Suchergebnisse

This report presents to the Government of Georgia (GoG) an analysis of the implications of potential policy changes to internally displaced person (IDP) assistance. A pressing question for policy makers in Georgia is the sustainability of status-based IDP assistance and what efforts can be made to tailor this assistance to favor the poor and vulnerable. Elimination of the IDP benefit has been subject to debate among policymakers. The World Bank has worked with the government to support improvements to the socioeconomic situation of IDPs in Georgia since 2008. The IDP Community Development Project, implemented between 2009-2012 improved service delivery, infrastructure, and livelihoods in over 40 IDP communities. Evidence on the socio-economic needs of IDPs has been collected by both government and donors; yet no comprehensive research has been conducted to critically compare their situation to that of the overall population. The objective of this research is to generate more evidence on the significance of the IDP benefit, and consequences that may be expected if this benefit is removed, in order to inform future policy decisions of the GoG in this regard. The report examines: (i) the policy and institutional framework and considerations that may support or obstruct a shift in IDP assistance; (ii) quantitative evidence on the socio-economic situation of IDPs as compared to non-IDPs in Georgia; and (iii) qualitative evidence on the significance of the IDP benefit, attitudes towards the benefit program, and vulnerabilities that may arise from its potential elimination. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for mitigating negative poverty and social impacts, should the government pursue a decision to remove the IDP benefit program.

The current report is a milestone for preparing the Romanian climate change (CC) action plan. A CC action plan should be based on the consolidation and coordination of both mitigation and adaptation measures and options. An important step in the elaboration of such a plan is the selection of appropriate actions. This selection requires the involvement of competent authorities in the key sectors, including, in the case of Romania, transport, energy, urban, water, agriculture, and forestry. The screening approaches are used to facilitate a transparent decision-making process in various fields such as environmental impacts, dangerous substances, environmental footprint of products, or CC actions. The report is structured as follows: section one gives introduction. Section two summarizes the usage of screening approaches in the field of CC and environment by different European Union (EU) member states and by the European Commission. Section three discusses the main categories of mitigation and adaption measures that can be included in a CC action plan. Section four presents the screening approach and process and describes several complementary tools (multi-criteria analysis, cost-benefit analysis (CBA), cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), modeling) that should be used when the screening approach is insufficient. Section five provides a conclusion and key recommendations.

Direct cash transfers for vulnerable elderly and disabled populations have been provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare (Kementerian Sosial, Kemensos) since 2006; a similar cash transfer for at-risk youth was inaugurated in 2009. The Government of Indonesia's (GoI) pro-poor development initiatives, international agreements and domestic laws and regulations, and considerable experience delivering more general social assistance programs led to the creation of cash transfers for these historically neglected and difficult-to-reach groups. These programs Jaminan Sosial Lanjut Usia (JSLU), Jaminan Sosial Paca Berat (JSPACA), and program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak (PKSA) for the elderly, disabled, and youth respectively transfer cash directly to beneficiaries. They account for increasing shares of the Kemensos overall budget, but subsidies directed to care and rehabilitation facilities as well as direct provision of institutional care still account for a noticeable portion of the Kemensos budget for these groups. Program support operations socialization and outreach; allocation, targeting and prioritization; monitoring and evaluation; and complaints and grievances have very small budgets and depend crucially on cooperation and enthusiasm from local governments and facilitators. A full range of safeguarding activities is spelled out in program guidelines but these have not been institutionalized at the local implementation level. There is variation in the content, methods, frequency, completion rates, and outcomes in all safeguarding activities, and no easy-to-use reporting process that would ensure information from implementation level reaches the central funding and policy agency, Kemensos. The note summarizes quantitative and qualitative evidence in order to build a sound foundation for evaluating the cash transfer programs JSLU, JSPACA, and PKSA provided by Kemensos. The evidence on which the evaluation is based here is composed primarily of first-hand observation of the programs in operation. Where possible information collected from administrative records, including monitoring and evaluation reports, and from Kemensos itself, is summarized. Design features, efficiency and effectiveness of program implementation and operation, and impacts (intended or not) the program produces for beneficiaries are all analyzed in as much detail as possible. Current policy planning within Kemensos assumes expansion of these programs in the coming years, so an evaluation of the programs' features is relevant for Indonesian policymakers and stakeholders.

Jamaica is a Caribbean country that has initiated comprehensive programs to address Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs). The government created the National Health Fund (NHF) to reduce the cost of treatment of NCDs and finance some prevention programs. The main objective of this study is to learn from Jamaica's experience in tackling major NCDs and related risk factors, to provide policy options for Jamaica to improve its NCD programs and to share with other countries the lessons learned from its experience. The study attempts to answer three questions: a) whether the NHF and its drug subsidy program have reduced out-of-pocket spending on NCDs; b) whether access to treatment of NCDs has improved; and c) what the economic burden on NCD patients and their families is. The report presents an overall picture of the epidemiological and demographic transitions in Jamaica, its current burden of NCDs, and the change in the trend of NCDs in the past decade, using publicly available data, particularly data from the Jamaica living condition household surveys. It assesses the risk factors and analyzes Jamaica's response to NCDs with emphasis on the impact of the NHF on people's lives. Estimates of the economic burden of NCDs are provided and policy options to improve Jamaica's NCD programs are suggested. This study focuses on Jamaica's experience in addressing major NCDs and their related risk factors with the objective of learning from Jamaica and providing policy options to Jamaica to improve its programs.

This paper describes forced displacement in the Europe and Central Asia Region (ECA) and the vulnerabilities associated with being a displaced person. It analyzes the development challenges of forced displacement particularly protracted displacement in the region and the prospects for durable solutions. Displaced persons face challenges related to recovery of or access to housing and land, employment and livelihoods, access to services and public goods including health, education, and infrastructure, and accountable and responsive governance.

Authors' introductionWe present an overview of research about racial residential segregation. The first part of the article reviews major debates and findings drawn primarily from the sociological literature. The second part of the article identifies new areas of research that in some cases cross into other disciplines such as geography and urban studies. We show the enduring persistence of racial residential segregation as well as its causes and consequences. We also highlight the ways in which residential segregation can be better understood by including discussions about the varied social and spatial expressions of, and responses to, segregation. The social scientific examination of the patterns and everyday experiences of racial residential segregation remains prolific.Authors recommendKrysan, Maria 2002. 'Community Undesirability in Black and White: Examining Racial Residential Preferences through Community Perceptions.'Social Problems 49: 521–43.The author presents an empirical critique of research which examines the role that residential preferences play in perpetuating racially segregated residential settlement patterns. The data are drawn from the Multi‐City Study of Urban Inequality. The author analyzes black and white participants' responses to open‐ended questions about community undesirability in 23 communities spread across four US metropolitan areas. Rather than examine residential preferences in relation to hypothetical communities of varying relative racial compositions, the author uses respondents' subjective perceptions of actual communities, and the reasons they give for their perceptions, as measures of residential preference. The major finding of the article is that preferences are mediated by class‐ and race‐based considerations, such as perceived community crime rates or a community's reputation as a hotbed of racial animosity and hostility.Logan, John R., Brian J. Stults, and Reynolds Farley 2004. 'Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change.'Demography 41: 1–22.The authors report on national‐ and metropolitan‐level residential segregation trends for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian groups using a cross‐sectional analysis of 2000 Census data. They also present findings from a longitudinal analysis of changing residential segregation trends for the period 1980 to 2000. During this time black–white segregation levels, measured by the Index of Dissimilarity, steadily declined nationally and in most major metropolitan areas. However, Hispanic–white and Asian–white segregation levels increased slightly at both the national and metropolitan levels since 1980. The authors estimate regression models to test prevailing hypotheses that seek to account for these changes. Notably, they conclude that black–white segregation remains high especially in older manufacturing centers in the Northeast and Midwest. Levels of Hispanic–white and Asian–white segregation meanwhile are increasing in regions where these minority groups are most heavily concentrated and where they continue to grow due to high levels of foreign‐born in‐migration.Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.This book is a seminal contribution to the scholarly debate about the causes and consequences of black urban poverty in the US. The authors argue that racial residential segregation is the key social process which explains the conditions under which a black urban underclass forms and is maintained. Segregation creates a 'structural niche' of concentrated black socioeconomic deprivation wherein, for instance, conditions of welfare dependency become normative and oppositional cultures emerge in reaction to the contradictory values of dominant groups. Massey and Denton claim that segregation is perpetuated by, but also compounds, the effects of institutional racism and white prejudice. To support their claim the authors point to historical trends in levels of racial residential segregation they attribute to public policy as well as private decision‐making. The book makes a methodological statement as well in relation to the conceptualization and measurement of residential segregation.Williams, Richard, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen Diaz McConnell 2005. 'The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending.'Social Problems 52: 181–208.The authors develop a theoretical framework to account for an emerging 'new inequality' in home mortgage lending and home‐ownership that has contributed to contemporary patterns of residential segregation. The 'old inequality', which was characterized by individual‐ and neighborhood‐level race‐ and class‐based discrimination, gave way in the early 1990s to a new form of inequality based on access to high‐cost loans and exposure to predatory lending practices. The authors rely on descriptive metropolitan‐level data on home mortgage lending to document rising rates of home‐ownership and loan origination among African American and low‐income borrowers, and within minority neighborhoods, since the early 1990s. Their interpretation of these data, however, leads them to conclude that despite these gains, the residential segregation generated by the old inequality creates the conditions for the emergence of the new inequality and similar patterns of residential segregation.Wyly, Elvin K., and Daniel J. Hammel 2004. 'Gentrification, Segregation, and Discrimination in the American Urban System.'Environment and Planning A 36: 1215–41.This article is a nice companion to the article by Williams et al. (2005) (see above). The authors examine racial and economic inequalities, such as residential segregation and racial discrimination, related to mortgage reinvestment and gentrification in major US central cities since the early 1990s. Using regression models to analyze home mortgage lending data and credit market characteristics across 30 US cities, the authors find that both early‐ ('peripheral') and late‐stage ('core') gentrification reproduce familiar patterns of race‐ and class‐based segregation, and are associated with more intensified forms of racial discrimination by property developers, realtors, and lenders.Online materials

