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As elsewhere in the ex-communist/socialist countries, the former planning system in Yugoslavia has been dismantled as from the beginning of 1990s, and the planning practice has from then onwards been steered by an apart mixture of old habits, few institutional innovations and the social, economic and political turbulence of the transition period. The previous system and practice of socioeconomic planning collapsed, so far not to be substituted for by new arrangements, to match the impact of the key factors of the transition period, i.e., political pluralization, privatization and marketisation. On the other hand, albeit the system of spatial/urban and environmental planning has been 're-touched' in the 1990s, the adjustments undertaken have not either been harmonized with the factors mentioned. What can now be recognized as the existing 'planning system' is, however, an strange mix of heterogeneous elements from a number of disparate modes, i.e., 'crisis-management-planning', 'planning-supported-wild-marketisation-and-privatisation', 'project-based-planning', etc. In effect, there is no overall professional and political consensus on the direction and content of reform in this field (which also applies to other key issues). In sum, the existing situation in the planning system and practice reads as follows: (1) The system has almost lost its legitimacy, partly because the majority of the former public interests collapsed, and new, indisputable public interests still not being established. Under such circumstances, new roles of planning are hardly known to the public at large, in part as a consequence of an overall anti-planning stance among the majority of political, economic and expert elites. (2) The inertia rules the professional landscape, since there has been a lack of new approaches and methodologies, to match the impact of new dominant factors and the miserable social and economic conditions in the country. Regarding the approaches and methodologies applied, the traditional ex ante planning evaluation still prevails, and more ex post and ex continuo evaluation is still missing. (3) The planning system is too centralized (within the two republics), since the radical recentralization of Serbia was undertaken in 1990, and subsequently the sub-national tiers were deprived of almost any effective planning instruments. In addition to this, the majority of regional entities ('districts') and communes lack a competent administrative machinery and expertise, as well as other support (e.g., research, planning information support etc.) for effecting autonomous planning policies. (4) There has been no more ambitious strategic planning (which is, however, somehow understandable vis-à-vis only now ended international sanctions and isolation of the country). On the other hand, the majority of the development documents that have been passed in the meantime, grossly lack elaborated implementation devices (policies and instruments). Especially in the field of urban planning, the detailed ('land use') schemes prevail over the more strategic development schemes for larger urban and regional areas. Specific development projects (and, only sometimes, more harmonized programmes) by far outnumber other planning schemes. (5) The integration and harmonization of various aspects of planning and policy, i.e., social, economic, spatial/urban, environmental, is very poor. In effect, physicalism still dominates the scene in spatial and urban planning, and the elements of socioeconomic development and environmental policy are scarce within this block. (6) The stipulated legal propositions pertaining to the openness, participativeness and transparency of the planning/policy procedures fall easily frail in the planning practice, resulting in the very poor content in this regard. (7) There has been a lack of planners and other experts experienced and knowledgeable in practicing planning under the new circumstance of political pluralism and radically changed structure of stakeholders and concomitant institutional arrangements. This also applies to 'educators' in general, because the prolonged international isolation of the FR Yugoslavia has caused the gross of their knowledge and capabilities irrelevant. In sum, it seems that many planners would not be able to assume new roles that they are expected to on the part of the society at large. (8)The planning/policy information, research, institutional and other support provided by the state and other agents often does not satisfy even the most basic needs in this fields, partly for a general scarcity of resources concomitant to the overall and deep social, economic and political crisis the society found itself in the 1990s. (9) Most frightfully, manipulation, paternalism and clientelism still represent dominant forms of power, which is a problem by itself in Yugoslavia being one of the most corruptive countries in the world. What is now most missing is a non-manipulative persuasion, as well as the authority of professional values, as the communication and interaction forms that seem only promising for and supportive to developing of a democratic, emancipatory and transformative planning mode. A number of attempts during the last decade to embark upon the preparation of the new 'Master Plan of the City Belgrade' (in the sequel: MP) came into realization not before the democratic political changes of October 2000 took place in Serbia. However, the so far undertaken steps do not seem promising, as they failed to satisfy a number of methodological and other standards, as well as to introduce necessary innovations. Unfortunately, the MP was commissioned to the Bureau of Urban Planning of the City of Belgrade (otherwise a 'faithful ally' of all non-democratic regimes in the City's urban planning and related matters over the last more than ten years now, during which there has been a so far unrecorded squandering and illegal privatization of public urban assets, mostly uncontrolled and not paid-for). Similarly, vested are to lead and complete the work mostly the experts/planners who 'controlled' and still 'control' the academic and professional scene in the same period (notwithstanding that were compromised and their abilities proved passé on many occasions), now recycled to perform new mission. Albeit the entire project had not been adequately prepared, already two interim documents have been elaborated now, viz., 'A Hypothesis of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021', and 'A Concept of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021'. In what follows, a brief review of the work done so far is presented: (1) The role of the MP is poorly defined, which is strange vis-à-vis the pronounced thesis on the 'insuperable role of market', which one renders puzzle about the veritable role of the MP. In addition to this, physicalism features as the key characteristic of this document: social and economic aspects of development are insufficiently present and poorly integrated into the MP, and so are the environmental aspects. The MP will however have to assume a part of socioeconomic development planning and policy as well, because the latter is predictably not likely to get recuperated in some time to come. Furthermore, the social, economic and environmental problems of Belgrade are so tremendous (e.g., extremely high rate of unemployment, probably around 40% of the total work force, obsolete technological, market and other structure of the larger part of Belgrade economy, prolonged crisis of economic growth, overall pauperization of the overwhelming majority of people, many hundred thousand refugees, few hundred thousand of young and educated people who left the country, disproportionate environmental pollution as compared to the level of economic development, etc.), that they must not be ignored in the development documents like the MP. (2) There is no sound conception on the public interests, particularly under the circumstances of a large number of legitimate individual interests fast emerging on the political scene, some of which also persisting to impose themselves as new and legitimate public interests. This results in a feeble notion on the existing and predictable future conflicts, as well as on the planning mechanisms and instruments that will be used in their control and management. (3) The concept of sustainable development has been only 'flirted with' in the MP, whereby a sound doctrine upon which development is to be directed and articulated is also missing (i.e., that which is of relevance for a territorial entity with the GDP of not more than some USD 1 500 per capita). (4) No efforts have been made to introduce more relevant methodological approach, i.e., those which would contrast the miserable socioeconomic and environmental fixities, viz.: (i) A more rigorous ex post evaluation of past decisions has not been performed, implying that future steps will be undertaken upon rather anecdotal insights in the existing power structure, institutional and organizational arrangements and dominant communication and interaction modes in planning. In the same context, the most significant problem of Belgrade area, i.e., how to approach the economic and ecological renewal and rehabilitation of its economy, has been hardly paid sufficient attention to. (This also applies to the position of Belgrade in the broader regional Euro-Asian context, which has terribly eroded over the last decade). (ii) Although the intention of the whole exercise is to work out a 'hard product', i.e., a urban development plan, no ex ante evaluation scheme has been produced so far, implying that the job is not being performed lege artis. Apart from other implications, this failure is particularly handicapping regarding the criteria of ex ante evaluation, leaving the professional audience and the public at large without the sound answers on key questions: What are the criteria upon which the evaluation has been undertaken? Whose are they? What interests stand behind them? Who decides on the criteria that will be applied? Apart from softening the rigour of the expertise, this flaw also allows for too ample 'maneuvering space' for the subsequent arbitrating to be performed by the politicians. (5) A trend-based extrapolation has been used as the key prognostic technique, which is absolutely unacceptable, keeping in mind the poor predictive power (I) and unstable institutional arrangements in planning and elsewhere (II). Instead, the political community would necessitate a number of veritable alternative scenarios of possible/desirable future development elaborated and presented for discussion, deliberation and decision-making in expert arenas and public forums. (6) Perhaps the weakest part of the MP goes to the issue of implementation of planning decisions, giving way to 'visioning' (in effect, to another planning 'phantasmagory'), which is again unacceptable vis-à-vis the pressing and burning realities of Belgrade and its broader surroundings. (7) Finally, an open, transparent and publicly verified 'offer to strategic partners' would also be needed, as the City does not have enough internal resources to cope with the problems of its economic, social, physical and environmental renewal. To conclude, major improvements are needed regarding the planning approach and methodology applied in the preparation of the Master Plan of the City of Belgrade 2021. As this project is likely to carry considerable demonstrational effects throughout the planning scene in Yugoslavia, its highly professional execution is of necessity, so that a major damage is avoided, i.e., that of a further loss of the legitimacy of planning and erosion of the planning profession.

