El artículo se propone describir la función normativa y el rol efectivo del Consejo de Planificación Regional de la Educación Superior (CPRES), desde la sanción de la Ley 24.521/95 hasta 2010. En particular, se describe cómo se piensa al CPRES en el marco de la implementación de la Ley, qué modelo de gestión se esperaba instalar con su incorporación y cuál se puso en funcionamiento finalmente. Se examinó el área metropolitana porque reúne a la mayoría de los representantes de las universidades nacionales con mayor tamaño y tradición, las universidades privadas y los institutos de educación superior no universitaria (IESNU). Se analizaron fuentes documentales y entrevistas en profundidad a informantes clave del ámbito académico, técnicos y políticos que participaron en el Programa de Reforma de la Educación Superior, iniciado en 1995. Con base en este análisis se evidenció que el CPRES se constituye como una estructura de autoridad de nivel intermedio con capacidad jurídico-institucional para planificar, coordinar y regular los procesos de implementación de las políticas en el marco de un contexto sistémico complejo y de alta diferenciación institucional. Sin embargo, aún no logran constituirse como efectivas autoridades de implementación. ; The article is aimed at describing the regulatory function and effective role of the Regional Planning Council for Higher Education (CPRES for its acronym in Spanish), since the passing of Law 24.521/95 until 2010. In particular, it describes thoughts about CPRES in the framework of the enforcement of said Law, expectations related to the administrative model arising from its implementation and the real model that was finally put into practice. The metropolitan area was chosen because it gathers most of the representatives of the largest and most traditional national and private universities, and the non-university higher education institutions (IESNU for its acronym in Spanish). Documentary sources and in-depth interviews with key informants of the academic, technical and political spheres involved in the Higher Education Reform Program initiated in 1995 were analysed. The analysis evidenced that CPRES is set up as an authority structure of intermediate level with legal institutional capacity to plan, coordinate and regulate the processes for the implementation of the policies within the framework of a complex systemic context and highly differentiated institutions. However, they have not managed to set themselves up as effective authorities of implementation. ; O artigo se propõe descrever a função normativa e o papel efetivo do Conselho de Planejamento Regional de Educação Superior (cpres), desde a promulgação da Lei 24.521/95 até 2010. Particularmente, descreve como é pensado o cpres no marco da implementação da Lei, que modelo de gestão se esperava instalar com a sua incorporação, e finalmente qual foi o que ficou em funcionamento. Examinou-se a área metropolitana porque reúne à maioria dos representantes das universidades nacionais de maior porte e tradição, as universidades privadas e os institutos de ensino superior não universitário (iesnu). Analisaram-se fontes documentais e entrevistas em profundidade a informantes chave do âmbito acadêmico, técnicos e políticos que participaram do Programa de Reforma da Educação Superior, iniciado em 1995. Com base nesta análise se evidenciou que o cpres constitui-se como uma estrutura de autoridade de nível médio com capacidade jurídico-institucional para planejar, coordenar e regular os processos de implementação das políticas no marco de um contexto sistêmico complexo e de alta diferenciação institucional. Entretanto, ainda no conseguem se constituir como efetivas autoridades de implementação. ; Documento incorporado en 2019 en el marco del "Programa de becas de experiencia laboral" de la Biblioteca Profesor Guillermo Obiols para estudiantes de Bibliotecología, a partir de un procedimiento técnico de captura de datos desarrollado por el personal del IdIHCS. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • In 2002, 22.7% of Nebraskans over the age of 18 were current smokers, accounting for approximately 389,000 smokers. • Since 1995, the prevalence of adult tobacco use in Nebraska has remained about 1 percentage point below the national average, but per capita tobacco consumption in Nebraska has been falling more slowly than the Unites States as whole. • The tobacco industry has directly been a major political force in Nebraska through lobbying and campaign contributions. The tobacco industry spent over $1,027,000 on lobbying from 1997-2002. The tobacco industry made direct campaign contributions to the members of the 2003- 2004 Nebraska Legislature totaling almost $93,000 over the course of their legislative careers. • Only 20 of the 49 members of the 2003-2004 Legislature have never accepted money from the tobacco industry. • The tobacco industry has also worked to increase its political influence in Nebraska by recruiting, often through financial contributions, third-party allies such as the Nebraska Restaurant Association, the Nebraska Chamber of Commerce, the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association, the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association, the Nebraska Retail Federation, the Nebraska Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors and the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association. • Despite opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies and the lack of a well-established grassroots tobacco control community, Nebraska was an early leader in passing statewide clean indoor air laws. Due largely to the efforts of state Senator Shirley Marsh, the Nebraska Legislature passed its first clean indoor air law in 1974, only one year after Arizona passed the first law in the nation that required smoking restrictions in some public places. • In 1979, the Nebraska Legislature passed the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, which was sponsored by state Senator Larry Stoney. The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was stronger than similar legislation that was proposed in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts at the same time. The tobacco industry and its allies responded by mobilizing against the implementing rules and regulations for the Act and succeeded in weakened these regulations. • The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was not strengthened for 20 years until 1999 when the Legislature passed a bill that required that almost all state buildings and vehicles become smokefree. • From 2000 -2003, the Legislature also strengthened the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act by requiring that commercial daycare facilities be smokefree and extending its enforcement provisions to include business owners. • From 1999-2004, the Nebraska Legislature has rejected three different attempts by state Senator Nancy Thompson to make restaurants throughout Nebraska smokefree. • Using tobacco settlement money, in 2000, the Nebraska Legislature approved $7 million per year for three years to increase funding for a preexisting state tobacco control program, Tobacco Free Nebraska. • Due to pressure from tobacco control advocates, the Nebraska Legislature approved a $0.30 cigarette excise tax increase in 2002, but the Legislature was only willing to pass this increase during a budget crisis and no earmark was provided for tobacco control. • Citing budget concerns in 2003, the Legislature cut funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska from $7 million per year to $405,000, despite several different options for continuing funding for tobacco control. • In 2003, the Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department led the push to pass Nebraska first comprehensive smokefree workplaces ordinances, but due to pressure from the tobacco industry and its allies, the Lincoln City Council passed a weakened and confusing ordinance that exempted bars and allowed separately ventilated "smoking rooms." • Tobacco control advocates have made progress in Nebraska, but they have not yet mobilized the political resources necessary to avoid suffering significant defeats at the hands of the tobacco industry.
