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A recent Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida decision has raised concerns over how both federal and state courts consider the unregulated cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. In State of Florida v. Michell Abner Espinoza, Judge Teresa Pooler held that Bitcoin did not fall under the statutory definitions of "payment instrument" or "monetary instrument" because virtual currency is not directly specified nor could it be included within one of the defined categories listed in Fla. Stat. § 560.103(29) or 896.101(2). Furthermore, Judge Pooler, alluding to the doctrine of lenity, refused to hold Espinoza responsible under a statute that is "so vaguely written that even legal professionals have difficulty finding a singular meaning." Judge Pooler thus disagreed with earlier decisions by several federal judges. The federal courts have uniformly held that Bitcoin is "money" or "funds" for the purpose of money laundering. Additionally, the federal courts, analyzing the applicable federal money laundering statutes, have refused to apply the doctrine of lenity because there were no ambiguities such that "an ordinary person would [not] know that engaging in the challenged conduct could give rise to the type of criminal liability charged." State and federal courts can interpret similar state and federal statutes in differing ways based on each statute's respective canon of construction and legislative intent. However, because the Florida Money Laundering Act (Fla. Stat. § 896.101) is modeled on the federal Money Laundering Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 1956), it is reasonable to assume that the courts would reach the same conclusion. Part I of this comment describes Bitcoin, discussing the cryptocurrency's origins as well as how it works. Part II analyzes both the state and federal anti–money laundering statutes in light of Florida v. Espinoza and the opinions of the federal courts. Part III discusses the state and federal business services statutes in light of Florida v. Espinoza and federal court decisions, including U.S. v. Ulbricht, which held Bitcoin to be within the plain meaning of "money" and "funds" under the applicable federal money laundering statute. Finally, Part IV of this paper addresses the public policy implications of how Bitcoin is interpreted under criminal statutes pertaining to money laundering. A brief synopsis will provide information on how other countries and states have considered Bitcoin and the steps that the U.S. Congress has begun to take to address Bitcoin in criminal prosecutions.

Problem: This study sought to analyze the influence patterns among federal court decisions, state appellate court decisions, and state statutes pertaining to the desegregation of public schools in North Carolina. Sources of Data: The search for cases and statutes pertinent to this study required the use of the National Reporter System, American Digest System, American Law Reports, North Carolina Reports, American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris Secundum, North Carolina General Statutes, and other legal bibliographical aids. Procedure: Each case was briefed, including the case citation, the date, the judge or judges, the situation, the decision, and the court opinion relative to the points of law. The cases were then arranged chronologically and the trends in the court decisions were identified. An attempt was made to compare the development of North Carolina law to trends which were detected in the Supreme Court's decisions in order to identify influence patterns among federal and state courts and state statutes. Major Findings: A trend in the United States Supreme Court's decisions from 1954 through 1973 was that the Court continually strengthened requirements for desegregating public school systems. In 1974, the Court broke this pattern when it ruled that an interdistrict remedy was not justifiable unless there was an interdistrict constitutional violation. During the different periods of this study, the trend in the Supreme Court's decisions was reflected in the lower courts and in the North Carolina Legislature in various ways. Conclusions: Based on the facts as presented in this study, the following were drawn: 1. In an effort to circumvent the 1954 Brown decision the North Carolina Legislature enacted the Pupil Assignment Act. 2. The State Supreme Court, the federal district courts in North Carolina, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to rule for plaintiffs in desegregation cases who had not exhausted the administrative remedies provided under the state statute. 3. The Supreme Court's reluctance to issue specific guidelines for desegregating school systems indirectly influenced the lower courts to be more lenient in their desegregation orders. 4. In 1961 and 1962, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the district courts in North Carolina in cases where the Negro plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies. 5. The Supreme Court's impatience with delays in desegregating public schools influenced the lower courts to scrutinize desegregation plans more closely during the period from 1964 through 1967. 6. The Supreme Court's 1965 decisions, pertaining to faculty desegregation, influenced the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to begin to consider faculty desegregation. The Court of Appeals consistently reversed the district courts' decisions in cases where the lower courts continued to refuse to grant relief to Negro plaintiffs who complained of racially based faculty allocations and assignments. 7. The decisions of the Supreme Court, which required the elimination of segregated school systems at once, were, almost immediately, reflected in the decisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the federal district courts in North Carolina during the period from 1968 through 1971. 8. During the period from 1969 through 1972, an influence pattern developed in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the district courts in North Carolina and then the Supreme Court would uphold the district courts' rulings, thus, reversing the decisions of the Court of Appeals. 9. The Supreme Court's interpretation of its 1971 holding, in Swann, as placing limitations on the power of the district courts in fashioning remedies in school desegregation cases, influenced its decisions during the period from 1973 through 1974. 10. Very little influence and no influence pattern developed between federal and state courts from 1954 through 1974. ; Doctor of Philosophy

Influence of the Supreme Court in shifting decisions to the states. Includes discussion of two cases decided by the New York State Court of Appeals in 1984, which have the potential for significantly expanding the rights of the mentally disabled.

