Suchergebnisse

In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military's likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to "win hearts and minds." These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state's readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not. (International Interactions (London)/FUB)

In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.

"War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation. Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers"--Provided by publisher

Cyberwarfare has become a fashionable topic in the last decade, partly because of the ever increasing sophistication of computer attacks, partly because of malicious actors setting their sight on industrial systems such as plants. Modern production systems are characterized by an IT-infrastructure controlling effects in the physical world. Such systems are called cyber-physical systems. In this paper the authors draw a distinction between information cyberattacks and cyber-physical attacks. Thereafter we provide insights into the specifics of cyber-physical attacks and examine to which extent they are similar to conventional warfare.