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For the Arab Gulf kingdoms, the Horn of Africa is a strategic perimeter. They want to minimize political threats — some are hostile to Islamists, all want to suppress democracy movements. Anticipating a post-carbon and food insecure world, the Gulf States want to possess rich farmlands. Each has its own vision of African client states that will do their bidding. This is a recipe for proxy wars, state fragmentation and autocracy in northeast Africa.For the Horn of Africa, today's crises are existential. War, dictatorship and famine are causing state collapse. The African Union is compromised, its peace and security system unravelling. The United Nations is retreating from peacemaking, increasingly reduced to a bare-bones humanitarian provider.The dangers were illuminated by the surprise New Year's Day deal between Abiy Ahmed, prime minister of Ethiopia, and Muse Bihi, president of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, a breakaway region of northwest Somalia. Ethiopia has been renowned for careful diplomacy, including championing the inviolability of existing boundaries. After fighting wars with Somalia in the 1960s and '70s, Ethiopia had learned to be circumspect and consultative in its dealings with Mogadishu.Last week, Ethiopia upended that tradition. It promised to recognize Somaliland as an independent sovereign state, in return for Somaliland leasing it a 12-mile stretch of land, including a seaport, that will allow Ethiopia to establish a naval base. This in turn unleashed strong words from Somalia — which had not been informed ahead of time. The AU called for Ethiopia to treat Somalia with respect. Fears of new conflicts were stirred. Unsaid in public is that the UAE is widely suspected to be the patron of the deal.For the United States, crises in the Horn of Africa are a sidebar to the ongoing Israel-Gaza war and the confrontation with Iran. Gunboat diplomacy in the Red Sea — the warships deployed under Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect shipping from attacks from the Houthis in Yemen — is the priority.The narrow strip of water carries 12 percent of world seaborne trade. For sailors, the Red Sea is "a sea on the way to somewhere else," its shores at best an inconvenience, at worst a security threat.There's a global consensus on keeping the shipping lanes open. If the Red Sea shuts down — as happened following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war— the knock-on effects on trade between Europe and Asia would be economically severe. The EU-run Operation Atalanta runs an anti-piracy flotilla involving warships from 13 European nations, (including the UK, which provided the flagship until Brexit), working with ships from Ukraine, India, Korea and Colombia.After a few years the flotilla commanders concluded that the solution to piracy lay onshore, in the form of diplomacy to resolve Somalia's conflicts and economic assistance to provide livelihoods to impoverished fishermen. That was a step in the right direction.Saudi Arabia chairs a Red Sea Forum that includes eight littoral states (all except Israel), to tackle piracy, smuggling and marine resources — not political issues.Six years ago, Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa who chairs the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for the Horn of Africa, introduced the term "Red Sea Arena." The idea was to create a diplomatic forum that would include not just the littoral states, but all the other countries with vital interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden or with political and commercial links across the narrow strip of water.The former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra explained: "The Red Sea has historically been a bridge rather than a divide, with the peoples on the two shores sharing culture, trade, and social relations." Egypt has millennia-old interests in the Nile Valley and both shores of the Red Sea. Ethiopia has a vital interest in access to the sea. The UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Turkey all have historic or current interests.Regional and global power struggles are played out in the Red Sea Arena. Seven nations including the U.S., China, Turkey and the UAE have naval bases there. Others, including Iran and Russia, have warships in the vicinity and are actively seeking bases. The port of Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba is Israel's strategic back door, as the Houthi attacks on shipping have dramatically shown.The plan for a standing conference of Red Sea Arena states built on proposals contained in the World Peace Foundation report to the AU, "African Politics, African Peace" — for which Mbeki and veteran UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi co-authored the preface. The idea was that Middle Eastern states should sign on to the principles of the AU's peace and security architecture and establish joint mechanisms for cooperation.The AU failed to act on these proposals. Nor were they raised at the UN Security Council.Instead, Arabian Gulf states are increasingly assertive in the Horn, and they're bringing an aggressive form of transactional politics, including funding proxies to fight wars. The U.S. — whose security umbrella sheltered the Red Sea for decades — seems uninterested.Saudi Arabia has long seen the African shore of the Red Sea as part of its security perimeter. Qatar and Turkey sought influence in Sudan and Somalia, especially among the Islamists. Israel has discreetly sought a determining role in the region.But the key actor is the UAE. A small, rich state, it uses proxies to project power, and supports separatists in disregard of international norms. Abu Dhabi's clients include key players in Libya and Chad, and it is positioning itself as kingmaker in the Horn. The UAE supports and arms Ethiopia. It already controls many ports in the region — including, it is suspected, the proposed Ethiopian port and naval base in the land leased from Somaliland. But Abu Dhabi has yet to clarify its strategic goals for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.The UAE has long had a free pass in Washington. Only recently has the U.S. begun to criticize Abu Dhabi's adventurism in Sudan, calling out its arming of the murderous Rapid Support Forces there.The last decade has been a rollercoaster of hope and horror for the peoples of the Red Sea Arena. Popular uprisings in Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan all descended into lethal brews of autocracy, war, atrocity, and famine, with local conflicts escalating into proxy wars. Guided by the short-term imperative of staying in power — and by the ambitions of cash-rich foreign sponsors — today's leaders are too often short-sighted and transactional.Under UN and AU guidance, a raft of peace agreements was crafted to serve as the threshold for democracy. Today a peace pact, such as the threadbare "Permanent Cessation of Hostilities" that ended Ethiopia's war in Tigray, may be no more than a truce. The principle of the primacy of politics — that served Africa's peace agenda well — has come to mean short-term transactionalism rather than a commitment to democracy, good governance, and inclusivity.A key African norm was "sovereignty as responsibility," developed by the Sudanese/South Sudanese lawyer and diplomat Francis Deng. Today we have its antithesis, decried as "neo-sovereigntism" by the Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe.Today's regression means that Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki is being rehabilitated. For 30 years, Isaias has ruled an iron fist, with no constitution let alone political parties or an open media, hoping that the tide of global liberalism would recede. He looks to be proven correct.Sudanese General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," commander of the Rapid Support Forces, the insurgent paramilitaries notorious for their human rights abuses, is touring Africa in a Royal Jet airplane (an Emirati airline). He arrived in Addis Ababa last week where he met Prime Minister Abiy. Extending protocol to Emirati-backed disrupters is the new normal in the region.To the extent that it functions at all, the AU is becoming the face of illiberal multilateralism, veering away from its founding principles. The UN's practice of deferring to its regional partners leaves it eviscerated. The InterGovernmental Authority on Development — the eight-member northeast African bloc — is now deeply divided and approaching paralysis.With the Horn of Africa and Yemen slipping far down the priority list in Western foreign ministries, America and Europe are sending mid-ranking diplomats into the snake pit, woefully under-armed for the perils they encounter. Too easily intimidated by swaggering local despots, perhaps swayed by zombie "Pan Africanist" slogans that challenge their right to talk about human rights, they have left their countries irrelevant in the face of ruthless Gulf power-broking.Recent developments could not have been anticipated in detail. But American diplomats saw the broader challenge some years ago. In 2020, a bipartisan "senior study group" on the Red Sea convened by the United States Institute of Peace, prioritized a broad diplomatic strategy for the Red Sea Arena. The USIP report warned that conflicts in the region could threaten U.S. national security and proposed a high-level envoy with a broad mandate.The Biden administration quickly appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa, but the Africa Bureau at the State Department soon downgraded the position. The cost of this strategic neglect is becoming clear today.There's still a chance for a diplomatic forum that promotes collective security. Washington has lost its best opportunities to take a lead — any U.S. initiative today will arouse deep suspicions among others. Middle Eastern powers don't, as a rule, propose collective action, and the Gulf states are divided. The Europeans will follow, not lead.The onus of leadership then falls on Africa and on the United Nations. Acting together, they can create a consensus that brings on board America, Europe, China, and Russia in a forum framed by the agenda of a stable and cooperative Red Sea Arena.
It has been known for several decades that a constantly growing asymmetry of the military power between the US and their NATO allies complicates transatlantic security relations. If allies cannot communicate in military terms, the risk of political split appears. Therefore one of the main priorities is the necessity to ensure that the allies are able to make their substantial military contribution. Lithuania also contributes to it by taking part in missions together with its allies. Missions are of military (using weapons, executing military operations and performing police functions) and civil character (providing help in case of natural disasters, sending humanitarian aid to voluntary soldiers). This paper focuses mainly on military missions. The subject of the paper: The participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The relevance of the topic: More and more often articles appear in Lithuania and abroad criticising the participation of the Western countries in peace missions, including Afghanistan; casualties, moral validity of these missions and heavy expenses are questioned; a more and more prevailing idea of Neorealism is mentioned. The goals of the paper: • To introduce the main trends of the theories of international relations; • To analyse the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions with reference to the theories; • To introduce a geopolitical context of the participation of Lithuania in foreign missions; • To review Lithuanian foreign military missions; • To discuss the perspectives of the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The method of work: The work is carried out using a descriptive analytical method, a comparative method and the analysis of scientific literature. The aim of the paper: This papers aims to review the participation of Lithuania in peace missions, to discuss its political and military aspects, paying the greatest attention to theoretical aspects. Among many existing theories of international relations, Neorealism and Constructivism are the most appropriate ones to explain the participation of Lithuania in international missions. Although the main conceptions of those theories are contradictory, in Lithuania's case they complement one another. Supporting the power of the US, Lithuania operates in the field of Neorealism theory as well as a common system of values in line with Western countries (especially the US) operates in the field of Constructivism and historic experience with Russia. Since the international system is anarchic, the dominant countries are those having the greatest power. Therefore Lithuania's support of the superpower is an entirely logical behaviour. Moreover, Lithuania is linked with the US by the common identity, which was formed by the US consistent denial of Lithuania's occupation in 1940 and 1944, supporting the restoration of independence and providing help for Lithuanian emigrants. Therefore in Lithuania's case both theories should be applied in analysing the support for the US and NATO and the participation in their foreign military missions. The examination of Lithuania's foreign military missions should not be restricted to the theories of international relations. The geopolitical context, which has a great influence on the country's behaviour, should be taken into consideration as well. The historical context of relations is connected with the current behaviour and the attitude towards such countries as Russia and it also has influence on choosing allies and the support to the policy they execute, including the military one. Attention should also be paid to the reliability of the potential allies and the reality of threats, for instance, whether a real conflict with Russia is possible. Russia should be the starting point since it is the main factor which influences the choice and behaviour of Lithuania. It is impossible to analyse Lithuania's international policy and its participation in missions without taking into consideration Russia, which is the greatest and most powerful neighbour. This country owns some of the biggest natural resources and one of the most powerful armies with the arsenal of almost 4000 nuclear heads. Therefore its influence on Lithuania cannot be neglected. Russian threat is not unreal. Its current behaviour might raise serious concerns. Russian military doctrine, issued in 2000, claims that the possibility of a military conflict with any country or a bloc of countries is very slight and no country is considered as its potential enemy. The main current threats to Russian security and its territorial integrity are international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and drug smuggling. Other threats are "territorial claims on Russian Federation" and "the expansion of military blocs and alliances which can endanger the security of Russian Federation". According to the military doctrine, Russia does not intend to fight with any country or a bloc of countries. However, it prepares for defence. At the press conference held at the end of January, Russian president Vladimir Putin once again noted that Russia has tested a new complex of ballistic missiles which is not owned by any other country. The warheads of those missiles can outfight any missile defence systems. The ballistic missiles have maneuvering heads. This can already be treated as the nuclear-weapon threat. Unconditional support of the US can be observed not only during the military missions, but also during military programs, such as the missile defence system and its dislocation in Europe. Lithuanian foreign policy has been traditionally oriented towards transatlantic relations and the consolidation of strategic partnership with the US. There is no doubt that such an attitude has been influenced by the US itself because currently it is the only power in the geopolitical arena which can influence Russia in the Baltic Sea region. The amplification of the US influence in the region, the neutralisation of new threats and a greater influence of Lithuania in foreign policy are the main factors that induce Lithuania to support Euro-Atlantism. Also, Lithuanian choice is influenced by the unwillingness to become the object of "exchange". It would become possible if the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia changed. It would be much more possible if the Lithuanian priority were Euro-continental security system. Inability to transform the EU