Suchergebnisse

A firm's deferred tax position can affect its incentives to lobby for or against tax reform, as well as how the firm is affected by a transition from one tax regime to another. We compile disaggregated deferred tax position data for a sample of large U.S. firms between 1993 and 2004 to analyze the incentives created by these positions and to explore how these positions might affect firm behavior before and after a pre-announced tax rate change. We find substantial heterogeneity in the size and sign of deferred tax positions. While half of our sample firms report a deferred tax position of less than three percent of assets, approximately ten percent report a position in excess of ten percent of assets. Although one might expect firms to defer the reporting of income when there is a pre-announced reduction in the corporate tax rate, we find that approximately one third of the firms in our sample would have an incentive to accelerate income in such a setting because doing so would maximize the value of their net operating loss carryforwards. We estimate that if the federal statutory corporate tax rate had been reduced from 35 to 30 percent in 2004, the resulting revaluation of deferred tax assets would have increased net income in that year by an average of 16.5 percent for firms with a net deferred tax liability, while reducing net income by an average of 11.4 percent for those firms with a net deferred tax asset. Our results suggest that the heterogeneous deferred tax positions of large U.S. corporations create substantial variation in the short-run effect of changes in corporate tax rates on reported earnings. Recognizing these divergent incentives is important for understanding the political economy of corporate tax reform. ; Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation ; National Science Foundation (U.S.) ; American Tax Policy Institute

TOP CORPORATE MANAGEMENT RESPONDS TO WHAT IS SOCIALLY DESIRABLE WHEN THE COSTS AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS PROVIDE THE INCENTIVE TO DO SO. EVEN WHEN CHANGING DIRECTIONS TO MATCH WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE SOCIALLY DESIRABLE WOULD PRODUCE LONG-TERM PROFIT MAXIMIZATION, SOME FIRMS MAY STAY WITH WHAT IS SOCIALLY UNDESIRABLE FOR WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS A GREATER SHORT-TERM PROFIT MAXIMIZATION.

Top corporate management responds to what is socially desirable when the costs and economic benefits provide the incentive to do so. Even when changing directions to match what is thought to be socially desirable would produce long‐term profit maximization, some firms may stay with what is socially undesirable for what is perceived as a greater short‐term profit maximization. Halpern suggests that such short‐term profit decisions made by General Motors with the Corvair, and by Ford with the Pinto, backfired. A key problem is seen as the time lag between corporate misdeeds and the final judgment of courts or the government.

"Barely a week goes by without a new privacy revelation or scandal. Whether by hackers or spy agencies or social networks, violations of our personal information have shaken entire industries, corroded relations among nations, and bred distrust between democratic governments and their citizens. Polls reflect this concern, and show majorities for more, broader, and stricter regulation -- to put more laws "on the books." But there was scant evidence of how well tighter regulation actually worked "on the ground" in changing corporate (or government) behavior -- until now. This intensive five-nation study goes inside corporations to examine how the people charged with protecting privacy actually do their work, and what kinds of regulation effectively shape their behavior. And the research yields a surprising result. The countries with more ambiguous regulation -- Germany and the United States -- had the strongest corporate privacy management practices, despite very different cultural and legal environments. The more rule-bound countries -- like France and Spain -- trended instead toward compliance processes, not embedded privacy practices. At a crucial time, when Big Data and the Internet of Things are snowballing, Privacy on the Ground helpfully searches out the best practices by corporations, provides guidance to policymakers, and offers important lessons for everyone concerned with privacy, now and in the future."

Argues that the underlying nationality of a firm remains the determinant of corporate structures and strategies. Compares internal governance, long-term financing structures, approaches to research and development, overseas investment, and intrafirm trading strategies.