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This book considers the discourses that come into play in organizational change. The book outlines the tensions that arise for people having to enact change, and analyzes the ways in which they position themselves in changing organizational environments. The book takes a social semiotic perspective on discourse, organization and change. Here, discourse encompasses not only the multi-modal resources that people mobilize in organizational (inter)action, but also the practices and transformative dynamics afforded by those resources. The organizational changes highlighted in the book revolve around three dimensions of work that are increasingly coming to the fore: participation, boundary-spanning and knowledging. These dimensions are explored through case studies, including a health planning project, an initiative to standardize work practices, and the tension between paper-based and IT-based reporting. The book addresses the relevance of this discourse perspective to organizational research more broadly, by investigating organization as a dynamic of 'resemiotizations'. Cover illustration by John Reid

RECENTLY, SCHOLARS HAVE FOCUSED ON POLICY DESIGN FLAWS AS THE CAUSE OF POLICY FAILURE RATHER THAN ON THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRATS TO FOLLOW THE DICTATES OF ELECTED OFFICIALS. THE POLICY DESIGN LITERATURE SUGGEST THAT POLICY COHERENCE AND CONTEXT, THE NATURE OF TARGET POPULATIONS, AND THE TRACTABILITY OF THE POLICY PROBLEM PREDICT A POLICY'S SUCCESSFUL ENFORCEMENT. ALTERNATE HYPOTHESES ARGUE THAT THE LOCAL-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION ENVIRONMENT AND THE RESOURCES THAT THE GOVERNMENT COMMITS TO IMPLEMENTATION HAVE AN IMPACT ON ENFORCEMENT LEVELS. TO TEST THESE HYPOTHESES, COULD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT IS MODELED IN A POOLED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS. THE AUTHORS FIND THAT POLICY MAKERS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLICY PROBLEM AND THE LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE INFLUENCE WHETHER STATUTES ARE SUCCESSFUL. IN ADDITION ENFORCEMENT IS A FUNCTION OF COMMITTED RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENTATION; BUREAUCRATIC VALUES; AND LOCAL VARIATION IN THE NEED FOR SERVICES, IN FISCAL INCENTIVES, IN CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS, AN DIN PARTY COMPETITION. THE FINDINGS REVEAL SOME OF THE FLAWS IN THE POLICY DESIGN THEORIES THAT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES IN EMPIRICAL TESTS.

How the coherence and design of legislation affects achievement of its goals; also discusses effects of local program administration; case study of state-level implementation of federal child support legislation; 1983-91; US. With separate analyses of public assistance recipients and non-poverty populations.

AbstractThis article develops a framework for understanding how the design of administrative judicial review can circumscribe the discretion of different bureaucratic actors. The framework proposes that bureaucratic discretion is limited to a great extent if courts can (i) overturn bureaucratic decisions on substantive grounds, (ii) review decisions associated with high economic costs, and (iii) issue detailed instructions for how rulings are to be implemented. Applying the framework to the Swedish case, we first show that the legislative design of the judicial review process allows administrative courts to greatly limit the discretion of senior officials and street‐level bureaucrats. Second, we show that Swedish courts defer to the expertise of bureaucratic actors in the welfare sector by sparingly overturning decisions. However, when courts actually overturn decisions, they frequently limit bureaucratic discretion by issuing detailed judgments in high‐cost cases, possibly undermining the conditions for good governance.

Uses Terry Moe's (1989) argument -- that effective public policies require presidentially created & run bureaucracies because only presidents have the incentives to consider broader public interests -- to examine the historical performance of the US federal drug law enforcement agencies, agencies that met Moe's criteria for president-dominated bureaucracy. Rather than effective public policy, revealed is an agency with little policy expertise, the absence of effective bureaucratic leadership, & public policy activities that have little or no impact on drug usage. This case study suggests that linkage between bureaucratic design & policy effectiveness is far more complex than Moe portrays. 46 References. Adapted from the source document.

