A solid financial armor could not protect Thailand against the impact of the global financial crisis on its real economy. Despite a sound banking system and low external vulnerabilities, the Thai economy contracted 5.7 percent between October 2008 and March 2009, as the magnitude and speed of the contraction in foreign demand, and resulting shock to the real economy, has been greater than anticipated. There continues to be little impact of the global financial crisis on Thailand's banks: liquidity remained adequate as financial institutions did not face solvency concerns given their adequate capitalization and lack of exposure to 'toxic' assets or risky derivative contracts. The combination of a sound financial sector, low external roll-over and balance-of-payment financing requirements, and, more recently, large current account surpluses, has led to capital inflows, build-up in reserves and an appreciation of the Baht relative to other currencies in the region. However, the impact of the global crisis on the real sector was far more severe than expected. Export volumes contracted by 8.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, compared to the World Bank's forecast in December of a 3.0 percent expansion. Exports contracted a further 16 percent in the first quarter of 2009. The aggravation of Thailand's political crisis, which had been dampening investor and consumer confidence since 2006, compounded the shock to the real economy. As a result, real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 after 38 quarters of growth, and is expected to contract for 2009 as a whole, the first annual contraction since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.
This study begins by considering the banking sector and then moves on to issues relating to improving access to finance to support Nigeria's economic growth vision. The second part of the study refers to issues relating to longer-term finance: both the sources of financing, such as pensions and insurance, and their uses in providing financing for resolving Nigeria's crucial infrastructure shortfalls in infrastructure and housing. The final part of the study returns to the fundamental 'plumbing' of the financial system focusing on the legal and regulatory foundation for creditor rights and corporate insolvency, instituting sound corporate governance standards for corporations and banks, and providing secure and low cost transmittal of payments and remittances. While it is difficult to identify a common theme running through this volume without compromising the diversity and nuance of the recommendations, the overarching theme supported by this volume is the importance of exchange of reliable information as the basis for financial transactions between unconnected third parties. Implementation of systems designed to strengthen accounting and reporting standards for banks and corporations, the registration of movable and immovable property, property liens and credit histories as well as exchange of information about prices, interest rates, fees and charges for financials services will considerably enhance the functionality of financial systems and prove crucial in establishing a trusted and robust market-based financial system in support of stable economic growth and development in Nigeria.
A supply chain is a system of resources, organizations, people, technologies, activities and information involved in the act of transporting goods from producer to consumer and user. This (SCS) guide is intended for trade and transport government officials, port authorities and transport, cargo and logistics communities, in particular in developing countries. The purpose of the guide is to make concerned trade and transport-related officials, managers and personnel in developing countries acquainted with, and aware of, the many initiatives mushrooming in the field of supply chain security, what these will mean for their respective organizations, and how to tackle the inlaid challenges. This chapter attempts to clarify the background and current status of the multitude of programs that exist across the world today. This is achieved by, firstly, giving a brief account of the changing security environment (post 9/11) and its resulting implications for SCS programs. This is important as it helps to explain the motivation of the programs which are later expanded upon in more detail within the chapter. Within this section, the motivations for different types of programs, not directly linked to the events of 9/11 but to other reasons, such as combating illegal activities, enhancement of efficiency and standardization are also explained. Secondly, a list of the main programs is present under four main subheadings: compulsory programs, major voluntary programs, regional or national programs, and others. Tables are presented at the end of the section summarizing the main points of each program. Finally, some of the issues surrounding the programs are presented in the concluding section.
In 1990, Australia and New Zealand were ranked around 25th and 37th in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, having been the highest-income countries in the world one hundred years earlier. Those countries relatively poor economic growth performance over that long period contrasts markedly with that of the past 15 years, when these two economies out-performed most other high-income countries. This difference in growth performance is due to major economic policy reforms during the past two to three decades, both at and behind the border. The report provide new evidence on the extent of governmental distortions to agricultural incentives in particular in the Australian and New Zealand economies since the late 1940s, both directly due to agricultural policies per se and indirectly (and negatively) through protection to manufacturing.
Real Gross Domestic product (GDP) in Thailand is projected to grow at 5.0 percent in 2008, driven by recovery in domestic demand. The key reason for the strengthened growth this year is the higher confidence of both consumers and investors with the return of democracy and the election of a new government late in 2007. Last year's better than-expected growth of 4.8 percent was due to buoyant export performance throughout the year even as domestic consumption and investment declined amidst the uncertain political environment and sudden shifts in policy. But this year, the opposite is likely. The external current account may weaken slightly in 2008, as the global downturn slows exports and robust domestic demand stimulates imports. Private investment should recover after its slump last year. Recovery in private consumption and investment could be fragile as there remain large down side risks to their growth, but could be mitigated by additional fiscal stimulus. In addition to the short-term measures have been introduced by the government to mitigate risks this year and next, longer term measures are needed to sustain Thailand's growth and poverty alleviation.
Doing Business in Egypt 2008 covers three topics at the sub national level: starting a business, dealing with licenses and registering property. These indicators have been selected because they cover areas of local jurisdiction and practice. In the last two years, doing business in Egypt has become more affordable the minimum capital required to start a business and the costs of registering property and dealing with licenses have been slashed. Doing Business in Egypt 2008 records all procedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a standardized warehouse. Doing Business in Egypt 2008 records the full sequence of procedures necessary when a business purchases land and a building to transfer the property title from another business so that the buyer can use the property for expanding its business, as collateral in taking new loans or, if necessary, to sell to another business. The ease of doing business index is limited in scope. The Doing Business indicators provide a new empirical data set that may improve understanding of these issues.
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was 9.9 percent in 2007. Economic growth has been primarily driven by agriculture (which contributed 3.4 percentage points to economic growth), and services (which contributed 4.3 percentage points). In the agriculture sector, the December 2007 annual livestock census reported an increase of 15 percent of livestock from 34.8 to 40.3 mln livestock, with the number of goats, sheep and cattle increasing by 18, 15 and 14 percent respectively. While most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) coming into Mongolia continues to go to mining, its value-added only grew by only 1.7 percent this year (mainly came from coal extraction). On the non-bank side, the financial regulatory commission has been making efforts to improve the legal and regulatory framework, however, its weak institutional capacity and resource constraints continue to be a major impediment in effective supervision. Several key laws relating to the financial sector need to be finalized. Efforts have been made towards resolving immediate issues relating to the closed savings and credit cooperatives, developing the insurance industry and developing a framework and institutions to develop the mortgage market. However, several laws and enabling regulation still need to put in place before benefits of increase in financial sector efficiency (lower cost of financing) can be fully realized.
El objeto de esta investigación erige es la indagación sobre la severidad punitiva de las decisiones judiciales, tomando como referencia nuclear la violencia contra las mujeres en relaciones de la pareja y los discursos judiciales manifestados en las decisiones pronunciadas por los juzgados y tribunales. Al enjuiciador le cabe siempre optar entre el abanico de proposiciones jurídicas, desvelando si son, o no, aplicables a la factualidad y, en caso afirmativo, cuáles son las consecuencias que se derivan de ellas (Larenz, 1978). La violencia de la pareja es un problema históricamente recurrente y un problema de género, las mujeres son las principales víctimas, que no sólo en Portugal, sino en la generalidad de los países y culturas, que ha reclamado la atención particular de juristas, psicólogos, sociólogos, políticos y, naturalmente, de las comunidades. Sin embargo, no se trata de un fenómeno nuevo, sino antes bien de una compleja e intrincada cuestión social, que atraviesa todas las épocas, aunque presentemente ocupe tal vez un protagonismo mayor en los debates y en las preocupaciones humanas, una vez que el devenir social y la creciente consciencia colectiva sobre la dimensión y efectividad de los derechos humanos vienen suscitando la formulación de otros mecanismos de control, presumiblemente adecuados. Esta es la razón por la que, en las últimas décadas, se han traído a colación interrogaciones, derivadas de los choques y contradicciones que van surgiendo a nivel de las representaciones sociales, de las tradiciones y de la cultura, a muchos títulos aún dominantes en nuestra sociedad; no obstante, por todos lados ha ido sedimentando –por lo menos a nivel de las intenciones– la idea de la tolerancia cero en relación a este tipo de violencia. VII El espacio inaugural donde todas estas cuestiones asumen un papel determinante, de resultas del cual se procede a la construcción de una arquitectura normativa, de definiciones uniformizadas, es el proceso de criminalización. El Derecho es, por lo tanto, un regulador de relaciones interpersonales que, fijando patrones de comportamiento, procura encontrar formas de colmatar el desorden y promover el bienestar de una sociedad (Hart,1995). Para ello, opera en la regulación de las situaciones, que divergen de un país a otro, como sucede en las diversas etapas de la criminalización, en especial en sus fases primarias (producción legislativa) y secundaria (aplicación judicial), cada una de ellas organizada según una gramática específica, aunque interconectada, reflejando una lógica propia, emergente de sus tiempos histórico-culturales y político-sociales (Debuyst & Digneffe,1998). Dichas lógicas emanan de los titulares del Poder y de quienes dirigen el sistema, de sus intereses e ideologías, partiendo de estos para emitir juicios de valor; según Larenz (1978), estos juicios constituyen expresiones de una toma de posición personal del Legislador y, posteriormente, del Aplicador, realizadas en el respeto por valores que se reconocen como tales; para fundamentarlos, el juez no está limitado tan solo a la intuición axiológica, debiendo aplicar criterios que gestionan los valores (positivos y negativos) considerados vinculantes en la comunidad sociopolítica y jurídica, y por ella. Los dilemas de la justicia tienen origen en el funcionamiento actual y global de la sociedad; las representaciones individuales nacen de procesos más amplios y, en muchas ocasiones, ajenos al propio individuo, es decir, la relación entre la autonomía individual y social está en juego cuando las reglas de una comunidad precisan ser determinadas (Wagner, 2011; Dias, 2010). La violencia conyugal es un fenómeno bastante complejo y compuesto por diversos factores, de cariz social, cultural, psicológico, ideológico, económico, entre otros (Costa, 2003). Actualmente, el Código Penal portugués ya consagra expresamente (en su artículo 152) el delito de violencia doméstica. Más allá de este artículo específico, la ley también criminaliza, por ejemplo, las amenazas, la coacción, la difamación, las injurias, la sustracción de menor, el incumplimiento de la obligación de manutención, la violación, el abuso sexual y el homicidio o tentativa de homicidio (APAV, 2014). Las penas criminales, a nivel de marco central, van desde 1 a 5 años de prisión, lo que permite que el juez pueda suspender la pena, dado que su límite máximo no supera los 5 años. Éste es precisamente el eje del problema, pues el propio Legislador abrió la puerta al expediente de la suspensión. La tipificación de la violencia doméstica (malos tratos físicos o psíquicos, incluyendo privaciones de libertad y ofensas sexuales) comprende, como víctimas, a las siguientes personas: cónyuge o ex-cónyuge; uniones de hecho heterosexuales y homosexuales (incluso sin cohabitación); progenitor de descendiente común en 1er grado; persona particularmente indefensa en virtud de la edad, deficiencia, enfermedad, embarazo o los dependientes económicos que con él cohabiten (se exige la cohabitación). En el caso previsto, si el agente practica el acto contra menor, en presencia de menor, en el domicilio común o en el domicilio de la víctima, es castigado con pena de prisión de 2 a 5 años (artículo 152). En cuanto a las penas accesorias, la ley penal establece las siguientes: a) prohibición de contacto con la víctima, en particular el alejamiento de la residencia, el alejamiento del lugar de trabajo y supervisión por medios técnicos de control a distancia; b) prohibición de uso y porte de armas y, c) obligación de asistencia a programas de prevención de la violencia doméstica. En el presente trabajo nos ceñimos a la violencia conyugal, entre personas heterosexuales, que mantengan vida en común, en una relación análoga a la de los cónyuges. Diversos estudios han mostrado que, a pesar de que la violencia contra las mujeres no se circunscribe a los espacios domésticos, pudiendo también producirse en la calle o en el lugar de trabajo, lo cierto es que gran parte de este tipo de violencia tiene lugar sobre todo en casa. En Portugal, la vivienda es el espacio privilegiado donde ocurre esta violencia (43%), como quedó demostrado en el informe de la APAV (2014) recientemente publicado, siendo en ese espacio familiar donde los maridos actúan como los principales ofensores de las mujeres. En ese mismo estudio se comprobó que la violencia contra las mujeres es sobre todo física y psicológica, cuando ocurre en el espacio doméstico; discriminación sociocultural, cuando se produce en el lugar de trabajo, mientras que la violencia sexual tiene lugar sobre todo en la calle. ¿Tendremos que preguntarnos si en Portugal la violencia sexual cometida en el interior de las familias y, por lo tanto, la que sucede en los espacios domésticos, tiene una relevancia menor que la violencia sexual que se produce en la calle, o si las mujeres no la valoran de igual forma y, por eso mismo, no denuncian a los ofensores sexuales con los que viven, dejando que una vez más la tradición se sobreponga a lo que la ley ya contempla? ¿Será que la ideación de los antes denominados deberes conyugales, incluyendo el débito sexual, aún permanece en las creencias de los ciudadanos? La experiencia de la APAV, en sus diversos Gabinetes de Apoyo a la Víctima, que reciben y actúan con mujeres víctimas de violencia conyugal, tal como los múltiples estudios que han sido realizados, confirma que la violencia es practicada en el seno de la relación conyugal (entre personas que viven en situación conyugal, casadas o no). Se trata de un sistema circular, que surge, se desarrolla y termina, iniciándose nuevamente, de forma semejante, por lo que se lo denomina ciclo de la violencia conyugal o doméstica, dado que puede ser entendido, en este sentido, como un círculo, en el cual las dinámicas de la relación de la pareja se manifiestan sistemáticamente, pasando siempre por determinadas fases. Así, en este ciclo pueden identificarse las siguientes fases: a) la fase de construcción de la tensión; b) la fase de la violencia; y c) la fase del apaciguamiento o "luna de miel". El ciclo de la violencia conyugal dificulta mucho las tomas de decisión de la mujer víctima, pues experimenta fases muy dramáticas (la tensión y el ataque violento), pero que terminan en una fase considerada gratificante (el apaciguamiento), en la cual se reanima la esperanza de tener una relación conyugal sin violencia, que implica creer e intentar nuevamente el proyecto de vida soñado o evitar la compleja y en ocasiones dramática salida del hogar. Entre otros aspectos, la relación con el ofensor, la historia de vida anterior, los apoyos de los que dispone (o de los que carece), la violencia implicada y todos los actos que la constituyen, el impacto que tienen –y, sobre todo, el significado que ella atribuye a cada uno de esos actos– determinan la singularidad de su reacción (APAV, 2013). La revisión de varios estudios interculturales y antropológicos indica que la violencia conyugal es indisociable de la cuestión del género (Dias & Machado, 2008). La relación entre el género y la violencia conyugal ha generado, no obstante, bastante discusión y controversia (Miller & White, 2003), habiendo autores que defienden la neutralidad/simetría de género (Moffit, Robins & Caspi, 2001) y otros que afirman que el género y el poder suponen el proceso clave de la violencia conyugal, sin reducirse a ser un mero componente de ésta. A pesar de que la creciente superposición de los papeles en la relación conyugal lleve a la dilución de los papeles sexuales en la familia, las diferencias de género normalmente existen en todas las sociedades, como indica Giddens (2010). Dichas diferencias de género se expresan, aunque de forma diferente, a todos los niveles de la estratificación social, reflejándose en las diversas partes de la vida social, a nivel de las oportunidades y presunciones que desempeñan en ella, desde la familia al Estado. Según el mismo autor, a pesar de que en algunos países las mujeres hayan progresado de forma significativa, las diferencias de género aún son notables, y la violencia doméstica se ha ido perpetuando en silencio (Dias, 2004); las mujeres siguen asumiendo la responsabilidad de educar a los hijos y cuidar de la casa y los hombres la de sustentar a la familia, prevaleciendo la desigualdad de roles a nivel de «[…] poder, prestigio y riqueza» (Giddens, 2010, p. 114). Como dice provocadoramente Foucault (1980), en la obra Power/knowledge, donde hay poder hay resistencia y, no obstante, o tal vez por eso mismo, ésta nunca está en una posición de exterioridad en relación al poder. Así, si es verdad que la igualdad declarada e incluso promovida en la ley encuentra numerosos obstáculos en su aplicación práctica, el Derecho no controla definitiva o aisladamente la vida social y sus valores, pero no se limita, al contrario de los más escépticos, a plasmar en letra de ley las concepciones socialmente dominantes. El Derecho –las leyes, la jurisprudencia, las prácticas jurídicas y judiciarias– ha tenido un papel constitutivo importante en la segregación discursiva de grupos de personas, especialmente las mujeres. Se entroncará ahí, quizás, la función correctora del Derecho, pasando a contribuir en la búsqueda de formas de deshacer esa segregación, no sólo prohibiendo tratamientos discriminatorios, sino obligando a las oportunas instancias a tomar medidas que contraríen la real situación de inferioridad socio-familiar de algunas personas: transmitir, por ejemplo, a la sociedad que la violencia doméstica es realmente un delito que se produce en su seno a causa de las desigualdades de género e incluso de la apatía judicial que en ocasiones se revela. Como ya mencionamos anteriormente, el presente trabajo tiene como objetivos averiguar: (i) ¿cómo absorbe el Aplicador el mensaje dimanado del Legislador, entidad política? Es decir: ¿el Aplicador adopta el racional legislativo o se apropia de él, por ejemplo a través de la memorización de su dimensión legislativa, produciendo otros (o diferentes) enunciados aplicativos? Y, (ii) ¿de verificarse semejante distorsión aplicativa, al existir una severidad menor, el transgresor ya se ha percatado de ese hecho? Es decir: ¿el delincuente doméstico presenta una cierta impunidad? De donde se deduce la cuestión crucial: (iii) ¿podrán los tribunales convertirse en entes susceptibles de contribuir a desculpabilizar el delito de violencia de la pareja? Cual la credibilidad del testimonio de las víctimas? Teniendo en cuenta los objetivos y las características del estudio y los recursos disponibles para la investigación, optamos por un tipo de estudio exploratorio, descriptivo-correlacional. Lo clasificamos como exploratorio porque se desconoce la existencia de estudios de esta índole; asume también carácter descriptivo-correlacional una vez que pretendemos describir el universo de una determinada problemática o fenómeno (violencia conyugal) y establecer relación entre variables (entre otras variables, la dependencia económica de las víctimas en relación al acusado), "en el estudio descriptivo-correlacional, el investigador intenta explorar y determinar la existencia de relaciones entre variables, con miras a describir esas relaciones. El principal objetivo del estudio descriptivo-correlacional es el hallazgo de factores relacionados con un fenómeno." (Fortin, 2003, p.174) La parte práctica se apoya en una recogida de datos de procedimientos archivados referentes al delito de violencia conyugal y su análisis ius psicológico, utilizando, con ese fin, el instrumento Índice de Severidad Penalizadora y Psicologización (Criminalización Secundaria) – (ISPP-CS) (Poiares, 2009). Como el Índice fue construido para el análisis de procedimientos penales sin especificación del tipo legal, fue necesario, de acuerdo con la literatura, del estudio de procedimientos, por la propia especificidad del delito de violencia conyugal, teniendo como base el ISPP-CS, añadir más variables , que son las siguientes: relación con el acusado; dependencia económica de las víctimas en relación al acusado; dependencia económica de los acusados en relación a la víctima; posesión de arma; otros procedimientos relacionados con violencia conyugal; número de procedimientos de violencia conyugal; información de los procedimientos de violencia conyugal a nivel de los hijos y menores de edad (número de hijos de ambos, de la víctima y del agresor; si el caso fue presenciado por menores hasta los18 años; si se contactó la Comisión de Protección de Niños y Jóvenes en Peligro ; datos de los procedimientos sobre el historial de los episodios de violencia (tipos de violencia, consecuencias físicas para la víctima; víctima observada en el hospital, víctima en internamiento; el acusado suele exhibir armas o hacer alusión a ellas durante las amenazas o agresiones; casos anteriores por agresiones a la víctima y/o a otro familiar, practicadas por el mismo acusado); solicitud de informe social/evaluación psicológica; medida de coacción; género del magistrado que dirigió el juicio, así como tiempo transcurrido entre la queja y la sentencia. Estos datos tuvieron un tratamiento estadístico en Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). El Índice de Severidad Penalizadora y Psicologización (Criminalización Secundaria) - ISPP-CS) tiene como objetivo general analizar la severidad penalizadora, así como permite verificar el grado de psicologización del procedimiento judicial, o sea, la utilización de información y conocimiento científico proporcionado por la Psicología Forense y su recepción a la hora de juzgar. En la vertiente severidad, el índice pretende evaluar cuál es el grado de penalización, oscilando entre un grado nulo y un grado elevado, pudiendo aplicarse a cualquier delito, una vez que el estudio se basa en los patrones de la dosimetría penal (= marco de la pena para cada tipo criminal), siendo el resultado expresado en porcentaje. Considera tres ejes: Acusado, Procedimiento Actual y Medida Final Adoptada. El primero proporciona diversa información sobre cada acusado en el procedimiento, en particular en las dimensiones socio-demográfica, cultural, clínica y forense. El segundo, tal como su propio nombre indica, remite al procedimiento actual del individuo: delitos en los que se encuentra pronunciado y medidas de coacción. Por último, la Medida Final Adoptada sugiere lo que fue determinado en tribunal y si se tuvieron en consideración la evaluación psicológica o la peritaje de personalidad, en el agravamiento o atenuación de la pena. El tipo de respuesta de los ítems varía entre las de respuesta múltiple o respuesta específica y directa. Se aplica a procedimientos ya archivados y el tiempo de duración de la aplicación del procedimiento es variable con la dimensión del procedimiento. El primer eje, el Acusado, está compuesto por las dimensiones socio-demográfica, cultural y por la anamnesis judicial, diferenciada por las sub-dimensiones clínica y forense. El segundo eje, el Procedimiento Actual, referencia el (1) delito(s) que se le imputa (respuesta especifica); en relación a los delitos imputados: (2) Tipo (respuesta específica); (3) Precepto Incriminador (respuesta específica); (4) Dosimetría penal (colocar el valor mínimo y el valor máximo). Por último, el tercer eje, "Medida Penal Adoptada", se refiere a: (1) Medida aplicada a cada delito (respuesta específica); (2) Acumulación jurídica (sí o no) (b) Medida aplicada en acumulación (respuesta específica); (3) La decisión refirió la realización de evaluación psicológica (sí o no); (4) La decisión refirió la realización de peritaje de personalidad (sí o no); (5) La evaluación psicológica fue utilizada para fundamentar la atenuación de la medida (sí o no); (6) El peritaje de personalidad sirvió de fundamento a la atenuación de la medida (sí o no); (7) La evaluación psicológica determinó el agravamiento de la medida (sí o no); (8). El peritaje determinó el agravamiento de la medida (sí o no); (9) En la decisión se invocaron razones para la atenuación de la medida (respuesta específica, cuáles); (10) Observaciones (respuesta específica). Este eje termina con una sinopsis general, que se aplicará a todos los delitos por los que haya sido condenado el sujeto. Referencia la dosimetría, diferenciando todos los delitos del individuo; (11) Medida aplicada (respuesta específica); (12) Medida aplicada en acumulación (respuesta específica); (13) Puntuación total (respuesta específica). La hoja de puntuación está constituida por ítems de cumplimentación referentes a los límites mínimo y máximo de la medida penal aplicable y a la pena concreta, en meses. Tal hoja de puntuación contiene asimismo una tabla formada por cinco columnas, cada una de ellas conteniendo cuatro puntos de escala referentes a la evolución del agravamiento de la pena; y una línea de cumplimentación, por acusado (Anexo II). En alternativa, se puede utilizar una plataforma informática construida por Branco (2013), destinada exclusivamente a facilitar el tratamiento de la información obtenida por este instrumento, transformando los resultados en una escala de 0-100%. En cuanto a los ítems relativos con el tipo de tribunal (singular o colectivo), número convencional, número de acusados, decisión (absolutoria o condenatoria), pena aplicada por acusado, fecha e identificación del asistente de investigación, debiendo éste indicar con una cruz cuál es el tipo de tribunal y de decisión; en lo que concierne al número convencional (número del procedimiento en la investigación), número de acusado y penas aplicadas, el asistente de investigación apunta objetivamente la información relativa a esos ítems, información recogida en el procedimiento analizado. La fecha y la identificación del asistente también deben ser indicadas. En lo tocante a la primera sección, correspondiente al Acusado, en su dimensión socio-demográfica, debe indicarse únicamente uno de los ítems relativos a la naturalidad (urbana/rural) y tan sólo uno de los ítems referentes al estado civil, así como a la situación profesional (empleado; desempleado; jubilado); deben ser indicadas, por escrito, las informaciones recogidas acerca del distrito municipal, municipio y edad; profesión; y la relativa al tiempo que hace que el sujeto está desempleado, si fuere el caso. En la dimensión cultural, el asistente debe indicar por escrito la etnia e indicar uno de los puntos referentes a la categoría formación académica, indicando si está completo o incompleto, siempre que sea el caso. Si, en el procedimiento analizado, otro fuere el ítem adecuado, especificarlo, indicando cuál, siempre que se haya facilitado dicha información. Con respecto a la categoría residencia urbana/rural, indicar tan sólo uno de los ítems e indicar por escrito el distrito municipal, municipio y tipo de alojamiento. Igualmente, indicar por escrito cuál es la relación afectiva o de parentesco entre los diversos acusados, siempre que exista. Con respecto a la Anamnesis Judicial, más específicamente a la dimensión clínica, en lo que concierne a la salud mental, indicar referencia de diagnóstico y cuál, así como indicar la existencia, o no, de acompañamiento; el mismo procedimiento en lo que se refiere a las adicciones; en este caso, el asistente debe indicar cuál es la sustancia e indicar debidamente si el sujeto es toxicómano o consumidor. En lo que atañe a las patologías físicas, indicar por escrito una referencia de diagnóstico, indicar la existencia o no de discapacidad, señalando cuál. En la dimensión forense, indicar si existió realización de evaluación psicológica o de peritaje de personalidad, indicando el tipo de institución responsable de su elaboración; indicar por escrito cuáles son las conclusiones, tanto de la evaluación como del peritaje; de la misma forma, indicar si existió, o no, decisión sobre inimputabilidad e indicar cuáles fueron las conclusiones. Aún en referencia a la decisión anterior, indicar si fue fundamentada por peritaje de personalidad o por evaluación psicológica forense. El asistente de investigación debe indicar la existencia, o no, de antecedentes criminales, registrando los delitos anteriormente cometidos y las medidas de coacción sufridas. Igualmente, debe indicarse con sí o no la existencia de prisión preventiva, mencionándose en su caso su duración; en lo que concierne a las medidas aplicadas, deben apuntarse las verificadas, tales como suspensión del procedimiento, multa, prisión, multa con pena suspendida, prisión con pena suspendida, prestación de trabajo a favor de la comunidad (PTFC), u otros; para todas las medidas verificadas, deberá ser indicado el delito. Deben ser anotadas cuáles son las medidas de coacción en el presente procedimiento y si se verificó o no prisión preventiva y cuál fue su tiempo de duración. Debe señalizarse la existencia de acompañamiento terapéutico durante el procedimiento (sí/no), indicando cuál y si tal fue o no cumplido. En relación a la revocación de la suspensión de la pena, debe ser registrado si tuvo lugar, y, en caso afirmativo, indicarse la razón. Obedeciendo al mismo criterio, debe indicarse el cumplimento o no de la pena y el tiempo de reclusión cumplido; con respecto a la libertad condicional, debe ser apuntada su verificación, o no, así como la revocación, o no, debiendo ser indicado cuál fue el motivo. En lo que concierne al procedimiento actual, indicar con sí o no la verificación de acompañamiento terapéutico, especificando cuál. En la segunda sección, relativa al Procedimiento Actual, especificar los delitos por los cuales el acusado se encuentra pronunciado, indicando la medida de coacción: prisión preventiva (sí/no); si se aplica otra medida, indicar cuál. En el caso de que el acusado haya cumplido prisión preventiva, indicar sí o no, en función de si se produjo desde el inicio del procedimiento o especificar desde cuándo y hasta cuándo se mantuvo. Para los delitos imputados, especificar el tipo, el precepto incriminador (artículo del CP o de ley suelta) y la dosimetría penal (medida de la pena), indicando la presencia de pena de multa y su valor, en el caso de que haya sido aplicada. En lo tocante a la tercera sección, Medida Penal Adoptada, especificar la pena aplicada a cada delito, la existencia o inexistencia de acumulación jurídica y cuál es la pena correspondiente a dicha acumulación; indicar si hubo o no decisión de prisión efectiva, especificando cuál es la medida penal efectivamente decretada. En lo que se refiere a la evaluación psicológica forense y al peritaje de personalidad, indicar con sí o no la referencia a su realización, su utilización para proceder a atenuación o agravamiento de la pena; indicar si fueron invocadas razones para atenuación de pena y, en caso afirmativo, cuáles. Con respecto a la sinopsis general, tomar en cuenta todos los delitos por los cuales el acusado fue condenado e indicar la dosimetría de cada uno; indicar con sí o no la aplicación de la Ley de los Jóvenes Imputables; especificar cuál es la pena aplicada, referente a cada delito; y cuál es la pena aplicada en acumulación jurídica. En relación a la interpretación del Índice de Psicologización, este indica el grado de exigencia y el grado de importancia atribuida a las evaluaciones psicológicas forenses y a los peritajes de personalidad en la decisión que culmina con la atribución de una medida penal, eventual agravamiento o atenuación: tal importancia se basa en la puntuación de los ítems relativos a la decisión integrada en la sección Medida Penal Adoptada. En el presente caso, cuanto mayor sea el índice, mayor relieve tuvo la presencia del trabajo llevado a cabo por los técnicos de Psicología Forense en contexto judicial. La población comprende todos los elementos que comparten características comunes, definidas por los criterios establecidos para el estudio: procedimientos de violencia conyugal, con nacionalidad portuguesa. Se optó por una muestra del tipo no probabilístico por juicio. Es el tipo de muestra en que los elementos que componen el subgrupo son escogidos en razón de su presencia en un lugar en determinado momento. Este tipo de muestreo es ideal cuando el tamaño de la población es pequeño y en estudios exploratorios (Fortin, 2003). La recogida de datos se realizó en el Partido Judicial de Lisboa, Instancia Local Criminal - 1ª Sección Central de Instrucción Criminal. La muestra está formada por treinta y cinco procedimientos (n= 35), todos en el ámbito de la violencia doméstica (artículo 15), en lo que atañe al cónyuge o ex-cónyuge o personas en una relación análoga a la de los cónyuges. El análisis de resultados al que procedimos nos permite concluir que el déficit de la lucha contra la violencia conyugal se sitúa en dos fases del procedimiento criminalizador: en la primaria, porque las penas aplicadas tienen una dosimetría correspondiente en el requisito de duración para suspensión de la pena (artículo 50 del CP); y en la secundaria, dado que, como se deduce de la investigación empírica, los jueces usan de forma casi perdularia la suspensión de la pena, conjugándose ambos niveles para la transmisión de un mensaje de impunidad que es el principal amigo de la reproducción de los comportamientos violentos. En la vertiente de la violencia en contexto de relación conyugal, con y sin vínculos jurídicos, importa viabilizar medidas de castigo y de ayuda psicológica, que puedan reprogramar el sujeto delincuente - este es el espacio de la criminalización terciaria (donde se consagran la ejecución de la pena y la reinserción); y el tiempo de castigo debe, en este como en las otras expresiones de la criminalidad, coincidir con el tiempo resocializador, dejando bien clara la ilicitud del comportamiento y posibilitando la interiorización de las interdicciones. El análisis de los resultados demuestra la incoherencia entre el Derecho dicho y el Derecho hecho y, del mismo paso, la línea de incoherencia entre la psicologización que se impone, tanto en relación al agresor como en lo que toca a la víctima, y la psicologización efectivamente practicada. Uno de los objetivos del instrumento que aplicamos reside en la indagación de la contribución que la Psicología aporta al espacio judiciario: se detectó una incidencia mínima, incluso si consideramos los llamados informes sociales, cuya dimensión psicológica es con frecuencia exigua. Los resultados, aunque meramente indicativos, demuestran una baja severidad punitiva en el ámbito de la violencia conyugal, lo que parece indicar la necesidad de reestructurar el contexto punitivo en delitos de esta naturaleza, tanto en la criminalización primaria como en la secundaria, reclamando un enfoque ius psicológico de esta problemática.ABSTRACT The intention of this work lies in the question of punitive severity of judicial decisions, erecting domestic violence as crime. To do so, was adopted the use of an instrument - the Punitive and Psychologizing Severity Index (Secondary Criminalization - ISPP-CS) (Poiares, 2009) - whose purpose involves analyzing the severity of criminal measures and the extent to which psychology influences the choice of the type of sentence imposed. The sample consists of 35 case, gathered in the region of Lisbon: Local Criminal Court - 1st Section Central Criminal Procedure. The results, even if merely indicative, demonstrate a low punitive severity within the conjugal violence, which may indicate the need to restructure the punitive context in such crimes, whether in primary or in secondary criminalization, demanding a judicial psychological approach to the problem.