and keep balance with Russia may lead Germany and France to the Russian zone of influence. It would be a threat to the independence of Lithuania. Because of these reasons Lithuania intends to limit its participation in ESDP. Officially it is stated as the intention to maintain transatlantic relations. However, it is not the only reason. ESDP is a step towards the federal model of the European Union which would limit the autonomy and decision-making of small countries. Lithuania is unwilling to become the province of the European Union, which, contrary to the NATO, is unable to provide security. Moreover, the participation in ESDP would require huge financial resources, which are allocated to NATO for the same purpose and therefore it is unreasonable to duplicate funds. There is also a problem of dual loyalty. Since the great EU countries and the US often come into conflict, it would become a problem to choose between NATO (the US) and ESDP (Germany, France). The participation of the US in the European defence system enables Lithuania to control political relations with other great countries – Germany and Russia. One more reason why Lithuania tends to support the US is that Germany and France neglect the concerns of small countries for the sake of their relations with Russia. Such behaviour is considered unreliable and therefore the priority is given to the US, since only trustworthy partners can remain in the security sphere. Before the Vilnius Ten supported the US in attacking Iraq, there was an opinion that after becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania as well as other post-socialist countries would give Europe a sense of freedom. This idea became very relevant during the G. W. Bush visit to Vilnius when he supported and guaranteed security to post-soviet states intending to become the members of NATO, saying "You are needed in NATO". The Vilnius Ten soon proved this necessity but the opinion of the countries which assigned billions for their integration into the European Union and were against the war in Iraq was neglected. Soon after the war in Iraq, the US Congress approved the list of new candidates for NATO. G. W. Bush noted in his speech that those members proved their necessity not only by words but also by their actions. However, until the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, its ally Great Britain and France, Germany and Russia was so strong that, according to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, the Vilnius Ten position separated Europe into two parts - the Old and the New one. The reproach expressed by France that the Vilnius Ten lost a good opportunity to remain silent and German reaction towards the participation of Polish soldiers in a post-Hussein Iraq show that either France and Germany do not understand Central Europe or they simply seek for autocracy in the continental foreign policy and therefore a different position of "New Europe" countries is unhandy for them. Currently the dislocation of the US missile defence system is one of the leading issues in international meeting agenda. This issue is extremely important for Lithuania because its two strategic partners - the US and neighbouring Poland – are involved in it. Lithuania's position towards the missile defence system was, and still is, rather complicated. On the one hand, Lithuania must support its strategic allies and partners. On the other hand, it would worsen relations with Russia. A new defence project, National Missile Defence
It has been known for several decades that a constantly growing asymmetry of the military power between the US and their NATO allies complicates transatlantic security relations. If allies cannot communicate in military terms, the risk of political split appears. Therefore one of the main priorities is the necessity to ensure that the allies are able to make their substantial military contribution. Lithuania also contributes to it by taking part in missions together with its allies. Missions are of military (using weapons, executing military operations and performing police functions) and civil character (providing help in case of natural disasters, sending humanitarian aid to voluntary soldiers). This paper focuses mainly on military missions. The subject of the paper: The participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The relevance of the topic: More and more often articles appear in Lithuania and abroad criticising the participation of the Western countries in peace missions, including Afghanistan; casualties, moral validity of these missions and heavy expenses are questioned; a more and more prevailing idea of Neorealism is mentioned. The goals of the paper: • To introduce the main trends of the theories of international relations; • To analyse the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions with reference to the theories; • To introduce a geopolitical context of the participation of Lithuania in foreign missions; • To review Lithuanian foreign military missions; • To discuss the perspectives of the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The method of work: The work is carried out using a descriptive analytical method, a comparative method and the analysis of scientific literature. The aim of the paper: This papers aims to review the participation of Lithuania in peace missions, to discuss its political and military aspects, paying the greatest attention to theoretical aspects. Among many existing theories of international relations, Neorealism and Constructivism are the most appropriate ones to explain the participation of Lithuania in international missions. Although the main conceptions of those theories are contradictory, in Lithuania's case they complement one another. Supporting the power of the US, Lithuania operates in the field of Neorealism theory as well as a common system of values in line with Western countries (especially the US) operates in the field of Constructivism and historic experience with Russia. Since the international system is anarchic, the dominant countries are those having the greatest power. Therefore Lithuania's support of the superpower is an entirely logical behaviour. Moreover, Lithuania is linked with the US by the common identity, which was formed by the US consistent denial of Lithuania's occupation in 1940 and 1944, supporting the restoration of independence and providing help for Lithuanian emigrants. Therefore in Lithuania's case both theories should be applied in analysing the support for the US and NATO and the participation in their foreign military missions. The examination of Lithuania's foreign military missions should not be restricted to the theories of international relations. The geopolitical context, which has a great influence on the country's behaviour, should be taken into consideration as well. The historical context of relations is connected with the current behaviour and the attitude towards such countries as Russia and it also has influence on choosing allies and the support to the policy they execute, including the military one. Attention should also be paid to the reliability of the potential allies and the reality of threats, for instance, whether a real conflict with Russia is possible. Russia should be the starting point since it is the main factor which influences the choice and behaviour of Lithuania. It is impossible to analyse Lithuania's international policy and its participation in missions without taking into consideration Russia, which is the greatest and most powerful neighbour. This country owns some of the biggest natural resources and one of the most powerful armies with the arsenal of almost 4000 nuclear heads. Therefore its influence on Lithuania cannot be neglected. Russian threat is not unreal. Its current behaviour might raise serious concerns. Russian military doctrine, issued in 2000, claims that the possibility of a military conflict with any country or a bloc of countries is very slight and no country is considered as its potential enemy. The main current threats to Russian security and its territorial integrity are international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and drug smuggling. Other threats are "territorial claims on Russian Federation" and "the expansion of military blocs and alliances which can endanger the security of Russian Federation". According to the military doctrine, Russia does not intend to fight with any country or a bloc of countries. However, it prepares for defence. At the press conference held at the end of January, Russian president Vladimir Putin once again noted that Russia has tested a new complex of ballistic missiles which is not owned by any other country. The warheads of those missiles can outfight any missile defence systems. The ballistic missiles have maneuvering heads. This can already be treated as the nuclear-weapon threat. Unconditional support of the US can be observed not only during the military missions, but also during military programs, such as the missile defence system and its dislocation in Europe. Lithuanian foreign policy has been traditionally oriented towards transatlantic relations and the consolidation of strategic partnership with the US. There is no doubt that such an attitude has been influenced by the US itself because currently it is the only power in the geopolitical arena which can influence Russia in the Baltic Sea region. The amplification of the US influence in the region, the neutralisation of new threats and a greater influence of Lithuania in foreign policy are the main factors that induce Lithuania to support Euro-Atlantism. Also, Lithuanian choice is influenced by the unwillingness to become the object of "exchange". It would become possible if the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia changed. It would be much more possible if the Lithuanian priority were Euro-continental security system. Inability to transform the EU and keep balance with Russia may lead Germany and France to the Russian zone of influence. It would be a threat to the independence of Lithuania. Because of these reasons Lithuania intends to limit its participation in ESDP. Officially it is stated as the intention to maintain transatlantic relations. However, it is not the only reason. ESDP is a step towards the federal model of the European Union which would limit the autonomy and decision-making of small countries. Lithuania is unwilling to become the province of the European Union, which, contrary to the NATO, is unable to provide security. Moreover, the participation in ESDP would require huge financial resources, which are allocated to NATO for the same purpose and therefore it is unreasonable to duplicate funds. There is also a problem of dual loyalty. Since the great EU countries and the US often come into conflict, it would become a problem to choose between NATO (the US) and ESDP (Germany, France). The participation of the US in the European defence system enables Lithuania to control political relations with other great countries – Germany and Russia. One more reason why Lithuania tends to support the US is that Germany and France neglect the concerns of small countries for the sake of their relations with Russia. Such behaviour is considered unreliable and therefore the priority is given to the US, since only trustworthy partners can remain in the security sphere. Before the Vilnius Ten supported the US in attacking Iraq, there was an opinion that after becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania as well as other post-socialist countries would give Europe a sense of freedom. This idea became very relevant during the G. W. Bush visit to Vilnius when he supported and guaranteed security to post-soviet states intending to become the members of NATO, saying "You are needed in NATO". The Vilnius Ten soon proved this necessity but the opinion of the countries which assigned billions for their integration into the European Union and were against the war in Iraq was neglected. Soon after the war in Iraq, the US Congress approved the list of new candidates for NATO. G. W. Bush noted in his speech that those members proved their necessity not only by words but also by their actions. However, until the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, its ally Great Britain and France, Germany and Russia was so strong that, according to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, the Vilnius Ten position separated Europe into two parts - the Old and the New one. The reproach expressed by France that the Vilnius Ten lost a good opportunity to remain silent and German reaction towards the participation of Polish soldiers in a post-Hussein Iraq show that either France and Germany do not understand Central Europe or they simply seek for autocracy in the continental foreign policy and therefore a different position of "New Europe" countries is unhandy for them. Currently the dislocation of the US missile defence system is one of the leading issues in international meeting agenda. This issue is extremely important for Lithuania because its two strategic partners - the US and neighbouring Poland – are involved in it. Lithuania's position towards the missile defence system was, and still is, rather complicated. On the one hand, Lithuania must support its strategic allies and partners. On the other hand, it would worsen relations with Russia. A new defence project, National Missile Defence
It has been known for several decades that a constantly growing asymmetry of the military power between the US and their NATO allies complicates transatlantic security relations. If allies cannot communicate in military terms, the risk of political split appears. Therefore one of the main priorities is the necessity to ensure that the allies are able to make their substantial military contribution. Lithuania also contributes to it by taking part in missions together with its allies. Missions are of military (using weapons, executing military operations and performing police functions) and civil character (providing help in case of natural disasters, sending humanitarian aid to voluntary soldiers). This paper focuses mainly on military missions. The subject of the paper: The participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The relevance of the topic: More and more often articles appear in Lithuania and abroad criticising the participation of the Western countries in peace missions, including Afghanistan; casualties, moral validity of these missions and heavy expenses are questioned; a more and more prevailing idea of Neorealism is mentioned. The goals of the paper: • To introduce the main trends of the theories of international relations; • To analyse the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions with reference to the theories; • To introduce a geopolitical context of the participation of Lithuania in foreign missions; • To review Lithuanian foreign military missions; • To discuss the perspectives of the participation of Lithuania in foreign military missions. The method of work: The work is carried out using a descriptive analytical method, a comparative method and the analysis of scientific literature. The aim of the paper: This papers aims to review the participation of Lithuania in peace missions, to discuss its political and military aspects, paying the greatest attention to theoretical aspects. Among many existing theories of international relations, Neorealism and Constructivism are the most appropriate ones to explain the participation of Lithuania in international missions. Although the main conceptions of those theories are contradictory, in Lithuania's case they complement one another. Supporting the power of the US, Lithuania operates in the field of Neorealism theory as well as a common system of values in line with Western countries (especially the US) operates in the field of Constructivism and historic experience with Russia. Since the international system is anarchic, the dominant countries are those having the greatest power. Therefore Lithuania's support of the superpower is an entirely logical behaviour. Moreover, Lithuania is linked with the US by the common identity, which was formed by the US consistent denial of Lithuania's occupation in 1940 and 1944, supporting the restoration of independence and providing help for Lithuanian emigrants. Therefore in Lithuania's case both theories should be applied in analysing the support for the US and NATO and the participation in their foreign military missions. The examination of Lithuania's foreign military missions should not be restricted to the theories of international relations. The geopolitical context, which has a great influence on