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The subtle signs that Ukraine is willing to engage diplomatically with Russia continue to increase. This week, Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, traveled to China for the first time since Russia's 2022 invasion to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
"I am convinced that a just peace in Ukraine is in China's strategic interests, and China's role as a global force for peace is important," Kuleba said during the meeting.
Following the meeting, the Ukrainian foreign ministry put out a statement saying that Kyiv was "ready to engage" with Russia if Moscow was prepared to do so "in good faith," but that so far they had seen no indication that Russia was ready to do so.
The meeting between the two top diplomats follows reporting from earlier this month that Ukraine would be willing to invite Russian representatives to its next peace summit, which Kyiv hopes to organize for later this year.
Beijing was notably absent from the last summit in Switzerland in June, refusing to participate due to Moscow's absence. Convincing Beijing to join the summits and endorse a version of Ukraine's "peace formula" has been a key aim of President Volodymor Zelensky's foreign policy.
When China released its own peace plan in February 2023, Ukraine's reaction was cautiously optimistic, and more welcoming than the United States or Western partners were of the plan. Ukraine's urgency to engage with China as a potential mediator has perhaps increased due to uncertainty over whether the U.S. and the West are really in it for the long term.
According to a New York Times report on the Kuleba-Wang meeting, Kyiv recognizes that a diplomatic process without Beijing will be unlikely to succeed, since China may be the only country with sufficient leverage over Moscow to push it to the table.
Moscow may also be willing to welcome Beijing as a player. "The message itself can be said to be in unison with our position," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in response to Kuleba's remarks about future negotiations. "You know that the Russian side has never refused to negotiate, has always maintained its openness to the negotiation process, but details are important here that you and I do not yet know."
The continued interest in mediating a peace between Ukraine and Russia is the latest sign of China's efforts to become a diplomatic power. In the past two years, Beijing has seized opportunities to broker agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and — this week — between Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah, as it works to bolster this image.
The Chinese foreign minister is also scheduled to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting this weekend in Laos, where the two diplomats are expected to discuss the war in Ukraine.
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Support for a diplomatic solution to the war is also growing among the Ukrainian population. A survey conducted in May and published this week by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed that the share of Ukrainians open to making territorial concessions in exchange for an end to the war has tripled in the last year, from 10% to 32%.
Just over half of respondents (55%) said that Ukraine should not give up territory under any circumstances, ten percentage points lower than in any of the ten surveys that KIIS has asked this question since May 2022.
— The U.S. and the EU are close to reaching a deal that would divide a $50 billion loan to Ukraine equally between the two of them, according to Politico. The $50 billion loan is expected to be repaid by the interest accrued on seized Russian assets.
— Ukraine is confronting a labor shortage as mobilization efforts for the war intensify, according to The Washington Post.
"Online job portals in Ukraine say they have never advertised so many openings. Millions of Ukrainians moved abroad to escape Moscow's brutal bombardment, and of those who stayed, hundreds of thousands of men have traded their jobs for military service," the Post reports. "Now, with Kyiv ramping up its mobilization efforts, businesses expect that workers will be even harder to find, further straining Ukraine's crippled economy." It is the latest sign of the destructive impact the war has inflicted on the Ukrainian economy, which is increasingly reliant on foreign aid. One Ukrainian economist told the Post that "without Western financial aid, the Ukrainian economy would collapse."
— Russia sentenced another journalist, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Alsu Kurmasheva, this week after a secret trial. Kurmasheva is a dual American-Russian citizen.
"Kurmasheva was convicted under Russia's wartime fake-news law, which bans the broadcasting or posting of any information about the war in Ukraine other than official propaganda," according to the Washington Post. She was also charged with failing to register as a foreign agent. Her conviction came the same day as that of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich. Unlike Gershkovich, Kurmasheva has not yet been declared to be wrongfully detained by the State Department, for reasons that the Post said "remain unclear."
State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said that she was being "targeted by Russian authorities for her uncompromising commitment to speaking the truth and her principled reporting," and that Washington continues "to make very clear that she should be released."
U.S. State Department news:
In a Wednesday press briefing, Miller was asked about Kuleba's statement that Ukraine was open to negotiations with Russia.
"They have always been ready for negotiations to reach a just and lasting peace, but that Vladimir Putin to date has shown no change to his war aims and has shown no real willingness for negotiations," he said. "So our take on this continues to be what it has been for some time, which is that when it comes to diplomacy, nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine."

Following a largely preordained election, Vladimir Putin was sworn in last week for another six-year term as president of Russia. Putin's victory has, of course, been met with accusations of fraud and political interference, factors that help explain his 87.3% vote share. If this continuation of Putin's 24-year-long hold on power makes one thing clear, it's that he and his regime will not be going anywhere for the foreseeable future. But, as his war in Ukraine continues with no clear end in sight, what is less clear is how Washington plans to deal with this reality.Experts say Washington needs to start projecting a long-term strategy toward Russia and its war in Ukraine, wielding its political leverage to apply pressure on Putin and push for more diplomacy aimed at ending the conflict. Only by looking beyond short-term solutions can Washington realistically move the needle in Ukraine.Since Russia's full-scale invasion, the U.S. has focused on getting aid to Ukraine to help it win back all of its pre-2014 territory, a goal complicated by Kyiv's systemic shortages of munitions and manpower. But that response neglects a more strategic approach to the war, according to Andrew Weiss of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who spoke in a recent panel hosted by Carnegie. "There is a vortex of emergency planning that people have been, unfortunately, sucked into for the better part of two years since the intelligence first arrived in the fall of 2021," Weiss said. "And so the urgent crowds out the strategic." Historian Stephen Kotkin, for his part, says preserving Ukraine's sovereignty is critical. However, the apparent focus on regaining territory, pushed by the U.S., is misguided. "Wars are never about regaining territory. It's about the capacity to fight and the will to fight. And if Russia has the capacity to fight and Ukraine takes back territory, Russia won't stop fighting," Kotkin said in a podcast on the Wall Street Journal.And it appears Russia does have the capacity. The number of troops and weapons at Russia's disposal far exceeds Ukraine's, and Russian leaders spend twice as much on defense as their Ukrainian counterparts. Ukraine will need a continuous supply of aid from the West to continue to match up to Russia. And while aid to Ukraine is important, Kotkin says, so is a clear plan for determining the preferred outcome of the war.The U.S. may be better served by using the significant political leverage it has over Russia to shape a long-term outcome in its favor. George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft, says that Russia's primary concerns and interests do not end with Ukraine. Moscow is fundamentally concerned about the NATO alliance and the threat it may pose to Russian internal stability. Negotiations and dialogue about the bounds and limits of NATO and Russia's powers, therefore, are critical to the broader conflict. This is a process that is not possible without the U.S. and Europe. "That means by definition, we have some leverage," Beebe says. To this point, Kotkin says the strength of the U.S. and its allies lies in their political influence — where they are much more powerful than Russia — rather than on the battlefield. Leveraging this influence will be a necessary tool in reaching an agreement that is favorable to the West's interests, "one that protects the United States, protects its allies in Europe, that preserves an independent Ukraine, but also respects Russia's core security interests there."In Kotkin's view, this would mean pushing for an armistice that ends the fighting on the ground and preserves Ukrainian sovereignty, meaning not legally acknowledging Russia's possession of the territory they have taken during the war. Then, negotiations can proceed. Beebe adds that a treaty on how conventional forces can be used in Europe will be important, one that establishes limits on where and how militaries can be deployed. "[Russia] need[s] some understanding with the West about what we're all going to agree to rule out in terms of interference in the other's domestic affairs," Beebe said. Critical to these objectives is dialogue with Putin, which Beebe says Washington has not done enough to facilitate. U.S. officials have stated publicly that they do not plan to meet with Putin. The U.S. rejected Putin's most recent statements of his willingness to negotiate, which he expressed in an interview with Tucker Carlson in February, citing skepticism that Putin has any genuine intentions of ending the war. "Despite Mr. Putin's words, we have seen no actions to indicate he is interested in ending this war. If he was, he would pull back his forces and stop his ceaseless attacks on Ukraine," a spokesperson for the White House's National Security Council said in response. But neither side has been open to serious communication. Biden and Putin haven't met to engage in meaningful talks about the war since it began, their last meeting taking place before the war began in the summer of 2021 in Geneva. Weiss says the U.S. should make it clear that those lines of communication are open. "Any strategy that involves diplomatic outreach also has to be sort of undergirded by serious resolve and a sense that we're not going anywhere," Weiss said.An end to the war will be critical to long-term global stability. Russia will remain a significant player on the world stage, Beebe explains, considering it is the world's largest nuclear power and a leading energy producer. It is therefore ultimately in the U.S. and Europe's interests to reach a relationship "that combines competitive and cooperative elements, and where we find a way to manage our differences and make sure that they don't spiral into very dangerous military confrontation," he says. As two major global superpowers, the U.S. and Russia need to find a way to share the world. Only genuine, long-term planning can ensure that Washington will be able to shape that future in its best interests.

