'This is one of those rare technical books which has an importance outside its own field' The Daily Telegraph.'One of the most stimulating post-war books on public finance' The Guardian.Part 1 examines the issue of Expenditure Tax in principle and includes chapters on the following:* Income, Expenditure and Taxable Capacity* The Concept of Income in Economic Theory* Taxation and Savings* Taxation and risk-bearing* Taxation and the Incentive to Work* Company Taxation* Taxation and Economic ProgressPart 2 examines the issue of Expenditure Tax in practice, asking whether personal expenditure tax
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'This is one of those rare technical books which has an importance outside its own field' The Daily Telegraph.'One of the most stimulating post-war books on public finance' The Guardian. Part 1 examines the issue of Expenditure Tax in principle and includes chapters on the following:* Income, Expenditure and Taxable Capacity* The Concept of Income in Economic Theory* Taxation and Savings* Taxation and risk-bearing* Taxation and the Incentive to Work* Company Taxation* Taxation and Economic ProgressPart 2 examines the issue of Ex.
Tax expenditures, credits and guarantees, and other nonconventional expenditures are prominent features of the public finances of the United States and other industrialized democracies. While reliable data on these practices have generally been available only for a decade or less, there is reason to believe that these types of transactions now constitute a larger share of total public expenditure than they did in the past. This article discusses the concepts arid implications of two types of nonconventional expenditures—tax expendituures and loans—as well as recent efforts to bring them within the scope of the budget process. The article deals mostly with American practices, but it also draws on the experiences of other democratic countries.
The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to tax provisions that pursue "nontax" goals. Scaling back these tax expenditures should be a high priority. Yet one-size-fits-all limits are often proposed, and are not good policy. Each tax expenditure generates its own mix of positive externalities and private benefits (or "programmatic benefits"). To choose the right limit, we should consider what programmatic benefits we would lose. The goal should be to reap programmatic benefits at lower cost. Different strategies are appropriate for each tax expenditure, including: tightening the definition of favored conduct; focusing on claimants who are easiest to motivate; favoring claimants who use the subsidy more effectively; calibrating how much favored activity we subsidize; and changing the government agency that administers the subsidy. We also should account for excess burden and distribution. Does repeal or a limit influence labor or savings decisions? Does it affect planning and administrative costs? Does it bring is closer to the distribution we want? In addition to proposing this three-part framework for limiting tax expenditures, which focuses on programmatic benefits, excess burden, and distribution, this Article also analyzes seven different limits. They have very different effects. For example, a "cap" eliminates the subsidy for high levels of favored activity. In contrast, a "floor" disallows the subsidy for low levels. "Haircuts," "maximum fractions," and "phaseouts" preserve the subsidy for both high and low levels of favored activity, but in weakened form. Each limit offers a different mix of strengths and weaknesses, making it a better fit for some tax expenditures than others. Like limits, tax expenditures also vary in systematic ways. This Article identifies an important distinction among them. For some tax expenditures, marginal benefits vary only with the activity level of all claimants in the aggregate; for others, marginal benefits also vary with the activity level of each claimant. When we subsidize green energy, for instance, the aggregate is our main concern; the goal is to replace as much carbon-based energy as possible, and it matters less who is doing so (as long as they do it well enough). In contrast, when we subsidize health insurance, we care a lot about how much insurance each individual has. The difference between what this Article calls "aggregate" subsidies (like green energy) and "individually-based" subsidies (like health insurance) can influence the type of limit we want. For example, caps are likely to be a better fit for individually-based subsidies than aggregate ones, since we care more about how much each claimant claims. This Article also makes a number of other recommendations, including: first, the subsidy rate often should vary for different tax expenditures; second, instead of using "basket limits" that govern a group of tax expenditures, we should tailor a separate limit for each one; and third, the subsidy rate often should vary with income.
The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to tax provisions that pursue "nontax" goals, such as the deduction for mortgage interest and the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Scaling back these "tax expenditures" should be a high priority, as many have urged. Yet too often, the same limit is suggested for a broad range of tax expenditures. In the 2013 budget deal, for instance, Congress revived a single limit on all itemized deductions called the "Pease rule." In 2012, both presidential candidates proposed their own one-size-fits-all limit. In the same year, the United Kingdom imposed a single cap on all personal deductions. Likewise, the Bowles-Simpson Commission, Martin Feldstein, Edward Kleinbard, and other distinguished commentators have each recommended their own version of uniform treatment.
Housing taxation expenditures are an important source of housing subsidies in most OECD countries. In this paper, we identify the impacts which housing taxation expenditures can have on macroeconomic performance, allocative efficiency and equity. There is considerable concern about the adverse nature of many of these impacts. In view of this concern tenure neutral reform proposals are subjected to critical scrutiny and the reform measures recently introduced by OECD governments are explained and evaluated. We conclude that, in general, fundamental reform of tax subsidy mechanisms has yet to be initiated by OECD governments.
