollah without incurring grave risks to its own population. It would be far better for Israelis to reoccupy the northern towns under the auspices of the mutual deterrence that prevailed before October 7, rather than to launch a big war against Hezbollah. However, the Israelis clearly think otherwise. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has promised a military campaign to drive Hezbollah beyond the Litani River unless Hezbollah heeds Israel's ultimatum to evacuate the border region. The horrifying risk from such an escalation is that Israel would turn Beirut and southern Lebanon into Gaza. If Taub's views are a reliable guide, the Israelis have totally given up on Biden and the Democrats. The putative "appeasement" of Iran is not "an offhand mistake of the Democratic Party" but "a premeditated strategy designed to strengthen Iran at the expense of America's traditional allies." At a time when Arab Americans and their allies are livid with Biden and Blinken, it is curious to find Taub and the Israelis joining in the execration. The former group hates B&B for giving Israel the greenest of green lights, the other for the bright red lights (stop with the civilian killing, don't invade Lebanon) that Taub discerns. The administration's position is unenviable. On one side is the geopolitical disaster that follows from a blank check to Israel, on the other the domestic perils of having a gigantic fight with Netanyahu and the whole Israeli nation. In this acute battle between the national interest and personal political survival, will President Biden do a John Adams and choose country over party? I do not have an answer to this question. One thing is crystal clear. Supporting Israel means supporting a grand design that calls for a war on all fronts, financed and enabled by the United States. The Israelis seem to have no consciousness of the fact that previous uses of force in Lebanon and Palestine didn't solve their security problem. Instead, they believe that more destruction, on a Dresden-like scale, will do this time around what it has not done in the past. Given Israel's lonely existence in a sea of Muslims, this belief seems irrational to me. Israel cannot get rid of its security problem or its enemies by the massive use of force. Escalation imperils Israelis as much as it imperils their neighbors. But the Israelis hold to their belief in force with theological conviction, and the belief should be taken with the utmost seriousness. Thus far, this irresistible force has not encountered an immovable object.

The alliance system of the United States is frequently called an empire, and for good reason. But it is a peculiar form of empire, in which the metropolitan center seems directed and ruled by the periphery. In the classic idea of empire, rule flowed from the top down. Not in this one. This inversion is nowhere more evident than in the relationship between the United States and Israel. Biden responded to the October 7 attacks by giving Israel total support for its aim of destroying Hamas. The same pattern is apparent in policy toward Ukraine. For 18 months, the Biden administration did not dare to set limits on Ukraine's war aims, though these anticipated, absurdly, total victory over Russia, with Vladimir Putin in the dock at the end. These certitudes, however, have begun to shake. Within the administration, there seems to have been a great awakening over the last few weeks that neither course is sustainable. The gist of recent reporting is as follows: the Ukrainians are losing the war and have to acknowledge that fact, better now than later. The Israelis are behaving barbarically and have got to be reined in, else our reputation in the world is ruined. On the Ukraine front, there were two bombshells. One was an NBC story that painted a dire picture of the military situation and reported that U.S. and European diplomats were telling Ukraine of the need to restrict its aims. It's too late in the day to hope for anything other than a stalemate, said one former administration official: "it's time to do a deal." The other was a long essay in Time that characterized Zelensky as a messianic and fanatical figure, out of touch with Ukraine's worsening prospects. Corruption is even worse than alleged. The West is scraping the bottom of the barrel for key military items. Ukraine's military can't find new recruits. More appropriations from Congress, even the $61 billion requested by the administration, can solve none of these problems.For 18 months, the Biden administration insisted that Ukraine's aims were wholly its own to determine and that the United States would support them regardless. With Ukraine's summer offensive having met with almost total failure, the administration appears to be getting cold feet. This is all very hush-hush, with "quiet" discussions reputedly going on behind the scenes. It's probable, indeed, that Biden's advisers are divided. Though official policy hasn't changed a whit, the