The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) established the right to assistance of counsel for all indigent defendants. However, it did not guarantee a right to effective assistance of counsel. An attorney must be more than a warm body standing next to a defendant. Strickland v. Washington (1984) established that not only do defendants have a right to assistance of counsel, but they must also have effective assistance. The Strickland decision established a two-part requirement in order for a defendant or petitioner to show ineffective assistance. After Strickland, the federal government continued to make decisions based off of these requirements, sometimes expanding and sometimes contracting the requirements, however, never steering too far from the Strickland test. States such as Wyoming and Colorado have continued to uphold the Strickland test. Though, states like New York and Hawaii viewed the requirement as too high, in turn these states lowered the bar for the ineffective assistance of counsel requirement. Few states have changed from Strickland indicating that the standards are fair, but the states that have changed, take a hard stance that the 6th Amendment's right to counsel has not been vindicated because the standards to show ineffective assistance are too high, resulting in only extreme cases finding ineffective assistance of counsel.

The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) established the right to assistance of counsel for all indigent defendants. However, it did not guarantee a right to effective assistance of counsel. An attorney must be more than a warm body standing next to a defendant. Strickland v. Washington (1984) established that not only do defendants have a right to assistance of counsel, but they must also have effective assistance. The Strickland decision established a two-part requirement in order for a defendant or petitioner to show ineffective assistance. After Strickland, the federal government continued to make decisions based off of these requirements, sometimes expanding and sometimes contracting the requirements, however, never steering too far from the Strickland test. States such as Wyoming and Colorado have continued to uphold the Strickland test. Though, states like New York and Hawaii viewed the requirement as too high, in turn these states lowered the bar for the ineffective assistance of counsel requirement. Few states have changed from Strickland indicating that the standards are fair, but the states that have changed, take a hard stance that the 6th Amendment's right to counsel has not been vindicated because the standards to show ineffective assistance are too high, resulting in only extreme cases finding ineffective assistance of counsel.

From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, federal courts greatly expanded the rights of persons institutionalized for treatment of mental illness. The rights have included due process in commitment proceedings, provision of services, & treatment in the least restrictive environment. These decisions have been based on federal statutes & constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, & protection from harm. Since 1982, however, the US Supreme Court has effectively closed the federal courts as a forum for advancing the rights of the mentally disabled, & federal courts must, in essence, defer to the states for decisions about treatment of the mentally disabled. Consequently, advocates for the mentally disabled are turning to state courts to advance client rights. Two significant cases, Klosterman v. Cuomo & Bezio v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities , decided by the NY State Court of Appeals in 1984, are discussed as having the potential for significantly expanding the rights of the mentally disabled. Modified HA

The present study is an analysis of the constitutional rights and responsibilities of community college students and academic personnel as determined by federal and state court decisions. The first chapter is a brief overview of the development of the community college. It demonstrates that the dubious position of the community college in higher education contributed to slow acceptance by many of the constitutional rights of students and academic personnel on community college campuses. Chapter two covers the First Amendment rights of academic personnel: academic freedom, loyalty oaths, political activity, classroom activities. It explains that the United States Supreme Court cases of Keyishian, Pickering and Epperson are clear indications that state-employed teachers have complete freedom under the First Amendment to express their views, as long as this expression does not substantially disrupt the activities of the state or its agencies. Epperson guarantees scholarly choices under academic freedom. Chapter three discusses tenure and the need for due process in tenure decisions. The landmark United States Supreme Court cases reviewed here are Rowe and Sinderm. Although state-employed teachers have no right to a tenure system, they do have a right to due process in any tenure decision, if either an implicit or explicit tenure system exists. Teachers may also exercise their constitutional rights without fear of employment-related retribution. Chapter four is an analysis of the constitutional rights of students under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judiciary overwhelmingly rejects "in loco parentis'' at the college level and views the student-college relationship as one based on constitutional principles. Tinker established that students retain their rights when they cross the school threshold. Papish showed that college student newspapers have complete freedom of expression, although college authorities may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner of distribution. Fourth Amendment rights on the college campus are difficult to ascertain since no definitive Supreme Court ruling on search and seizure on a college campus has been handed down. Due process in school disciplinary proceedings is a firmly established prj_nciple in the United States today. The 1975 decisions in Wood and Goss clearly show this. Race has been accepted as a suspect category under the Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection-- sex and appearance have not. Disparate treatment based on sex seems more likely to be declared unconstitutional than such treatment based on appearance. In chapter five the summary shows that academic personnel and students of community colleges are now accorded the same constitutional rights as their respective colleagues at four-year institutions, although community college administrators were slower to recognize many of those rights than were administrators of four-year institutions. It is recommended that community college administrators review all existing rules and procedures in light of the constitutional rights accorded citizens by the Federal Constitution. ; ED. D.