the country's behaviour, should be taken into consideration as well. The historical context of relations is connected with the current behaviour and the attitude towards such countries as Russia and it also has influence on choosing allies and the support to the policy they execute, including the military one. Attention should also be paid to the reliability of the potential allies and the reality of threats, for instance, whether a real conflict with Russia is possible. Russia should be the starting point since it is the main factor which influences the choice and behaviour of Lithuania. It is impossible to analyse Lithuania's international policy and its participation in missions without taking into consideration Russia, which is the greatest and most powerful neighbour. This country owns some of the biggest natural resources and one of the most powerful armies with the arsenal of almost 4000 nuclear heads. Therefore its influence on Lithuania cannot be neglected. Russian threat is not unreal. Its current behaviour might raise serious concerns. Russian military doctrine, issued in 2000, claims that the possibility of a military conflict with any country or a bloc of countries is very slight and no country is considered as its potential enemy. The main current threats to Russian security and its territorial integrity are international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and drug smuggling. Other threats are "territorial claims on Russian Federation" and "the expansion of military blocs and alliances which can endanger the security of Russian Federation". According to the military doctrine, Russia does not intend to fight with any country or a bloc of countries. However, it prepares for defence. At the press conference held at the end of January, Russian president Vladimir Putin once again noted that Russia has tested a new complex of ballistic missiles which is not owned by any other country. The warheads of those missiles can outfight any missile defence systems. The ballistic missiles have maneuvering heads. This can already be treated as the nuclear-weapon threat. Unconditional support of the US can be observed not only during the military missions, but also during military programs, such as the missile defence system and its dislocation in Europe. Lithuanian foreign policy has been traditionally oriented towards transatlantic relations and the consolidation of strategic partnership with the US. There is no doubt that such an attitude has been influenced by the US itself because currently it is the only power in the geopolitical arena which can influence Russia in the Baltic Sea region. The amplification of the US influence in the region, the neutralisation of new threats and a greater influence of Lithuania in foreign policy are the main factors that induce Lithuania to support Euro-Atlantism. Also, Lithuanian choice is influenced by the unwillingness to become the object of "exchange". It would become possible if the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia changed. It would be much more possible if the Lithuanian priority were Euro-continental security system. Inability to transform the EU and keep balance with Russia may lead Germany and France to the Russian zone of influence. It would be a threat to the independence of Lithuania. Because of these reasons Lithuania intends to limit its participation in ESDP. Officially it is stated as the intention to maintain transatlantic relations. However, it is not the only reason. ESDP is a step towards the federal model of the European Union which would limit the autonomy and decision-making of small countries. Lithuania is unwilling to become the province of the European Union, which, contrary to the NATO, is unable to provide security. Moreover, the participation in ESDP would require huge financial resources, which are allocated to NATO for the same purpose and therefore it is unreasonable to duplicate funds. There is also a problem of dual loyalty. Since the great EU countries and the US often come into conflict, it would become a problem to choose between NATO (the US) and ESDP (Germany, France). The participation of the US in the European defence system enables Lithuania to control political relations with other great countries – Germany and Russia. One more reason why Lithuania tends to support the US is that Germany and France neglect the concerns of small countries for the sake of their relations with Russia. Such behaviour is considered unreliable and therefore the priority is given to the US, since only trustworthy partners can remain in the security sphere. Before the Vilnius Ten supported the US in attacking Iraq, there was an opinion that after becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania as well as other post-socialist countries would give Europe a sense of freedom. This idea became very relevant during the G. W. Bush visit to Vilnius when he supported and guaranteed security to post-soviet states intending to become the members of NATO, saying "You are needed in NATO". The Vilnius Ten soon proved this necessity but the opinion of the countries which assigned billions for their integration into the European Union and were against the war in Iraq was neglected. Soon after the war in Iraq, the US Congress approved the list of new candidates for NATO. G. W. Bush noted in his speech that those members proved their necessity not only by words but also by their actions. However, until the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, its ally Great Britain and France, Germany and Russia was so strong that, according to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, the Vilnius Ten position separated Europe into two parts - the Old and the New one. The reproach expressed by France that the Vilnius Ten lost a good opportunity to remain silent and German reaction towards the participation of Polish soldiers in a post-Hussein Iraq show that either France and Germany do not understand Central Europe or they simply seek for autocracy in the continental foreign policy and therefore a different position of "New Europe" countries is unhandy for them. Currently the dislocation of the US missile defence system is one of the leading issues in international meeting agenda. This issue is extremely important for Lithuania because its two strategic partners - the US and neighbouring Poland – are involved in it. Lithuania's position towards the missile defence system was, and still is, rather complicated. On the one hand, Lithuania must support its strategic allies and partners. On the other hand, it would worsen relations with Russia. A new defence project, National Missile Defence
The paper attempted to assess the domestic and export market performance and prospects of Philippines cocochemicals. The Philippines holds the distinction of having the first oleochemical business venture in the ASEAN region. As of CY 2000, there were 18 manufacturers of cocochemicals registeres with the BOI with an aggregate production capacity of 678,301 mt. However, only 15 plants with a combined production capacity of 504,501 mt. were operating as of this year. Apart from the manufacturers of cocochemicals, there were two palm-based oleochemical manufacturers registered with the BOI in the same year. These were the Zambosur Oil Refinery Corporation and the Vegeoil Philippines, Inc. was operating in the year 2000. The industry is composed of the oleochemical producers of fatty alcohol, fatty acids, methyl esters, and glycerine as the by-product; and the surfactant or oleochemicals derivatives-producers involved in the manufacture of alcohol sulfates, alkyl phosphates, amines, distearates, etc.The oleochemicls derivative-producers source their raw materials from the basic oleochemicals producers. Thirteen Luzon-based plants accounted for 68.39 percent of the total oleochemical production capacity (504,501 mt.) in the year 2000. Two Mindanao-based plants captured 31,49 percent of the aggregate olechemical production capacity. Meanwhile, there was only one operating plant in the Visayas region and this firm represented a miniscule share of only 0.12 percent of the total registered capacity nationwide. The major players in the oleochemical industry in the Philippines are the United Cocochemicals, Inc. which registeres a 23.14 percent share of the total registered capacity nationwide and Pilipinas Kao, Inc. with 21.74 percent share. The United coco chemicals Inc., and Pilipinas Kao, inc. dominated in Luzon and Mindanao, respectively. Primo oleochemicals, inc. ranked third among the operating plants nationwide with 10.26 percent share while Procter and Gamble Phils., ranked fourth with 8.62 percent share. Cocochemicals production in the Philippines exhibited an erratic trend from 1989 to 1995. Since crude coconut oil is the feedstock or raw material in cocochemical production in the Philippines, cocochemical production in the country was influenced to a large extent by the availability of the price o crude coconut oil. However, the supply and price of crude coconut oil in the Philippines are highly unstable due to year-to-year weather variability. cocochemical production was found to be inversely related to the price of crude-coconut oil. Despite the fluctuating trend in cocochemical production, cocochemical production rose markedly from 71,799 mt in 1989 to 116,326 mt in 1995, or by 62 percent. Despite the lack of updated data on cocochemical production from 1996 to 2000, it is expected that the trend in cocochemical production in recent years will follow the trend in the domestic price of crude coconut oil and the quantity of availability crude coconut oil in the same period From 16,955 mt in 1989, domestic consumption of cocochemicals in copra terms increased markedly to 28,817 mt in 1995, or by 67 percent. on the average, domestic consumption of cocochemicals grew an an average of 52.3 percent per year during the period 1989-1995 could be attributed to the implementation of Executive Order (E.O.) 259 in 1989. The said executive order required the substitution of petroleum-based hard alkyl benzene, a non-biodegradable chemical used in the manufacture of soap detergents, with coco-fatty alcohol sulfate, which is biodegradable. An examination of the average annual cocochemical production vis-a-vis consumption during the period 1989-1995 showed that 34.2 percent was consumed by the domestic market. Several industries in the country utilize cocochemicals to manufacture soaps, shampoo, hair rinse, cosmetics, household detergents, textile/industrial detergents, agrichemicals toiletries (e.g. deodorants, bath oils, toothpastes and synthetic perfumes), polyyurethane, tobacco, base material in paints, explosive, propellants and pharmaceuticals. Currently, about 90 percent of domestic cocochemical consumption went to detergents compared to 59 percent in 1989. The increase in the percentage share of the househol detergent industries could be attributed to the passage of E.O. 259. It is expected that the domestic market potential of cocochemicals in great due to its wide application in local manufacturing industries and the growing end-use markets as a result of the country's increasing population and the real income per capital. The country's population increased as an average of 2.4 percent annually from 1990-1999 while the average annual growth rate in real income per capita was 1.01 percent. Real income per capita is a measure of the purchasing power of each individual consumer. Hence, a projected rise in consumers' purchasing power will allow increased purchase beyond the essentials of food, clothing, and shelter into personal care products, soap, detergents, and other products which rely on cocochemicals, Among the end-use markets, major growth areas will be in the soap and detergent market and the personal care product market. The demand for drugs, lubricants, and motor oil which use oleochemicals as inputs is also projected to continue growing. The Philippine oleochemical industry is largely export-oriented. An average of 65.2 percent of the total cocochemical production in the country during the period 1989-1995 was exported. The major cocochemicals exported by the Philippines as fatty alcohol, fatty acid, and methyl ester. other cocochemical exports include refined glycerine, crude glycerine, alkanolamide, and coco acid oil. During the nine-year period under review, the Philippines generally did not perform well in exporting cocochemicals as evidenced by the negative growth rate in the aggregate volume of exports of all types of cocochemicals (-1.2%/year). This could be largely attributed to the significant decline in the volume of methyl ester exports and to a lesser degree to the drop in the volume of exports of alkanolamide, coco acid oil, and crude glycerine. However, despite the negative trend in the aggregate export volume of all types of cocochemicals, overall export receipts generated grew by an average of 10.2 percent per year due to the rising export prices of cocochemicals (9%/year). Among the cocochemical exports of the Philippines, fatty alcohol, fatty acid, and refined glycerine appear to have bright export market prospects as evident from the increase in the number of foreign buyers and the positive trend in export volume, value and price of these cocochemicals. Oleochemical firms forecast that the world demand for natural oleochemicals will grow at 3-4 percent per year due to the world population growth and increased standards of living. The main markets of natural oleochemicals in the world will cntinue to be the United states, Europe and Japan, partly due to the high level of environmental awareness or conciuousness in these countries. For Philippine oleochemicals, the emerging major market is the people's Republic of china. Moreover, the demand for fatty alcohols to be used in the production of surfactants for the laundry and detergent industries in the United States, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan is projected to continue increasing. Considering that the demand for personal care products in Japan, the United States, and Europe is also growing, this, in turn, will increase the demand for fatty amines and derivatives has strong growth, partly due to the growing use in "ultra" liquid detergents and in hair-conditioning products and shampoos. The demand for fatty alcohol is also projected to increase because of the development of new uses of natural fatty alcohols such as the production of alkyl polyglucoside. On the other hand, there are indications that China will show strong growth in fatty acid demand and capacity in the coming applications. Drugs and personal care are by far the most important end-use markets especially in the United States , Western Europe, and Japan, followed by tobacco/triacetin in the United states and Western Europe, Glycerine is also used in manufacturing polyether polyols, alkyd resins, cellophane, explosives and food, among others. Despite the favorable market prospects of oleochemicals in the Philippines is confronted with the following problems which might constrain in the country from capturing a bigger share in the world market for oleochemicals; (1) stagnant coconut production and low coconut productivity; (2) high price of coconut oil and stiff competition with palm kernel oil-based oleochemicals from Malaysia and Indonesia; (3) price competitiveness of ethylene-based synthetic alcohols; (4) new competition coming from rapessed oil and cuphea as a feedstock in olechemicals production due to biotechnological development; (5) negative effects of trade liberaization ; and (6) smuggling of detergents. The future of the local oleochemical industry hinges on the reliability of coconut supply and the price competitiveness of coconut oil vis-a-vis palm kernel oil and ethylene. Unless coconut production is increased and prices of coconut oil are competitive, the country's cocochemical industry will face a bleak future. Given threat facing the local cocochemical industry from palm kernel-based olechemical industries in Malaysia and Indonesia and from synthetic capacities, concerted efforts of both the philippine government and the private sector in undertaking a large-scale replanting program in the country are urgently needed. To be globally conpetitive in the world oleochemical market, the Philippines should not only be cost-efficient in copra/coconut oil production. but in oleochemical manufacturing as well. To expand the domestic and export markets of locally manufactured cocochemicals, researches aimed at developing new uses of cocochemicals must also be accorded priority in terms of budgetary allocation by local research funding institutions.
