Government Price-Fixing. Jules Backman
In: Journal of political economy, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 633-634
ISSN: 1537-534X
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 633-634
ISSN: 1537-534X
SSRN
Working paper
In: 17 The Journal of Law and Economics 1974
SSRN
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 481-509
ISSN: 1930-7969
Many cartels do not directly fix the price of products. Instead, the participants may agree on a starting price for negotiations or the price of a component of the overall price. Antitrust investigations reveal that cartel agreements are also often very imperfectly implemented. Antitrust law in the United States and the European Union has typically taken a robust approach to these practices even where economic analysis might be unable to show that such practices always or almost always harm consumer welfare. The decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Lodge Real Estate Ltd. v. Commerce Commission offers a New Zealand perspective on the concept of a price-fixing agreement and imperfect collusion. The Court, this article argues, reached the correct decision in Lodge. The decision, however, evidences a pragmatic judgment, rather than the confident deployment of economic learning or foreign case law within the statutory framework of the Commerce Act 1986. The language of sections 30 and 30A of the Act was borrowed from an Australian statute, which in turn had attempted to capture the state of United States price-fixing law in the 1970s. A more formalistic and pre-Chicago approach to antitrust is evident in the language, much of which was inspired by United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. The case also highlights some of the distinctive features of the competition law in New Zealand. The reluctance to develop to guide in the application of the general provisions of the Commerce Act and requiring a demonstration of an effect on price on the facts may mark a departure from the body of pricing case law in the United States and the European Union and risks undermining the per se prohibition of cartel conduct in the Commerce Act. Without the same depth and breadth of cartel case law, the adoption of a more flexible approach to anticompetitive agreements evident in some decisions in the United States and the European Union could have different effects in a smaller jurisdiction.
In: National municipal review, Band 22, S. 588-592
ISSN: 0190-3799
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, S. 113-124
ISSN: 0002-7162
In: Antitrust law & economics review, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 91-109
ISSN: 0003-6048
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, S. 120-129
ISSN: 0002-7162
In: Economics of planning: an international journal devoted to the study of comparative economics, planning and development, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 97-124
ISSN: 1573-0808
In: The Economic Journal, Band 66, Heft 264, S. 587
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 195, Heft 1, S. 46-52
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 173, Heft 1, S. 113-124
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: National municipal review, Band 22, Heft 12, S. 588-592
In: Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 301