Suchergebnisse

There is still much progress to make concerning the French and the European railway networks, both from governance and competitiveness standpoints. This is the conclusion this work lead to. The results from the Enerdata-LET research consortium (2014) illustrate that, considering factor 4 for horizon 2050, the modal shift of demand in transport towards railway could be massive. Regarding this, the situation of Paris-Lyon high-speed line, already up to its saturation level, addresses the issue of the capacity a system possesses to bear new traffics. Two schools oppose there. On one side, the supporters of the SNIT suggest a quasi-doubling of the high-speed railway network, in order to cope with futures needs, whereas on the other side, the "Mobilité 21" commission gives priority to the search of increasing returns from the existing infrastructure. Without claiming to solve the issue, this work attempts to bring up comprehension elements on the interaction between demand and offer in the railway sector.Studying the accordance between an increase in railway demand and offer leads us to question performance. It means being able to define capacity of the railway infrastructure, first. But it also means questioning its limits, which addresses the phenomenon of saturation, also called congestion. Eventually, this all inevitably leads to put into perspective the relativeness of these limits and to question the ways to overcome them. The objective of this research is to apply this issue to the railway system, accounting its specificities. We consider its constitution as a network industry and as a natural monopoly, when considering the infrastructure (infrastructure manager). Without pretending to conclude the debate on governance, we consider that this particularity might influence actors and, thus, performance. We also consider the legal framework at the European scale. One can't question performance without framing the railway sector within its legal context. Then, the main purpose of the analysis stands in the study of saturation of the Paris-Lyon high-speed line. We consider the line as representative of the expected performance level of the whole French railway network. It challenges both technical and economic capacities that are in the core of our rationale on performance, its requirements and the opportunities of the French network. ; Les marges de progression pour le système ferroviaire français et européen restent nombreuses tant du point de vue de la gouvernance que de la compétitivité. C'est la conclusion à laquelle tend ce travail. Les résultats du consortium de recherche Enerdata-LET (2014) montrent que dans le respect du facteur 4 à horizon 2050, le report de la demande en transport vers le ferroviaire pourrait être massif. Face à cela, la situation de la LGV Paris-Lyon, déjà à la limite de la saturation, interroge sur la capacité du système à accueillir de nouveaux trafics. Deux écoles s'affrontent sur cette question. D'un côté, les tenants du SNIT proposent un quasi doublement du réseau LGV pour répondre aux futurs besoins tandis que la commission « Mobilité 21 » privilégie la recherche de rendements croissants à partir de l'existant. Sans prétendre résoudre le débat, ce travail tente d'apporter des éléments de compréhension sur l'interaction entre demande et offre dans le ferroviaire.L'étude de la concordance entre augmentation de la demande et offre ferroviaire nous mène à poser la question de la performance. Elle sous-entend d'être en premier lieu capable de définir la capacité d'une infrastructure ferroviaire. En second lieu, la mise en évidence de limites conduit à interroger le phénomène de saturation ou congestion. Enfin, interroger la notion de saturation mène inévitablement à mettre en perspective la relativité des limites et à poser la question de leur dépassement.L'objectif de cette recherche est d'appliquer cette problématique au système ferroviaire en tenant compte de ses spécificités. On tient compte de sa constitution en tant qu'industrie de réseau et de monopole naturel dans le cas de l'infrastructure (gestionnaire d'infrastructure). Sans prétendre trancher le débat sur le mode de gouvernance, on considère que cette particularité peut influencer le comportement des acteurs et indirectement la performance du système. On considère également l'évolution législative du système au niveau européen. On ne peut aborder la question de la performance sans resituer le secteur dans son contexte juridique. Enfin, l'essentiel de l'analyse repose sur l'étude de la saturation de la LGV Paris-Lyon. On considère cette LGV représentative de la performance souhaitée pour le réseau ferroviaire français. Elle concentre à la fois les défis techniques et économiques de la capacité qui constituent le cœur de notre réflexion sur la performance, ses conditions et les marges de progression du réseau français.