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Tunisia is beset by deepening political and economic challenges. President Kais Saied is transforming the country's parliamentary system into an authoritarian presidential one that has become increasingly repressive. Arrests and convictions of opposition politicians have surged. Saied's aggressive anti-foreigner discourse has fuelled xenophobic sentiment and contributed to a spike in violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. Economically, Tunisia is grappling with the fallout of a decade of sluggish growth compounded by a series of economic shocks since 2020. The nation's public debt has soared, with significant debt repayments looming. As the country tries to deal with mounting financial constraints, its inability to attract foreign loans is further clouding its economic future. Saied now must decide whether to embrace a credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or potentially default on Tunisia's foreign debt. Against this backdrop, the EU and, in particular, Italy have a pivotal role to play. They can either help steer Tunisia toward a more stable economic future or watch it descend into chaos.A worrying political and economic outlook While the protests that led to the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, the promise of a more democratic and egalitarian society in the North African country did not come to fruition. To be sure, the protests did lead to the overthrow of autocratic Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Moreover, Tunisia was the sole country to emerge from the regional uprisings with a new democracy. That experiment, however, foundered after Saied – who was elected to the presidency in 2019 – seized a monopoly on power in July 2021. Over the past two years, he has replaced the country's semi-parliamentary system with one lacking checks and balances, consolidating power in his hands. People's fear of repression resurfaced. Since mid-February 2023, arrests and convictions of public figures, especially politicians, have accelerated, undermining a disorganised and divided opposition.[1] Meanwhile, large sections of the population have focused on survival in the face of a worsening economic crisis and have increasingly disengaged from politics. President Saied has attempted to shore up his dwindling support by pushing nationalist policies. He has jailed members of the opposition in a move that seems aimed at bolstering his standing with swathes of the public who are frustrated with the former political class. Saied has also xenophobically accused sub-Saharan migrants of conspiring to change Tunisia's identity, creating a climate conducive to repeated violent attacks against a vulnerable minority.[2] Economically, the country is still reeling from a decade of slow growth. After the 2011 uprising, the Tunisian government combatted rising unemployment in part by hiring hundreds of thousands of civil servants. Today, the public sector is the country's largest employer and half of the annual budget is spent on the public payroll.[3] At the same time, public and private investment in infrastructure, research and other growth-enhancing spending items has dropped significantly, leading to a sharp decline in GDP growth. External factors also chipped away at the Tunisian economy. The Covid-19 pandemic brought a collapse in tourism. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, led to a spike in commodity prices. Surging inflation – particularly in food prices – and shortages of basic goods have eroded Tunisian living standards. Against this backdrop, Tunisia's public debt has skyrocketed, reaching nearly 90 per cent of GDP in 2022, with substantial financing requirements needed to maintain current levels of spending.[4] Credit rating agencies have downgraded the country as it struggles to balance its budget. The latest downgrade took place in June, when Fitch lowered Tunisia's rating to CCC- (well into junk status territory).[5] As a result, access to international financial markets has been virtually shut off, given the prohibitive interest rates (over 20 per cent) that this sovereign rating would entail. While the current account deficit has shrunk and foreign currency liquidity has improved over the past few months because of an uptick in tourism revenues and remittances from Tunisians working abroad, servicing its external debt will continue to be extremely challenging. With 2.6 billion US dollars in repayments scheduled for 2024 (including a euro-denominated bond maturing in February, equivalent to 900 million US dollars), it is still unclear how the government will be able to secure sufficient funds to meet these liabilities. The 2024 budget draft anticipates loans from Algeria and Saudi Arabia, as well as other, as yet unknown, external sources.[6]The IMF deal and the role of the EU Despite these financing difficulties, Tunisia has not yet signed a deal with the IMF. In October 2022, Tunisia and the IMF agreed on the terms of a 48-month, 1.9 billion US dollar loan aimed at stabilising the economy, but Saied rejected the deal, fearing social unrest from cutting subsidies and reducing the public sector wage bill. The IMF board postponed the deal in response. Since then, the president has remained steadfast in his rejection of what he calls "foreign diktats" from the IMF and Western states. The Europeans – in particular, Italy – have pressed the IMF to reopen negotiations and offered incentives to persuade Saied to accept a revised deal, despite their internal divisions on how to treat Tunisia. They are applying this pressure largely because the economic fallout from a debt default could further increase the number of people – both nationals and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa – leaving Tunisia for Europe. While some EU member states, such as Germany, have taken a more critical stance towards Kais Saied's authoritarian turn,[7] eventually the migration, security and economic interests of Italy and, to an extent, France seem to have prevailed within the EU.[8] Due to its geographic proximity to Tunisia, Italy would receive a majority of a migration influx, at least initially. For this reason, the Italian government has reiterated its concerns over Tunisia's economic situation on multiple occasions, while refraining from expressing any criticism of the country's increasingly authoritarian turn and violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants.[9] The EU has offered incentives to Tunisia to accept a deal with the IMF. After Giorgia Meloni and later EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte visited Tunis in June, they unveiled 900 million euros in macro-financial assistance conditioned on a deal with the IMF and 105 million euros for joint cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling measures to reduce irregular migration to Europe.[10] Despite the sweeteners the EU offered, the likelihood of a revised deal between Tunisia and the IMF has receded. In August, Saied removed the head of government, Najla Bouden, who had been directly involved in the negotiations with the IMF, and replaced her with a more pliant official, Ahmed Hanachi. Since then, Tunisia hasn't put forward a revised proposal to the IMF.[11] In October, the president reinforced his position by sacking Economy Minister Samir Saied after the latter claimed that a deal with the IMF would send a reassuring message to Tunisia's foreign creditors.[12] Tunisia has also rejected part of the funds offered by the EU. On 3 October, Saied rejected the first tranche of EU financial help, declaring that this "derisory" amount ran counter to the agreement between the two parties and was just "charity".[13] The repercussions of this refusal on the rest of the EU's financial incentives are unclear.[14]A fork in the road There are obvious reasons for Tunisia to secure a loan from the IMF. It would send a reassuring signal to Tunisia's foreign partners and creditors. It could encourage Gulf Arab states to provide additional financial support in the form of government loans and deposits with the central bank, and investment in the economy. That would provide the Tunisian government with breathing space. But implementation of reforms required under the loan's terms could set off anti-government protests by the country's main trade union (the UGTT) and, in turn, government-led repression. To forestall such a scenario, the president himself could incite protests and riots by using nationalist rhetoric to scapegoat the IMF for any unpopular measures required by the loan. A no-agreement scenario, however, would have much more severe and potentially even catastrophic consequences. Without a loan, Tunisia would struggle to find alternative funding sources to meet its scheduled foreign debt repayments. Saied could then resort to a politically motivated strategic default, followed by negotiations to restructure the country's external debt. Some Tunisian economists and supporters of the president are advocating for this approach: they say that declaring bankruptcy on external debt would allow the government to hammer out a restructuring plan with creditors and argue that the impact on the economy would be fairly limited, thanks to Tunisia's capital controls and its banking sector's low exposure to foreign bonds. But this approach carries great risk, as a foreign debt bankruptcy could lead to a run on Tunisian banks and destabilise the financial sector. In addition, the government could end the central bank's independence to print money, fuelling an inflation spiral. Politically, a default and its socio-economic repercussions could open the door to a dangerous spiral of social and criminal violence. It could also boost irregular outward migration, with Tunisians fleeing the growing political and economic chaos. Widespread protests may erupt against the disastrous social effects of the president's failed economic policy, prompting a violent response targeting businesspeople and political opponents for their alleged links to the West, as well as Western diplomats and the local Jewish community.Balancing economic support and respect for rights In light of these two possible scenarios, the EU and Italy should continue to encourage the Tunisian authorities to negotiate with the IMF, which remains the least politically and economically destabilising option on the table for Tunisia, if carried out with due care. At a minimum, a revised deal should include reduced expenditure cuts compared with the earlier proposal, particularly in the context of energy subsidies. At the same time, Italy and the EU should exercise caution and avoid turning their understandable concerns about Tunisia's stability into a blank check for the president. In particular, they should press the authorities to rein in the abuses perpetrated against migrants and stave off potential attacks against opposition politicians, businesspeople and the local Jewish community. Aside from humanitarian considerations, this would serve Italy's overarching goal of curbing migration: after all, attacks against the sub-Saharan minority have spurred outward migration, a trend that would accelerate if government persecution becomes even more severe. While supporting the deal, however, the EU and Italy should also prepare for the possibility of Tunisia continuing to reject it and declaring a foreign debt default. In such a scenario, the EU should be prepared to offer emergency financing to the country to help with imports of wheat, medicines and fuel. In doing so, the EU should synchronise the positions of member states to prevent conflicting agendas. Schisms have already emerged between countries like Germany and Italy over how to address Tunisia's authoritarian drift. For this reason, acknowledgement of the importance of internal stability could provide a common ground in overcoming divisions and helping prevent a new wave of anti-migrant violence.Michaël Béchir Ayari is a Senior Analyst for Tunisia at the International Crisis Group. Riccardo Fabiani is the Project Director for North Africa at the International Crisis Group.[1] "En Tunisie, arrestation de deux dirigeants d'Ennahdha", in Jeune Afrique, 6 September 2023, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1479880/; Mathieu Galtier, "En Tunisie, le spectre d'une «transition dictatoriale» après l'arrestation du principal opposant au président", in Le Temps, 18 April 2023, https://www.letemps.ch/monde/afrique/tunisie-spectre-dune-transition-dictatoriale-apres-larrestation-principal-opposant.[2] Lilia Blaise, "En Tunisie, les migrants subsahariens ciblés par des arrestations et des agressions", in Le Monde, 27 February 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/02/27/en-tunisie-les-migrants-subsahariens-cibles-par-des-arrestations-et-des-agressions_6163536_3212.html.[3] "La masse salariale du public accapare 16% du PIB de la Tunisie et la moitié des ressources de l'État", in Business News, 29 December 2021, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/-,520,115215,3.[4] Christy Un and Rugare Mukanganga, "What Next after Tunisia Rejects IMF and Austerity Burdens?", in African Business, 11 September 2023, https://african.business/?p=142637.[5] "Fitch Downgrades Tunisia to 'CCC-'", in Fitch Ratings, 9 June 2023, https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/fitch-downgrades-tunisia-to-ccc-09-06-2023.[6] Mathieu Galtier, "Chine, UE… Qui prêtera 3 milliards d'euros à la Tunisie pour boucler son budget ?", in Jeune Afrique, 31 October 2023, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1499339/.[7] Gabriela Baczynska, "Germany's Baerbock Joins Chorus Criticizing EU Migration Deal with Tunisia", in Reuters, 22 September 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/germanys-baerbock-joins-chorus-criticizing-eu-migration-deal-with-tunisia-2023-09-22.[8] "France Offers Tunisia 25.8 Million Euros to Help Tackle Migration", in Reuters, 19 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/france-offers-tunisia-258-million-euros-help-tackle-migration-2023-06-19.[9] "Italy PM: We Are Facing a Huge Problem Related to Tunisia Stability and Possibly Its Economic Collapse", in Middle East Monitor, 21 March 2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230321-italy-pm-we-are-facing-a-huge-problem-related-to-tunisia-stability-and-possibly-its-economic-collapse; "Meloni Tells G-7 IMF Should Take 'Pragmatic' Approach towards Tunisia", in The Arab Weekly, 22 May 2023, https://thearabweekly.com/node/60323.[10] European Commission, EU Comprehensive Partnership Package with Tunisia, 11 June 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/FS_23_3205.[11] Ahmed Eljechtimi, "IMF Official Says Tunisia Has Not Proposed New Loan Terms", in Reuters, 13 October 2023, http://reut.rs/3txN9N2.[12] "Tunisia President Sacks the Economy Minister over Statement about IMF", in Reuters, 17 October 2023, http://reut.rs/46AnLVB.[13] "Kaïs Saïed refuse la « charité » de l'UE", in Jeune Afrique, 3 October 2023, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1488693/politique/le-president-tunisien-refuse-la-charite-de-lue.[14] Gregorio Sorgi, "Tunisia Hands Back €60M of EU Funding as Migrant Deal Tensions Soar", in Politico, 11 October 2023, https://www.politico.eu/?p=3698370.
