Suchergebnisse

Key Messages * The industry is suffering a downturn that might lead to a wider economic crisis. The negative stage experienced by the housing sector is recognizable in the increasing number of unsold units, in the declining number of transactions and in the progressive cooling down of prices. Failing to recognize this fact would lead to the risk of being unprepared for an economic downturn. * The debate on affordable housing is incomplete if it is not contextualized in the realm of the general evolution of the property market. The current discussion is strongly unbalanced toward the issue of affordability, while the property market's cyclical dynamic is disregarded; such a tendency could lead to a situation in which the country will not be equipped to face the consequences of the downturn that has already started. * With regard to the affordability issue, the present study argues that home ownership is less of a problem than what the political debate would tend to suggest: with 76.3 per cent of home ownership, Malaysia is performing better than neighbouring countries. * The affordability issue is a complex one, and looking at it simply by looking at the ratio between median house price and median income is simplistic and misleading; in order to decide what is affordable is a choice involving a trade-off between three elements: price, floor area and location. * The low-end market segment is not disregarded by the private developers because it is naturally unprofitable, but because it is artificially made unprofitable by a series of regulatory obstacles that become supply-side bottlenecks. Recommendations * In order to face a downturn in the property market, this paper suggests primarily acting to address home-owners' negative equities. In the case of the emergence of a severe mortgage crisis, loan condition modifications should be helpful in seeking to reboot homeowners' damaged balance sheets in an effort to arrest a prolonged deleveraging process and more quickly restore household demand to levels no longer dominated by negative home equity. Keep in mind that this should be an emergency measure to be implemented only in dramatic circumstances. * Fiscal discipline and strict down-payment rules are recommended. In particular, it would be important for the government to monitor quantity and quality of the expenses, being clear on how eventual deficits are financed. With reference to down-payment rules, mortgage, property insurance, and property taxes should not exceed 30 percent of income. * Redesign of the fiscal system in favour of consumption taxes rather than income taxes. A mix of GST and reduced income taxes can be studied in order to ensure a source of income for the government from one side and to orient consumer attitudes toward saving, and so support re-building the monetary funds available for investment projects. * The better way to generate affordable projects would be to remove regulatory obstacles, starting with reducing the direct involvement of government agencies in building low-cost homes. * In contrast with what is suggested by the National Housing Policy, too-strict requirements for low-cost developments (i.e. minimum size) should be avoided in order to facilitate the interaction between supply and demand, taking into account the location and size factors, and therefore allowing lower income people to move toward the economic heart of the country, supporting thus not only their housing issues but also promoting their possibilities for a higher degree of social mobility. * Disruptive entrepreneurship will play a key role in developing new technologies for making housing developments cheaper from the cost side. However, in order to emerge such kind of entrepreneurship requires freedom to react to market signals and cannot be centrally designed, because of the specific nature of entrepreneurial discovery processes. * A higher role for the rental market is expected to emerge in the future. Under this perspective, the government might consider Jacob's proposal of guaranteed-rent homes, where the central authority guarantees the loan for those developers investing in affordable projects, and partially covers the rent disbursement, in order to make the projects both affordable and economically viable. This method would have the advantage of avoiding capital expenditure from the government side, and moreover of decreasing current expenditures whenever the subsidised tenants improve their economic conditions.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist im Jahr 2012 nur schwach gewachsen. