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No abstract is available for this article.

No abstract is available for this article.

SummarySeveral scholars concerned with global policy‐making have recently pointed to a reconfiguration of authority in the area of climate politics. They have shown that various new carbon governance arrangements have emerged, which operate simultaneously at different governmental levels. However, despite the numerous descriptions and mapping exercises of these governance arrangements, we have little systematic knowledge on their workings within national jurisdictions, let alone about their impact on public‐administrative systems in developing countries. Therefore, this article opens the "black box" of the nation‐state and explores how and to what extent two different arrangements, that is, Transnational City Networks and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, generate changes in the distribution of public authority in nation‐states and their administrations. Building upon conceptual assumptions that the former is likely to lead to more decentralized, and the latter to more centralized policy‐making, we provide insights from case studies in Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, and India. In a nutshell, our analysis underscores that Transnational City Networks strengthen climate‐related actions taken by cities without ultimately decentralizing climate policy‐making. On the other hand, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation tends to reinforce the competencies of central governments, but apparently does not generate a recentralization of the forestry sector at large.

SummaryPoor bureaucratization in prismatic (transitional) societies is attributed to malintegration of the ideal bureaucratic principles with subsisting traditional sociocultural features by Fred Riggs. Riggs has been severely criticized on many fronts, yet aspects of his theory remain relevant towards explaining persistent poor administrative behaviour in most African countries. This article applies Riggs' notion of poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism to explain the contribution of low state identity to persistent poor administrative behaviour in Africa. Historical institutionalism theory is also used to attempt at resolving the challenge of equilibrium for which Riggs' theory is commonly criticized. The author avers that communalism, a value that supports group interest in a traditional society, subsists in most poly‐communal transitional African countries, leading to distortions in administrative behaviour. A good number of African countries were mobilized through colonialism but poorly assimilated, thus lacking strong common state identity, which leads to ineffective public administration. The article suggests that resolving the trapping of the administrative system in Africa requires resolving the challenge of poly‐communalism and lack of common identity among a state population.

Summary"Political will" is oft‐cited as the major obstacle to government's anti‐corruption efforts. Notwithstanding, there is remarkably little systematic analysis of the concept, with some scholars describing it as the "slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon," whereas others are calling for its empirical relevance. This paper tries to unpack the "black box" of political will by making it an empirically relevant concept drawing on evidence from two Asian countries; Singapore and Bangladesh. Four key indicators based on the works of earlier scholars are used including origin of the initiative; comprehension and extent of analysis; credible sanctions; and resource dedication and sustenance are used. The paper also uses Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, World Bank's World Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness), and Political, Economic and Risk Consultancy's annual survey in Asia, as outcome measures. Based on the empirical evidence from the two countries, the paper shows that political will indeed has a positive influence on government's anti‐corruption efforts. Although political will may not be sufficient, it is a necessary condition to fight corruption, and that the difference between the positions of Singapore and Bangladesh on various global corruption league tables may be attributed to political will.