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has managed to overcome most of the strict sanctions imposed by Western economies, largely due to its ability to maintain economic relations with emerging powers in the field of energy, particularly oil, gas and nuclear. The atomic sector is spearheaded by the worldwide presence of Rosatom – a Russian company that heads a conglomerate of more than 300 companies responsible for the manufacture and sale of nuclear technologies for both civilian and military uses.
In recent years, Russia has emerged as a partner in providing nuclear technologies to countries in the Global South, gradually expanding its presence in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This strategy hinges on Moscow's ability to find new diplomatic and trade partners by negotiating with these countries without imposing severe non-proliferation conditionality (such as the United States' 123 Agreements[1]) and selling a wide range of nuclear-related technologies – being the only supplier worldwide of all the necessary elements to establish a nuclear programme.[2]
For Global South countries, Russia has become a potential provider of nuclear-related technologies. Therefore, Moscow employs Rosatom as a diplomatic tool to garner support within the United Nations to avoid further sanctions – what the literature calls "international clientelism" where Russia builds diplomatic ties and partnerships with countries to receive support for its positions during global governance negotiations.[3]
Rosatom has won numerous bids for the sale of reactors, positioning itself as the leader in terms of the number of simultaneously implemented nuclear reactor construction projects, with 3 units in Russia and 33 abroad at various stages of implementation.[4] Likewise, it controls approximately 20 per cent of the global market of conversion and enriched-related materials, something that made it an important partner of scientific groups from the US and European countries regardless of the Russia-Ukraine War[5] – for example, participating in the ongoing construction of the Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research (FAIR), an international accelerator facility to perform cutting-edge research in Germany.[6]
Similarly, since 2023 Rosatom has been the exclusive supplier of enriched uranium-related products to Brazilian nuclear facilities.[7] This landmark agreement is the first long-term partnership with Brasília, replacing previous imports from Canada and European consortiums. These factors come precisely at a time when Rosatom seeks to expand its relations with BRICS countries to increase its participation in the sale of nuclear subsidies for the production of radioisotopes in these nations and to secure financing from the BRICS New Development bank.[8]The increasing presence of Rosatom in the Global South
Rosatom currently controls approximately 70 per cent of the global export market for the construction of nuclear power plants.[9] Its expansion in the Global South occurs within the context of emerging powers seeking to boost their energy production through nuclear means.Middle Eastern and North Africa (MENA) region
On 27 April 2023, Turkish President Erdoğan expressed gratitude to Putin regarding the inauguration of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant – Turkey's first nuclear power reactor.[10] It will start operating in 2025 with four VVER 1200 pressurised-water reactors and will be responsible for around 10 per cent of the total national production of electricity. Located in Turkey's southern Mersin province, the nuclear power plant was constructed by Rosatom – whose subsidiaries financed 93 per cent of the project.[11] This development has had created tension with the Western bloc, as Turkey, a member of NATO, sought Russian technology to advance its civil nuclear programme regardless of the sanctions imposed because of the Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, Rosatom has provided Egypt with four VVER reactors for the construction of its first nuclear power plant – the second on the African continent – in a contract worth approximately 30 billion US dollars. The Russian government has also agreed to provide funding for 85 per cent of the cost.[12]
In North Africa, a region grappling with rapid population growth and a growing need for sustainable energy sources, Russia has initiated strategic dialogues to bolster nuclear cooperation. Countries like Morocco, Libya (whose nuclear reactor – temporarily shut down – was produced by the Soviet Union) and Tunisia, seeking to diversify their energy portfolios away from fossil fuels, have become focal points for these discussions.[13]
Rosatom has been at the forefront of these dialogues, leveraging memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and commercial negotiations to explore potential nuclear projects and collaborations. While aiming to address the region's energy demands, these engagements also align with Russia's broader geopolitical and economic interests in the MENA region.Sub-Saharan Africa
In a similar vein, different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia, have nuclear-related diplomatic and commercial agreements with Russia. Rosatom has actively engaged in the region, offering scholarship opportunities for local students to complete engineering studies in Russia.[14] In this regard, Russia seeks diplomatic rapprochement with Nigeria based on cooperation in uranium exploration and the establishment of a nuclear power plant financed through Russian credit lines.
Moscow has pursued preferential access to rare earth and uranium mines on the continent, as seen in agreements with Tanzania and Namibia. South Africa, a key member of the BRICS, is another notable case. The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), has close relations with the Kremlin since the Cold War, and the country needs to generate more electricity to address the recurrent blackouts. In 2023, Pretoria decided to boost nuclear energy production, with Rosatom poised as a top contender. Plans for new nuclear plants, however, face opposition, also due to corruption allegations surrounding a previously cancelled agreement.[15]
In all, Sub-Saharan countries have drawn closer to Russia, serving as both a diplomatic support and a market for Russian products.[16] While financing the growth of these nations by supplying nuclear technology, Russia receives diplomatic support in return, especially in the United Nations General Assembly. For instance, South Africa has supported Russia in UN votes, casting votes against several resolutions condemning Moscow and becoming embroiled in controversies regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict.[17]South Asia
Russia's nuclear diplomacy has extended to the Asian continent too – especially South Asia. In the case of India, the construction of Units 3, 4, 5 and 6 at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant revives a long-standing partnership dating back to agreements with the Soviet Union.[18] Likewise, the Russian company operates in Bangladesh, with preparations underway for the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant, the country's first nuclear power facility. In Sri Lanka too, Russia is a potential candidate for building nuclear reactors as part of a recently released long-term project to boost local energy production in the country.[19] Hence, in South Asia, Russia aims to leverage historical ties by offering technology and energy opportunities in the nuclear field to sustain commercial ties. Indeed, despite Western pressures, South Asia maintains significant trade with Moscow, thus mitigating the impact of sanctions on its economy.Latin America
Finally, in Latin America, Russia is strategically pursuing expanded partnerships and seeking increased access to raw material markets. Notably, in Bolivia, a 450 million US dollars contract with Rosatom will lead to the construction of a lithium carbonate mining and production complex – a material that is essential for nuclear reactors' cooling and containment systems. Concurrently, Russia has extended nuclear collaborations with Brazil.[20]
Once again, Russia clearly aims to bolster its diplomatic ties with these countries through nuclear energy. Former Brazilian President Bolsonaro, known for his right-wing policies, travelled to Moscow in 2022 to meet with Putin, signalling his intention to deepen diplomatic relations in the nuclear sector. Bolsonaro treated the information discussed during the trip as confidential, but the Brazilian press reported conversations with Russian companies to promote the interests of the navy and seek assistance with the certification of the fuel to be used in reactors for nuclear submarines.The challenges that lie ahead, and how to address them
Russia has found in the nuclear market a means to buttress ties with countries in the Global South by providing high-technology elements to these nations. Through partnerships in the nuclear sector, Russia has not only strengthened its presence in the global energy landscape but has also enhanced its geopolitical influence, particularly in regions where emerging economies seek technological advancements and energy solutions.
Russia's strategic use of nuclear partnerships with countries in the Global South does not only increase its global influence, but also poses challenges related to technology transfer and economic dependency. Indeed, these partnerships often rely heavily on Russian technology and financing, raising concerns about recipient countries' autonomy and economic vulnerability.
To mitigate the risk of Russia leveraging nuclear partnerships to augment its influence in the Global South, Western partners could offer alternative innovative solutions aligned with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines – such as the 2009 US agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Encouraging technology transfer and local capacity building based on the existing rules, Western assistance may empower recipient countries to develop their nuclear expertise while reducing dependency on a single supplier. For their part, adhering to IAEA standards and developing diversified partnerships, countries in the Global South could better navigate challenges and foster sustainable nuclear development in the long term.João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel holds a PhD in Political Science from the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain) and the Federal University of Minas Gerais.[1] The 123 Agreements are bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and other countries, facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation while ensuring non-proliferation through safeguards.[2] Kacper Szulecki and Indra Overland, "Russian Nuclear Energy Diplomacy and Its implications for Energy Security in the Context of the War in Ukraine", in Nature Energy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (April 2023), p. 413-421 at p. 414, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5.[3] Thales Carvalho and Dawisson Belém Lopes, "International Clientelistic Networks: The Case of Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly, 1999–2015", in Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 64, No. 3 (August 2022), p. 37-66, DOI 10.1017/lap.2022.11.[4] Rosatom website: Projects, https://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects.[5] Darya Dolzikova, "Atoms for Sale: Developments in Russian Nuclear Energy Export", in RUSI Special Reports, 14 February 2023, p. 7-8, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/atoms-sale-developments-russian-nuclear-energy-exports.[6] "Russia to Supply Unique Equipment for FAIR Research Accelerator Being Built in Germany", in TASS, 16 November 2015, https://tass.com/science/836929.[7] Ivan Dybov, "Opening New Horizons for Cooperation", in Rosatom Newsletter, No. 262 (February 2023), https://rosatomnewsletter.com/?p=16907.[8] "Rosatom to Get Financing for Projects from BRICS Bank", in Interfax, 31 July 2023, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/93126.[9] Alexandra Prokopenko, "Rosatom: A Difficult Target", in EIRP Russia's Global Energy Role Working Papers, No. 1 (May 2023), p. 3, https://innovationreform.org/?p=3049.[10] "Erdogan Thanks Putin for His Help on Turkish Nuclear Plant", in Al Jazeera, 27 April 2023, https://aje.io/tm54z9.[11] Rosatom, "Investment Management", in Public Report of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom for 2016, 2017, https://ar2016.rosatom.ru/?/en/162-investment-management.[12] Marina Lorenzini, "Why Egypt's New Nuclear Plant is a Long-term Win for Russia", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20 December 2023, https://thebulletin.org/?p=109481.[13] Chiponda Chimbelu, "African Countries Start Mulling Nuclear Energy", in Die Welt, 22 October 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/a-50872702.[14] Rosatom, "Rosatom: Bringing Better Education to Africa", in Rosatom Newsletter, No. 223 (December 2019), https://rosatomnewsletter.com/?p=11863.[15] Gerald Imray, "South Africa to Build New Nuclear Plants. The Opposition Attacked the Plan over Alleged Russia Links", in AP News, 12 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/83f81ae6efd328a532b0f0b16370f730.[16] Aanu Adeoye, "UN Vote on Russia Invasion Shows a Changing Africa", in Chatham House Expert Comments, 7 March 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/28423.[17] Crystal Orderson, "A 'Russian Love Affair': Why South Africa Stays 'Neutral' on War", in Al Jazeera, 2 June 2023, https://aje.io/5o8re2.[18] Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Russia (December 25-29, 2023), 30 December 2023, https://fsi.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37489.[19] "Sri Lanka Seeks Investors for Nuclear Power Plants", in Reuters, 18 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sri-lanka-seeks-investors-nuclear-power-plants-2023-11-17.[20] Brazilian Government, ENBPar e Rosatom buscam cooperação para novas fontes de energia verde, 3 October 2022, https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/enbpar-e-rosatom-buscam-cooperacao-para-novas-fontes-de-energia-verde.