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) stieg im Jahresdurchschnitt um 0,7 %, im Jahresverlauf sogar nur 0,4 %. Die Aussichten für den Prognosezeitraum sind verhalten optimistisch. Die Weltkonjunktur wird sich vorerst nur allmählich aufhellen und im nächsten Jahr spürbar an Dynamik gewinnen. Die deutschen Exporte werden von dieser Entwicklung profitieren. In Folge der sich abzeichnenden konjunkturellen Stabilisierung des Euroraums und der damit einhergehenden nachlassenden Verunsicherung wird sich auch der Attentismus bei der Investitionstätigkeit abschwächen. Außerdem dürfte der private Verbrauch in beiden Jahren die Konjunktur maßgeblich stützen. Die Institute rechnen mit einer Zunahme des BIP im Jahresdurchschnitt 2013 von 0,9 %, im Verlauf sogar um 1,9 %. Im Jahr 2014 dürfte das Wachstum 1,5 % betragen. Die Arbeitslosenquote bleibt in beiden Jahren nahezu unverändert (2013: 6,8 %; 2014: 6,7 %). Die Verbraucherpreise werden im Jahr 2014 um 1,4 % steigen, nach 1,6 % in diesem Jahr.Simulationen der mittelfristigen Entwicklung in Deutschland zeigen, dass sich die deutsche Wirtschaft weiterhin im Sog der europäischen Krise befindet. Dafür sind hauptsächlich zwei Faktoren bestimmend: Die deutschen Exporte in den Euroraum werden durch die synchrone Sparpolitik drastisch gedämpft. Außerdem wird die Fiskalpolitik auch in Deutschland restriktiv sein und Einkommen und Binnennachfrage dämpfen. Die durchschnittliche Wachstumsrate des BIP bis 2017 wird auf 1,3 % p.a. geschätzt. Szenarien einer expansiven Wirtschaftspolitik zeigen, dass mit einem Investitionsprogram die gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Euroraums und der einzelnen Mitgliedsländer wesentlich günstiger verläuft als im Basisszenario. Der wirtschaftliche Schrumpfungsprozess in den Krisenländern und die gegenwärtige Stagnation in den übrigen Mitgliedsstaaten der Währungsunion müssen gestoppt und durch ein Wirtschaftswachstum ersetzt werden, das stark genug ist, die Kapazitätsauslastung zu erhöhen und die Arbeitslosigkeit zu senken. Der notwendige Entschuldungsprozess muss vorangetrieben und die Staatsfinanzen auf einen nachhaltigen Pfad gebracht werden. Gleichzeitig müssen die Leistungsbilanzungleichgewichte weiter abgebaut und der Finanzsektor stabilisiert werden. Die aktuelle wirtschaftspolitische Strategie, bestehend aus fiskalischer Austerität und einer gestörten Geldpolitik infolge von Länderrisiken, wird kaum in der Lage sein, nachhaltige Fortschritte in diesen vier Bereichen zu gewährleisten.Unerlässlich für die Krisenbewältigung ist es, die Geldpolitik in den Krisenländern wieder wirksam werden zu lassen in dem das Vertrauen in die Staatsanleihen der Krisenländer wiederhergestellt wird. Zudem ist eine fiskalpolitische Umkehr erforderlich. Die Politik der Konsolidierung muss so gestaltet werden, dass sie die gesamtwirtschaftliche Aktivität nicht beeinträchtigt. Das Makrokonsortium schlägt eine europäische Investitionsoffensive vor. Den Krisenländern sollte eine externe Finanzierung im Wert von 1 % des gegenwärtigen BIP über eine Periode von fünf Jahren verbindlich zugesagt werden. Damit sollen öffentliche Investitionen finanziert und/oder die private Investitionstätigkeit finanziell unterstützt werden. Mitgliedsstaaten mit Leistungsbilanzüberschüssen, und insbesondere Deutschland, sollten expansive fiskalpolitische Maßnahmen in Höhe von mindestens 1 % des BIP implementieren, um eine Rolle als Konjunkturlokomotive zu übernehmen. ; The German economy achieved only a weak growth performance in 2012. GDP grew by 0.7 % on annual averages and by just 0.4 % over the course of the year. The prospects during the forecast period are mildly optimistic. The global economy will initially pick up only slowly, but the growth dynamic is expected to be stronger next year, boosting German exports. In the wake of the apparent stabilisation of the Euro area, uncertainty will gradually dissipate and investors will increasingly drop their wait-and-see attitude. Private consumption will, moreover, bolster growth in both the current and the coming year. The Institutes forecast GDP growth of 0.9 % on annual averages this year, a figure which understates the underlying dynamic: comparing the fourth quarter of 2013 with that of 2012 growth will reach a very much more substantial 1.9 %. In 2014 GDP growth is expected to be 1.5 %. The unemployment rate will remain more or less unchanged over the two years, at 5.1 % and 5.0 % on ILO definitions and 6.8 and 6.7 % respectively on German national