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) –Home Mortgage Disclosure Act http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/ This website provides access to publicly reported loan data under the provisions of the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. The site allows users to view descriptive information on consumer lending institutions as well as borrower and loan characteristics that can be geocoded by census tract. The site is fairly user‐friendly yet provides access to powerful aggregate loan data. Researchers have used these publicly available data to compile profiles of consumer finance and investment trends across metropolitan areas or to begin to document patterns of disinvestment, redlining, and subprime lending.
Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project (Reynolds Farley, University of Michigan) http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/racestart.aspQuoted from the website:This website provides you with indexes of racial residential segregation for all states, for all counties, for all metropolitan areas and for all cities of 100,000 or more using information from the Census of 2000. Indexes of dissimilarity, exposure indexes and interracial contact measures are available for five single races and for the three most frequently reported combinations of two races. Segregation measures are provided using three different levels of local area geography: census tracts, block groups, and blocks. The links on this page provide you with access to the calculation of measures, descriptions of their meaning, information about the census data and the measures as well as to a bibliography of major studies of the extent, causes, and consequences of racial residential segregation in the United States.
Windows on Urban Poverty (Paul Jargowsky) http://www.urbanpoverty.net/ This website provides interactive features that examine the 'spatial context' of urban poverty; that is, the ways in which poor and segregated neighborhoods shape the life chances of impoverished individuals and families. The site has links to reports and policy briefs as well as a mapping tool which allows users to view the spatial expression of concentrated poverty neighborhoods and related demographic information.
Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research (University at Albany, State University of New York) http://www.albany.edu/mumford/ The site allows users to access a wide range of social and economic indicators that document conditions of racial residential segregation across the US. The Mumford Center is a leader in reporting on national‐ and metropolitan‐level demographic trends compiled from publicly available US Census data.
The U.S. Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/ This is the official US government website where users can access US Census data. The site includes a range of interactive mapping tools that can be used to generate profiles of key demographic, social, and economic indicators at varying geographic scales, such as the neighborhood and metropolitan levels. The site also links users to relevant census‐based government reports, news releases, and even multimedia content (e.g., video, radio, photography).

Sample syllabusCourse outline and reading assignments Section 1: Segregation Trends and Patterns Residential Segregation in Black and White 'Census 2000 Basics' (http://www.census.gov/mso/www/c2000basics/00Basics.pdf)For an updated and extended discussion of measurement issues see: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/housing_patterns.htmlMassey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Chapter 1: 'The Missing Link'; Chapter 2: 'The Construction of the Ghetto'; Chapter 3: 'The Persistence of the Ghetto'Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. 'The Dimensions of Residential Segregation.'Social Forces 67: 281–315.Adelman, Robert M., and James Clarke Gocker. 2007. 'Racial Residential Segregation in Urban America.'Sociology Compass 1: 404–23. Moving Beyond the Black/White Dichotomy Logan, John R., Brian J. Stults, and Reynolds Farley. 2004. 'Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change.'Demography 41: 1–22.Fischer, Claude S., Gretchen Stockmayer, Jon Stiles, and Michael Hout. 2004. 'Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–2000.'Demography 41: 37–59.White, Michael J., Eric Fong, and Qian Cai. 2003. 'The Segregation of Asian‐origin Groups in the United States and Canada.'Social Science Research 32: 148–67.Crowder, Kyle D. 1999. 'Residential Segregation of West Indians in the New York/New Jersey Metropolitan Area: The Roles of Race and Ethnicity.'International Migration Review 33: 79–113. Section 2: Causes of Residential Segregation Institutions and Actors Charles, Camille Zubrinsky. 2003. 'The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation.'Annual Review of Sociology 29: 167–207.Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 2005. Chapter 1 ('Introduction') and Chapter 2 ('More Pluribus, Less Unum? The Changing Geography of Race and Opportunity').Tegeler, Phillip. 2005. Chapter 9 (Briggs): 'The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs'.Jackson, Kenneth.1985. Crabgrass Frontier. Chapter 11: 'Federal Subsidy and the Suburban Dream: How Washington Changed the American Housing Market'. Group Differences in Socioeconomic Status and Neighborhood Preferences Logan, John R., Richard D. Alba, Thomas McNulty, and Brian Fischer. 1996. 'Making a Place in the Metropolis: Locational Attainment in Cities and Suburbs.'Demography 33: 443–53.Alba, Richard D., John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults, Gilbert Marzan, and Wenquan Zhang. 1999. 'Immigrant Groups in the Suburbs: A Reexamination of Suburbanization and Spatial Assimilation.'American Sociological Review 64: 446–60.Harris, David R. 2001. 'Why are Whites and Blacks Averse to Black Neighbors?'Social Science Research 30: 100–16.Krysan, Maria, and Reynolds Farley. 2002. 'The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do they Explain Persistent Segregation?'Social Forces 80: 937–80.Emerson, Michael O., George Yancey, and Karen J. Chai. 2001. 'Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans.'American Sociological Review 66: 922–35. Mortgage Lending Discrimination Yinger, John. 1995. Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination. Chapter 2 ('The Housing Discrimination Study'); Chapter 3 ('Discrimination in Housing'); Chapter 7 ('The Impact of Housing Discrimination on Housing Quality, Racial Segregation, and Neighborhood Change').Ross, Stephen L., and Margery Austin Turner. 2005. 'Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes between 1989 and 2000.'Social Problems 52: 152–80.Williams, Richard, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen Diaz McConnell. 2005. 'The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending.'Social Problems 52: 181–208.Freidman, Samantha, and Gregory D. Squires. 2005. 'Does the Community Reinvestment Act Help Minorities Access Traditionally Inaccessible Neighborhoods?'Social Problems 52: 209–31. The Search for Housing Turner, Margery, and Stephen Ross. 2005. Chapter 4 (Briggs): 'How Racial Discrimination Affects the Search for Housing.'Farley, Reynolds. 1996. 'Racial Differences in the Search for Housing: Do Whites and Blacks Use the Same Techniques to Find Housing?'Housing Policy Debate 7: 367–85.Massey, Douglas S., and Garvey Lundy. 2001. 'Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings.'Urban Affairs Review 36: 452–69.Feagin, Joe. 1994. Living with Racism: The Black Middle‐Class Experience. Chapter 6: 'Seeking a Good Home and Neighborhood.' Section 3: Consequences of Residential Segregation Poverty Concentration and Hypersegregation Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. Chapter 5: 'The Creation of Underclass Communities'; Chapter 6: 'The Perpetuation of the Underclass'.Jargowsky, Paul A. 1997. Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City. Chapter 5: 'Theory and Evidence on Inner‐City Poverty.'Wilkes, Rima, and John Iceland. 2004. 'Hypersegregation in the Twenty‐First Century: An Update and Analysis.'Demography 41: 23–36.Roy, Kevin. 2004. 'Three‐Block Fathers: Spatial Perceptions and Kin‐Work in Low‐Income African American Neighborhoods.'Social Problems 51: 528–48. Neighborhood Effects Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon‐Rowley. 2002. 'Assessing "Neighborhood Effects": Social Processes and New Directions in Research.'Annual Review of Sociology 28: 443–78.LaVeist, Thomas A. 1993. 'Segregation, Poverty, and Empowerment: Health Consequences for African Americans.'The Milbank Quarterly 71: 41–64.Rosenbaum, Emily, and Laura E. Harris. 2001. 'Low‐Income Families in Their New Neighborhoods: The Short‐Term Effects of Moving from Chicago's Public Housing.'Journal of Family Issues 22: 183–210.Wagmiller, Robert L. 2007. 'Race and the Spatial Segregation of Jobless Men in Urban America.'Demography 44: 539–62. Crime and Neighborhoods Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. Preface, Introduction ('Down Germantown Avenue') and Chapter 1 ('Decent and Street Families').Pattillo‐McCoy, Mary. 1999. Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class. Chapter 4: 'Neighborhood Networks and Crime'.Massey, Douglas S. 2001. 'Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America.' Pp. 317–44 in Problem of the Century: Racial Stratification in the United States edited by Elijah Anderson and Douglas S. Massey.Logan, John R., and Brian J. Stults. 1999. 'Racial Differences in Exposure to Crime: The City and Suburbs of Cleveland in 1990.'Criminology 37: 251–76. Section 4: Mobility, Class, and Public Policy Residential Mobility Lee, Barrett A., R.S. Oropesa, and James W. Kanan. 1994. 'Neighborhood Context and Residential Mobility.'Demography 31: 249–70.South, Scott J., and Kyle D. Crowder. 1998. 'Leaving the 'Hood: Residential Mobility between Black, White, and Integrated Neighborhoods.'American Sociological Review 63: 17–26.Crowder, Kyle D., Scott J. South, and Erick Chavez. 2006. 'Wealth, Race, and Inter‐Neighborhood Migration.'American Sociological Review 71: 72–94.Pattillo‐McCoy, Mary. 2000. 'The Limits of Out‐Migration for the Black Middle Class.'Journal of Urban Affairs 22: 225–41. Intersection of Race and Class: The Black Middle Class Pattillo, Mary. 2005. 'Black Middle‐Class Neighborhoods.'Annual Review of Sociology 31: 305–29.Cashin, Sheryll D. 2001. 'Middle‐Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post‐Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America.'Cornell Law Review 86: 729–76.Adelman, Robert M. 2004. 'Neighborhood Opportunities, Race, and Class: The Black Middle Class and Residential Segregation.'City and Community 3: 43–63.Lacy, Karyn. 2004. 'Black Spaces, Black Places: Strategic Assimilation and Identity Construction in Middle‐Class Suburbia.'Ethnic and Racial Studies 27: 908–30. Public Policy and Politics Rubinowitz, Leonard S., and James E. Rosenbaum. 2000. Crossing the Class and Color Lines: From Public Housing to White Suburbia.Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 2005. Chapter 14: 'Politics and Policy: Changing the Geography of Opportunity'.Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. Chapter 8: 'The Future of the Ghetto'.Project ideas US Census Data Assignment (Adapted from an assignment developed by Nancy Denton, University at Albany, State University of New York)Your task for this assignment is to compare one US metropolitan area to another one. Your focus of the comparison should be on key sociodemographic variables including, but not limited to, the overall population size of the areas, the racial and ethnic composition of the areas, the socioeconomic standing of the areas, the housing quality, what types of occupational opportunities exist, the level of immigration in the areas, the level of residential segregation between groups in the areas, among others.You can choose any two metropolitan areas but they must be defined as such by the Census Bureau (i.e., make sure you obtain information at the metropolitan level). There should be some component of change; that is, identify how these variables have changed over time (an ideal strategy would be to focus on 1980 to 2000 changes, but there could be other strategies). In the end, you want a five‐page report comparing the two places. Which one would be better to live in? Why? From whose perspective?Potential data sources include:

The US Census: go to http://www.census.gov and click on 'American Factfinder' or another census tool
The Lewis Mumford Center: go to http://www.albany.edu/mumford and click on 'Census 2000' and use one of the tools to obtain data

Urban Ethnography Assignment (Adapted from an assignment developed by Charles Gallagher, Georgia State University)Write a short ethnography about an urban, public space. Your task is to choose a public space (broadly defined) and examine who uses the space, how the space is used, and the interactions that occur between people in that space. Pay close attention to issues like (but others too) the racial and ethnic background of the people using the space, the socioeconomic reasons which explain the location of the site (e.g., exchange versus use values; urban development), and the extent to which the space is actually 'public' (i.e., are there restrictions to the space like bars separating benches in half?).You can observe any public space. For example, the extent to which a park is actually public is continually and consistently contested and negotiated. What about transportation nodes? Malls? Restaurants? Comparative Urban Assignment Your task for this assignment is to review three scholarly articles about a city outside of the US. Your focus can be on any aspect of the city but you should include some general information about the area including, but not limited to, the geographic and demographic size of the area, the socioeconomic standing of the area, the residential segregation of groups in the area, among other issues.You can choose any city or metropolitan area as long as it is outside of the US. In the end, you want a five‐page report reviewing the three articles with a brief introduction about the city (this information could be gleaned from one of the articles).The main international urban journal, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, will be very useful for this assignment, but you can obtain articles from any peer‐reviewed journal. Make sure to use only scholarly journals rather than popular magazines, newspaper articles, or the internet. Rely on the social science literature.

The objective of this policy note on people with disabilities in Sierra Leone is to: (i) provide a diagnosis on the scale and nature of the problem; (ii) analyze current public policies in support of people with disabilities; (iii) review public and private programs; and (iv) propose some policy options to policy makers and development partners. This note contains five chapters, the first of which is this introduction. Chapter two summarizes the diagnosis of the scale and nature of the people with disabilities issue by examining the prevalence, types, and causes of disability and by discussing the socioeconomic profiles of people with disabilities, particularly their access to health, education, and social protection services. Chapter three includes an analysis of current public policies and of the legal and institutional framework for the protection and promotion of the rights of people with disabilities in Sierra Leone. Chapter four provides an overview of the current public and private programs to support people with disabilities, with a focus on their objectives, costs, limitations, and impact. Most of these programs have been in direct response to the conflict and have had an emergency nature, at times disregarding some of the more structural issues concerning people with disabilities and the needs of those people whose disability is only indirectly related to the conflict. The final chapter, chapter five, outlines possible options to reform the overall public/private approach to people with disabilities, and explores options for inclusive policies and programs to support people with disabilities including sector interventions to improve their standard of living.

This book has the potential to contribute to a reversing of this trend, whereby activities in not only the health sector but also in other sectors relevant to nutrition will gain increased support and prominence in national development planning. South Asia has by far the largest number of malnourished women and children, and no other region of the world has higher rates of malnutrition. Malnutrition in childhood is the biggest contributor to child mortality; a third of child deaths have malnutrition as an underlying cause. For the surviving children, malnutrition has lifelong implications because it severely reduces a child's ability to learn and to grow to his or her full potential. Malnutrition thus leads to less productive adults and weaker national economic performance. Therefore, the impact of malnutrition on a society's productivity and well being and a nation's long-term development is hard to underestimate. For the South Asia region of the World Bank, malnutrition is a key development priority, and in the coming years, the Bank intends to enhance dramatically its response to this challenge. As a first step, a series of country assessments such as this one are being carried out. These assessments will be used to reinforce the dialogue with governments and other development partners to scale up an evidence-based response against malnutrition. To succeed, we will need to address the problem comprehensively, which will require engaging several sectors. This assessment of malnutrition in Afghanistan lays out the scale, scope, and causes of the problem. The assessment also indicates key elements of a potential response.

This brief summarizes some of the significant constraints women in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) face: limited labor market mobility, a mismatch between skills acquired in school and what is in demand in the labor market, and legal or institutional factors related to cultural norms, all of which inhibit the transition from school to work. The brief identifies various policy options and outlines the World Bank's strategy for supporting governments in achieving gender parity in the region. Rigorous analytical work, experimental policy pilots and lending operations with a strong gender focus all form part of the Bank's strategy towards reducing gender gaps in economic opportunities.

Agriculture in Tanzania accounts for 28 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs 80 percent of its labor force. The sector is also an important source of export revenues. The data and findings presented in this report provide a summary of the performance of the agriculture sector in Tanzania using a set of indicators covering six areas. These are: 1) access to and availability of certified seed; 2) availability of and access to fertilizer; 3) access to farm machinery, particularly tractor hire services for land preparation; 4) access to agricultural and agro-enterprise finance; 5) the cost and efficiency of transporting agricultural commodities; and 6) measures of policy certainty and uncertainty as perceived by private investors and the effects these have on the enabling environment for producers and agribusinesses. The Agribusiness Indicators (ABI) team conducted interviews with Government agencies, private firms (fertilizer importers, seed companies, tractor importers and distributors, transporters), commercial banks, farmer-based organizations, donors, and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The ABI program is pilot testing an initial set of indicators on the ease (or difficulty) of operating agribusinesses in African countries. The indicators are used to assess whether the countries have an enabling environment that is conducive to agribusiness investment, competitiveness, and ultimately agriculture-led growth.

Despite the recent slowdown, the underlying growth of the global economy remains solid. After a 4 percent growth in 2010, Russia's real output is expected to grow 4.4 percent in 2011, increasingly driven by domestic demand. Russia's households have absorbed the food price shock thanks to a combination of higher wages and pensions, and resort to private and public safety nets. The country emerged from the global recession with lower unemployment and poverty than feared. But global risks and uncertainties increased with the new oil shock. Although the short-term impact will be positive for Russia's export and fiscal revenues, there is no room for complacency. Macroeconomic policy should focus on the short-term objective of controlling inflation and medium-term fiscal adjustment towards long-term, sustainable level of non-oil fiscal deficit. Improving the efficiency of public expenditure to create fiscal space for productive infrastructure and strengthening the investment climate for the private sector remain among key long-term challenges. The ongoing rethinking of the government's long-term strategy and a period of high oil revenues provide an opportunity to focus on these long-term issues more forcefully than during the global crisis.