Finland has one of the last fully monopolistic gambling sectors in Europe. Unlike in most Western European countries, the monopoly is also consolidated and enjoys a wide support as opposed to license-based competition. This paper analyses whether this preference for monopoly provision is due to the particularities of the Finnish society or rather to those of the Finnish gambling sector. We do this by comparing public discourses in media texts (N=143) from 2014 to 2017 regarding monopolies operating in alcohol retail, rail traffic and gambling sectors. The results show that gambling appears to be special even in the Finnish national context. While the Finnish alcohol retail and railroad traffic markets have been liberalised during the study period, the gambling monopoly has been concurrently strengthened despite similar political and international pressures towards dismantling. The discussion suggests that the differing outcomes reflect the varying positions of monopolies, their stakeholders and the justifications put forward. Intertwined stakeholder interests in the gambling sector appear to amplify consensus politics and set gambling apart from the other cases.

On-track competition in passenger services has traditionally been limited in European railways, with private operators offering marginal services in selected corridors in the UK, Sweden and Germany only. In recent years, a larger scale and more stable wave of open access market entry has occurred in Austria, the Czech Republic and Italy, where open access operators have gained market shares of 20-30% in long-distance corridors. Economic theory suggests that competition can result in productive efficiencies, although theories of competition are potentially outweighed by market characteristics which make monopoly a more efficient market structure when applied to the rail sector. The contestability of rail markets is further hampered by the presence of several barriers to entry as well as expansion. The literature on the efficiency effect of rail policy changes is vast, but the focus to date has been on industry structure and competitive tendering, with non-conclusive results highlighting the importance of tailoring rail policies to the specific characteristics of each network. Studies have not yet attempted to measure the industry efficiency impact of passenger open access operations, neither specifically nor systematically - which is the goal of this paper. Using a difference-in-difference estimator, we find that on-track competition has not, to date, led to major efficiency improvements across the rail systems affected - despite claims that new entrants have lower unit costs compared to incumbents. In the early days of market opening when guarantees of non-discriminatory access have not yet been fully established, on-track competition may be resulting in higher costs than in countries with monopoly passenger services. These results are based on a short timeframe and will need to be tested over a longer period, recognising that competition is a process with no instantaneous effects. An early assessment of market opening policies is crucial to inform future regulatory decisions, at a time of budgetary constraints, forthcoming European reforms under the Fourth Railway Package and growing interest in market entry by new operators.

In the last decade the industrial landscape and regulatory structures of the network industries such as telecommunications, energy and rail transport, have undergone a profound transformation. Liberalization has fragmented the former natural monopoly sectors; new players with new preferences have emerged. New regulatory institutions have been created to regulate the market at the national and the European level to foster competition, and at the same time to compensate for the negative consequences of market integration in order to protect services of general interest. This altered regulatory environment raises many important research questions such as: How were the new regulatory structures shaped and how do they function? What is their impact on market creation and service provision? In this article Héritier focuses on one specific aspect which has not yet been analysed much: How do firms in these sectors interact with the newly created regulatory bodies at the national and European level? To whom do they seek access and why? And, inversely, how do the newly created regulatory authorities at the national and the European levels deal with the regulated firms in order to secure compliance? Is the much cited informational asymmetry between the regulator and regulatee used by the regulatee to interpret the regulatory contract so as to save costs, and if yes, how does the regulatory authority cope with it? And inversely, is there a law of "increasing regulatory intrusiveness", possibly linked to the size and number of regulatory bodies? I examine the interaction between the regulator and regulatee from two different systematic perspectives: firstly by focusing on the attempts by firms and industrial associations to gain access to and influence "ex ante" regulation, i.e. by focusing on their attempts to influence the setting of rules for businesses at the national and the European level, and secondly by examining "ex post" regulation, i.e. regulation that monitors behaviour and attempts to resolve disputes that arise in implementing the existing regulation at the national and European level in the day-to-day interaction between firms and regulators. The analysis focuses on regulator-regulatee interaction in the British and German rail sectors.