definitions. Medium-term simulations indicate that the German economy is likely to remain constrained by the impact of the euro area crisis for an extended period. There are two main causal channels: German exports to the euro area will continue to be squeezed severely by the austerity policies being pursued across Europe, and even in Germany fiscal policy is expected to be contractionary, dampening the growth of incomes and domestic demand. Growth is expected to average 1.3 % in the years to 2017. Alternative scenarios show that by means of expansionary policies, including a European investment programme, far more favourable results could be obtained in the euro area as a whole and its member states individually than in the baseline scenario.The recession in the crisis-hit countries and the current stagnation in the remaining EMU member states must be overcome and give way to economic growth strong enough to increase capacity utilization and reduce unemployment. The necessary process of deleveraging must continue and public finances be put on a sustainable footing. At the same time, current account imbalances must be reduced and the financial sector stabilised. The current economic policy strategy, consisting first and foremost of fiscal austerity and a monetary policy rendered ineffective by country-specific risks, will almost certainly be unable to generate sustained improvements in these four key areas.A necessary condition for exiting from the crisis is to make monetary policy effective once more by re-establishing confidence in the government bonds of the crisis countries. This must be accompanied by a turnaround in fiscal policy. Fiscal consolidation must occur in such a way that it does not impinge negatively on aggregate demand. The Macro group proposes a European investment offensive. The crisis countries should receive external financing equal to 1 % of current GDP for a period of five years. This should be used to finance public investment and/or support for private investment. Member States with current account surpluses, especially Germany, should implement expansionary fiscal policy measures representing at least 1 % of GDP, such that they play the role of locomotive for the European business cycle. .

The German economy achieved only a weak growth performance in 2012. GDP grew by 0.7 % on annual averages and by just 0.4 % over the course of the year. The prospects during the forecast period are mildly optimistic. The global economy will initially pick up only slowly, but the growth dynamic is expected to be stronger next year, boosting German exports. In the wake of the apparent stabilisation of the Euro area, uncertainty will gradually dissipate and investors will increasingly drop their wait-and-see attitude. Private consumption will, moreover, bolster growth in both the current and the coming year. The Institutes forecast GDP growth of 0.9 % on annual averages this year, a figure which understates the underlying dynamic: comparing the fourth quarter of 2013 with that of 2012 growth will reach a very much more substantial 1.9 %. In 2014 GDP growth is expected to be 1.5 %. The unemployment rate will remain more or less unchanged over the two years, at 5.1 % and 5.0 % on ILO definitions and 6.8 and 6.7 % respectively on German national definitions. Medium-term simulations indicate that the German economy is likely to remain constrained by the impact of the euro area crisis for an extended period. There are two main causal channels: German exports to the euro area will continue to be squeezed severely by the austerity policies being pursued across Europe, and even in Germany fiscal policy is expected to be contractionary, dampening the growth of incomes and domestic demand. Growth is expected to average 1.3 % in the years to 2017. Alternative scenarios show that by means of expansionary policies, including a European investment programme, far more favourable results could be obtained in the euro area as a whole and its member states individually than in the baseline scenario.The recession in the crisis-hit countries and the current stagnation in the remaining EMU member states must be overcome and give way to economic growth strong enough to increase capacity utilization and reduce unemployment. The necessary process of deleveraging must continue and public finances be put on a sustainable footing. At the same time, current account imbalances must be reduced and the financial sector stabilised. The current economic policy strategy, consisting first and foremost of fiscal