THE EFFECT OF INFORMATIONAL GAP ACTIVITY TO THE UNMOTIVATED STUDENTS' ABILITY OF 8th GRADERS AT MTS AL HASANAH 1 SLAHUNG, PONOROGO Diyan Novika English Education Department, Language and Art Faculty, Surabaya State University. ndidy71@gmail.com Drs Fahri, M.A English Education Department, Language and Art Faculty, Surabaya State University. fahri@englishunesa.com Abstract The aims of this research is to find out the improvement of unmotivated students' speaking ability after treating by using Informational Gap Activity in teaching English of the eight grader of Mts Al Hasanah 1 Slahung Ponorogo. The method that is used in this study is a quantitative method. This design of study had more potential threat to internal validity as the time between pretest and posttest increases and as experimental situation become less controlled and contrived (Mc Millan, 1992 : 175) the design of single group of pretest and posttest. The data on students' English speaking ability were collected with a performance test. The hypothesis were tested with two-ways analysis using statistic calculation of T-test formula with significance degree 5% and 1%. And the other one is using questionnaire. The results of analysis showed that: (1) there were differences of the English speaking ability between the unmotivated students who learned through and that of the unmotivated students who learned through conventional method The result is 2,045 2,756 (2) and the other one is from their responses based on the questionnaire. The conclusion is that the implementation of Informational Gap Activity method has an effect on the English speaking ability viewed from students' verbal aptitude. Keywords: Unmotivated students, Informational Gap Activity INTRODUCTION English becomes the most essential language in the world. Almost all the people from many different countries around the world use it to communicate. The area of English has always become a special interest. It is spoken by millions of people all over the world. Genc (2007, p. 6) says that "when we learn a language, there are four skills that we need for complete communication. When we learn our native language, we usually learn to listen first, then to speak, then to read, and finally to write. These are called the four "language skills". As a consequence, English serves for many times many more people as a barrier between themselves and those some fields of interest, many people in their own countries will not be able to become doctors, for example if they cannot learn enough English. That's some reasons why English is important. Actually, learning process becomes the primary reference for determining success in learning. But, the more we get in our nation nowadays are most teachers do not pay attention and assume that this is not an important thing to discuss. On the contrary, it is very important for our education. According to the 2006 National Study of Junior/Senior High School Student Engagement (Yazzie-Mintz, 2007), two of three high school students are bored every day in class—typically, they say, because the work isn't interesting, challenging, or relevant for them. It seems that the classroom activities didn't interesting anymore for them. One more thing that we have to know is that the classroom is a social construct that is designed to facilitate learning. While learning can occur even when the only active participant is the student-as is the case when a person is reading a user manual the most effective learning scenarios are those that involve the proactive involvement of both instructors and students. The fundamental benefit of a personal student-teacher type of interaction is that the feedback and control mechanism is firmly established and can always be invoked to maintain the learning direction towards pre-set objectives. Moreover, the learning process is essentially affected by peer-group relationships within the classroom environment. That is, the interactions between teachers and students as well as among students constitute the learning network within which lesson concepts are shared, affirmed, and built upon. When disconnect occurs between teachers and students, the class becomes ineffective. Sutherland and Singh ( 2004 ) said "states that passive learning contributes to the failure of students". The lack of adequate student involvement almost certainly spells cognitive failure, especially when the opportunities to learn and practice English outside the classroom are rare or isolated. We can imagine what will happen with the student in that condition. Sure, unmotivated student will really increase just because of passive learning. And the more problem frequently found caused from that condition is that because of motivation lack to practice the second language in daily conversation. They are also too shy and afraid to take part in the conversation and afraid to make mistakes. Many factors can cause the problem of the students. Speaking skills here namely the students that learning language. Interest the material and the media among others including the technique in teaching English. Educator in general will agree with the importance of motivation as a key to success in language acquisition as it's both of condition and a result of effective interaction (winne and mark, 1989) "journal of information management education volume 11, 2012" Now, let's compare between what Yazzie-Mintz and Genc. Yazzie-Mintz said based on their research that there are two of three high school students are bored every day in class and the typically cause is that the work isn't interesting, challenging, or relevant for them. It seems that the classroom activities didn't interesting anymore for them. The second is about Genc statement (2007, p. 6) he said "when we learn a language, there are four skills that we need for complete communication. In the other hand, the class activity should be continuing as well as possible to make the student able to speak English, at least they have braveness to speak. Especially for the unmotivated student, and there should be good activities to face them. Of course the methods/activity should be interesting. One of them is by giving students information – gap activity which might make the students interact easily in speaking activity. Sari (2008,p. 3) says, "the core of information gap method is a corporation between groups and pairs". Information gap activities involve the learners in sharing the information that they have in order to solve a problem, gather information or make decisions (Rees,2005, p. 156). So, English language learning students should be involved in as many situations as possible where one of them has some information and another does not, but has to get it. In other words, situations containing an information gap between the participants are very useful. Neu and Reeser (1997, p. 127) said that in an information gap activity, one person has certain information that must be shared with others in order to solve a problem, gather information or make decisions. Information gap is a useful activity in which one person has information that the other lacks. Another advantage of information gap activities is that students are forced to negotiate meaning because they must make what they are saying comprehensible to others in order to accomplish the task (Neu and Reeser, 1997, p. 128). For these reasons, the writer is interested in analyzing the effect of Information Gap Activity to the unmotivated students' speaking ability of 8th graders at Mts Alhasanah 1 Slahung, Ponorogo METODE This section presented the steps how the researcher conducts the study. It covers the research design, participant of study, research instrument, procedure of collecting data, and data analysis. This research was an experimental research. It was done to find out the effect of Information Gap Activity to teach the unmotivated students speaking ability of the eight graders junior high student of Mts Al-Hasanah 1 Slahung. The method that is used in this study is a quantitative method. The study is based on both library and a field research. In the field research, the writer collected the data by using observing teaching and also treat the student (teaching English using information gap activity) learning the subjects. In this study, the researcher just used one group an experimental group. It is called as single group pretest-posttest design. And the results were determined by comparing the pretest and posttest scores. This design of study had more potential threat to internal validity as the time between pretest and posttest increases and as experimental situation become less controlled and contrived (Mc Millan, 1992 : 175) the design of single group of pretest and posttest is presented below: Table 2 Single group pretest and posttest design Group Pretest Treatment Posttest A Y1 X Y2 In which: A : The group of subjects Y1 : The pre-test given before treatment X : The independent variable or treatment where information gap activity was applied Y2 : The post-test given before treatment There were two variables in this study. There were dependent variable and independent variable. In this case, the independent variable is the teaching technique "informational gap activity". And the dependent variable would be the students' speaking ability. Based on (Mc Millan, 1992:22) stated that independent variable is the first thing that influence or predict the result. As the dependent variable is the students' speaking score. According to Mc Millan (1992:22), dependent variable is something that affected and predicted by the independent variable. The Participants of the study is ninth graders of mts Al Hasanah 1 Slahung, Ponorogo. It is located at Jalan Ponorogo-Pacitan. The researcher chose the place because the researcher graduated from there so that it makes the researcher easier to conduct the research there. There is one instruments use by the researcher in his study. There is: speaking performance (which is the score of pronunciation, grammar, vocabulary, fluency and comprehension) that would be applied using pre-test and post-test. The data from the score of speaking performance test are collected from two tests which are pre-test and post-test. And the data is presented in quantitative manner since the study is experimental research. These tests are to find out the unmotivated students' speaking ability. Before implementing the technique, the researcher teaches them without using Information Gap Activity. Then the researcher administered pre-test to the students. The students are asked to perform their speaking in front of the class with their friend then the researcher asked the some question about the materials about telling the time. In the next day the researcher gives them two times treatment or teaching speaking using Information Gap Activity then he gives the post-test to know the result by using rubric of speaking as below: a. Accent Pronunciation frequently unintelligible. Frequent gross errors and a very heavy accent make understanding difficult, require frequent repetition. "Foreign accent" requires concentrated listening and mispronunciation lead to occasional misunderstanding and apparent errors in grammar or vocabulary. Marked "foreign accent" and occasional mispronunciations which do not interfere with understanding. No conspicuous mispronunciations, but would not be taken for a native speaker. Native pronunciation, which no trace of "foreign accent". b. Grammar Grammar almost entirely inaccurate except in stock phrases. Constant errors showing control of very few major patterns and frequently preventing communication. Frequent errors showing some major patterns uncontrolled and causing occasional irritation and misunderstanding. Occasional errors showing imperfect control of some patterns but no weakness that causing misunderstanding. Few errors, with no patterns of failure. No more than two errors during the interview. c. Vocabulary Vocabulary inadequate for even the simplest conversation. Vocabulary limited to basic personal and survival areas (time, food, transportation, family, etc.) Choice of words sometimes inaccurate, limitation of vocabulary prevent discussion of some common professional and social topics Professional vocabulary adequate to discuss special interest; general vocabulary permits discussion of any non-technical subject with some circumlocutions. Professional vocabulary broad and precise; general vocabulary adequate to cope with complex practical problems and varied social situation. Vocabulary apparently as accurate and extensive as that of an educated native speaker d. Fluency Speech is so halting and fragmentary that conversation is virtually impossible. Speech is very