When the Ukraine aid bill hit President Joe Biden's desk Wednesday, everything was already in place to speed up its impact. The Pentagon had worked overtime to prepare a massive, $1 billion weapons shipment that it could start sending "within hours" of the president's signature. American officials even pre-positioned many of the arms in European stockpiles, an effort that will surely help get the materiel to the frontlines that much faster.
For Ukraine, the new aid package is massive, both figuratively and literally. Congress authorized roughly $60 billion in new spending related to the war, $37 billion of which is earmarked for weapons transfers and purchases. The new funding pushes Washington's investment in Ukraine's defense to well over $150 billion since 2022.
Beyond new weapons, the new outlays also provide a much-needed morale boost for Ukrainian soldiers, who have struggled to hold the line against Russia as their stockpiles have dwindled. But the key question remains the same as it did last week: Does Ukraine have a real chance to turn the tide and win the war?
Experts say it's a mixed bag at best. On the plus side, the new aid dramatically reduces the chance of near-term disaster, like a collapse of the Ukrainian frontlines followed by a rapid Russian advance.
But the assistance has a limited impact on the fundamentals of the conflict, including Ukraine's growing disadvantage when it comes to manpower. Put simply, the package can only help if Kyiv manages to dramatically expand the number of fighters at its disposal ahead of an expected Russian counteroffensive this summer.
"I would expect the situation to probably continue to deteriorate over the next three months, but if mobilization goes according to plan and the U.S. aid is unblocked then the situation should improve from autumn onwards," a relatively optimistic Polish analyst told Reuters.
Ukraine recognizes this bind and is pulling out all the stops to swell the ranks of its military. Following the passage of a new law broadening eligibility for conscription, Kyiv temporarily suspended all consular services for military-age Ukrainian men living abroad — unless, of course, they need help to come home and join up. Ukraine is also offering incentives to boost voluntary recruitment, including new rules that allow recruits to choose their unit and specialization, as well as the length of time they will serve.
But none of these efforts will pay off before a likely Russian offensive this summer, meaning that Ukraine may well lose more territory this year. The outcome of Russia's offensive will also provide an important indicator of Ukraine's chances for long-term success, especially given the impact that even minor Russian advances could have on the internal politics of Kyiv's backers.
When it comes to potential peace talks, the new aid package provides some notable upsides. "Importantly, it could reduce Russian optimism about the long game and thus make Moscow more inclined to compromise," Samuel Charap of the RAND Corporation told Politico.
But that advantage remains hypothetical so long as both Kyiv and Washington remain committed to retaking all of Ukraine's pre-2014 territory, according to George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft.
"Additional aid would be justified — indeed, it would arguably be required — if it were to be used as leverage in a broader diplomatic strategy for negotiating a compromise settlement of the war," wrote Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA. "But it is tied to no such strategy."
Beebe fears that, without a clear strategy for victory at the negotiating table, the new aid package "will almost guarantee that Ukraine will continue throwing its dwindling reserves of manpower into a war it cannot win."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Ukraine and Russia agreed to return a group of displaced children to their home countries following the countries' first known face-to-face negotiations in months, according to France 24. The exact details of the swap remain murky. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said 16 Ukrainian children returned home via the Qatari-mediated deal, while Russian officials claimed that 29 Ukrainian minors and 19 Russian children would be repatriated.
The swap showed rare progress on a particularly thorny issue for the warring parties. Ukraine alleges that Russia essentially kidnapped Ukrainian children in Russian-occupied areas and forcibly shipped them out of Ukraine, a claim that has led to charges against Russian officials at the International Criminal Court. Moscow, for its part, claims that the children were mostly orphans who were sent away from the frontlines for their own safety.
— The Biden administration secretly sent long-range missiles to Ukraine after securing promises that the weapons would only be used to hit targets within Ukrainian territory, according to CNN. Washington had previously chosen not to give Kyiv the missiles due to fears about potential escalation as well as dwindling Western stockpiles. While the risk of escalation remains, increased missile production led the Pentagon to drop its readiness concerns.
— The Ukraine aid package quietly authorized the Biden administration to seize up to $5 billion in Russian assets held within the United States in order to help fund Ukraine's war effort, AP News reported. In theory, the White House could start confiscating the money before the end of the year, though AP notes that Biden plans to work with allies on a coordinated set of seizures, which could delay the move. Such coordination would provide cover for European Union states that collectively hold over $200 billion in Russian assets. Moscow has pledged to fight any asset seizures in court and said it will retaliate in kind if the West moves forward with the plan.
U.S. State Department news:In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel condemned Russia's imprisonment of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and called for his immediate release. "Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, who has also been detained for five years, as bargaining chips," Patel said. "Evan and Paul should be released immediately."

February 2024 marked the tenth anniversary of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. In the eight years before the full-scale invasion, Crimea receded from most people's radar. Today, however, it has regained prominence—as a base for attacks on Ukraine, a region Ukrainian forces are focused on liberating, and a big piece of the puzzle in securing peace for Ukraine. But Russia has devoted considerable technologies, both infrastructural and visual, to trying to persuade the world that Russian control of the peninsula is henceforth permanent. Colonial InfrastructureThe most effective way for colonial powers to claim a territory is to build on it. Since the eighteenth century, when Russia first conquered Crimea, it has used infrastructure to secure and immortalize its hold on the territory. An example of this is the dacha, a land plot awarded to Russian settlers as an incentive to move to Crimea and a hallmark of Russian imperial rule. It allowed thousands of well-to-do Russians to resettle in Crimea and reimagine it as a Russian riviera, a splendid outpost for the middle and upper classes to sojourn during the summer months. During the Soviet era, while the image of a Crimean riviera was carefully preserved for mass consumption, the Soviet Union poured massive resources into military infrastructure on the peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet accounted for 140,000 military personnel in the 1980s, and Crimea became a foremost site for military research, production, and storage. In addition to its military equipment factories and shipyards, Crimea had ten military airfields, control system for weapons, air defense system facilities, and nuclear warheads storage facilities.Since the most recent Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has continued to invest in infrastructural projects as a means of cementing Russia's grip on the peninsula, securing loyalty from the population through improvement projects, and generally recasting the space as Russian. Perhaps the most famous infrastructure projects are the Crimean Bridge and Tavrida Highway. In 2018, Russia completed the construction of bridge that connected Crimea to Russia with two parallel four-lane roads and a railway track between the Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai and the city of Kerch. The construction of this twelve-mile-long bridge cost $3.7 billion. Two years later the four-lane Tavrida Highway, 1,606 miles long, was constructed, connecting the bridge with critical Crimean cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria.Both the bridge and highway, while exemplifying Russia's efforts to control and absorb Crimea into its space, also serve the specific military function of enabling the transport of troops and military. This vital logistical function explains Putin's presence at the grand opening of both projects and Ukrainian forces' intense focus on putting them out of commission since 2022. Social Colonization through InfrastructureTo compensate for the consequences of the international sanctions that have plunged Crimea into an economic abyss, Russia has invested heavily in social infrastructure: kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. Crimea is allegedly the most subsidized region under Russian control, accounting for 65–70 percent of direct subsidies from the Russian federal budget. Investment in social infrastructure, while aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Crimea's population, has simultaneously created sites for surveillance and dissemination of Russian propaganda. Especially through schools and control of curricula, Russia strives to integrate children and their parents into the "Russian world." When I visited Crimea in 2020 for research, it was apparent that even the most outspoken opponents of Russian occupation regarded these infrastructure projects with approval. Visual ColonizationMost of my interlocutors in 2020 were convinced that war against Ukraine was coming. The feeling of approaching war was palpable not only because of the growing military infrastructure but also from changes in the visual landscape. The Crimean public space had been visually reorganized around Soviet and war nostalgia themes. Already in January, four months before Russia's Victory Day on May 9, which celebrates success and valor in World War II, a huge banner was hanging in Sevastopol: "75 years of the victory (1945–2020)! Victory in the Great Patriotic War was, is, and always will be the fulcrum of Russia's people and its sustainable development!" Nearby you could see a random restaurant sign, "Heroes of a Great Country," and a poster featuring a Soviet soldier. Visual materials in all public spaces remind Crimeans of their privilege of belonging to the greatest country in the world that, if necessary, "can do it again," a slogan promising to win in a crusade against the West just as happened in 1945, according to current revisionist history. The war propaganda follows you everywhere, in the names of streets, monuments, and exhibitions scattered around the cities. One such monument is a tall stele with statues of soldiers on three sides. One statue is of a soldier of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the second is of a Soviet soldier of World War II, and the third is of a Russian soldier who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This monument is a pinnacle of Russian propaganda tailored to a Crimean audience. All these visual materials have made Crimea a Disneyland of Soviet/Russian nostalgia. Everything that could remind one of Ukraine has been removed or painted over. It is prohibited to display remembrances of the peninsula's history between 1991 and 2014. The same goes for the Crimean Tatar heritage. The Bakhchisaray Palace—the only testament to Crimean Tatar statehood—is under permanent "construction," or, more accurately, destruction. Any Crimean Tatar initiative to preserve their identity is under the strict control of the occupying authorities. Russia's Normalization Efforts Meet Ukrainians' TenacityThe longer Russia's occupation of Crimea lasts, the more permanent it seems. Russia has normalized war and a Russian presence. Memories of the "before times" fade, or those with intact memories have left. But Russia's colonization of space and memory obscures one vital point: the eventual return of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukrainian control and Ukrainian society when Russia's bellicosity crumples.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

