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The article argues that the state plays, and has always played, a key role in the internationalization of firms and that theoretical explanations of MNE should take that role into account. The first part of the paper deals with the place of the state in the theories of multinational firms ; most theories can be classified into three currents : those arguing the decline of the Nation-State as a consequence of the growth of MNE, those seeing the territorial expansion of the state as a natural consequence of multinationalism and those arguing the direct but weak thrust of the State in favour of MNE. The second section of the paper analyses the main types of government intervention pushing national firms into foreign operations. The third section studies the most evident case of government intervention on multinationalisation : the case of multinational state enterprises. The article concludes that the state should be included - an increasingly so - as a major purveyor of advantages to national firms seeking to initiate or pursue foreign activities.

Depending on one's point of view, multinational enterprises are either the heroes or the villains of the globalized economy. Governments compete fiercely for foreign direct investment by such companies, but complain when firms go global and move their activities elsewhere. Multinationals are seen by some as threats to national identities and wealth and are accused of riding roughshod over national laws and of exploiting cheap labor. However, the debate on these companies and foreign direct investment is rarely grounded on sound economic arguments. This book brings clarity to the debate. With the contribution of other leading experts, Giorgio Barba Navaretti and Anthony Venables assess the determinants of multinationals' actions, investigating why their activity has expanded so rapidly, and why some countries have seen more such activity than others. They analyze their effects on countries that are recipients of inward investments, and on those countries that see multinational firms moving jobs abroad. The arguments are made using modern advances in economic analysis, a case study, and by drawing on the extensive empirical literature that assesses the determinants and consequences of activity by multinationals. The treatment is rigorous, yet accessible to all readers with a background in economics, whether students or professionals. Drawing out policy implications, the authors conclude that multinational enterprises are generally a force for the promotion of prosperity in the world economy

Wie in vergangenen Rezessionen verursachte auch die Wirtschaftskrise 2008-2009 Spannungen im internationalen Handelssystem. Allerdings spielen diesmal Importzölle, das klassische Instrument, um eigene Industries vor ausländischer Konkurrenz zu schützen, keine bedeutende Rolle, vor allem nicht in den Industriestaaten. Die WTO-Bestimmungen haben sich diesbezüglich als effizienter Schutz gegen ein Abgleiten in eine protektionistische Handelspolitik erwiesen. In anderen Politikbereichen hingegen, etwa bei Beihilfen und WTO-Schutzmaßnahmen, fällt die Bilanz gemischt aus. Obwohl von keinem ausufernden Subventionswettlauf die Rede sein kann, sind massive staatliche Interventionen in der Automobilindustrie zu verzeichnen. Diese kamen vorwiegend führenden multinationalen Unternehmen zugute, die ihre internationale Präsenz und Mobilität dazu nutzen, bei verschiedenen nationalen Regierungen öffentliche Unterstützungen für sich herauszuschlagen. Weder nationalen Regierungen noch der WTO ist es gelungen, kostspielige Subventionen zu verhindern. Tatsächlich dürften sich Regierungen in einem internationalen Subventionswettbewerb befinden, der von globalen Autoproduzenten initiiert wurde. Dies führte auch dazu, dass sich die Automobilindustrie über die existierenden internationalen Beihilfebestimmungen hinwegsetzen konnte. Dies stellt keinen klassischen Protektionismus zugunsten nationaler Unternehmen dar, sondern eine neue Abwandlung bei der international agierende Firmen lokale Unterstützung für ihre globalen Operationen suchen und dabei Regierungen gegeneinander ausspielen und in einen Subventionswettlauf verstricken. ; Like all crises in the past, the economic downturn of 2008-2009 caused some frictions in the international trading system. Import tariffs, the traditional instrument for protecting domestic industries, however, have not played the primary role in this, particularly not in industrialised countries. The WTO rules have proved to be an efficient shield against a wholesale descent into protectionism in this respect. However, in other policy areas, such as state aid and WTO contingency measures the results are more mixed. While an all-out subsidy war has not broken out, heavy intervention has taken place in the automotive industry. This was much to the benefit of leading multinationals, who have used their international presence and mobility to extract various kinds of public support from governments. Neither governments nor WTO rules have managed to avoid costly subsidies. Indeed governments have found themselves caught in an international subsidy competition inflicted on them by global car manufacturers. This has allowed the car industry to take itself out of the existing international disciplines on subsides. While this is not classical protectionism offered to strictly national industries, we may see a new mutation emerging, wherein multinationals more effectively play governments against each other to lobby for local assistance for what are actually global operations.

Although many countries welcome inward investments by multinational firms (MNEs), it is often perceived that MNEs readily close down production in bad times. We study the choice of an MNE in deciding whether to establish a branch plant within a region, explicitly taking into account exit, as well as entry, costs. Protecting workers by having strict lay-off rules deters potential investment while subsidies attract it. We examine the policy trade-off for a host government and investigate how uncertainty affects the attractiveness of investment in a particular location. Just how much does the ease of exit influence the entry decision?