AbstractThe regionalisation of the world economy is one of the most important developments in global governance in the past two decades. This process has seen 'inter-regional' economic agreements emerge between two or more regional groupings. Drawing mainly on the European Union's external relations, observers accordingly point to the growing importance of regional actors, explaining their agency (or 'actorness') with regional attributes such as (supranational) institutional design, size, and member state cohesion. This article challenges this dominant explanation of regional agency. It argues that regional actors are socially, politically, and historically 'embedded'. Agency reflects the contingency of regional integration processes, the motivations that underpin those processes, and the specific relationships between regions and third parties. This approach explains an important case of inter-regionalism from the Asia-Pacific: CER-ASEAN relations. Since the early 1990s, Australia and New Zealand have used their 'Closer Economic Relations' trade agreement for relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This reflects the ambitions of Australasian officials to shape processes of Asian-Pacific regionalism, and the interests of ASEAN officials in consolidating their own process of transnational market-making. Here, regional agency owed to a transforming world economy and the reconceptualisation of regions within new networks of trade governance.
Both ASEAN and China used the concept of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) in order to pursue security diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. For ASEAN, NTS is an area of security cooperation that allows it to drive the agenda of security architectures involving extra-regional powers such as the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For China, NTS policy agenda allows it to gain acceptance among ASEAN member-states and an active role in the security agenda of ASEAN-led security architectures. The question that this article is pursuing is to what extent has ASEAN-China cooperation on NTS balanced between addressing the humanitarian aspect and the political objectives of security? This question is derived from the conceptual origin of NTS that stands on the importance of both the state and the individuals as the referent subjects of security. This article argues that ASEAN-China NTS cooperation emphasized more towards the strengthening of state's capacity to deal with non-state actors' transnational criminal activities, either for profit-seeking or subversive purposes. It is also apparent from evaluating the Memorandum of Understandings and Plans of Action between ASEAN and China that NTS cooperation is one China's investments to engage a closer cooperation with ASEAN as well as a stronger presence in Southeast Asia's strategic environment.
This paper is concerned with the determining factors of the interregional relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), specifically its institutional proliferation on the three institutional levels of EU-to-ASEAN relations (bi-regionalism), relations inside ASEM (trans-regionalism) as well as relations between the EU and individual ASEAN member states (region-to-state). Commonly, interregional relations are seen as depending on the actorness of the regional organisations involved. This paper proposes an alternative approach, focusing on structural interdependence and agency on the part of both regional actors as the two main determinants of the institutional proliferation. The analysis suggests that levels of political and economic interdependence are low at the bi-regional level and higher at both the trans-regional and region-to-state level, leading to a proliferation of institutional structures at these levels. Additionally, the analysis reveals three unique strategies by ASEAN and the EU contributing to the design of their interregional relationship. For ASEAN, these strategies consist of (1) omni-enmeshment, (2) vertical and horizontal hedging, and (3) the rule of relative institutionalisation. For the EU, these strategies consist of (1) a pragmatic approach towards ASEAN, (2) a widening of interest towards East Asia, and (3) capacity-building bi-regionalism.
AbstractMore than 800 years ago—at approximately the same time as the founding of the first European universities—the renowned monastic institution known as the Nālandā Mahāvihāra disappeared from historical records. Since 2006, a transnational Asian initiative to revive ancient Nalanda as 'Nalanda University' in Bihar, India, has been embraced at the highest government and philanthropic levels by a consortium of South, Southeast, and East Asian nations. Nalanda, described as an 'icon of Asian renaissance', and the issues surrounding its revival raise important questions about how a new interest in 'pan-Indo-Asianism' and a newly imagined vision of 'Asian' education are seen as converging to promote Asian interests. First, I consider the ambivalent relationship of the revival and its pre-modern namesake against the Nālandā Mahāvihāra's known history. Then I characterize two kinds of discourse on the contemporary project: one that is 'pan-Indo-Asian' and frames the revival as serving transnational Asian goals; and another that is Indic and imagines Nalanda as advancing Indian national concerns. While, for the various stakeholders, serious fissures are evident in the symbolic values of Nalanda—as an exemplar of Asia and of India—both types of discourse, taken together, reveal important insights into the development of an alternative model of education that is both modern and 'Asian'.