slowly and uneven except for short or routine sentences. Speech is frequently hesitant and jerky; sentences may be left uncompleted. Speech is occasionally hesitant, with some unevenness caused by rephrasing and grouping for words. Speech is effortless and smooth, but perceptibly non-native in speed and evenness. Speech is on all professional and general topics as effortless and smooth as a native speaker's. e. Comprehension Understanding only slow, very simple speech on common social and touristic topic; requires constant repetition and rephrasing. Understanding little for the simplest type of conversation. Understanding careful, somewhat simplified speech directed to him, with considerable repetition and rephrasing. Understands quite well normal educated speech directed to him, but requires occasional repetition and rephrasing. Understands everything in normal educated conversation except for every colloquial or low-frequency items, or exceptionally rapid or slurred speech. Understands everything in both formal and colloquial speech to be expected of an educated native speaker. To know the result of teaching speaking by using Information Gap Activity, the writer gives oral test to the students. Because the test is oral test, the writer divided the score into five criteria, which are the scores of pronunciation, grammar, vocabulary, fluency and comprehension. Then, the data from pre-test, they were analyzed and processed by using statistic calculation of T-test formula with significance degree 5% and 1%. The formula as follows: To = TO : Test observation MD : Mean of differences; the average score from the differences gained scores between I variable and II variable, which are calculated with the formula; MD = ΣD : Total score between I variable (X variable) and II variable (Y variable). And D is gained with formula; D = X-Y N : Number of cases SDD : The standard deviation from differences between score of X variable and Y variable, which is gained with the formula; SDD = -[ ]2 SEMD : The standard error from mean of differences that is gained with the formula; SEMD = DF : Degree of freedom with formula: N-1 The other data will be done by giving questionnaire to students, and giving the some causes that usually make the boring and ask them to make list based on their opinion. From the questionnaire that had been answered and the list had been arrange it will answer question number one and. Table 3. Conversion Table Total score FSI Level 16 – 25 0+ 26 – 32 1 33 – 42 1+ 43 – 52 2 53 – 63 2+ 63 – 72 3 73 – 82 3+ 83 – 92 4 93 – 99 4+ RESULT AND DISCUSSION Result In this chapter the researcher presented and analyzed the data. Dealing with analyzing the data, the researcher used t-test formula. The data were obtained from the test had been done previously. A. Description of Data After conducting the research, the writer obtained two kinds of data the scores of pre-test and the scores of post-test. And the other one is questionnaire. 1. Pre-test and Post-Test data a. The Pre-Test Scores The data of the pre-test scores can be seen in the table 4 below: No P G V F C T 1 75 53 52 63 52 295 2 76 73 60 68 73 350 3 74 75 68 70 73 360 4 60 85 74 65 86 370 5 72 95 73 77 93 410 6 64 76 73 73 74 360 7 56 48 55 43 45 250 8 56 48 55 43 45 250 9 - - - - - 10 64 76 73 73 74 360 11 77 93 83 78 90 421 12 55 45 60 45 47 252 13 55 56 77 54 54 296 14 53 55 52 53 50 263 15 64 66 62 62 66 320 16 64 66 62 62 66 320 17 72 95 73 77 93 410 18 64 76 73 73 74 360 19 62 74 60 66 68 330 20 63 57 55 60 65 300 21 55 90 65 65 90 365 22 65 84 86 73 82 390 23 63 57 55 60 65 300 24 58 55 55 50 55 273 25 58 55 55 50 55 273 26 65 84 86 73 82 390 27 55 67 55 58 63 298 28 55 67 55 58 63 298 29 64 66 62 62 66 320 After the data is analyzed, it shows that the mean ( x ) is 328 the standard deviation is 15,55 the median is 350 the highest score is 421 and the lowest score is 250. b. The Post-Test Scores The data of the post-test score can be seen in the table 5 below: No P G V F C T 1 82 93 90 80 93 438 2 82 96 80 81 91 430 3 82 92 80 74 93 421 4 74 90 82 74 90 410 5 83 90 82 75 90 420 6 75 90 70 71 90 497 7 82 80 74 72 80 388 8 72 74 72 75 72 365 9 - - - - - 10 82 93 85 72 93 425 11 76 90 82 82 90 420 12 74 90 82 74 90 410 13 80 84 75 75 80 394 14 84 90 83 83 90 430 15 66 70 70 64 72 342 16 74 80 82 74 80 390 17 82 92 80 76 84 416 18 75 90 76 73 90 404 19 75 80 74 71 80 380 20 80 90 82 76 90 418 21 73 90 80 65 90 398 22 82 92 90 84 92 440 23 74 90 82 74 90 410 24 64 72 70 65 72 343 25 72 62 70 55 60 319 26 72 84 80 74 82 392 27 74 70 64 62 70 340 28 74 70 64 62 72 342 29 73 80 65 72 80 370 After the data is analyzed, it shows that the mean ( X ) is 398,28 the standard deviation is 67,684 the median is 394 the highest score is 497 and the lowest score is 319. c. The Comparison of the Test Result The comparison of the test result can be seen in the table 6 below: No Pre Post D D2 1 295 438 -143 20449 2 350 430 -80 6400 3 360 421 -61 3721 4 370 410 -40 1600 5 410 420 -30 900 6 360 497 -137 18769 7 250 388 -138 19044 8 250 365 -115 13225 9 - - - - 10 360 425 -65 4225 11 421 420 1 1 12 252 410 -158 24964 13 296 394 -98 9604 14 263 430 -167 27889 15 320 342 -22 484 16 320 390 -70 4900 17 410 416 6 36 18 360 404 -44 1936 19 330 380 -50 2500 20 300 418 -118 13924 21 365 398 -33 1089 22 390 440 -50 2500 23 300 410 -110 12100 24 273 343 -70 4900 25 273 319 -46 2116 26 390 392 -2 4 27 298 340 -42 1764 28 298 342 -44 1936 29 320 370 -50 2500 N:29 ΣX = 9184 ΣY = 11152 ΣD = -1976 ΣD2 = 203480 Based on the data in table 5, the researcher calculated the result of ΣD = -1976 and ΣD2 = 203480. Then, he tried to find out the standard deviation of differences (SDD) with the formula: SDD = 2 SDD = 2 SDD = SDD = SDD = SDD = 48,72 To find out the mean of differences (MD) between variable X and Y, the researcher used the formula: MD = ∑ MD = MD = 68,13 After gaining the result of SDD = 68.13 the researcher calculated the standard error from mean of differences (SEMD) between variable X and Y: SEMD = SEMD = SEMD = SEMD = SEMD = 9,22 The last calculation is determining the result of t observation (to) of the test with formula: To = To = To = 7,389 The result 7,389 indicated that there was a difference of degree as much as 7,389. Regardless the minus, it doesn.t indicate negative score. Then, to complete the result of the research, the writer finds out the degree of freedom (df) with the formula: df = N - 1 = 29-1 = 28 df = 28 (see table of .t. value at the degree of significance of 5% and 1%) At the degree of significance 5% = 2,045 At the degree of significance 1% = 2,756 The result is 2,045 2,756 The result of analyzing the data by using the above formula shows that the coefficient is 7,389. It means that there is a significance improvement after the informational gap activity is used to teach speaking. B. Discussion After doing the research and analyzing the data. Let me analyze in other way as below : Table 7. The Result of Pre-test and Post-test Group Pre-test Post-test Observed-t Pre-Test and Post-test Single Group 328 398.28 7,389 From the table above, it showed the mean score of pre-test is 328 and the mean score of post-test is 398.28 It means that there was really significant difference and improvement of the score between them. Based on the result of the data analysis, it is proven that the students. Score of speaking taught by using Informational Gap Activity is better. It means that the use of information gap activity in teaching speaking is quite effective. Another reason based on the students. Responses are because most students find that information gap activity is enjoyable. This reason leads to better attention in learning and stimulate them to participate in information gap activity. But the problem that they faced mostly is lack of confidence and lack of vocabulary. In the early stages of the Informational Gap Activity the students were uncomfortable and uncertain. This led to initial lapses of silence. But soon they began helping one another to decide who should speak. Towards the end, their shyness left them and they began prompting each other with ideas. It can be told that "Informational Gap Activity" is the one of methods that can be used to teach and improve unmotivated students' speaking ability. The prove is that there is improvement of students' speaking score after treated by using Informational Gap Activity and that is really good effect of Informational Gap Activity. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION Conclusion Based on the research, the writer concludes that: From the result of the analysis of the research, it is proven that the students. Score of speaking taught by using Informational Gap Activity is better than before. And based on the result has answered by the research question, shows that using information activity in teaching speaking is quite effective. The use of information activity makes teaching learning and speaking activity more enjoyable and interesting. Simply that the technique the teacher use is quite attracting them and helps the shy students by providing a mask, where students with difficulty in conversation are liberated. In addition, it is fun and most students will agree that enjoyment leads to better learning. Here, the students have to practice speaking and find the answer themselves of course by asking friend. It will make them confident to speak. In information activity, the world of the classroom is broadened to include the outside world. This offers a much wider range of language opportunities. So, the students can be anyone and in any situation they wish. The use of information activity makes the class more active and alive. Students are willing to participate without any forces from the teacher. The use of information activity makes the students more motivated in learning and easier to grasp the lesson. Problems that the students faced mostly in Informational Gap Activity are lack of confidence and lack of vocabulary. B. Suggestion The success in teaching doesn.t depend on the lesson program only, but more important is how the teacher presents the lesson and uses various techniques to manage the class more lively and enjoyable. Regarding to the teaching speaking by using Informational Gap Activity, the writer gives some suggestion for the teacher and students as follow: For the teacher: The teacher should choose the materials that are appropriate and not too difficult for the students. Before assigning the information activity to the students, the teacher should make sure that the students have fully understood and have the information they need. The teacher should keep control the student activities. The teacher should present the language in an enjoyable, relaxed and understandable way. For the students: The students are hoped not to be shy in acting out their role. The students are hoped to be active and creative in enriching their vocabularies. The students are hoped to use English when they practice Informational Gap Activity although it is hard for them. The students should take part REFERENCES Sasson, Dorit. 2008. Information Gap Activities: Working in Groups or Pairs during Cooperative Learning Lessons. Available on http://lesson-plan-help.suite101.com/article.cfm/ learning games Bartz, HE. 1976. Basic Statistical in Education and Behavioral Sciences. Burgess Publishing Company. Mc Millan, J. H. 1992. Education Research Fundamentals for the customer. New York: Harper Collin Publisher Beard, P. R. (2008, November Thursday 13). What is the Role of the Teacher Today? Teacher's quality. Brewster, C. &. (October 22, 2007). Increasing Student engagement and motivation. Donald ary, l. c. (2006). Introduction to research in education. Dornyei, Z. (1994). Motivation and Motivating in the Foreign Language Classroom.The Modern Language Journal, Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 273-284 . Hicks, C., & Glasgow, N. &. ((2005)). what successful mentors do. Leech, B. L. (2003). Techniques for Semi-structured Interviews. Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4. Defrioka, A (2009). Improving Students' Interaction in Speaking Class Through Information GAP Activities, Vol.3 No.2 33-45 Richards, k. (2003). Qualitative Inquiry in tesol. Qualitative Inquiry . Schmidt, B. &. (1996). Foreign Language Motivation: Internal and external connections. Path Ways to the New Century. Fitriah, M. 2010. Improving Speaking Ability of Descriptive Text Use "Three-Step Interview for Eight Graders of SMPN 26 Surabaya". Brown, H. Douglas. 1994. Principal of Language Learning and Teaching. Third Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Tudor, Ian. 2001. The Dynamic of the Language Classroom. UK: Cambridge University