It is interpreted that government information must be exposed to the legislature, the control bodies and the citizens in order to be accountable for what has been done and must allow, among other aspects, the management evaluation of those who have the responsibility of managing resources. In our opinion, there is a very important relationship between transparency in accountability and governance. We emphasize the importance of incorporating better corporate governance practices in the public sector, as a generator of management control and risk administration in decision making at the central government level, as well as in state-owned companies. It is for this reason that it is confusing to find, on one hand, regulations emanating from the Ministry of Finance of the Nation (Resolution 25/95 of the SH) that defines assets using obsolete concepts, which ignore the natural and cultural heritage. On the other hand, the Investment Account itself refers to transparency in accountability and also explains the concepts that allow different users to generate the necessary capacities for the understanding and analyzing public accounts, for whose preparation, ignore a significant heritage. Although in a Constitutional State, transparency through access to public information is considered one of the mainstays of the democratic and republican system, from preliminary investigations, it comes up the lack of integrity in the information by not presenting the natural and cultural heritage in the Investment Account. It is the hypothesis of this study, that from the regulations that refer to the right of public information and financial administration and the control systems of the national public sector, among others, the need to incorporate advances in doctrine and accounting technology arises, in order to contribute to the accessibility and transparency of government public information. It is the objective to help in the adequacy and/or the updating of public government information regarding natural and cultural heritage to improve its accessibility and transparency and, thereby, contribute to objectively discovering the potential of the country. A theoretical investigation is carried out. It is taken into account that the definition of assets of Resolution 25/95 of the Ministry of Finance of the Nation should be updated and, among others, the right to access public information (Law No. 27,275 Right to Public Information and Law No. 25,831 on the regime of free access to public environmental information); governance and natural and cultural heritage (Law No. 24,156 on Financial Administration and Control Systems of the National Public Sector, guidelines of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean -CEPAL- and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development -OECD-) and the normative political principles answerability and enforcement are selected. Critical and comparative analyzes are performed and conclusions are inferred. Among the conclusions it is expressed that the construction of a bridge between current regulations and the most advanced criteria in terms of recognition, measurement and exposure of assets for the Public Sector is required, respecting at all times the spirit that should govern Government Accounting to represent the economic and social reality of the respective States. ; Se interpreta que la información gubernamental debe ser expuesta a la legislatura, los órganos de control y a la ciudadanía con el fin de rendir cuentas de lo actuado y deberá permitir, entre otros aspectos, la evaluación de gestión de quienes tienen la responsabilidad de administrar recursos públicos. En nuestra opinión, existe una relación muy importante entre la transparencia en la rendición de cuentas y la gobernanza. Enfatizamos la importancia de incorporar mejores prácticas de gobierno corporativo en el sector público, como generador de valor en la dirección, control de gestión y administración de riesgos en la toma de decisiones a nivel de gobierno central, así como también en las empresas estatales. Es por ello que resulta confuso encontrar por un lado normativa emanada de la Secretaría de Hacienda de la Nación (Resolución 25/95 de la SH) que define activo utilizando conceptos perimidos, los que ignoran al patrimonio natural y cultural. Por otra parte, la misma Cuenta de Inversión hace referencia a la transparencia en la rendición de cuentas y también se explican los conceptos que posibilitan que los diferentes usuarios generen las capacidades necesarias para el entendimiento y posterior análisis de las cuentas públicas, para cuya elaboración, entendemos, ignora un patrimonio significativo. Si bien en un Estado Constitucional la transparencia a través del acceso a la información pública es considerada uno de los pilares basales del sistema democrático y republicano de gobierno, de investigaciones preliminares surge que existe falta de integridad en la información al no presentar en la Cuenta de Inversión el patrimonio natural y cultural. Es la hipótesis de este estudio que de las normativas referidas al derecho de información pública y administración financiera y de los sistemas de control del sector público nacional, entre otras, surge la necesidad de incorporar los avances en la doctrina y tecnología contable para aportar a la accesibilidad y transparencia de la información pública gubernamental. Es el objetivo aportar a la adecuación y/o actualización de la información pública gubernamental en lo referido al patrimonio natural y cultural para mejorar su accesibilidad y transparencia y, con ello, contribuir a conocer objetivamente las potencialidades con que cuenta el país. Se realiza una investigación teórica. Se tiene en cuenta que la definición de activo de la Resolución 25/95 de la Secretaría de Hacienda de la nación debe ser actualizada y se seleccionan, entre otras, el derecho de acceso a la información pública (Ley nº 27.275 Derecho a la Información Pública y la Ley nº 25.831 sobre el régimen de libre acceso a la información pública ambiental); la gobernanza y el patrimonio natural y cultural (Ley nº 24.156 de Administración Financiera y de los Sistemas de Control del Sector Público Nacional, orientaciones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe -CEPAL- y de la Organización para la Cooperación y Desarrollo Económico -OCDE-) y los principios políticos normativos answerability y enforcement. Se realizan análisis críticos y comparativos y se infieren conclusiones. Entre las conclusiones se expresa que se requiere la construcción de un puente entre la normativa vigente y los criterios más a avanzados en cuanto a reconocimiento, medición y exposición de elementos del patrimonio para el Sector Público, respetando en todo momento el espíritu que debe regir a la Contabilidad Gubernamental para representar acabadamente la realidad económica y social de los respectivos Estados.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
This three-part series focuses on the security of, and strategic competition around, fiber optic communications infrastructure – the data super-highways of our world. Part 1: What is the optical core and why is it important? Part 2: The impact of strategic competition on fiber optic infrastructure marketsPart 3: How the US and its partners can ensure the security of the optical core Over 99% of the world's intercontinental communications travels along an estimated 570 submarine cables crisscrossing the planet's seabed. These submarine networks, spanning over 1.4 million kilometers, underpin global communications.Modern submarine cables function through the technology of fiber optics, where information is transmitted by coherent laser-based modems through very thin glass fiber cores. Each fiber can carry tens of terabits of data per second. Fiber optic amplifiers, referred to as repeaters, boost these optical signals every 60-70 kilometers when transmitted over long distances. When a subsea fiber optic cable is laid, it connects two or more landing points. Upon reaching these landing points, the cables connect to terrestrial backhaul networks. On land, the internet backbone is also enabled by fiber optics, commonly referred to as the optical core. Despite their significance, submarine and terrestrial networks tend not to resonate in public consciousness, especially in comparison to satellites and the more visible parts of terrestrial networks such as cell towers. Tangibility aside, cables offer higher capacity and lower latency when compared to satellite communication, meaning they can transmit far more data with increased reliability. These benefits are increasingly important given the exponential growth of global data usage. International bandwidth demand has grown by 33% annually over the past 5 years.Historically, these cables were developed and owned by telecommunication company companies and consortia. As the internet developed, private investment in fiber optic infrastructure grew, with major investment now being led by content delivery providers, hyperscalers, or investor groups. When it comes to submarine cable maintenance, a consortium of owners will contract repair services to third-party entities. Consideration of location, ownership, and maintenance of the optical core on land and on sea is important, especially as the majority of diplomatic and military communication around the world passes through these cables. In fact, the existence of military-operated and classified cables is minimal. Security RisksGiven the existential global reliance on optical infrastructure, it is a vulnerable target for