February 2024 marked the tenth anniversary of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. In the eight years before the full-scale invasion, Crimea receded from most people's radar. Today, however, it has regained prominence—as a base for attacks on Ukraine, a region Ukrainian forces are focused on liberating, and a big piece of the puzzle in securing peace for Ukraine. But Russia has devoted considerable technologies, both infrastructural and visual, to trying to persuade the world that Russian control of the peninsula is henceforth permanent. Colonial InfrastructureThe most effective way for colonial powers to claim a territory is to build on it. Since the eighteenth century, when Russia first conquered Crimea, it has used infrastructure to secure and immortalize its hold on the territory. An example of this is the dacha, a land plot awarded to Russian settlers as an incentive to move to Crimea and a hallmark of Russian imperial rule. It allowed thousands of well-to-do Russians to resettle in Crimea and reimagine it as a Russian riviera, a splendid outpost for the middle and upper classes to sojourn during the summer months. During the Soviet era, while the image of a Crimean riviera was carefully preserved for mass consumption, the Soviet Union poured massive resources into military infrastructure on the peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet accounted for 140,000 military personnel in the 1980s, and Crimea became a foremost site for military research, production, and storage. In addition to its military equipment factories and shipyards, Crimea had ten military airfields, control system for weapons, air defense system facilities, and nuclear warheads storage facilities.Since the most recent Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has continued to invest in infrastructural projects as a means of cementing Russia's grip on the peninsula, securing loyalty from the population through improvement projects, and generally recasting the space as Russian. Perhaps the most famous infrastructure projects are the Crimean Bridge and Tavrida Highway. In 2018, Russia completed the construction of bridge that connected Crimea to Russia with two parallel four-lane roads and a railway track between the Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai and the city of Kerch. The construction of this twelve-mile-long bridge cost $3.7 billion. Two years later the four-lane Tavrida Highway, 1,606 miles long, was constructed, connecting the bridge with critical Crimean cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria.Both the bridge and highway, while exemplifying Russia's efforts to control and absorb Crimea into its space, also serve the specific military function of enabling the transport of troops and military. This vital logistical function explains Putin's presence at the grand opening of both projects and Ukrainian forces' intense focus on putting them out of commission since 2022. Social Colonization through InfrastructureTo compensate for the consequences of the international sanctions that have plunged Crimea into an economic abyss, Russia has invested heavily in social infrastructure: kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. Crimea is allegedly the most subsidized region under Russian control, accounting for 65–70 percent of direct subsidies from the Russian federal budget. Investment in social infrastructure, while aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Crimea's population, has simultaneously created sites for surveillance and dissemination of Russian propaganda. Especially through schools and control of curricula, Russia strives to integrate children and their parents into the "Russian world." When I visited Crimea in 2020 for research, it was apparent that even the most outspoken opponents of Russian occupation regarded these infrastructure projects with approval. Visual ColonizationMost of my interlocutors in 2020 were convinced that war against Ukraine was coming. The feeling of approaching war was palpable not only because of the growing military infrastructure but also from changes in the visual landscape. The Crimean public space had been visually reorganized around Soviet and war nostalgia themes. Already in January, four months before Russia's Victory Day on May 9, which celebrates success and valor in World War II, a huge banner was hanging in Sevastopol: "75 years of the victory (1945–2020)! Victory in the Great Patriotic War was, is, and always will be the fulcrum of Russia's people and its sustainable development!" Nearby you could see a random restaurant sign, "Heroes of a Great Country," and a poster featuring a Soviet soldier. Visual materials in all public spaces remind Crimeans of their privilege of belonging to the greatest country in the world that, if necessary, "can do it again," a slogan promising to win in a crusade against the West just as happened in 1945, according to current revisionist history. The war propaganda follows you everywhere, in the names of streets, monuments, and exhibitions scattered around the cities. One such monument is a tall stele with statues of soldiers on three sides. One statue is of a soldier of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the second is of a Soviet soldier of World War II, and the third is of a Russian soldier who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This monument is a pinnacle of Russian propaganda tailored to a Crimean audience. All these visual materials have made Crimea a Disneyland of Soviet/Russian nostalgia. Everything that could remind one of Ukraine has been removed or painted over. It is prohibited to display remembrances of the peninsula's history between 1991 and 2014. The same goes for the Crimean Tatar heritage. The Bakhchisaray Palace—the only testament to Crimean Tatar statehood—is under permanent "construction," or, more accurately, destruction. Any Crimean Tatar initiative to preserve their identity is under the strict control of the occupying authorities. Russia's Normalization Efforts Meet Ukrainians' TenacityThe longer Russia's occupation of Crimea lasts, the more permanent it seems. Russia has normalized war and a Russian presence. Memories of the "before times" fade, or those with intact memories have left. But Russia's colonization of space and memory obscures one vital point: the eventual return of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukrainian control and Ukrainian society when Russia's bellicosity crumples.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

As Russia's war in Ukraine approaches its two-year anniversary, President Vladimir Putin has reportedly had his suggestions of ceasefire rejected by Washington. On Tuesday, Reuters reported that Russia had approached the United States through intermediaries in late 2023 and early 2024 to propose freezing the conflict along the current lines. Washington reportedly turned down the suggestion, saying that they were not willing to engage in talks if Ukraine was not a participant."Putin was proposing to freeze the conflict at the current lines and was unwilling to cede any of the Ukrainian territory controlled by Russia, but the signal offered what some in the Kremlin saw as the best path towards a peace of some kind," according to Reuters, which cites three anonymous Russian sources. The plan, one of the sources told Reuters, was for national security adviser Jake Sullivan to meet with the Russian counterpart to hash out the details. But after meeting with other senior officials including Secretary of State Antony Blinken and CIA Director Bill Burns, "Sullivan told Ushakov that Washington was willing to talk about other aspects of the relationship but would not speak about a ceasefire without Ukraine, said one of the Russian sources," according to Reuters. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said that there is no point in negotiating with Putin and has maintained that he will never accept Russia controlling any part of Ukraine."Everything fell apart with the Americans," one of the sources told Reuters, saying that Washington did not want to pressure Kyiv into reaching an agreement. The sources also added that given the U.S. reaction to a potential ceasefire, Moscow saw little reason to reach out again. Both Washington and Moscow have denied the reporting. The Kremlin "never made any kind of proposal to us nor have we seen any signs that Putin is sincerely interested in ending the war," an unnamed U.S. official told Politico's NatSec daily on Tuesday. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Wednesday that the report that Russia had made such an offer was "not true." Despite Washington's insistence, this is the latest piece of evidence that Putin may have pursued a ceasefire in recent months. The New York Times reported late in 2023 that the Russian president had quietly been sending signals to the West that he was prepared to freeze the conflict. "The signals come through multiple channels, including via foreign governments with ties to both the United States and Russia," the Times reported. "Unofficial Russian emissaries have spoken to interlocutors about the contours of a potential deal that Mr. Putin would accept, American officials and others said." The report also revealed that Putin had been interested in a potential ceasefire as far back as the fall of 2022, following Ukraine's successful counteroffensive. As journalist Leonid Ragozin explained in al-Jazeera earlier this week, this may be an effort to pressure the West to negotiate on Putin's terms."What Putin is trying to achieve is making the West face its moral dilemma which boils down to the cost and benefit of resisting his aggression," Ragozin writes. "The continued support for Ukraine's military effort will cost thousands of lives and devastate Ukraine even further, while success is hardly guaranteed." In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— The prospects for the next tranche of U.S. aid for Ukraine saw the first glimmer of optimism in months, but the chances that it becomes law remain murky. After a tumultuous negotiation, the Senate passed the $95 billion national security supplemental, which includes approximately $60 billion for Kyiv. The legislation next goes to the House of Representatives, which has been more skeptical of sending aid, and where leadership so far appears unwilling to bring the bill to the floor. Supporters believe that if the House voted on the package, it would pass overwhelmingly, and some have floated pursuing legislative maneuvers that would allow them to supersede leadership and bring the legislation to a vote. — Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he spoke with Paul Whelan, the U.S. Marine currently detained in Russia, on Monday, according to CNN. Blinken provided few details on his conversation with Whelan, who has been detained since December 2018. When asked about a possible prisoner exchange involving Whelan or detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, the Kremlin said that such matters could only be resolved, "in silence." — French President Emmanuel Macron announced in a statement that he will sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine on Friday. Macron did not specify what exactly the agreement will look like, but he said earlier this year that he was expecting to model an agreement after the 10-year deal that the United Kingdom and Ukraine signed earlier this year. — The Netherlands will join a coalition of countries that is providing Ukraine with advanced drones, according to Reuters. "Ukraine intends to manufacture thousands of long-range drones capable of deep strikes into Russia in 2024 and already has up to 10 companies working on production, Ukraine's digital minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, said in a Reuters interview on Monday."U.S. State Department news:In a Wednesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller reiterated the importance of Congress passing the supplemental, stressing that it was in the national security interest of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States."A lot of that money is spent here, helps develop the manufacturing base here in the United States. And so we will continue to push for the passage of the supplemental bill, and ultimately we think – as the President said, the world is watching," Miller said. "And certainly I'm sure that when we are in Munich we will hear directly from foreign leaders that they are watching very much what Congress does. We know the Ukrainian people are watching. And as the President said, history is watching as well."

