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In recent weeks, Japan's government under Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has im­plemented significant adjustments to the country's security policy. In December 2022, Tokyo published a new National Security Strategy along with two other defence-related strategic documents. In doing so, the government decided, among other things, to significantly increase Japan's defence budget to 2 per cent of its gross domestic product by fiscal year 2027. During bilateral alliance meetings in mid-January 2023, Japan and the United States addressed the implications of the new strategic documents and discussed possibilities for closer cooperation. By making far-reaching decisions such as on the acquisition of so-called counter-strike capabilities, Tokyo is seeking to respond to a rapidly deteriorating security environment. Even though some of the announced steps are indeed historic for Japan, they have been the topic of discussion for a while now and can therefore be seen as part of the evolution of Japanese security policy that has been occurring for years. (author's abstract)

The article analyzes the Russia's military buildup in the occupied Crimean and Sevastopol. It is proved that the Russian militarization led to a multifold increase in military forces and defense equipment on the peninsula, which is becoming a powerful military foothold. Russia has coastal missile defense systems that fully control the Black Sea, as well as layered air defense systems, by which Moscow closed the air zone over the peninsula, in Crimea. In addition to defense weapons, Russia increases the deployment of ships equipped with missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, threatening almost the whole of Europe, on the peninsula. Creating opportunities for the deployment of nuclear weapons on the peninsula radically changes the security situation in the Black Sea region and beyond.Despite the growing threats to Europe due to the militarization of Crimea, the European Union continues to emphasize the need for cooperation with the Russian Federation.The Russian annexation of Crimea drew the attention of NATO to the Black Sea and somehow changed its policy, which gradually moved to a strategy of deterrence against Russia. NATO increases the military presence in Eastern Europe and creates mobile super rapid deployment forces; it is planned to create Alliance naval, mechanized and aviation divisions, which are ready for deployment during thirty days. But in general, the NATO policy has a limited number of adequate responses in case of further Russian aggression, especially with regard to the states of the Black Sea region, which is not as high-priority as the Baltics.The lack of an Alliance military strategy for the Black Sea region and difficulties in deploying the NATO fleet in the Black Sea due to the Montreux Convention remain the main problem. ; У статі проаналізовано зростання військового потенціалу Росії в окупованому її Криму та Севастополі. Доведено, що російська мілітаризація призвела до багатократного збільшення кількості військових та техніки на півострові, який перетворюється на потужний військовий плацдарм. Росія дислокує в Криму протиракетні берегові системи, які повністю контролюють Чорне море, а також ешелоновані системи протиповітряної оборони, якими Москва повністю закрила небо над півостровом. Разом із обороною зброєю Росія нарощує присутність на півострові кораблів-носіїв ракет "Калібр" із дальністю польотів до 2500 кілометрів, що створює загрозу майже для всієї Європи. Створення можливостей для розміщення ядерної зброї на півострові радикально змінює безпекову ситуацію не тільки в Чорноморському регіоні, але й поза його межами.Російська анексія Криму привернула увагу НАТО до Чорного моря та певним чином змінила політику Альянсу, який поступово переходить до стратегії стримування Росії. На тлі російської агресії східноєвропейські держави погодилися на розміщення американських систем протиракетної оборони. У межах НАТО проводиться збільшення військового контингенту у Східній Європі, створюються мобільні групи надшвидкого реагування та військово-морські, механізовані та авіаційні дивізіони Альянсу. Але в цілому політика блоку має обмежену кількість адекватних відповідей у разі подальшої агресії Росії, особливо щодо держав Чорноморського регіону, які, за виключенням Туреччини, не мають потужного флоту. Головною проблемою залишається відсутність військової стратегії Альянсу щодо регіону та складнощі із базуванням флоту НАТО в Чорному морі через обмеження тонажів та часу перебування згідно Конвенції Монтре.