Light Rapid Transit (LRT) systems are often backed not only because they satisfy basic mobility functions, but because they can revitalize urban centers, affirm the legitimacy of state planners, support innovation and even cultivate an image of a city or region as progressive and modern. In this study, we argue that electrified, automated LRT systems can fulfill private functional frames, private symbolic frames, societal functional frames, and societal symbolic frames. In particular, we argue that light rail can fulfill private functional frames (making passengers feel safe, offering a cheap and efficient mode of transport), private symbolic frames (signifying political identity or exclusionary planning), societal functional frames (environmental stewardship), and societal symbolic frames (such as modernism or innovativeness, or the lack of it). Essentially, these frames encompass not only what light rail is and does, but what it means and represents, and even some of its failures and challenges. The article then identifies ten specific frames associated with two case studies of automated light rail systems, the established Docklands Light Rail (DLR) in the United Kingdom, and the emerging Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) in Poland. We find that the DLR is not only a vital part of meeting (functional) demand for mobility, it is innovative and exciting to ride, legitimation of a conservative approach to project development, a social injustice (to some), an environmentally friendly alternative to cars, and a perceived magnet for global investment into the greater Docklands area. Similarly, the PRT is not only a reliable and safe mode of transit, but also a technical marvel, a monopoly breaking symbol, a clean and sustainable form of mobility, and a reflection of either progressive Polish innovation and entrepreneurship, or enduring failure.

Since the beginning of the 90s, reforming infrastructures has been high on the European Commission's political agenda. Telecommunication, energy distribution and rail transportation have been liberalized following the same model: separation of network and operation, introduction of competition on operation and setting up of a regulatory agency to monitor the sector.The goal of these liberalization processes is to introduce more economic efficiency into these industries. The vertical separation, core of the liberalization process, and the introduction of competition on operations allow the introduction of a "price signal" which was lacking in the previous institutional arrangement (a vertically integrated state owned monopoly). But is this model initially designed for the telecom industry well fitted for the rail industry? May the price signal be efficient in this industry?We demonstrate that the assumptions underlying the current institutional project of the European Commission (width of the natural monopoly, use of market mechanisms to attribute rail capacity or to set the prices of passenger transportation services) are challenged by the specificities of the rail sector.In order to establish a real competition in this industry, public authorities should perform an important effort of market design and of ex ante regulation. As a minimum requirement, track access charging scheme should be modified, capacity attributed to new entrants should be allocated in a coherent way so they can optimize rolling stock rotations. Purchase and resale of high speed rolling stocks should also be made easier. ; Depuis le début années 1990, la Commission européenne a entrepris de reformer les grands réseaux d'infrastructure. Les télécommunications, la distribution d'énergie et le transport ferroviaire ont été libéralisés sur un modèle identique : séparation de l'infrastructure et des services, introduction de la concurrence pour les services et mise en place d'une autorité de régulation.Le but de ces libéralisations est ...

This book traces the historical development of the network utilities sector in Australia (communications, rail, gas, electricity, water supply, and sewerage services). It looks across industries, time periods and the state and federal jurisdictions, to identify what motivated the various governments to establish these enterprises and what issues arose. The book is therefore informed by the relationship between politics and society on the one hand and economic history on the other; as well as the efforts of governments in Australia to promote economic growth and the wealth of Australians. The main focus of the book is to identify and analyse the following two main questions: (i) What were the main drivers and motivations for governments establishing government-owned business in the network utilities sector? (ii) To what degree were these government-owned businesses successful at achieving the aims of these governments? In doing so the inherent characteristics of these industries are identified, in terms of their need for rights of way, network effects, the monopoly characteristics, and the potential for stimulating growth. Malcolm Abbott is an economist by profession who specialises in research in energy markets, water supply, transport, and network industries in general. In the past he has worked for the ACCC, KPMG, as a Ministerial Advisor, and as an Associate Professor of Economics at the Swinburne University of Technology in Australia. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Melbourne. Bruce Cohen is a private consultant and former barrister who has worked extensively in the energy and water sectors in Australia. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from The Australian National University and has been a member of the board of directors of a number of utility companies, a Commissioner of the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, and a former Chair of VicTrack and the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation.

Light Rapid Transit (LRT) systems are often backed not only because they satisfy basic mobility functions, but because they can revitalize urban centers, affirm the legitimacy of state planners, support innovation and even cultivate an image of a city or region as progressive and modern. In this study, we argue that electrified, automated LRT systems can fulfill private functional frames, private symbolic frames, societal functional frames, and societal symbolic frames. In particular, we argue that light rail can fulfill private functional frames (making passengers feel safe, offering a cheap and efficient mode of transport), private symbolic frames (signifying political identity or exclusionary planning), societal functional frames (environmental stewardship), and societal symbolic frames (such as modernism or innovativeness). Essentially, these frames encompass not only what light rail is and does, but what it means and represents, and even some of its failures and challenges. The article then identifies ten specific frames associated with two case studies of automated light rail systems, the established Docklands Light Rail (DLR) in the United Kingdom, and the emerging Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) in Poland. We find that the DLR is not only a vital part of meeting (functional) demand for mobility, it is innovative and exciting to ride, legitimation of a conservative approach to project development, a social injustice (to some), an environmentally friendly alternative to cars, and a perceived magnet for global investment into the greater Docklands area. Similarly, the PRT is not only a reliable and safe mode of transit, but also a technical marvel, a monopoly breaking symbol, a clean and sustainable form of mobility, and a reflection of progressive Polish innovation and entrepreneurship (or enduring failure).