As much as COVID-19 is a health and economic crisis, at its core, it is also a governance crisis.

NDI President Derek Mitchell and new Director of Democratic Governance Kristen Sample delve into ways governments and the international community have risen (or not) to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Derek Mitchell: As we all continue to shelter in place and respond to the colossal health and economic crisis that is COVID-19, we must not forget that at its core, pandemics are as much a result of governance failure as any failure of healthcare or health system.
Since working to support democratic processes, institutions and governance around the world is what NDI does for a living, we thought it useful to delve into the role governance has played in the COVID-19 pandemic with NDI's experience in more than 50 countries around the world serving as a guide. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute.
To discuss all this with me in this podcast, I'm joined by NDI's new director of democratic governance, Kristen Sample.
Kristen Sample: Thank you so much Derek.
DM: Kristen just joined us on March 1. She brings more than 20 years of democratic governance experience with her to NBI having advised and evaluated programs at UN Women, UN Democracy Fund, the Open Society Foundation, Global Partners, Governance and International IDEA. Kristen is an expert on countering corruption, legislative strengthening in the nexus of gender and politics and she has led projects focused on the impact of democratic reform on economic development and citizen security. At a moment when the global crisis in governance is at the center of international conversation, at least before the pandemic push pause, we are thrilled to have Kristen aboard to look at that issue with fresh creativity here at NBI. So welcome Kristen to your very first DemWorks podcast.
KS: I'm really pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today on such important issues.
DM: So we'll speak about the crisis of governance but also the pandemic factor as well. But I do want to start with this global governance crisis that has sort of preceded this. This is a broader overhang. We've seen all over the world popular demonstrations over the past year and more and everywhere from Moscow to Managua, to Hong Kong, to Khartoum, to Algeria, to Istanbul, to Paris. You can go on and on. And what it represents is a frustration with the quality of governance. Democracy somehow is not delivering for people. And I want to hear your thoughts on that. It's a moment of turmoil certainly. People will look at this and say, "Well, democracy is failing," but it's more than democracy that this is happening. It's a general quality of governance question that I think actually provides an opportunity. So let me just ask your thoughts on that first off, Kristen.
KS: Yeah. Thanks so much for that question, Derek. I think that NDI, since we have officers or programs spanning every region of the world basically in more than 50 countries, we're in a very good position to be able to take the pulse of what's happening in the different countries. In fact, we have been conducting surveys every two weeks of our country programs to get a sense of what's happening on the ground and we've received some very interesting signals that I'm really happy to be able to share with you today.
On the one side, we are saying that in many countries governments are responding very seriously, in very concerted ways to the health crisis. I mean in more than two thirds of the countries. The governments in the countries where we work are closing nonessential businesses in over 60%, they are communicating in ways, having very intensive communication campaigns that really are reaching all citizens. But when it comes to the democracy side, when it comes to implementing that response and pursuing a response that's consistent with democratic principles and norms and values and institutions, we are seeing some troubling developments at the same time.
For instance, the number of governments by our account, over 40% of the governments in the countries where we work are declaring emergency powers and it's clear that this is an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary measures, but in many cases these emergency powers are inconsistent with democratic principles. They are not linked to the crisis. There is no provision for legislative oversight or in many cases, these have no sunset class, so there's no time limit and these are simply open-ended.
And link to that and linked in many cases to these emergency powers, emergency decrees, we're seeing an uptick also in threats to fundamental freedoms. For instance, nearly half of our countries are reporting that there are measures in place where governments are repressing non-state media who are critical of the government's response to the pandemic and that in some cases, again, almost 50% of our countries, there are measures in place where governments are limiting space for civil society to engage in political actions.
Another factor that I'd like to highlight too is while we're all distracted by the pandemic and while people are at home and perhaps with less access to information and less direct contact with government, there are also signals that many governments are using this as an opportunity to diminish anti-corruption controls. So that means that in some cases economic response packages or healthcare delivery is taking place with less transparency and less openness, which as you can imagine is a risk in terms of making sure that those resources are actually getting where they need to be.
And all of this, all of the stresses, the frustration and these concerns of course also have impacts when it comes to citizen trust, interpersonal trust citizen trust of the government and also we're seeing greater potential for civic unrest and a deteriorating security environment.
So all together, I hate to start with such a pessimistic view, but I think it is important again, through the networks that we have, the relationships that we have with political and civic actors on the ground, to convey the seriousness of the situation and to make sure that we're always communicating that well, this response requires really drastic measures. These measures need to be consonant of course, with the principles of democratic governance.
DM: Right. It fits into this broader competition of narratives that occurred even before the pandemic began, where China or Russia saying, "Look, authoritarian governments are more efficient in providing services. We do this stuff better. Democracy is messy." And they're able, as you say, to take advantage of this moment when people are looking for strong central control to make that case and to both do that rhetorically but also through provision of services.
And then it's not just those major countries. You'll have folks whether it's Hungary or Poland or you just go around the world, they're postponing elections. They are shutting down civil society, they're settling scores with adversaries. They're constraining public debate, saying that those things are luxuries during a time of crisis and that gives them an opportunity then as you said, for not just power grabs, but resource grabs and money grabs and they say, "Look, these are extraordinary times. They require extraordinary measures." And the concern is that these extraordinary measures will be permanent, that they'll say you need us to be surveilling people.
So this is a challenge for certainly those who do democracy work and for folks inside these countries. But I think the broader question of security, we'll talk about that maybe a little bit later, but it's interesting what we're seeing on the ground as you say.
You do a lot of work in the legislative sphere, you have a lot of background on that. How legislatures are particularly important. Civil society is too, but just focusing on legislature's role as a check and balance against executive overreach, can you talk about from the NDI experience or your other observation, how legislatures are being challenged, how they're dealing with this moment, how they're adapting to deal with the COVID-19 moment.
KS: Yeah, absolutely. So I'm so glad you brought this point up. The first challenge that I'd highlight is this risk that the legislative branch is getting sidelined. In a crisis like this, the executive branch is generally front and center. Their role is clearly understood by citizens. Head of state might be the one out there doing daily press briefings or a health minister communicating medical reports. And there's this sense of emergency that as I sort of alluding to before, it seems to empower the executive branch. And unfortunately that seems to be, in many cases, at the expense of the legislative power.
And additionally, another challenge and another reason that legislatures are perhaps getting crowded out or sidelined is simply that, the coronavirus, by it's dynamic, it's not socially compatible. And since parliaments are these multi-member bodies that have more diffuse operations, more diffuse leadership and that involve hundreds of different people, it's simply just a challenge to assemble a large group of people together, bring them together and keep them front and center in this crisis.
So if that first challenge is making sure that people just keep in mind that legislatures matter and the legislatures are able to exert their rights and their authority, I'd say that the second challenge of course is just how do parliaments, legislatures operate in a virtual world. Politicians are by nature, they like to shake hands, they like to get out on the street, they need to be in touch with their constituents. And there are so many challenge involved in this current world that we have where we should all be social distancing.
So looking across the world where we work, their parliaments are adopting different measures. Some of them are using social distancing restrictions like reducing the number of MPs in sessions. Others are moving to remote voting, remote deliberations. And then others are not meeting at all, which of course is quite terrible. And in those cases where legislatures have been dissolved or have been suspended for long periods of time.
We are working too, as you were saying, as NDI closely with parliaments in a number of countries to try to do those adaptations to the rules of procedures so that they're able to continue meeting in session and continue deliberating and continuing exercising oversight. For instance, we have connected parliamentarians in Colombia with parliamentarians in Ecuador. We have virtual sessions to learn from Ecuador's experience in adopting a regulation for the implementation of virtual session and teleworking.
So we are trying to connect parliamentarians across countries to understand how some parliaments have been moving forward in terms of remote procedures and how that's going for them. And two more challenges. One I'd highlight is that oversight role that we've been talking about. And from the same survey that we conducted with our country programs, we found that in 59% of the countries, checks and balances have been weakened, have deteriorated under the pandemic.
And this is happening at such an unfortunate time when there's so many policy measures that need to be approved and put in place. If we just take the issue of debt policy for instance, I saw a statistic from the Westminster Foundation that more than 80 countries have already requested emergency aid from the IMF. I mean these countries are struggling of course to meet different types of fiscal obligations and they are desperate for cash in order to ramp up health services and put in place economic measures.
And so these governments are taking on debt obligations, debt burns that are going to have far reaching impacts and long lasting impacts that should really be approved by the legislative branch and include monitoring and reporting. And that's not always the case in most of these instances.
DM: So you just say it's a very dangerous time and folks are adapting procedurally, but there are really implications to this longterm, including for security. And I think we'll get to that after the break.
For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institutions, practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.
KS: Welcome back. Derek, I've heard you speak to the issue of authoritarian systems and how they're operating in this crisis and that the authoritarian nature in itself makes health crises more likely. And you've also said in some of your speeches and some of the conversations we've had that it's not a coincidence that the pandemic started in China and I'd really like to hear from your expertise, your deep background on China specifically. Can you explain to listeners why that is? Why there is that connection?
DM: Well, as I said at the top, this is not just a health crisis, it's a governance crisis. It's a factor of governance both in the prevention of the pandemic and the response to it. We talked so far mostly about the response, how we're responding to the pandemic, but the core of the pandemic is a failure of governance. The difference between a local health crisis that is contained and a pandemic lies in the ability of a political system to respond to that early challenge quickly and effectively. And that requires both government and civic action. And if you're going to deal with this crisis early, it requires both. To do that, you have to act swiftly. You have to have widespread testing and contact tracing. You need critical support from citizens. In order to do all that and to ensure that that happens, you have to have basic civic trust.
Closed societies routinely fail that test of having that civic trust and that rapid action for some very practical reasons. When a government suppresses a free flow of information, when it fails to empower independent civic institutions, when it's too insecure to convey bad news candidly, doesn't feel that it has a political legitimacy, therefore, it's insecure to convey bad news. When its data can't be trusted because it's opaque, when its officials are afraid to speak truth to power or communicate inconvenient truths to their superiors or act decisively, absent waiting for some strict orders from the very center and they can't move quickly, the result can be deadly.
It turns what is a local health issue into a pandemic so it crosses borders. It becomes not just a problem for one country but for all others. So democratic governance is very, very practical and once again in this regard, transparent, accountable, inclusive, responsive, open governments is essential to crisis response but it's also essential to prevent the crisis from emerging to begin with.