surveillance, sabotage, and disruption - whether by nation states or substate actors, and for economic, geopolitical, or military purposes. When it comes to submarine cables, which can pass through several maritime jurisdictions and international waters, transnationalism necessitates robust awareness of local jurisdictional law, especially around mandated data access by government and law enforcement. When considering the risks around optical core infrastructure, we will utilize the traditional information security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Image CreditConfidentiality Securing the confidentiality of data in transit is critical. Fiber optic cables transmit data via light, making it difficult for unauthorized individuals to intercept the data but not impossible. A British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) tapping operation was revealed in the 2013 Snowden Disclosures. The 1971 US government efforts around Soviet telecommunication cables, known as Operation Ivy Bells is another example. These days, optical fiber can still be 'tapped' using commonly-available equipment, although modern transmission methods have made this more difficult. By bending the fiber, it can be possible to reflect the light being pulsed through it, a concept known as evanescent wave coupling. The identification of potential intrusions, while difficult, can be done by monitoring the light intensity and looking for any anomalous fluctuations. Such detection relies, however, on network vendors having both the technical capability to identify anomalies and the motivation to report them.As is the case with most data transfers today, encryption is widely used in optical core infrastructure. Encryption can mitigate the impacts of snooping, but even without the ability to decrypt data, adversaries could access information such as the origin and destination of traffic. Foreign decryption efforts remain zealous, and as quantum computing looms on the horizon, consideration should be given to the development of post-quantum cryptography. Meanwhile, information that is captured today can be stored and decrypted once quantum computing is powerful enough to implement Shor's Algorithm ("harvest now, decrypt later"), which poses a risk to information that must be kept confidential for an extended period of time, such as classified materials.IntegrityThe integrity of the information being transmitted across fiber optics is not guaranteed. Devices can be inserted into the cable to manipulate signals and corrupt data. A malicious actor can pretend to be a source or recipient of certain information by changing the data expectations and steering traffic off a path. Research around the use of 'fiber fingerprinting' to focus on this integrity risk is ongoing. AvailabilityMuch like any other piece of physical infrastructure, cables are vulnerable to an array of risks, including cuts, breaks, and bends. In the case of submarine cables, most cable faults are due to accidental damage (through anchoring or fishing) typically affecting one cable while natural phenomena (such as undersea earthquakes and tsunamis) affect wide regions and multiple cables simultaneously. Severing a cable can be very disruptive as deep-sea repairs can be protracted. Submarine cable landing points are uniquely vulnerable given how easily they can be reached, especially as they are often clustered together. In January 2022, a devastating underwater volcanic eruption reshaped the seafloor and destroyed over 100 miles of the single submarine cable connecting the Pacific Island nation of Tonga to the outside world. The country was entirely offline for three days, with major disruption continuing for weeks. Repeated earthquakes in Taiwan in 2007 and 2010 led to damage of fiber-optic cables for much of the country and the broader region, disrupting service for multiple days, albeit disruption was mitigated by rerouting service on undamaged cables.There are numerous recent examples of intentional disruption of subsea cables. In April 2022, the US Department of Homeland Security revealed details around a foiled cyber-attack on a telecommunications company involved in a submarine cable linking Hawaii and the Pacific. While this attack was attributed to an international hacker group, one would be remiss to ignore malicious state behavior around the optical core. Sabotage of submarine cables, whether physically or via a cyber-attack, can be very difficult to attribute. Recent unattributed attacks include that on a Taiwanese subsea cable in April 2023 and a Baltic subsea cable connecting Sweden to Estonia in October 2023.That these attacks occur on or around fraught geopolitical zones is likely no coincidence.ConclusionRecognition of telecommunications as critical infrastructure for national security interests has steadily increased over the last decade. However, the significant security risks around submarine and terrestrial cables, and specifically the optical technology they rely on, requires more explicit attention by policy makers and elected officials alike. These risks are global and will have large secondary effects. Their ripples will extend far beyond the fibers. The vulnerability of optical equipment, both on land and undersea, necessitates the adoption of trusted vendors. Given the multi-faceted nature of the use, private ownership, and vulnerabilities of fiber-optics, the effort to secure them and enable a resilient internet backbone requires international cooperation and public-private collaboration. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect either way the views of Venable LLP.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
This three-part series focuses on the security of, and strategic competition around, fiber optic communications infrastructure – the data super-highways of our world. Part 1: What is the optical core and why is it important? Part 2: The impact of strategic competition on fiber optic infrastructure marketsPart 3: How the US and its partners can ensure the security of the optical core Over 99% of the world's intercontinental communications travels along an estimated 570 submarine cables crisscrossing the planet's seabed. These submarine networks, spanning over 1.4 million kilometers, underpin global communications.Modern submarine cables function through the technology of fiber optics, where information is transmitted by coherent laser-based modems through very thin glass fiber cores. Each fiber can carry tens of terabits of data per second. Fiber optic amplifiers, referred to as repeaters, boost these optical signals every 60-70 kilometers when transmitted over long distances. When a subsea fiber optic cable is laid, it connects two or more landing points. Upon reaching these landing points, the cables connect to terrestrial backhaul networks. Submarine Cable MapImage CreditOn land, the internet backbone is also enabled by fiber optics, commonly referred to as the optical core. Despite their significance, submarine and terrestrial networks tend not to resonate in public consciousness, especially in comparison to satellites and the more visible parts of terrestrial networks such as cell towers. Tangibility aside, cables offer higher capacity and lower latency when compared to satellite communication, meaning they can transmit far more data with increased reliability. These benefits are increasingly important given the exponential growth of global data usage. International bandwidth demand has grown by 33% annually over the past 5 years.Telecommunications NetworkImage CreditHistorically, these cables were developed and owned by telecommunication company companies and consortia. As the internet developed, private investment in fiber optic infrastructure grew, with major investment now being led by content delivery providers, hyperscalers, or investor groups. When it comes to submarine cable maintenance, a consortium of owners will contract repair services to third-party entities. Consideration of location, ownership, and maintenance of the optical core on land and on sea is important, especially as the majority of diplomatic and military communication around the world passes through these cables. In fact, the existence of military-operated and classified cables is minimal. Security RisksGiven the existential global reliance on optical infrastructure, it is a vulnerable target for surveillance, sabotage, and disruption - whether by nation states or substate actors, and for economic, geopolitical, or military purposes. When it comes to submarine cables, which can pass through several maritime jurisdictions and international waters, transnationalism necessitates robust awareness of local jurisdictional law, especially around mandated data access by government and law enforcement. When considering the risks around optical core infrastructure, we will utilize the traditional information security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CIA TriadImage CreditConfidentiality Securing the confidentiality of data in transit is critical. Fiber optic cables transmit data via light, making it difficult for unauthorized individuals to intercept the data but not impossible. A British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) tapping operation was revealed in the 2013 Snowden Disclosures. The 1971 US government efforts around Soviet telecommunication cables, known as Operation Ivy Bells is another example. These days, optical fiber can still be 'tapped' using commonly-available equipment, although modern transmission methods have made this more difficult. By bending