É inquestionável que nos últimos anos a revolução tecnológica tem gerado profundas alterações nas relações laborais, em especial pela necessidade de atender a um mercado globalizado e com um nível de exigência cada vez mais elevado. Para os juslaboralistas, estes efeitos costumam ser sintetizados na palavra "flexibilização". Vista de uma maneira simples, e dentro da perspectiva desta investigação, pode-se dizer que a flexibilização é responsável por profundas alterações na dinâmica do trabalho. Assim, a razão que leva o empregador à utilização dos meios tecnológicos de produção é a necessidade de competir em um mercado globalizado, que exige respostas mais precisas e principalmente mais rápidas que somente os meios tecnológicos têm capacidade de proporcionar. Sai o sistema estandardizado e entra um novo modelo que se apoia em uma produção diversificada, tomando o principio da eficiência econômica como parâmetro que garante a necessária internacionalização da produção e a busca de outros mercados consumidores. Torna-se imperiosa a adaptação da organização laboral a favor da flexibilidade. Brota, então, a necessidade de renovação infinita de infraestruturas e programas, mudança dos costumes laborais e descentralização produtiva (outsourcing) como premissa necessária para a preservação da competitividade no mercado de trabalho, e que desemboca, esta última, nos sempre questionados processos de terceirização (quarteirização etc.) de parcelas da atividade produtiva. Neste contexto, como um dos principais instrumentos desta nova relação laboral, gerado a partir da revolução tecnológica, pode-se considerar o correio eletrônico como um meio de comunicação de grande relevância, porém gerador de intensa controvérsia. Os dados estatísticos comprovam que há uma utilização recorrente do e-mail nas relações comerciais (por ser uma comunicação barata, rápida, precisa e segura). Por outro lado, não são poucas as queixas sobre seu uso indevido e abusivo por parte dos trabalhadores no contexto de suas relações laborais. A reação natural, por parte dos empresários, a estes abusos foi a adaptação de seus mecanismos de controle e fiscalização. Assim, para combater estes problemas gerados pelas novas tecnologias de informação, em particular o e-mail, os meios de fiscalização terminam por ser, muitas vezes, mais invasivos na esfera íntima do trabalhador. Em geral, à medida que o trabalho ganha complexidade e se torna cada vez mais heterogêneo, a fiscalização da produção necessita revisar seus métodos, passando a se valer o empregador de meios de fiscalização igualmente complexos, heterogêneos, flexíveis e, por consequência, invasivos, como vídeos, inspeções íntimas de trabalhadores, verificação das páginas da web vistas nos postos de trabalho. Nesse contexto em que a produção não responde a padrões facilmente fiscalizáveis, se impõe um maior nível de confiança no trabalhador. Na ausência dessa fidúcia, ela vem sendo suprida por mecanismos de fiscalização, denominados "controles defensivos" pela doutrina laboral italiana, que permitam ao empregador estabelecer um perfil do empregado ou empregada contratada. Neste contexto o correio eletrônico dos empregados se converte em um novo objeto de controle, para cuja adoção se apela, especificamente, à necessidade de garantir a proteção dos sistemas informáticos, a produtividade, a proteção à propriedade intelectual e a qualidade do labor prestado. É precisamente o uso massivo desse meio de comunicação nas relações comerciais e os abusos gerados por ambos os lados da relação laboral, no uso do correio eletrônico por parte do empregado, e no controle de seu uso por parte do empregador, o que suscita a necessidade de investigar até onde chegam as possibilidades de intervenção do empregador no correio eletrônico do empregado. O estudo que se segue consiste em uma análise comparativa dos sistemas jurídicos brasileiro e espanhol neste ponto. Os paralelos entre os ordenamentos, em especial em seu viés constitucional, não constitui novidade, mormente quando se leva em conta a influência que as constituições espanholas nos últimos 180 anos tiveram sobre os seus correlatos textos no Brasil. Não são poucos os estudiosos que assinalam esta influência, ao longo da história, bem como os estudos que apontam discrepâncias e pontos de convergência entre os sistemas constitucionais dos dois países. Bonavides, em artigo em que apresenta 3 (três) momentos de transição constitucional brasileira em que o país se valeu da experiência constitucional e de fatos relevantes ocorridos na Espanha, aborda a matéria com percuciência, enfatizando a semelhança entre os atuais textos constitucionais. A esse respeito, o autor assevera que "há surpreendentes traços de similitude ou analogia e até mesmo identidade dos dois processos institucionais de transição que envolveram o regime político de ambos os países na passagem da ditadura à democracia. A transição brasileira, conforme se observa das datas comemorativas ocorreu dez anos depois da espanhola, mas recebendo um poderoso influxo, como veremos, do modelo estreado na península ibérica e garantido ali em sua execução, segundo nos parece, pelo bom êxito alcançado com a celebração dos pactos de Moncloa." No mesmo diapasão, Da Silva, em ensaio no qual oferta visão histórico-comparativa das constituições da Espanha e do Brasil, enfatiza pontos de convergência e de divergência em ambos os textos. Segundo o autor, abordando os trabalhos realizados na assembleia constituinte brasileira, nunca se manuseou tanto a constituição espanhola como se fez durante o processo de formação da constituição federal de 1988. De fato, ainda que se reconheça a preponderância da Constituição Portuguesa como maior fonte inspiradora da Constituição do Brasil em 1988, a 20 cuidadosa análise comparativa com o texto espanhol, em especial na seara dos direitos fundamentais, dentre os quais a intimidade e o segredo das comunicações são bons exemplos, é possível verificar uma normatividade que, se não é propriamente idêntica, possui enunciados que, de forma nítida, denunciam a fonte de onde proveio, criando uma expectativa de como esses sistemas jurídicos respondem a situações fáticas idênticas. Curial enfatizar, com apoio em Da Silva que "essa aproximação normativa é que possibilita o estudo comparativo de dois ou mais ordenamentos constitucionais. Ora, comparar significa confrontar, aproximar coisas a fim de individuá-las e, individuando-as, distingui-las; e distinguindo-as, agrupá-las e classificá-las (Tripiccione), ou, na forma substantiva de Constantinesco, a comparação é uma operação do espírito pela qual são reunidos num confronto metódico os objetos a serem comparados, a fim de precisar suas relações de semelhança e divergência." E esse estudo comparativo ganha força e interesse diante da atual conjuntura econômica. É fato que, nos atuais tempos de globalização da economia, no plano comercial, os dois países anteriormente mencionados nunca estiveram tão próximos. Desde que em 1995 se produziu a explosão do processo privatizador brasileiro, as grandes companhias espanholas começaram a tomar posições no país e como consequência disto, a Espanha foi o primeiro investidor estrangeiro no Brasil em 1998, com 22% do volume total de investimentos e no ano 2000, com quase 29% do total dos Investimentos Estrangeiros Diretos no Brasil. O aporte do investimento espanhol veio, inicialmente, provocado pelo Plano Nacional de Desestatização brasileiro que atraiu o interesse das grandes empresas espanholas, em especial os grupos multinacionais. Esta primeira onda de investimento produziu um efeito de atração sobre outros setores e empresas de distintos portes e hoje o grande volume de investimento acumulado espanhol resulta heterogêneo e vai desde automação, engenharia e a construção civil até saneamento ambiental, passando pelos serviços de segurança ou seguros. Na outra face da moeda, se há alguns anos atrás, o investimento direto do Brasil na Espanha era praticamente inexistente, dados da pesquisa sobre capitais brasileiros no exterior realizado pelo Banco Central do Brasil indicam que na Espanha há US$ 4 bilhões em investimentos diretos, US$ 1,4 bilhão em títulos públicos de curto prazo e US$ 614 milhões em títulos de longo prazo. Cifras estas que aumentam continuamente. Assim, o total do investimento bruto brasileiro na Espanha tem crescido bastante em relação há anos anteriores, criando um quadro atual em que, excluindo–se os paraísos fiscais, a Espanha figura entre os países que mais recebem investimentos brasileiros no exterior. No terreno jurídico, e na matéria que aqui nos interessa, a aproximação começa pelo fato de que nenhum dos dois países conta com legislação que regule o uso do correio eletrônico pelo trabalhador e seu controle pelo empregador, ainda que haja em ambos os países proposições legislativas que intentam abordar o objeto deste estudo. A despeito de as previsões constitucionais relevantes em ambos os ordenamentos jurídicos sejam muito próximas e similares, todavia, as decisões dos tribunais infraconstitucionais sobre o tema seguem, até este momento, rumos muito distintos, ignorando muitas vezes parâmetros constitucionais. Por seu turno, e até tempos recentes, em concreto até a publicação da STC 241/2012, de 17 de dezembro, não havia em nenhum dos dois países decisões das Cortes Constitucionais sobre o tema objeto desta investigação. O objetivo deste estudo é apresentar uma comparação do tratamento jurídico-constitucional da capacidade do empregador de controlar o correio eletrônico dos trabalhadores no sistema jurídico espanhol e no brasileiro, assinalando diferenças/semelhanças que nos ajudem a compreender como cada um destes dois sistemas jurídicos se aproxima ao tema, assim como o que um sistema poderia aportar ao outro para sua melhor compreensão. Concentrar-nos-emos, especialmente, nos limites da ação do legislador na matéria e as bases de um enfrentamento da questão pelos Tribunais Constitucionais brasileiro e espanhol. Para chegar a estas conclusões, desde um ponto de vista metodológico, fez-se necessário enfrentar algumas questões preliminares ao desenvolvimento do tema. A primeira destas questões consistiu em efetuar um recorte, ao apreciar a questão exclusivamente sobre a base do direito ao segredo das comunicações. De fato, não se tem dúvida que a questão do controle do empregador sobre o correio eletrônico do trabalhador pode ser apreciado sobre outras vertentes, em especial a das liberdades de pensamento e de expressão e do direito à intimidade, sendo esta última a perspectiva em que usualmente a doutrina e a jurisprudência tendem a analisá-la. Todavia, neste estudo o objetivo é analisar o controle que se efetua ao processo comunicativo e seus limites quando confrontado com a liberdade de comunicação entre as pessoas protegida pelo segredo. Assim, a premissa inicial no desenvolvimento do tema, tratada no capítulo 1, é conhecer de maneira profunda o correio eletrônico, suas características enquanto meio de comunicação e importância como instrumento de trabalho e possibilidades de causar lesão aos interesses dos empregadores. E este detalhamento em torno do instrumental se justifica na medida em que, ainda que seja o correio eletrônico um meio de comunicação de mais de 40 anos, seu uso massivo é muito recente. Isso justifica os investimentos em frequentes inovações em sua tecnologia, havendo uma grande quantidade de mecanismos técnicos de defesa dos sistemas informáticos recentemente criados e outros em fase de criação, os quais permitem diferentes níveis de intervenção no processo comunicativo, cuja localização no marco constitucional precisa de análise. Ademais, é necessário conhecer suas características e espécies, indo além da mera e já desgastada distinção entre o correio pessoal e o corporativo, já que, entre outras questões a serem desafiadas, há que se reconhecer uma multiplicidade de distintas formas deste último que, por suas características peculiares, deveriam ensejar um diferenciado enquadramento nas normas e na doutrina preexistente. A resolução da questão que se propõe, ademais de uma análise mais detalhada do instrumental correio eletrônico, passa assim pela apreciação do ambiente e das circunstâncias em que a intervenção na comunicação telemática se dá. Nesse plano, o fato de a intervenção ocorrer no seio de uma relação de trabalho, faz como que esta funcione como uma espécie de catalisador capaz de influenciar a resolução desta "equação", na qual se busca apreciar a licitude/ilicitude das medidas de controle e seus eventuais limites. Nesse contexto, em aspecto apreciado no capítulo 2, fez-se necessário averiguar como a doutrina científica e a jurisprudência constitucional do Brasil e da Espanha tomam em conta a aplicação dos direitos fundamentais dos trabalhadores no âmbito privado das relações de trabalho. Assim, será feita uma análise da Drittwirkung em ambos os sistemas jurídicos. Dessa análise, buscou-se entender porque, a despeito de a eficácia dos direitos fundamentais nas relações entre particulares ingressar no contexto jurídico do Brasil e da Espanha indubitavelmente sob influência germânica, a forma como o TC espanhol conhece da lesão a direitos fundamentais nas relações de trabalho não encontra simetria com aquela pela qual a questão chega à apreciação do STF brasileiro. É certo que ambos não se apoiem para a resolução da questão na lógica dos conflitos de direitos fundamentais e reconheçam a plena efetividade dos direitos fundamentais do trabalhador no marco da relação laboral, e igualmente que o exercício de tais direitos admite limitações ou sacrifícios na medida em que se desenvolvem no seio de uma organização que reflete outros direitos reconhecidos constitucionalmente. Contudo, e como consequência mais visível dessas formas de enfrentamento tão distintas na jurisprudência constitucional do Brasil e da Espanha, é forçoso admitir a existência de um maior grau de maturidade e sistematização no TC espanhol em torno da matéria, cuja jurisprudência evoluiu de maneira indubitável desde o critério da boa fé até o critério de absoluta necessidade das restrições de direitos para o desenvolvimento da relação laboral ou da atividade empresarial, reconhecendo uma importância distinta entre estes direitos, ao perceber que os dois titulares de direitos em conflito não estão em pé de igualdade, havendo uma evidente relação de poder. Assim, pode-se dizer que a jurisprudência do TC espanhol criou para estes casos de controle de direitos fundamentais na relação laboral uma doutrina distinta à dos conflitos entre particulares e àquela do exercício dos direitos fundamentais ante os poderes públicos, porém bem mais próxima da segunda que da primeira. Todavia, ainda que a questão não seja enfrentada dentro da sistemática de conflito de direitos, sobretudo na Espanha, em que se parte de uma aproximação das relações laborais com as relações de poder, não cabe desconhecer, contudo, que nestas relações quem exerce o poder empresarial o faz com base no exercício do direito à liberdade de empresa na Espanha (art. 38 CE) e do direito à livre iniciativa (art. 1º, IV e 170 CRFB), e, segundo alguns, à propriedade no Brasil (art. 5º, XXII). Assim, o capítulo 3 se voltou para um aprofundamento no conteúdo jurídico do poder empresarial, desde sua origem constitucional e da natureza jurídica das faculdades constitucionalmente garantidas que lhe dão suporte. Seriam a liberdade de empresa e a livre iniciativa verdadeiros direitos fundamentais? Igualmente, analisa-se neste capítulo a jurisprudência do Tribunal Constitucional da Espanha e do STF, no Brasil, quando do enfrentamento de situações em que são externadas as múltiplas possibilidades de o poder empresarial atuar como limite aos direitos fundamentais dos trabalhadores. No capítulo 4, por seu turno, é vista a proteção constitucional à comunicação efetuada através de correio eletrônico, com ênfase no seu uso nas relações de trabalho. Desde já, cumpre dizer que não há tratamento constitucional expresso sobre o correio eletrônico, não estando indicado na lista das comunicações previstas no art. 18.3 CE, nem tampouco está enumerado no artigo 5º, XII, da Constituição de Brasil, como se vê da leitura das normas: Art. 18.3. Se garantiza el secreto de las comunicaciones y, en especial, das postales, telegráficas y telefónicas, salvo resolución judicial. Art. 5º, XII. É inviolável o sigilo de correspondência e das comunicações telegráficas, de dados e das comunicações telefônicas, salvo, no último caso, por ordem judicial, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal. Outrossim, levando em consideração a confusão doutrinária e especialmente jurisprudencial ocorrida em ambos os países, externada na preferência em analisar a intervenção perpetrada pelo empregador à luz do direito à intimidade, igualmente torna-se um imperativo apreciar as zonas de aproximação e distanciamento entre este e o direito ao segredo das comunicações, destacando, quanto ao último, o seu âmbito de cobertura, tutelado nas Constituições do Brasil e da Espanha, com o objetivo de verificar se a comunicação telemática efetuada através de correio eletrônico se encontra alcançada por este direito. E esta questão tem especial transcendência porque a enumeração é exemplificativa tanto no art. 18.3 CE quanto no art. 5º, XII, da CRFB. Efetivamente, o TC espanhol e o STF brasileiro têm mantido a possibilidade de que outros meios de comunicação sejam protegidos pelo segredo das comunicações, em especial aqueles que forem resultantes dos avanços tecnológicos. Uma doutrina que o Tribunal Constitucional espanhol aplicou expressamente ao correio eletrônico em sua STC 241/2012. Há, inclusive, normas de caráter infraconstitucional que refletem a extensão acima mencionada. Temos assim, na Espanha, o art. 197 do Código Penal (Lei Orgânica 10/1995, com o tipo penal de "interceptación o apropiación ilegítima do correo electrónico – delito de descubrimiento y revelación de secretos") e a Lei Geral de Telecomunicações (Lei 32/2003, de 03 de novembro – art. 33, que estende a garantia do segredo das comunicações a todos os serviços de comunicação eletrônica). No Brasil, no mesmo sentido, a Lei 9296/9625, que regulamenta o art. 5 º, XII da CRFB, indica que a proteção do segredo das comunicações abarca a mensagem por correio eletrônico. Sucede, ademais, que tanto o Tribunal Constitucional espanhol como o STF brasileiro têm, em geral, interpretado o direito ao segredo das comunicações como um direito de caráter formal, sobre cuja base se outorga proteção ao processo comunicativo, independentemente de seu conteúdo (por todas a STC 114/1984, na Espanha, e a decisão do STF no caso "Garotinho versus O Globo" - Petição 2.702-7/RJ), tratando-se de um direito que garante a proteção da comunicação contra terceiros. Este é um aspecto que adquire especial relevância no desenvolvimento da questão proposta, mormente por reconhecer, em princípio, a condição de terceiro ao empregador, posto que a proteção do direito compreende, de entrada, a liberdade de comunicação dos comunicantes contra a intervenção de terceiros que não formem parte do processo comunicativo. Desde esta perspectiva, a titularidade dos bens (de quem não integra o processo comunicativo) e a natureza da comunicação (pessoal ou comercial) seriam aspectos que adquirem relevância apenas na hora de analisar a legitimidade das limitações que venham a ser impostas pelo empregador ao segredo das comunicações/sigilo de correspondência eletrônica no que pertine ao uso do correio eletrônico. E não há dúvidas que limitações se justificam pelo choque com outros direitos e interesses igualmente protegidos pelos sistemas constitucionais, o que se reforça no âmbito da relação de trabalho, na qual as possibilidades de controle e fiscalização utilizadas pelo empregador (isto é, a suas possibilidades de limitar o desfrute do direito), a outra face da moeda, possui status constitucional. Assim, destaca-se também o âmbito de proteção abstrato (pela ação legislativa) e concreto do direito, salientando quanto a este último que obrigatoriedade da resolução judicial como único meio de restrição concreta ao direito ao segredo das comunicações, em que pese a recente STC 241/2012, continua a ser um tema não abordado doutrinariamente de forma sistemática por nenhum dos dois Tribunais Constitucionais. Todavia, esta aproximação da jurisprudência constitucional brasileira e espanhola em acertos, erros e omissões no tratamento das comunicações efetuadas através de correio eletrônico, até este momento, não se refletiu na adoção de soluções semelhantes pelos órgãos jurisdicionais infraconstitucionais dos dois países. Nesse sentido, destaca-se o capítulo 5 em que é feita apreciação dos principais aportes jurisprudenciais em torno da questão. De fato, malgrado os contornos deste direito estejam muito bem delineados na doutrina constitucional, ainda são muito escassos os julgados do Social, em ambos os países, que analisam os limites da intervenção do empregador sobre os e-mails do empregado desde esta perspectiva, tendo como elemento central o proceso comunicativo. Em ambos os países, doutrina e jurisprudência têm preferido se aproximar destes casos, como já mencionado, desde a perspectiva do direito à intimidade. E esta é uma confusão que, como veremos, também incorrem as recentes SSTC 241/2012 e 170/2013. Assim, necessário averiguar, ainda que em linhas gerais, como se situam os direitos fundamentais potencialmente lesados no marco das relações de trabalho, especialmente a garantia do segredo das comunicações, analisando a jurisprudência das salas do social no Brasil e na Espanha, assim como a doutrina dos Tribunais Constitucionais em torno deste tema central. No Brasil, ainda que a questão não tenha sido objeto de apreciação pelo STF, há algumas decisões da mais alta Corte Laboral do país (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho). Do conjunto destes pronunciamentos a respeito da matéria, é possível indicar algumas linhas mestras definidoras do seu posicionamento sobre o uso do e-mail nas relações laborais e estas não seguem os parâmetros constitucionais traçados pelo STF derredor do direito ao sigilo de correspondência: 1. O e-mail protegido constitucionalmente é somente aquele de uso pessoal (@ig, @hotmail, @gmail). 2. A empresa pode regulamentar o uso do e-mail pessoal e corporativo no ambiente laboral, de maneira que a norma interna é aplicável aos casos concretos de utilização inadequada pelo obreiro. 3. Não existe violação do segredo das comunicações no e-mail corporativo em relação à própria empresa. 4. A senha pessoal do correio eletrônico corporativo não é uma proteção ao segredo das comunicações do empregado em relação à empresa, porém funciona para a proteção patronal, para que terceiros não possam aceder às informações que tenham conteúdo secreto ou reservado. 5. É legítimo o controle formal e material sobre o envio e recebimento de mensagens de e-mail corporativo, desde que a fiscalização ocorra de forma "moderada, generalizada e impessoal", objetivando evitar prejuízos ao empregador. 6. O e-mail corporativo proporcionado pela empresa (verdadeira propriedade do empregador) tem natureza jurídica equivalente a uma ferramenta de trabalho, destinada ao uso profissional. Por seu turno, na Espanha, a jurisprudência infraconstitucional também segue sendo muito heterogênea, havendo, até bem pouco tempo atrás, uma inexplicável ausência de critérios esclarecedores pelo Tribunal Supremo. É bem verdade que esse quadro na jurisprudência social na Espanha tende a ser alterado, em prol de uma maior uniformização, a partir das recentes decisões do Tribunal Supremo, em especial o caso "Coruñesa de Etiquetas" e duas outras recentes decisões proferidas em 2011 (SSTS 1323/2011, de 08.03.2011 e 8876/2011, de 06.10.2011), que, ainda que não enfrentem a questão nuclear desenvolvida neste estudo, que é o controle do correio eletrônico à luz do direito ao segredo das comunicações, avançam na análise sobre a correta utilização dos meios informáticos colocados à disposição do trabalhador pela empresa (ainda que para alguns de forma antagônica), e as possibilidades de controle que o empregador pode exercer sobre eles, tendendo a causar reflexos bem diretos na jurisprudência das salas do social dos demais tribunais e julgados espanhóis. Entretanto, mirando a atual doutrina proveniente destes órgãos jurisdicionais, é forçoso reconhecer que as normas constitucionais existentes e os parâmetros trilhados pelos dois Tribunais Constitucionais ainda estão longe de proporcionar o ambiente propício para que posições homogêneas sejam adotadas pelos órgãos judiciais infraconstitucionais (mesmo depois de prolatada as SSTC 241/2012 e 170/2013, que confirmou essa jurisprudência). E esse quadro de insegurança jurídica faz com que especialmente as empresas tenham interesse em regulamentar a matéria em seu âmbito interno ou, ao menos vê-la tratada no plano das normas coletivas de trabalho. Assim, no capítulo 6 enfrenta-se um tema em torno do qual quase não há resposta judicial, que consiste na averiguação da possibilidade de o empregado, através de negócio jurídico individual (contratos de trabalho ou regulamentos internos que a ele aderem) ou por meio de convênios coletivos (a autonomia privada coletiva) pactuar outras restrições ao segredo das comunicações e seus efeitos. Para tanto serão analisados critérios para a validade do ato jurídico individual através do qual se consente à limitação no exercício de faculdades dos direitos fundamentais, assim como a verificação desta mesma questão a partir dos instrumentos de negociação coletiva brasileiros e espanhóis. Trata-se de questão muito importante em especial porque os Tribunais Constitucionais reconhecem que a eficácia dos direitos fundamentais é mais intensa nas relações assimétricas, a exemplo da relação laboral, em que o negócio jurídico, na maior parte dos casos, tem um caráter de verdadeira adesão. Ademais, aqui se questiona a utilidade prática da cláusula contratual ou de convênio coletivo para a intervenção do empregador nas comunicações de seus empregados, uma vez que haveria, para alguns estudiosos da matéria, necessidade de renúncia ao exercício do direito por parte de todos os integrantes do processo comunicativo, já que titulares do direito ao segredo das comunicações são tanto o emissor quanto o receptor da mensagem. Em geral, um destes não integraria o corpo de funcionários da empresa, de maneira que as cláusulas em questão interfeririam no interesse de terceiros que do negócio jurídico não teriam participado. Dessa forma, seja pelas mutações jurisprudenciais em torno do tema, seja pelo reconhecimento das múltiplas variáveis que envolvem as soluções que repousam na autonomia privada individual ou coletiva, seja, por fim, em virtude de um reconhecimento de certa maturidade já existente em torno da questão de fato, observa-se que ambos os países já buscaram a solução legislativa para o tema. Essa procura por esta via é mais recorrente no Brasil, onde, todavia, as proposições legislativas, se comparado ao seu paradigma espanhol, mais discrepam da jurisprudência constitucional existente em torno do tema. Nesse sentido, no capítulo 7 é feita uma análise crítica dos projetos de lei já formulados e em tramitação no Brasil e na Espanha, a partir da noção de limites à ação concretizadora dos direitos fundamentais pelo legislador, pautado no respeito ao conteúdo essencial e ao principio de proporcionalidade. À título de conclusão, como medida propositiva, é apresentada uma minuta de norma, voltada para dar resposta às principais questões que envolvem as possibilidades de uso do correio eletrônico no ambiente de trabalho De maneira que, ancorado em algumas informações já sedimentadas na doutrina constitucional e laboral, bem como das conclusões parciais formuladas em cada capítulo deste estudo, objetiva-se descortinar algumas questões. Dentre estas, destaca-se o reconhecimento dos reais motivos que têm levado à interpretação distinta emprestada ao tema pelos órgãos de justiça social do Brasil e da Espanha, bem como a indicação dos parâmetros para atuação do Poder Legislativo e aqueles que poderão ser utilizados pelo Tribunal Constitucional espanhol e pelo STF brasileiro na futura apreciação da licitude dos controles efetuados pelo empregador em relação aos correios eletrônicos recebidos ou enviados pelos empregados. Mas para uma correta conclusão a respeito deste tema central, imperativo será analisar outros temas igualmente pouco tratados na doutrina constitucional: o direito ao segredo das comunicações é afetado pela intervenção do empregador no correio eletrônico de seus empregados? Quais são os limites para a atuação legislativa em ambos os países a respeito do controle do empregador sobre e-mails dos empregados? Existem limites implícitos ao uso das comunicações telemáticas na relação de trabalho? Poderão os contratantes fixar limites ao uso do correio eletrônico através de contratos e da negociação coletiva? Admitida esta hipótese, quais seriam, então, os requisitos que deveriam ser observados para o reconhecimento da licitude dessas regras limitadoras ao exercício do direito ao segredo das comunicações/sigilo de correspondência estabelecidas em normas coletivas e no contrato de trabalho? Estes são alguns dos principais aspectos que se pretende desenvolver neste trabalho de investigação.
Transcript of an oral history interview with Dr. Carlos F. A. Pinkham, conducted by Jennifer Payne at Norwich University in Northfield, Vermont, on 9 January 2014, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. Carlos Frank Armory Pinkham graduated from Norwich University in 1965 and later returned to the campus to teach in the College of Math and Sciences. His interview includes many details of his academic career as well as recollections from his military service and family history. ; 1 Carlos Frank Amory Pinkham, NU '65, Oral History Interview January 9, 2014 Interviewed by Jennifer Payne CARL PINKHAM: Vermont. JENNIFER PAYNE: And your (inaudible) [00:00:02] class? CP: Nineteen sixty-five. JP: Ah, did you have a nickname at Norwich? CP: Not really, no. JP: No? The yearbook has you as Pink, but I imagine -- CP: Oh, yeah, Pink is -- Pink is -- if anybody used a nickname it was Pink. Yeah, mm-hmm. JP: Oh, what made you decide to choose Norwich? CP: It was very easy. My father taught here, and so as a poor university professor this is the only place he could afford to send me (laughs) because I got tuition free. JP: What was his name and what did he do? CP: Vernon Curtis David Pinkham. So, again, four names. It's a tradition in our family. JP: What did he teach? CP: He taught economics. JP: So, you came to Norwich pretty much straight out of high school. CP: Yes. JP: And were you interested in science then? CP: I have been interested in biology ever since I was able to think. So, I knew when I came here what I wanted to do. I knew what I wanted to do when I was a kid. JP: Really? CP: Yeah. I wanted to get a doctorate in biology. At the time that I came here I wasn't sure what field in biology. It was really a choice between evolution and marine biology, but I knew that I wanted to do that.2 JP: Wow. So who was your roommate when you got here? CP: Oh, boy, when I got here -- I don't remember. I do know that he never finished and I don't remember his name. JP: Do you remember any of your roommates? CP: Sure, Joe [Koons?] [00:01:50] was my sophomore year roommate and he never finished, and then Don Graves was my roommate in my junior year; he did finish. And Bob Priestly was my roommate in my senior year. JP: No kidding? CP: Yeah. JP: That's great. Now I know you've looked at these questions. Is there anything in particular that you want to focus on or start with? CP: No, not really. Just go ahead and fire away and we'll progress as ever we can. JP: Yes, OK. Your activities when you were here were humongous. You were in everything. You were corporal, master sergeant, correct? Major biology -- you were in the biology club, one, two, three, four president -- president twice; geology club, one, two, three, four; honor tank platoon, three and four; German club one, three, and four Vice President; AUSA three and four; mountain and cold weather; winter carnival committee; regimental ball committee; Epsilon Tau Sigma Vice President. CP: That's the honorary society -- the academic honorary society. JP: And you were in Who's Who, also, I noticed in the yearbook. You were on that page, but the list doesn't stop. You were in the varsity club two, three, four; class honor committee to cadet cadre two, three, four; dean's list one, two, three, four; DMS, which is -- CP: Distinguished military student. JP: Wow. What was your GPA? What was your -- CP: I was second in my class -- JP: Wow! CP: -- and the person that was first in my class, Harry Short, and I competed for that position all four years and his is a sad story because he beat me and legitimately so; he was a very smart person. He went on to med school, got his MD and in my fifth year of graduate school, I found out that he had just been killed in an airplane crash that he was flying himself. So that was probably one of the saddest things that had ever happened and has 3 ever happened in my life -- to lose this very dear friend who was my arch competitor, but still a person that I had a lot of respect for. And really it was -- another aspect of that is that I -- up to that point I kind of thought of those of us who were in this top echelon as being untouchable. In other words, somehow we were just -- our lives were special and therefore they would not be expendable and that woke me up to the fact that in fact that was a very incorrect assumption to proceed with. JP: So what do you remember most about Norwich? CP: Oh, (laughs) there's so many things. I remember, and this is going to go on to one of the other questions, William Countryman, my favorite professor, and it's hard to pick a favorite professor because there were certainly three that I had -- William Countryman, Bert Wagenknecht, who was the botany professor at the time in biology, and of course, the ever traditional and ever present Fred Larson, who played a major role in my interest in geology. So, these are the three people that vied for my preferences as the favorite professors, and Bill -- but Bill because I had him more often than all of the others. I think he won out, but he was a very special professor anyway. He was smart, knew how to teach, and knew how to keep his classroom in stitches, which is something that is very important for a good teacher to have. It's something that I never developed as a teacher, I have to admit. JP: How did he keep you in stitches? CP: Oh, he just had great stories that were always able -- that always fit in to whatever lesson he was talking about and he had a great sense of humor. He was a very wonderful fellow. I ended up working for him, actually, when I came back here for a number of years because he went into private consulting and I worked for him. That's the story we can get into a little bit later. JP: Yeah. Because you went to the military after, but what was the hardest part? It seems like you probably did very well. Were you ever disciplined? CP: No, no. Should I have been? Yes. (laughter) JP: For what? CP: Oh, there were a couple of times I think when -- well, the one time that I remember specifically is when I was the executive officer of the third battalion my senior year. I think I had a soccer game. I think that's what it was, and so I went on the soccer game without thinking about the fact that I had to make sure there was somebody who took my place in formation because the battalion commander I knew was not going to be there. And so one of our class cut ups, who was just -- went on to become a great guy -- probably because he was a class cut-up, took over the battalion at the time and he made a pretty good farce out of it from what I understand, and I was about ready to get some demerits and I think my dad stepped in and prevented that from happening. I don't know, but I know I never got them.4 JP: What did he do? CP: Well -- JP: The farcical -- CP: Oh, what did he do? Oh, he just got up and mocked the protocol, the commands and everything. I don't know. I don't know exactly what happened. I just heard that it was pretty farcical, so -- JP: Norwich cadets cutting up? CP: Right, right. JP: No, say it isn't so! So what was your least favorite? Did you have a least favorite class here? CP: Well, I suppose it had to be English. And the reason for that was that I hated writing; I didn't know how to write. And, again, there's a story about how that can be -- how that turned around, but after I got out of grad school, and so I'll hold that until later. But at the time I hated the writing aspect of English. I didn't mind the reading aspect, the reading of the different literary assignments, that was fine, but, boy, I just did not like writing. JP: OK. What was the most important thing that Norwich taught you? CP: There are several things, but the first thing I learned, I guess, is that nothing ever lasts forever, and that was a lesson I learned in rook school, and it was a lesson that I think a lot of people learned in rook school because if you didn't learn that lesson, you couldn't get through rook school. That's a valuable lesson to learn if you're really being confronted by things that are difficult at the time. It's good to know that it can't last forever. The second lesson, and I think this is one that has probably, Norwich teaches more than anything else, and I have not seen it as something that is grasped by the powers that be as something that they need to promote, and that is that done properly, if you allow it to do it to you, allow Norwich to do this to you, you discover that your limits are way beyond where you thought they were, way beyond spiritually, way beyond physically, way beyond mentally because Norwich has a tendency to push people. It was pushing people when I was a cadet here and it still does push people and in ways that many other universities don't. And one good proof of that happened my sophomore year. In the eighth grade -- I've got to go back a little bit -- in the eighth grade is when we moved to Northfield because dad took the teaching position that year, and in my homeroom I went into the first day, and of course being an eighth grader boy, I was very interested in girls, and I saw silhouetted against the window this very pretty, cute blonde and I said, "Well, that's kind of a neat girl." And so I asked about her and found out that she was going with somebody else and so being an honorable person I decided I probably 5 better not interfere. But a little while later I heard that someone had said that she was interested in me, which of course was all I needed to do. So I approached her and we struck up a relationship that lasted through the sophomore year of high school and she eventually broke off with me about that time -- at that time because she thought I was pretty much so a namby-pamby, which I was, and then -- but I always had a crush for her and the sophomore year, New Year's Eve, I had a date that didn't come through and so on just a whim I called her up because she was a townie as well, obviously, and asked her out to New Year's Eve and she didn't have a date that night, so she accepted. And from that point on we were a couple and she has now been my wife for almost 50 years. JP: Awww, that's so sweet. CP: Yeah, so basically she just liked what she had seen -- the change in me that was -- that Norwich had brought about. JP: What's her name? CP: Christine. JP: Christine. CP: Yeah. JP: Wow, so Norwich helped her fall in love -- CP: That's exactly correct. And she'll admit that, too. I'm not making this up. (laughs) JP: Did the words "I will try" mean anything to you as a student? CP: It means -- it's hard for me to kind of express because I think I always felt that way, and I always was a little bit disappointed with it because I want to do more than try; I want to succeed. And I think that probably of all of the things that Norwich did for me, its motto was not one of the things that I carried with me throughout my career. I mean, I just knew I would try. Maybe that's why Norwich and I were such a good fit, I don't know, but in any event. JP: Well, you were obviously successful from an early time. Do you have any funny stories about life or people at Norwich? CP: (laughs) I don't know whether I want to tell one of them. Well, I guess probably the story I will tell is that the infamous panty raid -- JP: Oh, yes. CP: Roy [Bear?] [00:14:58], Dick Herbert, and myself had heard about this thing happening but we were at my house that night. And we finally decided after the news had come that 6 it was probably interesting enough that we ought to go over and take a look. So we went over after it had been done and interestingly enough we were watching -- after most of it had been done -- just to watch and at this point I have mixed emotions about whether I should have been involved or not, but at any event, one of things we noticed is that the police and the fire -- well, the fire department was using a lot of fire hoses on the few that were left and they were doing most of the damage with their fire hose that was finally attributed to Norwich cadets. They were breaking windows with the water and everything. And so we were standing around, and of course we looked like Norwich cadets because we had short hair, and one of the policemen came up to us and said, "Are you guys from Norwich," and I said, "No, not me, I'm from Northfield. I'm a townie," and that wasn't a lie because I was, but at that point in time we recognized maybe we better get out of there. So we got out and came back to my house and eventually got back into school. You know, they were checking everybody coming back in at that point in time and we had not been involved in the raid and so we -- this is our junior year -- so we were let back in, and again, I think it was partly because my dad vouched for me and said yes, they were at home at our house, and that was true. So, that's one of the episodes that I think is kind of humorous. JP: So you were questioned along with everybody else that had gone? CP: Yeah, sure, sure. JP: Interesting. Were there other panty raids? I had heard there might have been annual -- CP: I wasn't aware of it and certainly nothing as big as that. I know that one made national headlines and (laughs) -- JP: Yes, yes it did. What did you do after graduation? CP: Well, I was commissioned in armor, but because of my grades and because of other good letters of recommendation from my profs and performances on the GREs, et cetera, I was allowed to defer to active duty to go to grad school. And this is during Viet Nam so I was very happy with that. I wasn't going to argue that and so I had applied to the three -- by then I knew that I wanted to do evolution -- I had applied to the three universities in the nation at the time that were giving doctorates in evolution -- Harvard, University of Illinois and UCLA. Was accepted to all three with scholarships and decided I needed to get far away but not too far away. So I chose the middle of the two, University of Illinois, to go to grad school, and went to grad school there and had a great experience and learned and awful lot. And had -- in those days you had four years of total deferment to active duty to get your doctorate -- and four years to get a doctorate in biology is really difficult if not, you know, you have to really be smart, even smarter than -- I shouldn't say even smarter -- I worked hard, I wasn't smart, I just worked hard -- and smarter than me. So at the end of the fourth year I still hadn't had my degree, but what I did -- there were two things that happened. I found out that if I had a doctorate I could switch from armor to medical service corp., which is what I had originally put in for anyway, and so there was caveat on that, though. I had a two-year obligation, active duty obligation, in 7 armor. If I switched my branch then I would have to have another two years, in other words, a total of four year obligation. So this is where I think my Norwich training came in really, really helpful in about two tenths of a second I had the decision. You know, two years of which one would have to be in Viet Nam in a tank versus four years of which I would be applying what I had learned state-side in a research institution. It was a pretty easy decision to make and so I accepted the caveated offer to go to medical service corp. The other thing I did is we got in that fourth year you had an option on when to be put on active duty, and so I took the furthest one away from when I applied, which actually gave me almost five years of graduate study in grad school, and I cut it so close that on Wednesday night I defended my thesis, Thursday morning I boarded the plane for Fort Sam, officers basic course. JP: Wow! CP: Yeah, it was close. JP: Wow. CP: So, that was a very fortunate thing for me because getting into medical service corp. was fundamental to a lot of what happened to me from that point on. JP: In what way? CP: Well, because after officer's basic which is, you know, a three month assignment, I was assigned to Edgewood Arsenal and to the biomedical research lab there and my first assignment was to do research on a nerve agent poisoning -- the mechanism of a nerve agent poisoning, organophosphorus, the nerve agents, and to do that I had to kill cats. They were anesthetized and then we exposed them to nerve agents and monitored what was happening to them with some fairly sophisticated equipment and deduced from the responses what was going on. Well, you know, I'm not opposed to research of that sort but it was not something that I was really comfortable with and it turned out that the guy across the hall from me had just -- we were living in apartment houses at the time and so this is for married couples -- and so the guy across the hall from me had just gotten out of being the executive officer for the human experiment platoon. These were humans that had volunteered to undergo various kinds of experiments, most of which were with psychedelic kind of drugs. So it was kind of a difficult job to be in charge of them. And because he still had some active duty time, he was offered a position with the newly formed ecological research branch. Now his specialty was aquatics. He was a fisheries guy, marine and fresh water fisheries, and so he kind of fit right in and I'll explain why that was newly formed here in a moment. But he told me about this, and he said that they were looking for a person who had specialty in land and my, in addition to a doctorate in evolution, one of the -- the major area in evolution that I had worked on was mammals, mammalogy, and so I had a lot of experience with mammals as well as with reptiles and amphibians because one of my major mentors was Doctor Hobart Smith, who was probably the world's leading herpetologist at the time. So I had a lot of good experience that would put me into that position. So the next day I went over and talked to the newly 8 assigned director of the ecological research branch, Scott Ward, and told him what I was interested in and what my qualifications were and the next day I was reassigned to his branch. He had a lot of pull at the time. Why did he have a lot of pull? Here's why. He was a very sophisticated politician for one thing, but what he was heading up was a really dynamic and important endeavor at the time. Basically, Nixon, who has been maligned for a number of different -- well, for one thing, and that's Watergate, but really did an awful lot of good stuff during his presidency. National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, diplomacy with China, et cetera. The list goes on. One of the things he did was he signed an executive order that unilaterally ended the open air testing of offensive, active -- of offensive and defensive biological and chemical weapons, and restricted any further research to just defensive research on biological and chemical weapons in labs. So, there were two places -- a number of places around the world where this research had been going on, two in the United States. One was in Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, the southern end of the Great Salt Lake desert, out in the middle of nowhere, which you would expect to be a place where this would be conducted. And there's some stories about that that I'll get into in the future, and then the other one was 17 miles northeast of Baltimore on Carroll Island, which is part of Edgewood Arsenal, an island -- a peninsula that jutted into the Chesapeake Bay. It was called an island because it was separated from the mainland by a channel of water, cooling channel from a power plant that was right there. And because they had stopped the open air testing the question was logically raised, was there any impact of the testing on the environment? Now Carroll Island it turned out -- well, both Dugway Proving Ground and Carroll Island formed these two groups to research this. On Carroll Island it turned out there were two parts to it. There was one part next to the mainland, and then there was an intervening large saltwater marsh, and then another part where all of the jutting out into the bay where all the testing had been done. And the two parts were fairly comparable to one another, so we had a very good control and a very good experimental area to do our studies on. So we started the study of that and that was the foundation of the Army's environmental ecological research effort, and so I was in on the ground floor of that, and that played a major role in my military career because -- well, one of the things that happened while we were there is as a result of the National Environmental Policy Act, we started getting into environmental assessments and environmental impact statements, one of the first groups to start doing that. And so, again, the procedures we developed and techniques and everything were eventually implemented -- became implemented into a lot of the Army approaches and regulations. To get a little ahead of myself I think it's important at this point to explain what happened at the end of the four years. I'm going to come back to Edgewood. At the end of the four years I was -- obviously my obligation, active duty obligation, was over and I thought, OK, this is it, I'm going to get out of the service. And I wanted to come back to Norwich and teach, quite honestly, and so I applied here but there wasn't a position available, and I really didn't know much about applying anywhere else, and I tried but I wasn't successful. But I had been offered a job at the sister organization out at Dugway Proving Ground as a civilian working, doing the same thing, extending what I had done at Edgewood. And I loved the job, I loved the people that I was working with both at Dugway, and by then we had formed this extended team where Dugway and Edgewood worked together, but I hated the environment of Baltimore, just didn't like the humidity in the summer, as a Vermonter I 9 couldn't handle it. So we took the job out at Dugway, and again, I'm going to come back to Edgewood, but I've got to finish this entry into Dugway because it's kind of a fascinating story. So, I had been out there many times and new I would love it, and so in order to make the final decision I had to take my wife and my two children out, then I had two boys, I now have three. So we left Baltimore when it was about 98 degrees and 150 percent humidity, not really, I mean, the air was just soaking. And we got on the plane and flew out to Utah and about 30 minutes out of Salt Lake City the pilot came on board and said the temperature in Salt Lake City is 110 degrees at which point my wife turned to me, she said, "As soon as we get off the plane we're turning around," because she was thinking 110 degrees with all of that humidity that we had just left behind, and I knew better. So I let her get off the plane and she looked around and she felt the air and she says, "I love it!" So I knew that we were sold on going out to Dugway. So, returning back to Edgewood, because we had these two wonderful control