Brazil is a land of contrasts; at the same time that it is emerging as a global economic power, it is also one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. When "Lula" Da Silva and his Workers' Party ("PT") won the 2002 election, they intended to pay a historical debt to the poor. Lula envisioned a country with inclusive growth, where redistribution and poverty reduction were seen as prerequisites for economic growth, and not as competing policy objectives (Leubolt, 2013: 76). In doing so, his government not only changed the content of social policies, but also the very policy-making process. Lula's Fome Zero strategy takes a comprehensive approach to reducing hunger in Brazil. Fome Zero is an umbrella framework that includes programs aimed at increasing access to food, strengthening family agriculture, fostering income generating activities, and supporting partnership promotion and civil society mobilization.This brief presents an analysis of the Fome Zero policy targeting family agriculture, the Food Purchase Program (Programa de Aquisicao de Alimentos, "PAA"). In Brazil 30% of rural enterprises are family farms. They produce 38% of the agricultural value and employ over 70% of rural workers (Rocha, 2009: 58). On the other hand, in 2003 rural poverty was as high as 41%. Accordingly, PAA seeks to tackle rural poverty and food insecurity by guaranteeing demand in local markets for small producers through local government purchases of agricultural products. The first section of this brief presents the context in which PAA was conceived, followed by a summary of the implementation process. The following section presents an evaluation of the policy results. Finally, the analysis concludes with lessons learned and proposed changes.As previously mentioned, the PT election can be seen as the catalyst that propitiated the introduction of PAA. However, the formulation of social policies in Brazil started after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1985. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution set in motion the decentralization process that empowered municipalities. Then, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) focused on strengthening democratic institutions and economic growth. In addition, in the early 1990s municipalities across different states devised conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes that benefited the poor. Moreover, during the FHC administration (1995-2002) the federal government launched CCTs at the national level (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentacao).The PT created a positive environment that enabled the formulation of Fome Zero, with elements that legitimized such social policies as PAA. First, with the transition to democracy social protection policies began to be seen as investments to further development and not as drainage of public resources. Second, the provision of social services had experienced a switch from a universalist model to one that prioritizes targeting vulnerable populations, i.e. CCTs. The third factor was the current economic growth, since the government would not have been able to establish redistributive programs without it. The fourth element was the country's poor social indicators. Despite experiencing growth, Brazil had high social exclusion and inequality because the rapid economic development was elusive to the poor. Finally, the fifth source of legitimacy was the PT election. Lula based his presidential campaign on a discourse of inclusive growth. He promised to eradicate poverty and to redistribute wealth in the country, while reaffirming his commitment to continue with the orthodox liberal monetary policies introduced in previous administrations.Rural poverty and food insecurity were the problems that drove the creation of the PAA policy. The PT designed the framework to address these issues through Fome Zero and the National Food and Nutritional Security Policy ("PNSAN"). However, it deliberately democratized and decentralized the policy debate. In a nutshell, Fome Zero is the articulation of a web of social protection policies and ministries and agencies and its, and PAA's, success relied on creating partnerships with key stakeholders (local governments, businesses and civil society organizations). The federal government created the Social Development Ministry ("MDS") to manage Fome Zero and its subsidiary policies. During the policy formulation process, the MDS organized meetings, workshops and symposia with a multiplicity of stakeholders. These encounters granted non-governmental organizations the possibility to exert influence in the policy process. Social movements also played a key role in the formulation of the National Law for Food and Nutrition Security ("LOSAN"). Furthermore, this law granted civil society participation through the newly created National Council for Food and Nutrition Security ("CONSEA"), which is present at the national, regional and local levels.It was important that the new policy aimed at reducing rural poverty avoid compromising the pro-export production model that had transformed Brazil into one of the world's largest food exporters. Policy-makers considered several traditional options, three of which were discarded for various reasons. An extensive agrarian reform redistributing land to the landless and small farmers would have reduced food outputs. A second alternative, to take no action, would assume that market forces would provide opportunities for poor peasants. The third scenario was to formulate several policies, scattered across different ministries without coordination. The selected policy option implemented by the PT followed a multi-sectoral approach. It sought to increase poor families' income through CCTs, (Bolsa Familia), aimed at feeding the vulnerable population via school meals, community kitchens and popular restaurants, and at strengthening family agriculture through credit and food purchase via PRONAF and PAA. Ultimately, this integral overarching policy focuses on guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food supply.Successful implementation of such a policy demanded a new policy model that articulates the different dimensions of the policy, while also facilitating the participation of multiple stakeholders. In short, CONSEA, MDS and the Inter-Ministerial Chamber on Food and Nutritional Security ("CAISAN") established the policy system. In such policy system, the national, state and municipal executive powers have the ability to adapt the policy to their local context. The system is crafted after receiving feedback from within the political structure, as well as from the civil society. The following diagram illustrates how the food security policy process works.Created by Law 10.969 in 2003, PAA is administered by MDS and the Ministry of Agricultural Development ("MDA"). PAA guidelines are defined by the Grupo Gestor ("Managing Group"), which is comprised of six ministries: MDS; MDA; Economy; Planning and Budgeting; Agriculture; and Education. The execution has two stages; first, at the national level in partnership with the National Supply Agency (CONAB), and second, decentralized execution involving the participation of state and municipal governments. These latter partnerships are crucial for PAA because the MDS and MDA budget are directed exclusively towards agricultural products procurement, while it is the local governments who ensure the system is operable to allow for the purchases.PAA includes four programs: Purchase for Immediate Donation, Incentives for Milk Consumption and Production, Direct Purchase and Stock Formation. The first two programs aim at buying produce and milk to redistribute among the vulnerable population. Between 2003 and 2010 they represented 39% and 37% of PAA budget, respectively. The objectives of Direct Purchase and Stock formation are to facilitate resources for the promotion of public and individual's stock formation that can guarantee food availability and fair prices for family farmers.PAA intends to benefit two groups of people: food producers and food consumers. The food producers are family farmers including fish farmers, fishermen, extractors, indigenous farmers, quilombolaand family farmers settled during the land reform. The food consumers group comprises people and families under social vulnerability, with imminent risk of nutritional and food insecurity, people assisted by national food and nutrition security programs, and children in public schools.The follow paragraph summarizes the main policy outputs. By the end of 2011 the program had reached over 204,000 small farmers, which is only 3.28% of the rural farmer population. PAA's target for 2013 is to buy products from 445,000 farmers. PAA is present in 2,300 municipalities across the country and targets the country's poorest regions. For instance, the Northeastern region receives 50% of PAA budget. In terms of resources, the MDS and MDA budget has risen from $52 million in 2003 to $585 million in 2013. In terms of food production, food purchases more than tripled between 2003 and 2010, from 135,800 to 426,400 tons. On average, PAA serves 25,000 institutions that feed over 15 million people.PAA has produced both intended and unintended outcomes. First, the program has increased rural farmers' income through food purchases. Now, local farmers produce and sell to local schools and hospitals. Moreover, PAA pays an extra 30% above the regular price for organic products, boosting local economies as a result. Second, producers not covered by PAA are indirect beneficiaries because they also enjoy higher local prices. Third, food stocks have also helped control price fluctuations. Fourth, there is greater diversity of products since PPA purchases more than 330 different items. Fifth, PAA has played an important role in the strengthening of associations and cooperatives. It also provides the stimulus to establish small agro-industries so that associations can process and add value to their production output.Two unintended outcomes attributable to PAA are an increase in price for some staple foods and the expansion of neo-patrimonial institutions, such as political corruption, patronage and clientelism at the local level. Thus, we can assume that the policy "winners" are MDS, CONAB, CONSEA, civil society organizations, farmers, vulnerable population benefited by PAA, local level authorities and local institutions (i.e. schools). On the other hand, three policy "losers" are those corporations in charge of selling food products to the government, farmers who cannot meet the PAA criteria, and low- and middle-income urban populations who must pay higher prices. Although negatively impacted by PAA, these groups do not threaten the viability of the policy. Corporations and big businesses still sell food products to the government because PAA cannot meet the food demand. Despite the fact that they cannot sell to PAA, farmers have a suitable environment that provides easy access to credit and encourages production. Finally, even though prices increased, so did the salaries of the middle-income population.PAA is an innovative policy because of its participatory model during the formulation process, which allows it to enjoy support from its beneficiaries and civil society organizations. Also, PAA's administration is notable since, given its multi-sectoral approach, six different ministries form the managing unit. Finally, the regular control and oversight done by social movements and the impending need to improve coordination among ministries make policy evaluation a necessary priority for PAA's success.In a short amount of time, PAA has already undergone three evaluation rounds (2005, 2008 and 2010). Each evaluation improves the policy and guarantees more popular support. For instance, after the last evaluation the government enacted Law 12.512/2011 and Decree 7.775/2012, which aims at facilitating coordination among the implementing bodies. It also raised the maximum farmer benefits from $1,250 in 2003, to $2,400 in 2006, to $4,100 in 2012. In addition, it encourages organic production by paying 30% above regular price. More importantly, the last policy redesign includes a gender component by establishing that at least 5% of PAA purchases must come from women's associations. Finally, it guarantees a quota of 30% of institutional purchases (schools and hospitals, among others) for small farmers.However, despite the iterative evaluation and redesign process, there is still room for improvement in the policy. Most importantly, PAA does not reach the poorest of the poor. Although the registration process is very efficient because it is based on another social program (PRONAF), the poorest farmers lack land titles, thus cannot be part of PRONAF or PAA. The policy could be improved with provisions enabling the inclusion of this group.PAA is helping with the national goals of poverty alleviation, however redefining its goals and incorporating strategic planning in rural development could improve PAA. More specifically, PAA should reconsider its strategy towards associativism and cooperativism. The policy could enhance further rural development by supporting associations and cooperatives in becoming artisanal industries that add value to their products.In conclusion, PAA intends to solve a social problem by addressing both the supply and demand sides. On one hand, PPA's objective is to eliminate hunger by guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food supply. On the other hand, PAA reduces rural poverty by providing opportunities to small farmers with market access and better prices. The policy has demonstrated positive results and has been constantly improved through iterative evaluations. With further strategic planning on how to help associations becoming the leaders of rural development the policy could achieve optimal positive impact.Sobre el autorMA International DevelopmentSchool of International ServiceAmerican UniversityLicenciado en Estudios InternacionalesUniversidad ORT - Uruguay