the fiber, it can be possible to reflect the light being pulsed through it, a concept known as evanescent wave coupling. The identification of potential intrusions, while difficult, can be done by monitoring the light intensity and looking for any anomalous fluctuations. Such detection relies, however, on network vendors having both the technical capability to identify anomalies and the motivation to report them.As is the case with most data transfers today, encryption is widely used in optical core infrastructure. Encryption can mitigate the impacts of snooping, but even without the ability to decrypt data, adversaries could access information such as the origin and destination of traffic. Foreign decryption efforts remain zealous, and as quantum computing looms on the horizon, consideration should be given to the development of post-quantum cryptography. Meanwhile, information that is captured today can be stored and decrypted once quantum computing is powerful enough to implement Shor's Algorithm ("harvest now, decrypt later"), which poses a risk to information that must be kept confidential for an extended period of time, such as classified materials.IntegrityThe integrity of the information being transmitted across fiber optics is not guaranteed. Devices can be inserted into the cable to manipulate signals and corrupt data. A malicious actor can pretend to be a source or recipient of certain information by changing the data expectations and steering traffic off a path. Research around the use of 'fiber fingerprinting' to focus on this integrity risk is ongoing. AvailabilityMuch like any other piece of physical infrastructure, cables are vulnerable to an array of risks, including cuts, breaks, and bends. In the case of submarine cables, most cable faults are due to accidental damage (through anchoring or fishing) typically affecting one cable while natural phenomena (such as undersea earthquakes and tsunamis) affect wide regions and multiple cables simultaneously. Severing a cable can be very disruptive as deep-sea repairs can be protracted. Submarine cable landing points are uniquely vulnerable given how easily they can be reached, especially as they are often clustered together. In January 2022, a devastating underwater volcanic eruption reshaped the seafloor and destroyed over 100 miles of the single submarine cable connecting the Pacific Island nation of Tonga to the outside world. The country was entirely offline for three days, with major disruption continuing for weeks. Repeated earthquakes in Taiwan in 2007 and 2010 led to damage of fiber-optic cables for much of the country and the broader region, disrupting service for multiple days, albeit disruption was mitigated by rerouting service on undamaged cables.There are numerous recent examples of intentional disruption of subsea cables. In April 2022, the US Department of Homeland Security revealed details around a foiled cyber-attack on a telecommunications company involved in a submarine cable linking Hawaii and the Pacific. While this attack was attributed to an international hacker group, one would be remiss to ignore malicious state behavior around the optical core. Sabotage of submarine cables, whether physically or via a cyber-attack, can be very difficult to attribute. Recent unattributed attacks include that on a Taiwanese subsea cable in April 2023 and a Baltic subsea cable connecting Sweden to Estonia in October 2023.That these attacks occur on or around fraught geopolitical zones is likely no coincidence.ConclusionRecognition of telecommunications as critical infrastructure for national security interests has steadily increased over the last decade. However, the significant security risks around submarine and terrestrial cables, and specifically the optical technology they rely on, requires more explicit attention by policy makers and elected officials alike. These risks are global and will have large secondary effects. Their ripples will extend far beyond the fibers. The vulnerability of optical equipment, both on land and undersea, necessitates the adoption of trusted vendors. Given the multi-faceted nature of the use, private ownership, and vulnerabilities of fiber-optics, the effort to secure them and enable a resilient internet backbone requires international cooperation and public-private collaboration. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect either way the views of Venable LLP.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
When, on 29 June 2023, the EU Deforestation-free Regulation (EUDR) entered into force, it was like a small earthquake – at least for whoever was dealing with EU agricultural imports. Never before, neither in the EU nor in the rest of the world, such an ambitious anti-deforestation piece of legislation has ever been enacted. Perhaps more importantly, it was the first to directly address the leading cause of global deforestation: agriculture. The EUDR indeed completely forbids the entry into the EU market of key agricultural commodities[1] whose production caused deforestation after a cut-off date (identified as 31 December 2020). As the EU is one of the leading importers of tropical deforestation (through agricultural commodities), the Regulation has indeed the potential to become one of the most important tools to protect global forests, and to be successful where other plans and initiatives have failed (as in the case of the UN's REDD+[2] and the EU's FLEGT).[3] However, its approval has triggered significant protests first from key partner countries (Indonesia and Brazil in particular), which then extended to a larger share of the Global South in 2023[4] and even reached EU member states, the US and Australia in 2024.[5] Opposition has been so significant that, despite having entered into force more than a year ago, its future is still unclear and there are growing chances its application will be even delayed by one or two years – the Regulation is structured in a way that is should be applied at a later stage than its entry into force, currently set for December 2024. A mix of political support and fine-tuning of the tools available for implementation will be required to guarantee the EUDR's now uncertain success.Agriculture and deforestation Agriculture is by far and large the leading cause of deforestation worldwide, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of all clearings.[6] Yet, despite decades of international efforts, it has been only indirectly addressed by initiatives and policies aimed at protecting forests. The 2010 EU Timber Regulation (EUTR)[7] exclusively applied to timber imports and so did the 2008 US Lacey Act and the 2019 Chinese Forest Law. The UN REDD+ framework instead has only focused on land-use-related emissions, aiming at compensating countries that decide to adopt forest-positive practices. Agriculture was left in the background, despite soy farming or palm oil production having been the most evident cause of deforestation respectively in the Amazon and in Borneo, for instance. There are many reasons for this, and the first is that regulating agriculture to prevent deforestation is no easy task. National legislations can greatly vary between producing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, etc.) and buyers (the EU), so that forest clearings and cultivations can be illegal for one side, but perfectly legal for the other. In several cases, agricultural exports represent such a significant share of the national economy that governments are very keen to turn a blind eye and allow illegal and destructive practices (as in the case of the forest fires for new palm oil plantations in Indonesia). Corruption, involvement of organised crime groups and lack of governance, among other issues, tend to further hide the environmental impact of agriculture. The key to regulating agriculture is indeed tracing, i.e. the ability to follow the commodity in each different step of the supply chain, from production to consumption. This allows for a full understanding and visibility of the impact of cultivations – also and particularly on forests. Tracing mechanisms are however scarce and have been so far only applied for timber in the EU as a consequence of the EUTR (with scarce success),[8] and by certification organisations for other agricultural commodities. These include schemes such as Fairtrade (for coffee) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, for timber and rubber), and similarly have had a limited impact especially because of their voluntary nature and of complications in gathering information – FSC in particular has been accused of certifying well-known environmental offenders.[9]The turn of the EUDR While in recent years technological developments and growing global environmental awareness have increased the reach of certification schemes, the share of certified production has remained scarce – for coffee, the most covered sector, this is around 30 per cent.