impetus to do so is clearly there. The bind over Israel is yet more acute. According to widespread reports, Biden and his advisers believe that Israel is embarked on a mad project in Gaza. They see that the United States — having given Israel a green light, a blank check, and tons of bombs — will be held directly responsible for the awful humanitarian consequences. They don't think Israel has defined a coherent endgame. They fear they are presiding over a moral enormity. They see a precipitous collapse in support from others. Over the past month, Biden has warned the Israelis not to act out of anger and vengeance in retaliation for October 7, advised against a ground invasion of Gaza, and insisted that Israel seek to avoid civilian deaths as much as possible. Use smaller bombs, say Biden's military advisers. Eroding support, his administration told the Israelis, "will have dire strategic consequences for Israel Defense Forces operations against Hamas." Last weekend, Secretary of State Antony Blinken went to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with these ideas and with a request for a "humanitarian pause." Bibi's response: ain't gonna happen. I have an idea. The United States could threaten to suspend military shipments to Israel if it failed to agree to a ceasefire. That might make an impression. Defying Israel, however, is something that no president since George H.W. Bush has been willing to do. The U.S. approach over the last 30 years, as now, has been in the voice of a steadfast friend: "This is really for your own good, but we wouldn't dare demand it of you." Hug the Israelis tight and reassure them endlessly of your undying commitment; that was the way to win an argument with them. There have been some Israeli leaders who responded to this approach, but Benjamin Netanyahu was never one of them. Bill Clinton's comment after first meeting with Netanyahu in 1996 — "Who's the fucking superpower here? — reflects Bibi's considered judgment that he can call forth domestic opposition in the United States that will nullify any threat from a U.S. president. Today, 66% of Americans want a ceasefire, according to one poll, but less than five percent of the House of Representatives does, so maybe Bibi knows whereof he speaks. AIPAC is busy with attack ads against the few brave congresspeople who have criticized Israel and called for a ceasefire. But Biden has to worry about America's larger role in the world and is alive to the likelihood that what is coming in Gaza will wreck America's legitimacy. Who in the non-West could ever bear again a lecture from the United States on its zealous commitment to human rights? What would this do to America's case against Russia? On present trends — no exit to the Sinai for the mass of Gaza's population, the complete collapse of the health and sanitation systems, relentless Israeli military pressure and economic blockade, 1.5 million already displaced — it is difficult to see how the total casualty count among Gazans avoids numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Probably many more will die from disease and epidemics than from bullets and bombs. The experience, as Netanyahu has said, will be remembered "for decades to come." What if it registers in world public opinion as an historic crime? Incredibly, advocates of total war against Hamas invoke Dresden, Hiroshima, and other atrocities to justify their course, neglecting that neither Germany nor Japan had anyone to weep for them after the war, whereas Palestinians have 1.8 billion Muslims to weep over them today. The obvious fact is that Israel cannot pursue to the end its aim of destroying Hamas without causing death on a biblical scale. There is no reason whatsoever for the United States to embrace these aims.Biden's choice is to get tough with the Israelis or to go along with what he fears is going to be a gigantic catastrophe. There are precedents for getting tough, but they are admittedly distant ones. Dwight Eisenhower did it in 1956 over the Anglo-French-Israeli Suez adventure. Bush I did it in 1991 over loan guarantees to Israel. But the most resonant example is 1982, when Ronald Reagan told Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to cease Israeli's bombardment of Beirut. "Menachem," Reagan said, "this is a holocaust." To Reagan's surprise, his threat of an agonizing reappraisal worked. "I didn't know I had that kind of power," he told his aide Mike Deaver. At the time of Reagan's threat, the death toll from two and a half months of war approached 20,000, of which nearly half were civilians.Can Biden summon the will to confront Netanyahu? Will his administration force Ukraine to the bargaining table? In our weird empire, where dependents call the shots, deeply embedded tendencies dictate a negative answer to both questions, though wise policy would dictate positive ones. Perhaps the time is ripe for a new policy in which America consults its own national interests rather than theirs.