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The two rival faces of political Islam gained ground in Tunisia after the 2011 Arab Uprising, which ended autocratic rule. A transition government granted amnesty to leaders of Islamist movements—both militant and non-violent—and allowed them to openly preach or gain legal status as a party. Ennahda grew into one of the most powerful political parties, while three different jihadi groups employed violent tactics to derail the government and mobilize support for Islamic rule. Tensions between the rivals was reflected in 2013, when al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb condemned Ennahda. "Don't be deceived by the people who call to democracy by decorating it under the name of the truth and give it a religious garment," it warned. Jihadists exploited the government's economic challenges, including unemployment, to gain public sympathy. As jihadi assassinations and bombings increased, protesters in 2013 blamed Ennahda for failing to reign in the Sunni militants. In 2014 elections, Ennahda lost 20 seats in parliament. It gradually evolved politically and, in 2016, renounced political Islam. "I am a Muslim democrat and they [jihadists] are against democracy," said Rachid Ghannouchi, the Ennahda cofounder. The division among disparate Islamist factions deepened as their goals and tactics increasingly differed. In 2017, separate extremist groups carried out 47 attacks on government and civilian targets across the country. Ennahda made a bit of a political comeback in the 2019 election when it lost 17 seats, but still won a plurality vying against more than 20 parties. Both militant and non-violent Islamists faced major setbacks. In 2021, Ennahda was forced out of politics by President Kais Saied, who banned the party and ordered the arrest of Ghannouchi and other party leaders. The government's aggressive counterterrorism also eroded jihadist capabilities. Militants launched only four attacks in 2022. EnnahdaSince it was founded in 1981, Ennahda has evolved from a religious opposition group repressed by the government into one of the most influential forces in Tunisian politics. A pivotal turning point was the 2011 Arab Uprising, which forced an autocratic leader from power and allowed opposition parties such as Ennahda to run for political office. Ennahda won pluralities in the 2011 and 2019 parliamentary elections, and it served as a kingmaker in forming a coalition government with secular parties in 2014. It was the most successful Islamist party in the Middle East, although its seats in parliament diminished with each poll. In 2021, Ennahda was forced out of politics, replicating the experience of other Islamist movements in the region. Its leaders were once again imprisoned. Ennahda's saga is a microcosm of the tensions between Islamist movements and secular political parties across North Africa and the Middle East. As the movement evolved, it even tried to shed its official Islamist identity. "We are Muslim democrats who no longer claim political Islam," Rashid Ghannouchi, Ennahda's leader, said at the 2016 party congress. Ennahda had historically made concessions to secular parties. But Ghannouchi's speech triggered skepticism among political rivals and foreign observers. "The party's internal culture is likely to remain Islamist or Islamist-inflected for a long time," insisted Monica Marks, a scholar of Islamist movements. In mid-2021, President Saied fired the prime minister, dissolved parliament, and assumed full executive power amid protests over the government's economic mismanagement and poor response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Critics called Saied's autocratic politics a coup, and new protests erupted against him. The divisions between Islamist and secular forces in Tunisia only deepened when Saied appointed a new prime minister and magistrates by decree and later introduced a new constitution. Opposition parties, including Ennahda, boycotted the late-December 2022 parliamentary election. They argued that a boycott was "better than participating in an electoral farce aimed at having the president expand his powers." In 2023, Ghannouchi was tried for "plotting against state security" for a video warning of civil war if opposition parties, both Islamist and secular, were banned from politics. He was sentenced to one year in prison. Ennahda party supporters wave the national flag during a demonstration against President Saied in Tunis on Oct. 15, 2022.Image CreditFactoidsParticipated in three elections – 2011, 2014, and 2019 Won 89 seats in 2011, 69 seats in 2014, and 52 in 2019Formed three coalition governments with diverse secular partiesLed two of the three governments between 2011 and 2021Timeline of Ennahda 1981: Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou founded the Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI) in April. Ghannouchi and his followers were arrested in July. Rachid GhannouchiImage Credit1989: MTI adopted the name Ennahda in a failed bid for legal recognition. It was banned from running from parliament, so Ennahda members ran as independent candidates. They won more than 10 percent of the vote, according to government figures, but did not win any seats. The party claimed election fraud, alleging that it had won a greater percentage of the vote.1991: The government banned Ennahda and arrested thousands of members. Key leaders went into exile, mainly in Europe. It was marginalized for two decades. 2011: After the Arab uprising ousted the government of President Ben Ali, Ennahda leaders returned to Tunis and mobilized the party to run for office. It won nearly 40 percent of the vote and formed a coalition government with two secular political parties. Hamid Jebali, Ennahda secretary general, became the first post-authoritarian prime minister.2013: Two secular members of parliament were assassinated in separate attacks attributed to Ansar al Sharia. Tens of thousands of people protested in Tunis, which led to the fall of Jebali's government. 2014: Tunisia adopted a democratic constitution in January and then held another election in October. Ennahda came in second with 28 percent of the vote. Ennahda joined a governing coalition led by a secular party. 2016: Ennahda shifted its political association with religion. "We are Muslim democrats who no longer claim political Islam," Ghannouchi declared. 2019: Ennahda nominated Abdelfattah Mourou, its first candidate, for president. Ennahda did not advance to the second-round and threw its support to Kais Saied, who won. Running against more than 20 parties, Ennahda came in first in the parliamentary election with only about 20 percent of the vote. It again formed a coalition with secular parties. Ghannouchi became the speaker of parliament, setting the stage for a divided government. 2020: Ghannouchi survived a no-confidence vote in parliament. 2021: Protests erupted nationwide over economic mismanagement and the government's poor response to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Saied dissolved parliament, declared a state of emergency, and consolidated power. Ghannouchi decried Saied's actions. More than 100 Ennahda leaders resigned from the party, accusing Ghannouchi of doing too little. 2023: Saied's government imprisoned Ghannouchi as well as many other Ennahda leaders. The government also closed Ennahda party offices and banned its political meetings. Militant GroupsJihadism soared after the 2011 Arab Uprising, which toppled the autocratic government of President Ben Ali. Islamists were freed from prison and permitted to proselytize openly. Ansar al Sharia was founded in April 2011, just three months after the Arab Uprising. The group spread its message through in-person and online preaching. It exploited public frustration with poor economic conditions and provided public services–including street cleaning–to gain adherents. Katiba Uqba bin Nafi, a jihadist movement affiliated with al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), was formed in late 2012. It gained popular support by appealing to marginalized communities along Tunisia's border with Algeria. The group began conducting assaults against Tunisian security forces in 2013. In 2014, an offshoot of Katiba Uqba bin Nafi declared allegiance to the Islamic State. The group adopted the name Jund al Khilafah Tunisia, and it also drew support from marginalized communities in northwest Tunisia. Katiba Uqba bin Nafi and Jund al Khilafah competed with one another for power and influence, even as they sporadically launched attacks on civilians and security forces. In 2015, a lone-wolf gunman, allegedly inspired by jihadist ideology, opened fire on a beachside resort—killing 38 civilians, mainly tourists—in Sousse. "The terrorists have targeted the state, the revolution, and the Islamic principles but we will prevail over them," Ghannouchi said at a press briefing after the attack. Tunisia's coalition government, which included Ennahda, launched an ambitious counterterrorism campaign in the northwest and improved border security. With U.S. financial support, its counterterrorism program succeeded in decreasing attacks. In 2017, extremists carried out 47 attacks; in 2022, they were linked to only four operations. But the North African country has not fully eradicated jihadism. Ansar al ShariaAnsar al Sharia was founded in 2011 by Seifallah Ben Hassine, a Tunisian militant who had reportedly worked with Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. He was later captured in Turkey, extradited to Tunisia, and sentenced to 43 years in prison. Ben Hassine was granted amnesty and released from prison after the 2011 Arab Uprising. Ansar al Sharia espoused a hardline Salafi jihadist ideology and sought to impose sharia in Tunisia. In 2013, a leader said, "The state we envision is based on God's laws. This is not up for discussion." Ansar al Sharia combined community service, proselytization, and violence to achieve this goal, and it was an ideological rival to the non-violent Ennahda movement.Ansar al Sharia had historic links to al Qaeda. Between 2011 and 2015, the group launched sporadic attacks–including suicide bombings–against Tunisian security forces. It organized a protest over a controversial video about the Prophet Mohammed in 2012, in which Tunisians stormed the U.S. Embassy. The group's activity diminished in 2015, after its founder was killed in an airstrike. Katiba Uqba bin NafiKatiba Uqba bin Nafi (or the Fighting Group of Uqba ibn Nafi, a general in the seventh century who conquered parts of North Africa) was established in December 2012. It affiliated with al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is headquartered in Algeria. It operated primarily in the northwest Kasserine and Kef regions, traditionally areas marginalized by the central government. It recruited in Kasserine, where unemployment was twice as high as the national average. In 2013, Katiba Uqba bin Nafi launched a sporadic attacks on security posts throughout the northwest. The government deployed more forces and arrested fighters planning attacks and smuggling weapons. By 2018, Katiba Uqba bin Nafi began to lose territory and popular support. It has not claimed responsibility for any attack since 2019.Jund al KhilafahJund al Khilafah (or Soldiers of the Caliphate) was founded in 2014 after fighters of Katiba Uqba bin Nafi defected and declared allegiance to ISIS. It competed for fighters and territory in northwest Tunisia with Katiba Uqba bin Nafi, while also attacking civilians and security forces. The group targeted and killed civilians to intimidate local populations. It conducted kidnappings and assassinations of both security forces and civilians. In 2018, Tunisia's counterterrorism campaign limited Jund al Khilafah operations. Islamic State of Iraq and SyriaUp to 6,000 Tunisians joined ISIS between 2013 and 2019, with more than 20,000 others attempting to join the largest jihadi movement in the Middle East. the Tunisian government began to crackdown on jihadists in 2013. The creation of a caliphate in 2014 appealed to young, well-educated Tunisians, many of whom had grown disillusioned when the Arab Uprising failed to improve their employment and economic prospects. Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria by Country of Origin (2015)Source: Official estimates from respective governments. Unofficial estimates are by the Soufan Group, "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq," December 2015. FactoidsTunisian jihadists were responsible for the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, an Afghan anti-Taliban leader, in the run-up to 9/11In 2015, a gunman opened fire on a resort in Sousse, killing 38 tourists in the most lethal attack in Tunisian history. Between 3,000 and 7,000 Tunisians joined the Islamic State, the largest percentage of foreign fighters from any country.Timeline of Militant Groups Note: This is not a comprehensive list of all jihadist activity in Tunisia.2000: Seifallah Ben Hassine and Tarek Maaroufi founded the Tunisian Combat Group, an affiliate of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria. 2001: Two militants affiliated with the Tunisian Combat Group assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance–an Afghan rival to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden reportedly organized the murder in the run-up to the 9/11 attacks. The Tunisian Combat Group has been defunct since the mid-2000s, when its two founders were imprisoned in Tunisia and Belgium. 2011: Seifallah Ben Hassine, also known as Abu Ayyad al Tunisi, established Ansar al Sharia in April. Tunisia's democratic transition allowed Ansar al Sharia to openly proselytize. 2012: Protestors stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in September. The Tunisian government blamed Ansar al Sharia. Katiba Uqba bin Nafi was founded in December. 2013: The Tunisian government blamed Ansar al Sharia for separate attacks that killed two members of parliament in Tunis. In August, the Tunisian government designated Ansar al Sharia a terrorist organization.2014: In May, Katiba Uqba bin Nafi attacked the Minister of the Interior's house in Kasserine, killing four policemen. Jund al Khilafah Tunisia was founded, after members of Katiba Uqba bin Nafi defected and declared allegiance to ISIS. Ansar al Sharia was blamed for at least 10 attacks against Tunisian security forces.2015: In March, two militants affiliated with ISIS opened fire on tourists at the Bardo Museum in Tunis. They killed 22 during the three-hour siege. In the largest jihadist attack in Tunisia's history, a gunman murdered 38 tourists in Sousse in June. Tunisia declared a state of emergency. In July, the U.S. military claimed to have killed Ben Hassine, the leader of Ansar al Sharia, in an airstrike in northern Mali. In November, an ISIS-affiliated jihadist killed two Presidential Guard members in a suicide attack.2016: Tunisian security forces prevented an attack by Tunisian nationals affiliated with ISIS-Libya in March. The operation killed 49 suspected terrorists, 13 security forces, and 7 civilians. The Tunisian Army killed the leader of Jund al Khilafah in November.2018: In October, a lone female suicide bomber wounded 20 in the heart of Tunis. No group claimed responsibility.2019: In June, two ISIS-affiliated jihadists launched twin suicide attacks in Tunis. One police officer and one security officer were killed. 2020: In March, two suicide bombers killed a police officer and injured six when they detonated their explosives across the street from the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. Jund al Khilafah beheaded a shepherd, who was reportedly suspected of collaborating with the government. His body was found in December near the Algerian border. 2021: Tunisian forces arrested the leader of Katiba Uqba bin Nafi.