[10] Most of the players indeed have had very little interest in changing the situation; traced, deforestation-free agricultural commodities are generally more expensive, and neither European and international buyers nor local producers have historically wanted to pay the additional sustainability price. The EUDR has marked perhaps the most significant change to this situation: it has introduced a "due diligence" requirement on companies importing the seven commodities covered by the Regulation into the EU, so that they would have to trace all their batches back to the original producer, to prove that they did not cause deforestation. By imposing traceability, not only has the EUDR delivered the tool mostly needed for its main objective (that is, reducing EU-related deforestation), but it also hopes that this will stimulate producers to expand traced production beyond EU demand – a sort of Brussels effect, which leads EU regulations to have a de facto impact that is larger than its de jure scope. While such an approach has definitely more chances for success than the much milder one adopted in the past by the EUTR and other policies, it contains all the elements needed to upset producing countries – and it has. Indonesia, a country with a long history of unregulated deforestation and a major exporter of palm oil to the EU, has been one of the first to oppose the EUDR only a few days after its entry into force[11] and was rapidly followed by Malaysia, Brazil and other countries, which ultimately became a sort of informal coalition of 17 countries which sent a letter to the European Commission in September 2023.[12] In June 2024 also the US joined the opposition[13] and were followed by Australia shortly thereafter. Reasons for oppositions are generally of two kinds: all countries, Brazil, Australia and the US in particular, complain about the unfeasibility of the Regulation, which they lament will be just too complicated to be successfully applied. Most of the countries in the Global South also object that they have been imposed EU rules, without having a say. While these countries' primary interest clearly lies in maintaining access to the European market without paying this sustainability price, the complaints are reasonable: building a traceability system for sectors that had limited to no attempts in the past will be very hard and very expensive, considering especially how convoluted global agricultural supply chains still are (in terms of number of intermediaries, lack of transparency, etc.). Equally, the EUDR saw very little debate with third countries and a great deal of unilateralism that was to some extent aimed at avoiding the endless negotiations that undermined the effectiveness of previous initiatives and regulations (the FLEGT, for instance). Such a unilateral approach was however likely designed also to increase the control of the EU on key commodities and improve food security, at a time in which China and other players are playing an increasingly greater role in South East Asia and Latin America.[14]The way forward The situation is getting more and more complicated for the EUDR. The opposition has spread to some EU member states in March 2024[15] and even to the European Parliament, with the EPP group leading calls for a two-year delay of the Regulation application in June 2024, shortly after the latest elections.[16] Governments and MEPs are likely being pushed by the domestic farming sector (which will also be affected by the Regulation) and by national importers, and the recent political wave against some of the Green Deal legislation (the Nature Restoration Law in particular) probably allowed these protests to grow louder. The EU should address these concerns rapidly, or risk failing the EUDR. This will not only delay much-needed forest protection, but will also discourage other countries from taking the same direction – something the US is now trying to achieve through the FOREST Act that has been recently re-proposed.[17] The EU should work on two sides: the technical and the political one. From a technical perspective, many tools can now significantly reduce the costs of tracing, and are easily and readily available to European and non-European users: satellite images from the EU Copernicus programme can offer a free and clear view of the farms where commodities are supposedly coming from (traceability always includes coordinates), and thanks to historic series it is possible to understand how the landscape has evolved over time, for instance. Apps such as Koltitrace, by agri service provider Koltiva, allows for easier collection of information along the supply chain, since it will be the different operators (farmers, intermediate buyers, etc.) that will directly insert them step by step, and not the final operator. However, even these advancements will have little impact without the cooperation of local and national institutions, and even of companies, in producing countries. Indeed, these will ultimately be the ones gathering and providing the information on which EU institutions will decide whether imports will be EUDR-compliant or not. Brussels should first improve relations with producing countries, ideally through dedicated platforms such as the task force the EU launched with Indonesia and Malaysia on palm oil already in 2023.[18] Engagement with the private sector should also be a priority, since companies often have the best understanding of their own supply chains, but dialogue has been very limited before and after the entry into force of the Regulation. The EU will however have the difficult task of balancing the demands of these players while maintaining the real effectiveness of the Regulation, in order not to transform one of the boldest attempts to protect global forests into just a very expensive bureaucratic exercise.Lorenzo Colantoni is senior fellow of the Energy, Climate and Resources programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). This Commentary has been produced under the PRODIGEES project, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 873119.[1] The EUDR covers the seven commodities that are more responsible for global deforestation: soy, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, rubber, beef and timber.[2] See UNFCCC REDD+ Web Platform, https://redd.unfccc.int.[3] On the 2005 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation, see Fredy D. Polo Villanueva et al., "Effects of EU Illegal Logging Policy on Timber-Supplying Countries: A Systematic Review", in Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 327 (1 February 2023), Article 116874, DOI 10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.116874.[4] Isabel Marques da Silva, "Why the Global South Is Against the EU's Anti-Deforestation Law", in Euronews, 20 September 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/09/20/why-the-global-south-is-against-the-eus-anti-deforestation-law.[5] Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, "Agriculture Ministers Push to Weaken Anti-Deforestation Rules for EU Farmers", in Euractiv, 25 March 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/?p=2067436.[6] UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "FRA 2020 Remote Sensing Survey", in FAO Forestry Papers, No. 186 (2022), p. xii, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb9970en.[7] European Parliament and Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of 20 October 2010 Laying Down the Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/995/oj.[8] Michael Munk Sørensen, Lorenz Carl Wähler and Malene Sand Jespersen, Impact Assessment Study for the Revision of the Product Scope of the EU Timber Regulation. Final Report, Brussels, European Commission, May 2019, https://op.europa.eu/s/zOdq.[9] Earthsight, "FSC Hall of Shame: The Ethical Wood Label's Long Line of Scandals", in Earthsight Blog, 25 October 2021, https://www.earthsight.org.uk/news/blog-fsc-hall-of-shame-the-ethical-wood-label-long-list-of-scandals.[10] Sjoerd Panhuysen and Frederik de Vries, Coffee Barometer 2023, Coffee Barometer Consortium, September 2023, p. 12, https://coffeebarometer.org/documents_resources/coffee_barometer_2023.pdf.[11] "Indonesia Invites Affected Countries to Oppose EUDR Policy: Minister", in ANTARA, 13 July 2023, https://en.antaranews.com/news/288156.[12] Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Like-Minded Countries Convey Official Concern Regarding the EUDR, 8 September 2023, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/5234/berita/17-like-minded-countries-convey-official-concern-regarding-the-eudr.[13] Andy Bounds and Alice Hancock, "EU's Use of Incorrect Deforestation Data 'Risks Blocking Imports", in Financial Times, 15 July 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/ab2aabbc-8978-444b-844b-3d0d70553266; Kate Abnett, "United States Asks EU to Delay Deforestation Law, Letter Shows", in Reuters, 20 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/united-states-asks-eu-delay-deforestation-law-letter-shows-2024-06-20.[14] Katharina Weber, "Forests, Foreign Policy and Trade. What the EU Deforestation Regulation Means from a Foreign Policy Perspective", in CEPS Explainers, No. 2023-15 (November 2023), https://www.ceps.eu/?p=41589.[15] Austria (which leads the opposition), Finland, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland and Sweden. See Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, "Agriculture Ministers Push to Weaken Anti-Deforestation Rules for EU Farmers", cit.[16] Robert Hodgson, "EPP Environment Lead Calls for Delay to Anti-Deforestation Law", in Euronews, 27 June 2024, https://www.euronews.com/green/2024/06/27/epp-environment-lead-calls-for-delay-to-anti-deforestation-law.[17] David E. Bond, Matt Solomon and Ian Saccomanno, "US Congress Reintroduces Bill to Restrict Imports Linked to Illegal Deforestation", in White & Case Insight Alerts, 7 December 2023, https://www.whitecase.com/node/120176.[18] European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Press Release: The 2nd Meeting of the ad hoc Joint Task Force on the EUDR, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 2 February 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/438155_en.