austerity and a monetary policy rendered ineffective by country-specific risks, will almost certainly be unable to generate sustained improvements in these four key areas.A necessary condition for exiting from the crisis is to make monetary policy effective once more by re-establishing confidence in the government bonds of the crisis countries. This must be accompanied by a turnaround in fiscal policy. Fiscal consolidation must occur in such a way that it does not impinge negatively on aggregate demand. The Macro group proposes a European investment offensive. The crisis countries should receive external financing equal to 1 % of current GDP for a period of five years. This should be used to finance public investment and/or support for private investment. Member States with current account surpluses, especially Germany, should implement expansionary fiscal policy measures representing at least 1 % of GDP, such that they play the role of locomotive for the European business cycle. . ; Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist im Jahr 2012 nur schwach gewachsen. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) stieg im Jahresdurchschnitt um 0,7 %, im Jahresverlauf sogar nur 0,4 %. Die Aussichten für den Prognosezeitraum sind verhalten optimistisch. Die Weltkonjunktur wird sich vorerst nur allmählich aufhellen und im nächsten Jahr spürbar an Dynamik gewinnen. Die deutschen Exporte werden von dieser Entwicklung profitieren. In Folge der sich abzeichnenden konjunkturellen Stabilisierung des Euroraums und der damit einhergehenden nachlassenden Verunsicherung wird sich auch der Attentismus bei der Investitionstätigkeit abschwächen. Außerdem dürfte der private Verbrauch in beiden Jahren die Konjunktur maßgeblich stützen. Die Institute rechnen mit einer Zunahme des BIP im Jahresdurchschnitt 2013 von 0,9 %, im Verlauf sogar um 1,9 %. Im Jahr 2014 dürfte das Wachstum 1,5 % betragen. Die Arbeitslosenquote bleibt in beiden Jahren nahezu unverändert (2013: 6,8 %; 2014: 6,7 %). Die Verbraucherpreise werden im Jahr 2014 um 1,4 % steigen, nach 1,6 % in diesem Jahr.Simulationen der mittelfristigen Entwicklung in Deutschland zeigen, dass sich die deutsche Wirtschaft weiterhin im Sog der europäischen Krise befindet. Dafür sind hauptsächlich zwei Faktoren bestimmend: Die deutschen Exporte in den Euroraum werden durch die synchrone Sparpolitik drastisch gedämpft. Außerdem wird die Fiskalpolitik auch in Deutschland restriktiv sein und Einkommen und Binnennachfrage dämpfen. Die durchschnittliche Wachstumsrate des BIP bis 2017 wird auf 1,3 % p.a. geschätzt. Szenarien einer expansiven Wirtschaftspolitik zeigen, dass mit einem Investitionsprogram die gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Euroraums und der einzelnen Mitgliedsländer wesentlich günstiger verläuft als im Basisszenario. Der wirtschaftliche Schrumpfungsprozess in den Krisenländern und die gegenwärtige Stagnation in den übrigen Mitgliedsstaaten der Währungsunion müssen gestoppt und durch ein Wirtschaftswachstum ersetzt werden, das stark genug ist, die Kapazitätsauslastung zu erhöhen und die Arbeitslosigkeit zu senken. Der notwendige Entschuldungsprozess muss vorangetrieben und die Staatsfinanzen auf einen nachhaltigen Pfad gebracht werden. Gleichzeitig müssen die Leistungsbilanzungleichgewichte weiter abgebaut und der Finanzsektor stabilisiert werden. Die aktuelle wirtschaftspolitische Strategie, bestehend aus fiskalischer Austerität und einer gestörten Geldpolitik infolge von Länderrisiken, wird kaum in der Lage sein, nachhaltige Fortschritte in diesen vier Bereichen zu gewährleisten.Unerlässlich für die Krisenbewältigung ist es, die Geldpolitik in den Krisenländern wieder wirksam werden zu lassen in dem das Vertrauen in die Staatsanleihen der Krisenländer wiederhergestellt wird. Zudem ist eine fiskalpolitische Umkehr erforderlich. Die Politik der Konsolidierung muss so gestaltet werden, dass sie die gesamtwirtschaftliche Aktivität nicht beeinträchtigt. Das Makrokonsortium schlägt eine europäische Investitionsoffensive vor. Den Krisenländern sollte eine externe Finanzierung im Wert von 1 % des gegenwärtigen BIP über eine Periode von fünf Jahren verbindlich zugesagt werden. Damit sollen öffentliche Investitionen finanziert und/oder die private Investitionstätigkeit finanziell unterstützt werden. Mitgliedsstaaten mit Leistungsbilanzüberschüssen, und insbesondere Deutschland, sollten expansive fiskalpolitische Maßnahmen in Höhe von mindestens 1 % des BIP implementieren, um eine Rolle als Konjunkturlokomotive zu übernehmen.