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Over the past year, a surge in migrant people arriving from Tunisia to Europe has thrust the North African country into the heart of European political agendas, sparking concerns across the continent's capitals about its hardships and risk of economic and social collapse. The immediate policy response involved a frenzy of Euro-Tunisian diplomatic activity guided by the Italian government – itself needing to demonstrate some kind of answer to increased migratory arrivals to its shores – and culminated in the signing of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July 2023.[1] The MoU, structured around five key areas of collaboration – macroeconomic stability, trade cooperation, green energy transition, people-to-people contacts, and migration and mobility – is said by so-called "Team Europe" to aim fostering a strategic and comprehensive partnership between the European Union and Tunisia. However, observers highlighted its detrimental shortsightedness, the flaws in its legal nature, as well as the necessity to allocate political and financial resources beyond migration management to truly diversify the agreement.[2] Against this backdrop, three European experts offer here considerations on challenges and prospects in EU–Tunisia relations and propose alternative avenues where cooperation can evolve, emphasising the creation of a stable and equitable political environment in both Europe and Tunisia.Putting Tunisia into context and empowering local voicesby Akram Ezzamouri[3] Tunisia's path through political transition and democratic consolidation after the 2010–2011 uprisings earned it for years the label of "regional model" for advancements in public freedoms. However, in the current Tunisian context – marked by a continuous decline in rule of law and rights following the power grab by President Kais Saied in July 2021, a shrinking social space and an increasingly numbed political alternative – this standing is seriously compromised. This change in the Tunisian trajectory has come hand in hand with Europe pivoting away from policies initially supporting reforms and the establishment of democratic spaces in Tunisia. Instead, the focus has shifted towards short-term securitisation measures addressing mainly European priorities in the fields of migration and counterterrorism, while overlooking the country's urgent socio-economic needs. The signature of the EU–Tunisia MoU in July 2023 has proved yet another step confirming this trend and marking the establishment of an uncoordinated, transactional and unbalanced European approach to Tunisia. Presented by Italy and the European Commission as a blueprint for the establishment of new or rebranded relations with African countries,[4] both the focus of the MoU and the process underlying its design and implementation are reminiscent of past bilateral initiatives with Libya, Morocco and Turkey. European measures externalising and informalising migration management,[5] coupled with more comprehensive dossiers spanning from energy cooperation, development and economic support have rarely produced the intended improvements in the Southern neighbourhood. On the contrary, they often proved to be self-defeating as they intertwined European interests with the illusion of authoritarian stability. The recent abuses of migrant people's rights in Tunisia and the constant clampdown on voices opposing Kais Saied, highlight how ill-fated funnelling funds into the Tunisian government without concurrently supporting reforms in the country's security sector is. To forge a sustainable partnership, shared challenges between the EU and Tunisia should not be addressed in isolation; they should rather be linked to the broader Tunisian context of centralised power and social fragmentation. In line with this, the so-called "Rome process", designed on the initiative of the Italian government to address irregular migration to Europe through the promotion of development in origin or transit countries,[6] must not overlook the underlying factors of instability related to the deterioration of governance. The Tunisian case is evidence of how strictly interconnected these issues are. The persistent socio-economic challenges drive people to leave the country, opting for perilous journeys across the Mediterranean.[7] This is exacerbated by the flourishing smuggling industry, a direct consequence of inadequate state control and documented collusions with elements within the Tunisian security forces.[8] To improve the Tunisian situation and address the real root causes of instability, the EU should contribute to reinstating a safe and pluralist political landscape in Tunisia, particularly with an eye on the 2024 presidential elections, if maintained. Advancing EU–Tunisia relations in this direction is surely an uphill battle, given Saied's rejection of any external or internal pressure challenging his agenda, as well as the credibility crisis faced by European countries and institutions among the regional population, stemming from their stance and divisions on Israel's war on Gaza.[9] However, empowering local voices and giving them space when discussing the way forward in EU–Tunisia relations could constitute a first step towards a more positive dynamic. It could also contribute to "ensure a safe and enabling environment for civil society, as well as freedom of expression, of the press, of peaceful assembly and of association", in line with what Italy recommended during Tunisia's fourth Universal Periodic Review in November 2022.[10]Folly of cynicism and naivete: Europe's failures to advance a Tunisia strategyby Colin Powers[11] On 16 July, EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi and Mounir Ben Rjiba, Tunisian Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, signed a MoU defining "a strategic and global partnership between the EU and Tunisia". In substance, the EU offered a package comprising financial assistance, support to Tunisia's border control capacity and to projects in the energy sector, and facilitation of legal mobility between the two parties. In exchange, they expected the autocratic regime in Tunisia to dutifully (and quietly) accept its role as a deputised patrolman for Europe's southern border. Visibly ill-conceived as the MoU was – particularly in light of the Tunisian President's sovereigntist pretensions – it swiftly proved ill-fated too. A few months after pen was put to paper, Tunis would take the extraordinary step of returning a 60 million euro grant which had been designated as part of a previous European Covid-19 recovery programme.[12] Signalling a wider diplomatic breakdown, the reverse transfer also marked a de facto pause on the implementation of the MoU. Beyond the uncertainty that has come to prevail as a result, the EU suffered significant institutional and reputational damage from the entire venture. Team Europe's freestyling and sidestepping of treaty-making procedures not only pushed the bounds of legality. These actions also caused fissures amongst EU member states while introducing confusion both in Brussels and foreign capitals over who has the right to act in the Union's name abroad.[13] The Commission's attempts at paying off an autocrat whose record of repression, cruelty to immigrants and racialised human rights abuses grows with each day, meanwhile, has eaten away at Europe's moral standing and degraded the EU's status as a defender of international law. To chart a better path in Tunisia and further afield, it is essential that Europe move beyond the superficial engagements it has favoured in addressing complex issues like immigration. There is, at this stage, little ambiguity about what drives Tunisians (and those transiting through the country) to brave a sea-crossing: it is the desire for a better life. Similarly, there is little ambiguity as to why such desires cannot be realised where those people currently reside. The Tunisian economy is structurally compromised, beleaguered by a domineering oligarchy, poor policy design and a subordinate position in global systems of production, trade and finance. Just as distressingly, the spectre of state violence haunts citizens and non-citizens alike at all times, with civil and political liberties won by way of the uprisings of 2010–2011 having been almost entirely wound back. In view of all this, it should be obvious why an MoU like the one agreed to in July last year, even if honoured to the letter, would fail to deliver what its European signatories seek. Economically, the agreement lacks the scale, comprehensiveness and discernment needed to alter Tunisia's structural condition. Politically, it subsidises some of the institutions most responsible for popular repression and helps underwrite the Saied autocracy. In other words, the MoU helps reproduce the grievances compelling people to flee. If equipping a repressive government to intercept more boats off the Tunisian coast, then, an agreement of this type will never stop those boats from departing in the first instance. A wiser policy would attempt to address causality at its source. Materially, it might combine some measure of debt relief conditional on political and security sector reform with fair-minded revisions to trade and investment treaties and concessionary capital deployments for developmentally and ecologically useful projects, for starters. Looking ahead, it is equally critical that the EU henceforth speaks with a single voice on Tunisia, that it installs mechanisms to restrict improvisational interventions like those led by the European Commission last summer, and that it adopts a people- rather than regime-first approach. Under von der Leyen's direction, Team Europe has been content to support Kais Saied under the premise that he might act as a guardian of stability. Weighing the upheaval Saied has already sown against the contributions he has made to the emigration wave, the misguidedness of this gambit can hardly be overstated. It is past time that Europe reverse course. Relevant parties in Europe need pursue a pact with Tunisia and the rest of Africa based not on the expedience a strongman may promise, but on a recognition of all people's fundamental dignity.Flipping the leverage script in EU–Tunisia relationsby Emmanuel Cohen-Hadria[14] There was a time when High Representative Josep Borrell's predecessors were hoping to add Tunisia's democratic transition to the list of EU foreign policy success stories, next to the EU-facilitated Serbia–Kosovo dialogue and the EU-mediated Iran nuclear deal. Tunisia's democratic transition was expected to epitomise the success of a principled and transformative EU foreign policy. Since then, Tunisian domestic developments have forced the EU to fast-track its shift from a principled to a transactional approach. While the former failed to bring about changes in the country, it recently became clear that the latter has not succeeded in promoting the EU's interests. In the weeks following the signature of the controversial MoU between Tunisia and the EU on 16 July 2023, irregular migrant arrivals in Italy increased.[15] Meanwhile, a poorly engineered plan, including promises of additional financial assistance, created expectations that the EU did not manage to meet. This culminated in the highly symbolic decision from Tunisia to refund 60 million euros of EU Covid-related aid in October 2023,[16] de facto freezing the implementation of the MoU.[17] There was a time when Tunisia was seen as a showcase of the EU's comprehensive and united approach, with member states and EU institutions playing off the same hymn sheet. The signature of the MoU broke these dynamics, bringing back the EU's old demons of disunity. In a leaked letter to Commissioner Várhelyi, HRVP Borrell wrote that several member states had expressed their "incomprehension regarding the Commission's unilateral action".[18] There are at least three takeaways from this episode. First, assuming that the shift towards a more transactional foreign policy is most probably unavoidable, transactional moves need nonetheless to be carefully calibrated and negotiated amongst all EU stakeholders, if the EU wants to minimise the risk of backfire. Second, the EU cannot afford poor coordination with other partners. The 400 million US dollar soft loan Saudi Arabia pledged four days after the signature of the MoU is probably good news for Tunisia in the short term.[19] It will indeed help the country's public finances stay afloat in the upcoming months. Yet, in the absence of any indication that Saudi Arabia's initiative was discussed with the EU, it ended up weakening further the EU's efforts to incentivise reforms in the North African country. Third, over-prioritising migration in the bilateral relationship of the EU with its southern partners weakens the former and increases the playing field of the latter. The bad news is that there is no easy fix. Migration will not disappear anytime soon from the top of the list of European priorities. Tunisia will not be the success story the EU had wished for. The EU should, however, make sure it does not turn into a complete failure story.[1] European Union and Tunisia, Mémorandum d'entente sur un partenariat stratégique et global entre l'Union européenne et la Tunisie, 16 July 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3887.