This research entitled "The Neoconstitutionalism in the Peruvian legal system," is aimed at demonstrating that in our country governed neoconstitutionalism within the constitutional practice, specifically in practice representing constitutional jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Court and Power Judicial. This study is the first of its kind thus affects their importance for the generation of new knowledge. The problem actually leads us to the analysis of legal positivism and neoconstitutionalism as a new model that provides an adequate description of the legal practice today, especially based or generated from intense judicial work of constitutional courts it, who apply and guarantee constitutional and fundamental rights under the Constitution contains. Historical, legal and philosophical antecedents in the positivist Hans Kelsen models; Herbert L. A. Hart; and Norberto Bobbio; Dworkin on reviews from the model rules Hart: the presence of principles in judicial practice and the model of the centrality of law to the centrality of the Constitution. The investigation is justified, because the contribution of neoconstitutionalism in our country, constitutional guarantees mechanisms to achieve real and effective enforcement of the principle of constitutional supremacy and fundamental rights through jurisprudential implementation of the principles and rights contained in the constitution, causing progressive constitutionalization of the ordinary law of the State, based on issues that traditionally regulated by law. The formulation of the problem is this: What is the epistemological basis of constitutional justice in the Peruvian legal system? The theoretical framework includes: classic, social, democratic constitutionalism and constitutional state. The hypothesis was formulated as follows: "The epistemological basis of constitutional justice in the Peruvian legal system is the doctrine of neoconstitutionalism". The immediate objective of this research is to understand the dimensions of the neoconstitutional doctrinaire justice in Peru. They were used the scientific method as a universal method, the inductive-deductive, comparative methods and the legal hermeneutical method. The main conclusion is that society is experiencing a time when prevailing constitutionalism of rights protected by the rulings of the Constitutional Court based on the respect and guarantee of fundamental rights. ; La presente investigación titulada: "El Neoconstitucionalismo en el Sistema Jurídico Peruano", está orientado a demostrar que en nuestro país rige el neoconstitucionalismo dentro de la practica constitucional, específicamente dentro de la práctica que representa la jurisprudencia constitucional expedida por el Tribunal Constitucional y el Poder Judicial. El presente estudio es el primero en su género que incide en la generación de nuevos conocimientos. La realidad problemática nos orienta al análisis del positivismo jurídico y al neoconstitucionalismo como nuevo modelo que brinda una adecuada descripción de la práctica jurídica de hoy, en especial aquélla radicada o generada a partir de la intensa labor jurisdiccional de los tribunales constitucionales, quienes aplican y garantizan los derechos fundamentales constitucionales que reconoce y contiene la Constitución. Los antecedentes históricos, legales y filosóficos se encuentran en los modelos positivistas de Hans Kelsen; Herbert L. A. Hart; y de Norberto Bobbio; en las críticas de Dworkin al modelo de reglas de Hart: la presencia de principios en la práctica judicial y en el modelo de la centralidad de la ley a la centralidad de la Constitución. La investigación se justifica, porque con el aporte del neoconstitucionalismo en nuestro país, los mecanismos de garantías constitucionales logren la vigencia efectiva y real del principio de supremacía constitucional y de los derechos fundamentales, a través de la implantación jurisprudencial de los principios y derechos contenidos en la constitución, provocando la progresiva constitucionalización del derecho ordinario del Estado, teniendo como base que temas tradicionalmente regulados por la ley. La formulación del problema es el siguiente: ¿Cuál es la base epistemológica de la justicia constitucional en el sistema jurídico peruano? El marco teórico comprende: Constitucionalismo clásico, social, democrático y el Estado constitucional. La hipótesis se formuló de la siguiente manera: "La base epistemológica de la justicia constitucional en el sistema jurídico peruano es la doctrina del neoconstitucionalismo". El objetivo inmediato de esta investigación es conocer las dimensiones doctrinarias de la justicia neoconstitucional en el Perú. Se han usado el método científico como método universal, los métodos inductivo-deductivo, comparativo y el método hermenéutico jurídico. La principal conclusión es que la sociedad actual vive una época en la cual impera el constitucionalismo de los derechos, amparado en los fallos del Tribunal Constitucional basados en el respeto y garantía de los derechos fundamentales.
Статья посвящена вопросу отграничения посреднических действий от исполнительских в интерпретации действующего уголовного законодательства и судебной практики за последние два десятилетия. Проводится проверка соответствия статей Особенной части Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации положениям Общей части о соучастии. Эмпирическую базу составили материалы судебной практики по преступлениям против жизни и здоровья, половой неприкосновенности и половой свободы личности; против собственности; против общественной безопасности, здоровья населения и общественной нравственности; экологическим преступлениям и преступлениям, связанным с взяточничеством. В статье освещены ключевые постановления Пленума Верховного Суда РФ, содержащие разъяснения по вопросу отграничения роли исполнителя от пособника. Разбираются неточности и двусмысленность формулировок актов высшего судебного органа, порождающих дискуссии в кругах ученых и отсутствие единообразия в правоприменительной практике. В статье содержится подборка судебных актов, в которых излагается и аргументируется позиция судов, отличная от разъяснений Верховного Суда РФ. Особое внимание уделено принятию федерального закона, дополнившего ч. 3 ст. 2051 УК, закрепляющей пособничество в совершении террористического акта в качестве самостоятельного преступления, и позициям государственных органов, излагаемым в отзывах на законопроект. Именно данное нововведение во многом положило начало тенденции смешения исполнительских и посреднических действий на законодательном уровне. Продолжением послужило дополнение Особенной части УК РФ ст. 2911 «Посредничество во взяточничестве». Кроме того, в статье анализируются законопроекты, находящиеся на данный момент на рассмотрении в Государственной Думе РФ, в случае принятия которых пособнические действия по ряду составов будут признаваться в качестве самостоятельных преступлений, а лица их совершившие — исполнителями. Автор отмечает, что Верховный Суд РФ зачастую выходит за рамки допустимого толкования и излагаемая им позиция является применением закона по аналогии, а не его разъяснением. Во избежание сложностей с применением ч. 5 ст. 33 УК РФ поддерживается предложение сделать перечень закрепленных в ней действий открытым. В целом автор приходит к выводу о тенденции к стиранию четкой границы между ролью исполнителя и пособника, констатирует отсутствие единообразия в судебной практике и считает необходимым развивать положения Общей части УК РФ о соучастии. ; The paper is devoted to the question of crime committer and assisting offender activities distinction in the interpretation of the current criminal legislation and judicial practice, accumulated over the last twenty years. An examination of the Special Part of the Criminal Code articles is made as to the compliance with the general provisions on complicity. The empiric basis consists of the cases on crimes against human life and health, sexual inviolability and sexual freedom of the person; against property; against public security, human health and public morality; ecological crimes and crimes related to bribery court practice. The article covers the key documents of the Russian Federation Supreme Court containing clarifications on the question of differentiating the crime committer and assisting offender roles. The article analyses judicial acts containing ambiguities, generating discussion in academic community and the lack of uniformity in enforcement practice. The paper contains a case selection which sets out the courts position different from the Supreme Court clarification. A particular attention is paid to the federal law Art. 205, added to part 3 of the Criminal Code, which stated abetting in terrorism as an independent crime, and to the state authorities positions, set out in the reviews to the draft. This law has set the tendency to confuse the concepts of crime committer and assisting offender concepts at the legislative level. The tendency was continued by the addition to the Criminal Code Art. 291 'Mediation in bribery'. There is also the analysis of the draft laws which are currently under consideration in the State Duma. In case of their adoption abetting in some crimes committing will be recognized as independent crimes and persons committed these crimes will be recognized as crime committers. The author notes that the Supreme Court is often beyond the permissible interpretation and its position is an application of the law by analogy but not the explanation. The author supports the proposal to make the p. 5 Art. 33 of the Criminal Code activities list open to avoid difficulties with this rule application. In general, the author concludes that there is a tendency to blur the distinction between the crime committer and assisting offender roles, lack of uniformity in judicial practice and calls for the development of the general provisions on complicity in the General Part of RF Criminal Code.