The White House and its allies launched a full-court press to get a supplemental aid package, which included $60 billion for Ukraine, over the finish line this week. Despite this, their effort failed Wednesday night, leaving the fate of funding up in the air.Earlier on Wednesday, President Joe Biden delivered surprise remarks ahead of the vote, warning that lapsed funding for Kyiv would have dire consequences for Europe and the world. "If Putin takes Ukraine, he won't stop there. It's important to see the long run here. He's going to keep going. He's made that pretty clear," Biden said. "If Putin attacks a NATO Ally — if he keeps going and then he attacks a NATO Ally — well, we've committed as a NATO member that we'd defend every inch of NATO territory. Then we'll have something that we don't seek and that we don't have today: American troops fighting Russian troops." This came in the wake of a letter sent to congressional leadership by Shalanda Young, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, saying that the U.S. is "out of money to support Ukraine in this fight," and urging them to pass the supplemental before the end of the year."Cutting off the flow of U.S. weapons and equipment will kneecap Ukraine on the battlefield," the letter warned. But after the Senate vote failed 49-51 on Wednesday the possibility that 2023 comes to an end without Congress passing another tranche of aid for Ukraine appears increasingly likely.On Thursday, Bloomberg's Erik Wasson reported on X that lawmakers believe that there is "no way" the House will pass aid this calendar year, with Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) committed to the House leaving by December 15. While the timeframe for current aid to dry up and the risk of Vladimir Putin expanding the war into Europe may be overstated, the sudden elimination of funding could be problematic nonetheless. As George Beebe of the Quincy Institute cautioned earlier this year, cutting off funding without warning would spell "bad news not only for those insisting on an unconditional Ukrainian victory, but also for those pressing for a diplomatic settlement of the conflict." "Avoiding such sobering possibilities will require compromise," Beebe continued. "The White House will have to compromise with domestic opponents of aid by making clear — at least behind closed doors — its plans for marrying military aid to a viable exit strategy. Opponents of aid will have to compromise with proponents to ensure that Ukraine does not collapse altogether, with all the attendant implications for the West and the world." Despite these dynamics, the Biden administration appears unwilling to shift its strategy and its rhetoric. In a phone call with Reuters this week, national security adviser Jake Sullivan reiterated Washington's position that it would not pressure Kyiv to enter negotiations with Moscow. "That's going to have to be up to them," Sullivan said. "We're just going to keep fighting day in and day out to try to secure this money." In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:—The Washington Post published a detailed analysis on why Ukraine's recent counteroffensive did not produce the desired results, highlighting, among other critical points, the gap in expectations between Washington and Kyiv."U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren't ready without additional weapons and training," reports the Post. "As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault."— Russian President Vladimir Putin made a rare overseas trip this week, visiting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The purpose of the trip was to discuss global oil markets and the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. The visit was partly intended to get arms and win over allies for his war effort, and possibly to "drive a wedge" between the Gulf States and the U.S., according to the Wall Street Journal.— Top Ukrainian officials came to Washington this week in an effort to bolster Kyiv's weapon making capabilities. The Ukrainian delegation, which was led by President Zelensky's adviser Andriy Yermak and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, met with a number of high-ranking U.S. officials including Jake Sullivan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo. The Ukrainians also met with lawmakers once the fight over aid took center stage on Capitol Hill. "Initially envisioned as a way for the Ukrainians to forge new contacts and commitments with the U.S. defense industry to bolster Kyiv's ability to build its own weapons, the meetings have taken on a deeper importance as the Biden administration pressures Congress to pass a $60 billion aid package, and as questions swirl over next steps in the war," reported Politico on Tuesday.Zelensky was also scheduled to address the U.S. Senate virtually on Tuesday, but he abruptly canceled his remarks shortly before the meeting. The meeting proceeded and eventually descended into chaos, according to multiple reports. "A classified briefing with administration officials called to shore up support devolved into a partisan screaming match on Tuesday afternoon, with Republicans angrily accusing Democrats of trying to steamroller over their demands for a border crackdown," reported the New York Times.U.S. State Department news:— In a Wednesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matt Miller reacted to that Senate meeting, at which Secretary of State Antony Blinken was present. "I think the Secretary found it to be a frank and candid exchange of views on the Hill, mostly between members of the Senate, not involving the administration," Miller said. "But as we made clear in the statement we issued today about the drawdown package, we have nearly exhausted the available security assistance that is available to Ukraine. It is urgent that Congress act to support Ukraine; it is urgent that Congress act to support democracy."

Over the last few months, Ukraine and its allies have pursued multiple efforts to convince unaligned nations to endorse their concept of a peace deal. President Volodymyr Zelensky and other high-ranking Ukrainian officials have made trips to Africa and the Middle East in hopes of winning over countries in the Global South. In June, senior officials from Kyiv, a number of European countries, and a number of important neutral countries, including Brazil, India, Turkey and South Africa, met in Denmark to discuss Zelensky's ten-point peace plan.Last month, Saudi Arabia hosted a follow-up summit, which was notable mostly for the presence of Chinese officials, who were absent from the first meeting. The Wall Street Journal reported in advance of the Jeddah confab that "Ukraine and Western officials hope the efforts could culminate in a peace summit later this year where global leaders would sign up to shared principles for resolving the war."Now, with the G-20 meeting having just concluded and the annual UN General Assembly meetings taking place next week, the Journal took stock of what these efforts have accomplished. The conclusion? "Western efforts to craft an international consensus on peace terms that would benefit Ukraine have made only incremental progress.""U.S. and European diplomats argue that they have chalked up some significant successes in global diplomacy on Ukraine," writes Laurence Norman. "But in recent months, diplomats and observers say, the international willingness to call out Russia publicly has diminished. A number of emerging countries have come out against calls from Ukraine and its backers to seek reparations from Russia over war damage and create an international tribunal targeting Russia's leadership."Signs of this tension were clear at last week's G-20 summit in New Delhi. The signatories of the leaders' declaration could not agree that the conflict was a war "against" Ukraine and instead referred to it as a war "in Ukraine." The statement spoke out against territorial conquests in general terms but did not directly condemn Moscow for its aggression. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the statement "a step in the right direction," while the Ukrainian foreign ministry said it was "nothing to be proud of."As the Journal report notes, Moscow has still been largely marginalized on the international stage. But because much of the Global South has suffered the economic consequences of the war, they are more motivated to seek a conclusion to hostilities. "At next week's gathering of world leaders at the U.N. General Assembly, developing countries appear eager to shift the global focus onto their priorities: global inequality and debt relief," writes Norman. As for Ukraine's government, it may look to take advantage of the presence of world leaders in New York to build on this summer's discussions to pursue a more unified international position in any eventual negotiations. "The U.S. and its allies have accepted that they are not going to win over some of the big non-Western powers completely," Richard Gowan, the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group, told the Journal. "But the international view of how the war should end…may help frame whatever solution is eventually available."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made remarks detailing discussions between Russia and NATO from before the war:"President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And [it] was a pre-condition for [him to] not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that. The opposite happened." Stoltenberg said. "He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second class membership. We rejected that. So he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. He has got the exact opposite." —Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the BBC that he believes that Ukraine has approximately 30 more days before weather conditions begin to hamper Ukraine's counteroffensive. An anonymous French diplomat agreed with this assessment, telling Politico that the counteroffensive would likely have to conclude by late October or early November.—North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made a rare trip abroad, visiting Vladimir Putin in Russia. Politico's NatSec daily newsletter reports that "It's widely believed that the autocrats met to hash out a deal where Moscow gets conventional weapons for the war while Pyongyang gets food aid as well as advanced technology for satellites and ballistic missiles." — The Pope's peace envoy, Matteo Zuppi, is visiting China this week, following trips to Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow earlier this summer. "On the issue of Ukraine, China has always been committed to promoting peace talks," said Mao Ning, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign minister. "We are ready to work with all parties and continue to play a constructive role in promoting de-escalation and cooling of the situation." The details of Zuppi's trip are not clear, although the Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported that he was likely to meet with Premier Li Qiang. Reuters notes that Beijing hosting a papal envoy is significant given Beijing's cool ties with the Holy See.U.S. State Department news:State Department spokesman Matthew Miller responded to a question about Stoltenberg's remarks during a press briefing in Wednesday's press briefing. "We always made clear in the run-up to that war that we were willing to engage in diplomacy with Russia. The Ukrainians made clear that they were willing to engage in diplomacy with Russia about legitimate regional security concerns. But we were not going to compromise one of NATO's founding principles," Miller said. "Ukraine did not want to seem to want to compromise their own right to determine their future as a country."