and experimental areas, we had a lot of wonderful data comparing two different community structures, those of let's say a species of trees on both places, fishes on both places, snakes on both places, amphibians on both places, mammals on both places, et cetera. And we had these wonderful databases. But at the time there was no way to really compare them because all of the mechanisms that were out there at the time, all of the methods that were out there at the time, were focusing on diversity, on measures of diversity, and we weren't interested in measures of diversity. We were interested in how alike are these two communities or how different are these two communities. So, the guy across the hall who introduced me to Scott, his name is Gareth Pearson. He eventually went on to become one of the directors in one of the labs of EPA, very successful career. JP: EPA is? CP: The Environmental Protection Agency. So Gareth and I sat down one night with this problem and a bunch of paper with some of our data on it spread out on the floor in his apartment and a six-pack of beer. And by the end of the six-pack, we had solved the problem, and we had developed an index that would compare these two communities in a very -- I've got to say clever way -- and in a very effective way and started applying that our data and then of course published it and this index, the Pinkham Pearson Index, is now regarded as the primary way to compare community structure. So we were very fortunate to be at the right place at the right time. I'm sure if we hadn't come up with it, somebody else would have. It's one of those things that's fairly obvious once you look at it, but, you know, we were there at the right time. JP: That's wonderful. I was hoping you would talk about that. CP: So we had a lot of fun. We did some great things. Great in the sense of they were fun things and wonderful to do. We started the -- we were the -- we, Edgewood, actually, the team that I was part of at Edgewood, really established the concept of the installation environmental impact assessment or statement where basically you go in to an installation, an Army installation, and you identify all of the resources on and around that installation and all of the activities on that installation that could impact these resources, and identified ways to mitigate the impact so that the installation could continue its 10 mission. And eventually out at Dugway as we continued the effort, because by the time I was at Dugway it was such a large effort that we needed to have both camps involved in this process. Another colleague of mine that I met at Dugway, David Gauthier, whom I also kind of took on as a person that I would work with the rest of my life, David and I were the co-editors of a seven volume -- became the co-editors of a seven volume treatise on doing ecological surveys at military installations, and one of the volumes was doing all of the procedures involved in doing an environmental assessment of an installation. All of the different topics you've got to cover and all of the ways you can cover them, it was a fairly extensive document. And still is -- its descendants are still being used in the environmental program in the military. So, I really enjoyed that part of my life. We got to go and I got to see lots of different parts of the United States. Never got away from the United States, but some of the really interesting installations where testing was going on of one form or another, whether it was vehicle testing or artillery testing or whatever, we got to go to because they were part of testing evaluation command at the time, which Edgewood Arsenal was part of, and that's where most of the environmental documentation was happening. One of the things -- and again, it's a matter of being at the right place at the right time, very quickly or very soon after we started our effort at Edgewood there was an operation at Edgewood that had been going on for years and their procedures, their environmental procedures, were just terrible, and we told them that they were just awful and that they would have to do something about them and they snubbed their noses at us. About six months later EPA caught up with them, newly formed EPA caught up with them, and the directors, whom we had said you better do something about this, ended up going to jail. JP: Really? CP: Yeah. So that all of a sudden gave us the notoriety or the fame that we needed to have to get everybody's attention and from that point on we got to do some pretty neat stuff. And going from coast to coast and seeing things, you know, I saw my first rattlesnake, I saw my first copperhead and things of this sort which were fun. In the wild, you know, turning things over and finding them there, which is part of our technique, and developed further techniques for looking at -- finding whether or not a military operation had impacts. I think one of the fun ones was Redstone Arsenal where a government operated -- a government owned, civilian operated (GOCO) facility had been operating during the Second World War manufacturing DDT. Every time they had a bad batch they just threw it out the back door. So although the facility had been destroyed, long gone, this batch was still there. Now what happened is that Redstone Arsenal called us there because they knew that there was this stream that was entering a bayou or a backwater of the Mississippi that didn't have any life in it and they wanted us to find out what was going on. So what we did is we used a technique which, I don't know whether we developed or had been used by others, but in any event, you go up and every time you find a branch in the river, or in the stream, you sample both sides and when you do that, you know, one, every time we went there, one branch was fine, the other branch was dead. And we kept following it back up until we found this huge area, a two or three football field size area of old DDT, and it became one of the nation's hazardous waste facility -- sites -- that had to be cleaned up. So it was, you know, it wasn't anything that the people there were 11 trying to cover up or had been responsible for, it had been done a long time ago and we were able to find that. Another program that I think was a lot of fun is that my boss, Scott Ward, was a falconer and this was in a time when falconers were -- he was a falconer when it was legit to be, OK to be, a falconer. But then the Endangered Species Act came along, which again, was another Nixon thing, and that prevented falconers from being -- you know, without having a license. You had to be licensed to be a falconer and had to have a legitimate reason. Well, he was a veterinarian and so he got his license. He was a wheeler-dealer and he made sure that he got his license and then he started working with peregrine falcons and their recovery. As you may know, about that time DDT, again, here's this DDT rearing its ugly head, had been bioaccumulating in predator species, the peregrine falcon being one of them, so that to a level that the eggs were thinning, the shells were thinning and the parents were breaking them in the nest as they were trying to sit on them. So, there was a real decline in peregrine falcons. In fact, the peregrine falcon south of the Arctic had gone extinct. So, Scott was involved in studying their recovery and to do so he became the coordinator of the North American peregrine falcon banding program, and he would go to a number of different places, Greenland, Hudson Bay, I think Alaska, and band fledglings in the nest, and then we would go to Assateague Island in the fall and in the spring and trap peregrine falcons to see if any of them had been banded to find out where they were coming from because at that point in time we really didn't know very much of any -- the peregrine falcons that are now south of the Arctic are all derived from peregrine falcons that were in the Arctic. It's a different subspecies but basically it was the only opportunity is to take these fledglings and bring them back here, and that was a Cornell program, did a wonderful job, and breed them in a captive breeding program and then reintroduce them to the wild. But knowing we just didn't have any information on what their flight pathways were, where their migration routes were, and so Scott was instrumental in coming up with that information. And so I was able to go with him and, you know, this is a military assignment. (laughs) JP: It's a great job. CP: Somebody had to do it, right. And spend a week or two weeks in the fall and in the spring on Assateague Island trapping peregrine falcons and birding and all sorts of stuff. So that was a lot of fun. We got to know a lot of interesting people because Scott made his way through the people who had influence at the time. I think one of the more interesting things is that, for example, we would often capture peregrine falcons with -- peregrine falcons -- he would also do it on Carroll Island -- capture either hawks or accipiters or falcons and they would have feathers in their beak or we would find kills in the woods, and part of our study was, you know, what had they killed? And so he would take these feathers and sometimes just one or two feathers they pulled out of the corner of their bill and send them off to a gal at the Smithsonian Institution, I can't remember -- I think her name was Roxy or something -- and she would identify it just from a single feather what the bird was. So that was part of our ability to get some additional data. What are they preying on when they're at different places in their migratory pathway, et cetera. So, that was another, you know, it was just a lot of fun things that we got to do and we would seine for fish. 12 JP: And we're back. CP: OK, so I'm trying to think of -- in the back of my mind there's one more story I want to tell and I can't come up with it right now. So those were fun days. We really had a great time doing all that sort of stuff. Oh, I know what it was. Another story was with Chandler Robins. Now, Chandler Robins is, I think he's still alive, one of the greatest ornithologists in the country. He wrote a book on birds of North America and Scott knew him well, and so I remember one night we had been out doing some night surveys and he had a recording of a bird that he couldn't -- all he had was the song and so we got on the phone the next morning and called up Chan and said, "Chan, I want to play something for you. Can you tell me what it is?" So we just played it for him over the phone. Chan says, "OK, so let me see. It was probably about nine o'clock at night, it was raining slightly and the sound is coming from the middle of a marsh, am I right?" And Scott says, "Yes," and so he says, "Well, it's a Black Rail," which fits all of those things. JP: Wow! CP: So this guy really knew his stuff. (laughs) That's the kind of stuff that we were exposed to for all of this. It was a lot of fun. JP: Did you photograph it? CP: Oh, no, no because it was at night. But I photographed a lot of birds. In fact, because I spent so much time going around doing this sort of stuff, my life list of North America north of the Mexican border is about 420 birds, 420 species. That's not anywhere nearly as many as it could be if I were a serious birder, but just because I have travelled so much, it's a lot larger than a lot of birders do have. JP: That's a lot of birds. CP: It is. JP: And you were outside and making the world a safer place. CP: Hopefully so. JP: That's pretty amazing. CP: Yeah. JP: Wow. I'm always amazed by you guys. CP: Yeah, it's fun what we get to do.13 JP: What about the Oxford Round Table? I know I'm jumping ahead, but I want to make sure we get that. CP: All right, so the reason -- I want to also hit my military career because I think that's important and, oh, we're doing fine. So let's hit the military career and then we'll come back to the Oxford Round Table. JP: Absolutely. CP: After I got out of Edgewood, I told you I was thinking about getting out of the service, my brother, my oldest brother, who at the time was a colonel in the Reserves, said, "No, you've got to stay in," and he explained to me why I needed to stay in. He said, "The benefits that you would accrue for retirement and for Space-A travel and medical coverage, et cetera, are just fantastic. You've got to stay in." So I did, I decided to stay in. And to get to the end of that story before I come back I stayed in for 47 years or whatever it was, I mean, 37 years. I retired at 60 from the Reserves and when I retired it was in '06 and I was the senior, maybe we should say old man of preventive medicine science officers and as such I was the mentor for about 700 preventive medicine science officers in the Reserves, the National Guard around the world. And from Norwich, this is when I was doing this, I sent out a weekly newsletter. Every Saturday I would come down early in the morning and I would work until one or two o'clock in the afternoon putting together this newsletter of all of the events that were important to preventive medicine science officers that had happened in that week and sent it out to them. And it got to be such a big thing that many of the active duty preventive medicine science officers were subscribing to it as well. JP: What was it called? CP: The Preventive Medicine's -- Reserves Component Preventive Medicine Science Officers' Newsletter, very imaginative title for it. JP: But very useful. CP: But it was very useful. JP: Extremely useful. CP: Yeah, it was during the Iraq war and during Pakistan as well. The beginning parts of -- I mean, Afghanistan. JP: So what kinds of things would be in it, for example? CP: Oh, there would be health reports from around the world, alerts about outbreaks of different things. There would be announcements of upcoming conferences that -- one of the things that preventive medicine science officers -- most preventive medicine science officers are in the Reserves are not assigned to a unit. They are what is known as 14 individual mobilization augmentees. They're on their own basically and they have to get their 50 points a year on their own. Because all of us have advanced degrees, we don't fit into most units and if there is a unit, it's probably across the country that we could fit into, and some of the people fit into those units, they just had to travel and they did their two weeks of active duty. And so it was very important to be able to get these people, all of these people for retention purposes if nothing else, to recognize all of the opportunities they had to get points and part of my role in this was to provide these opportunities -- show them the opportunities that they had and make sure they were taking advantage of them. JP: That's terrific. CP: So that was another side of it. And unfortunately, I think after I left I found a successor and I think he, after a year or so, found that the job was so demanding that he had to back out and I don't think anybody else took over. But it happened during a time when it was really important too because we were so widespread and some us of involved in conflicts around the world that it was important for us to have that at that particular time. I'm sure it would still be valuable today, but I don't think anybody has followed up on it. But then that's another thing where Norwich guys have a tendency to see a need and fill it. Another thing, which also is a Norwich story, I think, is to get my points, one of the ways you can get points is to be a liaison to West Point, and what that means is basically that you are helping to guide the applicants for West Point from Vermont or from whatever state you're in, through the process so that they either are successful or not. Well, it turns out in Vermont I think we have a higher percentage of people that get in for reasons which are not worth going into here than most states. But you still, one out of ten, one out of 20 would make it. So, one of the advantages of that is it gave me an opportunity to direct the nine or 18 failures to Norwich which many of them did come here as a result. So that was a good recruiting opportunity as well. And Norwich -- West Point preferred to have of all of those senior military academies, they preferred to have either West Point or Norwich personnel fill those positions because they knew that they would do a good job and a serious job. So, let's see, what else is here? All right, we can go on to the Oxford thing. So, I, as I've stated earlier, had always been interested in evolution and ever since I was able to remember, I recognized that the beauty around me that I was fascinated with in nature, the butterflies, the flowers, the trees, the frogs, whatever I was attracted to at the time, was just not by chance but brought about by a creator. Now I grew up in a family with a Christian influence and background, but I myself, I personally never understood who Jesus Christ was and his importance to me, and just recently I kind of figured out a good way to explain that. As a kid I had understood that Christmas was all about me. And Easter somehow had something to do with this person called Jesus Christ but I wasn't sure what it was. And quite honestly I really went through childhood, school, here, graduate school, and well into my military career until early into Dugway assuming that. I now know that I got it totally backwards and in fact Christmas is all about Jesus and Easter is all about me and you and all of us, the rest of us who need to have the salvation of Jesus. Now the story, I mean, I'm not going to go there because I'm not sure that's appropriate for this but I just want to set the stage for this. So I had always felt that this creator must be really awesome, but because early on, and I don't know why, 15 I understood because I'd been reading well enough, you know, extensively enough, I understood the evidence for evolution and the fact that evolution was a mechanism. So, I began to become convinced that that God used evolution, we'll call this creator God, used evolution to bring about us, to bring about the universe, to bring about everything, and so I spent a lot of my time, in fact, I thought when I get out of grad school that that's what I would focus on but the military took me in different places. And I wanted to see if I could understand more about how evolution worked and how a creator might have brought this about. So when I got out of Edgewood, went to Dugway out there, there was -- obviously this is Mormon country and Mormons proselytize and they tried to proselytize Chris and I, and Mormons are wonderful people and my boss is a Mormon and I have an awful lot of respect for them, but we were invited to a Mormon gathering and treated wonderfully and they were a very friendly group of people and as we were going home, my wife and I were talking to one another -- no, we weren't talking to one -- we were very silent and one of us, and we don't remember to this day who said, "What did you think of that," and the other one said, "Well, my spirit was troubled," and the other one agreed that that was the case. And so we began looking at our roots and it turned out that at that point in time the chapel at Dugway -- now, let me explain something about Dugway. Even though I was a civilian because it was a remote post civilians were allowed to live on the installation, so we were living on the installation. So the chapel had just undergone a change in chaplains and my wife had started going -- after this incident she started going -- and she came home after one Sunday service fairly early in the process and said, "You got to listen, you've got to come and listen to this guy because he's talking about the evidence for God and for belief and, you know, the science of it all," and I said, oh, come on, this guy can't know what he's talking about. So, I went and come to find out he did. He had some very good compelling evidence. And so that started me on a year and a half of questioning, of investigation, of seriously considering the possibility that, in fact, this God that's talked about in the bible is, in fact, the same God, creator -- Lord God creator of the universe that I had been thinking about all along and worshipping myself. And after a year and a half of reading the bible, of seriously going to church, of going to adult Sunday school, of talking with people, et cetera, I was finally convinced and turned my life over to Jesus. So, from that point on I thought, well, OK, from here on I'm going to get back on to the track of this thing and it didn't happen, it didn't happen. I still continue the environmental movement and then about -- well, six years, six and a half years into being at Dugway my -- oh, I got to do the science fair. Don't let me forget to do the science fair. My wife's mom started showing symptoms of Alzheimer's and her dad began to try to deal with it. He was retired at the time. She never did work. And he was having some difficulty and as time went on it became increasingly obvious to us that Chris needed to go back and help her dad take care of her mom and it was a good time because at that particular point in time we had progressed enough in our understanding of what the Word says, the bible says, we felt that we had an obligation to honor our parents and come back here and so at the same time I had been working with a colleague of mine that we rode to work with. By then we had moved off the installation and we were living in a small town called Terra, Utah, which was ten miles east, roughly east, of the main gate Dugway Proving Ground, and it was across -- the ten miles were mostly across Skull Valley and the road was ten miles of absolutely arrow-straight road. So you got in your car, if you were awake it didn't matter because 16 you just aim, lock the steering wheel in, and ten miles later you were at the front gate. And so we had a lot of time for discussion as we were doing this and we had come up with an idea for -- we were both avid gardeners -- we come up with an idea for preserving, allowing us to start our garden early using some -- he was a chemist and I'm a biologist -- using some very well known, well established properties of water and when it freezes it gives off heat called the heat of fusion and that heat could protect your plants from freezing. They do it in orchards, for example, by spraying water. So we came up with a device and it took us a little while to come up with it, but we came up with a device called the Wall O' Water Plant Protector. And so I figured, alright, this is going to give me my key, we can go back here and this is going to provide enough income, but it became obvious to me that this was going to take awhile for this to grow and so I had been going to officers advance course with three people. One of them was a chaplain that had been involved with my coming to the Lord. Another one was a person that I met in Salt Lake City in Utah. This is Salt Lake where the course was, who was a business major and so the business major heard about what we were doing because one of the nights we had to talk about something we were doing and I talked about it and he said, "Oh, this is a great idea. I want to help you make this happen." So he became the president of the company and he got things rolling as far as the business side is concerned. And so I was convinced that this was going to be my key to being able to come back here. Well, as I said, it very quickly became obvious it was not. It takes, like any new idea, almost any new idea, it takes a long time to get going and I decided well I better consider trying to find a job back here. Well, it turned out that Chris had been flying back to help her dad for just a little while and on the same flight she ran into Roy Bear who was flying out Midwest for something, I can't remember what it was, and they got talking, of course they knew each other from here, and he said, "Well, you know, I have been teaching anatomy and physiology in summer school, and I just don't want to do it anymore. So there's an opportunity for Carl to teach that." Well, I had never, you know, my major was at the population level or above. I mean, my focus, and I had not really had much in the way of physiology. But I, you know, this is an opportunity, I couldn't refuse this. So I put in for it and I got the job and that was important because it filled in a part of my education that was lacking because I started focusing not at the population level and above in the levels of complexity, but at the species level and below in levels of complexity. So, it really rounded out my education by forcing me to learn the material. You know, if you want to learn something, teach it. And so all of that played a role in -- as I was going through and teaching I was seeing things that played into very nicely into this idea that, you know, there really is a creator behind all of this. And so in the middle of all of this I suddenly get a letter out of nowhere. I have no idea, and I've asked them and they won't tell me where they got my name, but I got a letter saying that the Oxford Round Table is having a session on faith and science, the great matter, and would I like to be involved in it. And my initial reaction was I'd like to be and I've been thinking about this a lot and I've got a lot of thoughts on it, but, boy, do I have time to put something together and my three sons said, yes, you've got to do this, Dad. And so I said yes and I put the paperwork through Norwich and they said yes and so I was invited to go to the Oxford Round Table and make a presentation. And that's when I had to formally put down all of my thoughts. Since that time, and that was published online and since that time I've had a chance to present it elsewhere and to develop the thoughts a lot more 17 and the evidence now is even more compelling in my mind than it was even when I did it at Oxford. The primary thing that we have to recognize is that -- and this is something that makes sense if there is a creator behind all of this, is that science now fully recognizes, there are very few scientists who don't agree with this, that the universe began with an event called the Big Bang, 13.82 billion years ago and that accompanying that event the universe was imbued with about 20 fundamental forces constants and masses whose values are such that if they weren't exactly what they were we wouldn't be having this recording and that does two things. It says A, there's a beginning, so if you've got a beginning logically you've got to have something who begins it. An uncaused cause as it's sometimes referred to, and, also, that that beginning was accompanied with some very suspicious characteristics. Now, science by definition, and properly so, eliminates -- it doesn't eliminate. It admits it cannot investigate miracles. It is just not designed to follow miracles. Science can give us insights that I think can help us to understand whether or not miracles are possible, whether or not there is a God. And the point that this revealed at the time was that we have enough information, science has enough information about that moment of creation or of coming into existence of the universe, let's not call it creation at this point, that it has to be explained or it can be explained only by invoking infinity because only with infinity can you get all of these 20 or so values coming together with their precise values. Presumably they're independent coming together and having a situation where you would have a universe come into existence because the probability of this happening is so, so very, very tiny, all of them with their values. So, there are about eight ways of the sciences come up with explaining this and all eight of them can be reduced to this use of infinity and I say there are three ways that we invoke infinity. Science embraces two. One is that the universe is infinite and we're in the part that works with these constants, these values, or the other is that there's an infinity of universes and we're in the one that works, or that the universe is created by an infinite mind. And quite honestly, at this point anyway, we cannot distinguish among those three. Each of them is arguably just as logical as the other. There are many scientists who would say that the third one is not acceptable and I would challenge them the way Ravi Zacharias and other people challenge them in that maybe they have some personal biases that they need to look at seriously. But be that as it may, I, in looking at this and accepting this, discovered that there are eight phenomena that keep recurring again and again at what I call essential conditions that in the evolution, in the progress, the evolution from the Big Bang to us whether it's cosmological or chemical or biological evolution, there are requisite conditions that have to occur and every time you find a requisite condition, you identify a requisite condition, there are eight phenomena that are associated with it that happen, that are met, and so it makes me wonder if there's this pattern, is there something behind the pattern? And that's where all this comes in and obviously I believe there is, there is a creator God behind this. JP: So this paper generated quite a bit of -- CP: Quite a bit of thought and discussion and continues to. Yeah, absolutely. So, one of the other reasons we wanted to come back to Norwich, to continue on in this vein, was that I had as part of the coming to a belief and a faith in Christ, and being at a military installation, it was logical that I would find Officers Christian Fellowship. Officers 18 Christian Fellowship is a fellowship, as it states, of officers in the military and this is the Army -- the US branch of it, but there's worldwide groups called by different names, who embrace Christian faith and use it, try to use it, in their life and in their leadership roles. And so I encountered it and became convinced that was something that Norwich could benefit from. And so one of the reasons we came back was to form a Christian fellowship at Norwich using Officers Christian Fellowship as our basic model. So we came back in 1982. Chris preceded me by about four months and so we -- I arrived here in March -- permanently arrived here in March of 1982, getting ready to teach that summer school course, and I began immediately looking for a student that would be interested in forming a Christian fellowship and I couldn't find any. I looked and went to the chapel, asked around, I was having no luck. And one day I was walking on the upper parade ground, I don't remember why, but I was walking on the upper parade ground towards Jackman on the western side and I saw a cadet coming toward me and the Holy Spirit said to me, "You see that cadet? He's the one I want you to talk to about starting a Christian fellowship." And of course my reaction, my immediate reaction, was yeah, sure. I'm so concerned about this that I just created that thought in my mind, and I said I'm not going to pay any attention to it. But the closer I got to this cadet, we were walking towards one another, the more I felt the Holy Spirit saying, "Do it, do it," and it got to the point where I knew that if I hadn't done it I would be in disobedience to God. I would be disobeying the Holy Spirit and so I stopped him. I said, "Young man, you probably are not going to understand what I'm about to tell you and you're going to think I'm nuts, but the Holy Spirit just told me that I'm supposed to talk to you about starting a Christian fellowship at Norwich," at which point he stopped, I mean, he was stopped. He kind of went, "You're kidding me," and kind of fell back, took a step back, and he said, "As I was coming towards you, the Holy Spirit was telling me that I've got to talk to you about starting a Christian fellowship at Norwich." So, that started the Norwich Christian Fellowship. The cadet's name was John Pitrowiski and we started a fellowship that was in 1982, and that must have been -- I'm gathering, I'm thinking it might have been in April, I didn't put the date down. And so that was still in the days when I think Norwich went further beyond May. I think they went to late May or beginning of June, and so it wasn't very long but he had a couple of friends from classes beneath him, Joe Saltsman being one of them, who wanted to be part of this. And so it continued from that year on. And so last year we celebrated our 30 th year together and it's been a great trip helping Norwich students who are inclined to follow the Lord and find out about Officers Christian Fellowship, et cetera. So John Pitrowski, I lost track of him because he was a senior and he graduated a month or two after we formed the fellowship. And I had assumed that I must have done this in the fall of '83 because, you know, I had to have had a longer year. I had almost a year with him before he left that was my assumption. So I went through all of the year books from '80 -- let's see, '82, it would be '83 on. I couldn't find his name so I -- you know, did I somehow get his name wrong? But I asked Joe Saltsman and he says, "Yeah, I remember John." So I knew I had it right and one day -- actually, about a year before our 30th, it all of a sudden dawned on me. I said, "Do you know what? Is it possible that he was in the class of '82?" So I got out the '82 yearbook and sure enough there he was. Come to find out he goes to a church in Waterbury very close to the church I go to.19 JP: You're kidding. CP: He's been around all of this time. JP: Oh, no kidding. CP: So, on the 30th, which was his 30th reunion of course, we got together and had a big celebration. JP: That's wonderful. Do you have time for STEM? CP: Sure, sure. What happened is as I -- when I was in the eighth grade at Northfield I entered the state science fair with my shell collection. Now, in this day and age you couldn't do that and that's not really important to understand, but one of the things that I had really gotten involved with as a kid, and why I was considering marine biology, is I loved shells. I loved the animals that made shells and I loved shells themselves because I'm kind of artistic and I kind of like art stuff as well. And shells are very beautiful, they're geometric, they're colorful, they're wonderful things. So I was naturally attracted to them. So I entered that in eighth grade, won first place in the state science and math fair, and then again in my senior year I did the same thing, only I did some research and did some dissections and had some studies that I had done. Again, not the kind of stuff that we now do in the science fairs, but at the time it was. And again I won first place. So I was kind of sold on science fairs. So from that time on I offered to judge in science fairs. So at the University of Illinois, in Utah I judged, in Maryland I judged, I think, and I'm not 100 percent sure whether I did or not, but I know at the University of Illinois I did and in Utah I did. In Utah, because I was coming in from Dugway Proving Ground I was coming in as an Army judge and it was part of my assignment, my military points to do this as a military judge. So I did it for a year or two and one of the guys that I was doing it with had been working with the Army Research Office and their program of judging the International Science and Engineering Fair. So he'd been part of the Army judges for them. And he said, "I'm going to have to get out of this. Would you like to take my place?" So I said, "Well, yeah." So that year the international fair was in San Antonio and I went there and became a member of the Army judging team, generally about 30 judges every year from the Army would judge the International Science and Engineering Fair and give wonderful prizes. We sent students to the Plum Blossom Festival in Japan or the Fortnight in England, in London. You know, when the Army judges came around the students took notice. So it was a great assignment and a great opportunity and they treat the judges really well. Afterwards they have a big shindig for them with lots of cheese and lots of hors d'oeuvres and lots of wine and stuff, and I said, boy, this is a deal! So I became sold on that and did for the next 25 years served in that capacity almost every year. A couple years I didn't make it and in the last five I was the Chief Army Judge in charge in all of those 30 judges and also got some other assignments related to that. I became the Army judge for the National Junior Science and Humanities Symposium, which is a similar kind of thing done at about the same time of year, but rather than having a poster session, which is what the International Science and Engineering Fair poster presentation judges. The National Junior Science and 20 Humanities Symposium has a platform presentation. So it's a different -- you can, you know, sometimes the same projects can be in both but there are different ways of presenting the information. So, that convinced me that, I mean, I was already convinced, but that certainly drove the nail home that I was very much still interested in STEM and then I came to Norwich and of course the science fair was being held here and so I immediately became a judge in the science fair and recognized that Vermont State Science and Math Fair was not, it was one of the two or three states not involved in ISEF, and said, you know, I've got to get it involved but I just do not have the time to teach and to do the Vermont State Science and Math Fair component that would get us involved with ISEF. But I made a pledge that I would, to myself, I guess, that once I retired from the military in 2003 because that was when I turned 60, that I would make an effort to get us involved with ISEF. And at that point I had been working with Mary Hoppe and, oh, come on, I'm drawing a blank here. We'll have to get that back up. What's her name? [Martha McBride] Anyway, who had been the two directors, working with them to kind of be an understudy. And so the next year I said I'm going to continue this process as an understudy and I'm going to link us up with ISEF. Now, the main thing about ISEF is you send, at that time, one winner on to international -- from your state fair, on to the International Science and Engineering Fair to compete there, but that requires money and of course the science fair had no money. I mean, it had very little money that they were -- the major initiative that I saw I had to do with come up with a way of getting money and that has become a really time consuming operation. We raise in terms of actual awards and prizes and trip money, we raise about $25,000 a year now and it takes a lot of time to do that even though I have -- almost all of that is coming from established partners, as we call them, because every year you have to renew it, you have to send out emails, you have to send out letters, you have to follow up on them. Some of them follow up themselves, some of them you have to follow up on. You have to record all of this so you know what you did because we have over 120 partners. It's trying to keep all of them straight. You know, what conversation you had with which one three weeks ago is just, you know, you've got to keep accurate records of that. So it's a very time consuming process. But we are really making progress, we are making headway. We are getting more and more students involved in science fair projects and of course the problem with our country -- one of the problems with our country today -- is that many of our students look at Science Technology Engineering and Math, STEM, as being over their heads, over their ability, and we want to make sure that students understand that in many cases that's not the case. It's that they haven't had the opportunities to get excited by it. For example, when I was in the science fair as a senior, that was during the space race and I remember going from the state science fair to the New England science fair and that was during the New England science fair was the -- we heard over the speakers an announcement that the US had successfully sent our first astronaut into orbit. And so those were exciting times and those are the kinds of things that get people's kids' imagination going. Well, we needed something like that because let's face it, if we're going to retain our position as strategically as number one in the world, we have got to have a good Science Technology Engineering, and Math. I had recognized, having been travelling a few other places in the world that the US, high school STEM scores were very woefully low and yet, here we are number one in the world. How can that be? Well, there's a number of reasons, but one of the reasons is, what I had discovered was happening at Norwich, is that between 21 high school and graduating from college the role of the university in this country is to push our kids. It's really important that we push our kids and make them learn the stuff that other kids were learning in high school elsewhere around the world. And, for example, in Japan they're pushed hard, they do well in high school and they score well, but my oldest son, English as a second language teacher in Japan, so we went over to visit him and it turns out that their college over there is almost a lark. And so we can catch up with them and we do catch up with them and we pass them. Certainly other reasons for this is we get a lot of influx from the best of the foreign countries as well, too. I'm not trying to downplay that. But it became obvious to me that we really needed to do something positive and we need to do something positive to encourage our young kids to discover that science, technology, engineering, and math are wonderful and they're exciting and they're full of all kinds of challenges and opportunities and experiences that you're not going to get any other way and I think we're beginning to get that. JP: That's wonderful. You have done so much and you have been -- CP: I've been blessed. I haven't really tried to do this or do that. It's just that things have fallen in my path and I think because of Norwich I don't hesitate, I don't pull back from taking advantage of them, but I really have been blessed with lots of opportunities, lots of fun stuff. JP: You have done a lot of really amazing things. The Pinkham Pearson Index alone, notwithstanding the other stuff. Do you have any relatives at Norwich besides your dad? CP: My oldest brother, the one who said that I should stay in the military, in the reserves, David, who lives in Montpelier, he's still around. He's 87 I think. He was in the Second World War and after the war he came to Norwich for two years in engineering. He actually showed me a paper he wrote on nuclear power (laughs) that at the time of the Second World War was still a concept, and then he transferred to Cornell to finish his degree in engineering. So he's part of Norwich. I have two of my three sons attended Norwich and youngest, well, the middle son went to Vermont, VC, Vermont College, when it was part of Norwich and my youngest son came here and majored in psychology and actually has gotten a masters from Norwich in the masters degree, online degree program in criminal justice management or administration. JP: What's his name? CP: Kristian Pinkham. JP: Kristian Pinkham. Amazing. The Pinkhams at Norwich. CP: And the middle one is Kreig Pinkham. JP: With a C or K?22 CP: K. All my three sons are with K's. Kevin is my oldest. He's an English professor carrying on the family tradition of teaching down at Nyack College in New York, and Kreig is the director of the Washington County Youth Service Bureau, which is really responsible for homeless and run away youth in the state of Vermont. And my youngest son is a DEA agent in El Paso, Texas. JP: Wow, that's amazing! Gosh, I want to ask you a little bit about what advice would you give a rook today about how to survive and thrive the way that you did? CP: Well, the first thing is, again, remember -- and I still tell them this -- the two things that I think are important. One is that nothing lasts forever and so you can get through the rook school, the rook experience. If you keep this in mind it will keep you sane. And secondly, that if you allow it to, Norwich will push you and will help you to develop as an individual, but you've got to go along with the flow. You can't resist the flow. You've got to take advantage of the opportunities that it provides. I think that's really important. And of course, obviously, the students that I come into contact with through Norwich Christian Fellowship, I say to continue to develop your spiritual understanding, your spiritual walk, your spiritual self. And as a teacher I think I made it clear in my courses. On the first day of course I said, first day of class I said, "You've got to understand that I am a Christian and my worldview is formed by that -- is informed by that. I will not mention anymore about it in class. You will hear an awful lot about evolution in class because I'm an evolutionary biologist and if you feel that there is a problem between the two, I'm more than happy to talk with you about how that problem is not real, but that's got to be done outside of class." And so I made it clear in all of my classes that that was something that I -- that they needed to know about me in order to be fair and open. JP: Wow. How do you define leadership or have you already, do you think? CP: Well, to be honest with you, I've not given a whole lot of thought to what leadership really is, but on the spot I would have to say that leadership is a willingness to lead and a willingness to -- openness to see opportunities and to think creatively about these opportunities and how you might use them. And that's a good question because it brings up another story that I think I would like to relate to. And that is the story of the Russian scientist. Shortly after I left Edgewood as my individual mobilization designee assignment, I was assigned back to Edgewood from Dugway. And the two weeks that I was at Edgewood, my boss had -- because he was a North American peregrine falcon banding program coordinator, had gone to Russia, not during that two weeks, but he had earlier gone to Russia and met with and formed a working relationship with his Russian corresponding -- his Russian equivalent, and he and another Russian scientist were scheduled to come to the US during this two weeks that I was going to be assigned to Edgewood Arsenal, to Scott's group. And so this was during the Cold War, but there was some efforts at detent and this being something where there was no weapon system involved or anything like that. It was something as regarded by the government as being worthwhile. So I was invited by Scott to help him get his -- he had just bought a dilapidated Southern mansion in Maryland to get it up kind of a little bit in shape for this 23 meeting. And so I helped him do it and the Russians came and we spent an evening toasting one another and going through bottles after bottles of vodka and, again, my Norwich training came through because I was able to drink two Russians under the table. I'm not overly -- well, yes, I'm proud of that. Let's face it. I don't drink that way anymore, but at the time there was a value to it because when I was at Norwich, I drank like a Norwich student. So, anyway, in the process of that evening, we had a conversation and it was very obvious to me in this conversation that something was wrong, and I'm going to explain what was wrong, but I've got to go back just a little bit. In grad school finished all my courses except for one, population genetics. Population genetics was taught by a newly minted post-doc who had the audacity to expect his students to think. Well, I was a good student because I was fantastic at rote memory, I wish I still were, but at that time I was really good at it. And I wasn't used to a course where they said think and I got a 48 on the final exam and he was good enough to give me a D in the course. I had been essentially a straight A student and that shook me up as you can well imagine. And so I had to ask myself, is thinking a skill that I don't have? Is it something I'll never have or is it a skill that can be acquired? So I started researching thinking, creative thinking, and discovered that it is a skill that can be learned that every human being is born with it but quite often the school system teaches us out of it. In my case it was perhaps the school system, but more important, understand I love my father and he was a wonderful person, but he was an old guard, old school military guy. It was his way or not. So very quickly I learned it didn't do any good to think, it didn't do any good to explain things to him, my side of the story, because there was only his side of the story, so I stopped learning how to think. And so I got to this moment in grad school, this crisis moment, and discovered that I didn't know how to think. From the studies, however, from taking courses and everything I learned how to think and that's why I've got several patents and I've been able to come up with the Pinkham Pearson Index, et cetera. But as I was talking with these Russians, it became very obvious to me they were suffering from the same problem I had been suffering from. It was dangerous for them to think. So the only way they could come up with any thought whatsoever was to just randomly go all over the place and hope that somewhere sooner or later they would stumble across something that was useful and relevant. At that instant I knew we had won the Cold War. It was clear to me that they were fighting an impediment that would just prevent them from doing anything that we had to worry about. And, in fact, that's the way it turned out. JP: That's a nice -- that's a good story, big picture, little picture. Is there anything else that you would like to say? Anything about the Citizen Soldier or -- CP: The Citizen Soldier is a very, very important concept and I'd like to think that I embody it. The reason I feel that way is because I think I embody it, but the soldier doesn't always have to be, obviously, a fighting individual in the sense of a combat. Combat service and combat service support are two very, very important aspects of the military and you can be in combat, and my hat is off to everyone who is in that position, whose life is at risk, willingly puts their life at risk for their country and for their comrades, but there's also a role for those of us who are a little bit less brave, like myself, who want to serve and have a gift to give to the country but can give it in a way where the risk to life 24 and limb is not anywhere nearly as great as it is in the combat arms. So, I think the Citizen Soldier is a very important aspect that we need to be aware of and promote. And I'm proud to say I'm a part of Norwich which founded the concept. And I generally don't miss opportunities when I'm talking with youngsters to point that out to them. JP: Is there anything else you'd like to add? CP: Probably, but I can't think of it right now. I think that's about it. JP: That's about it. Thank you. CP: Oh, you're welcome. Thank you for the opportunity, I enjoyed this. This is fun. JP: This has been fascinating and I think it's going to be fascinating for people to hear. I think it's going to be very interesting for people who are interested in the different things you've spoken about and to hear you say them. So thank you. I'm going to hit stop. I need to do a little intro. And we're back with Carl Pinkham. CP: So the parting Norwich story while I was a student has to do with three events that happened my last three days at Norwich. On Friday I was commissioned a second lieutenant in armor. On Saturday I was married to Christine Waite who has been my wife for almost 50 years and on Sunday I graduated. JP: That's a busy -- CP: That's a very busy time. (laughter) JP: That's good. CP: That's it. JP: Thank you. END OF AUDIO FILE
Die European Values Study (EVS) und die World Values Survey (WVS) sind zwei groß angelegte, länderübergreifende und längsschnittliche Umfrage-Forschungsprogramme. Sie umfassen eine große Anzahl von Fragen zu moralischen, religiösen, gesellschaftlichen, politischen, beruflichen und familiären Werten, die seit Anfang der achtziger Jahre repliziert wurden.