Since the beginning of the 90s, reforming infrastructures has been high on the European Commission's political agenda. Telecommunication, energy distribution and rail transportation have been liberalized following the same model: separation of network and operation, introduction of competition on operation and setting up of a regulatory agency to monitor the sector.The goal of these liberalization processes is to introduce more economic efficiency into these industries. The vertical separation, core of the liberalization process, and the introduction of competition on operations allow the introduction of a "price signal" which was lacking in the previous institutional arrangement (a vertically integrated state owned monopoly). But is this model initially designed for the telecom industry well fitted for the rail industry? May the price signal be efficient in this industry?We demonstrate that the assumptions underlying the current institutional project of the European Commission (width of the natural monopoly, use of market mechanisms to attribute rail capacity or to set the prices of passenger transportation services) are challenged by the specificities of the rail sector.In order to establish a real competition in this industry, public authorities should perform an important effort of market design and of ex ante regulation. As a minimum requirement, track access charging scheme should be modified, capacity attributed to new entrants should be allocated in a coherent way so they can optimize rolling stock rotations. Purchase and resale of high speed rolling stocks should also be made easier. ; Depuis le début années 1990, la Commission européenne a entrepris de reformer les grands réseaux d'infrastructure. Les télécommunications, la distribution d'énergie et le transport ferroviaire ont été libéralisés sur un modèle identique : séparation de l'infrastructure et des services, introduction de la concurrence pour les services et mise en place d'une autorité de régulation.Le but de ces libéralisations est d'introduire une plus grande efficience économique dans ces secteurs. La séparation verticale, clef de voute de la libéralisation, et l'introduction de la concurrence à l'aval conduisent à la mise en place d'un « signal prix » qui n'existait pas dans le schéma institutionnel précédent (un monopole verticalement intégré). Mais ce modèle de libéralisation, initialement développé pour les télécommunications, est-il adapté au secteur ferroviaire ? Quelle peut être l'efficacité du signal prix dans ce secteur?La thèse démontre que les hypothèses économiques sous-jacentes au schéma de réformes de la Commission européenne (étendu du monopole naturel, utilisation de mécanismes de marché pour attribuer les capacités ou établir les tarifs des services de transport de passagers) sont mises à mal par les spécificités du secteur.Pour qu'une réelle concurrence s'établisse dans le secteur, les pouvoirs publics doivent effectuer un important travail de « market design » et de régulation ex ante. Il faut a minima que la tarification de l'infrastructure soit modifiée, que les capacités attribuées aux nouveaux entrants soient cohérentes afin qu'ils puissent optimiser leur matériel roulant et que l'acquisition et la revente du matériel roulant grande vitesse soient facilitées.

Finnish state monopolies have been in a state of change during the mid-2010s. This paper focuses on the developments of the alcohol retail, railroad and gambling sectors during this period by analysing media texts (N=143) from 2014 to 2017 and with the concepts of Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). Results show how the convergence of politics, policies and problematizations opened policy windows for government initiatives to liberalize alcohol retail and railroad traffic markets while consolidating the gambling monopoly. The differing outcomes are surprising given that they all took place under the same liberal right-wing government, as well as under obligations to dismantle monopolies in the European Union and in accordance with international commerce treaties. The explanation unfolds by looking at the stakeholders and their justifications. Differing outcomes also reflect the varying trajectories through which the policy processes proceeded, although they seem to conclude with consensus and at least a semblance of agreement between the different parties when a decision is reached. The study gives insight into how state monopolies are negotiated in contemporary Europe. ; Peer reviewed

Telematics of the number: Ten years ago, the SRU law opened an ambivalent reform of the rail passenger transport system in France. It preserves the operating monopoly of the incumbent operator, but entrusts the regions with the responsibility of organising authority. Economic theory suggests that the monopoly leads to a revenue capture. Using the surplus accounts method, which we use on the SNCF-TER billing account, we show that, at this initial stage, RFF is the main beneficiary of the total surplus available, far from the passengers who tend to benefit from rail regionalisation. The effect on public authorities is more ambiguous. Although the regions were able to control the price boundary of the operating subsidy, excluding tolls, they had to give up significant advantages in connection with the modernisation of rolling stock. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "RER economic model" governed by a specific governance mode. ; International audience Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "TER economic model" ruled by a specific mode of governance. ; Telematics of the number: Ten years ago, ...