Before entering the reform era, bureaucratic governance in Indonesia was characterized by the practice of collusion and nepotism in which the bureaucracy could not carry out its duties and obligations professionally and they could not achieve their careers fairly and sustainably. Therefore, the aim of bureaucratic reform is to realize fair bureaucratic governance in which bureaucratic apparatus can carry out their duties and obligations professionally and the bureaucracy can reach career paths as a state apparatus fairly and professionally. So far, bureaucratic reform has not yet reached its objectives, where bureaucratic governance, especially in the context of the promotion of the position of state civil apparatus (ASN), is still colored by the practice of collusion and nepotism caused by high political intervention in ASN promotion. Regional autonomy and regional head elections are wrong which causes bureaucratic reform to not work effectively. The regional head who is the result of the regional election places ASN in the strategic position of regional apparatus according to their political interests, not based on the potential possessed by the ASN. For this reason, the design of bureaucratic reforms needs to be reorganized so that the gap of political intervention in bureaucratic governance can be minimized in order to realize a professional bureaucracy. Keywords: Bureaucracy, Bureaucratic Reform, Human Rights

Before entering the reform era, bureaucratic governance in Indonesia was characterized by the practice of collusion and nepotism in which the bureaucracy could not carry out its duties and obligations professionally and they could not achieve their careers fairly and sustainably. This research use desciptive qualitative approach. In terms of data collection used, namely library research in the form of journals, books, and the Internet Therefore, the aim of bureaucratic reform is to realize fair bureaucratic governance in which bureaucratic apparatus can carry out their duties and obligations professionally and the bureaucracy can reach career paths as a state apparatus fairly and professionally. So far, bureaucratic reform has not yet reached its objectives, where bureaucratic governance, especially in the context of promotion of the position of state civil apparatus (ASN), is still colored by the practice of collusion and nepotism caused by high political intervention in ASN promotion. Regional autonomy and regional head elections are wrong which causes bureaucratic reform to not work effectively. The regional head who is the result of the regional election places ASN in the strategic position of regional apparatus according to their political interests, not based on the potential possessed by the ASN. For this reason, the design of bureaucratic reforms needs to be reorganized so that the gap of political intervention in bureaucratic governance can be minimized in order to realize a professional bureaucracy. Keywords: Bureaucracy, Bureaucratic Reform, Human Rights

We propose a model where a regional government's choice of the number of bureaucratic agencies operating in a region depends upon the degree of substitutability and complementarity of the bureaucratic services being demanded. We show that, if the government perceives the citizens' demand as a demand for substitutable services, it will choose provision by two independent agencies. If the government perceives the citizens' demand as a demand for complementary services, it will choose provision by a single consolidated agency. Exogenous shocks to the number of citizens amplify these incentives. Evidence from the Italian National Health Service (NHS) supports this hypothesis. Results show a positive effect of proxies of substitutable services on the number of regional local health authorities and a negative efect of proxies of complementary services. The major immigration amnesties, taken as shocks to the number of citizens entitled to the service, magnify these effects.

Institutional scholars often presume that the selection of a particular structural design necessarily shapes resulting policy outputs & outcomes. This phenomenon is an inherently political choice, yet we know little about its consequences regarding bureaucratic performance in a democracy. In this study, we examine whether the quality of agency outputs varies in relation to its institutional design. We empirically investigate this issue by examining the quality of current-year macroeconomic & fiscal projections generated by both presidential (Council of Economic Advisers & Office of Management & Budget) & congressional (Congressional Budget Office) support agencies, as well as an independent regulatory commission (Federal Reserve). Our statistical results uncover trivial cross-agency differences regarding bias & accuracy contained in this type of policy information. While varying degrees of political insulation might affect the durability of administrative agencies ex post, our empirical evidence rejects the politics of structural design thesis for short-term oriented policy analysis. Specifically, bureaucratic task outputs are generally unaffected in an ex ante fashion by the extent to which an agency's institutional structure is insulated from political influence. Our empirical evidence suggests that these particular agencies' concern with reputational considerations are fairly homogeneous & thus outweigh the varying political pressures that they confront attributable to the institutional structure that they operate under. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 75 References. Adapted from the source document.

In many theories of electoral accountability, voters learn about an incumbent's quality by observing public goods outcomes. But empirical findings are mixed, suggesting that increasing the visibility of these outcomes only sometimes improves accountability. I reconcile these heterogeneous findings by highlighting bureaucrats' role in the production of public goods. In a simple model of electoral accountability involving a voter, a politician, and a bureaucrat, I show that accountability relationships yield distinct empirical implications at different levels of bureaucratic quality. To illustrate how this model rationalizes otherwise mixed or heterogeneous results, I develop a new research design—a theoretically structured meta-study—to synthesize existing findings. Meta-study evidence on the accountability of Brazilian mayors suggests that a common model of electoral accountability that allows for variation in bureaucratic quality predicts observed heterogeneity in politician and voter behavior and beliefs across multiple studies with distinct samples, treatments, and outcomes.