The academic discourse of the early 1970s put interdisciplinarity on the agenda, the subject of which was deviance and crime. For half a century, the categories "deviant", "public penitentiary policy", "social responsibility of the state" and related categories have become the subject of official public political discourse. At the same time a comprehensive study of social control policy in political science has not shaped. Changing the discourse of penality in the late XX century reflects the dominance of the ideology of social defense in relation to deviant behavior and appropriate methods of ensuring social order. In accordance with the realities of the XXI century, the concept of protection (security) of society has been updated as a political priority. Declared "apolitical" classical justice have undergone a transformation of meanings. "Justice" has been replaced by managerial indicators of "economically justified social security", and "justice" itself by "social control" (since the late 1990s – "socio-technological control"). The dissertation substantiates the concept of the panoptic-carceral state, the functions of which are reduced to maximum social control of the population through its widespread use by institutions of imprisonment, the spread of non-institutional forms of restriction of liberty (including those not related to criminal justice) and digital control practices. The dissertation clarifies the consequences of the global impact on the state penitentiary policy: 1) transformation of social control according to the scheme "binary code of legality - disciplinary mechanism - security device" to the level of the fourth modulation (panoptic risk modulator), which is manifested in the creation of a system of panoptic spatial-virtual risk management, which consists in controlled and cost-effective reproduction of deviance as a product with appropriate commercial characteristics and qualities; 2) the transformation of the "criminal law of freedom" into the "criminal law of risks" and the involvement of civilian instruments in social control, as a manifestation of clarifying the political and legal principles of formation and implementation of penitentiary policy of the world; 3) differentiation of penitentiary practices of European and North American countries, penitentiary policy of Muslim countries, countries of South America and the Caribbean; 4) involvement of private actors in the implementation of penitentiary policy and demonopolization of the state's right to determine the principles of social control in open societies; 5) the creation by private national and transnational actors of territories of social control (prison-industrial complexes) that are not controlled by the states and constitute the possibility of forming private solitary quasi-states with the use of forced labor of prisoners. The dissertation formulates probable scenarios for the evolution of social control policy in the global and national dimensions, among which the most probable is the following. Given the persistence of modern global trends, we should expect a decrease in the number of social control centers, including TNCs, leading countries, global cities that will compete for resources, including the creation of prison-industrial complexes, migration centers, and other institutions, which are focused on maintaining marginalization of persons who are identified as dangerous elements of society. The dissertation introduces the concept of quasi-deviant as a special collective object of social control in the XXI century with the key characteristic "dangerous condition of the person" (pericolosità). The author identified the policy of probation as a component of the concept of "penitentiary policy" in the light of the concept of "punitive city" and as an element of the panoptic-carceral state of the XXI century. The author proposed the category of penological pessimism as a fundamental characteristic of social control in the XXI century due to the crisis of paradigms of general prevention and rehabilitation of deviants, as a result of which the category of active penological pessimism was formulated for the first time as a basis for studying the essence, forms and manifestations of social control in the XXI century. The dissertation establishes the supranational nature of modern penitentiary policy and identifies the factors influencing the spread of the phenomenon of supranationalization of penitentiary policy, as well as establishes the relationship between privatization and supranationalization of penitentiary policy. The dissertation formulates the principles, forms and consequences of the formation and implementation of the Ukrainian penitentiary policy (1991 – 2021), which is defined in the form of a system of quantitative and qualitative indicators. ; В работе обоснована концепция паноптично-карцерного государства и проанализированы тенденции инкарцерации современного общества. Доказано, что применение заключения и его неинституциональных приложений ограничивается только в Европе, а надзорно-дисциплинарные механизмы, которые еще недавно анализировались в категориях наказания, больше ассоциируются с мерами безопасности. Пенитенциарные системы национальных государств в XXI в. испытали и продолжают испытывать большого политического влияния, прежде всего, вследствие упадка велфаристского государства и сопутствующих традиционных целей социального контроля. При этом дальнейшей и еще более глубокой политизации пенитенциарных систем национальных государств способствует пунитивная постмодернистская культура социального контроля. В работе анализируется категория квазидевианта как особого коллективного объекта социального контроля в XXI в. с ключевой характеристикой «опасное состояние личности», где указано состояние может формироваться вне классических формальных пунитивних процедур. Анализируется формирование системы постреабилитационных тотальных институций в обновленной системе социального контроля и переход власти от национальных государств