W artykule przyglądam się temu, jaką edukację polityczną warto rozwijać we współczesnej polskiej szkole i wszędzie tam, gdzie buduje się w ludziach zdolność do wspólnej i niewyalienowanej pracy. Kierunek rozważań wyznaczyła konieczność ustosunkowania się myśli pedagogicznej – i równoległego dostosowania praktyk wychowawczych – do zmian w sposobie koordynacji społeczeństwa, które dokonują się w atmosferze groźby wybuchu wojny. Rozważania te buduję na dotychczasowych badaniach własnych z obszaru uczenia się w ruchach społecznych, analizując trzy porządki zapewniające koordynację społeczeństw (neoliberalizm, nacjonalizm, militaryzm) w kontekście wykluczanych przez nie wartości: dobra wspólnego, samorządu i pokoju. Rezultatem pracy jest matryca przyporządkowująca te kontrwartości różnym typom współpracy (koordynacji, kooperacji i kolaboracji). Matryca pozwala identyfikować specyfikę konkretnych przykładów mobilizacji społecznej, jak i rozpoznawać luki w kształceniu kolektywnych umiejętności współdziałania. Rezultaty analizy pozwalają zoperacjonalizować praktyki oporu pod kątem celów wychowania i stawiają w nowym świetle problemy powiązań i nawarstwiania się wrogich szkole ideologii neoliberalizmu, nacjonalizmu i militaryzmu. ; The paper analyses types of political education worth developing in contemporary Polish schools and in other places dedicated to building human capacity to work together in a non-alienated way. The analysis is based on my own research from the area of learning in social movements. I analyze three orders ensuring social coordination (neoliberalism, nationalism, and militarism) in the context of the values they exclude: the common good, self-government and peace. The result of the work is a matrix assigning these counter-values, accordingly, to coordination, cooperation and collaboration. 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The research analyses the role that law and the state of exception have played in the development and transformation of the Colombian state. This research shows, on the one hand, the enormous amount of research that has been carried out on the legal and political situation in Colombia and, on the other hand, the lack of a clear analysis of the relationship between law, violence and the state of exception. This relationship is transcendental if one seeks to understand the transformation of current states. For this reason, the thesis is built around the link between law and violence, which is manifested in the rule of law-state of exception dichotomy. This allows us to understand the development of Janus states, i.e. highly repressive and violent constitutional regimes. The case of Colombia exemplifies the situation of a Janus state that establishes the protection of rights, respect for the law and democracy as the foundation of its institutions, while at the same time coexisting with armed conflict, state violence and social inequality. This disconnect between, on the one hand, institutions and legal guarantees and, on the other hand, the application of law and reality, is neither uniform nor absolute. On the contrary, it is fragmentary and relative because it depends on the territory and the way in which power relations intervene in the articulation of the political and legal order. In order to understand the nature and character of a state such as the Colombian state, a characterization of legal and political normality and exceptionality was developed that includes the flexibility and fluidity of power relations, without resorting to closed definitions that are problematic when analyzing social phenomena. In such a way that this analysis allows for a discussion of the transformation undergone by various states in general. In this sense, the thesis goes beyond the conventional legal definitions of the state of exception, since it is possible to construct a broad analysis thanks to the study of major authors. However, as the research progressed, it became clear that it was necessary to construct, firstly, a characterization that would make it possible to study the various manifestations of exceptionality, both extreme and moderate, and secondly, a differentiation between normality and legal and political exceptionality. Two tasks that could not be achieved without the help of various theories that, beyond their differences, coincided in studying the relations between law, politics and violence. Taking these elements into consideration, the thesis poses two key questions. Firstly, it seeks to establish what was the mechanism or phenomenon that allowed legal exceptionality, concretized in the indiscriminate use of the state of exception, to continue during legal normality, and secondly, it seeks to determine what is the characterization of normality and legal and political exceptionality in Colombia? The answers to these questions are structured throughout the three parts of the thesis by means of two analyses, on the one hand, the theoretical analysis in which the characterization of normality and legal and political exceptionality is constructed in a general way and, on the other hand, the historical-legal analysis that aims to articulate this characterization with the specific case of Colombia. These analyses are in constant tension, which enriches the research and the debate. The first part of the paper provides a general characterization of normality and exceptionality structured around five fundamental elements. First, the characterization is permeable to social phenomena. Secondly, the analysis is based on a value judgement that must be located in a specific space, i.e. it is a judgement that indicates whether a phenomenon is favorable or unfavorable for the development of social life, which is located within the republican tradition and the rule of law. Thirdly, the characterization indicates that not everything that escapes normality is harmful, since the tensions between the normal and the abnormal often allow institutions to adapt. Fourthly, the characterization admits levels and variations because it does not respond to ideal models. Therefore, for there to be legal normality, it is not necessary for all law to be applied, since it is a recognized fact that normative systems function through the administration of illegalities. Fifthly, the categories of normality and exceptionality allow for a critical analysis of constitutional states. From this general characterization carried out in the first part of the thesis, the second part of the thesis seeks to characterize the normality and exceptionality of the Colombian state. To achieve this objective, firstly, the legal regime of the state of exception in Colombia is studied; secondly, an assessment of the role of the three branches of public power in relation to the state of exception is carried out; thirdly, symptomatic phenomena of the process of exceptionalities of law are analyzed; and fourthly, the characterization of the Colombian case is structured. Finally, in the third part of the thesis, a study is made of two presidential periods in which manifestations of the state of exception, the process of the exceptionalities of law and political exceptionality can be appreciated. These periods were chosen because they represent key moments in Colombia's recent history in which the manifestations of exceptionality were extreme. The articulation of the three parts of the thesis makes it possible to characterize Colombia's legal and political normality and exceptionality, hence some key elements stand out. Firstly, it is important to point out that legal exceptionality during the period of the 1886 Constitution, especially throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was characterized by the instrumentalization of the state of siege as a form of government. It was used to restrict citizens' rights, exclude fundamental issues for the community from democratic debate and impose a political and economic project. Subsequently, the legal normality established by the 1991 Constitution did not mean a break with the process of exceptionalities of law, although it did mean a break with the tendency to maintain the state of emergency permanently. This assertion is based on the fact that the constitutional and democratic order was altered by the process of the exceptionalities of law. This was manifested through phenomena such as constitutional reformism and the fetishism of the law, which allowed the political order to continue despite the instrumental ineffectiveness of the legal order. And the alternative orders that were maintained and generated hybridizations with the state legal order. In this scenario, legal normality fulfilled the function of concealing both the hybridizations between the state legal order and the alternative orders and the spaces of political exceptionality. Secondly, the process of the exceptionalities of law is integrated into political normality as a mechanism for preserving and opposing changes that alter the status quo of political power. This process can thus be said to affect political normality from the top down when political power promotes a raison d'état in which derivative interests take precedence over formal interests. This transformation was achieved through the development of a set of exceptional techniques such as clientelism, political violence and corruption that ended up influencing institutionalist and social life. Likewise, the process of exceptionalities was structured from the bottom up through micro-level power relations in which exceptional forms and alternative orders emerged and permeated the state's legal and political order. Thirdly, the historical fragmentation of the state is also part of the political normality that originates in the selective strengthening and differentiated presence of state organization. Similarly, state weakness is another distinctive feature that is reflected in the state's extreme dependence on politico-economic elites. However, this weakness contrasts with the macro-level stability of the state, which is based on factors such as the elites' ability to adapt clientelist and landlord structures to the demands of the capitalist system. Fourthly, in political normality, two facets of the state can be identified: on the one hand, a democratic state that guarantees real political competition, the rule of law, the continuity of the economic system and formal equality of access to income distribution, and, on the other hand, an exclusive and fragmented state that is guided by derivative ends, leading to the concentration of political power, capital and land in the hands of an elite. Fifth, political exceptionality is characterized by its intermittency, since it is not a generalized phenomenon that affects the entire territory, and by the predominance of political exceptionality in the dominant sense. Sixth, it is important to highlight two conclusions that emerge throughout the thesis. The first is that violence has both a destructive and a constructive capacity that allows it to shape power relations, as can be seen in the emergence of alternative orders. And the second is that the boundaries between legal exceptionality and political exceptionality are not absolute, i.e. a process of constant exceptionalities of law can give way to the emergence of spaces of political exceptionality. In sum, the research allows us to understand the transformations of Colombia's legal and political order without falling into superficial assertions that categories it simply as dictatorial or guarantees. On the contrary, the thesis seeks to show precisely the historical, legal and political particularities. In this sense, the research contributes to the debate on the role of the state, law and violence in today's societies. These societies are facing great challenges without adequately dimensioning the profound transformations that the legal and political orders have undergone in recent decades. ; La thèse chercher à comprendre le rôle du droit et de l'état d'exception dans le développement et la transformation des États actuels et en particulier de l'État colombien. Cette thèse a amené à découvrir, d'une part, l'énorme travail de recherche qui a été mené sur la situation juridique et politique de la Colombie et, d'autre part, l'absence d' analyse mettant clairement en évidence la relation entre le droit, la violence et l'état d'exception. Une relation qui s'avérait transcendantale lorsqu'il s'agit de chercher à comprendre la transformation des États. Pour cette même raison, la thèse est construite autour de la relation qui existe entre droit et violence, lien explicite dans la dichotomie État de droit-État d'exception. Ceci permet de saisir la mise en place d'États Janus, c'est-à-dire de régimes constitutionnels hautement répressifs et violents. Le cas colombien illustre la situation d'un État Janus qui établit la protection des droits, le respect de la loi et de la démocratie comme fondement de ses institutions, tout en coexistant avec le conflit armé, la violence étatique et les inégalités sociales. Cette déconnexion entre, d'un côté, les institutions et les garanties juridiques et, de l'autre, l'application du droit et la réalité, n'est ni uniforme ni absolue. Au contraire, elle est fragmentaire et relative puisqu'elle est fonction du territoire et de la manière dont les relations de pouvoir interviennent dans l'articulation de l'ordre politique et juridique. Afin de pouvoir comprendre la nature et le caractère d'un État comme l'État colombien. Cette recherche a opéré une caractérisation de la normalité et de l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique qui inclurait la flexibilité et la fluidité des relations de pouvoir, sans recourir à des définitions hermétiques toujours problématiques pour l'analyse de phénomènes sociaux. De sorte que la thèse permettra d'ouvrir le débat sur les transformations enregistrées par la Colombie, mais aussi plus généralement par divers autres États. En ce sens, cette thèse va au-delà des définitions juridiques conventionnelles sur l'état d'exception puisque, grâce à l'étude des grands auteurs, nous parvenons à élaborer une analyse approfondie.Toutefois, à mesure qu'avançait la recherche, devenait de plus en plus évidente la nécessité de construire, en premier lieu, une caractérisation qui permettrait d'étudier les diverses manifestations de l'exceptionnalité, aussi bien extrêmes que modérées, et, en second lieu, une différenciation entre normalité et exceptionnalité juridique et politique. Deux tâches irréalisables sans recourir à diverses théories qui, par-delà leurs différences, se rejoignent pour étudier les relations entre droit, politique et violence. Compte tenu de ces éléments, la thèse pose deux questions clés. En premier lieu, nous cherchons à déterminer le mécanisme ou le phénomène qui a permis que l'exceptionnalité juridique concrétisée par le recours indiscriminé à l'état d'exception puisse se poursuivre pendant la normalité juridique. Et, en second lieu, nous prétendons déterminer comment se caractérisent la normalité et l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique en Colombie. Les réponses à ces deux questions occupent les trois parties de la thèse et reposent sur le fondement de deux analyses. D'une part, l'analyse théorique sur laquelle est construite la caractérisation de la normalité et de l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique de manière générale et, d'autre part, l'analyse historico-juridique qui prétend appliquer cette caractérisation au cas spécifique de la Colombie. Ces analyses sont en tension constante ce qui enrichit la recherche et le débat. Pour commencer, la caractérisation générale de la normalité et de l'exceptionnalité est construite autour de cinq éléments fondamentaux. En premier lieu, la caractérisation est perméable aux phénomènes sociaux. En second lieu, l'analyse part d'un jugement de valeur qui doit se situer dans un espace concret. Il s'agit, en effet, d'un jugement qui indique si un phénomène est favorable ou non au développement de la vie sociale, tel qu'il est entendu au sein de la tradition républicaine et de l'État de droit. En troisième lieu, la caractérisation indique que tout ce qui est soustrait à la normalité n'est pas préjudiciable puisque, souvent, les tensions entre normal et anormal permettent d'adapter les institutions. En quatrième lieu, la caractérisation présente des paliers et des variations car elle ne répond pas à des modèles idéaux. Par conséquent, pour qu'il y ait normalité juridique, il n'est pas nécessaire que s'applique l'intégralité du droit, car c'est un fait avéré que les systèmes normatifs fonctionnent au moyen de la gestion des illégalismes. Et, en cinquième lieu, les catégories de normalité et d'exceptionnalité permettent de mener une analyse critique des États constitutionnels. À partir de cette caractérisation générale de la première partie de la thèse, la seconde partie cherche à caractériser la normalité et l'exceptionnalité de l'État colombien. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous étudions en premier lieu le régime juridique de l'état d'exception en Colombie. En second lieu, nous faisons le bilan du rôle des trois branches des pouvoirs publics en relation avec l'état d'exception. En troisième lieu, nous analysons des phénomènes symptomatiques du processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit et, en quatrième lieu, nous mettons en évidence le cas colombien. Finalement, dans la dernière partie de la thèse, nous nous livrons à une étude de deux périodes présidentielles qui nous permettent d'apprécier des manifestations de l'état d'exception, du processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit et de l'exceptionnalité politique. Nous avons choisi ces périodes car elles représentent des moments clés de l'histoire récente de la Colombie pendant lesquels les manifestations de l'exceptionnalité ont été extrêmes. L'articulation des trois parties de la thèse permet de caractériser la normalité et l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique de la Colombie. C'est pour cela que nous reprenons certains éléments clé. En premier lieu, il convient de signaler que l'exceptionnalité juridique pendant toute la durée de la Constitution de 1886, notamment pendant les années 70 et 80, s'est caractérisée par l'instrumentalisation de l'état de siège comme forme de gouvernement. L'état de siège a été utilisé pour restreindre les droits des citoyens, exclure du débat démocratique des matières fondamentales pour la communauté et imposer un projet politique et économique. Postérieurement, la normalité juridique instaurée par la Constitution de 1991 n'a pas constitué une rupture avec le processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit, mais avec la tendance à maintenir l'état d'exception de manière permanente. Cette affirmation s'appuie sur le fait que l'ordre constitutionnel et démocratique a été altéré par le processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit. Ceci a été illustré par des phénomènes comme le réformisme constitutionnel et le fétichisme de la loi qui permettaient la continuité de l'ordre politique, malgré l'inefficacité instrumentale de l'ordre juridique. Et, de même, par les ordres alternatifs qui se sont maintenus et ont généré des hybridations avec l'ordre juridique étatique. Dans ce scénario, la normalité juridique a eu pour fonction d'occulter les hybridations entre l'ordre juridique étatique et les ordres alternatifs, aussi bien que les espaces d'exceptionnalité politique. En second lieu, le processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit s'intègre à la normalité politique comme un mécanisme qui permet de conserver et de s'opposer aux changements qui altèrent le statu quo du pouvoir politique. Nous pouvons ainsi affirmer que ce processus affecte la normalité politique de haut en bas lorsque le pouvoir politique encourage une raison d'État où priment les intérêts dérivés sur les intérêts formels. Cette transformation est devenue effective grâce à la mise en place d'un ensemble de techniques exceptionnelles comme le clientélisme, la violence politique et la corruption qui ont fini par influer sur l'institutionnalité et la vie sociale. De même, le processus d'exceptionnalisation s'est structuré de bas en haut grâce aux relations de pouvoir au niveau micro d'où ont surgi des formes exceptionnelles et des ordres alternatifs qui se sont infiltrés dans l'ordre juridique et politique étatique. En troisième lieu, la fragmentation historique de l'État relève aussi de la normalité politique qui tire son origine du renforcement sélectif et de la présence différenciée de l'organisation étatique. De même, la faiblesse étatique est un autre trait distinctif qui se reflète dans la dépendance extrême de l'État par rapport aux élites politico-économiques. Toutefois, cette faiblesse s'oppose à une stabilité de l'État au niveau macro dont le fondement réside dans des facteurs comme la capacité des élites d'adapter les structures clientélistes et celles des propriétaires terriens aux exigences du système capitaliste. En quatrième lieu, dans la normalité politique on peut identifier deux facettes de l'État avec, d'un côté, un État démocratique qui garantit un vrai affrontement politique, le maintien en vigueur du droit, la continuité du système économique et l'égalité formelle d'accès à la distribution du revenu et, de l'autre, un État exclusif et fragmenté guidé par des fins dérivées provoquant la concentration entre les mains d'une élite politique des capitaux et des terres. En cinquième lieu, l'exceptionnalité politique est caractérisée par son intermittence puisque ce n'est pas un phénomène généralisé qui affecte tout le territoire. Enfin, en sixième lieu, il convient de mettre en exergue deux conclusions qui s'imposent tout au long de la thèse. La première est que la violence a une capacité destructive et une capacité constructive qui lui permet de façonner les relations de pouvoir, comme nous le voyons avec l'éclosion des ordres alternatifs. Et la seconde est que les limites entre l'exceptionnalité juridique et l'exceptionnalité politique ne sont pas absolues, ce qui signifie qu'un processus constant d'exceptionnalisation du droit peut permettre l'apparition d'espaces d'exceptionnalité politique. En résumé, cette recherche permet de comprendre les transformations de l'ordre juridique et politique de la Colombie, sans tomber dans des affirmations superficielles qui l'assimilent à un ordre dictatorial ou soucieux de garanties. Au contraire, la thèse cherche à montrer de manière précise les particularités historiques, juridiques et politiques. En ce sens, la recherche alimente le débat sur le rôle de l'État, du droit et de la violence dans les sociétés actuelles. ; (DROI - Sciences juridiques) -- UCL, 2021