The article analyzes the Russia's military buildup in the occupied Crimean and Sevastopol. It is proved that the Russian militarization led to a multifold increase in military forces and defense equipment on the peninsula, which is becoming a powerful military foothold. Russia has coastal missile defense systems that fully control the Black Sea, as well as layered air defense systems, by which Moscow closed the air zone over the peninsula, in Crimea. In addition to defense weapons, Russia increases the deployment of ships equipped with missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, threatening almost the whole of Europe, on the peninsula. Creating opportunities for the deployment of nuclear weapons on the peninsula radically changes the security situation in the Black Sea region and beyond.Despite the growing threats to Europe due to the militarization of Crimea, the European Union continues to emphasize the need for cooperation with the Russian Federation.The Russian annexation of Crimea drew the attention of NATO to the Black Sea and somehow changed its policy, which gradually moved to a strategy of deterrence against Russia. NATO increases the military presence in Eastern Europe and creates mobile super rapid deployment forces; it is planned to create Alliance naval, mechanized and aviation divisions, which are ready for deployment during thirty days. But in general, the NATO policy has a limited number of adequate responses in case of further Russian aggression, especially with regard to the states of the Black Sea region, which is not as high-priority as the Baltics.The lack of an Alliance military strategy for the Black Sea region and difficulties in deploying the NATO fleet in the Black Sea due to the Montreux Convention remain the main problem. ; У статі проаналізовано зростання військового потенціалу Росії в окупованому її Криму та Севастополі. Доведено, що російська мілітаризація призвела до багатократного збільшення кількості військових та техніки на півострові, який перетворюється на потужний військовий плацдарм. Росія дислокує в Криму протиракетні берегові системи, які повністю контролюють Чорне море, а також ешелоновані системи протиповітряної оборони, якими Москва повністю закрила небо над півостровом. Разом із обороною зброєю Росія нарощує присутність на півострові кораблів-носіїв ракет "Калібр" із дальністю польотів до 2500 кілометрів, що створює загрозу майже для всієї Європи. Створення можливостей для розміщення ядерної зброї на півострові радикально змінює безпекову ситуацію не тільки в Чорноморському регіоні, але й поза його межами.Російська анексія Криму привернула увагу НАТО до Чорного моря та певним чином змінила політику Альянсу, який поступово переходить до стратегії стримування Росії. На тлі російської агресії східноєвропейські держави погодилися на розміщення американських систем протиракетної оборони. У межах НАТО проводиться збільшення військового контингенту у Східній Європі, створюються мобільні групи надшвидкого реагування та військово-морські, механізовані та авіаційні дивізіони Альянсу. Але в цілому політика блоку має обмежену кількість адекватних відповідей у разі подальшої агресії Росії, особливо щодо держав Чорноморського регіону, які, за виключенням Туреччини, не мають потужного флоту. Головною проблемою залишається відсутність військової стратегії Альянсу щодо регіону та складнощі із базуванням флоту НАТО в Чорному морі через обмеження тонажів та часу перебування згідно Конвенції Монтре.