[2] Luca Barana and Asly Okyay, "Shaking Hands with Saied's Tunisia: The Paradoxes and Trade-offs Facing the EU", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|40 (August 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17362.[3] Akram Ezzamouri is a Research Fellow in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy.[4] Benjamin Fox and Eleonora Vasques, "Tunisia Pact a 'Blueprint' for New 'Cash for Migrant' Deals, Says EU Chief", in Euractiv, 27 June 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/?p=1946104.[5] Catherine Woollard, "The EU's Dodgy Deal with Tunisia Is a Classic of the Genre: Undemocratic, Unlawful and Unlikely to Work", in ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 26 July 2023, https://ecre.org/?p=15766.[6] International Conference on Development and Migration Conclusions, 23 July 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/23251.[7] World Bank, Tunisia Economic Monitor, Fall 2023: Migration Amid a Challenging Economic Context, December 2023, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/40676.[8] Refugees International, "European and Tunisian Migration Policies: A Recipe for Failure and Suffering", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|02 (January 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17964.[9] Nathalie Tocci, "Europe's Stance on Gaza Has Undermined Its Credibility", in Politico, 5 January 2024, https://www.politico.eu/?p=4076316.[10] United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Tunisia (A/HRC/52/6), 14 December 2022, para. 145.73, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/52/6. See also the OHCHR website: Universal Periodic Review – Tunisia, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/tn-index.[11] Colin Powers is a Senior Fellow and Chief Editor for the Noria Research MENA Program, France.[12] Jorge Liboreiro, "In Stunning Move, Tunisia Snubs Brussels and Refunds €60 Million in EU Aid", in Euronews, 12 October 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/10/12/in-stunning-move-tunisia-snubs-brussels-and-refunds-60-million-in-eu-aid.[13] Lisa O'Carroll, "EU States Expressed 'Incomprehension' at Tunisia Migration Pact, Says Borrell", in The Guardian, 18 September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/pv3qp.[14] Emmanuel Cohen-Hadria is the Director of the Euro-Mediterranean Policies Department at the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), Spain, and co-founder of Diplomeds.[15] "Migration Rates from Tunisia to Italy Increase Despite EU Deal", in Middle East Monitor, 30 August 2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230830-migration-rates-from-tunisia-to-italy-increase-despite-eu-deal.[16] Jorge Liboreiro, "In Stunning Move, Tunisia Snubs Brussels and Refunds €60 Million in EU Aid", cit.[17] In December 2023, the EU and Tunisia came to an agreement on a 150 million euro financial programme part of the MoU. See European Commission, The European Union and Tunisia Come to an Agreement on a EUR 150 Million Programme, 20 December 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6784.[18] Lisa O'Carroll, "EU States Expressed 'Incomprehension' at Tunisia Migration Pact, Says Borrell", cit.[19] "Saudi Arabia to Give Tunisia $500 Million as Soft Loan and Grant", in Reuters, 20 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-arabia-give-tunisia-500-mln-soft-loan-grant-2023-07-20.
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Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the two militant movements in Gaza, have violently challenged Israel's right to exist since their creation in the 1980s. Both have a similar agenda—to defeat Israel and create an Islamic state in historic Palestine. "The day that enemies usurp part of Muslim land, jihad becomes the individual duty of every Muslim," Hamas said in its 1988 charter. Both groups rejected the 1993 Oslo peace accord between Israel and the PLO that created the Palestinian Authority. In a 1994 pamphlet, Fathi Shikaki, a physician and the co-founder of PIJ, decreed, "The only option to our people is continuation of the jihad with all our strength and to end the occupation." Both Sunni militias have been trained, armed and financed by Iran. Both also have the same allies in Syria and Hezbollah, a Shiite militia and political party in Lebanon.But Hamas and PIJ differ ideologically. PIJ, which was created as a small group of underground cells, has long been more extremist in ideology and tactics. Shikaki was born to a family of refugees in Gaza in 1951 and joined the Muslim Brotherhood while studying medicine in Egypt in the 1970s. He was heavily influenced by the ideology of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian revolutionary leader. In 1979, Shikaki published a book, "Khomeini – The Islamic Solution and the Alternative," that advocated for Sunni-Shiite unity in the struggle against Israel. Shikaki broke with the Muslim Brotherhood to prioritize the Palestinian cause. His books--including "The Shia and Sunna: An Unfortunate, Artificial Turmoil" published in 1985--promoted the same pan-Islamic vision espoused by Tehran. Shikaki was assassinated by Israel during a trip to Malta in 1995. His successor, Ramadan Shallah, also maintained close ties to Iran. "The Palestinian Islamic Jihad is another fruit of the Ayatollah Khomeini's fructuous tree," Shallah said during a 2002 meeting with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran.Hamas, an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, emerged in 1987 during the First Intifada, or uprising, against Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Its origins were unrelated to Iran. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a quadriplegic and legally blind cleric, was the founder and spiritual leader. Born in 1936 in the village of al Jura, near the modern Israeli city of Ashkelon, he and his family fled to Gaza along with tens of thousands of other Palestinian refugees during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Like Shikaki, Yassin also spent time studying in Egypt and was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. But Hamas leaders promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic framework – rather than Khomeini's pan-Islamism. "Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed," Hamas said in its 1988 charter. "Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the case when an enemy should tread Muslim land."Hamas: Military WingHamas launched its first military operations against Israel in 1989. In separate attacks, it kidnapped and killed two Israeli soldiers in southern Israel. It stepped up attacks after establishing a military wing of underground cells--the Izz ad din al Qassam Brigades--in 1991. The militia was named after a Syrian-born preacher and militant who opposed Zionism as well as the British and French presence in the Middle East during from the 1920s. In the 1930s, he recruited hundreds of fighters, mainly among the rural poor, for the Black Hand, which attacked Jewish settlements and sabotaged British rail lines. He was killed in a shoot-out with British police near Jenin. He quickly became a hero among Palestinians and symbol of their cause.Hamas has attacked both Israeli military and civilian targets. It became infamous for suicide bombings and shootings at bus stops, restaurants and discos in the 1990s and 2000s. Hamas had a freer hand to operate in Gaza after the Israeli military withdrew in 2005. With the help of Iran and Hezbollah, it evolved into a larger, more disciplined, and better-equipped fighting force capable of pummeling Israeli towns with thousands of rockets and launching hit-and-run incursions over the Gaza border. Izz ad Din al Qassam fighters attend a military parade in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on May 27, 2021Image CreditBy 2023, the Hamas militia had built a diverse inventory of weapons, including rockets, drones, mortars, incendiary balloons, and even torpedoes. The CIA has estimated its force at up to 25,000, while Israel and Western media reported up to 40,000 fighters. It concealed weapons, some provided from Iran and others crafted locally, in a vast network of tunnels underneath Gaza.Hamas fighters—some 1,200 trained militants, plus hundreds more from Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Gaza civilians who joined in after Hamas breached the security barrier around Gaza—demonstrated unprecedented capabilities in attacks on civilian kibbutzim communities and southern military bases on Oct. 7, 2023. Hamas used drones and snipers to cripple Israel's communications and early warning systems along the border. It coordinated air, land, and sea operations on 22 Israeli communities. It launched at least 2,200 rockets at southern and central Israel. Some reached Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, which Hamas rockets had rarely been able to reach in previous hostilities.Image CreditMilitants also perpetrated atrocities. They killed more than 1,400 civilians and soldiers in bloodthirsty massacres, which included murder, rape and beheadings of children, females and the elderly. Some Israelis were burned alive while they hid in safe rooms. More than 300 were soldiers, officers and reservists in the Israeli military were killed. The vast majority were civilians. Hamas had not employed such grisly tactics in the past. Hamas and PIJ also took more than 200 hostages back to Gaza.Hamas: Political WingHamas ran for the first time in the 2006 legislative elections. Many Palestinians looked to Hamas as an alternative to the ruling Fatah party, which had gained a reputation for corruption and ineffectiveness after four decades of dominating Palestinian politics. Although Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats, the party did not expect to have to form a government for the entire Palestinian Authority and make policy decisions. Fatah refused to join a Hamas-led government, so President Mahmoud Abbas – a longtime Fatah member and ally of Yasser Arafat—ruled from the capital in Ramallah in the West Bank while Hamas effectively governed Gaza. Abbas placed security forces in Gaza under his control. In response, Hamas created its own parallel security force. Tensions boiled over in 2007 when Hamas believed that Fatah forces were planning to remove the Hamas government from office in Gaza. Hamas seized control of Gaza, while the Palestinian Authority retained control over the West Bank.Since the Hamas takeover, Israel and Egypt have maintained a blockade on Gaza that has caused an economic crisis for Palestinians. Repeated negotiations between Hamas and Fatah—brokered by Egypt, Qatar and Syria—to form a Palestinian unity government failed. The Palestinian Authority has been unable to hold elections since 2006. In 2021, Abbas postponed scheduled elections. He cited Israel's refusal to guarantee that Palestinians in East Jerusalem could vote, although Hamas and other secular Palestinians wanted to hold the poll anyway. "In Hamas, we don't want to turn the situation into an internal Palestinian struggle. We want the language of dialogue, communication and dialogue to prevail among all Palestinians," Haniyeh said.Image CreditLeadershipYahya Sinwar: Sinwar's family fled or were expelled from al Majdal Asqalan, in what is now southern Israel, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. He was born in 1962 in a refugee camp in Khan Yunis, Gaza. Sinwar became politically active in the early 1980s while studying at the Islamic University of Gaza, where he earned a bachelor's degree in Arabic studies. Sinwar was arrested by Israel in 1982 and reportedly held for four months in administrative detention with no formal charges. He was arrested again in 1985 and held for eight months.Sinwar joined Hamas when it was established in 1987 and co-founded its internal security service in 1988. Israel sentenced him to four life terms in prison for orchestrating the abduction and murder of two Israeli soldiers and four suspected Palestinian "collaborators" in 1988. Israeli officials dubbed him "the butcher of Khan Yunis" because of his brutality of other Palestinians. Sinwar served 22 years. In 2011, Israel released him and 1,026 other Palestinians in exchange for Gilad Shalit, a soldier abducted by Hamas in 2006. The United States put Sinwar on "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" list in 2015. The Hamas Shura Council elected him to head the political bureau in Gaza in 2017. Sinwar was willing to compromise with the Palestinian Authority and engage in a hudna – or ceasefire—with Israel, according to Palestinian experts. "The offensive that Sinwar was mainly focused on was sending a shock to the Israeli political system [to] provide him with the necessary leverage to have a much wider exchange of prisoners and a more comprehensive deal" with Israel, Khalil Shikaki, a Palestinian academic and pollster, said at the Carnegie Endowment on Nov. 2, 2023.Ismail Haniyeh: Haniyeh's family fled from al Majdal Asqalan, in what is now southern Israel, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Born in 1962 in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza, he joined the Islamic Student Bloc while a student in 1984. He graduated with a degree in Arabic literature from the Islamic University in Gaza in 1987. When the First Intifada broke out, he participated in anti-Israel protests and joined Hamas. He spent six months in an Israeli prison in 1988 and another three years starting in 1989. Israel deported him and hundreds of other