The research analyses the role that law and the state of exception have played in the development and transformation of the Colombian state. This research shows, on the one hand, the enormous amount of research that has been carried out on the legal and political situation in Colombia and, on the other hand, the lack of a clear analysis of the relationship between law, violence and the state of exception. This relationship is transcendental if one seeks to understand the transformation of current states. For this reason, the thesis is built around the link between law and violence, which is manifested in the rule of law-state of exception dichotomy. This allows us to understand the development of Janus states, i.e. highly repressive and violent constitutional regimes. The case of Colombia exemplifies the situation of a Janus state that establishes the protection of rights, respect for the law and democracy as the foundation of its institutions, while at the same time coexisting with armed conflict, state violence and social inequality. This disconnect between, on the one hand, institutions and legal guarantees and, on the other hand, the application of law and reality, is neither uniform nor absolute. On the contrary, it is fragmentary and relative because it depends on the territory and the way in which power relations intervene in the articulation of the political and legal order. In order to understand the nature and character of a state such as the Colombian state, a characterization of legal and political normality and exceptionality was developed that includes the flexibility and fluidity of power relations, without resorting to closed definitions that are problematic when analyzing social phenomena. In such a way that this analysis allows for a discussion of the transformation undergone by various states in general. In this sense, the thesis goes beyond the conventional legal definitions of the state of exception, since it is possible to construct a broad analysis thanks to the study of major authors. However, as the research progressed, it became clear that it was necessary to construct, firstly, a characterization that would make it possible to study the various manifestations of exceptionality, both extreme and moderate, and secondly, a differentiation between normality and legal and political exceptionality. Two tasks that could not be achieved without the help of various theories that, beyond their differences, coincided in studying the relations between law, politics and violence. Taking these elements into consideration, the thesis poses two key questions. Firstly, it seeks to establish what was the mechanism or phenomenon that allowed legal exceptionality, concretized in the indiscriminate use of the state of exception, to continue during legal normality, and secondly, it seeks to determine what is the characterization of normality and legal and political exceptionality in Colombia? The answers to these questions are structured throughout the three parts of the thesis by means of two analyses, on the one hand, the theoretical analysis in which the characterization of normality and legal and political exceptionality is constructed in a general way and, on the other hand, the historical-legal analysis that aims to articulate this characterization with the specific case of Colombia. These analyses are in constant tension, which enriches the research and the debate. The first part of the paper provides a general characterization of normality and exceptionality structured around five fundamental elements. First, the characterization is permeable to social phenomena. Secondly, the analysis is based on a value judgement that must be located in a specific space, i.e. it is a judgement that indicates whether a phenomenon is favorable or unfavorable for the development of social life, which is located within the republican tradition and the rule of law. Thirdly, the characterization indicates that not everything that escapes normality is harmful, since the tensions between the normal and the abnormal often allow institutions to adapt. Fourthly, the characterization admits levels and variations because it does not respond to ideal models. Therefore, for there to be legal normality, it is not necessary for all law to be applied, since it is a recognized fact that normative systems function through the administration of illegalities. Fifthly, the categories of normality and exceptionality allow for a critical analysis of constitutional states. From this general characterization carried out in the first part of the thesis, the second part of the thesis seeks to characterize the normality and exceptionality of the Colombian state. To achieve this objective, firstly, the legal regime of the state of exception in Colombia is studied; secondly, an assessment of the role of the three branches of public power in relation to the state of exception is carried out; thirdly, symptomatic phenomena of the process of exceptionalities of law are analyzed; and fourthly, the characterization of the Colombian case is structured. Finally, in the third part of the thesis, a study is made of two presidential periods in which manifestations of the state of exception, the process of the exceptionalities of law and political exceptionality can be appreciated. These periods were chosen because they represent key moments in Colombia's recent history in which the manifestations of exceptionality were extreme. The articulation of the three parts of the thesis makes it possible to characterize Colombia's legal and political normality and exceptionality, hence some key elements stand out. Firstly, it is important to point out that legal exceptionality during the period of the 1886 Constitution, especially throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was characterized by the instrumentalization of the state of siege as a form of government. It was used to restrict citizens' rights, exclude fundamental issues for the community from democratic debate and impose a political and economic project. Subsequently, the legal normality established by the 1991 Constitution did not mean a break with the process of exceptionalities of law, although it did mean a break with the tendency to maintain the state of emergency permanently. This assertion is based on the fact that the constitutional and democratic order was altered by the process of the exceptionalities of law. This was manifested through phenomena such as constitutional reformism and the fetishism of the law, which allowed the political order to continue despite the instrumental ineffectiveness of the legal order. And the alternative orders that were maintained and generated hybridizations with the state legal order. In this scenario, legal normality fulfilled the function of concealing both the hybridizations between the state legal order and the alternative orders and the spaces of political exceptionality. Secondly, the process of the exceptionalities of law is integrated into political normality as a mechanism for preserving and opposing changes that alter the status quo of political power. This process can thus be said to affect political normality from the top down when political power promotes a raison d'état in which derivative interests take precedence over formal interests. This transformation was achieved through the development of a set of exceptional techniques such as clientelism, political violence and corruption that ended up influencing institutionalist and social life. Likewise, the process of exceptionalities was structured from the bottom up through micro-level power relations in which exceptional forms and alternative orders emerged and permeated the state's legal and political order. Thirdly, the historical fragmentation of the state is also part of the political normality that originates in the selective strengthening and differentiated presence of state organization. Similarly, state weakness is another distinctive feature that is reflected in the state's extreme dependence on politico-economic elites. However, this weakness contrasts with the macro-level stability of the state, which is based on factors such as the elites' ability to adapt clientelist and landlord structures to the demands of the capitalist system. Fourthly, in political normality, two facets of the state can be identified: on the one hand, a democratic state that guarantees real political competition, the rule of law, the continuity of the economic system and formal equality of access to income distribution, and, on the other hand, an exclusive and fragmented state that is guided by derivative ends, leading to the concentration of political power, capital and land in the hands of an elite. Fifth, political exceptionality is characterized by its intermittency, since it is not a generalized phenomenon that affects the entire territory, and by the predominance of political exceptionality in the dominant sense. Sixth, it is important to highlight two conclusions that emerge throughout the thesis. The first is that violence has both a destructive and a constructive capacity that allows it to shape power relations, as can be seen in the emergence of alternative orders. And the second is that the boundaries between legal exceptionality and political exceptionality are not absolute, i.e. a process of constant exceptionalities of law can give way to the emergence of spaces of political exceptionality. In sum, the research allows us to understand the transformations of Colombia's legal and political order without falling into superficial assertions that categories it simply as dictatorial or guarantees. On the contrary, the thesis seeks to show precisely the historical, legal and political particularities. In this sense, the research contributes to the debate on the role of the state, law and violence in today's societies. These societies are facing great challenges without adequately dimensioning the profound transformations that the legal and political orders have undergone in recent decades. ; La thèse chercher à comprendre le rôle du droit et de l'état d'exception dans le développement et la transformation des États actuels et en particulier de l'État colombien. Cette thèse a amené à découvrir, d'une part, l'énorme travail de recherche qui a été mené sur la situation juridique et politique de la Colombie et, d'autre part, l'absence d' analyse mettant clairement en évidence la relation entre le droit, la violence et l'état d'exception. Une relation qui s'avérait transcendantale lorsqu'il s'agit de chercher à comprendre la transformation des États. Pour cette même raison, la thèse est construite autour de la relation qui existe entre droit et violence, lien explicite dans la dichotomie État de droit-État d'exception. Ceci permet de saisir la mise en place d'États Janus, c'est-à-dire de régimes constitutionnels hautement répressifs et violents. Le cas colombien illustre la situation d'un État Janus qui établit la protection des droits, le respect de la loi et de la démocratie comme fondement de ses institutions, tout en coexistant avec le conflit armé, la violence étatique et les inégalités sociales. Cette déconnexion entre, d'un côté, les institutions et les garanties juridiques et, de l'autre, l'application du droit et la réalité, n'est ni uniforme ni absolue. Au contraire, elle est fragmentaire et relative puisqu'elle est fonction du territoire et de la manière dont les relations de pouvoir interviennent dans l'articulation de l'ordre politique et juridique. Afin de pouvoir comprendre la nature et le caractère d'un État comme l'État colombien. Cette recherche a opéré une caractérisation de la normalité et de l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique qui inclurait la flexibilité et la fluidité des relations de pouvoir, sans recourir à des définitions hermétiques toujours problématiques pour l'analyse de phénomènes sociaux. De sorte que la thèse permettra d'ouvrir le débat sur les transformations enregistrées par la Colombie, mais aussi plus généralement par divers autres États. En ce sens, cette thèse va au-delà des définitions juridiques conventionnelles sur l'état d'exception puisque, grâce à l'étude des grands auteurs, nous parvenons à élaborer une analyse approfondie.Toutefois, à mesure qu'avançait la recherche, devenait de plus en plus évidente la nécessité de construire, en premier lieu, une caractérisation qui permettrait d'étudier les diverses manifestations de l'exceptionnalité, aussi bien extrêmes que modérées, et, en second lieu, une différenciation entre normalité et exceptionnalité juridique et politique. Deux tâches irréalisables sans recourir à diverses théories qui, par-delà leurs différences, se rejoignent pour étudier les relations entre droit, politique et violence. Compte tenu de ces éléments, la thèse pose deux questions clés. En premier lieu, nous cherchons à déterminer le mécanisme ou le phénomène qui a permis que l'exceptionnalité juridique concrétisée par le recours indiscriminé à l'état d'exception puisse se poursuivre pendant la normalité juridique. Et, en second lieu, nous prétendons déterminer comment se caractérisent la normalité et l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique en Colombie. Les réponses à ces deux questions occupent les trois parties de la thèse et reposent sur le fondement de deux analyses. D'une part, l'analyse théorique sur laquelle est construite la caractérisation de la normalité et de l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique de manière générale et, d'autre part, l'analyse historico-juridique qui prétend appliquer cette caractérisation au cas spécifique de la Colombie. Ces analyses sont en tension constante ce qui enrichit la recherche et le débat. Pour commencer, la caractérisation générale de la normalité et de l'exceptionnalité est construite autour de cinq éléments fondamentaux. En premier lieu, la caractérisation est perméable aux phénomènes sociaux. En second lieu, l'analyse part d'un jugement de valeur qui doit se situer dans un espace concret. Il s'agit, en effet, d'un jugement qui indique si un phénomène est favorable ou non au développement de la vie sociale, tel qu'il est entendu au sein de la tradition républicaine et de l'État de droit. En troisième lieu, la caractérisation indique que tout ce qui est soustrait à la normalité n'est pas préjudiciable puisque, souvent, les tensions entre normal et anormal permettent d'adapter les institutions. En quatrième lieu, la caractérisation présente des paliers et des variations car elle ne répond pas à des modèles idéaux. Par conséquent, pour qu'il y ait normalité juridique, il n'est pas nécessaire que s'applique l'intégralité du droit, car c'est un fait avéré que les systèmes normatifs fonctionnent au moyen de la gestion des illégalismes. Et, en cinquième lieu, les catégories de normalité et d'exceptionnalité permettent de mener une analyse critique des États constitutionnels. À partir de cette caractérisation générale de la première partie de la thèse, la seconde partie cherche à caractériser la normalité et l'exceptionnalité de l'État colombien. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous étudions en premier lieu le régime juridique de l'état d'exception en Colombie. En second lieu, nous faisons le bilan du rôle des trois branches des pouvoirs publics en relation avec l'état d'exception. En troisième lieu, nous analysons des phénomènes symptomatiques du processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit et, en quatrième lieu, nous mettons en évidence le cas colombien. Finalement, dans la dernière partie de la thèse, nous nous livrons à une étude de deux périodes présidentielles qui nous permettent d'apprécier des manifestations de l'état d'exception, du processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit et de l'exceptionnalité politique. Nous avons choisi ces périodes car elles représentent des moments clés de l'histoire récente de la Colombie pendant lesquels les manifestations de l'exceptionnalité ont été extrêmes. L'articulation des trois parties de la thèse permet de caractériser la normalité et l'exceptionnalité juridique et politique de la Colombie. C'est pour cela que nous reprenons certains éléments clé. En premier lieu, il convient de signaler que l'exceptionnalité juridique pendant toute la durée de la Constitution de 1886, notamment pendant les années 70 et 80, s'est caractérisée par l'instrumentalisation de l'état de siège comme forme de gouvernement. L'état de siège a été utilisé pour restreindre les droits des citoyens, exclure du débat démocratique des matières fondamentales pour la communauté et imposer un projet politique et économique. Postérieurement, la normalité juridique instaurée par la Constitution de 1991 n'a pas constitué une rupture avec le processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit, mais avec la tendance à maintenir l'état d'exception de manière permanente. Cette affirmation s'appuie sur le fait que l'ordre constitutionnel et démocratique a été altéré par le processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit. Ceci a été illustré par des phénomènes comme le réformisme constitutionnel et le fétichisme de la loi qui permettaient la continuité de l'ordre politique, malgré l'inefficacité instrumentale de l'ordre juridique. Et, de même, par les ordres alternatifs qui se sont maintenus et ont généré des hybridations avec l'ordre juridique étatique. Dans ce scénario, la normalité juridique a eu pour fonction d'occulter les hybridations entre l'ordre juridique étatique et les ordres alternatifs, aussi bien que les espaces d'exceptionnalité politique. En second lieu, le processus d'exceptionnalisation du droit s'intègre à la normalité politique comme un mécanisme qui permet de conserver et de s'opposer aux changements qui altèrent le statu quo du pouvoir politique. Nous pouvons ainsi affirmer que ce processus affecte la normalité politique de haut en bas lorsque le pouvoir politique encourage une raison d'État où priment les intérêts dérivés sur les intérêts formels. Cette transformation est devenue effective grâce à la mise en place d'un ensemble de techniques exceptionnelles comme le clientélisme, la violence politique et la corruption qui ont fini par influer sur l'institutionnalité et la vie sociale. De même, le processus d'exceptionnalisation s'est structuré de bas en haut grâce aux relations de pouvoir au niveau micro d'où ont surgi des formes exceptionnelles et des ordres alternatifs qui se sont infiltrés dans l'ordre juridique et politique étatique. En troisième lieu, la fragmentation historique de l'État relève aussi de la normalité politique qui tire son origine du renforcement sélectif et de la présence différenciée de l'organisation étatique. De même, la faiblesse étatique est un autre trait distinctif qui se reflète dans la dépendance extrême de l'État par rapport aux élites politico-économiques. Toutefois, cette faiblesse s'oppose à une stabilité de l'État au niveau macro dont le fondement réside dans des facteurs comme la capacité des élites d'adapter les structures clientélistes et celles des propriétaires terriens aux exigences du système capitaliste. En quatrième lieu, dans la normalité politique on peut identifier deux facettes de l'État avec, d'un côté, un État démocratique qui garantit un vrai affrontement politique, le maintien en vigueur du droit, la continuité du système économique et l'égalité formelle d'accès à la distribution du revenu et, de l'autre, un État exclusif et fragmenté guidé par des fins dérivées provoquant la concentration entre les mains d'une élite politique des capitaux et des terres. En cinquième lieu, l'exceptionnalité politique est caractérisée par son intermittence puisque ce n'est pas un phénomène généralisé qui affecte tout le territoire. Enfin, en sixième lieu, il convient de mettre en exergue deux conclusions qui s'imposent tout au long de la thèse. La première est que la violence a une capacité destructive et une capacité constructive qui lui permet de façonner les relations de pouvoir, comme nous le voyons avec l'éclosion des ordres alternatifs. Et la seconde est que les limites entre l'exceptionnalité juridique et l'exceptionnalité politique ne sont pas absolues, ce qui signifie qu'un processus constant d'exceptionnalisation du droit peut permettre l'apparition d'espaces d'exceptionnalité politique. En résumé, cette recherche permet de comprendre les transformations de l'ordre juridique et politique de la Colombie, sans tomber dans des affirmations superficielles qui l'assimilent à un ordre dictatorial ou soucieux de garanties. Au contraire, la thèse cherche à montrer de manière précise les particularités historiques, juridiques et politiques. En ce sens, la recherche alimente le débat sur le rôle de l'État, du droit et de la violence dans les sociétés actuelles. ; (DROI - Sciences juridiques) -- UCL, 2021