В настоящей статье обозначены рамки научного понимания термина «бюрократия». Проводится интерпретация сферы государственного управления в отечественной юриспруденции. Изучены существующие в государственно-правовой науке представления о системе органов государственной власти, о категориях: механизм государства, аппарат государства; об институте государственной службы. Проанализированы также теоретические взгляды на обусловленность управленческой сферы государственно-правовыми традициями. На основе имеющихся в отечественной юридической науке представлений внесены коррективы в научное понимание термина «государственная бюрократия», с целью адаптации его к юриспруденции. Обозначены теоретико-методологические подходы, позволяющие провести теоретический анализ становления правовых и политических основ российской бюрократии, объяснить проблемы правореализации в данной системе. Подобран теоретико-методологический комплекс, способствующий выявлению преемственности от присущих российской сфере государственного управления и государственной бюрократии характерных черт в контексте анализа самобытности государственности и правовой системы. В статье проводится анализ как юридических, так и общенаучных теоретико-методологических взглядов. Цель. На основе анализа положений социальных и юридических наук сформировать теоретико-методологический комплекс для объективного исследования государственного управления. Методы. Работа основана на базовых принципах теории государства и права, социологии, также применяется формально-логический метод теоретического анализа. Результаты. Приходим к выводу об отсутствии в юридической науке термина обозначающего всю систему государственного администрирования эквивалентного общенаучному понятию «государственная бюрократия». На основе теоретических положений юриспруденции общенаучный термин «государственная бюрократия» оптимизирован к государственно-правовой науке. Выявлена большая значимость для юриспруденции теории развития бюрократической организации, разработанной немецким социологом М. Вебером. Данная теоретическая концепция разрабатывает классическую модель развития, вместе с тем обладает потенциалом адаптации к самобытности государственности и правовой системы конкретного общества. Научная новизна. Существующее общенаучное определение понятия «государственная бюрократия» на основе теоретических представлений, действующих в юриспруденции, адаптируется к государственно-правовой науке. Выявляется эвристический потенциал теории М.Вебера для юридической науки как теоретической концепции способной исследовать специфику развития правовых основ государственной бюрократии на базе государственно-правовых традиций. ; This article provides a framework of scientific understanding of the term «bureaucracy». The authors introduce interpretation of public administration in domestic law. The authors study the existing state-legal scientific view on the system of public authorities, about categories: mechanism of the state, apparatus of the state, about the institute of the public service. Theoretical views on management of public-sphere conditionality legal traditions are analyzed. On the basis of existing views on domestic legal science the authors change scientific understanding of the term «state bureaucracy» aimed at adapting it to jurisprudence. The authors outline theoretical and methodological approaches that allow conducting a theoretical analysis of the formation of legal and political foundations of the Russian bureaucracy, explaining problems of enforcement of the right in the given system. The authors selected theoretical and methodological complex, which facilitates identification of continuity from the inherent limitations of the Russian public administration and state bureaucracy characteristic in the context of the analysis of the identity of the statehood and legal system. In the article, the authors analyze both legal and general theoretical and methodological perspectives. Purpose. To generate a theoretical-methodological complex for objective study of public administration using the analysis of social and legal sciences. Methods. The research is based on the basic principles of theory of state and law, sociology. The authors also applied a formal logical method for theoretical analysis. The results. The authors come to the conclusion about the absence of the term denoting the entire system of public administration and equivalent to the general scientific notion «state bureaucracy» in legal science. On the basis of theoretical jurisprudence provisions general scientific term «state bureaucracy» is optimized to legal science. The authors identified a large significance of the theory of bureaucracy development made by German sociologist M. Weber for the jurisprudence. This theoretical concept develops a classic model of development; however, it has some potential to adapt to the identity of state and the legal system of a particular society. Scientific novelty. The existing general scientific definition «state bureaucracy» on the basis of theoretical notions, existing in law, is adapted to the state and legal science. The authors identified heuristic potential of M. Weber's theory for legal science as a theoretical concept able to explore specificity of the development of the legal framework of state bureaucracy based on state-legal traditions.
Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report analyses the institutional set-up and use of regulatory policy instruments in Uganda. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia), and represents an attempt to apply assessment tools and the framework developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its work on regulatory capacity and performance to developing countries.
The article is devoted to the study of the legal regulation of parole in the form of life imprisonment in Ukraine. An analysis of the norms of international acts that regulate this issue, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the experience of some foreign countries.Attention is drawn to the fact that the European Court of Human Rights emphasizes that the existing pardon system in Ukraine is a violation of Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and for their harmonization and implementation of the standards referred to in Article 3 of the Convention, the following requirements must be met:1) those sentenced to life imprisonment must know from the very beginning of their sentence what they must do in order to obtain the right to parole;2) the convict should not be kept in places of imprisonment if the penological grounds for his further detention have disappeared;3) the presence of these grounds must be checked within a certain period of time;4) the release mechanism must have clear criteria and procedural guarantees;5) the refusal to satisfy the request for parole must be justified.The hopelessness of the possibilities of releasing persons from criminal liability in Ukraine has been proved. It is stated that the existing institution of pardon in our state is only an exception, it cannot be considered as providing a real prospect of release. Such exclusivity is also directly recognized by the Pardon Regulations, according to which persons convicted of particularly serious crimes may be pardoned only in exceptional cases in the presence of extraordinary circumstances. Given that the Ukrainian legislation does not contain an interpretation of the concepts of «pardon», «early release of persons sentenced to life imprisonment», there are additional difficulties in their enforcement. In addition, the futility of parole in Ukraine is recognized by international institutions such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Court of Human Rights. Given all the above, I believe that Ukrainian legislation in this area should be supplemented with rules that will provide a real opportunity for individuals to liberate and achieve the main goal set by the state – to recover and resocialize in society, and thus bring domestic legislation in line with international standards ; Статья посвящена исследованию правового регулирования условно-досрочного освобождения от отбывания наказания в виде пожизненного лишения свободы в Украине. Сделан анализ норм международных актов, регулирующих этот вопрос, практики Европейского суда по правам человека и опыта некоторых зарубежных стран ; Статтю присвячено дослідженню правового регулювання умовно-дострокового звільнення від відбування покарання у виді довічного позбавлення волі в Україні. Проаналізовано норми міжнародних актів, що врегульовують це питання, а також практики Європейського суду з прав людини і досвід деяких зарубіжних країн
The article is devoted to the study of the legal regulation of parole in the form of life imprisonment in Ukraine. An analysis of the norms of international acts that regulate this issue, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the experience of some foreign countries.Attention is drawn to the fact that the European Court of Human Rights emphasizes that the existing pardon system in Ukraine is a violation of Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and for their harmonization and implementation of the standards referred to in Article 3 of the Convention, the following requirements must be met:1) those sentenced to life imprisonment must know from the very beginning of their sentence what they must do in order to obtain the right to parole;2) the convict should not be kept in places of imprisonment if the penological grounds for his further detention have disappeared;3) the presence of these grounds must be checked within a certain period of time;4) the release mechanism must have clear criteria and procedural guarantees;5) the refusal to satisfy the request for parole must be justified.The hopelessness of the possibilities of releasing persons from criminal liability in Ukraine has been proved. It is stated that the existing institution of pardon in our state is only an exception, it cannot be considered as providing a real prospect of release. Such exclusivity is also directly recognized by the Pardon Regulations, according to which persons convicted of particularly serious crimes may be pardoned only in exceptional cases in the presence of extraordinary circumstances. Given that the Ukrainian legislation does not contain an interpretation of the concepts of «pardon», «early release of persons sentenced to life imprisonment», there are additional difficulties in their enforcement. In addition, the futility of parole in Ukraine is recognized by international institutions such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Court of Human Rights. Given all the above, I believe that Ukrainian legislation in this area should be supplemented with rules that will provide a real opportunity for individuals to liberate and achieve the main goal set by the state – to recover and resocialize in society, and thus bring domestic legislation in line with international standards ; Статья посвящена исследованию правового регулирования условно-досрочного освобождения от отбывания наказания в виде пожизненного лишения свободы в Украине. Сделан анализ норм международных актов, регулирующих этот вопрос, практики Европейского суда по правам человека и опыта некоторых зарубежных стран ; Статтю присвячено дослідженню правового регулювання умовно-дострокового звільнення від відбування покарання у виді довічного позбавлення волі в Україні. Проаналізовано норми міжнародних актів, що врегульовують це питання, а також практики Європейського суду з прав людини і досвід деяких зарубіжних країн
