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PurposeA growing amount of micro-data analyses has highlighted the importance of information trails, such as generated by card transactions, for improving tax compliance. Yet, time series evidence indicating a positive effect of card payments on VAT revenue performance has been scarce. This paper revisits the question of the effect of card payments on VAT revenue by using annual and quarterly panel data for the 19 euro area member states, covering the period 2000–2016.Design/methodology/approachA panel VECM is employed in order to address endogeneity issues and to account for common stochastic trends, which, is shown to be crucial in revealing the anticipated positive effect of card use on the performance of VAT.FindingsThe analysis confirms that a higher share of card payments in private consumption increases VAT revenue and the efficiency of revenue collection. Higher gains are estimated for countries with above average self-employment.Originality/valueThe contribution of the paper is twofold. First, to our knowledge it provides the first confirmation of the well-established literature on information trails using aggregate macroeconomic time series in a multi-country setting. Second, it has very timely policy implications, as low-hanging fruit are identified in euro-area economies with much to gain from strengthening the credibility of their fiscal performance, such as Greece.

Retail payment methods are in a stage of rapid development.New service providers and technological developments enable new payment services through a variety of channels.Payment solutions are being developed based eg on the Internet and on mobile phones. Presumably, the use of paper-based payment instruments will decrease further in the future thanks to electronification in the retail payment area. In this paper we focus on card payments in Finland and certain other countries.We also look at Internet- and mobile-based payments and discuss some of the challenges related to the new solutions.The paper ends with a brief discussion of recent changes in Finnish legislation in connection with retail payments.

Cash transaction is still dominant in Vietnam market. Even the advances of information technology have allowed banks and financial institutions introducing new and more efficient products and services but the rate of non cash transaction is modest. Vietnamese are still preferred cash payment. Basing survey data of consumer's perception toward card payment in HCM city, the aims of this study would shed some light on how individuals choosing payment by card and explain why cash transactions still remain strongly. This paper identified the factors which are affecting the card payment and examining how these factors impact to consumer's decision. The primary data was collected from 184 respondents through structured questionnaires. The factor and logit regression analyses were used to investigate the factors impacting to card payment's choice among consumer in HCM, Vietnam. The results indicated that factors strongly influence to consumer's decision to choose card to pay are age, cost, security and ease of use. The findings suggest that the number of card payment transactions would be improved by banks and government's efforts in order to provide necessary guidance, safety's assurance, appropriate regulation to educate and strengthening trust of consumer.

The payment card industry in the United States has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 reflects a high-water mark of congressional influence for the industry, altering bankruptcy procedures largely for the benefit of card issuers. Since that point, Congress has turned repeatedly to rein in perceived abuses in the industry. The most substantial and direct response to the perception of abuse is the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009. That statute was focused directly on the card industry and outlawed a wide variety of industry practices. More recently, in § 1075 (the "Durbin Amendment") of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress cut permissible interchange fees for debit card transactions to amounts that approximate the costs of processing those transactions; the Federal Reserve's implementing regulation apparently will lead to a more than 50 percent decline in those fees. So why is it at all noteworthy that Congress, in the course of reining in an industry targeted for excessive behavior, should require substantial changes in the industry's operations? My hypothesis is a simple one. Both provisions make it more challenging to operate profitably in the payment card market. Because both provisions will pose greater challenges for smaller firms than they do for larger firms, both statutes will make it harder for smaller banks to compete in the payment card market. It may not be easy to evaluate the consequences of greater concentration in the industry. But it is clear that industry concentration is not what drove Congress to action: whatever else Congress was trying to do, it certainly was not trying to drive small banks from the payment card market.