к частным актеров. Анализируется изменение сущности государства за счет делегирования такой функции частным акторам, причем «делегирование функции» нередко трансформируется в «захват политической власти». Исследуются особенности украинской пенитенциарной политики и ее модуляции. Установлено, что украинская пенитенциарная политика является непоследовательной, лишенной преемственности и прозрачности (в том числе финансовой). Пенитенциарную политику Украины за период последних тридцати лет можно определить как «а-политику», а иногда даже как «анти-политику», учитывая негативные показатели государственного управления пенитенциарной системой. Доказано, что появление в международных стандартах и национальном законодательстве многих государств неопозитивистских категорий свидетельствует о разрыве между формально декларируемыми целями и политическими отношениями. Система контроля общества XXI века не предназначена для достижения указанных формально-классических целей, поскольку она выполняет другие более важные функции, связанные с еще большим растворением в теле общества постмодернистской дисциплины и цифрового социального контроля. ; У роботі обґрунтовано концепцію паноптично-карцерної держави та проаналізовано тренди інкарцерації сучасного суспільства. Доведено, що на сучасному етапі застосування ув'язнення та його неінституційних додатків обмежується лише в Європі, а наглядово-дисциплінарні механізми, що донедавна аналізувалися у категоріях покарання, більше асоціюються із заходами безпеки. Пенітенціарні системи національних держав у ХХІ ст. зазнали й продовжують зазнавати більшого політичного впливу, перш за все, внаслідок занепаду велфаристської держави та супутніх традиційних цілей соціального контролю. При цьому подальшій та ще глибшій політизації пенітенціарних систем національних держав сприяє пунітивна постмодерністська культура соціального контроля. У роботі аналізується категорію квазідевіанта як особливого колективного об'єкта соціального контролю у ХХІ ст. з ключовою характеристикою «небезпечний стан особи», де зазначений стан може формуватися поза межами класичних формальних пунітивних процедур. Аналізується формування системи постреабілітаційних тотальних інституцій в оновленій системі соціального контролю та перехід влади від національних держав до приватних акторів. Аналізується зміна сутності держави за рахунок делегування такої функції приватним акторам, причому «делегування функції» нерідко трансформується у «захоплення політичної влади». Досліджуються особливості української пенітенціарної політики та її модуляції. Встановлено, що українська пенітенціарна політика є непослідовною, позбавленою спадкоємності та прозорості (у тому числі фінансової). Пенітенціарну політику України за період останніх тридцяти років можна визначити як «а-політику», а інколи навіть як «анти-політику» з огляду на негативні показники державного управління пенітенціарної системою. Доведено, що поява у міжнародних стандартах та національному законодавстві багатьох держав неопозитивістських категорій свідчить про розрив між формально задекларованими цілями та політичними відносинами. Система контролю суспільства ХХІ ст. не призначена для досягнення зазначених формально-класичних цілей, оскільки вона виконує інші більш важливі соціальні функції, пов'язані зі ще більшим розчиненням в тілі суспільства постмодерністської дисципліни та цифрового соціального контролю.

Problem setting. Transformational changes in political systems are an essential condition for their development. However, if in a peaceful time, diverse political transformations take place on evolutionary principles, then during the war they are significantly accelerated. The hybrid war has brought new emphasis to the transformation of political systems. Such transformations take place practically throughout the political system, but in order to classify the most important transformations, it is expedient to distinguish its key subsystems - institutional, normative, functional, communicative, spiritual and cultural.Analysis of recent research and publications on the topic. In the works of O. Babkina, V. Bebik, V. Gaponenko, V. Gorbatenko, I. Gorokhovsky, V. Kotygorenko, V. Kafarsky, N. Khoma, I. Kresinoy, A. Kudryachenko, V Masic, Y. Matsievsky, P. Mironenko, M. Mikhalchenko, I. Onischenko, E. Pereguda, T. Poyarkova, M. Primush, O. Romanyuk,F. Rudich, V. Soldatenko, O. Stoiko, T. Tkachenko, G. Zelenko, and other native. The researchers have considered in detail the processes of formation and development of political systems. In the works of O. Demenko, V. Dubov, M. Gonchar, V. Gorbulin,A. Litvinenko, V. Mandrageli, B. Parakhonsky, M. Rozumnyj, L. Smola, M. Trebin,G. avorskaya the problems of the hybrid war in the context of determining its essence, content, orientation, purpose, as well as the specifics of deployment and flow. Scientific developments by F. Cappen, F. Hoffman, R. Glenn, R. Newson, J. Sherr reveal the views of Western specialists on hybrid wars. At the same time, studies that examine the transformation of political systems under the influence of the hybrid war in Ukrainian political science is clearly not enough.Paper objective. Indicate the existence of a large number of definitions of the hybrid war, none of which does not claim to epistemological absolute. Analyze the transformational processes in the main subsystems of the political system of society (institutional, normative, functional, communicative, spiritual and cultural) in the context of a hybrid war. Indicate the innovative moments of the development ofpolitical systems under the influence of hybrid offensive (defense). Emphasize the special role of the state as the basic political institution on the organization of the vital functions of the political system in the conditions of active hybrid influences of the opposite side (enemy state).Paper main body. A hybrid war affects all subsystems of the political system ofsociety - institutional, normative, functional, communicative, spiritual and cultural (cultural- ideological). However, there is a significant difference in the depth and intensity of such influence.There is a fundamental influence of the hybrid war on the state as the basic political institution of society, which is the main actor of military-political relations. Destruction (weakening) of the enemy state was and remains the goal ofany war, including hybrid war. Under these conditions, the state is faced with the need to create versatile variants of the power response to hybrid hazards. As a rule, special government bodies are created with additional powers. There are large-scale institutional transformations within the security and defense sector. For the conduct of hostilities, the forces of reserve are involved. Full or partial mobilization is announced. New parts and connections are deployed. Additional elements of the security and defense sector can be created.There are changes in the regulatory legal subsystem. Orders of the supreme commander- in-chief, directives of the supreme commander-in-chief, decisions of military-civilian administrations, etc. may be added to traditional normative legal acts (laws, decrees, resolutions, decisions, orders).The functional subsystem is also in a state of massive changes. The authorities deliberately urge all patriotic forces to strengthen armed resistance against the aggressor (occupation). Volunteer armed formations, underground structures, local self-defense units, volunteer movements, information resistance, establishment of foreign aid channels, etc. are strongly stimulated. As a result, there is a deetatization of military practice, an active involvement of the general population in defense activities.The communicative subsystem feels no less dynamic changes. Inside the political system there is a rapid selection ofpolitical actors based on their attitude to the objectives of the war, the opportunities for participation in it and the ways of working in practical military actions. Subjects expressing doubts about the possibility of victory, and even congratulating the enemy, acquire the status of non-systemic elements, whose activities should be stopped immediately. Their leaders have to face political (criminal) responsibility for anti-state actions.The spiritual and cultural subsystem is connected with the peculiarities of mass political culture, the rational and irrational components of collective and individual political consciousness. The ability of the political system to actively resist the dangers of the hybrid war and to succeed in its consequence is the domination of positive (heroic-patriotic, liberation, victorious) cultural-ideological entities thatform the general spiritual uplift of the people. The vulnerability of the political system, which loses the hybrid war and questions the future of the state, society, and nation, leads to the opposite result. Apathy, fatalism, despondency, internal emptiness of a person are a nourishing environment for the formation of a feeling of defeat, which is the goal of a hybrid variety of hostilities on the part of the enemy.The overall impact of the hybrid war on the political system of society is indisputable. The political system, using its adaptive potential, inevitably changes in the structural, functional, communicative, normative, and so on. The direction and intensity of such changes depends on the stability andflexibility of the political system, target orientations and resources of the attacking party, as well as the foreign policy context of the deployment and development of military events.Conclusions. The overall impact of the hybrid war on the political system of society is indisputable. The institutional subsystem of the political system of society in the context of hybrid warfare is characterized by the creation of new military-political authorities, accelerated development of the military organization of the state (security and defense sectors), increased attention to or protection against the infrastructure of information and psychological warfare, as well as deepening of the international military-political partnership. In the normative subsystem there is a dynamic update of legislation on national security and defense, taking into account the needs of the war. The functional subsystem stimulates the qualitative execution of legally defined responsibilities in the field of national security and defense, mobilization of state and social capabilities for military tasks. The communicative subsystem provides the search andformation ofnew formats of interaction of elements of the political system with each other, with the external environment and with civil society. Changes in the spiritual and cultural subsystem are to intensify the activity of mass media, cultural, artistic and educational institutions on the issues of informational and psychological offensive (defense), as well as the formation of heroic-patriotic, liberation, victorious components ofsocial consciousness capable of ensuring the spiritual uplift of the nation in order to win the war. The focus and intensity ofsuch changes depends on a number of factors, the main of which is the stability of the political system, supplemented by elements offlexibility, target orientations and resources of the attacking party, as well as the foreign policy context of the deployment and development of military events. ; Рассмотрено влияние гибридной войны на политическую систему общества и ее ключевые подсистемы - институциональную, нормативную, функциональную, ком­муникативную, духовно-культурную. Указано на сущностные изменения, происхо­дящие в указанных подсистемах в условиях конфликтного взаимодействия сторон, участвующих в гибридной войне. ; Розглянуто вплив гібридної війни на політичну систему суспільства та її клю­чові підсистеми - інституційну, нормативну, функціональну, комунікативну, духо­вно-культурну. Вказано на сутнісні зміни, що відбуваються у вказаних підсистемах в умовах конфліктної взаємодії сторін, що беруть участь у гібридній війні.