Beide Organisationen vereinbarten, ab 2017 bei der gemeinsamen Datenerhebung zusammenzuarbeiten. Der EVS war verantwortlich für die Planung und Durchführung von Umfragen in europäischen Ländern unter Verwendung des EVS-Fragebogens und der methodischen Richtlinien des EVS. Der WVSA war für die Planung und Durchführung von Umfragen in Ländern außerhalb Europas verantwortlich, wobei der WVS-Fragebogen und die methodischen Richtlinien des WVS verwendet wurden. Beide Organisationen entwickelten ihre Entwürfe für Master-Fragebögen unabhängig voneinander. Die gemeinsamen Items definieren den gemeinsamen Kern beider Fragebögen.
Der Gemeinsame EVS/WVS wird aus den beiden Quellendatensätzen des EVS und des WVS erstellt: - European Values Study 2017 Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017), ZA7500 Data file Version 5.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13897 (https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13897). Haerpfer, C., Inglehart, R., Moreno,A., Welzel,C., Kizilova,K., Diez-Medrano J., M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2024. World Values Survey: Round Seven–Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat. Version. 6.0.0, doi:10.14281/18241.24.
Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8233 Security Council Seventy-third year 8233rd meeting Saturday, 14 April 2018, 11 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10891 (E) *1810891* S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 2/26 18-10891 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: I have been following closely the reports of air strikes in Syria conducted by the United States, France and United Kingdom. Last night at 10 p.m. New York time, the United States President announced the beginning of air strikes with the participation of France and the United Kingdom, indicating they were targeting the chemical-weapons capabilities of the Syrian Government to deter their future use. The statement was followed by announcements from Prime Minister May and President Macron. The air strikes were reportedly limited to three military locations inside Syria. The first targets included the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre at Al-Mazzah airport in Damascus, the second an alleged chemical-weapons storage facility west of Homs and the third an alleged chemical-weapons equipment storage site and command post, also near Homs. The Syrian Government announced surface-to-air missile responsive activity. Both United States and Russian sources indicated there were no civilian casualties. However, the United Nations is unable to independently verify the details of all those reports. As Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is my duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general. The Charter is very clear on these issues. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I call on the members of the Security Council to unite and exercise that responsibility, and I urge all members to show restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate matters and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. As I did yesterday (see S/PV.8231), I stress the importance of preventing the situation from spiralling out of control. Any use of chemical weapons is abhorrent, and the suffering it causes is horrendous. I have repeatedly expressed my deep disappointment that the Security Council has failed to agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I urge the Security Council to assume its responsibilities and fill that gap, and I will continue to engage with Member States to help to achieve that objective. A lack of accountability emboldens those who use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity, and that in turn further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons, as well as undermining the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. The seriousness of the recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma requires a thorough investigation using impartial, independent and professional expertise. I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in undertaking the required investigation. The team is already in Syria. I am informed that its operations plan for visiting the site is complete and that the Mission is ready to go. I am confident it will have full access, without any restrictions or impediments to its performance of its activities. To repeat what I said yesterday, Syria represents the most serious threat to international peace and security in the world today. In Syria we see confrontations and proxy wars involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militias, foreign fighters from all over the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law in general, in utter disregard of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. They have lived 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 3/26 through a litany of horrors, atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on. At this critical juncture, I call on all States Members to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the norms against chemical weapons. If the law is ignored, it is undermined. There can be no military solution to the crisis. The solution must be political, and we must find ways to make real progress towards a genuine and credible political solution that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity and freedom, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I have asked my Special Envoy to come to New York as soon as possible to consult with me on the most effective way to accelerate the political process. The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia has called this emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the aggressive actions of the United States and its allies against Syria. This is now our fifth meeting on the subject in a week. President Putin of the Russian Federation made a special statement today. "On 14 April, the United States, with the support of its allies, launched an air strike on military and civilian infrastructure targets in the Syrian Arab Republic. An act of aggression against a sovereign State on the front lines in the fight against terrorism was committed without permission from the Security Council and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles of international law. Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria's Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent. Not a single local resident could confirm that such an attack had occurred. "The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has sent experts to Syria to investigate all the circumstances. However, a group of Western countries cynically ignored this and took military action without waiting for the results of the investigation. "Russia vehemently condemns this attack on Syria, where Russian military personnel are helping the legitimate Government to combat terrorism. "The actions of the United States are making the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Syria even worse, inflicting suffering on civilians, for all intents and purposes enabling the terrorists who have been tormenting the Syrian people for seven years, and producing yet another wave of refugees fleeing the country and the region in general. The current escalation of the Syrian situation is having a destructive effect on the entire system of international relations. History will have the last word, and it has already revealed the heavy responsibility that Washington bears for the carnage in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya." Russia has done everything it could to persuade the United States and its allies to abandon their militaristic plans threatening a new round of violence in Syria and destabilization in the Middle East. Today, and at the Council meeting we called yesterday (see S/PV.8231), the Secretary-General expressed his concern about how events are developing. Washington, London and Paris, however, preferred to let the calls for sanity go unheard. The United States and its allies continue to demonstrate a flagrant disregard for international law, although as permanent members of the Security Council they have a special duty to uphold the provisions of the Charter. It was a disgrace to hear an article of the United States Constitution cited as justification of this aggression. We respect the right of every State to honour its own fundamental law. But it is high time that Washington learned that it is the Charter of the United Nations that governs the international code of conduct on the use of force. It will be interesting to see how the peoples of Great Britain and France react to the fact that their leaders are participating in unlawful military ventures that invoke the United States Constitution. These three countries constantly lean towards neocolonialism. They scorn the Charter and the Security Council, which they attempt, shamelessly, to use for their own unscrupulous purposes. They do no serious S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 4/26 18-10891 work in the Council. They refuse to consult with us, while falsely assuring everyone of the opposite. They are undermining the Council's authority. The alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian city of Douma has been cited as the excuse for this aggression. After an inspection by our specialists, Russia's representatives stated unequivocally that no such incident took place. Moreover, people were found to have taken part in staging the incident, which was inspired and organized by foreign intelligence services. After the matter emerged, the Syrian authorities immediately invited experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to try to establish all the circumstances through a field mission to Douma. The visa formalities were dealt with quickly and security guarantees given. As the air strikes began, the specialists were already in Syria and preparing to begin their work. I would like to remind Council members and everyone else that on 10 April (see S/PV.8228), when our draft resolution (S/2018/322) on ensuring the security of the work of the OPCW's special mission was blocked, we were assured that there was no need for such a document. They said that no additional effort on the part of the Security Council was necessary to ensure that the mission could reach Douma and conduct an investigation of the chemical incident. Now, however, we can see that we were absolutely right. Yesterday, some of our colleagues — some out of naivety and others out of cynicism — told us that this situation had allegedly arisen owing to the lack of an independent investigative mechanism. The aggression today has shown, as we said, that this had nothing whatever to do with it. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mission (JIM) was in place during last year's attack on the Al-Shayrat airbase, but that did not stop the United States from launching a missile attack. After that, the JIM spent six months tailoring its conclusions to justify the strike. We have said over and over again that they do not need any investigations. They did not need them then and they do not need them now. The organizers of the aggression did not even wait for the international organization that is authorized to establish the basic facts to do so. Apparently they had established and instantly identified the perpetrators, after disseminating rumours about them through social networks with the help of the militias they sponsor and the non-governmental organizations that are their clients. This was backed up by mythical secret intelligence. Their masks — or rather the White Helmets — have come off once again. We have become accustomed to the fact that their efforts to achieve their dubious geopolitical aims, the aggressor countries deliberately blame the so-called Assad regime for every evil. There has been a trend recently to shift the blame onto Russia, which, as they tell it, has been unable to restrain Syria's so-called dictator. All of this goes according to a tried-and- true formula, whereby a provocation results in a false accusation, which results in a false verdict, which results in punishment. Is that how these people want to conduct international affairs? This is hooliganism in international relations, and not on a petty scale, given that we are talking about the actions of key nuclear Powers. Several missiles were aimed at the research centre facilities in Barzeh and Jamraya. There have been two recent OPCW inspections there with unrestricted access to their entire premises. The specialists found no trace of activities that would contravene the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria's scientific research institutions are used for strictly peaceful activities aimed at improving the efficiency of the national economy. Do they want Syria to have no national economy left at all? Do they want to kick this country — only a few years ago one of the most developed in the Middle East — back into the Stone Age? Do they want to finish whatever their sanctions have not yet accomplished? And yet they still contrive false breast-beating about the sufferings of ordinary Syrians. But they have no interest in ordinary Syrians, who are sick of war and glad about the restoration of the legitimate authorities in the liberated territories. Their aggressive actions merely worsen the humanitarian situation that they claim to care about so deeply. They could end the conflict in Syria in the space of 24 hours. All that is needed is for Washington, London and Paris to give the order to their tame terrorists to stop fighting the legitimate authorities and their own people. The attacks were aimed at Syrian military airfields that are used for operations against terrorist organizations, a highly original contribution to the fight against international terrorism, which, as Washington never tires of saying, is the sole reason for its military presence in Syria, something that we are extremely doubtful about. Rather, it is becoming increasingly clear that those in the West who hide 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 5/26 behind humanitarian rhetoric and try to justify their military presence in Syria based on the need to defeat the jihadists are in fact acting in concert with them to dismember the country, a design confirmed by the categorical refusal of the United States and its allies to assist in the restoration of the areas of Syria that have been liberated by Government forces. Their aggression is a powerful blow and a threat to the prospects for continuing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations, which, despite the real difficulties, is moving forward, albeit at varying speed. Why do they bother endlessly pinning all their hopes on the Geneva process when they themselves are driving it straight towards yet another crisis? We urge the United States and its allies to immediately halt their acts of aggression against Syria and refrain from them going forward. We have proposed a brief draft resolution for the Council's attention on which we request that a vote be held at the end of this meeting. We appeal to the members of the Security Council. Now is not the time to evade responsibility. The world is watching. Stand up for our principles. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today. This is the fifth Security Council meeting in the past week in which we have addressed the situation in Syria. A week has gone by in which we have talked. We have talked about the victims in Douma. We have talked about the Al-Assad regime and its patrons, Russia and Iran. We have spent a week talking about the unique horror of chemical weapons. The time for talk ended last night. We are here today because three permanent members of the Security Council acted. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States acted not in revenge, not in punishment and not in a symbolic show of force. We acted to deter the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime responsible for its crimes against humanity. We can all see that a Russian disinformation campaign is in full force this morning, but Russia's desperate attempts at deflection cannot change the facts. A large body of information indicates that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April. There is clear information demonstrating Al-Assad's culpability. The pictures of dead children were not fake news; they were the result of the Syrian regime's barbaric inhumanity. And they were the result of the regime's and Russia's failure to live up to their international commitments to remove all chemical weapons from Syria. The United States, France and the United Kingdom acted after careful evaluation of those facts. The targets we selected were at the heart of the Syrian regime's illegal chemical-weapon programme. The strikes were carefully planned to minimize civilian casualties. The responses were justified, legitimate and proportionate. The United States and its allies did everything they could to use the tools of diplomacy to get rid of Al-Assad's arsenal of chemical weapons. We did not give diplomacy just one chance. We gave it chance after chance. Six times. That is how many times Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions to address chemical weapons in Syria. Our efforts go back even further. In 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), requiring the Al-Assad regime to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons. Syria committed to abiding by the Chemical Weapons Convention, meaning that it could no longer have chemical weapons on its soil. President Putin said that Russia would guarantee that Syria complied. We hoped that this diplomacy would succeed in putting an end to the horror of chemical attacks in Syria, but as we have seen from the past year, that did not happen. While Russia was busy protecting the regime, Al-Assad took notice. The regime knew that it could act with impunity, and it did. In November, Russia used its veto to kill the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, the main tool we had to figure out who used chemical weapons in Syria. Just as Russia was using its veto (see S/PV.8107), the Al-Assad regime used sarin, leading to dozens of injuries and deaths. Russia's veto was the green light for the Al-Assad regime to use these most barbaric weapons against the Syrian people, in complete violation of international law. The United States and our allies were not going to let that stand. Chemical weapons are a threat to us all. They are a unique threat — a type of weapon so evil that the international community agreed that they must be banned. We cannot stand by and let Russia trash every international norm that we stand for, and allow the use of chemical weapons to go unanswered. Just as the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons last weekend was not an isolated incident, our response is part of a new course charted last year to deter future use of chemical weapons. Our Syrian strategy has not changed. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 6/26 18-10891 However, the Syrian regime has forced us to take action based on its repeated use of chemical weapons. Since the April 2017 chemical attack at Khan Shaykhoun, the United States has imposed hundreds of sanctions on individuals and entities involved in chemical-weapons use in Syria and North Korea. We have designated entities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa that have facilitated chemical-weapons proliferation. We have revoked the visas of Russian intelligence officers in response to the chemical attack in Salisbury. We will continue to seek out and call out anyone who uses and anyone who aids in the use of chemical weapons. With yesterday's military action, our message was crystal clear. The United States of America will not allow the Al-Assad regime to continue to use chemical weapons. Last night, we obliterated the major research facility that it used to assemble weapons of mass murder. I spoke to the President this morning, and he said that if the Syrian regime should use this poison gas again, the United States is locked and loaded. When our President draws a red line, our President enforces the red line. The United States is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for their part in the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons. We worked in lock step; we were in complete agreement. Last night, our great friends and indispensable allies shouldered a burden that benefits all of us. The civilized world owes them its thanks. In the weeks and months to come, the Security Council should take time to reflect on its role in defending the international rule of law. The Security Council has failed in its duty to hold those who use chemical weapons to account. That failure is largely due to Russian obstruction. We call on Russia to take a hard look at the company it keeps, live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Council, and defend the actual principles the United Nations was meant to promote. Last night, we successfully hit the heart of Syria's chemical weapons enterprise, and because of these actions we are confident that we have crippled Syria's chemical weapons programme. We are prepared to sustain this pressure if the Syrian regime is foolish enough to test our will. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): These are uncertain times and today we deal with exceptional circumstance. Acting with our American and French allies, in the early hours of this morning the United Kingdom conducted coordinated, targeted and precise strikes to degrade Al-Assad's chemical weapons capability and deter their future use. The British Royal Air Force launched Storm Shadow missiles at a military facility some 15 miles west of Homs, where the regime is assessed to keep chemical weapons in breach of Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A full assessment has not yet been completed, but we believe that the strikes to have been successful. Furthermore, none of the British, United States or French aircraft or missiles involved in this operation were successfully engaged by Syrian air defences, and there is also no indication that Russian air defence systems were employed. Our action was a limited, targeted and effective strike. There were clear boundaries that expressly sought to avoid escalation, and we did everything possible, including rigorous planning, before any action was undertaken to ensure that we mitigated and minimized the impact on civilians. Together, our action will significantly degrade the Syrian regime's ability to research, develop and deploy chemical weapons and deter their future use. The United Kingdom Prime Minister has said that we are clear about who is responsible for the atrocity of the use of chemical weapons. A significant body of information, including intelligence, indicates that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack we saw last Saturday. Some of the evidence that leads us to this conclusion is as follows. There are open source accounts alleging that a barrel bomb was used to deliver the chemicals. Multiple open source reports claim that a regime helicopter was observed above the city of Douma on the evening of 7 April. The opposition does not operate helicopters or use barrel bombs. And reliable intelligence indicates that Syrian military officials coordinated what appears to be the use of chlorine in Douma on 7 April. No other group could have carried out this attack. Indeed, Da'esh, for example, does not even have a presence in Douma. The Syrian regime has been killing its own people for seven years. Its use of chemical weapons, which has exacerbated the human suffering, is a serious crime of international concern as a breach of the customary international law prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and that amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity. Any State is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 7/26 take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force for the United Kingdom is humanitarian intervention, which requires that three conditions to be met. First, there must be convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief. I think that the debates in the Council and the briefings we have had from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and others have proved that. Secondly, it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. I think that the vetoes have shown us that. Thirdly, the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim. I think we have heard both in my intervention in Ambassador Haley's how that has also been met. The history of the Syrian conflict is a litany of threats to peace and violations of international law. The Security Council has met 113 times since the Syrian war started. It was therefore not for want of international diplomatic effort that we find ourselves in this position today. After a pattern of chemical-weapons use since the outbreak of the conflict, Al-Assad defied the international community in 2013 by launching a sarin gas attack on eastern Ghouta, which left more than 800 people dead. Despite the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013) and despite four years of patient engagement, Syria continues to use chemical weapons against its people and has failed to answer a long list of serious questions. The only conclusion we can reach is that Syria has not declared or destroyed all of its chemical weapons, despite its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is not assertion on our part but a matter of record, and I draw the Russian Ambassador's attention to his points about Barazan and Jimrya. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) still has unanswered questions and discrepancies. He knows this. We all know this. The Council was briefed by the OPCW Director-General. Resolution 2118 (2013) decides in the event of non-compliance to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Yet on 28 February 2017, when the United Kingdom together with France, proposed a draft resolution (S/2017/172) taking measures under Chapter VII short of the use of force, Russia vetoed (see S/PV.7893). The very least the Security Council should have been able to do was to follow up on the findings of the report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism by extending its mandate. Yet four times Russia vetoed different proposals from different Council Members to do just that. The Syrian regime and it supporters are responsible for the gravest violations of international humanitarian law in modern history. They have used indiscriminate weapons, notably barrel bombs and cluster munitions, against civilians, and they have deliberately targeted medical facilities and schools, as well as humanitarian personnel and civilian objects. They have used sieges and starvation as methods of warfare, accompanied by attacks on opposition-held civilian areas. The regime has persistently obstructed humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. Tens of thousands of people have been illegally detained, tortured and executed by the regime. This is one of the most serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime we have ever faced. A State party has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has defied the Security Council, and it has broken international law. Repeated attempts over several years to hold them to account have been met with Russian obstruction and resistance. In the Security Council, we have repeatedly attempted to overcome this obstruction without success. We are faced with a litany of violations, no sense of guilt, no sense of regret, no sense of responsibility, a shameful record, wrapped in a mix of denial, deceit and disinformation. I would invite those like the Russian Ambassador who speak about the Charter to consider the following. It is hard to believe that it is in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter to use or condone the use of chemical weapons, and in the United Kingdom's view it cannot be illegal to use force to prevent the killing of such numbers of innocent people. I will take no lessons in international law from Russia. Despite all the foregoing, we would like to look forward. The United Kingdom, together with France and the United States, will continue to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis. My French colleague will say more about our work in a few moments. We believe that it must comprise four elements. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 8/26 18-10891 First, Syria's chemical weapons programme must be ended and the chemical weapons stockpiles destroyed once and for all. Secondly, there must be an immediate cessation of hostilities and compliance with all Security Council resolutions, including those that mandate humanitarian access. Thirdly, the regime must return to the Geneva talks and agree to engage on the substantial agenda put forward by the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Fourthly and finally, there must be accountability for the use of chemical weapons and other war crimes in Syria. The Secretary-General rightly highlighted the political process. We propose that, as we members of the Security Council will all be together next weekend in the retreat with the Secretary-General very kindly hosted by Sweden, we use that opportunity to reflect on next steps and the way back to the political process. And with our allies, we stand ready to work with all members of the Security Council towards this end. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): A week after the chemical massacre in Douma and a day after last night's strikes, I want to say again straight away to those who pretend to wonder that France has no doubt whatsoever about the responsibility of the Al-Assad regime in this attack. This morning we made public a notice comprising information collected by our intelligence services. We dismiss those who try once again to challenge what is obvious and to disguise the facts before the world. For years now, Bashar Al-Assad, with the active support of his allies, has been devising a strategy of destruction designed to crush any opposition with contempt for the most basic principles of humanity and at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Syria. We saw it in Aleppo, in Homs, in eastern Ghouta. For years, the Syrian regime has used the most terrifying weapons of destruction — chemical weapons — to massacre and terrorize its civilian population. We had another demonstration of this in Douma, as we had seen before in Khan Shaykhun, Sarmin, Telemens and Qaminas, where its responsibility was clearly established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). No one can say he or she did not know. For years, the Syrian regime has systematically and repeatedly violated all its international obligations. The list of such violations is long; it is overwhelming. We all know them: violations of all international chemical-weapons obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria has been a party since 2013, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of such weapons against civilians; violations of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality; violations of successive Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and, by the same token, of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations; finally, the use of chemical weapons against civilian populations constitutes a war crime within the meaning of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. In August 2013, the Secretary-General even described the use of chemical weapons as a crime against humanity. In view of the repeated and proven violations by the Damascus regime of all the rules on which our security is based, France has consistently called for strong action by the international community. We have made every effort to ensure that these horrors do not remain without consequences at the United Nations and the OPCW and that they are stopped. The Security Council had undertaken by successive resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) to impose coercive measures within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in the event of new violations. It has been prevented from acting in conformity with its commitments because of the vetoes systematically used by Russia. By making such systematic use of its veto in the Security Council, Russia has betrayed the commitment it made to the Council in 2013 to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal. The Security Council's blockade of the mass atrocities committed in Syria is a deadly and dangerous trap from which we must escape. When it ordered the 7 April chemical attack, the Syrian regime knew exactly to what it was exposing itself. It wanted to once again test the international community's threshold of tolerance and it found it. In the face of this attack on the principles, values and rights that are the basis of United Nations action, silence is no longer a solution. We cannot tolerate the downplaying of the use of chemical weapons, which is an immediate danger to the Syrian people and to our collective security. We cannot let the deadly genie of proliferation out of its bottle. We had clearly warned Al-Assad's regime and its supporters that such a transgression would not remain without reaction. We have acted in 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 9/26 accordance with our role and responsibility. We have done so in a controlled, transparent framework, taking care to avoid any escalation with the actors present on the ground. The President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France have spoken on this subject. Some who for years have flouted the most elementary rules of international law now assert that our action is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. I would remind them that the Charter was not designed to protect criminals. Our action is fully in line with the objectives and values proclaimed from the outset by the Charter of the United Nations. The Organization's mission is "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". This action was indeed necessary in order to address the repeated violations by the Syrian regime of its obligations — obligations stemming from the law, treaties and its own commitments. Finally, our response was conceived within an proportionate framework, with precise objectives. The main research centre of the chemical weapons programme and two major production sites were hit. Through those objectives, Syria's capacity to develop, perfect and produce chemical weapons has been put out of commission. That was the only objective, and it has been achieved. My country, which knew at first hand the devastating effects of chemical weapons during the First World War, will never again allow impunity for their use. We will never stop identifying those responsible, who must be brought to justice. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we launched last January. Allow me to stress this point: last night's strikes are a necessary response to the chemical massacres in Syria. They are a response in the service of law and our political strategy to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. To be more specific, we have four imperatives on the Syrian issue that are in the immediate interest of Syrians, but also in the interest of the entire international community, as the Secretary-General reminded us, and I want to thank him for his briefing. Let me recall those four imperatives. First, the Syrian chemical-weapons programme must be dismantled in a verifiable and irreversible way. We must spare no effort to establish an international mechanism for establishing responsibility, to prevent impunity and to prevent any repeat attempts to the Syrian regime to use chemical. Secondly, terrorism must be eradicated by permanently defeating Da'esh. That is a long-standing commitment that still requires genuine effort to ensure a definitive victory. Thirdly, there must be a ceasefire throughout the Syrian territory and humanitarian access to the civilian populations, as required by Security Council resolutions. We need full and unhindered humanitarian access in order to help people in need, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, it is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys safely reach eastern Ghouta on a daily basis. Fourthly, we need a crisis-exit strategy, with a lasting political solution. We can sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis only through an inclusive political solution on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). We have been calling for that for seven years. It has never been so urgent to implement it and to relaunch genuine negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to achieving a political transition in Syria. Only that road map will allow us to finally emerge from the Syrian impasse. France is ready to tackle it, as of today, with all those who are ready to put all their efforts to that end. In that spirit, at the initiative of France and in line with President Emmanuel Macron's statement tonight, we will submit as soon as possible a draft resolution on those different aspects with our British and American partners. Today I ask Russia, first and foremost, to call on the Damascus regime to enter into a plan for a negotiated solution so that the long-lasting suffering of Syrian civilians can finally be brought to an end. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Just yesterday we were gathered in this Chamber for a meeting on the situation in Syria, during which China made clear its position on the issue of Syria, expressed profound concern about the further escalation of the tensions in Syria and made a clarion call for a political solution to the issue of Syria (see S/PV.8231). I would like to restate the following. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 10/26 18-10891 China has consistently stood for the peaceful settlement of disputes and against the use of force in international relations. We advocate respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military actions that circumvent the Security Council contravene the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations, and would hamper the settlement of the Syrian issue with new compounding factors. We urge all the parties concerned to refrain from any actions that may lead to a further escalation of the situation, to return to the framework of international law and to resolve the issue through dialogue and consultation. China believes a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation of the suspected chemical-weapons attack in Syria is necessary in order to arrive at a reliable conclusion that can withstand the test of history. Until that happens, no party must prejudge the outcome. There is no alternative to a political settlement in resolving the Syrian issue. The parties concerned in the international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator and should work together unremittingly towards a political settlement of the Syrian issue. I would like to restate that China stands ready to continue its positive and constructive role in the efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Syrian issue in the interests of peace and stability in the Middle East and in the world at large. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan expresses its serious concern about the sharp escalation of the situation in Syria. We call on all parties to prevent further military escalation and take effective steps aimed at restoring confidence and establishing peace and ensuring security in the long-suffering land of Syria on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We called yesterday and the day before yesterday, and every time when we have observed increasing tensions, in this Chamber for responsible action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Who else, if not Council members, should show the world an example of compliance with the principles and provisions of the Charter? We are telling others to strictly follow international law and order, but sadly, yesterday we witnessed a different example. Whatever action taken under whatever good pretext cannot and will not justify the military use of force. Violence carried out against violence will never bring about peace and stability. Kazakhstan's position has always been, and continues to be, that military action is the last resort, to be used only in cases approved by the Security Council. There was no approval by the Council of the military strikes that took place yesterday. "Humanity hoped that the twenty-first century would herald a new era of global cooperation. This, however, may turn out to be a mirage. Our world is once again in danger and the risks cannot be underestimated. The threat is a deadly war on a global scale. Our planet is now on the edge of a new cold war that could have devastating consequences for all humankind." (S/2016/317, annex, p.2) That is an exact quote from the manifesto of my President, entitled "The World. The Twenty-First Century", of 31 March 2016. Just yesterday Secretary- General António Guterres confirmed, to our regret, that the Cold War is back with a vengeance (see S/PV.8231). Kazakhstan appeals to the parties to adhere to both the Charter of the United Nations and international law. We think that the time has come for serious talks encouraging the United States and the Russian Federation, given their standing as the co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group and their respective influence on the parties, to move actively in the direction of finding middle ground and a political settlement to the conflict in Syria. The United Nations has a vital role to play in convening those negotiations and helping the parties resolve their disputes. My delegation is also extremely concerned about recent developments and the lack of unity among Security Council members with regard to the chemical attack in Syria. From its early days of independence, through a series of practical steps, Kazakhstan has consistently promoted peace initiatives in the international arena to achieve disarmament, non-proliferation and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and strongly condemns their development, testing and use. I repeat: Kazakhstan strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 11/26 It is important to conduct a thorough, objective and impartial investigation into all aspects of the alleged chemical attack in Douma so as to enable the international community to render a fair verdict against the perpetrators, in full compliance with international law. The Government and other parties must thoroughly execute their obligations to comply with the relevant recommendations made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations by accepting designated personnel, while providing for and ensuring the security of the activities undertaken by such personnel. We would like to remind the members of the Council that Kazakhstan's principled position is not only to condemn in the strongest terms the use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, in particular against the civilian population, but also to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means. President Nazarbayev stressed in his manifesto that the main tools for resolving disputes among States should be peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security, mutual respect and non-inference in the domestic affairs of other States. Preventing the escalation of conflict and ending wars are the most challenging tasks; there are no other reasonable options. World leaders must treat such tasks as the highest priority on the global agenda. We must also respect the sovereignty of States Members of the United Nations and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter. We urgently need a political solution. Only a political, diplomatic approach, dialogue and confidence-building measures in the spirit of the Charter and Security Council documents on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace can bring about proper results. We therefore call upon the international community to show political will to overcome differences and resume negotiations, in the belief that only a United Nations-led political transition in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) can end the Syrian conflict, which, in turn, can advance only if the Council is united. There is great need to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further the Geneva negotiations in order to see positive results. All parties at the international, regional and Syrian levels should support an immediate ceasefire and seriously and objectively move forward without any preconditions within the framework of the International Syria Support Group, under the auspices of the United Nations Office in Geneva. We believe that the Syrian people are capable of determining their own future. However, achieving their aspirations for democracy, reconstruction and stability is impossible without genuine international support to contain the negative impact of spoilers and to help Syrians combat terrorism and build their State on a firm and stable foundation. Kazakhstan has always stood for dialogue and the resolution of international conflicts. All parties must ensure that the situation does not further deteriorate. Military means will not work; only political solutions will succeed. My President warned that there will be no winners in any modern war, as everyone will be on the losing side. He proposed to work towards the total elimination of war and a world without conflict. Finally, we again call upon all relevant parties to persist in diplomatic efforts, seek political solutions, engage in dialogue and support the United Nations as the main mediation channel. Kazakhstan is ready to work with all colleagues to preserve peace and security on the basis of mutual understanding, goodwill and determination to make the world a safer place. Mr. Radomski (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Poland views the recent events in the context of repeated chemical-weapons attacks against Syria's civilian population as a consequence of the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators so far. The lack of an appropriate response encourages a greater number of attacks with the use of weapons that are both banned under international law and blatantly inhumane. In such circumstances the international community cannot remain passive. It should take all the necessary measures to prevent such attacks from being repeated in the future, in particular against a defenceless civilian population. At the same time, the competent international bodies should take decisions that will enable the perpetrators to be identified and brought to justice. We fully understand the reasons behind the action taken last night by the United States, the United Kingdom and France against Syrian chemical-weapons capabilities. We support that action, as it is intended to deter chemical-weapons attacks against the people of Syria. Let me underline that it is the primary responsibility of the Security Council to set up an S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 12/26 18-10891 investigative mechanism to examine the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that context, we reiterate our disappointment with the politically motivated Russian veto on the proposal for establishing an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Poland will continue its international efforts aimed at the complete elimination of chemical weapons. The use of such weapons is unacceptable and should be prosecuted vigorously in every instance and location in which they are used. Poland calls for refraining from actions that could escalate the situation. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank you, Sir, for convening today's important meeting. I also thank the Secretary- General for his briefing. The conflict in Syria is now in its eighth year. That is longer than the Second World War. President Al-Assad is responsible for one of the worst and most enduring humanitarian disasters of our time. From the beginning of the crisis, we have witnessed terrible violations and violence and a flagrant lack of respect for international law, in particular by Syrian Government forces. We must also never forget the atrocities committed by Da'esh. As the Secretary-General stated yesterday, we have witnessed "systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law tout court — in utter disregard for the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter". Indeed, there are numerous and flagrant violations of Security Council resolutions, international protocols and conventions Chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in Syria. The Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded that the Syrian authorities were responsible for four chemical-weapons attacks, and Da'esh for two. The use of such weapons is abhorrent, intolerable, a war crime and a crime against humanity. That is why, as has been noted here before, the international community banned their use in the international armed conflict more than a century ago. Subsequent developments have confirmed the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons as a norm of customary international law. We will spare no effort to end the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable; there can be no further impunity. The Security Council has the primary responsibility to act in response to threats to international peace and security. It is our joint responsibility to uphold the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. It is our common legal and moral duty to defend the non-proliferation regimes that we have established and confirmed. That is best done through true multilateralism and broad international consensus. In that regard, we welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon's Fact-finding Mission to Syria and we look forward to its findings. It is regrettable that the Council was unable to come together and agree on a timely, clear and unified response to the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria. We regret that Russia, again this week, blocked the Council from setting up a truly impartial and independent attribution mechanism. That has contributed to the situation in which we find ourselves now. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Deterrence and prevention of their use is the concern of the entire international community. We therefore share the rage and anger and are appalled by the repeated use of such weapons in Syria. It is necessary to rid Syria of chemical weapons once and for all, and hold those responsible accountable. At the same time, as the Secretary-General said in his statement yesterday, there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and international law in general. We are at a dangerous moment. We call for restraint and for avoiding any acts that could escalate, or further fuel, tensions. We need to avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond are exhausted. We worked tirelessly so that no stone was left unturned in efforts to find a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibility in accordance with the Charter. We have shared a proposal with Council members to achieve that objective by inviting the Secretary-General to come back to the Council with a proposal. In order to be successful, diplomacy needs to be backed by clear demands. The Secretary-General called on the Council to take action, but regrettably the Council could not unite. It was indeed a missed opportunity, but we stand ready to continue those efforts. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 13/26 In the light of all that has now happened, it is more critical than ever to avoid an escalation and revert to the track of diplomacy for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015). We reiterate our total support for the United Nations-led political process, which urgently needs to be reinvigorated, as well as the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) for the cessation of hostilities. Humanitarian access can wait no longer. A sustainable political solution is the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian people. Let us all then rally around that objective. Let us redouble our efforts and put an end to the long, brutal and meaningless conflict once and for all. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): I would like to begin by thanking the Secretary-General for his briefing today. Both yesterday and today, he spoke of the litany horrors that the Syrian population has experienced in the past seven years, of which the chemical-weapons attacks are among the most gruesome. The world hardly needs reminding of the unspeakable suffering that countless Syrian men, women and children have endured. It is a suffering that comes at the hands of Al-Assad and his allies. The Syrian regime has left the world no doubt as to its willingness to unleash terror on its own population. The repeated use of chemical weapons counts as the most cynical expression of that campaign. Just a week ago, the world was yet again confronted with reports of chemical-weapons use — that time in Douma. All the while, the Russian Federation has made clear to the world its readiness to stand by Al-Assad every step of the way. It has blocked draft resolutions in the Council that could have stopped the violence. I call upon all members of the Security Council to support a collective, meaningful response to the use of chemical weapons. But even if the Council fails to act, it should be clear to the world that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Against the background of past horrors and the unabated risk of recurrence, the response by France, the United Kingdom and the United States is understandable. The response was measured in targeting a limited number of military facilities that were used by the Syrian regime in the context of its illegal chemical-weapons arsenal. The action taken by those three countries made clear that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. Last night's response was aimed at reducing the capabilities to execute future chemical attacks. But do not let the Syrian regime and the Russian Federation think for a moment that we will waver in our pursuit of full accountability for the perpetrators of past chemical attacks. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism, so that the culprits of those heinous attacks can be identified and held accountable. We call on the Russian Federation to stop opposing that. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime or crime against humanity. The Kingdom of the Netherlands strongly believes that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Impunity cannot, and will not, prevail. However, should the Council continue to suffer from the paralysis inflicted by a single permanent member, we must not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the top of the United Nations Organization, and we have a powerful General Assembly. Both have to consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes every option to establish an independent and impartial mechanism, whether within the framework of the United Nations framework or of other relevant international organizations, as long as it results in a mechanism that can establish who is responsible, so that the perpetrators can subsequently be held to account. Any new mechanism should build upon the important work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the ongoing Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission. It is therefore crucial that the Mission have complete and unhindered access to all information and sites it deems necessary to conduct its investigations with regard to the attack with chemical weapons in Douma last weekend. The international norms against the use of chemical weapons must be respected, and the Syrian people must be relieved from the violence, hardship and injustice that has haunted them for so long. To that end, we call for a political solution and an immediate cessation of violence, as agreed upon earlier by the Council, as well as full, unhindered and immediate humanitarian access. We reiterate our determination to achieve justice for the victims. The need to collectively stand up for the fate of the Syrian people is now more apparent than ever. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and participation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 14/26 18-10891 in this meeting. Bolivia would also like to thank the Russian Federation for its initiative in convening this emergency meeting of the Security Council. Today is a dark day in the history of the Council. Three permanent members have made the decision, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to take unilateral action against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State Member of the Organization. Bolivia would like to clearly and categorically express its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical substances as weapons, as it is unjustifiable and criminal wherever and whenever it happens, by whomever, given it constitutes a serious crime against international law and international peace and security. Those responsible for committing such terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished with the utmost rigour. Bolivia continues to demand a transparent and impartial investigation to determine who the culprits are. Aside from that topic, the purpose of this meeting is linked to the fact that, as I stated, three permanent members of the Council have used force in breach of the Charter. It is impossible to combat the alleged violation of international law by violating international law. Bolivia is surprised by the fact that, given that, they have a greater a greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the permanent Council members bypass the United Nations when it suits them. They advocate for multilateralism as long as it serves their purposes and then simply discard it. When multilateralism is no longer in their interest, it no longer concerns them. This is not the only case in which, sadly, unilateral action has been used. We recall, and will not tire in recalling, such use in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011. Any such action must be authorized by the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations. All unilateral actions run counter to international law, as well as to the values and principles of the Charter. Bolivia rejects the use and the threat of the use of force. Unilateral actions not only respond to the specific interests of those who carry them out, but are also measures that are — allow me to use the word — imperialist. It so happens that the empires that we mentioned earlier consider themselves morally superior to the rest of the world. They consider themselves exceptional and indispensable, and therefore believe that they are above the law and international law, but in reality the interest of those who unilaterally use force and violate the Charter is not to advance democracy or freedom or to combat the use of chemical weapons. Their goal is to expand their power and domination. What we have witnessed over the past few hours is an attack on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which has not begun the work that was scheduled to begin today. A unilateral attack is an attack on multilateral organizations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It is an attack on the Council and its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It is an attack on the Charter, and it is an attack on the entire international community. I wonder, with regard to the permanent members that used force just a few hours ago, how much money have they invested in arming and training the armed groups in Syria? What natural resources are they after? With what moral authority will they be able invoke the Charter in the future? Sadly, the history of violating the purposes and principles of the Charter is a long one. We mentioned Libya and Iraq, which were recent cases. The unilateral decision concerning Jerusalem also sent another absolutely clear signal of the lack of respect for international law. Who are the ones selling weapons to those who are bombing civilians in Yemen? Who are the ones who rejected the Paris Agreement on climate change? Who are the ones who stepped away from the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration? Who are the ones who build walls? We nevertheless believe that it is also important to talk about history over the long term. Above all, we have been experiencing the consequences of the havoc wreaked by some of the colonialist Powers and of their disdain for international law in the Middle East that dates back over 100 years. We are currently reliving the same scenario in Syria, characterized by total disregard for international law. To a certain extent, we relived it, for example, when the United Kingdom refused to return the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands to Argentina or when the Chagos Archipelago issue was not resolved. I hope that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning that matter will be respected. In other words, we are talking about a whole range of policies that are detrimental to international peace and security. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 15/26 The Permanent Representative of the United States said that the United States, her country, has its finger on the trigger — "locked and loaded". Of course, we clearly heard her words with a great deal of concern and sadness. We know that the United States has aircraft carriers, satellites, smart bombs and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and we also know that it has nothing but scorn for international law. But we have this — we have the purposes and principles of the Charter, and ultimately, as history has shown time and again, those principles will prevail. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing at the beginning of this meeting. The State of Kuwait believes in and is committed to the Charter and principles of the United Nations, respect for the sovereignty of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers upon the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whereby it can act on behalf of Member States to carry out that mandate. Article 25 stipulates that the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. What we have witnessed in the Syrian crisis is an impasse concerning the international community's efforts and the flagrant violation of its resolutions. We have followed very closely and with great concern the dangerous developments in Syria relating to recent military operations in response to the use by the Syrian authorities of chemical weapons prohibited by international law. We underscore that those developments are the result of the impasse in the international community's efforts embodied by the Security Council to reach a political settlement to the bloody conflict in Syria, which has gone on for more than seven years. It has led to hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of displaced Syrians and resulted in the major destruction of civilian infrastructure in several cities. The chemical weapons issue long enjoyed a unified approach in the Council, which condemned the use of all chemical weapons in Syria regardless of who uses such weapons. Moreover, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013) unanimously, imposing measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in case of the non-compliance of various parties with its provisions or the continued use in Syria of chemical weapons, which, as we have said, are internationally banned weapons. In order to ensure the implementation of that resolution, in August 2015 the Security Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015), established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to determine those responsible for any crime involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In fact, the Mechanism identified the perpetrators of such crimes on several incidents. The unfortunate divide in the positions of the Council encouraged the parties to the crisis to continue their violations of resolutions of international legitimacy, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions. The most recent resolution 2401 (2018), adopted unanimously, is another example of resolutions being violated. It calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to allow for humanitarian access to the besieged areas. Unfortunately, that humanitarian resolution was not implemented, as we know. The State of Kuwait regrets this escalation and calls on members to overcome their differences within the Security Council and to restore the unity of the Council so that it can shoulder its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We also call on members to bridge the existing gap by establishing a new, independent, impartial and professional mechanism to investigate the use of any chemical weapons in Syria and to determine who is accountable for such crimes. We reiterate our full readiness to participate in any effort aimed at achieving a compromise among the positions of members of the Council so as to ensure that those who are responsible for these crimes will be held accountable and punished, and to preserve the non-proliferation regime. It is certain that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis. Intensive efforts must be made to spare the Syrian people further suffering. We reiterate our principled and firm position regarding the Syrian crisis, which is in line with the position of the League of Arab States calling for the preservation of the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria; putting an end to acts of violence and the killing; avoiding bloodshed; saving Syrian lives; and reaching a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the United Nations on the basis of the 2012 Geneva First Communique, and resolution 2254 (2015), through a process of political transition S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 16/26 18-10891 with the involvement of all Syrian parties so that the Syrian people can achieve their legitimate aspirations. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): I would like to thank the Peruvian presidency for responding quickly to the request for the holding of this meeting, and we would like to express our appreciation to Russia for making the request. It would have been a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the Council if it had failed to meet in the light of what transpired yesterday. We also thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and his presence today. For those of us who are elected members of the Security Council, the responsibility is indeed extremely heavy, to the point of being unbearable. Let us not forget that we are here representing 193 countries, to which, like permanent members, we have made solemn promises that are generally encapsulated in the Charter of the United Nations. For those of us who are members of the African Union, an organization that for obvious historical reasons attaches huge importance to scrupulous adherence to the principles of the Charter, the obligation that we have to tell the truth and to stand up and be counted for peace is also enormously heavy — all the more so when the parties involved, from our own national perspective, are friends. It was only yesterday that the Secretary-General urged Member States to act responsibility in these dangerous circumstances and stressed the need to avoid the serious situation from spiralling out of control (see S/PV.8231); indeed, he repeated the same sentiment today. We have also been repeatedly expressing our concern that the dynamic in Syria could lead to devastating consequences not only nationally, but regionally and internationally. No doubt, the strike undertaken by the three countries yesterday appears not to have led to the situation spiralling out of control. We do not take that lightly, even though it might be difficult to be consoled by that fact in the light of the potential danger we still face. That is why we call for maximum restraint, the exercise of wisdom and a quick return to dialogue among the major powers that have enormous influence on the current situation in Syria. As we stressed yesterday and previously, it is absolutely vital to resume the path of diplomacy. The alternative is without a doubt catastrophic beyond our imagination. We hope that no one wants to see that happen, but it could if we do not act together with a huge sense of urgency to defuse the current tension and reduce further military escalation. By no means do we overlook the genesis of this tragedy we are facing. It has to do with the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma. At least, that is what ratcheted up the tension, leading to what took place yesterday, which is difficult to defend as being consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. But there is also one point that makes it difficult for us to understand what took place yesterday. The Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is arriving, or, as just said by the Secretary-General, has already arrived in Syria to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons, which is the cause of all this tension. In the light of that, you must excuse us, Mr. President, if we were a little perplexed. While the priority of the time is clearly to avert the further escalation of the latest development, we are not underestimating the importance of ensuring accountability for any confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that regard, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should be allowed to conduct a thorough investigation to establish the facts related to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma. The sustainable way to end impunity, which we believe is extremely important, to deter and stop the use of chemicals as weapons is through united and concerted action, including through an attribution mechanism that the Council could and must set up. That has become all the more critical now, when, as we all know, truth is becoming very difficult to establish. An opportunity has been created for parties and even individuals to claim the veracity of their own facts. We know that we are all disappointed by the current deadlock, but that should not justify overlooking the obligation to adhere to the principles of the Charter. Let me conclude by referring to what the Secretary-General said yesterday. I wanted to refer to it again because it reflects the truth and is, therefore, worth repeating: "[T]he Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present." (S/PV.8231, p. 2) That is why we must appeal to the members of the Security Council, especially the Permanent Five, to help create a situation where diplomacy would have the upper hand and the primacy of politics will be our guide for coming out of what is a troubled moment in our 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 17/26 recent history. The Geneva process and Special Envoy de Mistura need the unqualified support of the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his statement, which clearly illustrates the perspective of the United Nations on this issue. What took place last night was clearly not a surprise to any member of the Security Council. It remained to establish only the day and the time. In fact, as we said in our statement yesterday (see S/PV.8232), we are concerned about the rhetoric that we are hearing and where it will lead us. It has now led us to where we feared and did not want to go — military attacks against Syria. Yesterday in this Chamber, Secretary-General António Guterres spoke about the memory of the Cold War, which in fact returned with a vengeance in the early hours of the morning, reminding the peoples of the world of the conflict of interests that still exists between two blocs. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea has followed with great concern the reports on the attacks carried out by the United States, with the support of the armed forces of France and the United Kingdom. According to estimates, the coalition fired more than 100 cruise missiles and air-to-ground missiles from two United States naval ships stationed in the Red Sea, as well as from tactical warplanes that overflew the Mediterranean and B-1B bombers from another area. The coalition launched a coordinated attack on three targets, which included a scientific research centre in an area of Damascus, a facility to the west of Homs and a command post near that facility. While surgical and very selective, last night's strikes are a violation of Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles and norms of international law. It is important to recall that, according to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members of the Council must therefore refrain from creating situations of insecurity and instability. The Security Council should not highlight or disregard the fact that those strikes may have unpredictable and potentially tragic consequences for the Middle East by encouraging or justifying the development of nuclear programmes in order to prevent any further aggression. Experts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are already in Douma to carry out investigations. Until we have reliable and irrefutable proof of the alleged chemical attack in Douma last week, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is of the view that no aggression can be justified. Our delegation also reiterates that, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, in the case of any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it is imperative to seek a solution first and foremost through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means. History continues to show us that military interventions never resolves conflicts but, instead, cause them to proliferate and to continue, causing devastation and destruction. We must ensure that that does not happen again in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic. We again point out that the military intervention in Libya in 2011 and its consequences today should be a clear lesson to the international community. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea opposes the use of force in international relations. We accept its use only when it is in line with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. As we have already said, in the case of Syria, it would not bring about any substantial change in the overall situation in the country. We reiterate that political agreement is the only viable way to find a lasting solution to the Syrian problem. All the parties involved must resolve their differences through dialogue, agreement and consultation. That process requires the support of the international community. The failure of diplomacy only exacerbates the suffering of the Syrian people and is the highest expression of the Security Council's failure. Equatorial Guinea continues to believe that, in order to fully clarify the 7 April events in Douma, a thorough, impartial and objective investigation must be carried out in order to reach a reliable conclusion. We urge the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to promptly carry out an investigation and to report to the Security Council on its conclusions as soon as possible. We also again reiterate the urgent need to establish, under the auspices of the Secretary- General, a professional, independent and transparent investigative body to attribute responsibility for and identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons so that those responsible, whoever they are, are brought to international justice. Only in that way can that thorny issue achieve consensus and unity among the members of the Security Council. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 18/26 18-10891 I conclude my statement by reiterating the unequivocal position of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, which is that we wholeheartedly condemned the use of chemical weapons by whomever. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Cote d'Ivoire would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and for his briefing on the latest developments in Syria following the air strikes carried out by certain members of the Security Council during the night of Friday, 13 April. Côte d'Ivoire requests all the actors involved in the Syrian conflict at the various levels to show restraint and not to further complicate the disastrous situation in which the Syrian people find themselves. Weapons and bombs have struck Syria too often in disregard for our collective action towards peace. Is it necessary to recall that, by signing the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the founding Members sought to establish a new world order based on multilateralism and its resolve to make peace a universal common good, the maintenance of which was entrusted to the United Nations and the Security Council as its primary responsibility? The Secretary- General has just reminded us of that. In every situation in which the Charter of the United Nations has guided the action of the international community, respect for its principles has always enabled us to overcome the most inextricable challenges, thereby preventing many disasters for humanity. Based on its strong conviction in the virtues of multilateralism, my country therefore believes that resorting to force in order to maintain international peace and security must be authorized by the Security Council in order to preserve its essential legal authority and to thereby prevent any deviation or abuse. Only a Security Council that is strong and representative of our time will be able to mobilize all Member States of the United Nations in support of its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Côte d'Ivoire would therefore like to express its deep concern over the inability of the Council to relaunch the dialogue in Syria and to sideline the supporters of a military solution. Côte d'Ivoire would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, no matter who is responsible, and we call for the establishment of a multilateral mechanism to attribute responsibility and to bring those responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice in the appropriate international tribunals. In that context, my delegation reiterates its support for the investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to shed light on the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma in eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire once again urges the members of the Security Council to unite with a view to putting an end to their differences and to effect the establishment of this mechanism to establish responsibility, which all the members of the Council would like to see set up. Côte d'Ivoire would like to reassert its conviction and its position of principle that the response to the crisis in Syria cannot be a military response. Quite to the contrary; it must be sought in the framework of dialogue and an inclusive political process, as envisioned in the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015). The time has come to decisively give every opportunity for dialogue a chance and to make sure that the Council is in step with history. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. Peru notes with great concern the developments in Syria. In the face of military action, as a response to information on the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population in the country, we reiterate the need to keep the situation from spiralling out of control and causing a greater threat to stability in the region and to international peace and security. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons as an atrocity crime. For that reason, we have supported the urgent deployment to Syria of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, as well as the establishment of a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial attribution mechanism. We regret the stalemate in the Security Council and our inability to take a decision on the issue. In that regard, Peru encourages the Secretary-General to redouble his efforts in accordance with the prerogatives entrusted to him in the Charter of the United Nations with a view to helping to resolve the stalemate in the Council and to establish the attribution mechanism. Peru believes that any response to the crimes committed in Syria, as well as a solution to the conflict in Syria overall, must be consistent with the Charter, with international law and with the Council's resolutions. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 19/26 As the Secretary-General has reminded us, the Council is the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it is up to its members to act in unity and to uphold that responsibility. Peru joins the Secretary-General's urgent appeal to all Member States to act with restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation reaffirms its commitment to continue working in order to achieve sustainable peace in Syria, to guarantee protection for the civilian population, to ensure that there is no impunity for atrocious crimes, as well as to help defuse the situation. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I should like to respond to the remarks made by the Ambassador of Bolivia about the United Kingdom. We have no doubt about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and surrounding maritime areas. Successive British Governments have made clear that sovereignty will not be transferred against the wishes of the Falkland Islands. The Falkland Islanders voted overwhelmingly to maintain their current constitutional arrangements with the United Kingdom. Turning to the Chagos archipelago, the United Kingdom is participating in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice, even as we disagree with jurisdiction in that case. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I will be very brief and limit myself to reading out what it says in the special declaration on the question of the Malvinas Islands, signed by all the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Heads of State and Government: "Reiterate their strongest support for the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and the permanent interest of the countries of the region in the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland resuming negotiations in order to find — as soon as possible — a peaceful and definitive solution to such dispute, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations .". That would include in particular General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX). The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I welcome the presence of the Secretary- General at this very important moment in the history and the work of the Security Council. In his important statement yesterday, the Secretary-General warned that the Cold War had returned (see S/PV.8231). That is exactly right. We all agree with the relevance of this remark. I take this opportunity to recall those who relaunched the logic of the Cold War. Of course, we all remember, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, that a number of philosophical books were published here in this country, including The End of History and the Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama. Another author, American thinker Samuel Huntington, wrote an essay entitled The Clash of Civilizations. Those two works marked the return of the Cold War logic. Indeed, the message of those two books was as follows: To the people of the world, you must take the American approach and surrender to the American will or we will attack you. "My way or the highway", as the American saying goes. That marked the return of the Cold War philosophy. Lies serve no purpose. They serve the person who lies once and only once. Lies deceive only once. When a lie is repeated it becomes exposed and exposes the person who is lying. My colleague the Ambassador of France announced that the aggression of his country, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, was carried out on behalf of the international community. If that is the case, I wonder which international community my colleague the French Ambassador is speaking of. Is he speaking of a real international community that S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 20/26 18-10891 actually exists? Has the international community that he represents authorized this tripartite aggression against my country? Did their Governments obtain a mandate from this international community to attack my country? My American, French and British colleagues claimed that they have bombarded centres for the production of chemical weapons in Syria. If the Governments of these three countries knew the actual location of these production centres that they claim to have bombarded, why did they not share that information with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? Why did they not share this information with the Fact-finding Mission in Damascus before attacking my country? It is just a question I am putting to the Security Council. Furthermore, I would like to assure Council members that the OPCW investigation team arrived today at noon. Obviously, the team was delayed for a full day getting from Beirut to Damascus before the attack, for reasons that we do not know, as though the team was asked not to go to Damascus until after the bombing took place. But the team did reach Damascus today at noon and will hold a meeting in two hours, at 7 p.m., Damascus time, with the local authorities. My Government will, of course, provide every support to the team so that it may carry out its mission successfully. The facility of the Barzah Research and Development Centre, the building that was targeted by the tripartite aggression, was visited twice last year by experts from the OPCW. They inspected it, after which they gave us an official document stating that Syria had complied with its obligations under the OPCW and that no chemical activities had taken place in the inspected building. If the OPCW experts gave us an official document confirming that the Barzah Centre was not used for any type of chemical activity in contravention to our obligations with respect to the OPCW, how do Council members reconcile that with what we have heard this morning? How do they reconcile that with all the accusations and claims that the aggression targeted a chemical-weapons production centre? My American colleague said that the time for discussion is over — that it was over yesterday (see S/PV.8231). If that is so, then what are we doing today as diplomats an ambassadors at the Security Council? Our mission here is to speak, to explain what happened, to shed light on all the issues. We are not here in the Security Council simply to justify an aggression. How can we state that the discussion is over? No, the discussion is continuing in this Chamber, if the idea is to put an end to aggressions or to implement the provisions of the Charter and international law. That is why we are here. My British and French colleagues spoke of a plan of action and have invited the Secretary-General to implement it before the Council and the Syrian Government have agreed to it. Their plan of action is in fact a very strange one. But I would like to present on behalf of my Government a counter plan of action, which, I assume, should have been presented today. First, we should read the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and define and recall the responsibilities of the three States in maintaining international peace and security, rather than threatening it. I happen to have three versions of the Charter, two in English and one in French. Perhaps these three States should read what the Charter actually states. Secondly, these three States must immediately stop supporting the armed terrorist groups that are active in my country. Thirdly, they should put an end to the lies and fabrications being used to justify their aggression against my country. Fourthly, these three States should realize that, after seven years of a terrorist war that was imposed on my country, Syria, a war carried out by these three countries and their agents in the region, their missiles, airplanes and bombs will not weaken our determination to defeat and destroy their terrorists. This will not prevent the Syrian people from deciding their own political future without foreign intervention. I will repeat this for the thousandth time — the Syrian people will not allow any foreign intervention to define our future. I promised yesterday that we will not remain inactive in the face of any aggression, and we have kept our promise. I will explain how we have kept our promise. Allow me now to address those States that remain committed to international law. I would tell them that the Syrian Arab Republic and its many friends and allies are perfectly capable of dealing with the brutal aggression that my country has had to face. But what we are asking the diplomats and ambassadors today who are committed to international legitimacy and the Charter to call on the United States, Britain and France to read the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular those pertaining to respect for 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 21/26 the sovereignty of States and to the non-use of force in international relations. Perhaps the Governments of these three countries will realize, if only once, that their role in the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security rather than to undermine it. As I just said, I have three copies of the Charter, and I would ask the Council's secretariat to distribute them to the three delegations so that they might enlighten or awaken themselves from their ignorance and their tyranny. In flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States, Britain and France, at 3:55 a.m. on Saturday, 14 April, Damascus time, attacked the Syrian Arab Republic by launching some 110 missiles against Damascus and other Syrian cities and areas. In response to this terrible aggression, the Syrian Arab Republic has exercised its legitimate right in line with Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself, and we have defended ourselves against this evil attack. Syrian air defences were able to intercept a number of rockets launched by the tripartite aggression, while some of them reached the Barzah Centre in — not outside — the capital Damascus. The Centre in that location that includes laboratories and classrooms. Fortunately, the damage was only material. Some of those modern, charming and smart rockets were intercepted, while others targeted a military site near Homs, wounding three civilians. The Governments of these three States prepared for this evil attack by issuing aggressive statements through their senior officials, saying that their only excuse for preventing the advance of the Syrian Arab Army against armed groups was these allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Indeed, in a race against time, the armed terrorist groups did receive instructions from those aggressors to fabricate this charade of the use of chemical weapons in Douma. They found false witnesses and manipulated the alleged crime scene as they did before, which served as the pretext for this scandalous aggression. This can only be explained by the fact that the original aggressors — the United States of America, Britain and France — decided to interfere directly in order to avenge the defeat of their proxies in Ghouta. In fact, those who fabricated the charade of the chemical attack in Ghouta were arrested and admitted on television that it was a fabricated attack. We have a video of that if the presidency wishes to see it. I would like to draw the attention of those who align themselves with the Charter of the United Nations and international legitimacy to the fact that this evil aggression sends another message from those three aggressors to the terrorist groups that they can continue using chemical weapons in the future and committing their terrorist crimes, not against Syrian civilians only but in other countries. There is no doubt about that. In 146 letters we have drawn the Council's attention to the plans of the terrorist groups to use chemical weapons in Syria. There are 146 letters that have been sent to the Council and the Secretariat. Today, some Council members are suddenly reinventing the wheel. The Council knows that this aggression took place just as a fact-finding team from the OPCW was supposed to arrive in Syria at the request of the Syrian Government to examine the allegations of a chemical attack in Douma. Obviously, the main message that these aggressors are sending to the Council and to the world is that they are not actually interested in the Council's mandate and that they do not want a transparent and independent investigation. They are trying to undermine the work of the investigative mission and anticipating the results. They are trying to put pressure on that mission to conceal their lies and fabrications, just as happened six years ago, in 2013, when Mr. Sellström went to Khan Al-Assal from Damascus, as I have explained in a previous statement to the Council. This morning's attack was not just an attack on Syria, as my dear friend, the representative of Bolivia said; rather, it was an attack against the Charter, the Council, international law and 193 members of this Organization. The attempt by Washington, D.C., London and Paris to ensure the failure of the United Nations working groups and fact-finding missions is systematic. While those three States boast of their support for these bodies, behind the closed doors of the Organization they pressure and blackmail them not to carry out the mandates for which they were established. We recall what took place with the investigative missions in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia and Africa. No investigative mission can be successful if it is subjected to political blackmailing. It cannot succeed. Of the three aggressors, I say they are liars. They are compulsive liars. They are hypocrites. They are attempting to ensure the failure of any action of the Organization that does not serve their interests. Ever since the Organization was established, they have tried to undermine the efforts of international investigative bodies. They have tried to exploit them. I need only mention Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Africa. The aggressors exhausted the Council agendas for decades S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 22/26 18-10891 with their attempts to divert its attention from its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. They used the Council to pursue their aggressive policy of interference and colonialism. Yesterday, in the press of the United States and of the West, the main theme was lying in the context of a campaign that was claiming success, but they know it was a lie. While these three Governments were launching their evil aggression against my country, Syria, and while my country's air defence system was countering the attacks with a great deal of bravery — one hundred missiles were destroyed and did not reach their target — the American Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff were before the American and international press in an outrageous surrealist scenario. They were not actually able to answer objective questions. Millions of television viewers must have pitied those two men because they were like dunces, repeating phrases without any meaning, and were unable to respond to the legitimate questions of a journalist about their attempts to target chemical weapons facilities and the danger that posed to civilians if the alleged chemical weapons were to spread. They did not respond. They were also unable to respond to a journalist who asked the Secretary of Defense, "You said yesterday that you had no proof that the Syrian Government was responsible for the attack in Douma. What happened in the past few hours? What made you change your mind?" His answer was that he received confirmation from intelligence services. The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms this tripartite attack, which once again shows undeniably that those three countries pay no heed to international legitimacy, even though they repeatedly say they do. Those countries have revealed their belief in the law of the jungle and the law of the most powerful even as they are permanent members of the Security Council, an organ entrusted with maintaining international peace and security and with stopping any aggression, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Syrian Arab Republic is disgusted by the scandalous position of the rulers in Sheikhdom of Qatar, who supported this Western colonial tripartite aggression by allowing planes to take off from the American Al Udeid air base in Qatar. It is not surprising that the little boys of the Sheikhdom of Qatar took that position. They have supported terrorist gangs, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others, in a variety of ways in order to destabilize Arab countries, including Syria. The Syrian Arab Republic is asking the international community, if it exists — we have heard a new definition of the international community today — and the Security Council to firmly condemn this aggression, which will exacerbate the tensions in the region and which is a threat to international peace and security throughout the world. I call upon those who are committed to international legitimacy to imagine with me the meeting in which the United States National Security Council decided to carry out this attack. I cannot help wondering what was said. "We have no legal basis for attacking Syria. We have no proof that a toxic chemical weapons attack took place in Douma, but let us set that aside. We did not need international legitimacy or any legal argument to conduct military interventions in the past." I am just imagining the discussion that might have taken place among them yesterday. "This military action is necessary for us and for our allies in order to distract public attention in our countries from the scandals involving our own political elite and ensure that the corrupt system in some Gulf States pays the price of such aggression. Most important is how to protect the terrorism that we have sponsored in Syria for years." The President (spoke in Spanish): Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/355, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Russian Federation. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation Against: Côte d'Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 23/26 Abstaining: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 3 votes in favour, 8 against and 4 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements after the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We voted against the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/355) because we believe that its language was unbalanced. It was not comprehensive and failed to address all of our concerns about the current situation. At the same time, we agree with the Secretary-General that actions must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law in general. In our national statement delivered earlier today, we explained our view on the current situation in Syria and condemned the use of chemical weapons and the many other flagrant violations of international law in Syria. We also underscore the importance of a sustainable political solution. As members of the Security Council, we reiterate that we must unite and exercise our responsibility with regard to the situation in Syria. If there is any encouragement today, it is that it appears that everyone around the table insists on a sustainable political solution as the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian population. We therefore reiterate our full support for the United Nations political process, which must now be urgently reinvigorated, including through strong support for the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to explain why we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution proposed by Russia (S/2018/355). We abstained not because the text does not contain a great deal of truth — indeed it does — or because it does not adhere to principles to which we should all adhere; it does. We abstained on the grounds of pragmatism. We know that even if it had received nine votes, it would have been vetoed. Therefore it would have had only symbolic value. Nonetheless, that is not unimportant. However, for us, it is critical to defuse tensions and prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. We would like to play a constructive role in that regard. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan abstained in the voting today on draft resolution S/2018/355 because we believe that all disputes among States should be resolved through peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security. As I mentioned in my statement earlier today, we call for all parties to refrain from actions that could aggravate tensions and cause the situation to spiral out of control. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Our abstention reflects the frustration of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea with regard to the failure to adopt a resolution to establish an attribution and accountability mechanism to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. We reiterate our call for a consensus-based resolution that would establish that mechanism and prevent a repeat of the action we witnessed yesterday. In that regard, we recall that the Swedish initiative was endorsed by the 10 elected members of the Council. We could introduce the required changes into the draft resolution to enable its adoption by consensus, which would allow the mechanism to be established under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): The draft resolution submitted by Russia (S/2018/355) has just been categorically rejected. The result of the voting sends a clear message that the members of the Council understand the circumstances, reason for and objectives of the military action taken yesterday. The Council understands why such action, which has been acknowledged as proportional and targeted, was required. No one has refuted the fact that the use of chemical weapons cannot be tolerated and must be deterred. That is the key point. It is important that we now look towards the future. As I have just said, the air strikes were necessary and served to uphold international law and our political strategy to end the tragic situation in Syria. It is for that reason that, together with our American and British partners, France will work with all members of the Security Council to submit a draft resolution on the political, chemical and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict with a view to devising a lasting political solution to the conflict. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands voted against the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 24/26 18-10891 (S/2018/355) because the text does not provide for the urgent action that the Security Council must take in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It ignores the very essence of the action that must be taken by the Council. It should condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria, protect its people and hold accountable those responsible. Today's draft resolution does none of the above. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): Kuwait voted against draft resolution S/2018/355. At the time when the State of Kuwait reiterates its adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use of force as a means to settle disputes and requires them to be settled by peaceful means, yesterday's use of force was the result of efforts to disrupt the will of the international community, specifically by hindering the Security Council in its determination to take measures at its disposal to end the ongoing use of internationally prohibited chemical weapons in Syria. That is a flagrant violation of resolution 2118 (2013), which unequivocally expresses the Security Council's intention to act under Chapter VII of the Charter when one party or several parties fail to comply with its provisions or in the case of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. The Council must once again show its unity and bear its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter. It must agree on a new independent, impartial and professional mechanism for investigating any use of chemical weapons, bring those responsible for such crimes to account, and ensure that they do not enjoy impunity. We call for intensified efforts and a return to the political track, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim of reaching a peaceful settlement to the crisis based on the first Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has always opposed the use of force in the context of international relations. We advocate for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity, and the territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military action bypassing the Security Council runs counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violates the principles of international law and the basic norms governing international relations and, in the present case, will further complicate the Syrian issue. Based on that principled position, China voted in favour of draft resolution S/2018/355, proposed by the Russian Federation. I would like to emphasize here that a political settlement is the only viable pathway to solving the Syrian issue. China urges the parties involved to remain calm, exercise restraint, return to the framework of international law and resolve issues through dialogue and negotiations We support the role of the United Nations as the main channel for mediation, and we will spare no effort to reach a political settlement of the situation in Syria together with the international community. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today is the day when the Security Council and the world community should raise their voices in the defence of peace, security, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Every delegation in this Chamber is a sovereign country, and no one should attempt to pressure or dictate to any of us how to interpret international law and the Charter of the United Nations, or how to consult our own consciences. We have never hesitated to vote in accordance with the dictates of international law, the Charter, our conscience and truth. Today's meeting confirms that the United States, Britain and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, continue to plunge world politics and diplomacy into a realm of myths, myths that have been created in Washington, London and Paris. That is dangerous work, representing a kind of diplomacy that traffics in myths, hypocrisy, deceit and counterfeit ideas. Soon we will arrive at the diplomacy of the absurd. These three countries create these myths and try to force everyone to believe in them. We counter their myths with facts and a true picture of what is going on. But they do not want to see or hear. They simply ignore what they are told. They have come up with a legend about Russia as a constant wielder of the Security Council veto whom they purposely provoke into using the veto so as to then present themselves in a favourable light, especially right now. They are distorting international law and replacing its concepts with counterfeits. They are unabashedly hypocritical. They demand an investigation, and before the investigation has even started they name and punish the guilty parties. Why did they not wait for the result of the investigation that they themselves all called for? The Security Council is paralysed because of these countries' persistent deceptions both of us 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 25/26 and the international community. They are not only putting themselves above international law, they are trying to rewrite it. They violate international law and try to convince everyone that their actions are legal. The representative of the United Kingdom gave three reasons justifying the missile strikes based on the concept of humanitarian intervention. They are trying to substitute them for the Charter. That is why we and other countries did not support it then and do not support it now, because we do not want it to become the justification for their crimes. We demand once again that that they halt this aggression immediately and refrain from the illegal use of force in the future. Today we once again showed the whole world how we play our underhanded games. In Soviet times there was a pamphlet entitled Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From? that described Washington and the NATO countries' military preparations. Nothing has changed. The threat to peace comes from exactly the same place. Look at what they say and listen to the war drums that they are beating in Washington today in the guise of hypocritical concern for democracy, human rights and people in general. The five-minute rule in the latest presidential note's rules of procedure (S/2017/507) will not allow me to list them, because the list is too long. I could cite other examples, as for example how the President of France showed interest in a conversation with President Putin in an investigation in Douma and was ready to send French experts there when that idea suddenly disappeared. Because a different algorithm was put forward. That is obvious. Today is a sad day. It is a sad day for the world, the United Nations and its Charter, which has been blatantly violated, and the Security Council, which has shirked its responsibilities. I should like to believe that will not see another day as bad as today. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make another statement in my national capacity. Peru abstained in the voting because we believe that the draft resolution did not adequately reflect the need to guarantee due accountability for the use of chemical weapons throughout Syrian terrority and because its language is imbalanced and would not help to restore the Council's unity, which is critical to addressing the events in Syria in a comprehensive manner. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to make another statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I think it is obvious why we voted against the draft resolution. We support completely what the French representative laid out about next steps and we will work tirelessly to that objective, along with partners on the Council. The Russian Ambassador referred to myths. These are not our myths. The way forward in the Council has been blocked. The second of our own criteria for taking this action on an exceptional basis must be objectively clear. There is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. In the 113 meetings of the Council on Syria, I think that has been demonstrated absolutely crystally clear. The United Kingdom believes that it cannot be illegal to prevent the use of force to save lives in such numbers as we have seen in Syria. The reason we took this action — our legal basis — was that of humanitarian intervention. We believe that that is wholly within the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has ask for the floor to make a new statement. I now give him the floor. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I apologize for requesting the floor once again. The scene that we have just witnessed is quite sad. There are those in the Council who prefer to overlook an enormous elephant that we have spoken of before. The elephant is the direct American military occupation of one-third of my country's territory — a direct American military occupation of one-third of the Syrian Arab Republic territory. However, there are those who speak of minor details which they believe to be pivotal. No, the political scene is far more dangerous than that. We are a State whose sovereignty has been facing a direct military violation by a permanent member of the Council. That is the true scene, and not the allegations and the film prepared by the terrorist organization known as the White Helmets established by British intelligence. We need to focus on the main scene here. Some would claim that they are fighting Da'esh in Syria and Iraq. However they have given air cover to Da'esh. Whenever the Syrian Arab Army makes advances against Da'esh, United States, British and French war planes bombard our military sites. Why? To prevent our decisive victory against that entity. However, they failed S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 26/26 18-10891 and we were able to achieve victory against Da'esh with our brothers in Iraq in three years and not in thirty, as former President Obama predicted. We understand that the capitals of the three countries that launched the aggression against my country are frustrated. Some colleagues who voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/355) claim to support a political settlement. We tell them now, after their shameful vote against the draft resolution, that those who voted against it are no longer partners of the Syrian Government in any political process. The British Ambassador explained things about the Malvinas Islands. That testimony reveals the facts about the imperialistic policies of Britain. I am actually the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) and I work under the agenda of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. My task and that of my colleagues in the C-24 is to end colonialism throught the world. The Malvinas are on the list of territories that do not enjoy self-governance. We are working in accordance with the United Nations agenda to end the British occupation of the Malvinas. As for my colleague the Ambassador of Kuwait, I remind him — although he and his Government are well aware of it — that when my country participated in the liberation of Kuwait, we did not justify our principled position to the people of Kuwait. Our position was a principled one. We did not need draft resolutions, meetings or any tripartite aggression. We did not look into the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or undermine our national obligations to our brothers in Kuwait, nor did we join any bloc that was hostile to Kuwait. We fulfilled our national duty towards our brothers in Kuwait. The Ambassador of Kuwait will also recall that my country could have played a different role at the time and could have negatively impacted the peace, safety and security of Kuwait, but we chose not to do so. We acted pursuant to a national principled position that was not subject to negotiation or discussion. The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.
Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8231 Security Council Seventy-third year 8231st meeting Friday, 13 April 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10728 (E) *1810728* S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 2/22 18-10728 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: The situation in the Middle East is in chaos to such an extent it has become a threat to international peace and security. The region is facing a true Gordian knot — different fault lines crossing each other and creating a highly volatile situation with risks of escalation, fragmentation and division as far as the eye can see, with profound regional and global ramifications. We see a multiplicity of divides. The first is the memory of the Cold War. But, to be precise, it is more than a simple memory: the Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present. Secondly, there is the Palestinian-Israeli divide. Thirdly, there is the Sunni-Shia divide, evident from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. It is important to note that apparent religious divides are normally the result of political or geostrategic manipulation. Finally, there is a wide range of different factors — from opposing attitudes in relation to the role of the Muslim Brotherhood or the status of the Kurds, to the dramatic threats to communities that have been living in the region for millenniums and are part of the rich diversity of Middle Eastern societies. Those numerous divisions are reflected in a multiplicity of conflicts with different degrees of interconnection, several of which are clearly linked to the threat of global terrorism. Many forms of escalation are possible. We see the wounds of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continuing to fester. The recent violence in Gaza resulted in many needless deaths and injuries. I repeat my call for an independent and transparent investigation into those incidents. I also appeal to those concerned to refrain from any act that could lead to further casualties, in particular any measures that could place civilians in harm's way. That tragedy underlines the urgency of revitalizing the peace process for a two- State solution that will allow Palestinians and Israelis to live side by side in peace in two democratic States within secure and recognized borders. I reaffirm the readiness of the United Nations to support those efforts. In Yemen, we are witnessing the worst humanitarian disaster in today's world. There is only one pathway to ending the Yemeni conflict and to addressing the humanitarian crisis: a negotiated political settlement through inclusive intra-Yemeni dialogue. My Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, is doing everything possible to facilitate that political settlement. He will brief the Council next week. In Libya, I encourage all parties to continue to work with my Special Representative, Ghassan Salamé, as he engages in the political process with a broad range of Libyan interlocutors across the country in order to implement the United Nations action plan. It is high time to end the Libyan conflict. The case of Iraq demonstrates that progress is possible with concerted local, regional and global commitment. With the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, having overcome the risk of fragmentation, the Government of Iraq must now focus on reconstruction, reforms and reconciliation. I hope that the upcoming elections will consolidate that progress. At the recent Paris and Rome conferences, the international community reaffirmed its support for Lebanon's sovereignty, stability and State security institutions. It is absolutely essential to prevent a new Israel-Hizbullah conflict, which could inevitably result in many more victims and much greater destruction than the last war. I reiterate the critical importance to act on key principles and commitments on Lebanon, including the Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 1701 (2006), and the policy of disassociation. The dangers of the links to the Syrian conflict are 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 3/22 evident in the recent confrontations between Iran and Israel in Syria.Syria today indeed represents the most serious threat to international peace and security. We see there confrontations and proxy wars, involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militia, foreign fighters from everywhere in the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law, in general, in utter disregard for the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. I reiterate that there is no military solution to the conflict. The solution must be political through the Geneva intra-Syrian talks, as stipulated in resolution 2254 (2015), and in line with the consistent efforts of my Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura. Syrians have lived through a litany of horrors: atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on.In a moment of hope, the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding that all parties cease hostilities without delay for a durable humanitarian pause. Unfortunately, no such cessation of hostilities ever really took place. That is the bleak panorama of Syria today.In that panorama, I am outraged by the continued reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I reiterate my strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by any party to the conflict under any circumstances. Their use is abhorrent and a clear violation of international law. The seriousness of the recent allegations requires a thorough investigation, using impartial, independent and professional expertise.In that regard, I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Fact-finding Mission in undertaking the required investigation into those allegations. The mission should be granted full access, without any restrictions or impediments, to perform its activities. I take note that the Syrian Government has requested that and is committed to facilitating it. The first OPCW team is already in Syria; a second team is expected today or tomorrow.However, we need to go further. In a letter to the Council two days ago, I expressed, following the end of the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,"my deep disappointment that the Security Council was unable to agree upon a dedicated mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria".I want to repeat today that the norms against chemical weapons must be upheld. As I wrote in the same letter:"[e]nsuring accountability for a confirmed use of chemical weapons is our responsibility, not least to the victims of such attacks. A lack of accountability emboldens those who would use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity. This, in turn, further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons and the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. I urge all Member States to act responsibly in these dangerous circumstances;"I appeal to the Security Council to fulfil its duties and not to give up on efforts to agree upon a dedicated, impartial, objective and independent mechanism for attributing responsibility with regard to the use of chemical weapons. I stand ready to support such efforts."The increasing tensions and the inability to reach a compromise in the establishment of an accountability mechanism threaten to lead to a full-blown military escalation. In my contacts with the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, I have reiterated my deep concerns about the risks of the current impasse and stressed the need to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control.That is exactly the risk that we face today — that things spiral out of control. It is our common duty to stop it.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing.I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 4/22 18-10728 Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are greatful to the Secretary-General for his briefing. His participation, his assessments and his authoritative words about the situation that has developed are very significant. We agree with him that there are many wounds in the Middle East. However, most important, currently the deepest wound is the situation in Syria, insofar as any negative repercussions would have major global implications.Two days ago, news of a threat by the United States to launch missile strikes against the Syrian Arab Republic ricocheted around the world. The Russian Federation was also warned to prepare for strikes. Let me point out that our military is in Syria at the invitation of its legitimate Government in order to combat international terrorism. We continue to see dangerous military preparations for an illegal act of force against a sovereign State in violation of the norms of international law. It is not just the use of force but even the threat of it that flies in the face of the Charter of the United Nations, and that is precisely what we are seeing in the most recent statements and actions of Washington and its allies. The bellicose rhetoric is being ratcheted up at every level, including at the very top. Additional forces and assets of the United States military and its allies are bearing down on the Syrian coast. It feels as though Washington is singlemindedly heading towards unleashing a military scenario against Syria. That cannot be permitted. Such developments would be fraught with terrible consequences for global security, especially considering that a Russian military contingent is deployed in Syria.There are also those who have been observing these risky preparations with tacit approval, declaring that they understand Washington's motives or engaging in direct incitement, thereby becoming potential accomplices in an act of reckless military adventurism. There are people in the Security Council who love to talk about preventive diplomacy. Right now, for some reason, they are nowhere to be seen or heard. The guilty parties have been speedily identified not just before any investigation has been conducted but even before it has been established whether the incident in question took place at all, but evidently they must still be punished. Someone will have to answer for these unfortunate developments and for the previous interventions that have engulfed many countries in years of crisis with untold casualties.Witness the recent experience of Iraq and Libya, which, among other things, shows that the attitude of America's leaders to the Security Council is largely one of convenience. They need it as cover for their Iraqi test tubes and Libyan no-fly zones. What they are presenting us with now is another virtual test tube, and an empty one. The reckless behaviour of the United States as it tramples on international law and State sovereignty is unworthy of its status as a permanent member of the Security Council, which presupposes the highest possible degree of responsibility and certainly not a right to sabre rattling, a right that is unknown in international law.Why does the United States continue to torture the Middle East, provoking one conflict after another and pitting the States of the region against one another? Who will benefit from a potential strike against the Syrian military, which is taking the brunt of the fight against terrorism and achieving major victories in it? We know for sure that the ringleaders of the Syrian armed groups were given orders to launch an offensive after a possible military action. Is this latest wave of chaos really being unleashed just for that?The excuse is the alleged use of toxic substances in the Syrian town of Douma on 7 April, for which there has been no reliable confirmation. Our specialists found no trace of the use of toxic substances. The residents of Douma know of no such attack. All the evidence of the alleged attack has been provided by anti-Government forces for whom this development is in their interests. We have good reason — indeed, we have information — leading us to believe that what took place was a provocation with the participation of various countries' intelligence services. We have been issuing warnings about this for a long time. It is a repeat of the Khan Shaykhun scenario in April of last year.The Syrian Government, for which this is clearly the last thing it needs, has said that it was not involved and has sent a request for an immediate inspection by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the location of the alleged incident. It has offered security guarantees jointly with the Russian military. The mission is already getting started on its work in Syria and we hope that it will be able to conduct a truly independent and impartial investigation.Only the Security Council has the authority at the international level to decide what measures to take and against whom in connection with the use of chemical 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 5/22 weapons in Syria. Russia will continue to work diligently and systematically to de-escalate the recent tensions in international relations. We proposed adopting a brief resolution in support of the OPCW inspection mission in Douma that the United States, Britain and France irresponsibly blocked, thereby demonstrating their lack of interest in an investigation. The only thing they care about is overthrowing the Syrian Government and, more broadly, deterring the Russian Federation. This has been clearly visible in other international and domestic political events built on unfounded hoaxes and conspiracy theories that always centre around the Russian Federation.What is the United States trying to achieve? After many years of internecine strife in Syria, significant areas of the country have been stabilized. The political process is reviving and indicators of national reconciliation are emerging. The terrorists have been dealt a significant blow. We have never denied that the United States has also made a certain contribution to achieving that shared goal, but it has always kept certain types of terrorists in reserve for its fight against the so-called regime and for advancing its geopolitical priorities in the region.My British colleague is always asking me what Russia is doing to implement resolution 2401 (2018). My answer is that my country is practically the only one that is doing anything about it. Over the course of the Astana process, peace has been restored in more than 2,500 towns and villages. That does not mean that they have become victims of the regime, as the United States calls it, merely that with the help of Russia and other guarantors they have established normal relations with the central authorities in Damascus. With the support of the United Nations, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held successfully in Sochi. How many towns and villages has the United States brought peace to? How many groups has it persuaded to join the ceasefire agreements?In order to break the deadlock in the situation in eastern Ghouta after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of armed groups, with Russian assistance. The militias and their family members were safely evacuated from the district, and civilians were finally given the opportunity to shake off years of terror. Film of their genuine joy exists, but the Western media is not showing it. The United States does not care about the fate of the prisoners of the militias in eastern Ghouta who had been supporters of the Syrian Government. When they were bargaining with the Syrian authorities to exchange prisoners, the militias claimed that they were holding between 2,000 and 4,000 people. Now it turns out that there are far fewer. People died from harsh treatment and hard labour digging huge tunnels for their torturers.Some members have grieved to see their bearded pilgrims setting off for Syria on free tourist tickets. They lost no opportunity to shriek from every street corner about the plight of the hundreds of thousands of people in besieged eastern Ghouta. Now those people need help in rebuilding normal lives, but these Council members have already lost interest because the area is under Government control. Now there will have to be unpleasant discussions about the blockade of Fo'ah and Kefraya. When was the last time a humanitarian convoy was there? When was the last time Council members even asked about it? Someone must answer for the coalition's destruction of Raqqa.These are dangerous developments, with far-reaching ramifications for global security. In this instance, responsibility lies entirely with the United States and its allies. It is a pity that Old Europe continues to lose face. We call on the leaders of these States to immediately reconsider, return to the international legal fold and not to lead the world to the dangerous brink. We urgently need to find a peaceful way out through a collective effort. The Russian Federation is ready to cooperate equitably with all partners and to solve the problems that may arise through dialogue. We will continue to focus on finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Syria based on established international law. We will continue to work actively to that end, and we call on all our partners to do the same.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I started to listen to my Russian friend so as to respond to him, but instead I am truly in awe of his ability to say what he said with a straight face.Today's meeting of the Security Council has been convened under truly strange circumstances. The Russian Federation has asked us to discuss what it calls unilateral threats related to Syria. What is strange is that Russia is ignoring the real threat to international peace and security that has brought us all here. It is ignoring its own unilateral responsibility for all of it. What we should discuss today is the use of deadly chemical weapons to murder innocent Syrian S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 6/22 18-10728 civilians. That is one of the most blatant and grotesque violations of international law in the world today. It is a violation of all standards of morality. It violates the long-standing international consensus that chemical weapons represent a unique evil. Chlorine, mustard gas and other chemical weapons killed 90,000 people and injured more than 1 million during the First World War. In the history Canada in the Great World War, the Canadian soldier A.T. Hunter described it this way."The gas cloud gathered itself like a wave and ponderously lapped over into the trenches. Then passive curiosity turned to active torment — a burning sensation in the head, red-hot needles in the lungs, the throat seized by a strangler. Many fell and died on the spot. The others, gasping, stumbling with faces contorted, hands widely gesticulating and uttering hoarse cries of pain, fled madly through the villages and farms and through the city itself, carrying panic to the remnants of the civilian population and filling the roads with fugitives of both sexes and all ages".Chemical weapons did not produce the most casualties in the First World War, but they were the most feared. In the Second World War chemical weapons were employed on an industrial scale against civilians, resulting in the worst genocide in human history, which the United States recalled just yesterday on Holocaust Remembrance Day. That is what brings us here today. That is what chemical weapons are all about. That is why we must not stay silent in the face of the horrible use of chemical weapons in our own time.The first response to all of this death and injury was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical weapons and more. Later, in 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed. It obligates all of its parties to never under any circumstances"develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone".It also prohibits all parties from helping anyone to engage in such activities. The United States is a party to the Convention. Russia is a party to the Convention. Every country that is currently a member of the Security Council is a party to the Convention. Even the Al-Assad regime has pledged to abide by the Convention, so in theory all of us agree on the core principle at stake today. No country can by allowed to use chemical weapons with impunity. Now that we have established what we all agree on, let us ask ourselves what we should be condemning today. We should be discussing the actions that truly brought us to this moment in time. We should not be condemning the country or group of countries that might have the courage to stand up in defence of our common principle against the use of chemical weapons. Instead, we should be condemning the country that has unilaterally prevented the Security Council from upholding it.Which member of the Council most exhibits unilateralism with regard to chemical weapons? It is Russia alone that has stopped at nothing to defend the Syrian regime's multiple instances of the use of chemical weapons. It is Russia alone that killed the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which enabled the world to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is Russia alone that has used its veto six times to prevent the condemnation of Al-Assad's use of chemical weapons. It is Russia alone that has used its veto 12 times to protect the Al-Assad regime. To make matters worse, it was Russia alone that agreed to be the guarantor of the removal of all chemical weapons in Syria. If Russia had lived up to its commitment, there would be no chemical weapons in Syria and we would not be here today. That is the Russian record of unilateralism. It is a record that has led to the trashing of all international standards against the use of chemical weapons. This meeting should not be about so-called unilateral threats, but rather about the multiple actions that Russia has taken to bring us to this point.Our President has not yet made a decision about possible actions in Syria, but should the United States and its allies decide to act in Syria, it will be in defence of a principle on which we all agree. It will be in defence of a bedrock international norm that benefits all nations. Let us be clear. Al-Assad's most recent use of poison gas against the people of Douma was not his first, second, third or even forty-ninth use of chemical weapons. The United States estimates that Al-Assad has used chemical weapons in the Syrian war at least 50 times. Public estimates are as high as 200.In the weeks after Al-Assad's sarin-gas attack last April, which killed nearly 100 people, including many children, the regime used chlorine gas at least once and possibly as many as three times in the same area. Last November, just as the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism expired, the regime again attacked its people with sarin in the Damascus suburbs.13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 7/22 In January, Al-Assad used at least four chlorine-filled rockets in Douma, and then he struck again last weekend. Thanks to Russia, there was no United Nations body to determine blame. But we know who did this; our allies know who did this. Russia can complain all it wants about fake news, but no one is buying its lies and its coverups. Russia was supposed to guarantee that Al-Assad would not use chemical weapons, and Russia did the opposite.The world must not passively accept the use of chemical weapons after almost a century of their prohibition. Everything the United Nations stands for is being blatantly defied in Syria, with the help of a permanent member of the Council. All nations and all peoples will be harmed if we allow Al-Assad to normalize the use of chemical weapons. It is those who act to violate the prohibition of chemical weapons who deserve our condemnation. Those who act to defend it deserve our support. The United States and its allies will continue to stand up for truth, accountability, justice and an end to the use of chemical weapons.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing and deeply appreciate his tireless efforts on the issue of the Middle East and that of Syria.The current situation in Syria is perilous. The country is at the crossroads of war and peace, and China is following the developments there with great concern. The possibility of an escalation of tensions worries us deeply. The pressing priority of the moment is to launch a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the relevant incidents in order to arrive at authoritative conclusions.China has consistently stood in favour of the peaceful settlement of disputes and opposed the routine use or threat of force in international relations. To take unilateral military action by circumventing the Security Council is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and runs counter to the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations.Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be fully respected. We call on the parties concerned to remain calm, exercise restraint, refrain from any move that could lead to further escalation of the situation and resolve the issue peacefully through consultation and dialogue. China is convinced that there can be no military solution to the Syrian issue; the only way out is a political settlement. China supports the United Nations in playing an active role in safeguarding the authority and standing of the Organization and its Security Council.China calls on the international community to steadfastly continue its diplomatic efforts, tirelessly stay the course so as to settle the Syrian issue politically, give full play to the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and resolve without delay the Syrian issue comprehensively, justly and adequately, in keeping with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions.The people of the world yearn for peace and oppose war. The situation in Syria has ramifications for peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large, as well as for the credibility and authority of the Council. At this critical juncture, the Council must rightfully discharge its sacred responsibility emanating from the Charter of the United Nations; act in line with the dictates of our times; build unity and consensus and do its utmost to maintain peace; leave no stone unturned in its efforts to prevent war; and live up to the trust and expectations of the international community.China is and has always been a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development and a defender of the international order. China stands ready to continue its unflagging efforts to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large, in a spirit of responsibility to history and to the peoples of the world.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.We are meeting today to address the threats to international peace and security that have arisen as a result of the situation in Syria, six days after the latest chemical-weapons carnage, on 7 April in Douma.For seven years, the situation in Syria has without a doubt constituted a grave threat to international peace and security as defined in the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council itself characterized this as such unanimously on 27 September 2013, when resolution 2118 (2013) was adopted in the wake of the appalling chemical-weapons attacks that had taken place in eastern Ghouta. The world then learned for the first time and with horror of the symptoms of large-scale chemical-weapons-related deaths in Syria.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 8/22 18-10728 To counter those who are seeking to sow confusion, going so far as to accuse the Syrian people of having gassed themselves; those who are suggesting conspiracy theories; those who are endeavouring methodically to destroy our mechanisms for action on chemical weapons in Syria, we must come back to simple facts. Yes, the Syrian crisis represents a threat to international peace and security. This threat is related to the repeated, organized and systematic use of chemical weapons by the Bashar Al-Assad regime, which once again reached new levels of horror with the two attacks perpetrated in Douma on 7 April last. Those attacks claimed the lives of at least several dozen people and wounded hundreds of others. Many of the injured will continue to suffer throughout their lives from the serious respiratory and neurological aftereffects of the chemicals used.There is no doubt once again as to the responsibility of Damascus for this attack. The facts collected on the ground, the symptoms of the victims, the complexity of handling of the substances used, and the determination of the regime's forces to subjugate the last pockets of resistance in Douma as expeditiously as possible and using every means at their disposal, all point to this.This is a well-known and documented modus operandi, given that an independent mechanism, created at the initiative of the Security Council, had already established at least four times since 2015 that chemical weapons had been used by the Damascus regime in Sarmin, Talmenes, Qmenas and Khan Shaykun — an investigative mechanism that a permanent member of the Security Council decided last November to force into silence.The chemical-weapons policy of the Bashar Al-Assad regime is among the most serious violations of all the norms that guarantee our collective security. It is first and foremost a violation of all international obligations relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a party.Secondly, it constitutes a violation of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality.Thirdly, it constitutes a breach of successive Security Council resolutions: resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and therefore a breach of the obligations incumbent upon Syria under the Charter of the United Nations.Lastly, the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which was banned in 1925 under the Geneva Protocol, constitutes a war crime under the Statute of the International Criminal Court.The Secretary-General in August 2013 called the use of chemical weapons a crime against humanity. That chemical war is a tool to accelerate a deliberate policy of submission by terror, which, in seven years, has caused the deaths of 400,000 people, the deliberate destruction of civilian and health infrastructure in entire regions, a massive exodus of refugees and displaced persons and has fuelled international terrorism. This frightening picture is that of one of the most blatant threats to international peace and security in the contemporary era. It is also the record of those who, against all odds, continue to support it.I will once again have to state the obvious: if Syria has continued to use toxic substances for military purposes, it is because it has retained the capacity to use and manufacture them, in contravention of its international commitments, of the guarantees provided by Russia in the framework of the 2013 Russian-American agreement and of Security Council resolutions.It has already been several years since the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) informed us of the major remaining doubts about the sincerity of Syria's initial declaration to the organization in 2013. Many of the OPCW's questions and requests for documents have gone unanswered. Syria has never provided a satisfactory explanation for the inspectors' discovery of substances and capabilities that Syria had never declared. We saw those capabilities again in action on 7 April, used to kill as many civilians as possible and terrorize the survivors to consolidate the definitive takeover of Douma by the Syrian regime.Beyond Syria, the prevailing impunity since 2013 affects the entire chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it the entire security system that we have collectively built since the Second World War. It is that collective security legacy, built to protect future generations from the outbreaks of violence in the two global conflicts, that the members of the Security Council have been mandated to protect. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without reacting is to let the genie out of the bottle. That would be a terrible setback to international order, for which we would all pay the price.13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 9/22 The Security Council, to which the Charter of the United Nations entrusts the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the entire international community, is therefore more than justified in meeting today. It is more than justified for the Council to note, once again, the violation of international law and its own resolutions, and the persistence of a proven threat to international peace and security. It is more than justified to urgently re-establish a mechanism for attributing responsibility for chemical attacks — that opportunity was given to the Council in vain, once again, on Tuesday (see S/PV.8228) with the American draft resolution (S/2018/321).The Council is more than justified in doing what it has committed itself to do, that is, to take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. But in the face of the mass atrocities committed in Syria, the Council's action has been paralysed for several years by successive Russian vetoes. Russia vetoed 12 draft resolutions on Syria, including six on the chemical issue alone. Those vetoes had no other objective than to protect the Syrian authorities — to guarantee a regime of impunity, in defiance of all international standards. To allow the indefensible, Russia has deliberately chosen to sacrifice the ability of the Council to act, the most important tool of our collective security. We had proof of that again last Tuesday.On 7 April, Douma joined Ypres, Halabja and Khan Shaykhun in the litany of chemical massacres. I solemnly say that, in deciding to once again use chemical weapons, the regime reached a point of no return on 7 April. France will assume its responsibility to put an end to an intolerable threat to our collective security and to finally ensure respect for international law and the measures taken for years by the Security Council.A chemical attack like that of Douma, which consists in gassing the last inhabitants of a besieged enclave — even when it is about to fall, even when the last fighters are negotiating their surrender — is the height of cynicism. That is where we are after seven years of the regime's war against its people. This is the situation to which the world must provide a firm, united and resolute response. That is our responsibility today.It will also be essential to combat impunity for those responsible for the use of such weapons and, more broadly, for those who are responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Syria. France is fully committed to that endeavour. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we initiated last January. We will also continue to support and assist all international mechanisms in their work to investigate the most serious crimes committed against civilians in Syria.In addition to the chemical issue, continuing violations of international humanitarian law must cease without delay. We ourselves demanded it by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018) — thwarted the day after its adoption by the resumption of bombardments by the regime with the active support of its allies, including those within the Council who had subscribed to the truce. Resolution 2401 (2018) has lost none of its relevance, quite the contrary — full and unhindered humanitarian access to help populations in distress must be implemented throughout the territory. It is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys can reach eastern Ghouta safely and that civilians fleeing hostilities or in need of medical treatment can be protected.Finally, we can only sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis within the framework of a political solution and on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). Only under those conditions can put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people, eradicate terrorism and work together for the stability of the Middle East. We have been calling for a political solution for seven years. May those who join us today in their concern about the consequences of the Syrian crisis finally force the regime to accept negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations.We cannot allow the most fundamental values and standards of humanity, such as those emanating from the Charter of the United Nations, be thwarted and flouted in front of our eyes without reacting. Those values and standards must be defended and protected. That is the reason behind our commitment — to restore the complete ban on chemical weapons set in stone within international conventions, and thereby consolidate the rule of law. It is the responsibility of those who believe, like France, in effective multilateralism led by a respected United Nations.We must stop the Syrian chemical escalation. We cannot allow a country to simultaneously defy the Council and international law. The ability of Damascus to violate all our norms constitutes a threat to international security. Let us put an end to it.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 10/22 18-10728 Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): The Secretary-General has presented a catalogue of danger in the Middle East, including Gaza, Yemen and Iraq. It is no disrespect to those issues that today, like other speakers, I will concentrate on Syria. The United Kingdom will be ready to put its shoulder to the wheel on those other issues when the time comes.The situation we face today and the reason we are in the Security Council today arise wholly and solely from the use of chemical weapons on the Syrian people, most probably by the Syrian regime — not just once, but consistently and persistently over the past five years. The highest degree of responsibility, to quote the Russian Ambassador, is indeed what the Council, and in particular its five permanent members, are for, and it is our duty to uphold.The British Cabinet met recently and concluded that the Al-Assad regime has a track record of the use of chemical weapons and that it is highly likely the regime is responsible for Saturday's attack. This is a further example of the erosion of international law in relation to the use of chemical weapons, as my French and American colleagues have set out, and it is deeply concerning. But more important than that, the use of chemical weapons cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. The British Cabinet has agreed on the need to take action to alleviate humanitarian distress and to deter the further use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime. To that end, we will continue to work with our friends and allies to coordinate an international response.The Secretary-General mentioned the Cold War. Of course, the Cold War was bracketed by East-West cooperation. We have been on the same side as Russia. In April 1945, Russia liberated Vienna as part of our joint efforts to bring peace to Europe. In 1995, it passed the Dayton Accords at part of our joint efforts to bring peace and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in 2018 the Russians refuse to work with us to bring peace to Syria.Instead, since the first attack on Ghouta and chemical-weapons use, in 2013, the Joint Investigative Mechanism has ascribed two uses of mustard gas to Da'esh, three uses of chlorine to the Syrian regime and one use of sarin to the Syrian regime before the latest attack. As my French colleague has set out, the United Kingdom, the United States and France are members in good standing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are members and supporters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission. In the debates in the Security Council earlier this week, we would have dispatched an investigative mission, had Russia and Bolivia not blocked that effort (see S/PV.8228).Syria is the latest pernicious chronology of Russia's disregard for international law and disrespect for the international institutions we have built together to keep us collectively safe. This is revealed in actions over Georgia 10 years ago, over Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 and over the attack in Salisbury, which we will return to next week.Let me repeat what I said in the Security Council last week. My Government and the British people are not Russophobic. We have no quarrel with the Russian people. We respect Russia as a country. We prefer a productive relationship with Russia, but it is Russia's own actions that have led to this situation.What has taken place in Syria to date is in itself a violation of the United Nations Charter. No purpose or principle of the Charter is upheld or served by the use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians. On the contrary: to stand by and ignore the requirements of justice, accountability and the preservation of the non-proliferation regime is to place all our security — not just that of the Syrian people — at the mercy of a Russian veto. We will not sacrifice the international order we have collectively built to the Russian desire to protect its ally at all costs.The Russian Ambassador set out what Russia is doing on the ground in Syria. He thought that might be inconvenient for me to hear. However, it is not inconvenient for me to point out that Russia has given $5.5 million to the United Nations appeal. The United Kingdom has given a $160 million, and this is part of a contribution totalling $3.5 billion in all. It is not inconvenient for me to say that; it may be inconvenient for the Russian Ambassador to hear it.The Russian Ambassador also asked why we were not joining in and trying to stabilize actions in Syria and bring about peace. We have tried. Indeed, we have tried very hard to support Staffan de Mistura in getting the Geneva political process under way, and we shall continue to so. But we do not join Russia, because, sadly, its efforts have not been to try and restart the Geneva process. Instead, their efforts have been to support Syria in the use of chemical weapons and the 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 11/22 bombardment of the Syrian people. In the area known as T-4, they helped the regime liberate this area but they took their eye off the ball and Da'esh took it back. They took it again, but, sadly, foreign fighters have been able to re-establish themselves there. This is not de-escalation. This is not political progress. This is a gross distortion by Russia of what is actually happening on the ground.The circumstances that we face today are truly exceptional. My colleagues from the United States and France have set out in great detail the catalogue of awful things that are happening to the Syrian people. That catalogue goes to the heart of what the Geneva Conventions, the non-proliferation regime, the United Nations and the Security Council are for. It is not only dangerous what Russia is doing in vetoing our resolutions and in supporting the Syrian regime's actions against its own people. It is ultimately prejudicial to our security. Indeed, it will let Da'esh re-establish itself. It is something that we believe we need to take action to defend.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today, for his efforts and for his good offices.Last weekend, reports once again began to emerge of horrifying allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, this time in Douma, with reports of a large number of civilian casualties. Like many others, we were alarmed by these extremely serious allegations, and we called for an immediate, impartial and thorough investigation to establish the facts. In that regard, we welcome the fact that the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which we fully support, has been deployed to Syria. Full access and cooperation by all parties must now be ensured.I want to reiterate once more that Sweden will spare no effort to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law, it constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and their use in armed conflict is a war crime. The international disarmament and non-proliferation regime must be safeguarded, which is best achieved through true multilateralism and broad international consensus.We share the outrage and the frustration of many in this Chamber about chemical-weapons use in Syria. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year, and we are at a dangerous moment. We fully share the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General about the risks of the current impasse and the need to avoid the situation escalating and spiralling out of control and to pay further attention to the divides, tensions and fault lines in the region, as described again by the Secretary-General this morning.We remain deeply disappointed that the Security Council has been unable to agree and move forward on a substantial, swift, and unified response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We deeply regret that Russia once again used its veto and blocked the Council from taking action this week (see S/PV.8228). Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond have seriously been considered. We are working tirelessly to ensure that no stone is left unturned in efforts to find a way forward in the Security Council. The Secretary-General offered to support such efforts through his good offices, which is an opportunity that should be seized. That is why yesterday we circulated yet another proposal that asks for four things.First, it condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in Syria and expresses alarm at the alleged incident in Douma last weekend, because the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law.Secondly, it demands full access and cooperation for the OPCW Fact-finding Mission, because we need facts and evidence about what happened in Douma last weekend.Thirdly, it expresses the Council's determination to establish a new impartial, objective and independent attribution mechanism based on a proposal by the Secretary-General, because the perpetrators of chemical-weapons attacks must be identified and held to account, and, to that end, we need a new mechanism.Fourthly, it requests the Secretary-General to dispatch immediately a high-level disarmament mission to Syria because we need to resolve all outstanding issues on chemical weapons and rid Syria once and for all possible chemical weapons that might still exist in S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 12/22 18-10728 the country. Such a mission would add political and diplomatic leverage to the necessary technical and professional work of the OPCW. We therefore call on all members of the Council to muster the political will and respond to the appeal by the Secretary-General so as to come together and move forward.The use of chemical weapons is a grave threat to international peace and security. It is indeed deplorable that the Council has not yet been able to come together and agree on a timely and firm response. Even though the use of chemical weapons in itself violates international law, any response must comply with international law and respect the Charter of the United Nations. The time has now come to urgently revert to a political process under United Nations auspices for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015), and for Syria and the Astana guarantors to move forward without further delay and live up to their commitments so that resolution 2401 (2018), which demands the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access, can be fully and urgently implemented. That is the only way to end to the suffering of the Syrian people and end the brutal seven-year-long conflict.We firmly believe that there is a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibilities under the Charter. We believe that there continues to be a way for the Council to come together. We believe that we need to ensure that we have exhausted every peaceful effort and every diplomatic option to stop further atrocities from being carried out in Syria, hold those responsible to account, come to terms once with the chemical-weapons issue in Syria, cease hostilities and find a political solution.