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Ned
Lebow on Drivers of War, Cultural Theory, and IR of Foxes and Hedgehogs









Drawing
on classical political theories, International Relations is dominated by
theories that presuppose interests or fear as dominant drivers for foreign
policy. Richard Ned Lebow looks further back into the history of ideas to conjure up a
more varied set of drives that underpin political action. In this Talk, Lebow, among others, elaborates on
the underpinnings of political action, discusses how war drives innovations in
IR theorizing in the 20th century, and likens himself to a fox,
rather than a hedgehog.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)








What
is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?







Well, the big challenge in international politics is always
how do we keep from destroying one another and that's the negative question.
But it is mirrored by a positive question which is, how do we build community
and tolerance and peace? And that's not exactly the flip side, but that's
always been the big question in IR. And part of that, I think, is how we learn
to manage threatening change. Because in my perspective, that's the driving
force of conflict: ultimately, both World Wars can be attributed to
modernization and its destabilizing consequences. That is also the reason why
it is a falsehood to base theory on that little select slice of history during
the World Wars, extrapolate it, and try to think its universal. Yet that is
what IR theory does: so many theorists, and so many of the people you recently
interviewed, are guilty of doing that. So that's the big question and
certainly, that's what drove me to study IR in the hope that I could make some
small contribution to figuring out some of the answers or partial answers to
these questions.