Palestinian militants to Lebanon in 1992.After the PLO signed the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993, he returned to Gaza to head the Islamic University. He quickly climbed the ranks within Hamas. In 2001, he became the third-highest ranking official. In 2006, he headed the Hamas list in its first run for parliament. After Hamas upset the secular Fatah Party, Haniyeh was appointed prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas forced Fatah—its political officials and security forces -- out of Gaza in 2007. Palestinian President Abbas dismissed him, but Haniyeh remained the de facto leader of Gaza until Hamas leaders elected him to head the 15-person Politburo in 2017. The United States labeled him a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" in 2018. He left Gaza in 2019 and set up an office in Qatar. Haniyeh was reelected head of the Politburo in 2021.Khaled Mashaal: Mashaal was born in 1956 in Silwad, a West Bank town. He and his family fled to Kuwait during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Mashaal was devout from a young age and joined the Muslim Brotherhood at 15. He received a degree in physics from Kuwait University and founded a student group called the List of the Islamic Right. Mashaal has been involved in Hamas since its inception, despite living in Kuwait. He founded a Kuwaiti chapter of Hamas but left the country when Iraq invaded in 1990. He moved to Amman, Jordan, where he headed the local Hamas chapter. He was elected the head of Hamas Politburo in 1996.Mashaal survived a botched assassination attempt by Israel in 1997. Two Mossad agents sprayed poison into his ear but were caught trying to escape. The ordeal earned him the title of "living martyr." Jordan expelled Mashaal and senior Hamas leaders in 1999 for "illicit and harmful" activities that could undermine national security. After a stint in Qatar, he set up an office in Damascus, Syria in 2001. The United States labeled Mashaal along with five other Hamas leaders as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" in 2003.After Israel assassinated Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin in 2004, Mashaal became the overall leader of Hamas. He relocated from Damascus to Doha in 2012, after Hamas and Iran backed different actors in the Syrian civil war. In 2017, Haniyeh was elected to replace Mashaal. But the latter made a comeback in 2021 when he was elected head of the diaspora division, the second-highest ranking position.Image CreditPIJ: Military WingPIJ has had the second-largest fighting force in Gaza after Hamas. Its mission is to fight Israelis and replace the Jewish state, according to leaders. "The call to jihad and resisting the occupation should precede all other activities," Shallah said in 1998. It recruited primarily among young and educated men in Gaza willing to engage in bombings, suicide missions and assassinations against Israeli forces and settlers. But unlike Hamas, it has not provided social services, schools or health services so has not built wider public support. It also rejects political engagement, so has built no formal constituency. The difference between the two movements is that Hamas, which governs Gaza, has had to consider the costs—and potential backlash—of any operation against Israel. PIJ does not.PIJ launched its first attack on Israeli targets in Gaza in 1984. Shikaki and other PIJ leaders gained military training and new allies after Israel deported them to Lebanon in the late 1980s. Shikaki traveled to Tehran, where he met with Ayatollah Khomeini and was promised new aid and arms. Iran's Revolutionary Guards training the PIJ deportees at Hezbollah camps in Lebanon. PIJ and Hezbollah fighters began joint attacks on Israeli targets. In 1989, PIJ moved its headquarters to Damascus but maintained fighters in southern Lebanon. Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters in tactical gearImage CreditIn 1992, PIJ established the al Quds Brigades as a formal military wing. It rejected the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO in 1993. Throughout the 1990s, it escalated attacks on Israel in an attempt to derail the peace process. Its attack on a bus stop killed 21 Israeli soldiers and one civilian in 1995. During the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, PIJ carried out suicide missions, car bombings and mass killings on both military and civilian targets deep inside Israeli, including a pizzeria and bus stop in Jerusalem.Since 2018, PIJ has coordinated some of its operations against Israel with Hamas and 10 other militant groups at joint operations room in Gaza. The others included armed wings of secular groups such as Fatah, the PFLP and the DFLP. But PIJ has often acted independently, however. In 2019, 2022 and May 2023, PIJ conducted limited clashes with Israel, and Hamas stayed out of the fighting. But Hamas led the unprecedented Oct. 7, 2023 assault on Israel. After Hamas militants broke through the Israeli security barrier around Gaza, PIJ fighters reportedly followed a few hours later. They claimed to have taken 30 hostages back to Gaza.By 2023, its fighting force ranged from 1,000 to several thousand, according to State Department estimates. PIJ could have up 15,000 fighters, according to Western media and Israeli experts. Its weapons included more than a dozen types of rockets, some produced locally and others from Iran smuggled through tunnels from Egypt.Image CreditPIJ cells have historically been concentrated in Gaza but they have also operated in the West Bank. In 2021, PIJ commanders Jamil al Amouri and Wiam Iyad Hanon established the Jenin Battalion, a cross-factional militant group based in Jenin, a hub for militant activity. Israel killed Jamil al Amouri in June 2021 and Hanon in October 2023.LeadershipZiyad al Nakhalah: Nakhalah was born in 1953 in Khan Yunis, Gaza. His father was killed during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Nakhalah earned a bachelor's degree from the Gaza Teachers Institute. Israel arrested Nakhalah for the first time in 1971 for his involvement in the Arab Liberation Forces, a militant group. He was sentenced to life in prison but was released 14 years later as part of a prisoner swap with Israel in 1985. Three Israeli soldiers were freed in exchange for 1,150 Palestinians and Lebanese prisoners.After his release, Nakhalah organized the PIJ military wing. In 1988, Israel arrested him for involvement in the First Intifada and deported him and other militants to Lebanon. Nakhalah became the PIJ representative in Beirut. After Israel assassinated Shikaki in 1995, PIJ officials selected Ramadan Shallah to lead PIJ, with Nakhalah as deputy secretary general. The United States labeled Nakhalah a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" in 2014. In 2018, Shallah reportedly had a stroke and was hospitalized in Beirut. Nakhalah replaced him. Relationship with IranSince the 1979 revolution, Iran has armed, trained and funded proxies across the Middle East. In some cases, it created allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and a plethora of Shiite militias in Iraq. In other instances, Iran sponsored existing groups with overlapping goals, such as PIJ and Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the Houthis in Yemen. Iran's support for PIJ and Hamas has enhanced its revolutionary credentials among Arabs and the wider Muslim world, only partly about the Palestinian issue. Iran's goal has been to be the vanguard of the Islamic world, including in alliances with Sunni movements to transcend the sectarian divide.Image CreditHamas-Iran TiesFor more than three decades, Iran has provided financial support to Hamas, which ranged from $20 million to $50 million annually from 1990 to 2000. In 2008, Iran increased its financial support and increased the flow of weapons to Hamas. Iran reportedly produced or supplied many of the rockets fired by Hamas during the 2008-9 Gaza war with Israel. The conflicted ended when Israel declared a ceasefire in January 2009. The next month, Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal visited Tehran. "You are our partners in the victory in Gaza," he said in a speech. Mashaal also thanked Iran's supreme leader and president "for all the financial, political and popular support which you have given to us. The Palestinian people will not forget."Iran's relationship with Hamas frayed when the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011. Hamas backed the Syrian rebels, while Iran backed the government of President Bashar Assad. As ties deteriorated, Iran suspended funding to Hamas in 2012. Relations began to improve after Hamas selected Yahya Sinwar to the political bureau chief of Hamas in Gaza. Iran and Hamas reconciled in 2017, and Tehran resumed its funding. "Relations with Iran are excellent and Iran is the largest supporter of the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades with money and arms," Sinwar said in August 2017. "The relationship today is developing and returning to what it was in the old days." Historically, Iran smuggled weapons to Hamas via Sudan, where the IRGC Qods Force operated warehouses and trained on rocket production, Fabian Hinz, an expert on missile proliferation, told The Iran Primer. Rockets were then smuggled via Egypt to the Sinai Peninsula through tunnels into Gaza. Smuggling became increasingly difficult after Egypt started sealing off or destroying Hamas tunnels in 2013 and Sudan cut diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016.Ismail Haniyeh (left) meets with Supreme Leader Khamenei (right) in Sept. 2019Image CreditIran increasingly trained Hamas fighters in Gaza and helped develop local weapons production. "Instead of giving them a fish or teaching them to catch a fish, we taught our allies and friends how to make a hook, and they are now in possession of missile capabilities and technologies," General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, said in January 2021. "Today, the Palestinians fire rockets instead of throwing stones."Hamas leaders have repeatedly expressed appreciation for Iranian support. "I give thanks to those who provided funds and weaponry to the courageous resistance, the Islamic Republic of Iran, [which] has not skimped in extending funds, weaponry, and technology to the resistance," Haniyeh said on a Hamas Telegram channel in May 2021. The State Department estimated that Iran provided Hamas with about $100 million pear year as of 2023.In October 2023, Iranian leaders applauded Hamas for its multi-pronged attack on Israel. Supreme Leader Khamenei called the unprecedented operation "a devastating earthquake" and a "great calamity" for Israel, even though the Palestinian group committed murderous atrocities and hostage seizures of Israeli civilians from homes, streets and even a music festival in central and southern Israel. In a telephone call with Haniyeh, President Ebrahim Raisi called the attack "the fulfillment of the 70-year-old expectation of the Palestinian nation and the Islamic Ummah (nation)." PIJ-Iran TiesKhomeini influenced the ideology of PIJ co-founders Shikaki and Abd al Aziz Awda, a preacher. Iran started funding PIJ in 1987, according to Shikaki. PIJ ties with Tehran deepened after Israel deported Shikaki and other PIJ operatives to Lebanon in 1988. Iran's Revolutionary Guards provided funding and military support to PIJ at camps in Lebanon and Syria. In 1991, Iran hosted PIJ, Hamas, and other groups for a conference, the International Committee for the Support of the Palestinian Intifada. Tehran sought to counter the Madrid Peace Conference convened that same year to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.PIJ increasingly depended on Iran for support. Starting in 2000, Iran reportedly paid PIJ millions of dollars in cash bonuses for each attack against Israel during the Second Intifada, which lasted until 2005. In 2002, Khamenei promised to increase support by 70 percent. "It is no secret that we say that the military assistance provided to the Palestinian resistance – from A to Z, from bullet to rocket – is assistance from the Islamic republic, Iranian assistance," PIJ spokesman Dawud Shihab said in 2012.PIJ-Iran relations appeared strained in 2015. Iran reportedly stopped or curtailed its financial support after PIJ refused to denounce the Saudi-led offensive against the Houthis, the Iran-backed rebels in Yemen. Tehran shifted support to the smaller and short-lived al Sabirin movement (or "the Patient"), which was headed by Hisham Salem, a former PIJ operative. But the Islamic Republic resumed support for PIJ in 2016. Aid increased to $30 million in 2018, according to Israeli media. "I am proud to say that the rockets that are used to pound Tel Aviv have an Iranian signature on them," Ramez al Halabi said during clashes with Israel in May 2021.In October 2023, Iranian leaders praised PIJ for participating in the Hamas-led attack on Israel. "What happened in the occupied territories and in the battle with the usurping Zionist regime was a huge, unique event in the past 70 years, and you really made the Islamic community happy with this innovative and victorious operation," President Raisi told Nakhalah during a phone call. "We consider the final victory of the Palestinian nation to be a divine promise and the Iranian nation always stands by the freedom-loving and independent nations, and at the top of them is the Palestinian nation."