After having accompanied the industrial revolution in the 19th century, rail transport difficultly adapt to the challenges launched by the road since a hundred years. Nowadays, European rail transport suffers from competition from the road, both for travellers and cargo. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the role of the railways in the goods and passengers transport has been declining. In the countries of the European Union, it now does ensure only 6% of passenger transport and 16% of goods transport. The European rail transport renewal is also marked by the development of the high-speed train. Total passenger "high speed" traffic is 15 billion passenger-km in 1990 against 111 billion passenger-km in 2014, that is an overall growth of 740%. The share of total passenger "high speed" traffic has increased from 4% in 1990 to 25% in 2014.The obvious observation is that, since the beginning of the 1990s, the railways have lost market share and therefore required growing subsidies.The need to improve this situation led to imagine a wide range of possibilities for action by national and European public authorities. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the European Commission is engaged in a vast reform aiming at the construction of an integrated railway area.In a context of European rail slump, we want to appreciate the performance of the railways in order to identify the main factors that will avoid the decline. We start from the idea that railways must be efficient in terms of production and commercialization of services.Each of the four chapters of this thesis uses various methods to contribute to the growing field of the rail transport.The first chapter uses the partial measures of productivity indicators to evaluate the performance of a panel of four European railway companies, the DB in Germany, SNCF in France, the RENFE in Spain and FS in Italy, observed between 1990 and 2012. Our aim here is twofold, to take stock of the current situation and reveal the path of major European rail companies on a period starting a little before the railway reforms initiated by the European Commission. These indicators help us to evaluate four areas of performance: productive performance, business performance, economic performance and financial performance. It is for us the opportunity to evaluate the efficiency of the directive 91-440 of 29 July 1991 relating to the development of Community railways, directive that recommends to promote the independence of management of railway companies, as well as their financial clean-up, especially their deleveraging. The second chapter shows the theoretical framework of technical efficiency, by a review of the theoretical foundations and by presenting the methodology of the borders. To complete this analysis, we propose a review of non-exhaustive literature of empirical studies on the evaluation of the performance of the railways. The third chapter suggests empirical contributions to the measurement of the performance of the railways. It is for us the opportunity to evaluate, compare and explain the differences in performance of some countries of the European union. Four performance indicators have caught our attention: productive efficiency, trade efficiency, technical efficiency and the variation of the total factor productivity. To this end, we simultaneously estimated three parametric and stochastic borders, namely, a production-oriented input border, a border of consumption and a border of technical efficiency-oriented input. ; Après avoir accompagné la révolution industrielle au XIXe siècle, le transport ferroviaire ne parvient que difficilement à s'adapter aux défis que lui a lancés la route depuis une centaine d'années. Depuis le début du XXe siècle, le rôle des chemins de fer dans le transport des marchandises et de voyageurs n'a cessé de décliner. Dans les pays de l'Union Européenne, il n'assure plus désormais que 6 % du transport de voyageurs et 16 % du transport de marchandises. Le renouveau du transport ferroviaire européen est aussi marqué par le développement du train à grande vitesse. Le trafic total de voyageurs « grande vitesse » est de 15 milliards de voyageurs-km en 1990 contre 111 milliards de voyageurs-km en 2014 soit une croissance globale de 740 %. La Part du trafic total de voyageurs « grande vitesse » a progressé, elle est passée de 4 % en 1990 contre 25 % en 2014. Le constat évident est que, depuis le début des années 1990, les chemins de fer ont perdu des parts de marché et ont donc exigé des subventions croissantes. La nécessité d'améliorer cette situation a conduit à imaginer un large éventail de possibilités d'action de la part des pouvoirs publics nationaux et européens. Depuis le début des années 90, la Commission Européenne s'est engagée dans un vaste chantier dont la finalité est la construction d'un espace ferroviaire intégré. Dans un contexte de marasme ferroviaire européen, nous