In 1988, Sweden made a vertical cut in its nationalised railway monopoly; since then, infrastructure is handled by a public-sector agency while trains were initially run by a government-owned monopolist. This paper seeks to describe this reorganisation, the subsequent process towards free entry and competition in parts of the sector and the consequences of these changes. It is argued that the policies have not focussed on (ticket) prices and competition issues and have rather been directed towards the sector's inability to recover costs, which seems to be a Europe-wide phenomenon. Some recommendations for further changes of the industry are suggested.

AbstractWe provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between market size and vertical structure in the railway industry. The framework is based on a simple downstream monopoly model with two input suppliers: the labour force and the rail infrastructure firm. The operation of the downstream firm (i.e. the train operating firm) imposes costs on the rail infrastructure firm. We show that the downstream firm with a larger market size is more likely to integrate with the rail infrastructure firm. This is consistent with the phenomenon in the railway industry.

Proceedings on CD-ROM. ; International audience ; Inherited from the mid-20th century, the European organization of national railways in state-owned, integrated and few regulated monopolies is not relevant anymore. Although this has been an interesting answer to the problems of externalities, investments and regulation, changes have occurred in technology, demand and economical analysis. In particular, economists have proposed many regulation schemes, which lead the regulators to increase the efficiency of the firms operating on the market. Because of the high costs of rail transportation, governments decide to liberalize the market; in particular, the European Commission and the European Parliament wish the passenger rail market opening. However, some countries, like France, still have not opened their passenger rail market, which is currently monopolized by the historic and national operator, the SNCF. In this paper, we assume that for social, political and economical (economies of density, network externalities) reasons, the regional passenger traffic will remain operated by the SNCF, in the coming years. However, we propose a regulation framework, based on yardstick competition (comparisons of performances), which could encourage the SNCF to improve the efficiency of its regional trains. Yardstick competition consists in estimating what should be the best prices and subsidies, by comparing the performance of several similar and regulated firms, operating on several monopoly markets. If an operator seems to be relatively efficient according to comparisons, it has to be rewarded. On the other hand, an inefficient operator has to be punished, so that the comparison mechanism promotes competition. The paper aims at analysing the introduction of yardstick competition on the French market of regional rail transport operation. We show that the implementation of yardstick competition permits the local regulators to preserve the monopoly of the SNCF and to develop a virtual competition between its local activities. This leads to improve the efficiency of the regional operators and to increase the expertise of the rail regulators. In the first part of the paper, we discuss the implementation of yardstick competition on the French market of regional rail transport operation. First we describe what is called yardstick competition and how it could be implemented on this market. Then, we show that paradoxically to the preservation of the SNCF monopoly, the new market structure of the regional passenger rail transport (regionalized in 2002) is suitable for such an implementation of yardstick competition. In the second part, we examine some theoretical, economical models. On the one hand, we explain why the use of comparisons benefits to the rail regulators (reduction of its capture by the operator, reduction of uncertainty.). On the other hand, we review and discuss some limits of the mechanism (external heterogeneity of the compared operators, investment incentives, and collusion.). In the third part, we present the results of an econometric treatment, estimating the efficiency scores of the regional operators. First, we describe the cost-data base used, before resolving the question of external heterogeneity between the operators. It appears that the only explanatory variable of the external inefficiency is the delinquency rate: in some regions, the operator has to employ more ticket inspectors due to the delinquency. Then we explain the followed methodology and discuss the outcomes of the model. Operators' efficiency scores vary from 0.8 (for the worst) to 1 (for the best). Those internal inefficiencies may be due to sub-optimal spatial organization or employee rotations, the operation of rural trains with two agents although one is sufficient, informational rent or local strikes. Hence, we conclude that yardstick competition could be an original and efficient way of introducing "intramodal" competition in the regional passenger rail market.