The Washington Post reported recently that U.S. intelligence officials do not believe the Ukrainian military will achieve a key goal set out at the launch of its counteroffensive against Russian occupying forces back in June — reaching the southeastern city of Melitipol and cutting off Russia's access to Crimea by land.While the counteroffensive has achieved some recent successes — including piercing Moscow's first line of multi-echeloned defensive positions and taking a key village — the Wall Street Journal reported last week that "there is no sign of a collapse in Russian lines."In fact, most recent mainstream reporting on the status of the offensive has been similarly dour, which might come as a surprise to anyone paying attention to predictions from the American pundit class shortly before the Ukrainian counteroffensive began.Despite reports at the time quoting U.S. intelligence predicting that the upcoming Ukrainian offensive would result only in "modest territorial gains," and fall "well short" of Kyiv's goals, many lawmakers, experts, and pundits had a much more confident take. In fact, several senior officials openly suggested that the Ukrainian operations would be a rousing success, while others said it would lead to an all-out victory, expelling the Russians out of occupied Ukraine and perhaps even Crimea. "I expect major gains in the coming days and weeks," said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) — one of Ukraine's most hyperbolic supporters — during a May 28 interview on Fox News. "I think they can expel Russia from Ukraine."The Russians are "in for a rude awakening" he said a couple days later. "In the coming days, you're going to see a pretty impressive display of power by the Ukrainians." Indeed, Graham's rosy assessments were just the tip of the overly optimistic grandstanding iceberg from that time. Here's a brief — albeit not comprehensive — sample of what we heard about the upcoming counteroffensive last spring from not just expert pundits, but also top U.S. officials, despite their presumed knowledge of more sober U.S. intelligence predictions:Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: "I think Ukraine will have a very good chance of success." [03/28/23]National security adviser Jake Sullivan: "We believe that the Ukrainians will meet with success in this counteroffensive." [06/04/23]NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: "I'm confident that when Ukraine decides to launch new operations to liberate more land, Ukraine will be successful." [4/21/23]Former CIA Director, Gen. David Petraeus (ret.): "I personally think that this is going to be really quite successful. .. And [the Russians] are going to have to withdraw under pressure of this Ukrainian offensive, the most difficult possible tactical maneuver, and I don't think they're going to do well at that." [05/23/23] "I think that this counteroffensive is going to be very impressive." [06/03/23]Retired U.S. Army Gen. Ben Hodges: "I actually expect, however, that [the Ukrainians] will be quite successful." [05/12/23]Historian Edward Luttwak: "If Kyiv and the West are looking for the most plausible path to victory, this is it." [05/11/23]Atlantic Council non-resident fellow Richard Hooker: "As we are often told, no plan survives contact with the enemy. There will likely be the occasional tactical miscue or operational hiccup during the coming counteroffensive, but a careful assessment suggests the odds are heavily in favor of Ukraine." [05/23/23]Former Chief of the British General Staff, General Richard Dannatt: "[A]fter Kyiv's successful counteroffensive, Vladimir Putin 'may be swept out of the Kremlin.'" [03/28/23]Paul Massaro, senior policy adviser, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: "Full Ukrainian victory is coming. Sooner than you think." [06/12/23]It's hard to square these hopeful, borderline fanciful analyses with what we knew at that time. In fact, there were plenty of other experts offering more balanced forecasts of what was to come with Ukraine's counteroffensive. For example, the Quincy Institute's George Beebe wrote back in April that available evidence at that time "paint[s] a much bleaker picture of Kyiv's prospects in the war than the White House has acknowledged." He added that that evidence depicts "manning and training levels for Ukraine's much anticipated counter-offensive that inspire little confidence it will produce a decisive breakthrough against reinforced Russian defenses." Good policy requires good information, particularly when it comes to war and peace. Unfortunately, the commentariat in U.S. media and beyond hasn't been providing very informed analysis when it comes to the war in Ukraine.Analysts should separate what they might want to happen with what — from a more objective point of view — is more likely to actually happen. Too often, experts are offering rosy predictions of Ukrainian military operations where most available evidence suggests otherwise. And as these unfounded optimistic predictions pile up, so too does American support both among the public and policymakers to pour more weapons and money into — what should look like to anyone taking a sober look at realities on the ground — a protracted stalemate or perhaps worse. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mike Milley was shouted down last November when he suggested that perhaps Ukraine and its Western allies had a decent window of opportunity to negotiate an end to the war. While he has said more recently that it's too early to assess whether the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been a success (albeit without defining success), he also maintained that kicking all Russian forces out of Ukraine via solely military means "is going to be very, very difficult and challenging.""A different way of going at it is through negotiations," he said last week. "And maybe that'll happen too."But if more objective assessments of the war in Ukraine continue to be drowned out by this same kind of emotion-based, wishful-thinking commentary and analysis, maybe it won't.

David Boaz


Here we go again. Another "obituary" for libertarianism. While Salon Magazine declares that we all live in a "libertarian dystopia," and a new brand of big‐​government conservatives promise to free the Republican party and American government from their libertarian captivity, Barton Swaim declares in the Wall Street Journal that a new book "works as an obituary" for libertarianism. That's not a characterization that I think the authors—Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi—would accept of their book, The Individualists: Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Struggle for the Soul of Libertarianism.
Swaim notes that the book surveys many different kinds of self‐​styled libertarians over the past two centuries, and that the authors lay out six "markers" that libertarians share: property rights, individualism, free markets, skepticism of authority, negative liberties, and a belief that people are best left to order themselves spontaneously. Not a bad list, significantly overlapping with the list of seven key libertarian ideas that I laid out in the first chapter of my own book, The Libertarian Mind.
He goes on to argue, following the authors, "In the 21st century, the movement in the U.S. has consisted in an assortment of competing, often disputatious intellectual cadres: anarchists, anarcho‐​capitalists, paleo‐​libertarians (right‐​wing), 'liberaltarians' (left‐​wing) and many others." Somehow he leaves out actual libertarians, such as those who populate the Cato Institute, Reason magazine, the Objectivist world, and much of the Libertarian Party. Indeed, a few lines later he cites the "diversity" of "the priestess of capitalism Ayn Rand, the politician Rand Paul and the billionaire philanthropist Charles Koch"—none of whom would fall into any of the esoteric categories that he suggests make up modern libertarianism and in fact belong to actual libertarianism or its penumbras.
The whole review is ahistorical. Swaim never mentions classical liberalism, the revolutionary movement that challenged monarchs, autocrats, mercantilism, caste society, and established churches beginning in the 18th century. Liberalism soon swept the United States and Western Europe and ushered in what economic historian Deirdre McCloskey calls the "Great Enrichment," the unprecedented rise in living standards that has made us moderns some 3,000 percent richer than our ancestors of 1800. The ideas of the classical liberals, including John Locke, Adam Smith, and the American Founders, are those that animate modern libertarianism: equal rights, constitutional government, free markets, tolerance, the rule of law. Zwolinski and Tomasi say that "what sets libertarians apart is the absolutism and systematicity" with which we advocate those ideas. Well, yes, after 200 years of historical observation and philosophical and economic debate, many of us do believe that a firmer adherence to liberal/​libertarian ideas would serve society well. We observe that the closer a society comes to consistent tolerance, free markets, and the rule of law, the more it will achieve widespread peace, prosperity, and freedom.
Swaim insists that libertarians do not engage "with ultimate questions—questions about the good life, morality, religious meaning, human purpose and so on." He's wrong about that. Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments. F. A. Hayek stressed the importance of morals and tradition. Ayn Rand set out a fairly strict code of personal ethics. Thomas Szasz's work challenged the reductionists and behaviorists with a commitment to the old ideas of good and bad, right and wrong, and responsibility for one's choices. Charles Murray emphasizes the value and indeed the necessity of community and responsibility. Libertarian philosophers of virtue ethics find the case for limited government to be based on the search for the good life. Swaim would be on more solid ground to say that libertarianism does not presume to tell individuals what to believe and how to live. Separation of church and state and all that. As I wrote in a letter to the Journal (not yet published), Swaim refers to the "studiously amoral philosophy of libertarianism." A popular summary of libertarianism, "don't hit other people, don't take their stuff, and keep your promises," is just the basic morality that allows human beings to live together in peace.
As for his claim that libertarianism is dead, that this book is an obituary, I refer Swaim again to all the people who complain that we're living in some sort of libertarian world. Libertarians often feel depressed; they believe the world is on "the road to serfdom." But in fact the world is far freer in this century than ever before in history. Free markets and free trade, an end to slavery and caste societies, representative government, and the rule of law now govern the Western world and much of the rest. Most of the Cato Institute's website comprises complaints about the malfeasance of the U.S. government. But in the bigger picture, libertarians have had much success. In the roughly 50 years since I started thinking about politics, one could point to such successes as:
the end of conscription in the United States
social, economic, and political equality for women
dramatically lower marginal tax rates
freer trade
deregulation of major industries such as airlines, trucking, communication, and finance
the almost total demise of communism
and the consequent discrediting of socialism and central planning
the reorientation of antitrust policy to a consumer welfare standard
expanded First Amendment protections
expanded Second Amendment protections
the progress of gay rights and gay marriage
growing opportunities for school choice
a slow erosion of the war on drugs
I could go on. None of these are total victories. No ideology achieves all of its sweeping vision, at least not without a military conquest of the government and the ability to rule by decree—and those experiments are nothing to emulate. In various parts of the world bad ideas are back—socialism, protectionism, ethnic nationalism, anti‐​Semitism, even industrial policy. The libertarian challenge is to join with other liberals—Reaganite conservatives, free‐​speech liberals, people who are "fiscally conservative and socially liberal"—to push back against these bad resurgent ideas. But this record of accomplishment is no obituary.