voulons apprécier les performances des chemins de fer afin d'identifier les principaux facteurs qui permettront d'éviter le déclin. Nous partons de l'idée que les chemins de fer se doivent d'être performants sur le plan de la production et de la commercialisation des biens et services. Chacun des quatre chapitres de cette thèse utilise diverses méthodes pour contribuer au champ croissant de l'économie du transport ferroviaire. Le premier chapitre utilise les mesures partielles des indicateurs de productivité pour évaluer la performance d'un panel de quatre compagnies ferroviaires européennes, la DB en Allemagne, la SNCF en France, la RENFE en Espagne et les FS en Italie, observées entre 1990 et 2012. Notre objectif ici est double, dresser un bilan de la situation actuelle et révéler la trajectoire des entreprises ferroviaires européennes majeures sur une période débutant un peu avant les réformes ferroviaires initiées par la Commission européenne. Les indicateurs retenus nous ont permis d'évaluer quatre domaines de performance : la performance productive, la performance commerciale, la performance économique et la performance financière. Il est question pour nous d'évaluer l'efficacité de la directive 91-440 du 29 juillet 1991 relative au développement de chemins de fer communautaires, directive qui recommande de promouvoir l'indépendance de gestion des entreprises ferroviaires, ainsi que leur assainissement financier, en particulier leur désendettement. Le deuxième chapitre aborde le cadre théorique de l'efficacité technique, en passant en une revue les fondements théoriques et en présentant la méthodologie des frontières. Pour compléter cette analyse, nous proposons une revue de littérature non exhaustive des études empiriques portant sur l'évaluation des performances des chemins de fer. Le troisième chapitre propose des contributions empiriques à la mesure des performances des chemins de fer. Il est question pour nous d'évaluer, de comparer et d'expliquer les écarts de performances de certains pays de l'union européenne. Quatre indicateurs de performance ont retenu notre attention : l'efficacité productive, l'efficacité commerciale, l'efficacité technique et la variation de la productivité totale des facteurs. Pour ce faire nous avons simultanément estimé trois frontières paramétriques et stochastiques, à savoir, une frontière de production orientée input, une frontière de consommation et une frontière d'efficacité technique orientée input.

After having accompanied the industrial revolution in the 19th century, rail transport difficultly adapt to the challenges launched by the road since a hundred years. Nowadays, European rail transport suffers from competition from the road, both for travellers and cargo. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the role of the railways in the goods and passengers transport has been declining. In the countries of the European Union, it now does ensure only 6% of passenger transport and 16% of goods transport. The European rail transport renewal is also marked by the development of the high-speed train. Total passenger "high speed" traffic is 15 billion passenger-km in 1990 against 111 billion passenger-km in 2014, that is an overall growth of 740%. The share of total passenger "high speed" traffic has increased from 4% in 1990 to 25% in 2014.The obvious observation is that, since the beginning of the 1990s, the railways have lost market share and therefore required growing subsidies.The need to improve this situation led to imagine a wide range of possibilities for action by national and European public authorities. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the European Commission is engaged in a vast reform aiming at the construction of an integrated railway area.In a context of European rail slump, we want to appreciate the performance of the railways in order to identify the main factors that will avoid the decline. We start from the idea that railways must be efficient in terms of production and commercialization of services.Each of the four chapters of this thesis uses various methods to contribute to the growing field of the rail transport.The first chapter uses the partial measures of productivity indicators to evaluate the performance of a panel of four European railway companies, the DB in Germany, SNCF in France, the RENFE in Spain and FS in Italy, observed between 1990 and 2012. Our aim here is twofold, to take stock of the current situation and reveal the path of major European rail companies on a period starting a little before the railway reforms initiated by the European Commission. These indicators help us to evaluate four areas of performance: productive performance, business performance, economic performance and financial performance. It is for us the opportunity to evaluate the efficiency of the directive 91-440 of 29 July 1991 relating to the development of Community railways, directive that recommends