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The "crowding out" effect of debt‐financed government spending on the private sector consumption‐saving decision and on private investment behavior has been a controversial subject for several years. Do increases in debt‐financed government spending stimulate private consumption and saving in the short run, as well as private consumption in subsequent periods? Or does the realization that future taxes must be raised to finance repayment of the debt result in a lack of stimulus for consumption as well as no detrimental impact on subsequent private saving? This article empirically tests for the presence and/or magnitude of tax discounting and crowding out, carefully distinguishing between the two, and decomposes government debt instruments according to their maturities in order to determine impact due to a reorientation of debt structure. The results do not support the existence of tax discounting, suggesting instead that government deficits do stimulate current consumption.

The acceleration of authoritarianism in Venezuela since 2004, together with Hugo Chávez's reelection in 2006, cannot be explained easily with functional theories. Instead, we focus on political opportunities: specifically, economic resources at the state's disposal together with weakened institutions of representation helped crowd out the opposition. We show how clientelism and electoral authoritarianism feed each other. Together with deliberate strategies of polarization, impunity, and job discrimination, lavish spending has allowed the state to mobilize majorities and emerge undefeatable at the polls. This invincibility is, paradoxically, the reason that the Venezuelan state has become an unreliable force for promoting democracy.

This paper investigates the effects of budget deficits within a classical-Harrodian framework in a closed economy. In this framework, growth and cycles are endogenous, underutilized capacity is a recurrent phenomenon, capacity utilization fluctuates around the normal level in the long run, and unemployment is persistent. Give the normal rate of profit, the key determinant of growth is the social savings rate. Along the warranted path when growth is balanced and is financed via retained earnings and equity, the social savings rate can be shown to be equal to the flow of business and household savings less the money and government bond holdings of the aggregate private sector--that is, it equals the flow of investable surplus available to firms to finance investment. An increase in the budget deficit always raises short-run output growth, although the stimulus is slowed down by the accumulation of debt by firms. However, with a fixed private savings rate, an increase in the deficit lowers the warranted path. If raising the warranted path is desired, appropriate policies that would raise the social saaving rate would have to be implemented. As in Harrod, whether crowding out is harmful depends on the rate of warranted growth relative to the natural growth rate.

Contrary to earlier assertions, the historical data for Britain do confirm a (lagged) crowding-out effect during the Industrial Revolution. Heavy government borrowing after 1793 for the wars with France raised interest rates. These results are confirmed with nominal-interest-rate equations rather than with real-rate equations, which impose restrictive assumptions about the adjustment of nominal rates to inflation expectations. We see no reason to abandon the neoclassical, factor- allocation model of saving and investment in favor of a theory asserting that firms accumulate capital for investment independently of household saving decisions.