The ending of the original The Blob I have a distinct memory of watching the original The Blob on a Saturday afternoon movie. I watched a lot of Saturday afternoon movies, Godzilla, all of the Universal monsters, and various giant ants, crabs, and praying mantis. The Blob stood out because it was actually frightening in a way that a giant monster crushing a city was not, and because its ending, in which a frozen blob was dropped someplace north of the Arctic Circle was followed by a giant question mark hovering over the sky, lingered in my mind. At the time it seemed like the perfect way to end a horror movie, with the horror still intact. I must admit as well that Steve McQueen's last line, "As long as the Arctic stays cold," sounds much more ominous these days.  
It is perhaps because of this fondness for the original that I rewatched the eighties remake as part of the Criterion Channel's 80s Horror collection (parenthetically I want to throw out a few words of praise for the Criterion Channel in general and for their ability to do a great job with Halloween programing. While the collection only has a few horror movies, including, for some reason, the original Blob, the channel has branched out to include some classics, like Wolfen, some forgotten gems, like The Hidden, and some oddballs that would not show up anyplace else). The remake is uneven, but not terrible. Perhaps its best innovation is to update the original film's social conflict. The original was framed in the conflict between the small town authority figures and the kids (who were portrayed by actors well into their twenties when the film was made). This is preserved in the figure of Kevin Dillon, who, for some reason, wears the "Puffy shirt" that Seinfeld would make famous. The remake expands the social conflict to include a government agency whose attempt to contain the blob is couched in cold war paranoia in which every alien is a potential bioweapon. Its real improvement, however, in how it updates the question mark that lingers over the original with a scene featuring the town's preacher. He has witnessed the blob's attack on the small town and concludes that it is a harbinger of the apocalypse, that he sees himself tasked to complete. Upon rewatching I realized that what I liked about this ending is its fundamental incompleteness. There was no sequel to this particular version of the blob. The ending just hovers as a question mark. I wish more films were allowed to end on the question. The original Halloween has one of the best endings of modern horror. Its ending makes the film feel like one of the stories told around a campfire about "escaped lunatics." When I was growing up "escaped lunatic" stories were what we told camping, not ghost stories, and they always ended with some twist about the scratching of a car roof, or who was licking a hand, all guaranteed to make it hard to sleep. Halloween's ending, "he looked over the balcony and the body wasn't there" always seemed to be one such ending, which is why the film almost feels more like a rendition of a kind of urban legend or folk tale. Of course this ending has been turned into multiple sequels that have expanded on Michael Myers ability to survive bullets, fire, stabbings, etc., As I watched the most recent film in the long line of sequels, Halloween Ends I kept thinking that it would be better if the whole series had ended with just the shot of the imprint in the shape of the body in grass (or gone in the direction Carpenter wanted, with a different Halloween film each year, as in the underrated Season of the Witch).. All of the original movies of the eighties and seventies that were serialized into sequels, reboots, and, in the language of the new Scream film, requels (reboot and sequel, like the new Halloween films that simultaneously follow existing films and restart the sequence, often cutting films out of the canon), Halloween, Friday the 13th, and A Nightmare on Elm Street, ended on a question mark, on a scene in which the seemingly dead killer or monster comes back in one last jump scare. In the parlance of the times, they left it open for a sequel, but now, everything is open for a sequel. Any character that does not die can return, and even those who do can return, somehow. The endings of the originals almost function as frightening short films in their own right, albeit, ones dominated by jump scares. It is worth noting how much they "hold up" even as many of the sequels and prequels they gave rise to fade into well deserved obscurity. All of those sequels, which expand upon and then reduce the mythology of the characters, add up to so much less than endings which made them possible. The question mark, incompleteness, is as much a part of the narrative as what we see on the screen. Contemporary intellectual property driven film production, however, abhors a vacuum. Everything that is not explicitly resolved must be made and remade until there is nothing left to extract from it. A lot of the frustration and boredom that many people feel about contemporary film and television stems from the tension between narrative, which demands closure as well as incompleteness, and the extraction of value which works against both. It is not enough to see that a character lives, the sequel must be made, just like it is not enough to learn that spies found the plans for the Death Star, we must see their story, and their back story. Narratives are finite by definition, but commodity production is a bad infinity. 

Almeno dal cosiddetto neolitico recente (circa 4000 cal a.C.) nel sud-est della penisola iberica inizia un processo di differenziazione tra gli insediamenti che accompagna un importante e progressivo processo di diversificazione sociale legato a dinamiche di accumulazione differenziale della ricchezza e al bisogno di riprodurre la situazione controllando la forza lavoro. Dall'eneolitico (3300 a.C.) alcuni insediamenti, in particolare Los Millares (Santa Fe de Mondújar, Almeria), ci permettono osservare al loro interno i processi di segregazione spaziale con differenti linee di muraglie, aree specializzate e laboratori metallurgici, nonché prove del consumo differenziale di prodotti agropastorali e accesso a prodotti esotici e di prestigio. Queste differenze si estendono al rituale funerario e si esprimono anche nell'enfasi sul controllo territoriale attraverso la dispersione di megaliti e fortini. Tra l'età del bronzo antico e recente (2150-1350 a.C.), con lo sviluppo della cultura del Argar, non solo l'enfasi sul controllo territoriale viene estesa, con la dispersione di insediamenti arroccati, ma quella segregazione spaziale è più evidente non solo nei centri politici come La Bastida (Totana, Murcia) ma anche nei piccoli villaggi. Infatti, anche nei piccoli nuclei, come mostra l'analisi del Castellón Alto (Galera, Granada), si sviluppa un complesso agglomerato urbano con case con più ambienti destinati a diverse attività, infrastrutture stradali e di approvvigionamento idrico e aree separate per l'élite, specialmente nelle zone più alte (acropoli). L'usanza di seppellire i defunti sotto le case facilita anche l'identificazione del livello sociale degli abitanti di ciascuna area all'interno dello stesso sito. Le relazioni tra le élite ci aiutano a valutare che questo processo di urbanizzazione è comunque destinato a convertire solo alcuni siti in centri ideologici e politici (città) in cui le principali élites riproducono il sistema di classe. Lo stesso discorso si può fare per i principali insediamenti eneolitici. ; At least from the so-called Late Neolithic (around 4000 BC) a process of differentiation between the settlements begins in Iberian South-east. Changes in settlement pattern were accompanied by an important and progressive increase in social diversification linked to dynamics of differential accumulation of wealth and control of labour force. From the Chalcolithic (3300 BC) some settlements, in particular Los Millares (Santa Fe de Mondújar, Almeria), allow us to observe within them the processes of spatial segregation with different lines of walls, specialized areas and metallurgical workshops, as well as evidence on differential consumption of farming products and exotic and prestigious items. These differences extend to the funeral ritual and are also expressed in the emphasis on territorial control through the dispersion of megaliths and hill-forts. Between the Early and Late Bronze Age (2150- 1350 BC), with the development of the Argar culture, not only the emphasis on territorial control is extended, with the dispersion of well defended settlements placed on high positions, and spatial segregation is more evident not only in political centers such as La Bastida (Totana, Murcia) but also in small villages. In fact, even in small villages, as shown by the analysis of the Castellón Alto (Galera, Granada), a complex urban agglomeration develops with houses with more rooms for different activities, street and water supplies infrastructures and separate areas for the elite, especially in the highest areas (acropolis). The custom of burying the dead under the houses also facilitates the identification of the social level of the inhabitants of each area inside the settlements. Links between the elites help us to assess that this process of urbanization is anyway related to keep only some sites as the ideological and political centers (cities) where main elites reproduce the class system, as can be said also by main Chalcolithic settlements. ; Al menos desde el denominado Neolítico Tardío (alrededor de 4000 cal AC) en el sudeste de Península Ibérica comienza un proceso de diferenciación entre los asentamientos que acompaña un importante y progresivo proceso de jerarquización social relacionado con dinámica de acumulación diferencial de riqueza y la necesidad de reproducir la situación controlando la fuerza de trabajo. Desde el Eneolítico (3300 cal A.C.) algunos asentamientos, en particular Los Millares (Santa Fe de Mondújar, Almería), nos permiten observar dentro de ellos los procesos de segregación espacial con diferentes líneas de murallas, áreas especializadas y talleres metalúrgicos, así como evidencias de consumo diferencial de productos agropecuarios y acceso restringido a productos exóticos y de prestigio. Estas diferencias se extienden al ritual funerario y se expresan también en el énfasis en el control territorial a través de la dispersión de megalitos y fortines. Durante el Bronce Antiguo y Tardío (2150-1350 cal AC), con el desarrollo de la Cultura de El Argar, no sólo se extiende el énfasis en el control territorial, con la dispersión de asentamientos encastillados, sino que esa segregación espacial interna es más evidente tanto en centros políticos como La Bastida (Totana, Murcia) como también en pequeños poblados. De hecho, incluso en núcleos menores, como muestra el análisis del Castellón Alto (Galera, Granada), se desarrolla una compleja aglomeración urbana con viviendas con múltiples estancias destinadas a diferentes actividades, infraestructuras viarias y de suministro de agua y áreas separadas para la élite, especialmente en las áreas más altas (acrópolis). La costumbre de enterrar a los muertos debajo de las casas también facilita la identificación del nivel social de los habitantes de cada zona dentro del mismo yacimiento. Las relaciones entre las élites nos ayudan a evaluar el hecho de que en este proceso sólo determinados yacimientos se convierten en los centros políticos (ciudades) e ideológicos de las élites centrales, donde mejor se expresa y reproduce el sistema de clases, como ya sucedía durante el Calcolítico. ; Proyecto "Estrategias agropecuarias y consumo en la Edad del Bronce del sur de la Península Ibérica. Análisis de plantas, animales y restos humanos (HAR2016-80057-P)" financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.