The most important legal instrument of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations __ the ASEAN Charter __ entered into force on December 15, 2008 and bestowed a legal personality for this regional organization. The ASEAN Charter has given root to a new ASEAN. In this original framework, the ASEAN meetings of 2009 and in particular the October 23-25, 2009, ASEAN Summit hosted in Thailand were conceived to herald a new phase in ASEAN's life. By their results, the 2009 ASEAN Summits will have a special place in the history of this regional institution because they managed to consider in a constructive way and to find workable solutions on how to give tangibility to three communities: "A Community of Action"; "A Community of Connectivity"; "A Community of Peoples". This article contains an analysis from a diplomatic perspective of the most significant documents adopted at the ASEAN Leaders' level. A fundamental question is: can ASEAN successfully cope with future predictable and unpredictable challenges (global or regional)? In this regard, is ASEAN able and equipped to take the lead in genuine institution building in the East Asia region? The general conclusion is that ASEAN can play a more important role in its area and at global level, only if its members cooperate more closely in all fields.
In the early 15th through 13th centuries BCE, the world of the Near East, from the Mediterranean to modern day Iran, was linked together in what historians today call the First International Age. Correspondence from that period found at El Amarna in Egypt and other sites in Mesopotamia and Anatolia details the diplomatic and economic exchanges between the "Great Powers" of the time (Babylon, Assyria, Mittani, Hatti, and Egypt), and contains letters from the Egyptian vassal kingdoms in the Levant, known as Canaan. The complex diplomatic interchanges and active economic trade during this period were possible because of the status of Canaan as a series of semi-autonomous vassal states under the Egyptian empire. Canaan acted as the economic center for the entire region, linking the goods and kingdoms of southwest Asia, Africa, and southeastern Europe into a single trading system. Though under the nominal control of Egypt, Canaan served as neutral territory for all the powers, enabling complex political and diplomatic interchange throughout the region. This paper explores the conditions within Canaan that allowed this system of exchange to flourish, and will show that a number of military, political, and cultural factors in Canaan, which were cultivated by the Egyptians, allowed the region to act as an international territory facilitating trade and political interaction between the Great Powers.
In den vergangenen Jahren hat ein Wettlauf um Einflusszonen in Südostasien eingesetzt, in den auch China und die USA involviert sind. Ausdruck dafür ist der von Obama verkündete "Pivot to Asia", die Hinwendung der USA nach Asien. (APuZ)
Hanois Streben nach Äquidistanz zu Moskau und Peking, Vietnams Abhängigkeit von sowjetischer Hilfe: eine Quelle von Spannungen. Hanois Bemühen um eine Eingrenzung des sowjetischen Einflusses in den indonesischen Staaten. Vietnamesisches Mißtrauen gegenüber dem sino-sowjetischen Annäherungsprozeß. Einstellung der ASEAN-Staaten der UdSSR gegenüber vor und nach 1978. Birmas Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion seit 1948. (DÜI-Sen)
Asia's regional architecture : a historical-institutional perspective -- Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the making of an alliance consensus -- Change and continuity : 1989-1997 -- Rising regionalism : 1997-2007 -- Complex patchwork : 2008-2016 -- Regional order and governance -- Conclusion : theory, policy, and the relevance of historical institutionalism and Asia
Recent studies of ASEAN have focused on why ASEAN community building has emphasised liberal norms such as human rights, democracy promotion and a commitment to wider participation while maintaining a set of sovereignty-preserving regional principles – the ASEAN Way norms – that have been more suited to securing illiberal agendas and the authoritarian practices of state elites. ASEAN's seeming progressive turn is argued to be instrumentally aimed at buttressing the legitimacy of the grouping as a credible regional institution in international society in which these norms are widely accepted though not uncontested. With recent developments suggesting further consolidation of, or a return to, authoritarian tendencies across the region, state-based modes of governance may become more limited in terms of what ASEAN member states are prepared to endorse. It is, therefore, time for scholars to expand analysis to explore how transnational issues and problems may be functionally governed outside of formal regional institutions involving non-state actors in key roles. While the turn to privately generated standards, rules and practices in global governance is well-recognised and researched, the disparate studies on private governance in South-East Asia are rarely cumulated into a more coherent research programme that addresses the effectiveness of private governance as well as its normative implications. These questions point to a promising agenda for research on regional and other transnational modes of governance in South-East Asia. (Pac Rev/GIGA)
Suh Jaemahn: An overview of Korean-Jordanian relations. - S. 23-34. Rew Joung Yole: Regional system and developing nations: the case of Korea. - S. 35-43. Braizat, Musa S.: Jordan's regional role: balancing change with stability. - S. 45-72. Park Byung-ho: The causes and effects of the rapid growth of Korean exports (1962-1977). - S. 75-88. Ahmad, Ahmad Qassem El-: Encouragement of investment laws in Jordan since 1955. - S. 89-110. Zu'bi, Bashir Al- ; Kasasbeh, Hamad: Jordan's economy: challenges and opportunities. - S. 113-138. Tealakh, Gali Oda: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Korea cooperation in Central Asia. Prospects and potentialities. - S. 139-160. Shim Ui-sup: New international economic cooperation strategies of Korea and Jordan for the Islamic frontier countries in Central Asia. - S. 161-173
