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US political debates often refer to the experience of "single-payer" systems such as those of Canada and the United Kingdom. We argue that single payer is not a very useful category in comparative health policy analysis but that the experiences of countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, and Australia provide useful lessons. In creating universal tax-financed systems, they teach the importance of strong, unified governments at critical junctures—most notably democratization. The United States seems politically hospitable to creating such a system. The process of creation, however, highlights the malleability of interests in the health care system, the opportunities for creative coalition building, and the problems caused by linking health care finance and reform. In maintaining these systems, keeping the middle class supportive is crucial to avoiding universal health care that is essentially a program for the poor. For a technical term from the 1970s, "single-payer health care" has proved to have remarkable political power and persistence. We argue it is not a very useful term but the lessons from such systems can be valuable for those contemplating movement toward universal health coverage in the United States.

PUBLISHED ; Background A persistent feature of international health policy debate is whether a single-payer or multiple-payer system can offer superior performance. In Ireland, a major reform proposal is the introduction of ?managed competition? based on the recent reforms in the Netherlands, which would replace many functions of Ireland?s public payer with a system of competing health insurers from 2016. This article debates whether Ireland meets the preconditions for effective managed competition, and whether the government should implement the reform according to its stated timeline. We support our arguments by discussing the functioning of the Dutch and Irish systems. Discussion Although Ireland currently lacks key preconditions for effective implementation, the Dutch experience demonstrates that some of these can be implemented over time, such as a more rigorous risk equalization system. A fundamental problem may be Ireland?s sparse hospital distribution. This may increase the market power of hospitals and weaken insurers? ability to exclude inefficient or poor quality hospitals from contracts, leading to unwarranted spending growth. To mitigate this, the government proposes to introduce a system of price caps for hospital services. The Dutch system of competition is still in transition and it is premature to judge its success. The new system may have catalyzed increased transparency regarding clinical performance, but outcome measurement remains crude. A multi-payer environment creates some disincentives for quality improvement, one of which is free-riding by insurers on their rivals? quality investments. If a Dutch insurer invests in improving hospital quality, hospitals will probably offer equivalent quality to consumers enrolled with other insurance companies. This enhances equity, but may weaken incentives for improvement. Consequently the Irish government, rather than insurers, may need to assume responsibility for investing in clinical quality. Plans are in place to assure consumers of free choice of insurer, but a key concern is a potential shortfall of institutional capacity to regulate managed competition. Summary Managed competition requires a long transition period and the requisite preconditions are not yet in place. The Irish government should refrain from introducing managed competition until sufficient preconditions are in place to allow effective performance.

PUBLISHED ; A persistent feature of international health policy debate is whether a single-payer or multiple-payer system can offer superior performance. In Ireland, a major reform proposal is the introduction of 'managed competition' based on the recent reforms in the Netherlands, which would replace many functions of Ireland's public payer with a system of competing health insurers from 2016. This article debates whether Ireland meets the preconditions for effective managed competition, and whether the government should implement the reform according to its stated timeline. We support our arguments by discussing the functioning of the Dutch and Irish systems.; Although Ireland currently lacks key preconditions for effective implementation, the Dutch experience demonstrates that some of these can be implemented over time, such as a more rigorous risk equalization system. A fundamental problem may be Ireland's sparse hospital distribution. This may increase the market power of hospitals and weaken insurers' ability to exclude inefficient or poor quality hospitals from contracts, leading to unwarranted spending growth. To mitigate this, the government proposes to introduce a system of price caps for hospital services.The Dutch system of competition is still in transition and it is premature to judge its success. The new system may have catalyzed increased transparency regarding clinical performance, but outcome measurement remains crude. A multi-payer environment creates some disincentives for quality improvement, one of which is free-riding by insurers on their rivals' quality investments. If a Dutch insurer invests in improving hospital quality, hospitals will probably offer equivalent quality to consumers enrolled with other insurance companies. This enhances equity, but may weaken incentives for improvement. Consequently the Irish government, rather than insurers, may need to assume responsibility for investing in clinical quality. Plans are in place to assure consumers of free choice of insurer, but a key concern is a potential shortfall of institutional capacity to regulate managed competition.; Managed competition requires a long transition period and the requisite preconditions are not yet in place. The Irish government should refrain from introducing managed competition until sufficient preconditions are in place to allow effective performance

The merit pay system offers an expensive, complicated, and inequitable way of compensating senior level supervisors and management officials, or a more advanced method of rewarding and recognizing employee accomplishments, depending upon one's point of view. To survive, the pro gram must demonstrate tangible returns on an investment estimated as high as a billion dollars for fiscal year 1981 alone.

Rights -- Equality -- Needs -- Outcomes -- Technology -- Quality -- Costs -- Efficiency -- Unnecessary care -- Administrative costs -- Priorities -- Prevention -- Managed care -- International competitiveness -- The elderly -- Minorities -- Rural areas -- Prescription drugs -- Public opinion -- Reform -- The politics of medicine -- Is managed competition the answer? -- Designing an ideal health care system -- Designing ideal health insurance.

"Der Beitrag behandelt das polnische System der kollektiven Entgeltaushandlung, wie es sich seit Beginn der 90er Jahre herausgebildet hat. Es wird deutlich, dass der Schwerpunkt der Arbeitsbeziehungen nach wie vor auf der betrieblichen Ebene liegt. Auf der gesamtstaatlichen Ebene erfolgt die Lohnfestsetzung in einer Kommission nach dem tripartistischen Modell. Die Besonderheiten des polnischen Systems wie beispielsweise die starke Vernetztheit von Politik und Gewerkschaftsbewegung und die dezentrale Struktur der Entgeltaushandlung werden herausgearbeitet. Es wird deutlich, dass die Institutionalisierung der Beziehungen und das Verhalten der einzelnen Akteure nicht losgelöst von der planwirtschaftlichen Vergangenheit des Landes gesehen werden können. Auf die Probleme der Gewerkschaften, ihre Schlagkraft zu erhalten, wird ebenso eingegangen wie auf die Versuche der privaten Unternehmen, sich stärker auf kollektiver Ebene zu organisieren und von Staat und Gewerkschaften als relevanter Sozialpartner institutionell anerkannt zu werden." (Autorenreferat)