The topic of this report is a collaborative governance arrangement between the Norwegian government and organisations of economically and social disadvantaged persons. The arrangement has been operative since the spring of 2008 and involves the following elements: • A Contact Committee of representatives of the government and organisations of economically and social disadvantaged persons, convening two–three times per year to discuss measures for combating poverty and social exclusion in Norway • A Collaborative Forum established to enable spokespersons of ten to twelve organisations to strengthen their competence, clarify and prioritise joint demands and policy proposals to be presented to Ministers at the next Contact Committee meeting. • The Battery, a centre for supporting self-organisation and self-help efforts (under the Church Street Mission), in the role as secretariat, facilitator and intermediary in relation to the Ministries • Provision of financial support; the government has granted funds for the operation of to the Battery for its work vis-ö -vis the Contact Committee and the Collaborative Forum and for establishing new local Batteries across Norway, and for basic grants and project support for organisations of economically and social disadvantaged persons. Even if new and still under development, this model of collaborative governance and open and inclusive policy making has attracted attention internationally, for instance from the European Commission and the OECD. The international interest has centred on the model's emphasis on facilitating capacity building and joint policy articulation among underrepresented groups, providing new resources these groups and the role of the Battery as facilitator and intermediary. Arguably the combination of these traits makes the Norwegian unique in a comparative context. This report takes stock of the experiences and achievements of almost three years of operation. On the basis of documentary analysis and a series of long semi-structured interview with key informants the study examines to what extent the model is on the right track to meet the stated objectives and the stakeholders' expectations. The main findings of the study are: • The involved parties – the Battery and the organisations – have to considerable extent succeeded in making the Collaborative Forum an arena for capacity building and joint policy articulation, but the organisations' heterogeneity in terms of profile, focus, organisational philosophy and approach has been a major challenge in their efforts to agree on truly joint proposals and clear priorities for demands vis-ö -vis the Ministers. Especially some organisations have tended to compete against each other about getting "their" cause and demands to be at the fore of the discussions. As a pragmatic solution to this competition, the Collaborative Forum has tended to propose a number of diverse issues to be included in the agenda of each Contact Committee meeting and allow some issues to be taken up at several successive meetings. Consequently, there has been relatively low renewal of issues over time and issues like for instance child poverty and the education of survivors of child protection have been given relatively scant attention. • Similarly, the Collaborative Forum and Battery had made some progress in promoting capacity building among the organisations of economically and socially disadvantaged persons but there was clearly a scope for further development, for instance in clarifying the target group for different capacity building events and in using the heterogeneity of the organisations as a potential source for competence transfer and mutual learning between the organisations. • While the availability of new funds for joint initiatives, actions and projects had stimulated more collaboration between the organisations involved in the model, the full potential for such joint ventures had not been exhausted. Factors contributing to the underuse of this opportunity were again the heterogeneity of the organisations, and the participating organisations' uneven access to resources for basic organisational activities. • Overall the spokespersons of the organisations clearly stated that it had been important and valuable for them to be involved in the model, especially to be included among the representatives attending the Contact Committee meetings. In particular the spokespersons emphasised the improved possibilities for voice (or 'representation' in the sense spelled out by Nancy Fraser 2008) in relation to the experiences, needs and demands of people at the margin of Norwegian society. Next the spokespersons appreciated the increased visibility and acknowledgement of the organisations' objectives, activities, competence and abilities (or 'recognition' in Fraser's sense). The organisations were, however, more reserved or critical about the amount of tangible results of the participation, in the meaning of genuinely new and better public politics and provision (or achievements of 'redistribution' in Fraser's sense). Although most of the spokespersons referred to some improvements in public policy, they regarded these more as adjustments and amendments than reforms indicating a new direction of public policy. Spokespersons also criticised the Ministers and Civil Servants for giving delayed and limited feedback on the issues and proposals that the organisations had raised in the Contact Committee meetings. The report discusses several factors that may account for this dissatisfaction on the part of the organisations and present a number of suggestions and recommendations for how the Ministers and Civil Servants could become more accountable, as perceived by the spokespersons of the organisations. ; Rapporten analyserer et uvanlig middel for å bekjempe fattigdom i Norge: Siden våren 2008 har representanter for regjeringen og om lag ti organisasjoner av økonomisk og sosialt utsatte diskutert tiltak mot fattigdom i et Kontaktutvalg. Organisasjonenes representanter har møtt jevnlig i et Samarbeidsforum for å styrke sin kompetanse og diskutere seg fram til felles forslag og prioriteringer overfor politikerne. Selvhjelpssenteret Batteriet (under Kirkens Bymisjon) har vært sekretariat. Denne modellen for sivil dialog har vakt internasjonal oppmerksomhet, men er ikke godt kjent i Norge. Rapporten gjør rede for erfaringene med modellen så langt, bygd på intervjuer og foreliggende dokumenter, og presenterer en rekke forslag for å gi modellen større gjennomslagskraft.