A bipartisan group of senators expressed, in the words of Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), "grave skepticism" over President Joe Biden's approach to trying to de-escalate tensions with the Houthis in the Red Sea, grilling administration officials about the legal authority and strategic effectiveness of their policy during a hearing on Tuesday.Sens. Kaine, Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), and Todd Young (R-Ind.) led the way in questioning witnesses Timothy Lenderking, the State Department's special envoy for Yemen, and Daniel Shapiro, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, during testimony in front of the subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterrorism. The witnesses spoke out against ongoing Houthi attacks saying that it was causing major disruptions to the global economy, jeopardizing diplomacy between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and risking further regional escalation in the Middle East. "These attacks which affect the entire region cannot go unchallenged," said Shapiro. That response, according to Shapiro, has included striking over 230 Houthi targets, which, he claimed "likely destroyed hundreds of Houthi weapons."Kaine, Murphy, and Young, who, along with Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) sent a letter to the White House in late January pressing the administration on its strategy, took the opportunity to ask its representatives the questions directly.All three Senators pushed the witnesses on the legal authority and historical precedent the administration was operating under as it carries out a series of airstrikes. The administration officials maintained that the President's article II authorities served as justification. "Article II self-defense means you can defend U.S. personnel, you can defend U.S. military assets, you probably can defend U.S. commercial ships. But the defense of other nations' commercial ships? In no way and it's not even close," said Kaine. "It is, in my view, laughable to call that self-defense." Young also focused his line of questioning on the administration's theory of deterrence. As Biden himself has admitted, strikes against Houthi targets have not stopped the group's actions in the Red Sea. When pushed by Young, Shapiro said "until they stop, we are not done" with airstrikes. Shapiro effectively declined to answer Young's follow-up question over what level of military activity the administration thought necessary to deter the Houthis, and what level of military activity they would be willing to pursue to reach that endpoint. As Murphy later noted, 23,000 Saudi airstrikes in Yemen between 2015 and 2022 — some of which had hit the same places that U.S. strikes were now targeting — failed to alter the Houthis' calculus, and there was little evidence that more limited airstrikes from Washington today would have a different result.One point of animated discussion and disagreement during the hearing was on one path that some senators thought could push the Houthis to stop their aggression: pushing for a truce in Gaza. There was quite a bit of skepticism over the Houthi claim that its aggression was a result of Israel's brutal war on Gaza and Washington's continued support for it. Murphy called this claim "ridiculous on its face," Young said it was "parroted rhetoric," Lenderking argued that tying the two issues together was "entirely an illegitimate linkage," and Shapiro stated that the situation was "entirely unrelated to Israel." All pointed to the fact that Houthi attacks were "indiscriminate," as Shapiro put it, and had targeted a number of non-Israeli ships.Yet, as Kaine and Sen. Chris van Hollen (D-Md.) noted, Houthi attacks notably decreased during a short-term truce in Gaza in late November and early December 2023. "I am a little disappointed that you so quickly try to pull cold water on the idea that this is connected to the war in Gaza. These attacks started, Secretary Shapiro, as you said on November 19," said Kaine. "I think the most natural interpretation of this is the Houthis, seeing some suffer in the region, are saying others are going to suffer in the region until we've figured out a response." He added that the U.S., in his opinion, will not be able to re-establish deterrence until they get a hostage deal that leads to a longer truce in Gaza.When challenged by Van Hollen, Shapiro did acknowledge that attacks declined during the first truce, but argued that the trend could have been coincidental, and that other periods of calm in the Red Sea had come after rounds of airstrikes.Right after calling the linking of the two issues "entirely illegitimate," Lenderking seemed to admit a ceasefire could ease tensions, while also suggesting that the Biden administration was not prepared to push for that outcome. "The fact that they continue this and have said publicly that they will not stop until there's a ceasefire in Gaza is an indication that we're not yet at the point, unfortunately, where they do intend to dial back," he said. The hearing also featured more partisan attacks on the administration's Middle East policy and no senators expressing outright support for its strategy, demonstrating a level of frustration among some of the Senators most involved in regional affairs over Biden and his team's approach.That anger also extended to protesters who interrupted proceedings on two occasions. "You all know exactly how to stop the blockade in the Red Sea," one of them said. "And that's to stop support for the genocide in Gaza."