And it is a matter of national security. This highlights frankly what many of us have known all along, that this is not just nice but has very practical national security effects. And as we just talked earlier, the irony is that just as the world needs more open democratic societies to prevent future crises and deal with the current one, there are opportunistic politicians who are closing political and civic space. That I think is a very practical reason why that closed societies cause these pandemics.
KS: I think that all of those points that you've been raising in terms of the threats and the vulnerabilities are so important for us to keep front and center. At the same time, here in NDI, as you know, is we're very keen to make sure that there are also opportunities to elevate the many examples around the world where governments are acting democratically and effectively in response to the crisis and they're framing and working with citizens in ways that are absolutely consistent with democratic values and principles. And so I do want to showcase some of those.
I think it's received a lot of press around the world how New Zealand, for instance has reacted, and I read this week that New Zealand is perhaps one of the very first countries to have been able to successfully eliminate COVID. They have no new COVID cases. And it's a case that really stands out for the way that the prime minister has been able to deliver information in a very clear, compassionate, inclusive way, a way that's very grounded in science of course, and transparent.
And at the same time where the legislature has had an important role developing a parliamentary select committee that's providing scrutiny of the government's response. The government has also been very affirmative there I think, in terms of issues of freedom of information and media freedom and has said that they would not slow down, for instance, their commitment to responding to requests for information during the crisis. So there's certainly the case of New Zealand, which is so interesting and it's shown such early success, but there are other places around the world too where specific measures taken by the government I think have been so positive and far reaching.
Uruguay comes to mind for instance. We see so many cases where authoritarian leaders are using this crisis to be able to settle scores as you were saying, or to act in a very partisan fashion. But in Uruguay, the president convened all of the former presidential candidates to give a joint press conference to send a powerful message of unity and to show that across the party divide, they were working together to develop responses.
Taiwan also really stands out for its cross party coordination, the transparent communications they've had, the very creative efforts that the government has put in place there, I think they've called it humor, not rumor. A campaign to share facts in real time to counter disinformation, to manage fear. So there aren't many cases out there as I was saying, of governments that are responding effectively and in ways that are building that citizen trust that you were mentioning.
DM: Yes. And then a further one, another democracy that's a leading democracy, probably the first out of the gate is South Korea. They did exactly what was necessary. People are looking at that example, a democratic example. They didn't sacrifice rights at all. They obviously had very strong controls at times of the society, but it took very swift action. They did widespread testing, contact tracing and they worked with civil society and is shown over and over that civil society is probably one of the most important factors. It's not simply a government driven thing that makes a response success. Civil society serves as a very efficient force multiplier for government. We saw that in Katrina, hurricane Katrina. We see it's proved over and over that it really is effective in getting the word out and messaging.
Ensuring is like in Taiwan through their civic tech community, they're sort of hackers. They're young citizens, who themselves in a voluntary fashion, formed a community. They were viewed as allies and partners not alienated from the government. And that partnership has been a success in Taiwan, has been a success in South Korea and is essential for a success. And that means that governments need to be open, need to be transparent, they need to see society as partners. So this is absolutely critical.
KS: Yeah. And I just want to add on the South Korea example. I'm so glad you brought that up because South Korea held elections during the pandemic on April 15, they had national assembly lessons and they were actually able to organize those elections in a way that was seen as very transparent, that was very consistent with electoral integrity and they had higher levels of turnout than in previous elections, which is pretty amazing. And there's so many countries around the world that are facing elections in 2020. I think the way that South Korea was able to do it with a very intensive communication campaign as you were speaking again to their transparency of communication, they had expanded early voting measures in place. They had home voting, they had very comprehensive safeguards for people to be able to vote in person. So even organizing an election in a time that seems so difficult and so challenging, I think that as you were saying, democracies like South Korea are showing that there is a way forward.
DM: Right. And I think we can learn some lessons from that as well. There are groups, including NDI has been at the center of this, of putting together documents that say here are the election integrity guidelines for this moment, that democracy should not be sacrificed at the alter of crisis response, that elections need to move forward if they can be done in the right way and if they need to be postponed, it's postponed within a certain timeframe and only during a period of high crisis. So there are principles here where democracy can continue to move forward. It makes the society stronger, it builds that civic trust that's important for crisis response. But we need to... You can walk and chew gum at the same time at this moment. So I'm glad we were able to talk about some of these democratic examples.
KS: Absolutely. And I will be right back after this quick message.
You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our DemWorks podcast available on iTunes and SoundCloud.
DM: Welcome back with Kristen Sample. Of course you're new to NDI, but you know NDI very well and it's a fundamental principle everywhere that nations will only succeed when societies are fully inclusive, where they don't leave anybody behind. They enable all to contribute equally. That means women, that means young people, that means traditionally marginalized groups, LGBT communities, et cetera. It's just plain logic that if you leave anybody behind, that you're not going to get the most out of your citizen when you're going to hold your country back, and yet we are witnessing negative impacts toward these populations during this COVID-19 moment. Kristen, can you speak to this, explain what's going on here and why it matters?
KS: Sure, absolutely. I mean obviously this crisis isn't occurring in a vacuum. It's occurring in a context where across the world, across all countries, there are already this array of existing intersecting inequalities where some people were coming into this crisis already in a disadvantaged place. And then the pandemic itself has differentiated impacts that affect women and other marginalized groups disproportionately. I'll just give a few examples.
I mean lockdown for women who are living in relationships of power imbalance and of abuse perhaps, lockdown for them means locked in, with an abusive partner. And for instance our survey of country offices that I was referring to previously, in 66% of our countries, there seems to be an increase in sexual and gender based violence since the pandemic. In 15% of those countries, it's a significant increase. Of course these women might be locked in in vulnerable situations and then at the same time have less access to government resources, government support. So that's one example.
Others, people with disabilities for instance, who have always struggled to access health services, transportation in an equitable fashion, you can imagine that that lack of access and the differentiated impact of the pandemic on them is life threatening in some cases.
There are digital divide concerns, people in rural areas or women, other marginalized groups who may have less access to information, to resources. There are real concerns also and cases around the world where this pandemic is being exploited by anti migrant hate groups for instance, who try to link movement and migration to the origin of the virus. Or in some cases, for instance in Africa and some of the countries where we work, media outlets are perpetuating stereotypes against people with albinism for instance, and placing the blame for the virus on them.
So there are so many challenges around making sure that people have access to resources, people are safe and that we are able to convey and support a message of social cohesion and solidarity instead of the divisions that we're seeing pop up around the world. I think that in our case, for instance in Indiana, what we're trying to do is reinforce the need for inclusive decision-making, making sure for instance, that women are involved in decision making and other marginalized groups are involved in decision making and representation and in these deliberation bodies, making sure that the policymaking is taking into account these vulnerabilities and these different differentiated needs. And also the government messaging is inclusive, getting to everybody and it's supporting the social cohesion messaging and solidarity messages.
DM: And again, this is critical for the crisis response, pandemic response. I mean COVID-19 doesn't discriminate. Whoever has it, whoever is vulnerable or subject will get it and it will spread to the society writ large. So if you're not inclusive, if you're excluding folks, if politicians then see that there is an opportunity here as some politicians will to divide and conquer, to play on fear. Or spoilers from the outside may see that there are opportunities if they're divided societies, to create tensions that then require or enable them to negotiate the deal that you want to make or promote corruption within the society.
There are all kinds of ways this makes societies less stable, less secure, and affects the development and certainly the response to crises. So this is not just a nice thing, it's not just a human rights thing. This is fundamentally important to national security, international security and to everything that we're seeking to achieve through democracy.
KS: Absolutely. And I think along the things I'd really like to hear from you too, Derek, in terms of how you see along the lines of this being an international crisis that includes the whole world, that joins us all although we are in very different places. How you see role NDI's role in supporting that cross border cooperation and solidarity and having the international community come together?
DM: Given that authoritarians are claiming their model is unique for this moment, we have to be out there making our case. But in terms of our specific adaptations that we are doing, we are working in places like Ethiopia to ensure that the public opinion surveys are necessary invents of their postponed elections or continue forward, but can be done virtually. That we can adapt legislative rules of procedure in places that need it to allow for remote voting and continue the legislative process to ensure that election integrity is maintained.
As I mentioned earlier, there are certain principles and established accepted international principles for when and how to postpone elections, how to hold them during moments of crisis. And we put together crisis response kits that can be used. It's called the practical toolkit for politicians during a pandemic that can help political parties figure out how to do crisis management or help the government put together crisis communication.
So a lot of things that can be done internally and done across different countries that ensure the solidarity is still there, the momentum for democracy is still there. The expectation that democratic norms are sustained in this moment so that the headlines are not simply roll back authoritarian opportunism, that massive surveillance, all the things that people may succumb to because of fear during crisis, that there is an alternative voice and it says it doesn't have to be like that. Or if it does have to be like that now, it doesn't have to continue to be like that indefinitely and that there are some standards by which these things are being imposed.
So that international norm setting at this moment, it's probably more important than ever to do and we are trying to do at national level. We're trying to do it across different countries to ensure that there is not a vacuum to which the authoritarian voice moves and has free open season for its own values. It goes across, I think, a lot of different countries. And Kristen, I'd be interested in your thoughts from your perspective of governance, how that's working.
KS: I think that there's a real role for the international community to play. And I wanted to highlight that too in what you're saying because these challenges are so vast that clearly we have to work together on people to people exchanges and supporting lesson sharing. And so I do think that there's an absolute role for the international community playing in terms of getting out the messages of that democracy is not a luxury, it's not something that could be put into a coma or put on hold while we're all sheltering, that it's something that has to be reaffirmed on a daily basis.
And so I do think that countries also have to, in addition to standing firm, standing on their own ground on democratic principles, they also have to be willing to promote and expand those democratic principles across borders, especially to counter those liberal influences that you were referring to earlier, that in some cases are, really transmitted and increased through disinformation campaigns or phony PR campaigns that need to be called out of course by all actors.
DM: Thanks again, Kristen for joining me in conversation about how democracies can best meet the challenges of COVID and how NDI with its global partners are meeting the moment.
KS: Thank you, Derek.
DM: I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other DemWorks podcasts, please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.