The article is devoted to the study of the legal regulation of parole in the form of life imprisonment in Ukraine. An analysis of the norms of international acts that regulate this issue, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the experience of some foreign countries.Attention is drawn to the fact that the European Court of Human Rights emphasizes that the existing pardon system in Ukraine is a violation of Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and for their harmonization and implementation of the standards referred to in Article 3 of the Convention, the following requirements must be met:1) those sentenced to life imprisonment must know from the very beginning of their sentence what they must do in order to obtain the right to parole;2) the convict should not be kept in places of imprisonment if the penological grounds for his further detention have disappeared;3) the presence of these grounds must be checked within a certain period of time;4) the release mechanism must have clear criteria and procedural guarantees;5) the refusal to satisfy the request for parole must be justified.The hopelessness of the possibilities of releasing persons from criminal liability in Ukraine has been proved. It is stated that the existing institution of pardon in our state is only an exception, it cannot be considered as providing a real prospect of release. Such exclusivity is also directly recognized by the Pardon Regulations, according to which persons convicted of particularly serious crimes may be pardoned only in exceptional cases in the presence of extraordinary circumstances. Given that the Ukrainian legislation does not contain an interpretation of the concepts of «pardon», «early release of persons sentenced to life imprisonment», there are additional difficulties in their enforcement. In addition, the futility of parole in Ukraine is recognized by international institutions such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Court of Human Rights. Given all the above, I believe that Ukrainian legislation in this area should be supplemented with rules that will provide a real opportunity for individuals to liberate and achieve the main goal set by the state – to recover and resocialize in society, and thus bring domestic legislation in line with international standards ; Статья посвящена исследованию правового регулирования условно-досрочного освобождения от отбывания наказания в виде пожизненного лишения свободы в Украине. Сделан анализ норм международных актов, регулирующих этот вопрос, практики Европейского суда по правам человека и опыта некоторых зарубежных стран ; Статтю присвячено дослідженню правового регулювання умовно-дострокового звільнення від відбування покарання у виді довічного позбавлення волі в Україні. Проаналізовано норми міжнародних актів, що врегульовують це питання, а також практики Європейського суду з прав людини і досвід деяких зарубіжних країн
This article is aimed at studying some certain aspects of new contract institute of Ukrainian civil law – the institute of rent. The subject of the study is the civil legal relations concerning the conclusion, execution and termination of the rental agreement. The subject of the research is the legislation base of Ukraine. Legal definition of the rent contract is analyzed in the paper. The object of the contract, its form and its parties are also studied. Types of rent contract are distinguished. Besides, the authors analyze the questions of origin and development of various aspects of rent relations; they give legal characteristic of rent contract according to Civil Code of Ukraine, reveal drawbacks of the rent regulation in Ukrainian legislation and give suggestions on improvement of current civil legislation in the sphere of rental relations. The authors have come to conclusion that the practice of applying of the legal construction of rent contract, which have been being formed during the 15 years of the Civil Code, proves that the rent institute is not deprived of certain problems, influencing the legal enforcement. So provided that the legal loopholes and enforcement deficiencies are eliminated, the construction of rent contract will be used more frequently by participants in the civil turnover. In order to achieve this goal it is extremely important to offer clear proposals to the national parliament for improvement of the current legislation regarding the regulation of public relations related to the use of the rent agreement. ; Este artículo tiene como objetivo estudiar algunos aspectos del nuevo instituto contractual del derecho civil ucraniano: el instituto de alquiler. El tema del estudio son las relaciones jurídicas civiles relativas a la conclusión, ejecución y rescisión del contrato de alquiler. El tema de la investigación es la base legislativa de Ucrania. La definición legal del contrato de alquiler se analiza en el documento. El objeto del contrato, su forma y sus partes también se estudian. Se distinguen los tipos de contrato de alquiler. Además, los autores analizan las cuestiones de origen y desarrollo de varios aspectos de las relaciones de renta; dan características legales del contrato de alquiler de acuerdo con el Código Civil de Ucrania, revelan inconvenientes de la regulación del alquiler en la legislación ucraniana y dan sugerencias sobre la mejora de la legislación civil vigente en el ámbito de las relaciones de alquiler. Los autores llegaron a la conclusión de que la práctica de aplicar la construcción legal del contrato de alquiler, que se formó durante los 15 años del Código Civil, demuestra que el instituto de alquiler no está privado de ciertos problemas, lo que influye en la aplicación de la ley. Por lo tanto, siempre que se eliminen las lagunas legales y las deficiencias de cumplimiento, los participantes en la rotación civil utilizarán con mayor frecuencia la construcción del contrato de alquiler. Para lograr este objetivo, es extremadamente importante ofrecer propuestas claras al parlamento nacional para mejorar la legislación actual con respecto a la regulación de las relaciones públicas relacionadas con el uso del contrato de alquiler. ; Наукова стаття має на меті дослідити деякі аспекти нового договірного інституту цивільного права України – інституту ренти. Об'єктом дослідження є цивільно-правові відносини щодо укладання, виконання та розірвання договору ренти. Предметом дослідження виступає нормативно-правова база України. У статті аналізується легальне визначення договору ренти, досліджуються предмет договору, форма договору, суб'єкти, які можуть виступати сторонами за договором, виділяються окремі різновиди договору ренти. Серед іншого, автори торкаються питань виникнення та розвитку рентних відносин, дають юридичну характеристику договору ренти у відповідності до Цивільного кодексу України, виділяють недоліки законодавчого закріплення інституту ренти, висувають свої пропозиції щодо вдосконалення цивільного законодавства у сфері рентних відносин. Автори дійшли висновку, що практика застосування юридичної конструкції договору ренти, що формується протягом 15 років чинності Цивільного кодексу, доводить, що інститут ренти не позбавлений певних проблем, що впливають на правозастосування. Таким чином, за умови усунення правових прогалин та недоліків у практиці правозастосування, договір ренти буде використовуватися частіше учасниками цивільного обороту. Для досягнення цієї мети надзвичайно важливо запропонувати національному парламенту чіткі пропозиції щодо вдосконалення чинного законодавства щодо регулювання суспільних відносин, пов'язаних із використанням договору ренти.
An up-close account of policing during the Ferguson protests, providing insights from both police officers and members of the communityPolicing Unrest presents the frontline experiences of police officers during the intense three weeks of protest, vigils, looting, violence, and large civil demonstrations in and around Ferguson, Missouri, following the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by a police officer. Looking closely at the lived experiences of police officers and community residents, Tammy Rinehart Kochel raises important questions about police-community relations and the role of police as peacekeepers in support of social justice.Drawing on interviews with dozens of police personnel who policed the protests, Kochel offers insight into their shared experiences and provides compelling personal accounts of how they performed their jobs during the protest. The book covers a range of topics such as police-community relationships and community policing principles; how factors such as police subculture and organizational culture stacked up against social identity during this crisis; the role of an officer's characteristics, especially an officer's race, play in an officer's self-legitimacy; and the implications for police recruitment and training. Kochel's unique access allowed her to provide a balanced perspective on police officers' cynicism and public protests against police that were rampant in the year following Ferguson against the need to restore police-community relations and police legitimacy through increased transparency, accountability, and procedural justice. Policing Unrest explains how the Ferguson protests ushered in an era of police reform and reveals what it is like being a police officer facing public unrest, particularly in the wake of widely publicized incidents of police brutality around the country
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