İran 1979 yılında Ayetullah Ruhullah Humeyni'nin liderliğinde gerçekleşen İslam Devrimi'nin ardından, Devrim'in ilkelerini İslam coğrafyasına yaymayı ve Şii nüfus bulunan ülkeler üzerinde etki alanını genişletmeyi amaçlamıştır. Devrim'den önce Batı dünyası ile iyi ilişkiler içerisinde olan Şah rejiminin aksine, 1979 yılından itibaren, ezilen Müslüman halkları korumak ve hem Doğu'dan hem de Batı'dan uzaklaşılarak "yalnız İslam" ilkesinden hareketle dış politikada bağımsızlık öncelenmiştir. Bu makalede, İran'da Devrim'in ardından değişime uğrayan dış politika parametreleri dikkate alınarak, İran'ın dini rehberleri ve Cumhurbaşkanları düzeyindeki dış politika tercihleri temel noktalarıyla incelenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Devrim'in hemen ardından başlayan İran-Irak Savaşı, İran'ın mezhep politikaları, stratejik çıkarları, komşularıyla ilişkileri ve Arap Baharı süreci gibi kırılma noktaları üzerinde durulmuştur. İran'ın askeri caydırıcılık kapsamında konvansiyonel gücünü geliştirmesinin yanı sıra, 1979'dan itibaren Devrim Muhafızları'nın kontrolünde Şii milislerin örgütlenmesi suretiyle oluşturduğu, bölgesel vekil unsurları kullanmak üzerine kurduğu stratejisine değinilmiştir. İran'ın Ortadoğu'nun etkili ülkelerinden biri olmasında geçmişten bugüne müşterek hedefleri doğrultusunda müttefiklik ilişkisi kurduğu Rusya'nın katkılarına yer verilmiştir. ; After the Islamic Revolution, which took place in 1979 under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, Iran aimed to spread the principles of the Revolution to the Islamic geography and to expand its sphere of influence on countries with Shiite populations. Contrary to the Shah's regime, which had good relations with the Western world before the Revolution, independence was prioritized in foreign policy, starting from 1979, to protect the oppressed Muslim peoples and to move away from both the East and the West, based on the principle of "Islam alone". In this article, considering the foreign policy parameters that changed after the Revolution in Iran, foreign policy preferences at the level of religious leaders and Presidents were examined with their main points. In this context, the breaking points such as the Iran Iraq War which started right after the Revolution, Iran's sectarian policies, strategic interests, relations with neighbors and Arab Spring process are emphasized. Besides to the development of Iran's conventional power within the scope of military deterrence, Iran's strategy which is based on the use of regional proxies formed by the organization of Shiite militias under the control of the Revolutionary Guards since 1979, has been mentioned. It is included that the contributions of Russia which Iran has established alliances in line with their common goals from past to present in Iran's becoming one of the influential countries of the Middle East.

If Australia's Future Submarine Program is to deliver, it needs to rapidly develop a comprehensive Systems Security Engineering (SSE) and Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (CT&E) Strategy that provisions Australian owned and operated infrastructure to design, build, demonstrate and sustain cyber-resilience in critical submarine systems. Failure to act swiftly creates significant program risk that can only be mitigated through costly design rework and in the near term will result incapability limitations. Submarine T&E Sites and Cyber Resiliency are interdependent and inter-related. The Program Director has committed to building land based test infrastructure, however a serious concern is that if there are any delays in the development of organic test capability, these will force the French designer and builder, Naval Group (formerly DCNS), to provision French sites solving the near term problem but adversely impacting Australia's ability to take long term ownership of Submarine cyber-resilience. Australia can exploit lessons learned from US DOD Cybersecurity initiatives to help mitigate Australia's Future Submarine Cybersecurity Risks.Cyber has become a supposedly cheap first-strike weapon of political choice by potential adversaries in a milieu placing insurgency, terrorism, international crime and state-based influences in close un-regulated proximity. The merging of electronic and cyber warfare means that no physical artefact such as a submarine, however unconnected or firewalled it may be, is immune to probing. The quantum attack surface (QAS) of the future submarine is as much in the past, as it is in its designs today and operations tomorrow. It must not only survive to be credible, but even before build is part of an offensive cyber capability forcontemporary deterrence. Cybersecurity craft in the U.S. has determined that critical Defence systems, like submarines, nuclear weapons and space surveillance, require robust security systems engineering and Cybersecurity T&E to build and sustain robust cyber-resilient systems. The future submarine, and every current and future Australian DoD capability has cyber-resilience as a requirement, and there is an opportunity to ensure these requirements flow down through to design, build and test by leveraging the approaches used by the U.S. DoD. Secondly, this paper outlines the security systems engineering and Cybersecurity T&E challenge could be addressed by adopting U.S. DoD best practices to engineer, test and sustain cyber-resilient systems.Lessons learned from the U.S. DoD can be used to inform and refine Australia's Future Submarine Cybersecurity program.