If we turn to what the central debate should be in
International Theory, well, I would frame this in two parts: the first should
be 'what are the different ways in which we can conceive of international
theory and how, by all of us pursuing it the way we feel comfortable with, we
can enrich the field without throwing bric-a-brac at each other and find ways
of learning from each other?'







A few years ago, I edited a book with Mark Lichbach (Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics
and International Relations) as a rejoinder to King, Keohane and Verba's
book, which we found deeply offensive. It has the narrowest framework and then
they base their understanding on the Vienna school yet they seem to have forgotten
that Hempel and Popper would disavow the positions that King, Keohane and Verba
(KKV) are anchoring themselves in as epistemologically primitive. And the very
examples they give to illustrate 'good science'—Alvarez and his groupaddressing the problem of dinosaur extinction—they fail to see that what
these people did was in fact code on the dependent variable, which is the big
no-no for KKV! And the reason why Alvarez et al were taken seriously, was not because they went through the order
of research that KKV promoted, but rather because they came up with an
explanation for a phenomenon that people have long known about—yet explanations
don't figure at all in KKV's take; they had no interest in mechanisms, it was
all narrow correlations. It's absurd! So we edited the book, and we invited
people who represented different perspectives, but all of whom had evidence and
struggled to make sense of the evidence, to talk to one another and to look at
the problems they themselves find in their positions and how one could learn
broadly from considering this. That's the kind of debate that seems to me is a
useful one. Not who is right or wrong, but how can we learn collectively. And
secondly, I think maybe we need fewer debates, and more good research.











How did you arrive
at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?







I suppose it's a combination of people, books, and events, and
being a dog that constantly gnaws on bones and works it through. Very clearly the
Second World War and the Cold War were what brought me to the study of IR. I'm sure
in their absence, considering the counterfactual, I would have gone into Astrophysics,
which was the other field that really interested me.







I think the first concrete influence was as an undergraduate
and then as a graduate, being struck by certain individuals whose minds seemed
to sparkle; and I admired them for that and they became role models. And I
would make myself, intellectually, a little Hans Morgenthau, a little Karl
Deutsch; see the world through their eyes, and play with it. I never really wanted
to make myself into them, but rather to benefit by seeing what the world was
like when seen through their eyes. So in this sense, let me go back and draw on
Boswell, Hughes, and Mill for my answer. They all conceived of identity as
something that's a process of self-fashioning in which we mix and match the
characteristics that we observe in other people. And the purpose of society is
to throw up these role models and provide interaction with them so that we can
constantly be engaging in self-fashioning. And ultimately, we create something
that's novel that other people want to emulate or reject, as the case may be.
And I think that mixing and matching, and ultimately creating a synthesis of my
own, I developed my own approach to things.







The second element of this is to pick problems that engage
me, and stick with them. My first book in IR was about international crises and
I worked on this, it must have been 8, possibly even 9 years. I started out initially
convinced that deterrence theory made sense but wouldn't fit the historical evidence. Then one day, while
playing around, I realized the theory was wrong and by reversing it, I could
understand why it didn't work and see there were very different dynamics at
play. So working on a problem constantly and going back and forth between
theory and empirical findings, you gradually develop your own sense of the
field.







It also helps, over the course of an intellectual lifetime, to
work on different kinds of problems: I've just finished a book on the politics
and ethics of identity; I finished a manuscript up for review on the nature of
causation and different takes on cause; and the previous two books were on
counterfactuals and the origins of war. And I learned something theoretically
and methodologically by throwing myself into these problems and also, in some
cases, by going beyond what one would normally consider the domain of IR to look
for answers. I've often done philosophy and literature in the identity book. I
also go to musical texts: I have a reading of the Mozart Da Ponte Operas as a deliberate
thought experiment to test out ancient regime
and enlightenment identities under varying circumstances to expose what's wrong
with them and to work toward a better approach of Così fantutte. And I
read the music, not only the libretti,
to get at an answer. Of course, when you've been doing it a long time, it keeps
you alive and alert when you look at something new. I'm just finishing my 46th
year of University teaching. It's a long time!







Thirdly, there were a few pivotal books. I read George
Orwell's 1984 and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in the early 50s. Both
of those were very powerful books. I also read in about 1950 - Life Magazine
produced a large volume on WWII and it had fabulous photographs and of course
Life was famous, Robert Capa's photographs, and
the text by John Dos Passos. A big big book that I read and re-read and that
was a powerful influence on me. I'd say the Diary of Anne Frank, when it came
out, which was not all that dissimilar but had a different ending from my own
war experience, and then in high school I read, or struggled to read—I don't
think I understood it—Ideology and Utopia
(full text here) by Karl
Mannheim, and then I read Politics among
Nations and the Twenty Year's Crisis.
And both those books made enormous sense to me at the time. But I think the
book that over the course of my lifetime has had the most influence on me of
anything is Thucydides' The History of
the Peloponnesian War (read full text here).











What would a
student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global
way?







I am tempted to give you a flippant answer that an expert is
somebody from out of town; what used to be with slides would now be with a PowerPoint
presentation. I think frankly you need to do two things: you need to be
analytically sophisticated and original on the one hand, but to do it well, you
have to have an empirical base. There has to be some problem or set of problems
that you've rolled up your sleeves, looked at the data, talk to the people who
are on the ground doing these things, and you need to go back and forth between
that empirical knowledge and conceptual one. That's success as a social scientist. 







And traditionally, there's
always been another key. You must have one foot in society in which you belong
and another foot outside so you can do it as an outsider as well as an insider.
That's terribly important. I think, in this sense, that Americans are more
parochial than other people. They are good insiders but they are not very good
outsiders and they just don't understand the rest of the world and when you
read what they write about the rest of the world, you wonder what planet they
are living on. If you don't see the rest of the world, you can't look at the
America from another perspective. It's like people who take hegemony seriously;
it's like believing in Santa Claus, except Santa Claus is benign. To gain a
deep experience of the world in itself is a pre-requisite. Do a year abroad in
some other culture. Learn a language. Have a relationship with someone from a
different culture—you begin to learn the languages and all the rest will come.
That's the way to start.











You are
most famous to most people for your Cultural
Theory of International Relations (2008). What does it comprise and can you
say something about its classical roots?







I return to classical theory of conflict and cooperation
because I find that in modern theory, all drives of human action have been
reduced to appetite, and reason to mere instrumentality. The Greeks, by
contrast, believed there were several fundamental drives—drives that affected
politics—and while these included appetite, they weren't just appetite. Reason was more than instrumentality; it also had
the goal of understanding what led to a happy life; then, next to reason and
appetite, the third drive was spirit or self-esteem (the Greek thumos), which is very different and
often opposed to appetite. It is about winning the approbation of others to
feel good about ourselves. The difference between honor and standing—two
variants of self-esteem—is that honor is status achieved within a fixed set of
rules, while standing is whenever you achieve status by whatever means.







Now most existing IR theories are either only built on
appetites—as liberalism and Marxism—or fear. And for the Greeks fear is not a
human drive but a powerful emotion which can become a motive. And when reason
loses control over either appetite or spirit, people begin to worry about their
own ability to satisfy their appetites, their spirit, or even protect
themselves physically. That's when fear becomes a powerful motive. Realism is
of course the paradigm developed around fear. I differ in that my theory
recognizes multiple motives, that are active to varying degrees at different
times. They don't blend the way a solution does in chemistry, but they retain
their own characteristics, even if jumbled together. So my theory expects to
see quite diverse and often conflicting behavior, whereas other theories only
pay attention to state behavior that seems to support their theory, and feel
the need to explain away other behavior inconsistent with their theory. I revel
in these variations. Second, I vary in describing what derives from these
motives as (Weberian) ideal types—which means, something you don't encounter in
the real world, but rather, an abstraction, a fictional or analytical
description, that helps to make sense of the real world but never maps onto it
exactly. So, a fear-based world gives you a very nice description of a
foundation of anarchy. But of course this is an ideal-type world. Fear is only
one motive. You have go to a place where civil order has broken down, like
Somalia or the trenches in WWII, to see fear-based models compete.







Starting from these three motives and the emotion of fear, I
argue that each of these generates a very different logic of cooperation,
conflict and risk-taking; and each is associated with a different kind of
hierarchy. And all of them except fear rely on a different principle of
justice. Just to give an example: for actors—whether individuals or
states—driven by self-esteem, they tend to be risk prone (because honor has to
be won by successfully overcoming ordeals and challenges); it leads to a
conflictual logic because you are competing with others for honor; and it can
be rule-based (although the rules can brake down and move into fear); and the
principle is one of fairness, in contrast to interest or appetite which has a
principle of equality. The hierarchy is one of clientelism, where people honor
those at the top, which, in return, provides practical benefits for those on
the bottom. The Greeks called this hegemonia;
the Chinese had a similar system.







But because any actual system is not an ideal type, we have
to figure out what that mixture is and we can begin to understand foreign
policies. And I try to give numerous examples in the book. And the big turning
point, I argue, is modernity, where it becomes more difficult to untangle the
motives and their discourses. Because in modernity both Rousseau and Adam Smith
try to understand why we want material things, so the two become connected. You
could argue that even in Egyptian times they were connected, in the pyramids,
which are nothing if not erections of self-esteem. But it becomes more
difficult and so, rather than saying, using literary texts, artistic works and
political speeches as a way of determining the relationship, I approached the
problem differently with the examples of the World Wars, the Cold War, and the
Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq. I said let's run a test of seeing how
carefully we can explain the origins and the dynamics of these conflicts on the
basis of interest, on the basis of fear, on the basis of self-esteem. And I
think that's methodologically defensible.



Now the interesting point is that the honor or self-esteem
explanation is gone completely from modern IR explanations but does at least
just a good a job—if not better—at explaining these conflicts I mention above. There is an important sense—and this is my latest book—in which going to war was the dominant way to get recognized as a great power, and I feel that the example of the war in Iraq illustrates that that principle is on the retreat.







I obviously use Greek thinking as a source here of—again, I
wouldn't use the word knowledge—but as a source of insight into human nature
and the recurring problems regardless of society. Some of the great writers and
thinkers cannot be surpassed as sources of knowledge that we as social
scientists are shadows on the cave by comparison. And I find the Greeks
particularly interesting for several reasons. One, they had a richer
understanding of the psyche that moderns who have adduced everything to appetite
and reason to a mere instrumentality, this is, to me, an incredibly narrow,
crude way of thinking of the human mind. And, for whatever reason, they were
gifted with tragedians who pierced to the core of things. So I find them as a
source of inspiration but it's by no way limited to the Greeks. You can pick
great authors from any culture, in any century, and read them and learn a lot.











How
should we understand your cultural theory of international relations in
relation to the 'big' paradigms?