As a result of large-scale excavations of a few unfortified settlements next to the capital city along with the previously received materials from studying the same category of archaeological sites, quite a huge amount of data has been collected that is fully sufficient in order to provide characteristic of material and some elements of spiritual culture of the population of the mentioned socio-economic formations. Most of the researched settlements were bound to sources of water supply. In the area where it was possible to trace whithin configuration of the excavations (Sofiivska Borshchahivka), there were traced streets planning and formation of the farmstead constructions. At some places certain traditions of inside constructions' layout and general features of housebuilding are noticed. The studied houses are deepened in the ground, in some cases on basements; to the living quarter sometimes was adjacent a lobby-entrance. At Sofiivska Borshchahivka village, two-chamber dwelling with floor in the living part was investigated; at Teremky settlement — a single-chamber dwelling with floor laid on the pegs pounded into the ground. The stove was placed by the entrance and directed towards it. In addition to the dwellings household constructions were found. The livestock farming is marked by the construction for fattening pigs at Khodosivka-Roslavske, the agriculture — by pits for grains at Sofiivska Borshchahivka. The main production facilities of ironmakers (Kremenyshche, Hodosivka-Kozakiv Yar), amber processing specialists (Khodosivka-Roslavske), specialists in pyrolysis of wood as well as subsidiary production facilities — woodworkers (Khodosivka-Roslavske), stoneworkers (Sofiivska Borshchahivka) and etc. were excavated. Tools of soil cultivation, harvesting and processing of the crop testify the developed agriculture, while spit and fetters clasps — developed livestock; special arrowheads — hunting; awn, fishing nets sinkers, hooks — fishing; hazel nutshells — gathering. The population was also engaged in gathering spice plants, dyes, fibers, fruits, mushrooms, berries, and, based on the natural conditions and modern documents — probably also in wild-honey farming. Tools and various facilities indicate spinning, weaving, manufacturing and repairing of shoes and clothing, while some tools, and unfinished items, production waste indicate metalworking. Artifacts of bones carving, woodworking tools, and findings indicating development of other industries are also recorded. In the collection we have a wide representation of household items, jewelry and details of a costume, amulets of pagan cults and those items of special piety of Christians with items of the temple service. Many elements of weapons, military equipment and equipment of a rider and a battle horse were collected. In addition to ceramic tableware, among which are products with glaze, sophisticated tableware, etc., fragments of glass tableware and metal pan were recorded. Some of jewelry items and insignia of the Orthodox worship not only reflect trade and cultural ties, but also characterize the perception of space by the population. The results of the excavations not only show that the information resource of rural sites is not yet exhausted, they not only emphasize the extraordinary nature of the material culture of the settlement Khodosivka-Roslavske even in comparison with neighboring locations, but also serve as an additional argument in favor of considering the sites of the capital suburbs as a separate social-economic and cultural formation. ; Масштабными раскопками нескольких неукрепленных пунктов в округе столицы вместе с ранее полученными данными относительно этой категории памятников накоплен массив материала, вполне достаточный для характеристики материальной и некоторых элементов духовной культуры населения указанных социально-экономических образований. Большинство изученных селищ расположены возле источников водоснабжения. Там, где это позволяют проследить площадь и конфигурация раскопов (Софиевская Борщаговка), зафиксированы уличная планировка и формирование усадебной застройки. Местами отмечены определенные традиции внутриусадебного размещения сооружений и общие черты домостроительства. Исследованные дома углублены в землю, в отдельных случаях возведены на подклетях, к жилому помещению иногда примыкал тамбур-вход. На селище Софиевская Борщаговка исследовано двухкамерное жилище с полом в жилой части, на поселении Теремки — однокамерное с полом, уложенном на вбитые в землю колья. Печь ставили возле входа и ориентировали устьем к последнему. Кроме жилищ известны хозяйственно-бытовые постройки, животноводство маркирует сооружение для откорма свиней из Ходосовки-Рославского, земледелие — ямы для зерна из Софиевской Борщаговки. Раскопаны основные объекты железоделов (Кременище, Ходосовка-Козаков яр), мастеров обработки янтаря (Ходосовка-Рославское) и сухой перегонки дерева (Софиевская Борщаговка) и вспомогательные — специалистов по обработке дерева (Ходосовка-Рославское) и камня (Софиевская Борщаговка) и др. Орудия обработки почвы, сбора и переработки урожая свидетельствуют о развитии зернового хозяйства, косы и застежка от пут — скотоводства, специфические наконечники стрел — охоты, острога, грузила от сеток, крючья — рыбной ловли, скорлупа лещины — собирательства. Занималось население и сбором пряно-вкусовых растений, красителей, волокон и плодов, а, исходя из природных условий и документов нового времени, вероятно и бортничеством. Орудия и приспособления указывают на прядение, ткачество, изготовление и ремонт обуви и одежды, а некоторые инструменты, незавершённые изделия, отходы производства — на металлообработку. Зафиксированы артефакты косторезного производства, деревообрабатывающие орудия, находки, свидетельствующие о развитии других отраслей. В коллекции широко представлены бытовой инвентарь, украшения и элементы костюма, имеются амулеты языческих культов и предметы личного благочестия христиан вместе с вещами храмового служения. Собрано немало предметов вооружения, воинского доспеха, а также снаряжения всадника и боевого коня. Кроме керамической посуды, среди которой — изделия с поливой, изысканные формы столовой и т. п., выявлены фрагменты стеклянного, металлическая сковородка. Часть украшений и инсигнии православного паломничества не только отражают торговые и культурные связи, но и характеризуют восприятие населением картины мира. Результаты раскопок не только демонстрируют неисчерпаемость информационного ресурса сельских памятников, не только подчеркивают неординарность материальной культуры поселения Ходосовка-Рославское даже в сравнении с соседними пунктами, но и выступают дополнительным аргументом в пользу рассмотрения памятников пригородов столицы как особого социально-экономического и культурного образования. ; Розгорнуте останнім часом масштабне вивчення неукріплених пам'яток у передмістях Києва разом з отриманими раніше даними дозволяє детально характеризувати специфіку матеріальної і простежених за матеріальними залишками елементів духовної культури середньовічного населення столичних околиць. Багатогалузеве розвинене господарство, високий рівень добробуту мешканців, простежені в процесі розкопок аспекти духовного життя засвідчують неординарність вивчених селищних структур і дозволяють вбачати у сільській окрузі столичного мегаполісу своєрідне соціокультурне явище.

En el Segundo Juzgado Especializado en lo Civil de Maynas, el accionante José Carlos Vela Amasifuen interpone demanda de Desalojo por ocupación precaria contra Alejandrina Zumaeta Pinedo quien se encontraba ocupando parte del bien inmueble submateria del demandante ubicado en la Calle Echenique número novecientos noventa y nueve, inscrito con el Código de Predio P12012320; solicitando al juzgado se pronuncie ordenando a la demandada desocupar y entregar al actor el bien sub litis. El Juez de primera instancia declara FUNDADA la demanda, en consecuencia, ordena que la demandada ALEJANDRINA ZUMAETA PINEDO cumpla con restituir al actor JOSÉ CARLOS VELA AMASIFUEN, la parte que viene ocupando del inmueble de su propiedad ubicado en la Calle Echenique N° 999. La demandada interpone recurso de apelación. El Colegiado de la Sala Civil, revoca la sentencia de primera Instancia que declaró fundada la demanda; reformándola, la declara IMPROCEDENTE. El accionante interpone recurso de casación. La Sala Civil Transitoria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica resuelve declarando FUNDADO el recurso de casación interpuesto por José Carlos Vela Amasifuen, en consecuencia, declararon NULA la sentencia de vista y actuando como sede de instancia, CONFIRMARON la sentencia apelada y ordenó que la demandada cumpla con restituir al demandante la parte que viene ocupando del inmueble de su propiedad. ; En el Primer Juzgado Especializado en lo Civil de Maynas, la accionante Gladys Martínez Khan interpone demanda de acción constitucional de amparo, por vulneración a su derecho constitucional al trabajo al haber sido despedida sin expresión de causa, a fin de que se le restituya su derecho fundamental vulnerado reponiéndole a su centro de trabajo con contrato indeterminado por haberse desnaturalizado el contrato sujeto a modalidad y se ordene su reposición como trabajadora a plazo indeterminado. El Juez de primera instancia declara fundada la demanda, pues argumenta que se ha vulnerado su derecho constitucional al trabajo consagrado en los artículos 22° y 27° de la Constitución Política del Estado, además del derecho a acceder a un puesto de trabajo conlleva el derecho a no ser despedido sino por causa justa configurándose con ello un despido sin imputación de causa, debiendo, por tanto, ampararse la demanda. El demandante interpuso recurso de apelación. El Colegiado de la Sala Civil Mixta C.S.J. Loreto, revoca la sentencia de primera Instancia que declaró fundada la demanda; reformándola, la declara nula. Además, declara nula la Resolución N° 14 que declara fundada la excepción de incompetencia, por tanto, declarando nulo todo lo celebrado. El Tribunal Constitucional emite su sentencia, declarando fundada la demanda por haberse comprobado la afectación del derecho al trabajo; en consecuencia, declara Nulo el despido arbitrario. Asimismo, ordena que la Empresa Electro Oriente S.A. reponga a Doña Gladys Martínez Khan, como trabajadora a plazo indeterminado en el cargo de auxiliar de compras; o en otro de similar puesto categoría en el plazo de dos días. ; In the Second Specialized Civil Court of Maynas, the plaintiff José Carlos Vela Amasifuen files a lawsuit for Eviction for precarious occupation against Alejandrina Zumaeta Pinedo who was occupying part of the plaintiff's submaterial real estate located at Echenique Street number nine hundred and ninety-nine, registered with the Property Code P12012320; requesting the court to rule ordering the defendant to vacate and deliver the sub litis property to the plaintiff. The judge of first instance declares the lawsuit FOUNDED, consequently, he orders that the defendant ALEJANDRINA ZUMAETA PINEDO comply with restoring the actor JOSÉ CARLOS VELA AMASIFUEN, the part that has been occupying the property of his property located at Calle Echenique N ° 999. The defendant files appeal. The Collegiate of the Civil Chamber, revokes the judgment of first Instance that declared the claim founded; reforming it, it declares it IMPROPER. The plaintiff files a cassation appeal. The Transitory Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic resolves by declaring FOUNDED the appeal filed by José Carlos Vela Amasifuen, consequently, they declared the hearing sentence NULL and acting as the seat of instance, CONFIRMED the appealed sentence and ordered that the defendant complies with restoring to the plaintiff the part that has been occupying the property of his property. ; In the First Specialized Civil Court of Maynas, the plaintiff Gladys Martínez Khan files a constitutional action for amparo, for violation of her constitutional right to work, having been fired without expression of cause, in order to have her right restored fundamental violated by replacing her work center with an indeterminate contract for having distorted the contract subject to modality and her replacement as an indefinite-term worker is ordered. The judge of first instance declares the claim founded, as he argues that his constitutional right to work enshrined in articles 22 and 27 of the Political Constitution of the State has been violated, in addition to the right to access a job entails the right not to be fired except for just cause, thereby configuring a dismissal without imputation of cause, and therefore, the claim must be protected. The plaintiff filed an appeal. The Collegiate of the Mixed Civil Chamber C.S.J. Loreto, revokes the judgment of first Instance that declared the claim founded; reforming it, it declares it null. In addition, it declares Resolution N ° 14 null and void, which declares the incompetence exception founded, therefore, declaring everything that has been celebrated null and void. The Constitutional Court issues its judgment, declaring the claim founded because the right to work has been found to be affected; consequently, it declares the arbitrary dismissal null and void. It also orders that Empresa Electro Oriente S.A. replace Doña Gladys Martínez Khan, as an indefinite-term worker in the position of purchasing assistant; or in another of similar category position within two days.