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): First of all, on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, I thank Secretary-General António Guterres for having illustrated for us the chaotic and dangerous situation currently prevailing in the Middle East by providing a detailed overview of every one of the conflicts in that vulnerable region, from Libya to the desolate and devastating crisis in Syria, which, as all evidence suggests, runs the imminent risk of dramatically deteriorating.In line with the statement of the Secretary-General, we reaffirm Equatorial Guinea's firm belief that in confronting such situations we must always have recourse to dialogue and establish and respect mechanisms intended for achieving the peaceful settlement of conflicts until such options are exhausted. A unilateral military response could be counterproductive, and, far from solving the problem, it would lead to more suffering and chaos than already present, as the Secretary-General indicated — and additional disorder as in case of Libya, with which we are well familiar in Africa, and the consequences of which affect the entire Sahel region and part of Central Africa. We stand categorically against the use of force with the sole exception that it be justified under the conditions set forth under the Charter of the United Nations Charter and that it be used as a last resort after all other means have been exhausted.We are concerned about the rhetoric that is being used. It sounds dangerously familiar to us, and we do not like where it might lead us. We appeal to Governments' sense of responsibility, and in particular to the permanent members of the Security Council, as we believe that they have the additional responsibility of defending the relevance of the Council.We would like to ask the following questions. Who benefits from the inability of the Security Council to make decisions? Are we contributing to delegitimizing the Council? Are we actively eroding the Council's relevance in the international political arena? If the Council is unable to take action, how long will it take before the international community withdraws its faith, hope and trust in the Council?There is no military solution to the Syrian issue. We must therefore continue to look for ways to solve the problem through diplomatic channels. All Council members must act responsibly and agree to establish an independent and impartial monitoring mechanism to ascertain what took place in Douma and ensure accountability and that the perpetrators are brought to justice.The Secretary-General stated his disappointment with the Council's failure to establish a mechanism that would identify and attribute responsibility to those using chemical weapons. We could not agree more with that statement. Only a few days ago, our delegation stated its frustration when the Council failed to adopt three draft resolution put to the vote (see S/PV.8228). The Secretary-General's offer concerning his good offices must be considered, and we must provide him with that opportunity.In conclusion, we reiterate the position of Equatorial Guinea in arguing against and condemning 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 13/22 the use of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction regardless of who uses them.Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I thank you, Sir, for having convened this meeting. We welcome the presence of the Secretary-General among us. His assessments are always very precise and useful, and we thank him for the intensive work that he is doing for the benefit of upholding the purposes and principles of the Organization.For some reason, some members of the Security Council are avoiding addressing the main reason for convening this meeting, which is that one State Member has threatened the unilateral use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Much has been said about the use of chemical weapons, and Bolivia would like to make clear its total and absolute condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical agents as weapons as unjustifiable and criminal acts wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed. For their use is a grave crime under international law and against the interests of international peace and security. Those responsible for committing those terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished. We demand a transparent and impartial investigation that must identify those responsible for any act of the use of chemical weapons.Needless to say, it is essential that the Security Council ensures an independent, impartial, complete, conclusive and, above all, depoliticized investigation. We regret that the Security Council has as yet failed to achieve that objective. Nonetheless, we will support all work intended to accomplish that goal. It is crucial that the Council continue to discuss the issue of the use of chemical weapons, but I reiterate that what has brought us together at this meeting is the threat of one State Member' illegal use of force.Over the past 72 years, humankind has built a framework that is not only physical or institutional, but also juridical. Humankind has setup instruments of international law intended precisely to prevent the most powerful from attacking the weakest with impunity so as to establish a balance in the world and prevent grave violations to international peace and security. We have built an international system — the Security Council is clear evidence of it — based on rules. It is the duty of the Council and of all the organs of the United Nations to respect those rules and defend multilateralism. The Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits unilateral action, must be upheld.Another key detail to remember is that the Security Council is not representative of the five permanent members it comprises, nor of its 15 members seated around this table; rather, it represents the entire membership of 193 States, both the nations and their peoples. The Security Council must not be utilized as a sounding board for war propaganda nor interventionism. It should also not be made into a pawn to be sacrificed on the chessboard of war, geopolitics and petty interests.We have heard many stories from history about the prohibition of chemical weapons, and Bolivia is an active participant in that system, but I would like to talk about the story of our Charter. When one is unsure about how to act under certain circumstances, I read that the best way to settle such uncertainty is to recall the principles of the French Revolution and reflect on where the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are upheld. Those principles form part of the genesis of the Charter. Another part comes from the Magna Carta, of course, which, for the first time in history, limited the exercise of power precisely to defend the weakest.Another antecedent to the Charter is the Yalta Conference. I read that the Conference established the system of control and checks and balances, which is the Security Council with its five permanent members. Bolivia did not attend the Conference. As I understand it, just Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were present. The outcome of the Conference was ratified at the San Francisco Conference a few months later in 1945. That is the system that we have agreed to uphold, which is why I believe that is essential to understand the principles of our Charter. Our Charter is not words on page, meant to hand out to tourists visiting the United Nations Headquarters, but rather a set of norms that we have agreed to comply with and uphold. Article 2 states that"The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles."Principle 4 of Article 2 reads,"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 14/22 18-10728 any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."That is to say that any use of force must be authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter. Any form of unilateral action therefore contravenes international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.Another point worth mentioning is that we have listened, with due respect, to our colleagues speak about the criminal use of chemical weapons, and we completely agree with them on that. However, it would be very dangerous to fight an alleged violation of international law with another violation of international law and the Charter. That is why, in this specific case, we hope that there is an independent, impartial, comprehensive and conclusive investigation.Allow me to offer a clarification to my dear colleague from the United Kingdom. While Bolivia voted against one draft resolution, it voted in favour of two others. It voted against the one because, regrettably, this platform was being exploited for political motives. Draft resolutions are presented for nothing more than the spectacle of it, for the television cameras. Draft resolutions are presented knowing that they will be vetoed, and not all efforts are put forth to reach consensus, though that is what we normally do for resolutions.We believe that this meeting is very important because we not only discussing an attack on a Member State, or the threat of a military strike against a Member State of the United Nations, whichever it may be, but rather because we are living at a time of constant attacks on multilateralism. Let us recall that the achievements in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change have been undermined. Let us recall that the gains reached with the Global Compact for Migration have been eroded. Let us recall that there is a clear policy and mindset of multilateralism subversion. What happens is that for some the discourse on human rights is used until it no longer serves their interests, and then they violate those rights.My region is a witness to that. We endured Operation Condor, as it was called, during the 1970s, which was planned by the intelligence services of some Member States. When democracy did not suit them, they financed coups d'etat. When they were unhappy with the discourse on human rights, they infringed human rights. When the discourse of democracy was no longer enough, they were ready to finance coups d'etat. The use of unilateral practices leaves behind unhealed wounds, despite the passage of time.Some of the members of the Council have spoken on the situation in Iraq and Libya, which I believe are some of the worst crimes that have been committed this century. The invasion of Iraq, with its dire consequences, left more than 1 million dead. The effects of the strikes against Libya and the regime-change policies imposed on it, which, as my colleague from Equatorial Guinea aptly said, they still feel, suffer and endure throughout the entire region of the Sahel and Central Africa. But no one wants to talk about the root causes of those conflicts, and no one will talk about the impunity enjoyed for those serious crimes. It warrants repeating. Those are the most serious crimes committed this century. We hope that all the members of the Security Council, given the high degree of responsibility we have — 10 of us elected by the membership and five enjoy the privilege to have a permanent seat on the Council with the power of veto — must lead by example for the rest of the membership on the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter.By way of conclusion, I would like to reiterate what former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a similar situation in 2013: "The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". That is my appeal. Everything must be addressed within the framework of the Charter. The use of force is legal only in the exercise of the right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the Charter, or when the Security Council approves such action. That was the reason for the meeting, and Bolivia's position is to categorically condemn any threat or use of unilateral force.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would very much like to thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing today. We share his concern about the fact that the Middle East is experiencing crises and challenges that unquestionably represent threats to international peace and security. The situation will undoubtedly deteriorate if the Security Council resolutions are not implemented by the relevant parties.The question of Palestine, the practices of the Israeli occupation there and its continued violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the relevant Security Council resolutions 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 15/22 are testament to that. The most recent is its repression of peaceful protests in Gaza and the use of excessive force. That led to the deaths of dozens of civilians and injuries to hundreds as they exercised their legitimate right to demonstrate peacefully in support of the March of Return. Kuwait condemns those Israeli practices in the strongest terms. We regret that the Security Council has not taken action to condemn such acts of repression or to call on the Israeli occupation forces to end them. The Israeli occupying Power should not be an exception. Everyone should respect and abide by international law and the Charter of the United Nations and should implement the relevant Security Council resolutions with the aim of achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace that can fulfil the Palestinian people's legitimate political right to establish their own State on their own land, with East Jerusalem as its capital.We have had a number of meetings over the past few days. Today's meeting would not have taken place if we had been able to agree on a new mechanism to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This disagreement has led to deep divisions among the members of the Security Council. We must step up our efforts to advance the stalled political process in Syria. We have been concerned about escalating tensions among all parties since the beginning of the year. Through the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which primarily calls for a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days, we tried to improve the humanitarian situation. Unfortunately, however, it has not been implemented and has in fact been violated in flagrant disregard for the will of the international community.We share the concern and disappointment of the Secretary-General about the deteriorating situation in Syria and the ongoing allegations of the use of chemical weapons, and support his call for an agreement on a new mechanism to ensure accountability and end impunity in Syria. We reiterate our support for the efforts of the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to establish the facts surrounding the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and emphasize that there must be accountability for the perpetrators of those crimes, if they are confirmed.In view of our responsibility as members of the Council, we should do our utmost and not lose hope, and we should continue our efforts to agree on the establishment of an independent, impartial and professional mechanism for attributing responsibility and ensuring accountability. The continued violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2118 (2013), by the warring parties in Syria further convince us that, in the case of grave violations of human rights or crimes that amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, there should be a moratorium on the use of the veto as a procedural matter, so that such tragedies for innocent civilians are not repeated.The State of Kuwait takes a principled and firm position, in line with that of the League of Arab States. We call for preserving the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria, as well as for a cessation of the violence and hostilities in order to put an end to bloodshed, protect the Syrian people and achieve a peaceful settlement. This would be done under the auspices of the United Nations and through the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Syria, based on the Geneva communiqué of 2012 (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015), with the aim of achieving a political transition agreed on by all sectors of Syrian society and of meeting their legitimate aspirations.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We join others in expressing our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his insightful briefing and personal presence at today's meeting. In our view, since his appointment as steward of this world Organization, he has ceaselessly promoted a very important approach, which is the use of amicable and preventive diplomacy.Following an alert to the world, the Security Council underlined in its first presidential statement of 2018, on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace (S/PRST/2018/1), adopted during Kazakhstan's presidency of the Security Council, that the ways to address conflict may include measures to rebuild trust by bringing Member States together around common goals. That has been particularly important in situations where international relations have featured confrontations and tension behind which the contours of a global war are increasingly apparent. We are right now in a moment when we must exercise special caution and vigilance in making decisions about our actions, especially in the Middle East. We believe that it is time to tap into all the tools available for a comprehensive strategy of preventive diplomacy in order to avoid the very serious consequences of any S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 16/22 18-10728 military action that could have repercussions for global security and stability.The recent escalation of the rhetoric on Syria and the threat of the use of unilateral actions has left the delegation of Kazakhstan deeply concerned about the unfolding situation, which has the potential to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. We all bear a responsibility for complying with international law and order, and none of our countries has the right to violate the Charter of the United Nations or to act or threaten to act unilaterally with respect to a sovereign nation under any pretext, unless that is decided by the Security Council. The Security Council is a collective body and is designed to take balanced decisions with regard to the issues of peace and security. We can agree or disagree, but we are mandated to work together to achieve a decision for which we have to bear a collective responsibility.Kazakhstan believes that the most effective way to prevent conflicts is to use diplomacy and mediation, not military means. We look forward to the next round of talks to be held in Geneva and in our capital, Astana, when the parties will address the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of their respective agreements, among other issues.In addressing the disputes over the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma in Syria, which has provoked the most recent tension in international relations, we consider it necessary to state the following. Kazakhstan strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed. Impunity is not permissible. We should act resolutely to stop any further use of such inhuman weapons, but we should act on the basis of proven facts. In this particular case, where there are doubts about the actual use of a poisonous substance, Kazakhstan calls on the members of the Council to be patient, at least until the expert group of the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to Syria is deployed to the site of the alleged attack and can report on the findings of its investigation, particularly given that yesterday we learned that the Syrian Government has granted visas for the OPCW investigators and pledged to facilitate access to the sites of the alleged chemical attack. We should first establish and understand the scientifically and professionally ascertained facts, after which the Council should decide on the appropriate line of action to take.At this stage, any military action or threat of it without the prior approval of the Security Council is undesirable. It could have a long-lasting negative impact that would be very difficult to overcome and could result in unprecedented and unanticipated complications. Kazakhstan remains committed to the Charter of the United Nations and to all Security Council resolutions aimed at resolving the political and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict. We believe it is crucial to exercise restraint and refrain from any rhetoric that might exacerbate the already fragile and volatile situation. Such a pause for reflection on the consequences is essential to preserving international peace and security.In the light of the prevailing circumstances, it is more critical than ever that all Council members implement resolution 2401 (2018). The crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and the relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Lastly, we fully endorse the views articulated by the Secretary-General on 11 April about the risks of the current impasse that we are witnessing today (see SG/SM/18984). We must at all costs avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Our ultimate goal should be to put an end to the horrific suffering of the Syrian people and to help them to move forward on a path of peace and progress.Once again, this is an alarming moment, and we need to work together to restore unity and effectiveness in the Security Council by rebuilding trust and consensus in order to preserve global peace and security. We need cooperation within the Council to establish a workable attribution mechanism, which we passionately advocated today in this Chamber. Let us make it happen and transform our words into real deeds. The delegation of Kazakhstan is ready for that and calls on its colleagues to go the extra mile in that direction.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and deeply appreciate his efforts to weigh in on the grave challenge that we are facing, in order to ensure that what should and must be avoided will not happen because of miscalculation or a lack of thoughtfulness or of appreciation for the tremendous responsibility that the Security Council, especially its permanent members, bears. The Cold War is back with a vengeance, the Secretary-General said, but this time, he went on to tell us, in a less managed 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 17/22 manner. It is difficult to quarrel with him. His approach was quite comprehensive, focusing, as he said, on the multiplicity of dangerous conflicts that the Middle East is facing. While his approach may be better, I choose to focus on Syria because it is the current flashpoint.Following the alleged chemical attacks in Douma, it is regrettable that the Council was not able to adopt a resolution to create an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism for identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This is a problem that has been with us for some time and a reality that sadly reflects the lack of unity in the Council even on matters that are manifestly in the common interest of all. We certainly welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission to Syria to establish the facts surrounding the alleged use of chemicals as weapons. We have repeatedly stated that using chemicals as weapons is inhumane, and we condemn their use by any actor under any circumstances. One matter remains, and that is establishing a mechanism for attribution. We hope that will be done as soon as possible, but that does not mean that in the meantime we should cease to exercise maximum restraint in the interests of peace.Right now, pragmatic considerations and simple rational calculation suggest that we must get our priorities right. We need to continue to live if we are to be able to fight evil. We have continued to express our deep concern about the current dynamics in Syria and their devastating implications for regional and international peace and security. We fully concur with the Secretary-General, who stressed in his statement of 11 April that it is vital to ensure that the situation does not spiral out of control (see SG/SM/18984). He stressed that legitimate concern again today. The Security Council, as the principal body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should not and cannot allow that to happen. At a time when we are talking about preventive diplomacy — as well as after appointing a Secretary-General who told us, in his maiden speech to the Council (see S/PV.7857), that prevention is not merely a priority, but the priority — now is the time for the United Nations to undertake the search for diplomacy for peace in earnest. If we are seriously committed to moving our Organization from a culture of reaction to one of prevention, now is the time to stand firm, speak with one voice and take proactive and collective action that can be respected by all major stakeholders.That requires the Council to be united for global peace and security. We know that is difficult, but we believe that we have no other sane option. This is the time for the Security Council to stand up and be counted. The Security Council is the custodian of the Charter of the United Nations, which, growing out of the devastation of the Second World War, promised to save succeeding generations from that scourge. That is a clarion call the Council should heed and act on. The situation should not be allowed to spiral out of control. The Secretary-General is right and the Council should listen to him.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive and insightful briefing. His statement rightly focused on the broader Middle East. However, I will focus on the most pressing issue at hand, the use of chemical weapons in Syria.The Charter of the United Nations starts with the words "We the peoples of the United Nations", and while the Russian Federation is blocking the Council from taking effective action on the crimes of Russia's ally Syria, all peoples of every nation are outraged by the continued unrestrained violence that the Syrian regime has unleashed against its own people. As the Secretary-General just said, the people of Syria have lived through a litany of horrors. No responsible Government can ignore the universal outrage that those horrors have provoked.Our collective incapacity in the Council to stop the crimes in Syria should weigh heavily on the conscience of all our members, but on the conscience of one permanent member in particular. It was our collective conscience that created the Charter of the United Nations. It was our collective conscience that created the Chemical Weapons Convention. The use of chemical weapons is unlawful in and of itself. It is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity.We strongly believe that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. As the Secretary-General just said, the norm against the use of chemical weapons must be upheld. The non-proliferation regime must be upheld. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria is therefore neither optional S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 18/22 18-10728 nor negotiable. The images of last weekend's attack in Douma are appalling. Atrocities have once again been inflicted on Syria's civilian population. Once again, dozens of innocent civilians have been killed and hundreds injured. The Kingdom of the Netherlands believes that it is highly likely that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack. It has a proven history of such attacks, having used chemicals as a weapon against its own people in 2014, 2015 and 2017. It is unacceptable that four years after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, its declarations can still not be verified as accurate or complete.The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a long-time supporter of fighting impunity when it comes to chemical weapons. Regrettably, all attempts to achieve accountability in the Council have failed. Referral to the International Criminal Court was vetoed. The renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was also vetoed. This week, accountability was again vetoed. With its vetoes, the Russian Federation has assumed much responsibility for the crimes committed by the Syrian regime. The draft resolution for a new accountability mechanism that was vetoed this week remains the bare minimum of what is acceptable to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism that can ensure that the culprits of that vicious attack will be identified and held accountable.No veto can wipe from our memory the clear findings presented by the JIM on the use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime and Da'esh. No veto can stop our compassion for the victims of the chemical-weapon attack last weekend. No veto can end our determination to achieve justice for the victims and for the people of Syria as a whole.In conclusion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands remains committed to fighting impunity. We reiterate our strong support for an international, impartial and independent mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice. At the heart of our policy on Syria is a deep desire for peace and justice for its people. Impunity cannot and will not prevail.Let me end with warm words of appreciation to the Secretary-General and his tireless efforts for justice and the international legal order.Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive briefing and to assure him of our full support in finding a political solution to all conflicts, not just the one in Syria.Since we are discussing the situation in the Middle East and in particular the current situation in Syria, let me begin with a very sad observation. Even with our unanimously adopted resolutions, such as resolution 2401 (2018), we are still not seeing any substantial change on the ground. The fighting is far from being over and the human suffering is tremendous. Taking into consideration the current situation and the growing risk of the loss of human life owing simply to a lack of food or medicine, we should try to do our utmost to find possible ways to ensure that life-saving aid convoys can reach those in need. Unfortunately, that applies not only to eastern Ghouta but also to Idlib and Aleppo provinces. We must find a way to alleviate the suffering of ordinary Syrians. The civilian population in Syria has already suffered too much.International public opinion is watching our meetings and sees our lack of agreement on the most basic principles under international humanitarian law. The Council bears enormous responsibility and will be held accountable for its actions. We therefore call on the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure that all the parties to the conflict, especially the regime and its allies, implement the ceasefire, enable humanitarian access and medical evacuations and fully engage in the United Nations-led talks in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), which represent the best path to peace.With regard to the issue of chemical weapons, a century ago that was a normal way to wage war. Just recently we commemorated the hundredth anniversary of the first use of chemical weapons, on the Western and Eastern fronts of the First World War alike. French, British, American and other Allied soldiers were targeted with chlorine in Ypres, while Russian soldiers were dying from the same gruesome weapons in Bolimów, now part of Polish territory. Now, a century later, we are being challenged by these ghastly weapons yet again. Our nations are seeing the effects of the same 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 19/22 toxic gas through the images of civilians who sought refuge in basements in Ghouta and other areas in Syria.Chemical weapons were banned when the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) cam into effect in 1997. We had begun a new chapter in the history of non-proliferation and disarmament. All of us in this Chamber agree that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere is deplorable and unacceptable. Can we really allow the success story of the CWC to be reversed? Will the Security Council allow the vision of a world free of chemical weapons to be destroyed? It is regrettable that the establishment of an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria was vetoed on Tuesday (see S/PV.8228), thereby enabling those responsible for chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law and is central to achieving durable peace in Syria. As members of the Security Council, we must find a way to reach agreement on how to properly respond to chemical attacks in Syria. We hope to see the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) deployed to Douma as soon as possible. We reiterate our appreciation to the Director-General and staff of the OPCW for their commitment to its goals and work, often in particularly challenging circumstances.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire thanks Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing on new developments in the critical situation in several countries in the Middle East, in particular Syria, since the Security Council considered the issue on 9 and 10 April (see S/PV. 8225 and S/PV. 8228).Despite the relative lull in the fighting in Syria, the humanitarian situation remains troubling in the light of the allegations of the recurring use of chemical weapons by parties to the conflict. As a result of its internal divisions, despite our goodwill, the Council has failed to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously in order to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need. In the light of the continuing reports of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, the Council was unable to reach an agreement on a statement that at the very least would have conveyed our solidarity to the Syrian people at this difficult time. The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire remains concerned by the current impasse in the Security Council, which has, unfortunately, prevented it from reaching agreement on a mechanism to combat impunity vis-à-vis the use of chemical weapons in Syria.In this context, we reiterate our support for the impartial, transparent, independent investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with the aim of shedding light on allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, in eastern Ghouta.Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of any use of chemical weapons, by any party, during peacetime or during wartime. Once again we beseech members of the Council to unite so as to set aside their differences and successfully set up an accountability mechanism to ensure that those who use chemical weapons are held accountable.We remain alarmed by the tensions stemming from the current political impasse, and we encourage the Secretary-General to make use of his good offices with stakeholders to restore peace and calm, in order to prevent any further escalation of the situation. To that end, my country invites all parties to exercise restraint so as to peacefully resolve this issue and in so doing safeguard international peace and security, which is our shared legacy.Côte d'Ivoire reaffirms our conviction and our principled position that there can be no military response to the crisis in Syria. The solution needs to be sought through dialogue and an inclusive political process, as stipulated in the road map set out by resolution 2254 (2015). My country remains convinced that dialogue alone will lead us to an equitable settlement of the conflict in Syria.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru.We would like to express our gratitude for the briefing by Secretary-General António Guterres and to thank him for his willingness to help to achieve a solution to the impasse in which the Security Council currently finds itself. We encourage him to continue to spare no effort in this respect, in line with the prerogatives conferred upon him by the Charter of the United Nations.Peru expresses its deep-rooted concern at the divisions that have emerged in the Council, in particular between its permanent members, and at the regrettable use of the veto, which limits our capacity to maintain S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 20/22 18-10728 international peace and security and to resolve the humanitarian conflicts and crises that form our agenda.We note with alarm the fact that the conflict in Syria continues to involve atrocity crimes committed with impunity and that it has deteriorated into a serious threat to regional and global stability, to the point where it is giving rise to serious tensions.With respect to reports of the further use of chemical weapons in Douma, we believe it necessary to resume, as a matter of urgency and in a renewed spirit of compromise, negotiations that will lead to ensuring full access, as required, for the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is being deployed in Syria to determine what happened; and to create a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial mechanism to attribute responsibility.On that understanding, we believe it important to recall once again that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that any response to the barbaric events taking place in that country must be in keeping with the norms of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.We recall also that in its resolution 2401 (2018), the Council ordered a humanitarian ceasefire throughout the entire Syrian territory, and that it is urgent to make headway in the political process in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). As the Secretary-General himself said, of particular concern is the potential threat posed by the current deadlock. We must at all costs prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. This must not occur given that our duty is to put an end to the suffering of millions of people and to impunity for atrocity crimes.Peru reiterates its commitment to living up to the lofty responsibility that the maintenance of international peace and security entails. My delegation will continue to work towards a solution to the conflict and protect the Syrian people, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.I would like to recall the statement by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2017/507, on the length of interventions.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): First, I should like, on behalf of my Government, to express our condolences to the people and the Government of Algeria in connection with the tragic military plane crash that claimed the lives of 247 passengers.Secondly, I welcome the participation of the Secretary-General in this very important meeting. I thank him for his comprehensive and accurate briefing, which made clear that he and others in the Council did in fact understand this meeting's agenda item. He spoke in a manner commensurate with the threats to international peace and security posed by the allegations and accusations against my country and its allies.My colleague the Ambassador of Sweden said that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime. This is true. I agree with him, as does my Government. However, I would ask him whether he believes that war in itself is a crime and needs to be stopped and prevented. Perhaps this would be a very good title for a book by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and perhaps this would make clear to Member States that war in itself is a crime.My colleague the representative of the United States said that the Syrian chemical weapons that killed civilians had been used 50 times; that is what she said. Chemical weapons were used 50 times and killed 200 civilians. Imagine that — the Syrian Government reversed the course of the global terrorist war against my country by killing only 200 civilians after having used chemical weapons 50 times. Are these not the words of amateurs? This is a scenario for DC Comics' Superman series. Is that how the White House strategists think — that a certain Government has used chemical weapons 50 times to kill 200 civilians? How is that logical?My American colleague overlooked one important detail — that her country, on board the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the Syrian chemical stockpiles in the Mediterranean, along with ships from Denmark and Norway. How could it be that the experts in the United States delegation did not tell her that Ms. Sigrid Kaag told the Security Council in June 2014 that there were no more chemical stockpiles in Syria. Could they have simply forgotten all of that?Some believe that the massive western military forces in the eastern Mediterranean are due to a Sufi Western affection for a handful of terrorist yobs in 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 21/22 Douma. By the way, those yobs were chased out to the North, as the Council is aware. They are now on their way to Saudi Arabia and thence to Yemen. They will be recycled and used on other fronts, including Yemen. No, the massive military forces in the Mediterranean do not target that handful of terrorists. They target the State of Syria and its allies. That should be the topic discussed today in this meeting.My colleague the American Ambassador was not horrified that her country used 20 million gallons of Agent Orange in Viet Nam in 1961, killing and injuring 3 million Vietnamese. Four hundred thousand children are born with deformities every year due to the use of Agent Orange at that time. She was not horrified by her country's forces killing thousands of Syrians in Raqqa and thousands of Iraqis in Fallujah and Mosul through the use of white phosphorus, which is a chemical weapon. I ask my colleague, the Ambassador of Sweden: Is that not a war crime?I would like to read a remark of the former Defence Minister of Britain, Mr. Doug Henderson. He spoke of the use by his country and the United States of white phosphorus in Iraq. I would ask my friend the British Ambassador to listen to this. Mr. Henderson said that it was unbelievable that the United Kingdom would occupy a country — meaning Iraq — to look for chemical weapons and at the same time use chemical weapons against that very same country.George Orwell, the well-respected and ethical Western author said: "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act". The truth that needs to be told today is that three permanent members of the Security Council are dragging the entire world once again towards the abyss of war and aggression. They seek to obstruct the Council's work in maintaining international peace and security, which is the main principle agreed upon and endorsed by our founding fathers when they adopted the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco on 26 June, 1945. Even though my colleague, the Ambassador of Bolivia has already read it out, I would like to once again remind the Council of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter:"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".The truth that needs to be told today is that those three States have a legacy based on fallacies and fabricated narratives in order to launch wars, occupy States, control their resources and change their governing systems. The truth that needs to be told today is that the entire world and the Council stand witnesses to the invasion, occupation and destruction of Iraq based on a United States lie in this very Chamber 14 years ago. They stand witnesses to France's exploitation of the Council to destroy Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians while ending the future of an entire people for the very simple reason that its President at the time, Mr. Sarkozy, wanted a cover up for his financial corruption. This is an ongoing case, of which members are all aware. However, some countries still fall for those lies promoted by those very same States in order to attack my country, Syria.God bless the days when France the policies of Charles de Gaulle in the Council followed and repudiated the aggression of the United States and Britain against Iraq. We yearn for those days. France no longer respects the policies of Charles de Gaulle and is now one of the countries that launch attacks against other countries.The truth that needs to be told today is that the international community has not sought to rein in those who are reckless and undermine international relations, subjecting them to disaster time and again since the establishment of this international Organization. Our biggest fear is that if the international community does not come together to end the abuse of those who are reckless, then the Organization will die in circumstances very similar to that which led to the death of the League of Nations.The truth that needs to be told today is that after the failure of the United States, Britain, France and their proxies in our region to achieve their objectives in Syria through providing all forms of support to the armed terrorist groups, we see them today tweeting and bragging about their nice, new and smart rockets, and defying international legitimacy from the Council Chamber. They dispatch war planes and fleets to achieve what their terrorists have failed to achieve over the past seven years.The truth that needs to be told today is that the Syrian Government liberated hundreds of thousands of civilians in eastern Ghouta from the practices of armed terrorist groups that used them as human shields, held S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 22/22 18-10728 them hostage for years and prevented any medical or food assistance from reaching them. The terrorist groups used the schools, homes and hospitals of those civilians as military bases to launch attacks on 8 million civilians in Damascus.The truth that needs to be told today is that some reckless people are pushing international relations towards the abyss based on a fake video prepared by the terrorist White Helmets, pursuant to instructions by Western intelligence.The truth that needs to be told today is that the so-called international alliance used its war planes to serve Da'esh in order to block the victory of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against that terrorist organization. That international alliance made the White Helmets its media division to fabricate and falsify incidents in order to benefit the Al-Qaida terrorist organization.The government of my country took the initiative to invite the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to dispatch its Fact-finding Mission to visit Syria and the alleged site of the incident in Douma. The Government of my country has provided all the facilitation needed for the team to work in a transparent and accurate manner. The team is supposed to start its work in a few hours. This invitation was issued out of strength, confidence and diplomatic experience, not because we are weak or afraid and giving in to bullying or threats.The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms the Governments of these three States for launching their threats to use power in a flagrant violation of Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which identifies the primary purpose of the United Nations as the maintenance of international peace and security and the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches to peace.With the exception of the United States, Britain and France, we all understand that the Security Council is the organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security and should stand against attempts to impose the law of the jungle and the rule of the powerful. However, some Member States think that the United Nations is just a private business company that works on the basis of pecuniary interests, market rules and the principle of supply and demand to determine the fate of peoples and States, and that use it as a platform for cheap theatrics and the dissemination of lies. This is the truth that disappoints the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world.I am not reinventing the wheel in this Chamber. The history of our relations with those States is filled with agony, pain and bitterness as a result of their very well-known policies of aggression. Another more important and shocking truth that should be told today is that the silence of the majority with respect to those aggressive policies does not constitute collusion with these States, but it does arise from fear of their arrogance and political blackmail, economic pressure and aggressive record. Those States do not blink when they go after anyone who is telling the truth.In conclusion, if those three States — the United States, Britain and France — think they can attack us and undermine our sovereignty and set out to do so, we would have no other choice but to apply Article 51 of the Charter, which gives us the legitimate right to defend ourselves. This is not a threat the way they do; it is a promise. This is a promise. We will not let anyone attack our sovereignty.Why do I say that this is a promise? I say this because a thought commonly ascribed to the great United States leader George Washington, who lived more than 200 years ago comes to mind — the sound that is louder than that of the cannons is the sound of the truth that emanates from the heart of a united nation that wants to live free. We in Syria also have leaders and prominent figures as great as George Washington. They are doing the same thing for Syria — protecting the unity and sovereignty of their country.The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