My theory is constructivist, at every level. I can go even further and claim that my theory is
the only constructivist theory.
Alexander Wendt is not a constructivist. If anything, he's a structural
liberal. It did have preexisting identities and has a teleology as he believes
a Kantian world is inevitable— that's quite a statement to make! And I hope
he's right. On the other hand, I define constructivists in a broader way. Most
constructivists start with identities and identities are certainly an important
feature of my work, but my theory rests on a different premise, and that is the
notion of there being certain core values which are germane to politics, and
they vary in relative importance from society to society, and they find
expression in different ways. So it is constructivist, I think, in the Weberian
sense: we have to understand from within the culture what makes things
meaningful. And, in that sense, you could bring in the notion of
inter-subjective reality, but I go beyond it, because other values are always
present in this mix and therefore there's behavior that appears contradictory
that is often misunderstood if you apply the wrong lens to it. So there's a
lack of interdisciplinary understanding as well: you have to look at both to
see how the world works. So cultural theory is constructivist and it allows us
to reframe and expand what constructivism means.







If I apply this constructivist thinking to one of the core
principles in our approach to world politics: what is a cause? I start by
asking, what does 'cause' mean, in physics? Why physics? Because physics is
always the field that political scientists look at, we have 'physics envy', so
to speak. And interestingly, in physics, there is no consensus about what cause
means. Some physicists think that very notion of cause is unhelpful to what
they do. Others are happy with regularities and subscribe to causal thinking. Still
others thing that you need to have mechanisms to explain anything. Still others,
and here statistical mechanics can be taken as a case in point, invoke Kantian
understandings of cause. Within physics there's no argument between people
adhering to these different understandings of 'cause', because you should do
what works! They don't criticize one another. So if they have this diversity,
why shouldn't we? Why shouldn't we develop understandings of cause that are
most appropriate to what we do? So I develop an understanding I call 'inefficient
causation' (download full paper here),
sort of playing off of Aristotle. And it is a constructivist understanding, but
it also incorporates elements that are distinctively non-constructivist. And
identities are only a small piece of the puzzle.











Is
there any sense to make of the way IR has evolved over the 20th
century?







I think if you look at some of the central figures, it's
quite easy. There are 2 great cohorts of International Relations theorists.
Those born in the early years of the 20th century comprise Hans
Morgenthau, John Hertz, E.H. Carr, Harold Lasswell, Nicholas Spykman, Frederick Schuman, and Karl Deutsch—who was
on my dissertation committee together with Isaiah Berlin and John Hertz. The
second cohort is born between about 1939 and 1945, and it comprises Robert
Jervis (Theory Talk #12), Joseph Nye
(Theory Talk #7), Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9), Oren Young, Peter
Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15), Stephen Krasner (Theory Talk#21), Janice Steinberg… And I'll tell you what I think the reasons are for
these groups to emerge at these particular moments: the first cohort lived
through World War I. And did so, fortunately, in at an age where they were too
young to be combatants for the most part, but they certainly had to deal
intellectually and personally with its consequences and then watch the horrors
unfold of the 1930s.







And the second, my own, cohort was born at the outset of the
Second World War. I think, in that group, I may be the only one of them born in
Europe (France). The rest of them were born in the US. And we came of age
during the most acute crisis of the cohort. So I was either in university or
graduate school during the Berlin crisis, during the Cuba crisis, and certainly
had an interest first in the consequences of WWII and how something like this
could happen, and then living through the horrors of the Cold War, not knowing
if indeed one would live through
them. And that created a very strong incentive and focus for our group of
people. Now a surprising number of this second group did their graduate studies
at Yale: Janice Stein, I, Oren Young, Bruce Russet, Krasner, later all at Yale
with Karl Deutsch. The rest, Jervis, Keohane and Krasner at Harvard with Samuel
Huntington. I think you have the odd person who's born somewhere in between –
so, Ken Waltz (Theory Talk #40), for
instance, is younger. He must be a 1920 person, almost exactly in between these
two, just as Ernst Haas.







And I wouldn't be surprised now if there is another cohort
emerging, the people of around the age of Stefano Guzinni, Jens Bartelson,
Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44).
What ties this third cohort together is that they all watched the end of the
Cold War and are coping with its aftermath. So I believe that it's probably two
things: the external environment and the extent to which you're in an
intellectually nurturing institution. And of course for our cohort, it
certainly helped that there were jobs. That was not true of the earlier cohort.
Almost all of them, except E.H. Carr, ended up in the US as refugees. Did you
know Morgenthau started as an elevator boy in New York? Then he got a job
teaching part-time at Brooklyn College because someone fell ill. His wife
cleaned other people's apartments to supplement their income. Then he got a job
at the University of Kansas City, which was a hellhole, and finally Harold
Lasswell got called to Washington for some war work and got Chicago to hire
Morgenthau to replace him.











What is
the issue with the discipline today if, as you noted before, we fail to ask the
most interesting questions and instead focus on method?







Well, it of course depends on which side of the pond you
sit. On the American side of the pond, positivist or game-theoretical
behaviorist or rationalist modeling approaches dominate the literature; it's
just silly, from my perspective. It's based on assumptions which bear no
relationship to the real world. People like it because it's intellectually
elegant: they don't have to learn any languages, they don't have to read any
history, and they can pretend they're scientists discussing universals.
Intellectually, it's ridiculous. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Theory Talk #31) is a classic case in point. He's made a huge
reputation for himself with The War Trap (1981).
That book and the corresponding theory are based on a simple assumption,
namely, that there's a war trap compelling states into war, because initiators
win wars. But just look at the empirical record from 1945 to the present—initiators
lose between 80-90% of the wars they start. And that really depends on the
definition of victory. If you use the real definition, the Clausewitzian one,
you have to ask: do they achieve their political goals through violence? Then
the answer is, even fewer "victories". Well, let's cut them some slack, use a
more relaxed definition: did they beat the other side militarily? Initiators
still lose 78 or 82%—I forget exactly which percentage of their wars. And the
profession right now is so ignorant of history that nobody said 'Wait a
minute!' the day the book came out. Instead IR scholars all focus on this model
and fine-tuning it—it's ridiculous! And well, I don't want to go on with a
critique, but this is a serious problem, for it concerns a huge
misunderstanding regarding one of the most important problems out there.







But what happens now is this kind of thinking metastasizes
throughout the discipline because what students in International Relations or
Political Science more generally are taught are calculus, statistics—and I'm
not against this, one should learn them; I use them myself when I wear my
psychologist hat and do quantitative research and statistical analysis—but they
don't learn languages, they don't learn history, they don't learn philosophy.
They are so narrow! Much of this of course has to do with the reward structure
in the United States. It's clear that the statistical scientists are at the top
of the hill. So, economists transform themselves into scientists; but the
social scientists copy them because there are clear institutional rewards. If
you look at our salaries in comparison to the salaries of anthropologists,
historians—then if you sit at the edge of your chair and look over the abyss
you might see the humanists down there in terms of what they get. So very
clearly, there are strong institutional rewards. Once the positivist crowd got
a lock on various foundations and journals, if you want a job, if you want to
rise up through the profession, students tell me you have to do this stuff. IR
graduate students are bricklayers that get turned out of these universities.
That's the tragedy! It's no longer a serious intellectual enterprise. It's not
connected to anything terribly meaningful.







And mind you, I must say, while on the other, European, side
of the pond there is more diversity (one of the reasons I feel more comfortable
here), at the same time there is a strong tendency to go for a certain
heavy-handed brand of post-modernism. If you don't start an article with a
genuflection to Foucault or De Saussure or Derrida, you don't get published.
And by not looking beyond these 20th century thinkers, people in
Europe are often given credit for inventing things which were common knowledge
for hundreds and hundreds of years. Utterly ridiculous. But in between, there
are of course people who are trying to make sense of the world, including many
people in the positivist tradition who are doing good quantitative research and
trying to address serious problems in the world. The difficulty is that these
two extremes are often people who approach IR as a religion and they think that
their way of doing research is the only way
and they have no respect for others. And that's a kind of arrogance to which,
to me, is a violation of what the university is all about.







Ultimately, what is good theory? One approach would be to
say that a good theory is one that appears to order a domain in a way that is
conceptually rigorous - to the extent that that's even possible - that is
original and that raises a series of interesting questions which haven't been
asked before, but which are amenable to empirical research and finally it
should have normative implications. This is what Hans Morgenthau meant when he
said that the purpose of IR theory is not to justify what policymakers did, but
to educate them to act in ways that would lead to a better and more peaceful
world. And that, I think, is the ultimate goal of IR theory that we should not
lose sight of.











You
indicated that Isaiah Berlin was on your dissertation committee. He famously
tries to explain Tolstoy's philosophy of history (in War and Peace) through the parable of the hedgehog and the fox. If
theorists constraining themselves to one drive underpinning policy choices
would be hedgehogs, how would you see yourself? A fox or a hedgehog?







I am clearly a fox! I do different things. Whether I do them
well is debatable. But I certainly think that I'm a man of many tricks. Of
course the distinction also implies not believing in an overarching truth, and
indeed, I try hard not to think about truth because I don't think you can get
very far when you do. Epistemologically and eclectically, I'm a great believer
that we can never really establish a cause, truth, and knowledge. One of the
great problems here goes back to Plato who was shocked that craftsmen equated
technical ability to produce things with knowledge—Sofia, which is wisdom. And
today you have the problem one step up, so another category of knowledge for
the Greeks was episteme. Aristotle
would describe it as 'conceptual knowledge' or that which might even be
represented mathematically. And the people who would be 'expert' in episteme
think they have sofia and their claim
to being a hedgehog is the same kind of conceit, a form of hubris. Berlin's
distinction between hedgehogs and foxes is a very useful and nice concept to
play around with.







Yet it's a bit much to reduce Tolstoy to that tension. You
could do it as a game but it doesn't do much justice because there is so much
else in Tolstoy. He's tilting against the French historians of the 19th
century who have erected Napoleon into this strategic genius. And he does a
very convincing job of showing that what goes on on the battlefield has nothing
whatsoever to do with what Napoleon or anyone else who is wearing a general's
ebullience or theorists hat says. And also, and in this sense, one could see
him as the beginning of subaltern history of social science, he's telling the
story—admittedly about aristocrats, not commoners—but he's telling the story of
ordinary people on the battlefield, not the people making the decisions. So the
war is in a way a background to the lives of the people, focusing our attention
a very humanist way, on people. This, too, is revolutionary for his time.















Professor
Richard Ned Lebow Professor of International Political Theory at the Department
of War Studies, King's College London and James O. Freedman Presidential
Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College. He is also a Bye-Fellow of
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. He has taught strategy and the
National and Naval War Colleges and served as a scholar-in-residence in the
Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration. He has
authored and edited 28 books and nearly 200 peer reviewed articles.















Related
links








Read the
first chapter of Lebow's The Tragic
Vision of Politics (2003) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow & Kelly's Thucydides and
Hegemony: Athens and the United States (Review of International Studies
2001), here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's Deterrence and Reassurance:
Lessons from the Cold War (Global Dialogue 2001) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Long Peace, the End of the
Cold War, and the Failure of Realism (International Organization, 1994)
here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading
the Lessons Correctly (Political Science Quarterly 1983) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)