to promote the independence of management of railway companies, as well as their financial clean-up, especially their deleveraging. The second chapter shows the theoretical framework of technical efficiency, by a review of the theoretical foundations and by presenting the methodology of the borders. To complete this analysis, we propose a review of non-exhaustive literature of empirical studies on the evaluation of the performance of the railways. The third chapter suggests empirical contributions to the measurement of the performance of the railways. It is for us the opportunity to evaluate, compare and explain the differences in performance of some countries of the European union. Four performance indicators have caught our attention: productive efficiency, trade efficiency, technical efficiency and the variation of the total factor productivity. To this end, we simultaneously estimated three parametric and stochastic borders, namely, a production-oriented input border, a border of consumption and a border of technical efficiency-oriented input. ; Après avoir accompagné la révolution industrielle au XIXe siècle, le transport ferroviaire ne parvient que difficilement à s'adapter aux défis que lui a lancés la route depuis une centaine d'années. Depuis le début du XXe siècle, le rôle des chemins de fer dans le transport des marchandises et de voyageurs n'a cessé de décliner. Dans les pays de l'Union Européenne, il n'assure plus désormais que 6 % du transport de voyageurs et 16 % du transport de marchandises. Le renouveau du transport ferroviaire européen est aussi marqué par le développement du train à grande vitesse. Le trafic total de voyageurs « grande vitesse » est de 15 milliards de voyageurs-km en 1990 contre 111 milliards de voyageurs-km en 2014 soit une croissance globale de 740 %. La Part du trafic total de voyageurs « grande vitesse » a progressé, elle est passée de 4 % en 1990 contre 25 % en 2014. Le constat évident est que, depuis le début des années 1990, les chemins de fer ont perdu des parts de marché et ont donc exigé des subventions croissantes. La nécessité d'améliorer cette situation a conduit à imaginer un large éventail de possibilités d'action de la part des pouvoirs publics nationaux et européens. Depuis le début des années 90, la Commission Européenne s'est engagée dans un vaste chantier dont la finalité est la construction d'un espace ferroviaire intégré. Dans un contexte de marasme ferroviaire européen, nous voulons apprécier les performances des chemins de fer afin d'identifier les principaux facteurs qui permettront d'éviter le déclin. Nous partons de l'idée que les chemins de fer se doivent d'être performants sur le plan de la production et de la commercialisation des biens et services. Chacun des quatre chapitres de cette thèse utilise diverses méthodes pour contribuer au champ croissant de l'économie du transport ferroviaire. Le premier chapitre utilise les mesures partielles des indicateurs de productivité pour évaluer la performance d'un panel de quatre compagnies ferroviaires européennes, la DB en Allemagne, la SNCF en France, la RENFE en Espagne et les FS en Italie, observées entre 1990 et 2012. Notre objectif ici est double, dresser un bilan de la situation actuelle et révéler la trajectoire des entreprises ferroviaires européennes majeures sur une période débutant un peu avant les réformes ferroviaires initiées par la Commission européenne. Les indicateurs retenus nous ont permis d'évaluer quatre domaines de performance : la performance productive, la performance commerciale, la performance économique et la performance financière. Il est question pour nous d'évaluer l'efficacité de la directive 91-440 du 29 juillet 1991 relative au développement de chemins de fer communautaires, directive qui recommande de promouvoir l'indépendance de gestion des entreprises ferroviaires, ainsi que leur assainissement financier, en particulier leur désendettement. Le deuxième chapitre aborde le cadre théorique de l'efficacité technique, en passant en une revue les fondements théoriques et en présentant la méthodologie des frontières. Pour compléter cette analyse, nous proposons une revue de littérature non exhaustive des études empiriques portant sur l'évaluation des performances des chemins de fer. Le troisième chapitre propose des contributions empiriques à la mesure des performances des chemins de fer. Il est question pour nous d'évaluer, de comparer et d'expliquer les écarts de performances de certains pays de l'union européenne. Quatre indicateurs de performance ont retenu notre attention : l'efficacité productive, l'efficacité commerciale, l'efficacité technique et la variation de la productivité totale des facteurs. Pour ce faire nous avons simultanément estimé trois frontières paramétriques et stochastiques, à savoir, une frontière de production orientée input, une frontière de consommation et une frontière d'efficacité technique orientée input.