Publisher's version (útgefin grein) ; Background In an era of shifting global agendas and expanded emphasis on non-communicable diseases and injuries along with communicable diseases, sound evidence on trends by cause at the national level is essential. The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) provides a systematic scientific assessment of published, publicly available, and contributed data on incidence, prevalence, and mortality for a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of diseases and injuries. Methods GBD estimates incidence, prevalence, mortality, years of life lost (YLLs), years lived with disability (YLDs), and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) due to 369 diseases and injuries, for two sexes, and for 204 countries and territories. Input data were extracted from censuses, household surveys, civil registration and vital statistics, disease registries, health service use, air pollution monitors, satellite imaging, disease notifications, and other sources. Cause-specific death rates and cause fractions were calculated using the Cause of Death Ensemble model and spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression. Cause-specific deaths were adjusted to match the total all-cause deaths calculated as part of the GBD population, fertility, and mortality estimates. Deaths were multiplied by standard life expectancy at each age to calculate YLLs. A Bayesian meta-regression modelling tool, DisMod-MR 2.1, was used to ensure consistency between incidence, prevalence, remission, excess mortality, and cause-specific mortality for most causes. Prevalence estimates were multiplied by disability weights for mutually exclusive sequelae of diseases and injuries to calculate YLDs. We considered results in the context of the Socio-demographic Index (SDI), a composite indicator of income per capita, years of schooling, and fertility rate in females younger than 25 years. Uncertainty intervals (UIs) were generated for every metric using the 25th and 975th ordered 1000 draw values of the posterior distribution. Findings Global health has steadily improved over the past 30 years as measured by age-standardised DALY rates. After taking into account population growth and ageing, the absolute number of DALYs has remained stable. Since 2010, the pace of decline in global age-standardised DALY rates has accelerated in age groups younger than 50 years compared with the 1990-2010 time period, with the greatest annualised rate of decline occurring in the 0-9-year age group. Six infectious diseases were among the top ten causes of DALYs in children younger than 10 years in 2019: lower respiratory infections (ranked second), diarrhoeal diseases (third), malaria (fifth), meningitis (sixth), whooping cough (ninth), and sexually transmitted infections (which, in this age group, is fully accounted for by congenital syphilis; ranked tenth). In adolescents aged 10-24 years, three injury causes were among the top causes of DALYs: road injuries (ranked first), self-harm (third), and interpersonal violence (fifth). Five of the causes that were in the top ten for ages 10-24 years were also in the top ten in the 25-49-year age group: road injuries (ranked first), HIV/AIDS (second), low back pain (fourth), headache disorders (fifth), and depressive disorders (sixth). In 2019, ischaemic heart disease and stroke were the top-ranked causes of DALYs in both the 50-74-year and 75-years-and-older age groups. Since 1990, there has been a marked shift towards a greater proportion of burden due to YLDs from non-communicable diseases and injuries. In 2019, there were 11 countries where non-communicable disease and injury YLDs constituted more than half of all disease burden. Decreases in age-standardised DALY rates have accelerated over the past decade in countries at the lower end of the SDI range, while improvements have started to stagnate or even reverse in countries with higher SDI. Interpretation As disability becomes an increasingly large component of disease burden and a larger component of health expenditure, greater research and development investment is needed to identify new, more effective intervention strategies. With a rapidly ageing global population, the demands on health services to deal with disabling outcomes, which increase with age, will require policy makers to anticipate these changes. The mix of universal and more geographically specific influences on health reinforces the need for regular reporting on population health in detail and by underlying cause to help decision makers to identify success stories of disease control to emulate, as well as opportunities to improve. Copyright (C) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. ; Research reported in this publication was supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; the University of Melbourne; Queensland Department of Health, Australia; the National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia; Public Health England; the Norwegian Institute of Public Health; St Jude Children's Research Hospital; the Cardiovascular Medical Research and Education Fund; the National Institute on Ageing of the National Institutes of Health (award P30AG047845); and the National Institute of Mental Health of the National Institutes of Health (award R01MH110163). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the funders. The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed in this Article and they do not necessarily represent the views, decisions, or policies of the institutions with which they are affiliated, the National Health Service (NHS), the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), the UK Department of Health and Social Care, or Public Health England; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Government, or MEASURE Evaluation; or the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). This research used data from the Chile National Health Survey 2003, 2009-10, and 2016-17. The authors are grateful to the Ministry of Health, the survey copyright owner, for allowing them to have the database. All results of the study are those of the authors and in no way committed to the Ministry. The Costa Rican Longevity and Healthy Aging Study project is a longitudinal study by the University of Costa Rica's Centro Centroamericano de Poblacion and Instituto de Investigaciones en Salud, in collaboration with the University of California at Berkeley. The original pre-1945 cohort was funded by the Wellcome Trust (grant 072406), and the 1945-55 Retirement Cohort was funded by the US National Institute on Aging (grant R01AG031716). The principal investigators are Luis Rosero-Bixby and William H Dow and co-principal investigators are Xinia Fernandez and Gilbert Brenes. The accuracy of the authors' statistical analysis and the findings they report are not the responsibility of ECDC. ECDC is not responsible for conclusions or opinions drawn from the data provided. ECDC is not responsible for the correctness of the data and for data management, data merging and data collation after provision of the data. ECDC shall not be held liable for improper or incorrect use of the data. The Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children (HBSC) study is an international study carried out in collaboration with WHO/EURO. The international coordinator of the 1997-98, 2001-02, 2005-06, and 2009-10 surveys was Candace Currie and the databank manager for the 1997-98 survey was Bente Wold, whereas for the following surveys Oddrun Samdal was the databank manager. A list of principal investigators in each country can be found on the HBSC website. Data used in this paper come from the 2009-10 Ghana Socioeconomic Panel Study Survey, which is a nationally representative survey of more than 5000 households in Ghana. The survey is a joint effort undertaken by the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana and the Economic Growth Centre (EGC) at Yale University. It was funded by EGC. ISSER and the EGC are not responsible for the estimations reported by the analysts. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics granted the researchers access to relevant data in accordance with license number SLN2014-3-170, after subjecting data to processing aiming to preserve the confidentiality of individual data in accordance with the General Statistics Law, 2000. The researchers are solely responsible for the conclusions and inferences drawn upon available data. Data for this research was provided by MEASURE Evaluation, funded by USAID. The authors thank the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics and ZAO Demoscope together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology, Russia Academy of Sciences for making data available. This paper uses data from the Bhutan 2014 STEPS survey, implemented by the Ministry of Health with the support of WHO; the Kuwait 2006 and 2014 STEPS surveys, implemented by the Ministry of Health with the support of WHO; the Libya 2009 STEPS survey, implemented by the Secretariat of Health and Environment with the support of WHO; the Malawi 2009 STEPS survey, implemented by Ministry of Health with the support of WHO; and the Moldova 2013 STEPS survey, implemented by the Ministry of Health, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the National Center of Public Health with the support of WHO. This paper uses data from Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) Waves 1 (DOI:10.6103/SHARE. w1.700), 2 (10.6103/SHARE.w2.700), 3 (10.6103/SHARE.w3.700), 4 (10.6103/SHARE.w4.700), 5 (10.6103/SHARE.w5.700), 6 (10.6103/SHARE.w6.700), and 7 (10.6103/SHARE.w7.700); see Borsch-Supan and colleagues (2013) for methodological details. The SHARE data collection has been funded by the European Commission through FP5 (QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812), FP7 (SHARE-PREP: GA N degrees 211909, SHARE-LEAP: GA N degrees 227822, SHARE M4: GA N degrees 261982) and Horizon 2020 (SHARE-DEV3: GA N degrees 676536, SERISS: GA N degrees 654221) and by DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion. Additional funding from the German Ministry of Education and Research, the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, the US National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-13S2, P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064, HHSN271201300071C), and from various national funding sources is gratefully acknowledged. This study has been realised using the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel, which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. The United States Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study is a supplement to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740). It was conducted jointly by Duke University and the University of Michigan. The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. This paper uses data from Add Health, a program project designed by J Richard Udry, Peter S Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is due to Ronald R Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health website. No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis. The data reported here have been supplied by the United States Renal Data System. The interpretation and reporting of these data are the responsibility of the authors and in no way should be seen as an official policy or interpretation of the US Government. Collection of data for the Mozambique National Survey on the Causes of Death 2007-08 was made possible by USAID under the terms of cooperative agreement GPO-A-00-08-000_D3-00. This manuscript is based on data collected and shared by the International Vaccine Institute (IVI) from an original study IVI conducted. L G Abreu acknowledges support from Coordenacao de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior (Brazil; finance code 001) and Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq, a Brazilian funding agency). I N Ackerman was supported by a Victorian Health and Medical Research Fellowship awarded by the Victorian Government. O O Adetokunboh acknowledges the South African Department of Science and Innovation and the National Research Foundation. A Agrawal acknowledges the Wellcome Trust DBT India Alliance Senior Fellowship. S M Aljunid acknowledges the Department of Health Policy and Management, Faculty of Public Health, Kuwait University and International Centre for Casemix and Clinical Coding, Faculty of Medicine, National University of Malaysia for the approval and support to participate in this research project. M Ausloos, C Herteliu, and A Pana acknowledge partial support by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNDS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P4-ID-PCCF-2016-0084. A Badawi is supported by the Public Health Agency of Canada. D A Bennett was supported by the NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre. R Bourne acknowledges the Brien Holden Vision Institute, University of Heidelberg, Sightsavers, Fred Hollows Foundation, and Thea Foundation. G B Britton and I Moreno Velasquez were supported by the Sistema Nacional de Investigacion, SNI-SENACYT, Panama. R Buchbinder was supported by an Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Senior Principal Research Fellowship. J J Carrero was supported by the Swedish Research Council (2019-01059). F Carvalho acknowledges UID/MULTI/04378/2019 and UID/QUI/50006/2019 support with funding from FCT/MCTES through national funds. A R Chang was supported by National Institutes of Health/National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases grant K23 DK106515. V M Costa acknowledges the grant SFRH/BHD/110001/2015, received by Portuguese national funds through Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia, IP, under the Norma Transitaria DL57/2016/CP1334/CT0006. A Douiri acknowledges support and funding from the National Institute for Health Research Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care South London at King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust and the Royal College of Physicians, and support from the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre based at Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust and King's College London. B B Duncan acknowledges grants from the Foundation for the Support of Research of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (IATS and PrInt) and the Brazilian Ministry of Health. H E Erskine is the recipient of an Australian NHMRC Early Career Fellowship grant (APP1137969). A J Ferrari was supported by a NHMRC Early Career Fellowship grant (APP1121516). H E Erskine and A J Ferrari are employed by and A M Mantilla-Herrera and D F Santomauro affiliated with the Queensland Centre for Mental Health Research, which receives core funding from the Queensland Department of Health. M L Ferreira holds an NHMRC Research Fellowship. C Flohr was supported by the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre based at Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust. M Freitas acknowledges financial support from the EU (European Regional Development Fund [FEDER] funds through COMPETE POCI-01-0145-FEDER-029248) and National Funds (Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia) through project PTDC/NAN-MAT/29248/2017. A L S Guimaraes acknowledges support from CNPq. C Herteliu was partially supported by a grant co-funded by FEDER through Operational Competitiveness Program (project ID P_40_382). P Hoogar acknowledges Centre for Bio Cultural Studies, Directorate of Research, Manipal Academy of Higher Education and Centre for Holistic Development and Research, Kalaghatagi. F N Hugo acknowledges the Visiting Professorship, PRINT Program, CAPES Foundation, Brazil. B-F Hwang was supported by China Medical University (CMU107-Z-04), Taichung, Taiwan. S M S Islam was funded by a National Heart Foundation Senior Research Fellowship and supported by Deakin University. R Q Ivers was supported by a research fellowship from the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia. M Jakovljevic acknowledges the Serbian part of this GBD-related contribution was co-funded through Grant OI175014 of the Ministry of Education Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. P Jeemon was supported by a Clinical and Public Health intermediate fellowship (grant number IA/CPHI/14/1/501497) from the Wellcome Trust-Department of Biotechnology, India Alliance (2015-20). O John is a recipient of UIPA scholarship from University of New South Wales, Sydney. S V Katikireddi acknowledges funding from a NRS Senior Clinical Fellowship (SCAF/15/02), the Medical Research Council (MC_UU_12017/13, MC_UU_12017/15), and the Scottish Government Chief Scientist Office (SPHSU13, SPHSU15). C Kieling is a CNPq researcher and a UK Academy of Medical Sciences Newton Advanced Fellow. Y J Kim was supported by Research Management Office, Xiamen University Malaysia (XMUMRF/2018-C2/ITCM/00010). K Krishan is supported by UGC Centre of Advanced Study awarded to the Department of Anthropology, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. M Kumar was supported by K43 TW 010716 FIC/NIMH. B Lacey acknowledges support from the NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre and the BHF Centre of Research Excellence, Oxford. J V Lazarus was supported by a Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities Miguel Servet grant (Instituto de Salud Carlos III [ISCIII]/ESF, the EU [CP18/00074]). K J Looker thanks the NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Evaluation of Interventions at the University of Bristol, in partnership with Public Health England, for research support. S Lorkowski was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (nutriCARD, grant agreement number 01EA1808A). R A Lyons is supported by Health Data Research UK (HDR-9006), which is funded by the UK Medical Research Council, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council, NIHR (England), Chief Scientist Office of the Scottish Government Health and Social Care Directorates, Health and Social Care Research and Development Division (Welsh Government), Public Health Agency (Northern Ireland), British Heart Foundation, and Wellcome Trust. J J McGrath is supported by the Danish National Research Foundation (Niels Bohr Professorship), and the Queensland Health Department (via West Moreton HHS). P T N Memiah acknowledges support from CODESRIA. U O Mueller gratefully acknowledges funding by the German National Cohort Study BMBF grant number 01ER1801D. S Nomura acknowledges the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan (18K10082). A Ortiz was supported by ISCIII PI19/00815, DTS18/00032, ISCIII-RETIC REDinREN RD016/0009 Fondos FEDER, FRIAT, Comunidad de Madrid B2017/BMD-3686 CIFRA2-CM. These funding sources had no role in the writing of the manuscript or the decision to submit it for publication. S B Patten was supported by the Cuthbertson & Fischer Chair in Pediatric Mental Health at the University of Calgary. G C Patton was supported by an aNHMRC Senior Principal Research Fellowship. M R Phillips was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC, number 81371502 and 81761128031). A Raggi, D Sattin, and S Schiavolin were supported by grants from the Italian Ministry of Health (Ricerca Corrente, Fondazione Istituto Neurologico C Besta, Linea 4-Outcome Research: dagli Indicatori alle Raccomandazioni Cliniche). P Rathi and B Unnikrishnan acknowledge Kasturba Medical College, Mangalore, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal. A L P Ribeiro was supported by Brazilian National Research Council, CNPq, and the Minas Gerais State Research Agency, FAPEMIG. D C Ribeiro was supported by The Sir Charles Hercus Health Research Fellowship (#18/111) Health Research Council of New Zealand. D Ribeiro acknowledges financial support from the EU (FEDER funds through the Operational Competitiveness Program; POCI-01-0145-FEDER-029253). P S Sachdev acknowledges funding from the NHMRC of Australia Program Grant. A M Samy was supported by a fellowship from the Egyptian Fulbright Mission Program. M M Santric-Milicevic acknowledges the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (contract number 175087). R Sarmiento-Suarez received institutional support from Applied and Environmental Sciences University (Bogota, Colombia) and ISCIII (Madrid, Spain). A E Schutte received support from the South African National Research Foundation SARChI Initiative (GUN 86895) and Medical Research Council. S T S Skou is currently funded by a grant from Region Zealand (Exercise First) and a grant from the European Research Council under the EU's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement number 801790). J B Soriano is funded by Centro de Investigacion en Red de Enfermedades Respiratorias, ISCIII. R Tabares-Seisdedos was supported in part by the national grant PI17/00719 from ISCIII-FEDER. N Taveira was partially supported by the European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership, the EU (LIFE project, reference RIA2016MC-1615). S Tyrovolas was supported by the Foundation for Education and European Culture, the Sara Borrell postdoctoral programme (reference number CD15/00019 from ISCIII-FEDER). S B Zaman received a scholarship from the Australian Government research training programme in support of his academic career. ; "Peer Reviewed"
Only Vanderbilt University affiliated authors are listed on VUIR. For a full list of authors, access the version of record at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6965101/ ; Identifying the underlying genetic drivers of the heritability of breast cancer prognosis remains elusive. We adapt a network-based approach to handle underpowered complex datasets to provide new insights into the potential function of germline variants in breast cancer prognosis. This network-based analysis studies similar to 7.3 million variants in 84,457 breast cancer patients in relation to breast cancer survival and confirms the results on 12,381 independent patients. Aggregating the prognostic effects of genetic variants across multiple genes, we identify four gene modules associated with survival in estrogen receptor (ER)-negative and one in ER-positive disease. The modules show biological enrichment for cancer-related processes such as G-alpha signaling, circadian clock, angiogenesis, and Rho-GTPases in apoptosis. ; CAC: We thank all the individuals who took part in these studies and all the researchers, clinicians, technicians, and administrative staff who have enabled this work to be carried out. We acknowledge all contributors to the COGS and OncoArray study design, chip design, genotyping, and genotype analyses. ABCFS: Maggie Angelakos, Judi Maskiell, Gillian Dite. ABCS: Frans Hogervorst, Sten Cornelissen and Annegien Broeks. ABCTB Investigators: Rosemary Balleine, Robert Baxter, Stephen Braye, Jane Carpenter, Jane Dahlstrom, John Forbes, Soon Lee, Debbie Marsh, Adrienne Morey, Nirmala Pathmanathan, Rodney Scott, Allan Spigelman, Nicholas Wilcken, Desmond Yip. BBCS: Eileen Williams, Elaine Ryder-Mills, Kara Sargus. BCINIS: Dr. K. Landsman, Dr. N. Gronich, Dr. A. Flugelman, Dr. W. Saliba, Dr. E. Liani, Dr. I. Cohen, Dr. S. Kalet, Dr. V. Friedman, Dr. O. Barnet. BIGGS: Niall McInerney, Gabrielle Colleran, Andrew Rowan, Angela Jones. BREOGAN: Manuela Gago-Dominguez, Jose Esteban Castelao, Angel Carracedo, Victor Munoz Garzon, Alejandro Novo Dominguez, Maria Elena Martinez, Sara Miranda Ponte, Carmen Redondo Marey, Maite Pena Fernandez, Manuel Enguix Castelo, Maria Torres, Manuel Calaza, Jose Antunez, Maximo Fraga; Joaquin Gonzalez-Carrero and the Department of Pathology and Biobank of University Hospital Complex of Vigo, Instituto de Investigacion Biomedica Galicia Sur, SERGAS. BSUCH: Peter Bugert, Medical Faculty Mannheim. CCGP: Styliani Apostolaki, Anna Margiolaki, Georgios Nintos, Maria Perraki, Georgia Saloustrou, Georgia Sevastaki, Konstantinos Pompodakis. CGPS: Dorthe Uldall Andersen, Maria Birna Arnadottir, Anne Bank, Dorthe Kjeldgard Hansen, and the Danish Cancer Biobank. CNIO-BCS: Guillermo Pita, Charo Alonso, Nuria Alvarez, Pilar Zamora, and Primitiva Menendez. CPS-II: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Program of Cancer Registries. The National Cancer Institute Surveillance Epidemiology, and End Results program. CTS: Leslie Bernstein, Susan Neuhausen, James Lacey, Sophia Wang, Huiyan Ma, and Jessica Clague DeHart. Dennis Deapen, Rich Pinder, and Eunjung Lee, Pam Horn-Ross, Peggy Reynolds, Christina Clarke Dur and David Nelson, Hoda Anton-Culver, Argyrios Ziogas, and Hannah Park and Fred Schumacher. DIETCOMPLYF: charity Against Breast Cancer (Registered Charity Number 1121258) and the NCRN. Participants and the investigators of EPIC (European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition). ESTHER: Hartwig Ziegler, Sonja Wolf, Volker Hermann, Christa Stegmaier, Katja Butterbach. FHRISK: NIHR for funding. GC-HBOC: Stefanie Engert, Heide Hellebrand, Sandra Krober and LIFE. Markus Loeffler, Joachim Thiery, Matthias Nuchter, Ronny Baber. GENICA: Dr. Margarete Fischer-Bosch [HB, Wing-Yee Lo], German Cancer Consortium (DKTK), and German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ) [HB], gefordert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) im Rahmen der Exzellenzstrategie des Bundes und der Lander -EXC 2180 -390900677 [HB], Evangelische Kliniken Bonn gGmbH, Johanniter Krankenhaus, [Yon-Dschun Ko, Christian Baisch], University of Bonn, Germany [Hans-Peter Fischer], Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (DKFZ), Heidelberg, Germany [UH], Institute for Prevention and Occupational Medicine of the German Social Accident Insurance, Institute of the Ruhr University Bochum (IPA), Bochum, Germany [Thomas Bruning, Beate Pesch, Sylvia Rabstein, Anne Lotz]; University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany [Volker Harth]. HABCS: Michael Bremer. HEBCS: Rainer Fagerholm, Kirsimari Aaltonen, Karl von Smitten, Irja Erkkila. HUBCS: Shamil Gantsev. KARMA and SASBAC: Swedish Medical Research Counsel. KBCP: Eija Myohanen, Helena Kemilainen. kConFab/AOCS: Eveline Niedermayr, Family Cancer Clinics and the Clinical Follow Up Study (received funding from the NHMRC, the National Breast Cancer Foundation, Cancer Australia, and the National Institute of Health (USA)). LMBC: Gilian Peuteman, Thomas Van Brussel, EvyVanderheyden and Kathleen Corthouts. MARIE: Petra Seibold, Judith Heinz, Nadia Obi, Sabine Behrens, Ursula Eilber, Muhabbet Celik and Til Olchers. MBCSG: Paolo Radice, Jacopo Azzollini, Bernardo Bonanni, Bernard Peissel, Roberto Villa, Giulia Cagnoli, Irene Feroce, and Cogentech Cancer Genetic Test Laboratory. NBCS: Kristine K. Sahlberg (PhD), Lars Ottestad (MD), Rolf Karesen (Prof. Em.) Dr. Ellen Schlichting (MD), Marit Muri Holmen (MD), Toril Sauer (MD), Vilde Haakensen (MD), Olav Engebraten (MD), Bjorn Naume (MD), Alexander Fossa (MD), Cecile E. Kiserud (MD), Kristin V. Reinertsen (MD), Aslaug Helland (MD), Margit Riis (MD), Jurgen Geisler (MD) and OSBREAC. NHS/NHS2: AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, WY. OBCS: Arja Jukkola-Vuorinen, Mervi Grip, Saila Kauppila, Meeri Otsukka, Leena Keskitalo and Kari Mononen. OFBCR: Teresa Selander, Nayana Weerasooriya. ORIGO: E. Krol-Warmerdam, and J. Blom. PBCS: Louise Brinton, Mark Sherman, Neonila Szeszenia-Dabrowska, Beata Peplonska, Witold Zatonski, Pei Chao, Michael Stagner. The ethical approval for the POSH study is MREC/00/6/69, UKCRN ID: 1137. Experimental Cancer Medicine Centre (ECMC) supported Faculty of Medicine Tissue Bank and the Faculty of Medicine DNA Banking resource. PREFACE: Sonja Oeser and Silke Landrith. PROCAS: NIHR for funding. RBCS: Petra Bos, Jannet Blom, Ellen Crepin, Elisabeth Huijskens, Anja Kromwijk-Nieuwlaat, Annette Heemskerk, the Erasmus MC Family Cancer Clinic. SBCS: Sue Higham, Helen Cramp, Dan Connley, Ian Brock, Sabapathy Balasubramanian and Malcolm W.R. Reed. We thank the SEARCH and EPIC teams. SKKDKFZS: SUCCESS Study teams in Munich, Duessldorf, Erlangen and Ulm. SZBCS: Ewa Putresza. UCIBCS: Irene Masunaka. UKBGS: Breast Cancer Now and the Institute of Cancer Research and NHS funding to the Royal Marsden/ICR NIHR Biomedical Research Centre. WHI: investigators and staff for their dedication. BCAC is funded by Cancer Research UK [C1287/A16563, C1287/A10118], the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (grant numbers 634935 and 633784 for BRIDGES and B-CAST respectively), and by the European Community ' s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement number 223175 (grant number HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS). The EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme funding source had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation or writing of the report. Genotyping of the OncoArray was funded by the NIH Grant U19 CA148065, and Cancer UK Grant C1287/A16563 and the PERSPECTIVE project supported by the Government of Canada through Genome Canada and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (grant GPH-129344) and, the Ministere de l'Economie, Science et Innovation du Quebec through Genome Quebec and the PSRSIIRI-701 grant, and the Quebec Breast Cancer Foundation. Funding for the iCOGS infrastructure came from: the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement no 223175 (HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS), Cancer Research UK (C1287/A10118, C1287/A10710, C12292/A11174, C1281/A12014, C5047/A8384, C5047/A15007, C5047/A10692, C8197/A16565), the National Institutes of Health (CA128978) and Post-Cancer GWAS initiative (1U19 CA148537, 1U19 CA148065 and 1U19 CA148112 -the GAME-ON initiative), the Department of Defence (W81XWH-10-1-0341), the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) for the CIHR Team in Familial Risks of Breast Cancer, and Komen Foundation for the Cure, the Breast Cancer Research Foundation, and the Ovarian Cancer Research Fund. The DRIVE Consortium was funded by U19 CA148065. ABCFS was supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute (USA). The content of this manuscript does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Cancer Institute or any of the collaborating centers in the in the Breast Cancer Family Registry (BCFR), nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the USA Government or the BCFR. The ABCFS was also supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, the New South Wales Cancer Council, the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (Australia) and the Victorian Breast Cancer Research Consortium. J.L.H. is a National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Senior Principal Research Fellow. M.C.S. is a NHMRC Senior Research Fellow. The ABCS study was supported by the Dutch Cancer Society [grants NKI 2007-3839; 2009-4363; 2015-7632]. The ABCTB was supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, The Cancer Institute NSW and the National Breast Cancer Foundation. The work of the BBCC was partly funded by ELANFond of the University Hospital of Erlangen. The BBCS is funded by Cancer Research UK and Breast Cancer Now and acknowledges NHS funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, and the National Cancer Research Network (NCRN). For the BCFRNY, BCFR-PA, BCFR-UT this work was supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute. For BIGGS, ES is supported by NIHR Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre, Guy's & St. Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust in partnership with King's College London, United Kingdom. IT is supported by the Oxford Biomedical Research Centre. The BREOGAN is funded by Accion Estrategica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS PI12/02125/Cofinanciado FEDER; Accion Estrategica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS PI17/00918/Cofinanciado FEDER; Accion Estrategica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS Intrasalud (PI13/01136); Programa Grupos Emergentes, Cancer Genetics Unit, Instituto de Investigacion Biomedica Galicia Sur. Xerencia de Xestion Integrada de Vigo-SERGAS, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain; Grant 10CSA012E, Conselleria de Industria Programa Sectorial de Investigacion Aplicada, PEME I + D e I + D Suma del Plan Gallego de Investigacion, Desarrollo e Innovacion Tecnologica de la Conselleria de Industria de la Xunta de Galicia, Spain; Grant EC11-192. Fomento de la Investigacion Clinica Independiente, Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad, Spain; and Grant FEDER-Innterconecta. Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad, Xunta de Galicia, Spain. The BSUCH study was supported by the Dietmar-Hopp Foundation, the Helmholtz Society and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ). CCGP is supported by funding from the University of Crete. The CECILE study was supported by Fondation de France, Institut National du Cancer (INCa), Ligue Nationale contre le Cancer, Agence Nationale de Securite Sanitaire, de l'Alimentation, de l'Environnement et du Travail (ANSES), Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR). The CGPS was supported by the Chief Physician Johan Boserup and Lise Boserup Fund, the Danish Medical Research Council, and Herlev and Gentofte Hospital. The CNIO-BCS was supported by the Instituto de Salud Carlos III, the Red Tematica de Investigacion Cooperativa en Cancer and grants from the Asociacion Espanola Contra el Cancer and the Fondo de Investigacion Sanitario (PI11/00923 and PI12/00070). The American Cancer Society funds the creation, maintenance, and updating of the CPS-II cohort. The CTS was initially supported by the California Breast Cancer Act of 1993 and the California Breast Cancer Research Fund (contract 97-10500) and is currently funded through the National Institutes of Health (R01 CA77398, UM1 CA164917, and U01 CA199277). Collection of cancer incidence data was supported by the California Department of Public Health as part of the statewide cancer reporting program mandated by California Health and Safety Code Section 103885. The University of Westminster curates the DietCompLyf database funded by Against Breast Cancer Registered Charity No. 1121258 and the NCRN. The coordination of EPIC is financially supported by the European Commission (DG-SANCO) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. The national cohorts are supported by: Ligue Contre le Cancer, Institut Gustave Roussy, Mutuelle Generale de l'Education Nationale, Institut National de la Sante et de la Recherche Medicale (INSERM) (France); German Cancer Aid, German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (Germany); the Hellenic Health Foundation, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (Greece); Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro-AIRC-Italy and National Research Council (Italy); Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands (The Netherlands); Health Research Fund (FIS), PI13/00061 to Granada, PI13/01162 to EPIC-Murcia, Regional Governments of Andalucia, Asturias, Basque Country, Murcia and Navarra, ISCIII RETIC (RD06/0020) (Spain); Cancer Research UK (14136 to EPIC-Norfolk; C570/A16491 and C8221/A19170 to EPICOxford), Medical Research Council (1000143 to EPIC-Norfolk, MR/M012190/1 to EPICOxford) (United Kingdom). The ESTHER study was supported by a grant from the Baden Wurttemberg Ministry of Science, Research and Arts. Additional cases were recruited in the context of the VERDI study, which was supported by a grant from the German Cancer Aid (Deutsche Krebshilfe). FHRISK is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. Prof D Gareth Evans is supported by the NIHR Manchester Biomedical Research Centre (IS-BRC-1215-20007). The GC-HBOC is supported by the German Cancer Aid (grant no 110837, coordinator: Rita K. Schmutzler, Cologne). This work was also funded by the European Regional Development Fund and Free State of Saxony, Germany (LIFE -Leipzig Research Centre for Civilization Diseases, project numbers 713241202, 713-241202, 14505/2470, 14575/2470). The GENICA was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Germany grants 01KW9975/5, 01KW9976/8, 01KW9977/0, and 01KW0114, the Robert Bosch Foundation, Stuttgart, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (DKFZ), Heidelberg, the Institute for Prevention and Occupational Medicine of the German Social Accident Insurance, Institute of the Ruhr University Bochum (IPA), Bochum, as well as the Department of Internal Medicine, Evangelische Kliniken Bonn gGmbH, Johanniter Krankenhaus, Bonn, Germany. The GESBC was supported by the Deutsche Krebshilfe e. V. [70492] and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ). The HABCS study was supported by the Claudia von Schilling Foundation for Breast Cancer Research, by the Lower Saxonian Cancer Society, and by the Rudolf Bartling Foundation. The HEBCS was financially supported by the Helsinki University Central Hospital Research Fund, Academy of Finland (266528), the Finnish Cancer Society, and the Sigrid Juselius Foundation. The HUBCS was supported by a grant from the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education (RUS08/017), and by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research and the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations for support the Bioresource collections and RFBR grants 14-04-97088, 1729-06014 and 17-44-020498. Financial support for KARBAC was provided through the regional agreement on medical training and clinical research (ALF) between Stockholm County Council and Karolinska Institutet, the Swedish Cancer Society, The Gustav V Jubilee foundation and Bert von Kantzows foundation. The KARMA study was supported by Marit and Hans Rausings Initiative Against Breast Cancer. The KBCP was financially supported by the special Government Funding (EVO) of Kuopio University Hospital grants, Cancer Fund of North Savo, the Finnish Cancer Organizations, and by the strategic funding of the University of Eastern Finland. kConFab is supported by a grant from the National Breast Cancer Foundation, and previously by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), the Queensland Cancer Fund, the Cancer Councils of New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia, and the Cancer Foundation of Western Australia. LMBC is supported by the "Stichting tegen Kanker." The MARIE study was supported by the Deutsche Krebshilfe e.V. [70-2892-BR I, 106332, 108253, 108419, 110826, 110828], the Hamburg Cancer Society, the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Germany [01KH0402]. MBCSG is supported by grants from the Italian Association for Cancer Research (AIRC) and by funds from the Italian citizens who allocated the 5/1000 share of their tax payment in support of the Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Nazionale Tumori, according to Italian laws (INT-Institutional strategic projects "5x1000"). The MCBCS was supported by the NIH grants CA192393, CA116167, CA176785 an NIH Specialized Program of Research Excellence (SPORE) in Breast Cancer [CA116201], and the Breast Cancer Research Foundation and a generous.pngt from the David F. and Margaret T. Grohne Family Foundation. MCCS cohort recruitment was funded by VicHealth and Cancer Council Victoria. The MCCS was further supported by Australian NHMRC grants 209057 and 396414, and by infrastructure provided by Cancer Council Victoria. Cases and their vital status were ascertained through the Victorian Cancer Registry (VCR) and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), including the National Death Index and the Australian Cancer Database. The MEC was supported by NIH grants CA63464, CA54281, CA098758, CA132839 and CA164973. The MISS study is supported by funding from ERC-2011294576 Advanced grant, Swedish Cancer Society, Swedish Research Council, Local hospital funds, Berta Kamprad Foundation, Gunnar Nilsson. The MMHS study was supported by NIH grants CA97396, CA128931, CA116201, CA140286 and CA177150. The NBCS has received funding from the K.G. Jebsen Centre for Breast Cancer Research; the Research Council of Norway grant 193387/V50 (to A-L Borresen-Dale and V.N. Kristensen) and grant 193387/H10 (to A-L Borresen-Dale and V.N. Kristensen), South Eastern Norway Health Authority (grant 39346 to A-L Borresen-Dale) and the Norwegian Cancer Society (to A-L Borresen-Dale and V.N. Kristensen). The NC-BCFR and OFBCR were supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute (USA). The NCBCS was funded by Komen Foundation, the National Cancer Institute (P50 CA058223, U54 CA156733, U01 CA179715), and the North Carolina University Cancer Research Fund. The NHS was supported by NIH grants P01 CA87969, UM1 CA186107, and U19 CA148065. The NHS2 was supported by NIH grants UM1 CA176726 and U19 CA148065. The OBCS was supported by research grants from the Finnish Cancer Foundation, the Academy of Finland (grant number 250083, 122715 and Center of Excellence grant number 251314), the Finnish Cancer Foundation, the Sigrid Juselius Foundation, the University of Oulu, the University of Oulu Support Foundation and the special Governmental EVO funds for Oulu University Hospital-based research activities. The ORIGO study was supported by the Dutch Cancer Society (RUL 19971505) and the Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRINL CP16). The PBCS was funded by Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. Genotyping for PLCO was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Institutes of Health, NCI, Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics. The PLCO is supported by the Intramural Research Program of the Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics and supported by contracts from the Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health. The POSH study is funded by Cancer Research UK (grants C1275/A11699, C1275/C22524, C1275/A19187, C1275/A15956 and Breast Cancer Campaign 2010PR62, 2013PR044. PROCAS is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. PROCAS is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. The RBCS was funded by the Dutch Cancer Society (DDHK 2004-3124, DDHK 2009-4318). The SASBAC study was supported by funding from the Agency for Science, Technology and Research of Singapore (A*STAR), the US National Institute of Health (NIH) and the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation. The SBCS was supported by Sheffield Experimental Cancer Medicine Centre and Breast Cancer Now Tissue Bank. SEARCH is funded by Cancer Research UK [C490/A10124, C490/A16561] and supported by the UK National Institute for Health Research Biomedical Research Centre at the University of Cambridge. The University of Cambridge has received salary support for PDPP from the NHS in the East of England through the Clinical Academic Reserve. SKKDKFZS is supported by the DKFZ. The SMC is funded by the Swedish Cancer Foundation and the Swedish Research Council (SIMPLER, VR 2017-00644). The SZBCS was supported by Grant PBZ_KBN_122/P05/2004. The UCIBCS component of this research was supported by the NIH [CA58860, CA92044] and the Lon V Smith Foundation [LVS39420]. The UKBGS is funded by Breast Cancer Now and the Institute of Cancer Research (ICR), London. ICR acknowledges NHS funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre. The USRT Study was funded by Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. The WHI program is funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, the US National Institutes of Health and the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHSN268201100046C, HHSN268201100001C, HHSN268201100002C, HHSN268201100003C, HHSN268201100004C, and HHSN271201100004C). This work was also funded by NCI U19 CA148065-01.