Der Autor vermittelt einen kurzen Überblick über die Entwicklung der von der United National Party-Regierung Sri Lankas seit 1977 verfolgten Außen- und Außenwirtschaftspolitik, wobei Haltung und Aktivitäten Sri Lankas bzgl. Fragen der internationalen Beziehungen sowie die Regionalpolitik Sri Lankas behandelt werden. (BIOst-Klk)
A new dawn is emerging in the regional order of the Indo-Pacific, with Japan playing a central role in keeping the region focused on shared concerns. At the summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Biden in Washington DC this week, concerted efforts to demonstrate the depth and breadth of partnership between Japan and the United States was on full display that went well beyond pageantry. But amid concerted efforts to expand the networks of security partnerships across the region, prospects for enhancing the latticework of economic ties continue to lag behind. The good news is that trade relations are no longer the source of heightened tension as in the decades past. Instead, shared concerns about the China challenge have emerged as a driving force for greater strategic economic cooperation. Wariness of Chinese economic coercion and Beijing's abuse of advanced technologies have become the driving force for greater cooperation on technology development. The latest development in bilateral economic partnership also brings much-needed capital as well as political buy-in to ensure sustained commitment to industries that will be key for future growth as well as security. Certainly, the excitement over new investments between the United States and Japan to bolster advanced technology cooperation is palpable, as are the initiatives to build up the workforce in emerging industries. Microsoft's decision to invest $2.9 billion in Japanese AI and cloud infrastructure as well as workforce training is expected to jump-start Japanese spending in those critical sectors. Moreover, the announcement of new AI research partnerships between major US universities through funding from a consortium of Japanese companies, as well as NVIDIA, Amazon, Arm, and Microsoft, are expected to stimulate greater dynamism and innovation in Japanese universities in applied technologies. Yet, the divide between the flourishing of security partnerships to enhance the defense of the Indo-Pacific and efforts to bolster greater prosperity in the region continues to grow. The latest summit meeting has laid the foundation for the two countries to coordinate efforts to expand security networks across the region. Including Japan in the second pillar of AUKUS together with Australia and the UK to further joint defense capabilities adds to Tokyo's efforts to shift its military export policy in recent months. Moreover, the first trilateral summit between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines that immediately followed the Biden-Kishida meeting is enhancing coordinated defense posture in the South China Sea, which in turn will supplement US-Japan-ROK efforts against the North Korea threat. Efforts to enhance the latticework to deter China as well as North Korea and Russia are expected to deepen moving forward. When it comes to economic coordination, however, there is yet no clear shared vision of what success would mean, especially when it comes to enticing the Global South. Japan and the United States may not see eye to eye when it comes to dealing with China as an economic challenge, but they are aligned when it comes to promoting innovation, establishing rules of new technologies, and protecting the rules-based economic order. For South and Southeast Asia, however, there is no clear gain for closer US-Japan ties on developing advanced technologies, nor even from preventing Chinese acquisition of such developments. Rather, their focus remains to secure investments as well as opportunities to go up the value chain and to avert the middle income trap. The launch of the Luzon Economic Corridor to connect Subic Bay, Clark, Bantangas, and Manila as the first project under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment is promising for the Philippines, given its focus on developing transportation projects including civilian port upgrades and investing in semiconductor manufacturing capabilities in the country. Its success will be vital, especially given that over half of Southeast Asians surveyed by Singaporean think tank ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute would choose China over the United States should they need to pick a side. The China challenge has spurred greater cooperation between Japan and the United States in developing pioneering technologies. But fear of Beijing alone is not the motivating factor. Rather, joint investment in critical technologies and harnessing the power of the private sector in particular will be a driving force in shaping the economic relationship between Tokyo and Washington moving forward. Similarly, wariness of China alone will not be enough to entice countries across the Indo-Pacific to be an integral part of the latticework that is emerging to act as a deterrence against Chinese aggressions. Ensuring the success of the Luzon initiative and replicating its model through partnerships between governments as well as the private sector will be vital to ensure that there is lasting support for the free and open Indo-Pacific vision that is now firmly a force unifier between the United States and Japan. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.