World map of Coronavirus (Covid-19)



19. Governance is Key During COVID-19? (w/ Kristen Sample) Posted 6 days ago

Democracy (General), COVID-19 Podcast NDI Listen democracy

The analysis of articles and normative documents for quality control and regional origin of wines was carried out. Chemical composition of the grapes and the wine has been considered, qualitative and quantitative changes during vinification, maturation and aging of wine were shown. The basic group of compounds contents and ratios which determine the qualitative characteristics of wines, as well as have an important role in the formation of aroma and taste of the drink was found. The prerequisites for the development of the market of counterfeit products and wine falsification methods were discussed. The analysis of scientific literature and regulatory framework governing the quality of the wines on the territory of Russia and the European Union and the existing approaches to determine their authenticity was conducted, the advantages and disadvantages are shown. The examples of using different criteria for the establishment of natural and adulterated wines have been discussed, as well as their approaches to identify and create a comprehensive system of wine production quality evaluation using methods of physicochemical analysis. The main methodological approaches to establish a wine regional origin, combining the capabilities of modern methods of analysis, mathematical modeling and statistics are analyzed, examples of their use in practice are shown.Keywords: wine, methods of analysis, quality, authenticity, regional origin, falsification, mathematical modeling (Russian)DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/analitika.2014.18.4.001 Yu.F. Yakuba1, A.A. Kaunova2, Z.A. Temerdashev2, V.O. Titarenko2, A.A. Halafjan2 1North Caucasian Regional Research Institute of Horticulture and Viticulture of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Krasnodar, Russian Federation2 Kuban State University, Krasnodar, Russian FederationREFERENCES1. 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Moreno I.M, González-Weller D., Gutierrez V., Marino M., Cameán A.M., González A.G., Hardisson A. Differentiation of two Canary DO red wines according to their metal content from inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectrometry and graphite furnace atomic absorption spectrometry by using Probabilistic Neural Networks. Talanta, 2007, vol. 72, pp. 263-268. doi:10.1016/j.talanta.2006.10.029.164. Rodrigues S.M., Otero M., Alves A.A., Coimbra J., Coimbra M.A., Pereira E., Duarte A.C. Elemental analysis for categorization of wines and authentication of their certified brand of origin. Journal of Food Composition and Analysis, 2011, vol. 24, no. 4–5, pp. 548-562. doi:10.1016/j.jfca.2010.12.003.165. Bentlin F.R.S., Pulgati F.H., Dressler V.L., Pozebon D. Elemental analysis of wines from South America and their classification according to country. Journal of the Brazilian Chemical Society, 2011, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 327-336. doi:10.1590/S0103-50532011000200019.166. 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ICP-MS determination of strontium isotope ratio in wine in order to be used as a fingerprint of its regional origin. J. Anal. At. Spectrom., 2001, vol. 16, pp. 607-611. doi:10.1039/B100307K.182. Liu L., Cozzolino D., Cynkar W.U., Gishen M., Colby C.B. Geographic Classification of Spanish and Australian Tempranillo Red Wines by Visible and Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Combined with Multivariate Analysis. J. Agric. Food Chem., 2006, vol. 54, pp. 6754-6759. doi:10.1021/jf061528b.183. Brescia M.A, Kosir I.J, Caldarola V., Kidric J., Sacco A. Chemometric Classification of Apulian and Slovenian Wines Using 1H NMR and ICP-OES Together with HPICE Data. J. Agric. Food Chem., 2003, vol. 51, pp. 21-26. doi:10.1021/jf0206015.184. Adami L, Dutra S.V, Marcon A.R, Carnieli G.J, Roani C.A, Vanderlinde R. Geographic origin of southern Brazilian wines by carbon and oxygen isotope analyses // Rapid Communications in Mass Spectrometry. 2010, vol. 24, no. 20, pp. 2943-2948. doi:10.1002/rcm.4726.185. Dutra S.V., Adami L., Marcon A.R., Carnieli G.J., Roani C.A., Spinellia F.R., Leonardelli S., Vanderlinde R. Characterization of wines according the geographical origin by analysis of isotopes and minerals and the influence of harvest on the isotope values. Food Chemistry, 2013, vol. 141, no. 3, pp. 2148-2153. doi:10.1016/j.foodchem.2013.04.106.186. Kaunova A.A., Petrov V.I., Tsiupko, T.G., Tеmеrdashеv Z.A., Pеrеkotii V.V., Luk'ianov A.A. [Identification of wine provenance by ICP-AES multielement analysis], Journal of Analytical Chemistry, 2013, vol. 68, no. 9, pp. 917-922. doi:10.7868/S0044450213090065. ; Проведен анализ опубликованных работ и нормативных документов, посвященных вопросам контроля качества и региональной принадлежности вин. Рассмотрен химический состав винограда и изготавливаемой из него винодельческой продукции, показано его качественное и количественное изменение в процессе винификации, созревания и выдержки вин. Установлены основные группы соединений, содержания и соотношения которых определяют качественные характеристики вин, а также играют важную роль в формировании аромата и вкуса напитка. Обсуждены предпосылки развития рынка поддельной продукции и способы фальсификации вин. Проведен анализ научной литературы и нормативной базы, регламентирующей качество вин на территории России и стран Европейского союза, существующих подходов к определению их подлинности, указаны достоинства и недостатки. Обсуждены примеры использования различных критериев для установления натуральных и фальсифицированных вин, а также подходов их комплексной идентификации и создания системы оценки качества винодельческой продукции с помощью методов физико-химического анализа. Проанализированы основные методические подходы к установлению региональной принадлежности вин, сочетающие возможности современных методов анализа, математического моделирования и статистики, продемонстрированы примеры их использования на практике.Ключевые слова: вина, методы анализа, качество, подлинность, региональная принадлежность, фальсификация, математическое моделированиеDOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/analitika.2014.18.4.001

This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose